1. On a consideration of the whole of the evidence, we make the following findings of fact.
2. The respondent is now aged 30. He was first registered as a pharmacist in 2015. After working elsewhere, he was employed on 21 June 2018 as a pharmacist in a pharmacy in metropolitan Adelaide (the pharmacy). He was a trusted employee. He was provided with a key to the pharmacy and a code to operate the security alarm. He had access to the money safe and the Drugs of Dependency Safe. He had access to the computer programmes utilised by the pharmacy. He was responsible for conducting the Drug of Dependency Audit which had to be completed at the end of each month.
3. The respondent resigned from the pharmacy on 8 September 2019 after some alleged performance issues had been raised with him. His misconduct came to light very soon thereafter.
4. From 24 July 2018 (just over a month after starting in his position), the respondent began a course of conduct in which he dishonestly obtained drugs of dependency from the pharmacy by creating false records of prescriptions in the pharmacy's drug dependency computer program. In the period from 24 July 2018 to 8 September 2019, he did so on about 39 different occasions. On these occasions, he entered into the computer program about 68 false prescriptions for the purpose of dishonestly obtaining drugs.
5. The respondent's modus operandi was as follows. He used the name of a person known to him as the "patient" and the name of that person's usual medical practitioner as the "prescriber". He misrepresented in the pharmacy records that prescriptions had been issued by the prescriber for the patient for drugs of dependence such as oxycodone, Endone®, Oxynorm®, Oxycontin®, Novacodone, MS Contin (morphine), and Durogesic® (fentanyl). These are Schedule 8 drugs. This information was then transferred to the Drugs of Dependency Book (a computer program) so that the respondent could take the drugs from the Drugs of Dependency Safe and the audit would still balance. He would then delete the entry from the patient file.
6. Evidence from the patient and the medical practitioner demonstrates that no such prescriptions had been issued, and the records entered by the respondent were false. These facts gave rise to the charge of dishonestly manipulating a machine for benefit (count 5 on the information).[9] It was alleged and admitted that the total value of the drugs obtained by the respondent in this way was $2,299.45.
7. During the period of his employment, the respondent also on many occasions manually altered the pharmacy stock list (Manual Stock Ethicals Report) to hide the fact that he had dishonestly taken pharmaceuticals for his own benefit. The taking of these pharmaceuticals gave rise to the second charge of theft (count 6 on the information).[10] It was alleged and admitted that the total value of the pharmaceuticals obtained in this way was $5,800.45.
8. As previously stated, the respondent resigned from his employment on 8 September 2018. He returned his key to the pharmacy on 11 September but had obviously had a copy of the key cut before returning it. On 19 September 2019, despite no longer being an employee, he used this key and his code to enter the pharmacy after hours for the purpose of dishonestly obtaining drugs. He had no authority to enter the pharmacy at this time. This was the first occasion of serious criminal trespass (count 1 on the information).[11] He moved about with the aid of the light on his mobile phone. He accessed the money safe and the Drugs of Dependency Safe. He accessed the computer programme and made false entries of the nature previously explained. On this occasion he falsely represented that prescriptions for fentanyl patches had been filled and the patches had been dispensed to a patient. Evidence from the patient confirms that she did not receive the patches. The respondent dishonestly obtained fentanyl patches from the Drugs of Dependency Safe under the cover of this false representation. The taking of the fentanyl patches gave rise to the first count of theft (count 2 on the information).[12] The value of the fentanyl patches was $94.37.
9. The respondent again entered the pharmacy after hours on 22 September 2019 for the purpose of dishonestly obtaining drugs. He also did so on 23 September 2019. These constituted the second and third charges for serious criminal trespass (counts 3 and 4 on the information).[13]
10. The charges in the information (to which the respondent pleaded guilty) suggest that the total value of pharmaceutical goods dishonestly obtained was $8,194.10. However, the learned Magistrate stated that the loss to the pharmacy was $5,894.65. He ordered payment of that amount as compensation.[14] This discrepancy in value is of no significance with respect to our categorisation of the conduct or the disciplinary sanctions that we consider appropriate.
11. A notification was made in September 2019 concerning the respondent's conduct. The respondent was advised of the notification and a proposal to take immediate action by letter dated 12 November 2019. The respondent was then legally represented and offered an undertaking to refrain from practice. Such an undertaking was signed on 14 November 2019 and accepted by the Board.
12. On 18 December 2019 the respondent was interviewed by police and declined to answer questions. He was arrested and charged with three counts of serious criminal trespass, 70 counts of dishonestly manipulating a machine and theft totalling $5,800.28.[15] Different charges were later substituted, but it is these original charges that are relied upon for the purposes of the second allegation against the respondent.
13. At the time of these charges, the respondent was still a registered pharmacist with an obligation to comply with the requirements of s 130 of the National Law. His registration had been due for renewal on 30 November 2019, and he did not apply for renewal. However, s 108(2) of the National Law has the effect that his registration continued in force for one month, namely until 31 December 2019. He was still registered on 18 December when the charges were laid.[16]
14. The charges were sufficiently serious to give rise to s 130 obligations. He was obliged to notify the Board of the charges within seven days. He failed to do so. This is not a criminal offence but may constitute conduct in respect of which disciplinary action may be taken.[17]
15. The respondent subsequently entered a plea of guilty and was convicted of the substituted charges on 5 May 2021. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 6 months and 9 days, suspended on him entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. He was ordered to pay compensation of $5,894.65 and a victims of crime levy.

1. The conduct for which the respondent was convicted in the Magistrates Court clearly constituted professional misconduct. It was conduct that fell substantially short of the required standard. It was conduct inconsistent with the respondent being a fit and proper person to hold registration.
2. The respondent was sentenced in the Magistrates Court on the basis that he had developed an addiction to drugs of dependence and committed the offences to obtain drugs for his own use. Even if this was accepted as an explanation for the conduct, it does not change the proper categorisation of the conduct.[18] It was professional misconduct of a most serious kind.
3. We accept the submission of the Board that the failure to comply with the obligations under s 130 of the National Law can be categorised as unprofessional conduct.
4. It is appropriate to consider the two allegations against the respondent together. Taken overall, the respondent's conduct amounts to professional misconduct.

1. It is clear from the Remarks on Penalty that the respondent was sentenced on the basis that he had developed an addiction to drugs of dependence and dishonestly obtained the drugs from the pharmacy for his own use. The learned Magistrate stated that he had subsequently returned home to live with his parents and had undergone a detoxification program. It was suggested that he was "no longer addicted to drugs".
2. It appears that these remarks were based primarily on submissions made by the respondent's counsel. There were also references in the statements of two character witnesses to similar effect. These witnesses were reporting what the respondent had told them. There was no compelling evidence, however, to establish that the respondent suffered an addiction or that he had successfully completed detoxification treatment. There was no medical evidence of that nature and no expert evidence as to the likelihood of recidivism.
3. The suggestion that the respondent developed an addiction and took the drugs for that reason is entirely plausible. The respondent may well have engaged successfully in treatment, albeit that such would be no guarantee of future behaviour. It was of course open to the Magistrates Court to accept these submissions if they were not challenged by the police prosecutor. However, that does not mean that the Tribunal should necessarily accept these assertions in the current proceedings in the absence of appropriate evidence.
4. In Carpenteri v Registrar of Firearms [2021] SASC 27, Kourakis CJ stated (at [28] - [34]):

Section 39(1)(b) of the SACAT Act provides: > > the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, and may adopt, as in its discretion it considers appropriate, any findings, decision or judgment of a court or other tribunal (insofar as may be relevant to the proceedings before the Tribunal), and may otherwise inform itself as it thinks fit. > > Subparagraph (b) confers a discretion on, but does not oblige, the Tribunal to adopt the findings, decision or other judgment of a court. It is a facilitative provision designed to encourage efficiency in administrative decision-making and to avoid the re-litigation of facts on which the Tribunal can safely rely because of the nature of the proceedings in which the facts were found. > > Plainly enough, findings made by a court in criminal proceedings are generally reliable. However, it will not always be appropriate to adopt them in administrative decisions which are made under legislative schemes calculated to protect the public. The purpose of criminal proceedings is the conviction and punishment of offenders and the exoneration of the innocent. Convictions are generally based on findings made beyond reasonable doubt. They may therefore constitute a sound basis on which to proceed in schemes calculated to protect public safety. However, on sentencing, the prosecution may not be in a position to prove an aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, but the evidence of that circumstance may be sufficient to deny an offender a licence. An offender carries the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities a mitigating factor affecting his or her sentencing. However, the prosecution, or the Court, may for a number of reasons take a generous view of the evidence which favours the offender. The decisions of the Director of Public Prosecution as to whether or not to accept a factual basis for a guilty plea will be affected by a range of considerations appropriate in the discharge of the Director's prosecutorial duties, but which may not adequately serve the public interest in the exercise of the protective powers under the Firearms Act. > > The jurisdiction exercised by the Registrar of Firearms under the Firearms Act is not dependent on, or in any way constrained by, findings made for the purposes of sentencing. It may be otherwise when an administrator exercises a discretion enlivened by the fact of a criminal conviction, or otherwise substantially controlled by it. However, the powers of the Registrar of Firearms are enlivened by any conduct which affects a licensee's fitness to hold a firearms licence, whether or not it is an offence and whether or not there has been a conviction. The discretion to not grant, suspend or cancel a firearms licence can be exercised irrespective of a conviction. > > Consistency in decision making is desirable, but, it would be an error of law to bind or confine the Tribunal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to the facts as found on that conviction, where the exercise of jurisdiction is not tied to a conviction. That is so because the purpose of the criminal proceedings is the enforcement of the criminal law and the appropriate punishment of offenders, whereas the purpose of the regulatory jurisdiction, exercised by the Registrar under the Firearms Act, is the safety of the community. > > In That's Entertainment WA Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police,[19] Pritchard J, sitting in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in reasoning with which I respectfully agree, put it this way:[20] > > First, ... the Commission is required to engage in a quite different task from that of a Court dealing with a prosecution. The Commission applies a different standard of proof and may have regard to evidence which would not be admissible in a Court where rules of evidence apply. Moreover it does so in order to decide if conduct which is alleged constituets [sic] a proper cause for disciplinary action. In that context, a conclusion that proper cause existed for disciplinary action on the basis that a licensee engaged in conduct which breached the LC Act would not be in consistent with an earlier decision to acquit the licnesee [sic] of an offence in respect of that conduct. > > Secondly, as I have already observed, the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is quite different from the purpose of criminal proceedings. The object of criminal proceedings includes the punishment of those who disobey the law, while the object of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public by maintaining standards of behaviour of persons permitted to work or carry on business in a particular industry or profession ... > > Mr Carpenteri was sentenced on favourable facts based on nothing more than submissions. The circumstances of this case exemplify the occasions on which it may be necessary for the Registrar, and on review, the Tribunal, to inquire into the circumstances of an offence, and make independent findings. (Some citations removed)

5. This Tribunal has to make an assessment of the risk that the respondent might pose if he were to practise in the future. We must do so on an adequate evidentiary basis, given the paramount objective of protecting the public. In this context, we do not consider it appropriate to adopt the Remarks of the learned Magistrate to which we have referred. Those remarks may have a factual basis, but we simply do not have sufficient evidence to establish whether that is so.

1. After completion of the criminal proceedings, AHPRA invited the respondent to make a response to the notification and sought over a period of time to engage with him for that purpose. The respondent failed to make any response or to engage with the investigatory process. As previously indicated, he has also failed to engage in any way with the proceedings before this Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the Tribunal is left with no direct evidence from the respondent as to the reasons for his conduct. There is the suggestion of an addiction, but there is no reliable evidence to back that up. There is no medical evidence as to treatment or its outcome. There is no basis to adequately assess the risks the respondent might pose in the future. Our information concerning the respondent's personal circumstances is scant and that information is now 18 months old.
3. The Magistrate accepted that the respondent had no prior record and that, apart from these offences, he had been a person of good character. He had not offended subsequently. We take this into account. At the time of sentencing, it appears that the respondent was working as a labourer. We have regard to the two character references tendered before the Magistrates Court. They suggest that the offending was out of character and describe the respondent as empathetic and compassionate. They suggest that he had worked conscientiously to rebuild his life after the convictions. It is unfortunate that we do not have updated and direct information from the respondent.

Principles regarding the imposition of sanction

1. We adopt the following statements of principle which were set forth by the Tribunal in a recent decision.[21]
2. In NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177; [1968] HCA 20 at [12], the High Court confirmed that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings for a barrister was:

entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved.

3. This statement was adopted and applied to the discipline of health practitioners in Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 at 553-554, where Doyle CJ (Williams & Martin JJ agreeing) stated:

The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish a practitioner in the sense in which punishment is administered pursuant to the criminal law. A disciplinary tribunal protects the public by making orders which will prevent persons who are unfit to practise from practising, or by making orders which will secure the maintenance of proper professional standards. A disciplinary tribunal will also consider the protection of the public, and of the relevant profession, by making orders which will assure the public that appropriate standards are being maintained within the relevant profession.

4. The protection of the public may sometimes require disciplinary action which has a greater adverse effect on the practitioner than may be warranted if punishment was the relevant consideration.[22] Unlike the process of sentencing for a criminal offence, personal circumstances of a practitioner may be of limited significance in the process of determining what is necessary in the public interest.[23]
5. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, at page 636, the Court of Appeal made it clear that:

The gravity of professional misconduct is not to be measured by reference to the worst cases but by the extent to which it departs from the proper standards. If this is not done, there is a risk that the conduct of delinquents in a profession will indirectly establish the standards applied by the Tribunal.

6. In Physiotherapy Board of Australia v Adey [2017] SAHPT 3 at para [36], the SA Health Practitioners Tribunal observed that:

... the imposition of disciplinary action may serve one or all of the following purposes:

• preventing practitioners who are unfit to practice from practising;
• securing maintenance of professional standards;
• assuring members of the public and the profession that appropriate standards are being maintained and that professional misconduct (or unprofessional conduct) will not be tolerated;
• bringing home to the practitioner the seriousness of their conduct;
• deterring the practitioner from any future departures from appropriate standards;
• deterring other members of the profession who might be minded to act in a similar way;
• imposing restrictions on the practitioners' right to practice so as to ensure that the public is protected.

1. In order to achieve these purposes, the Tribunal should impose disciplinary sanctions that adequately reflect the incompatibility of the misconduct with the fitness of the person to be registered. The disciplinary action should be such as to convey to other practitioners and the general public that such conduct is incompatible with registration and will not be tolerated. The sanction should be sufficient to assure the public that standards within the profession will be maintained and the public will be adequately protected.[24]
2. In Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia,[25] the Full Court of the Supreme Court of SA rejected a submission that the period of disqualification in that case need not have been long as the Tribunal could rely on the National Board refusing re-registration if any risk to the public still remained. The Court made the point that the Tribunal generally has before it, a wealth of information that may not be before a national board on a subsequent application for admission. The Tribunal is far better placed to understand the extent to which the conduct is incompatible with fitness to be registered.[26] The Chief Justice, with whom the other members of the Full Court agreed, stated:[27]

However, there are specific considerations to which a Tribunal must have regard in fixing a period of disqualification, which are informed by the material received in the disciplinary proceedings which may not be revealed on an application for readmission to a health profession. An order of disqualification must 'bring home to the practitioner the seriousness of the practitioner's departure from professional standards'. A Tribunal which finds professional misconduct and must fix the period of disqualification is best placed to make the assessment of the period necessary to achieve that purpose. > > I accept that there is an overlap between the length of disqualification to be imposed for the purposes of enforcing professional standards and an evaluation of the suitability of the practitioner at a future time, but in assessing the suitability of an applicant it would duplicate the function of the Tribunal, and twice vex the disqualified practitioner, if a National Board were to ask itself whether an applicant, whose period of disqualification has ended, has been unregistered for a sufficient period of time to have learnt his or her lesson, and thereby to have become a suitable person for registration. > > The Tribunal is responsible for professional discipline; its orders should be effectively final and not interim measures. A National Board should not have the function of second guessing the sanctions it imposes. > > In any event, the Tribunal must also impose a period of disqualification which emphasises to other members of the profession that unprofessional conduct will be visited with significant sanctions. Even though that consideration has some analogy with general deterrence, its purpose is to maintain public confidence in the system of regulation of registered practitioners. If those wider considerations were absent, and if the Tribunal were to confine itself to a subjective assessment of when the particular practitioner is likely to have changed his or her ways, relatively shorter periods of disqualification might be imposed. > > After a period of disqualification fixed by the Tribunal has expired, the function of a National Board, when considering an application for registration, is not to revisit the wider considerations evaluated by the Tribunal, but to assess how the applicant has responded to the sanctions and the steps he or she has taken to address and correct the root causes of his or her misconduct.[28]

3. We note the observation by the Tribunal in Medical Board of Australia v Nicholas[29] that disqualification periods should not be so short as to hold out false hope to a practitioner or place national boards under the pain of premature and unmeritorious applications.

1. The proper handling of drugs, and particularly drugs of dependence, is a fundamental professional responsibility of a pharmacist.[30] In this case the respondent violated safeguards established to protect him and other members of the public. He abused the trust of the owner of the pharmacy. Over a significant period of time, he acted in an elaborate and systematic way to unlawfully obtain Schedule 8 drugs. After completing his employment, he on three occasions committed serious criminal trespass for the purpose of continuing his unlawful activity. His actions were fundamentally dishonest and such as to seriously damage the reputation of the profession.
2. He entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charges (and thus acknowledged his wrongdoing), but on the information before the Tribunal he has done nothing further to accept professional responsibility for his actions. He failed to notify the Board of the criminal charges as required under the National Law. He has failed to provide any explanation for his conduct to the professional regulator and has failed to participate in these proceedings.
3. Despite his previous good record, the professional misconduct reveals serious character flaws inconsistent with a fitness to be registered. There is no basis upon which we could find that such flaws have been acknowledged and rectified. The respondent remains, on the evidence before us, unfit to be registered. There is inadequate information for us to assess why the conduct occurred, or what risk the respondent might pose in the future. We have no adequate information as to the respondent's level of insight or rehabilitation. We must proceed on the basis that there is a risk of reoffending that cannot be properly assessed.
4. Insofar as the professional misconduct may have been related to an addiction, that would raise concerns regarding the potential dangers to the public of practising under the influence of drugs of dependence and the failure to report a relevant health condition. However, the Tribunal has no adequate evidence that the respondent had an addiction. If the respondent did undergo treatment, we have no evidence as to the outcome and no way of assessing the risk of recidivism. If the respondent had an addiction, there is no basis to be confident that he could safely return to a profession where he was handling drugs of dependence on a regular basis.
5. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) NSWLR 630 at page 635, the Court of Appeal stated:

In cases such as this, the Tribunal and this Court should not assume that the doctor has become a reformed person. As Walsh J said in Ex Parte Tziniolis; Re Medical Practitioners Act (1996) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 468; 84 WN (NSW) (Pt 2) 275 at 286: > > ".... Reformations of character and of behaviour can doubtless occur but their occurrence is not the usual but the exceptional thing. One cannot assume that a change has occurred merely because some years have gone by and it is not proved that anything of a discreditable kind has occurred. If a man has exhibited serious deficiencies in his standards of conduct and his attitudes it must require clear proof to show that some years later he has established himself as a different man'.

6. In short, the evidence before the Tribunal provides an insufficient basis to be confident that the respondent would practise safely and honestly in the future.
7. In Optometry Board of Australia v Bhoola (No 2),[31] the practitioner had deliberately and repeatedly altered prescriptions prepared by a colleague with the result that the glasses were made up for patients based on a wrong prescription. There was resulting harm to patients as well as to the owner of the store. The practitioner denied the conduct, but it was found proved. The Tribunal stated, in a comment with which we agree:

Honesty is fundamental to the concept of professionalism. Calculated dishonesty can be inimical to membership of a profession. This case involved a calculated course of conduct over a period of just under a year. The misconduct is serious.[32]

8. The Tribunal imposed a disqualification for a period of one year. On appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court, this period was found to be inadequate. It was increased to five years. Relevantly for present purposes, the learned Judge stated:[33]

In the absence of any explanation for the conduct, it is difficult to accept that there is little or no likelihood that the respondent will not repeat the conduct some time in the future. Given that no motive has been identified, there remains a risk that similar circumstances may occur in the future, which cause the respondent to reoffend. Not only has the respondent demonstrated no insight into his conduct, he has rejected the finding of the SACAT completely. This stance can only lead to a conclusion that there can be no confidence that reoffending will not occur. > > ... > > To provide adequate protection to the public and to maintain the standards in the profession, the sanction to be imposed must take into consideration the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a judgment as to the risk of reoffending. In the absence of any explanation for the conduct or even an acceptance of the findings of the SACAT, there can be no confidence that the respondent will not reoffend. The respondent's conduct was significantly below the standard required in the profession. It was deliberate, dishonest, and prolonged. It caused harm to patients, a colleague, and his employer.

9. The disqualification for a period of five years was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court stated:[34]

As to the applicant's risk of recidivism and prospects of rehabilitation, the applicant continued to deny the conduct. He had not taken responsibility for the conduct and there was no explanation for it, nor insight into it. In those circumstances, it was difficult for the appeal Judge to have any confidence that there would not be repetition of the conduct by the applicant. Whilst there was evidence of the applicant's otherwise good character and subsequent employment where there was no suggestion that he had not behaved other than appropriately, there was still a considerable risk of recidivism in the face of the applicant's denials and failure to take responsibility for his conduct. > > In light of the serious nature of the applicant's conduct, which was far below the standard required in the profession, and the risk that the applicant would repeat such conduct, a substantial sanction was required to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession. The appeal Judge was correct in concluding that the Tribunal's disqualification of the applicant from applying for registration as an optometrist for 12 months was inadequate. The sanction imposed in its place, that the applicant be disqualified from applying for registration as an optometrist for five years was a significant one, but for the reasons we have outlined, it was necessary to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession and was appropriate.

10. Returning to the present case, the respondent's registration lapsed on 31 December 2019 and he has since been unregistered. He has not practised since November 2019 when he gave an undertaking not to do so.
11. The Tribunal must now impose sanctions that will adequately provide for the protection of the public. We consider that it is appropriate to impose a reprimand to signify the Tribunal's utter condemnation of the professional misconduct.
12. It is inevitable that the Tribunal must impose a period of disqualification. The Board suggested that this should be for a period of two years. We do not consider that this would be a sufficient period. This is another case where the risk of future misconduct cannot be ruled out and the level of that risk cannot be properly assessed.[35] The respondent's irresponsibility with respect to the management of drugs of dependence, his unlawful conduct, and his blatant dishonesty over an extended period are fundamentally inconsistent with a fitness to practise. It is necessary to set a period of disqualification that highlights that incompatibility and demonstrates that such conduct will be visited with significant sanctions.[36] This is necessary to maintain public confidence in the profession and the system of regulation. We consider that there should be a disqualification for a period of five years.
13. We also consider that there should be a prohibition from providing any health service for the same period. Quite apart from it being inappropriate for the respondent to be engaged in any activity that may bring him into contact with drugs of dependence, honesty is, in our view, fundamental to the provision of any health service. This is especially so when such services are provided to persons who are vulnerable in one way or another.
14. The Board also seeks an order for costs. There is no basis to resist that application.
15. Accordingly, the orders of the Tribunal pursuant to s 195 and s 196 of the National Law are:

(a) The Tribunal finds that the respondent has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct. > > (b) The respondent is reprimanded. > > (c) The respondent is disqualified for a period of five years from applying for registration as a health practitioner. > > (d) The respondent is prohibited for a period of five years from providing any health service ("Health service" has the meaning it bears in the National Law). > > (e) The respondent must pay the costs and disbursements of the Board, to be agreed, or in default of agreement, to be fixed by the Tribunal.

16. Pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the Tribunal prohibits the publication of the names of, or any material tending to identify, any person other than the respondent referred to in the evidence filed before the Tribunal.

[1] The National Law is to be found in Schedule 2 to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (the Act).

[3] Direction of Tribunal given 18 October 2022.

[4] Affidavits of Pablo Mujica sworn 1 July 2022 and David Robert Holland sworn 21 November 2022; Tribunal Records of service.

[5] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336, per Dixon J at 361-362; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ, at 171.

[8] Exhibit C1, comprising BD Vols 1 and 2.

[18] Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich [2005] 243 LSJS 145, [2005] SASC 478 at [42] - [49]; Medical Board of Australia v Dapp [2008] QCA 44 at [21] - [33].

[19] (2013) 228 A Crim R 201.

[20] (2013) 228 A Crim R 201 at [66]-[67].

[21] Medical Board of Australia v Nicholas - Unreported decision 2 March 2022 (Matter 2021/SHP000032) at [37] - [43].

[22] Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169, [43]; [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545, 554.

[23] Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169, [61]-[62]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWLR 630, 636; Medical Board of Australia v Singh [2017] WASAT 33.

[24] Cf. Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Freeman [2020] SACAT 88, [16], [18].

[25] [2020] SASCFC 74, [65]-[66], [70].

[26] [2020] SASCFC 74 [70] - [74].

[27] [2020] SASCFC 74 [70] - [74].

[28] [2020] SASCFC 74 [70] - [74].

[29] Medical Board of Australia v Nicholas - Unreported decision 2 March 2022 (Matter 2021/SHP000032) at [47].

[30] Pharmacy Board of Australia v Ramsey [2021] SACAT 21 at [32] - [33]; Pharmacy Board of Australia v Foo [2019] VCAT 203 at [28] - [29]; Pharmacy Board of Australia v Hanna [2018] VCAT 1817 at [16]; Pharmacy Board of Australia v Balci [2017] VCAT 1309 at [36]; Pharmacy Board of Australia v Sayegh [2011] NSWPHT 1at [207] - [209].

[31] [2020] SACAT 47.

[32] Optometry Board of Australia v Bhoola (No 2) [2020] SACAT 47 at [25].

[33] Optometry Board of Australia v Bhoola [2021] SASC 51 at [67] and [69].

[34] Bhoola v Optometry Board of Australia [2022] SASCA 20 at [66] and [67].

[35] Bhoola v Optometry Board of Australia [2022] SASCA 20.

[36] Marin v Chiropractic Board of Australia [2020] SASCFC 74 at [73].