Petsinis v Victorian Legal Services Board [2016] VSC 389

2 Petsinis completed an LLB degree at the University of Melbourne in 1977. After graduating in early 1978, he undertook articles of clerkship at a suburban legal firm. He was admitted to the legal profession in April 1979.

3 After his full practising certificate was granted in late 1979, Petsinis began work as a sole practitioner. At this point he was 24 years old.

4 Shortly after commencing practice, Petsinis bought a property in High Street, Northcote with the intention of renovating it to use as his office. He borrowed a large sum from the then State Bank of Victoria in order to finance this purchase.

5 In January 1980, 'a matter of months' after he founded his practice,[1] Petsinis began stealing money from his clients.[2] He described his conduct in his affidavit sworn 28 June 2012 ('First Affidavit') as follows:

In order to 'obtain' funds I adopted a method whereby when I settled small personal injury claims for a number of clients (actually 29 clients), I informed each of them that the amount of settlement was approximately $800.00 less than it actually was. Consequently, the total amount which I obtained from the clients, using this method, amounted to approximately a total sum of $38,000.00. On each file, however, I was entitled to $400.00. I chose not to claim those costs but instead to take a lump sum representing about twice the amount of the costs which otherwise would have been due to me.

6 Petsinis clarified in a later affidavit sworn 1 May 2014 ('Fifth Affidavit') that 47 clients were impacted by this conduct.

7 In his First Affidavit Petsinis described his state of mind at the time of the offending, noting that he felt under considerable strain:

My practice expanded rapidly. I became very busy, handling upwards of 300 current files at any given time, without the assistance of another professional.

... I found that I was conducting many files and completing them without sending out accounts and as a result not generating sufficient fees. In many instances, I did not bill clients for work which I had done. I was run off my feet. ... I found myself in financial difficulties. I felt that I was unable to afford to borrow any more funds from the bank and, as I felt that there was family pressure on me to succeed in my chosen profession, I did not want to burden my family with my problems ...

8 Further in that affidavit, Petsinis referred to his relative youth and the resurgence of his mother's breast cancer in 1979. It is relevant to remark that although Petsinis' description of his circumstances could imply that there was an extended period under these pressures before he began stealing his clients' money, that period in fact commenced shortly after he began practice.[3]

9 In cross-examination before the Board of Examiners in 2014, Petsinis agreed that in conjunction with the factors set out above, he had been motivated in part by a desire to 'show some success' to his family. In his Fifth Affidavit, he acknowledged that he had 'no adequate excuse' for his conduct, and that he was 'deeply ashamed' of what he did.

10 In August 1981, prompted by an inquiry from one of his clients, the Fraud Squad and the Law Institute of Victoria investigated Petsinis' accounts and discovered the deception. After being exposed, Petsinis left Australia. He returned after about four months having resolved to face the consequences of his actions.

11 Upon his return, Petsinis was arrested, charged and granted bail. He then ceased practising as a lawyer and commenced work for his future father-in-law as a sand-blaster.

12 It was not until late June 1984 that the criminal proceedings involving Petsinis came before Hampel J.[4] Petsinis pleaded guilty to 29 counts of theft, and one count of having a deficiency in his trust account.[5] He was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment to be served at an Attendance Centre. His name was struck off the Supreme Court roll.[6]

13 In his sentencing remarks, Hampel J noted the consequences for Petsinis of being struck off.[7] His Honour said:[8]

The result will be that you will have lost your professional status and the respect and advantages that flow from it. In your case, it is the loss of something which both you and your family have strived towards in circumstances of some hardship over a number of years.

I have heard a number of witnesses who spoke of your character and the good name of your family. There is no doubt in my mind that you feel great shame in letting all these people down.

14 Petsinis was required to pay the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund a sum of money to satisfy the claims made against it by his clients. At the date of sentencing, in June 1984, Petsinis had repaid $46,345. Hampel, J in his sentencing remarks, made it clear that a significant amount remained outstanding, in excess of $30,000.[9]

15 For reasons that are not immediately apparent, the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund seems to have made no timely effort to call in this debt.[10]

16 In his First Affidavit, Petsinis deposed that he wrote to the Law Institute of Victoria, shortly after having been sentenced, in relation to his outstanding debt. He deposed further that he received no reply.

17 On 26 November 1984, Petsinis paid $100 towards this debt. That was his last repayment for many years.[11]

18 Around 1988 or 1989, Petsinis discussed with a solicitor the possibility of being readmitted to the legal profession. The solicitor noted the outstanding debt and advised Petsinis that the Law Institute of Victoria would oppose the application on that basis. The solicitor further advised Petsinis to defer any application for readmission until a future time.

19 In 1993, Petsinis instructed a solicitor to write to the Law Institute of Victoria on his behalf querying the outstanding debt. The letter which was sent also foreshadowed Petsinis' intention to apply for readmission. A response was received in July 1993, advising Petsinis that the amount then owing was $23,206.39. Around this same time, Petsinis was advised by his solicitor that any application for readmission was unlikely to be successful at that time. There appears to have been no further correspondence between Petsinis or his legal representatives and the Law Institute of Victoria as to the debt.

20 In any event Petsinis made no payments after November 1984 until he satisfied the debt in its entirety in June 2000. Payment in 2000 coincided with his later interactions with the Legal Practice Board, seeking its approval for him to engage in work as a conveyancer.[12]

21 In November 1985, a little over a year after he was sentenced for his various offences, Petsinis began what he termed a 'secretarial business of providing conveyancing services'. He deposed in his First Affidavit that in preparation for commencing this business he familiarised himself with the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 ('the 1958 Act') and

concluded that it was lawful for [him] to act essentially as a secretarial service specialising in conveyancing so long as [he] refrained from giving legal advice and from holding out [himself] as a qualified solicitor.

22 Shortly after the business commenced, the Law Institute of Victoria directed Petsinis to remove the letters 'LLB' after his name on his letterhead. Petsinis complied with that direction.

23 In 1988 and 1993, the Law Institute again contacted Petsinis querying certain aspects of his business. The Law Institute expressed concern that Petsinis could be seen to have breached restrictions in the 1958 Act that precluded the carrying out of legal work except by qualified persons.[13]

24 The response from Petsinis on each occasion was that the firm carried out conveyancing transactions, and that he did not hold himself out as a qualified lawyer.[14]

25 The Law Institute did not pursue its enquiries any further.

26 As Petsinis conceded in his First Affidavit, while working as a conveyancer during the 1990s, he also drafted a number of wills. By his affidavits and his counsel's submissions, Petsinis asserted that the wills were prepared with the permission and approval of a supervising lawyer. But he acknowledged that he took instructions directly from the clients and that he alone prepared the documents.

27 In January 1997, the 1958 Act was replaced by the Legal Practice Act 1996 ('the 1996 Act'). The 1996 Act imposed a new restriction to the effect that a person who had been struck off the Supreme Court roll could not be employed in connection with the performance of conveyancing work without the authorisation of the then Legal Practice Board.[15]

28 In his First Affidavit, Petsinis claimed that he did not become aware of this restriction until early March 2000; and only became aware of the requirements of the new Act when he was contacted by a delegate of the professional standards body at the Law Institute of Victoria. According to evidence given by the delegate in Fenral Nominees, as noted by Hansen J in his reasons for judgment, the tenor of their exchanges was 'that Petsinis was required to cease his employment with the conveyancing company and that Petsinis refused to do so.'[16]

29 Petsinis stated in his First Affidavit that there was more to his response than the delegate had indicated. He claimed to have said words to the following effect:

I am responsible for many current files which require my attention for the purpose of attendance and completion and I could not possibly cease practising as a conveyancer as that would cause major problems for the clients of the company.

30 Petsinis' employer at this time was the company named Fenral Nominees Pty Ltd ('Fenral', to distinguish it from the proceedings to which we have referred at n 1 and subsequently.) Petsinis' wife was a director of that company, but he held the central role in the conveyancing practice. Fenral did not have the relevant authorisation from the Legal Practice Board to employ Petsinis.

31 Shortly after his exchanges with the delegate of the professional standards body, Petsinis instructed lawyers to apply to the Legal Practice Board for authorisation for Fenral to employ him as a conveyancer. While he awaited the Board's decision, Petsinis continued to act as a conveyancer. According to his evidence in the Fenral Nominees matter, Petsinis' solicitor had advised him that this was permitted.[17] Petsinis claimed that neither the Law Institute nor the Board had specifically advised him to the contrary.

32 Petsinis did not disclose to the Legal Practice Board that he was continuing to act as a conveyancer during this period. However he took various administrative steps to remove himself from the public face of the conveyancing business, and in a conversation with the delegate of the professional standards body in April 2000, Petsinis said that his name as a consultant had been removed from the conveyancing business. He also resigned as a director of Fenral in an 'attempt to lessen the extent of the breach' while he continued to work in the conveyancing business.[18]

33 In a letter dated 22 May 2000, the Board denied the relevant authorisation. The letter directed that Petsinis immediately cease working as a conveyancer.

34 Petsinis appealed the Board's decision to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal was heard by Hansen J over five days in late 2000. His Honour granted the relevant authorisation for Petsinis' employment as a conveyancer upon the condition that he produce documents and submit to inspections by the Legal Practice Board upon short notice as necessary.[19] In his reasons for judgment, Hansen J stated:

On balance I am not persuaded that 'the interests of consumer protection' require that Petsinis not be permitted to be engaged or employed as a conveyancer by Fenral. I am satisfied in all the circumstances that he is an appropriate or fit and proper person to be engaged or employed as a conveyancer. ... I am of the view that, chastened by the experience of this application and not having worked as a conveyancer since 23 May last, Petsinis and his wife will make all reasonable efforts to ensure that they keep up to date with requirements of and comply with all relevant legislation concerning the business of a conveyancer, including by making inquiries of the Board, and not engage in work that Part 12 does not permit an unqualified person or corporation to engage in. I am also of the view that in the future Petsinis, and Mrs Petsinis, will appreciate the need to be open and candid in answering a query from the Board or other regulatory authority, and, indeed, in all dealings generally.[20]

35 Hansen J expressed concern throughout his judgment that Petsinis' various accounts of his offences could be regarded as having a 'misleading tendency'.[21] But his Honour ultimately concluded that the 'inaccuracies' were due to an 'inattention to detail and carelessness in drafting' rather than any intention to mislead the Court.[22]

36 His Honour also considered that Petsinis' ignorance of the 1996 Act, and accompanying regulations, was 'surprising' given his familiarity with the conveyancing industry. But he accepted, as a fact, that Petsinis had been unaware of the relevant provisions.[23]

37 His Honour further accepted the evidence of Petsinis that his lawyer had advised him that he could continue working as a conveyancer pending the Board's decision, even though that advice was 'plainly incorrect'.[24] He commented, however, that continuing to work without informing the Board or having some arrangement with it 'was not what one would expect of an honourable conveyancer seeking to work in conformity with the law as it affected him or her in practice'.[25]

38 Hansen J observed that the question before him was strictly confined to Petsinis' fitness to work as a conveyancer, and that 'a person employed to perform conveyancing work as defined undertakes work of a narrower and far more limited scope and responsibility than might be undertaken by a barrister and solicitor in legal practice.'[26]

Preparation of wills, including the Kellie Rose will

39 A further issue considered by Hansen J related to Petsinis' participation in certain work performed for Kellie Rose, a close family friend, in March 2000, in particular the preparation of a will.[27] This was one of a number of wills which, as mentioned earlier,[28] Petsinis acknowledged drafting in his affidavits prepared for the current proceeding.

40 Hansen J summarised Petsinis' cross-examination regarding his involvement in drawing up Ms Rose's will as follows:[29]

He knew that the preparation of a will was a legal matter and that he was not supposed to do legal work. Legal work would be referred to a solicitor. In this instance he did not think of saying to Rose that as a will was a legal matter he would have nothing to do with it or that he could refer her to a solicitor. He did not advise Rose he was not permitted to draw a will. So, he believed and recollected that, having taken instructions, he referred the matter by handing the instructions to Buxton [Fenral's supervising solicitor]. He said that Buxton would then have advised it was okay to go ahead and draw the will and have it signed. He had no recollection of Buxton preparing any draft clauses or discussing them with him. Petsinis then drew the will. He would not have drawn the will without Buxton's okay.

41 His Honour concluded that it was unfortunate that the supervising lawyer, Malcolm Buxton, had not been cross-examined,[30] but accepted Petsinis' evidence that he had received Mr Buxton's approval to draw Ms Rose's will.[31] Hansen J then stated:[32]

It is clearly wrong for Petsinis and [his business] to perform such work or, indeed, any work precluded by Part 12 and Part 13 of the Act. It should never happen again. The proper and only course is for Petsinis and any other employee of [Petsinis' business] to advise a client that he is not able to perform the work in question and that it must be performed by a solicitor to whom the client should be referred or left to go at his or her option.

Engagement in legal work without supervisory arrangements

42 After Hansen J's judgment, Petsinis resumed work as a conveyancer employed by Fenral under the conditions imposed in the judgment. In May 2009, a new company named RCPT Pty Ltd ('RCPT') was incorporated which took over Petsinis' employment.[33]

43 Petsinis was still restricted under the 1996 Act from performing any legal work.[34] This restriction on his practice continued after the introduction of the Legal Profession Act 2004,[35] and after the introduction of the Conveyancers Act 2006, under which he was entitled to only a provisional licence.[36]

44 In his affidavit sworn 14 December 2012 ('Third Affidavit'), Petsinis deposed that the supervising lawyer, Mr Buxton, was associated with his conveyancing practice from 2001 to around 2007-08. He also deposed that the conveyancing documents that he used were generated from precedents that Mr Buxton had approved.

45 Petsinis further deposed that, from time to time, he would draft special conditions for a contract of sale, and would prepare rescission notices or leases. In his Third Affidavit, he stated that these documents were usually approved by Mr Buxton, but that, on some occasions, 'due to time pressures', approval was obtained only after the documents had been executed. In cross-examination before the Board of Examiners in 2014, Petsinis agreed that this latter arrangement constituted him performing legal work in breach of the relevant legislation.[37]

46 In 2007-08, Mr Buxton became unwell and withdrew from his position as the supervising lawyer. From then until October 2012, there was no supervising lawyer approving any legal work associated with Petsinis' conveyancing. Again, in cross-examination before the Board of Examiners, Petsinis accepted that during this period he was acting in contravention of the Legal Profession Act 2004.[38]

47 Between October 2012 and April 2013, Ian Collard, a solicitor, agreed to act as Petsinis' supervising lawyer on the basis that all draft documents would be sent to him for approval and comment before they were sent to any other party.

48 In April 2013, a long-time employee of Fenral (and later RCPT), Joanne Failla, was registered as a fully licensed conveyancer. From that time onwards, as a fully licensed conveyancer Ms Failla was entitled to perform the legal work associated with conveyancing.[39] In his affidavit sworn 30 May 2014 ('Fourth Affidavit') Petsinis deposed that this alleviated his need to have a party external to Fenral act as a supervising lawyer. He deposed also that during this time, while

Ms Failla has continued to be sole director of RCPT as the holder of an unrestricted individual conveyancing licence [he had] continued to be primarily responsible for the running and management of the conveyancing business operated by RCPT.

49 Ms Failla has indicated a desire to retire in the coming years, which Petsinis claims is a motivating factor in his application for readmission.

50 In August 2009, Petsinis' business received a letter from Consumer Affairs Victoria ('CAV') attaching a complaint from a purchaser of a property for whom Petsinis acted, which alleged that the purchaser had been charged costs without her knowledge.

51 In response, Petsinis acknowledged that he had not obtained written consent from the purchaser in respect of those charges. He also acknowledged that he had been acting for both the purchaser of the property and the vendors (who were the purchaser's parents), and had assumed that the vendors were passing on all relevant information to the purchaser.

52 In reply, CAV raised certain concerns regarding the conduct of Petsinis' business. In particular, CAV queried the failure of that business to issue a costs disclosure, its failure to issue a conflict of interest disclosure, and its failure to confirm all instructions and keep all parties informed in writing. CAV noted that such conduct could potentially constitute breaches of the Conveyancers Act 2006, and directed the business to amend its practices. CAV took no further action.

53 In April 2014, Petsinis filed a notice of intention to apply for readmission to the legal profession. The Board of Examiners, as it then was, referred the application to a special hearing, which took place on 19 August 2014. The Board heard oral evidence and received submissions from counsel assisting the Board of Examiners and from counsel representing Petsinis.

54 In April 2015, the Board published its reasons. The Board's four members were equally divided on whether the applicant was a fit and proper person for the purposes of readmission. However, the Chairman of the Board exercised a casting vote to form a majority in favour of that recommendation.

55 The statutory majority, in its reasons, considered that when presented with his failures, Petsinis had 'acknowledged them appropriately and apologised appropriately'.[40] It also considered that Petsinis was not 'intentionally deceptive in his application' and that 'the periods of unqualified practice were not enough in themselves to warrant refusal of the application in all the circumstances'.[41]

56 The Board's reasons noted that Petsinis had failed to draw specifically and directly to the Board's attention his various contraventions of the Legal Profession Act 2004. Rather, he had merely stated, somewhat elliptically, that he had not worked with a supervising lawyer.[42] Further, Petsinis had not specifically identified in his disclosures the unauthorised conveyancing employment identified by Hansen J,[43] to which we have referred above, but instead contented himself with attaching the reasons for judgment to his affidavit.[44] In this regard, the Board stated:[45]

[I]t would have been preferable if the disclosure by the applicant was more comprehensive. It is the underlying consequences of the failure to have a supervising instructing solicitor [that] troubled the Board, conduct that involved the applicant engaging in unqualified practice at a time that he was struck off the roll of practitioners. ...

The Board acknowledges the applicant rectified the situation in October 2012 and considers that it is unlikely that the applicant would repeat the offending. In addition the Board is of the opinion that while the conduct constituted unqualified practice, the applicant did have considerable knowledge and ability in relation to conveyancing at the time of the conduct and, in terms of protection of the public, the conduct could have been of greater concern had he not had this knowledge and experience.

although the applicant's material could have been better prepared and more accurate and that he could have been more forthright about his failure to comply with the statutory requirements concerning unqualified legal practice, the applicant nonetheless does now appreciate his obligations if he were to be re-admitted.[46]

58 By way of contrast, the minority of the Board focused 'particularly on the instances of misconduct highlighted by Hansen J in the Fenral case and the conduct of engaging in legal work without a supervising solicitor in the period 2007/2008 to 4 October 2012'.[47] The minority concluded that this indicated that Petsinis was 'not prepared to observe the Court's effective prohibition on his engaging in legal practice ... or the statutory prohibition against unqualified practice'.[48]

59 The Board, having found by majority that Petsinis was a fit and proper person to be readmitted to practice, recognised that it was a matter for the Court to determine whether it was prepared to accept the Board's recommendation.[49] The Board referred Petsinis' application to the Court accordingly, giving rise to the present proceeding. The proceeding was formalised by Petsinis' filing of an originating motion on 18 April 2016, seeking a declaration that he is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession as an Australian lawyer, and an order that, upon his giving an oath of office, he be so admitted.

60 In an affidavit sworn 18 April 2016 ('Seventh Affidavit'), Petsinis disclosed a further interaction with the Legal Services Board relating to his work as a conveyancer. That matter was not disclosed to the Board of Examiners before it published its recommendation regarding Petsinis' application for readmission in April 2015.

61 Petsinis deposes that, in October 2012, he wrote to the registered proprietors of certain properties in Candy Street, Northcote, on behalf of a client who was intending to develop neighbouring sites. In his letter, Petsinis asserted that his client's property included a certain tract of land that the recipients were using as a right of way at the rear of their properties. A letter to Petsinis in response asserted that the right of way had been adversely possessed.

62 Petsinis did not directly address the assertion of adverse possession. However, in February and November 2014, he simply reasserted in writing his client's right to exclusive use of the right of way, and requested the removal of fences impeding that use.

63 One of the neighbouring proprietors responded in November 2014, claiming that there was no legal basis for the removal of the fence. That letter recommended that Petsinis' client 'seek formal legal advice from a qualified lawyer with a practising certificate and expertise in the area, as [they] ha[d] done'.

64 In January 2015, Petsinis was contacted by a representative of the Legal Services Board who asked in what capacity Petsinis was acting in respect of this client, and queried whether he was holding himself out as a lawyer. Petsinis deposed that he responded that he was not purporting to be a lawyer but was merely asserting his client's rights in relation to his land.

65 In July 2015, Petsinis received notice from the Legal Services Board that it had received a complaint against Petsinis for 'unqualified legal practice' in relation to the Candy Street properties, but that it had decided not to investigate the matter further.

66 In line with an undertaking Petsinis had earlier given to the Board of Examiners, he completed a Graduate Diploma of Legal Practice at the College of Law in December 2015.

67 The submissions advanced by Petsinis ultimately asserted that he had demonstrated that he had rehabilitated himself and was now a fit and proper person to be readmitted to the Australian legal profession. His submissions placed reliance on the reasons of the Board of Examiners and emphasised the majority's satisfaction that Petsinis had appropriately acknowledged his past wrongdoing and would honour his obligations in the future.

68 At the hearing, counsel for Petsinis stressed that the Board of Examiners' recommendation should be of particular significance to the Court, especially as the Board had had the advantage of observing Petsinis under cross-examination.

69 Petsinis submitted that the offences that resulted in his being struck off ought to be given reduced weight because he had served his sentence, acknowledged the gravity of his conduct and the shame he carries, and had not reoffended in the lengthy period since the relevant conduct. He contended that the Court could be satisfied that 'there is no significant risk of [him] repeating the misconduct that resulted in his removal from the roll'.

70 Petsinis further submitted that his reference to stealing from 29 clients (rather than 47) was simply due to his having relied, in error, on the 29 counts of theft with which he was ultimately charged and to which Hampel J's sentencing remarks referred.

71 In relation to the debt owing to the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund, Petsinis conceded that he 'took an inordinate period of time to pay [it] off' and that his disclosures could have been better presented on this issue. His submissions stressed that ultimately the Board noted that the debt had now been fully repaid.

72 With respect to Petsinis' failure to cease acting as a conveyancer after being alerted to the statutory injunction against his so acting, his counsel submitted that this error could be attributed to fear of potential consequences for his clients. Petsinis' submissions asserted that he had 'learnt from his mistake ... and would not repeat it if the same situation arose again'.

73 In relation to his engagement in unqualified legal practice since being struck off the roll, Petsinis emphasised four matters. First, he had acknowledged the error when questioned about it before the Board. Secondly, there was minimal risk to the public from the conduct as Petsinis nonetheless had considerable knowledge and skill at the time of his unqualified practice. Thirdly, aside from the wills that he drew during the period before Hansen J's judgment, the contravening conduct concerned work that he is now able lawfully to perform under Ms Failla's unrestricted conveyancing licence. Finally, the majority of the Board of Examiners had concluded that the periods of unqualified practice were not enough in themselves to warrant refusal of his application in all of the circumstances.

74 At the hearing, counsel for Petsinis stated unequivocally that, if his client was readmitted, he had no intention of applying for a practising certificate to work as a solicitor or barrister. Rather, his application for readmission was motivated solely by his wanting to continue to run his conveyancing practice without requiring anyone to be shackled to the business as a supervising lawyer or licence holder. If he were readmitted, he would be entitled to apply for an unrestricted conveyancing licence and do the legal work incidental to running a conveyancing practice without Ms Failla's involvement. Counsel for Petsinis assured the Court that his client's ambitions were strictly confined in this regard.

75 The submissions of the Victorian Legal Services Board ('LSB'), which acts as the defendant in these proceedings, emphasised that Petsinis was required to discharge a 'heavy burden' to be readmitted. The LSB submitted that '[i]f the Court is left in doubt, he must fail'. The submissions further contended that '[t]he Court is exercising an entirely protective role - there is no element of punishment therefore notions of mercy are not relevant'.

In the period since he was removed from the roll, the plaintiff has shown a substantial and recurrent disregard for strict compliance with the obligations imposed by law. Furthermore, in preparing his affidavit material, the plaintiff has also not shown the level of diligence and candour that is expected of a prospective officer of the Court. This lack of diligence and candour combined with his 16-year delay in making restitution for his thefts suggests that the plaintiff does not take full responsibility for, and has not demonstrated genuine remorse, for his conduct.

77 In particular, the LSB's submissions expressed concern at Petsinis' failure to comply with his statutory obligations by repeatedly engaging in unqualified legal work and by working as an unauthorised conveyancer. The LSB noted that this conduct spanned an 'approximately 20-year period from at least 1993 until 2012' and took place '[d]espite warnings from the Law Institute (in 1998 and 1993), and Hansen J in the Fenral Nominees proceedings (in 2000)'.

78 Further, the LSB averred that Petsinis was even now reluctant to take responsibility for his misconduct, pointing to what it contended was misleading language in various parts of his affidavit material.

79 At the hearing before this Court, after being pressed by the Bench, counsel for the LSB stated that he did not suggest that Petsinis had been deliberately deceptive at any point since being struck off. Instead he characterised the issue as relating to a lack of diligence and candour.

80 With respect to the possibility of imposing a conditional admission, counsel for the LSB stressed its position that Petsinis' intention not to seek a practising certificate if he were admitted as a lawyer did not change the fundamental question before the Court, namely whether Petsinis is now a fit and proper person for the purpose of readmission. Counsel further noted that the ability of the Court to place conditions on a lawyer's admission had been doubted by Gillard J in Frugtniet v Board of Examiners.[50]

81 As an adjunct to the reasons of the Board of Examiners, the Victorian Legal Admissions Board ('VLAB'), as it is now called, provided a set of submissions for these proceedings. These submissions were confined to assistance on the functions played by the Board of Examiners under the 2004 Act, the functions of VLAB and the Court in dealing with applications for admission under the Legal Profession Uniform Law,[51] and the principles relevant to an application for readmission to the legal profession.

82 Relevantly, VLAB's submissions noted that the Court's inherent jurisdiction to refuse admission is preserved by the Uniform Law.

83 VLAB submitted that although under the new statutory regime the Court requires a compliance certificate from VLAB in order to exercise its power to admit an individual to the legal profession, the power itself remains within the original jurisdiction of the Court. The submissions contended that the matter before the Court is not an appeal from the Board of Examiner's decision, but is rather an exercise of that original jurisdiction. VLAB's submissions stated that, in that context, although the Board of Examiners' findings should be treated as significant, they could not be determinative of the question whether readmission was warranted.

84 VLAB also submitted that, whatever may have been the position in the past, the Uniform Law recognises that the Court has an ability to impose conditions on an individual when admitting them to the legal profession.

85 Admission to the legal profession is governed by Part 2.2 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law, which is found in Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014.[52] Part 2.2 of the Uniform Law came into effect on 1 July 2015. Prior to the Uniform Law coming into force, the admission process was governed by the Legal Profession Act 2004. This earlier regime was still in force at the time that the Board of Examiners considered Petsinis' application for admission.

86 The Uniform Law sets out requirements according to which VLAB is to assess applicants for admission but, as VLAB's submissions noted, it reserves the Court's original jurisdiction in assessing applicants' eligibility for admission. Section 16(4) provides:

Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to refuse admission.

87 The High Court recognised this inherent power in Re Davis[53] after considering a statutory regime in New South Wales which included a provision that '[e]very candidate whom the Board shall approve as a fit and proper person to be made a barrister shall be admitted as a barrister by the Court on any day appointed for that purpose'. The High Court rejected a contention that the Supreme Court of New South Wales had no ability in such a regime to make its own assessment of a candidate. Starke J explained that 'the interposition of the Court would be merely ministerial if it were under an absolute duty to admit a person as a barrister upon approval of the Board'.[54] He concluded:[55]

...the faculty or power [to refuse admission] is reposed in the Court in the public interest. [The Court] must have the approval of the Board but upon the Court is placed, in the end, the duty and responsibility of admitting persons as barristers. The Court has power in reserve, seldom required, having regard to the functions of the Board, but still necessary, as this case well illustrates.

88 It is this inherent power that the Court exercises in this matter. Notwithstanding that, the legislative regime under the Uniform Law which structures VLAB's assessment of applicants for admission will be described below as it provides a useful reference for the Court's own assessment.

89 The Uniform Law allows applicants to seek admission to the legal profession whether for the first time or after having been struck off. Section 6(1) defines 'admission' to include 'readmission', for the purposes of the Uniform Law. Section 23(8) also specifically permits a person whose name has been removed from the roll to apply for admission.

90 Section 16 provides that the Supreme Court 'may admit' an individual to the Australian legal profession if certain requirements are met, including that:[56]

(a) the designated local regulatory authority has provided the Supreme Court with a compliance certificate in respect of the person and the certificate is still in force; ...

91 Section 17 sets out the prerequisites for the issue of a compliance certificate:

(1) The prerequisites for the issue of a compliance certificate in respect of a person are that he or she -

(a) has attained the academic qualifications specified under the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified academic qualifications prerequisite); and

(b) has satisfactorily completed the practical legal training requirements specified in the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified practical legal training prerequisite); and

(c) is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.

(2) In considering whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession -

(a) the designated local regulatory authority may have regard to any matter relevant to the person's eligibility or suitability for admission, however the matter comes to its attention; and

(b) the designated local regulatory authority must have regard to the matters specified in the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section.

92 Petsinis' academic qualifications and practical legal training are not in dispute. As previously indicated, he completed both a law degree and articles of clerkship in the 1970s. In order to refresh his practical training, he has more recently completed a Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice.

93 The Legal Services Council, empowered by s 428 of the Uniform Law, has made rules relating to admission known as the Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules 2015.[57] Rule 10 sets out relevant considerations for VLAB in determining whether an applicant is a fit and proper person:

(1) For the purposes of section 17(2)(b) of the Uniform Law, the following matters are specified as matters to which the Board must have regard:

(a) any statutory declaration as to the person's character, referred to in rule 16,

(b) any disclosure statement made by the person under rule 17,

(c) any police report provided under rule 18,

(d) any student conduct report provided under rule 19,

(e) any certificate of good standing provided under rule 20,

(f) whether the person is currently of good fame and character,

(g) whether the person is or has been a bankrupt or subject to an arrangement under Part 10 of the Bankruptcy Act or has been an officer of a corporation that has been wound up in insolvency or under external administration,

(h) whether the person has been found guilty of an offence including a spent offence in Australia or in a foreign country, and if so:

(i) the nature of the offence, and

(ii) how long ago the offence was committed, and

(iii) the person's age when the offence was committed,

(i) whether the person has been the subject of any disciplinary action, howsoever expressed, in any profession or occupation in Australia or in a foreign country,

(j) whether the person has been the subject of disciplinary action, howsoever expressed, in any profession or occupation that involved a finding adverse to the person,

(k) whether the person is currently unable satisfactorily to carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner,

(l) whether the person has a sufficient knowledge of written and spoken English to engage in legal practice in this jurisdiction.

(a) take an examination, and

(b) obtain a result in that examination,

specified by the Board for the purposes of subrule (1)(l).

94 While VLAB must have regard to these statutory considerations, they are in no way binding upon the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. However, they provide some useful guidance as to what the legislature considers important in this assessment. The facts that have been brought to the attention of the Court by the parties reflect their focus on these considerations.

95 A final matter should be examined having regard to Petsinis' stated intention to work only in his conveyancing practice and his willingness to accept conditions on his admission to that effect. Section 22(1) of the Uniform Law imposes an obligation on the Supreme Court to maintain a roll of Australian lawyers for the jurisdiction 'containing the names and other relevant particulars of persons admitted by the Court, whether conditionally or without conditions'. This provision implies a statutory grant of power to the Court to impose conditions on admissions. The terms used in this provision suggest that such a power is broad-ranging. However, read in the context of the whole of Part 2.2 of the Uniform Law, one finds that the only further mention of the imposition of conditions on admission is with respect to the admission of foreign lawyers, in s 20. It is not clear whether any statutory power to impose conditions is so limited.

96 Regardless, the Court is not relying upon a statutory jurisdiction, but an inherent one. Under these auspices, the specific statutory power to impose conditions on admission is not expressly relevant. Rather, the Court can turn to its inherent power and the concomitant power to impose conditions as recognised in Re Bridgman,[58] Re Taylor,[59] and Re an Application by L for Admission as a Legal Practitioner.[60]

97 For example, in Re Bridgman, although the Court chose not to readmit the applicant, it remarked that it was 'quite clear that [it had] full power in a proper case to re-admit, conditionally or unconditionally'.[61] In Re Taylor, the Queensland Supreme Court considered that the case was not one 'in which it would be an appropriate course simply to admit the applicant to practise, unconditionally'.[62] Given that, it chose to admit the applicant as a lawyer 'subject to a condition that he not practise on his own account or in partnership'.[63] The Court regarded a defined time limit on the condition as insufficient, so it imposed its conditions 'without limit as to time' but 'reserv[ed] to the applicant a right to apply to have the condition expunged'.[64]

98 We note that, in the alternative, if the Court did not have the power to order conditional admission, a practical substitute could readily be found by requiring an applicant to make an undertaking to the Court.[65]

99 The question before this Court is whether it should exercise its power to refuse admission to Petsinis, notwithstanding the recommendation from the Board. As Martin CJ explained in Re Stokes; Ex parte Stokes, although the Board's findings 'will obviously be of significance to the court, those findings will not be determinative'.[66]

100 The Board of Examiners reviewed Petsinis' evidence in line with the suitability matters set out in s 1.2.6 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. Those suitability matters largely mirror the mandatory considerations in the Uniform Law Admission Rules. Of particular relevance in Petsinis' case, the suitability matters required the Board to consider whether he had been found guilty of an offence,[67] whether he had engaged in legal practice when not admitted,[68] whether he had been struck from the roll[69] and whether he was of good fame and character.[70] All the matters that were disclosed to this Court as set out above were before the Board, with the exception of the exchange relating to the Candy Street property.

101 By statutory majority, the Board concluded that Petsinis was a fit and proper person to be admitted. It did not contemplate any conditions being imposed on Petsinis' admission.

102 This is no small matter. The Board is made up of respected and experienced legal professionals, and their opinions should be given significant weight.[71] In the hearing, counsel for Petsinis urged the Court to accept the Board's finding as a primary factor.

103 However, the Court must make its own decision on the evidence.

104 In applications for readmission, emphasis should be placed on examining an applicant's rehabilitation. The key principles guiding the Court in an assessment of an application for readmission were set out by Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ in Ex Parte Lenehan:[72]

When ... a person applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to probable permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal. A solicitor may be restored to the roll after he has been struck off, but the power to reinstate should be exercised with the greatest caution and only on solid and substantial grounds.

105 There is a presumption that, having been struck off the roll, an individual carries a permanent defect that renders them unfit to be admitted to the Australian legal profession. The Court must be satisfied that this defect no longer persists to be satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted. The applicant must show his 'worthiness and reliability for the future'.[73]

106 This cautionary note is not intended repeatedly to impose punishment on the individual for past wrongdoings. Instead, the Court's jurisdiction is a protective one; its concern is with protecting the public, the administration of justice, and the reputation and standing of the legal profession.[74]

107 It would be of grave concern to the Court if there were any significant risk of Petsinis' dishonest behaviour being repeated and thereby placing the public at risk. However, the Court recognises that an applicant can demonstrate, even in instances such as this, that their prior conduct no longer renders them unfit and improper.

108 In Re Bridgman,[75] the applicant had been convicted for stealing from a client and sentenced to a term of eighteen months' imprisonment. The applicant in that case also admitted to misappropriating other clients' money over two separate periods from 1919 to 1920 and 1923 to 1926. Blair CJ of the Queensland Supreme Court explained that readmission could still be contemplated in these circumstances:[76]

The rule is not so inexorable as that after a man has undergone a long period of exclusion and punishment and suffering, which his misconduct carries with it, if we are satisfied that his conduct has been such in the meantime as to insure confidence in his character, we might not either admit him in the first instance or re-admit him.

109 The legal profession and the community also benefit from recognising that those whom it has previously censured can be rehabilitated and again trusted as officers of the Court. Martin CJ observed in Re Stokes; Ex parte Stokes that:[77]

if the court can have the requisite confidence that there will be no significant risk of repetition of the misconduct which resulted in the removal of the practitioner's name from the roll, there is a public interest in the restoration of the names of such persons to the roll. That public interest derives in part from the fact that such persons will be in a position to serve the community by providing legal services, but also from the encouragement of rehabilitation and redemption of those whose conduct has, in the past, prevented them from conducting their profession ...

110 In Re Bridgman, the Queensland Supreme Court refused to readmit the applicant. His application for readmission came only six years after being struck off and the Court was not satisfied that it could safely certify him to be a fit and proper person.[78]

111 In Ex parte Lenehan,[79] however, the High Court admitted an applicant who had a number of allegations of misappropriating funds raised against him as a young man, one of which he admitted. The majority noted that, since his youth, Mr Lenehan had had a distinguished war service that had involved him handling considerable funds with appropriate care.[80] The majority observed that '[f]rom the age of 28 to 45 he has behaved in such a way as to raise a strong presumption that he has redeemed his early errors and that they did not reflect any permanent defect of character'.[81]

112 Similar reasoning applied in Kriss v Legal Practitioners Admission Board[82] which considered an applicant who had been removed from the roll in 1995 for a deliberate breach of trust in concealing an 'overpayment' he had effected. Cooper AJ allowed the applicant to be readmitted as he judged there was no suspicion that the applicant's earlier misconduct reflected a permanent defect in his character.[83] Since 1995, the applicant had lived an exemplary life demonstrating integrity, honesty and probity. In particular, Cooper AJ pointed to the applicant's community work, his being awarded the Australian Service Medal, the Australian Active Service Medal and the Return from Active Service Badge, and his voluntary and accomplished management of the Portland RSL Club Ltd.[84]

113 As in Mr Lenehan's case, considerable time has passed since the wrongdoing that resulted in Petsinis being removed from the roll. He committed his offences over a period of a year and a half ending some 35 years ago, when he was just 26 years of age. Since that time, he has devoted himself to building a successful conveyancing practice.[85] In his practice he has handled, by his reckoning, over 5000 cheques with an average value in excess of $100,000. There has been no suggestion that Petsinis has at any point again come close to dishonesty, or duplicity, of the kind he perpetrated in his youth. Rather, counsel for the LSB specifically conceded that its concerns were limited to issues of what he termed 'sloppiness' and a lack of candour.

114 Those issues will still need to be addressed. However, it is important to recognise that there is no indication that the 'permanent defect' that Hampel J implicitly recognised in determining to strike Petsinis from the roll in 1984 continues. This leads to a preliminary view that admitting Petsinis to the Australian legal profession would not constitute a risk to the public. Petsinis' efforts in adapting to his changed circumstances after being struck off, and in establishing and maintaining a busy conveyancing practice, are to be commended.

115 Support for this proposition can be found in Johns v Law Society of New South Wales[86] which concerned an applicant who had been struck off the roll for deliberately misapplying trust funds for his own purposes. After having been struck off, Mr Johns set about making a new life for himself, re-establishing his reputation, and concentrating on a career in property development.[87] The Court of Appeal chose to readmit Mr Johns noting in his favour that he 'had established himself as a successful businessman by methods of complete propriety'.[88]

116 Turning to the other issues raised before this Court, Petsinis has had exchanges with the Law Institute of Victoria and a complaint was lodged against his practice with Consumer Affairs Victoria. At the hearing, his counsel submitted that the few complaints that had been raised against Petsinis should be considered against the background of the thirty years that he has been practising as a conveyancer. There is force in this argument. Further, we consider these incidents are not fatal to Petsinis' readmission given, in each instance, that no misconduct was substantiated and only warnings were given. It remains that in each instance the enforcement authority took no further steps to pursue Petsinis.

117 Nor should Petsinis' delay in repaying his debt to the Law Institute of Victoria or Solicitors' Guarantee Fund prohibit his readmission in all of the circumstances. The delay can, in part, be attributed to the Law Institute of Victoria's failure to make any effort to follow up on the debt for around 15 years. Although Petsinis is by no means free from blame in this regard, we consider that he has appropriately acknowledged his negligence and expressed his contrition. Further, having paid off the debt in 2000, it is no longer a prevailing concern in 2016.

118 Most troubling are the instances of unqualified engagement in legal practice. These have been repeated and extended. The LSB suggested that these 'showed a worrying lack of recognition of the effect of the orders striking [Petsinis] off the roll'. The fact that, from 2000 - when Hansen J specifically warned against engaging in unqualified legal work - to 2012, Petsinis either used his supervising lawyer irregularly or did not have a supervising lawyer to perform the necessary bespoke legal work at all is problematic.

119 It is relevant, as the Board noted in its reasons, that Petsinis was skilled in this work and was not likely to have endangered his clients' interests. But that does not mean that such conduct should not be condemned. If we had any concern that such disrespect for the law might continue, we would refuse admission.

120 However, we are satisfied in all the circumstances that Petsinis has now learned the risks of such behaviour, and that it will not be repeated.

121 Further, we appreciate that the distinction between conveyancing work and the legal work associated with conveyancing work can at times be opaque and that, in some instances at least, Petsinis was not deliberately flouting the law, but was, albeit misguidedly, devoting himself to serving his clients' interests.

122 Again, this does not neutralise the seriousness of his behaviour. However, it indicates that Petsinis does not possess an inherent propensity to subordinate the law to his own interests. In drawing attention to his various breaches of the law, scrutinising his poor decisions through the process of drafting his numerous affidavits, submitting to cross-examination before the Board of Examiners, and in seeking the approval of the Court, Petsinis has now brought the risks of future non-compliance to the absolute forefront of his mind.

123 We consider that the spectre of swift discipline and of an abandoned conveyancing practice have encouraged Petsinis to at last face the gravity of his actions, and will ensure he has no further lapses.

124 We agree with the majority of the Board's view that Petsinis has appropriately acknowledged and apologised for his engagement in unqualified legal practice and believe he would pose no risk to the public if admitted.

125 Further, we do not consider that Petsinis' affidavits were characterised by a lack of diligence or a lack of candour that should be fatal to his readmission, bearing in mind that he was attempting to canvass 35 years of his life in his materials.

126 Finally, it is relevant that Petsinis does not intend to seek a practising certificate if he is readmitted. His work would be confined solely to the conveyancing practice in which he has decades of experience, and its incidental legal work which most experienced conveyancers are authorised to perform.

127 In Re B,[89] Moffitt P expressed an uneasiness with the idea that an applicant's confined career aspirations might influence whether they would be deemed fit and proper. His Honour stated:[90]

the admission of a person as a barrister which is not in order that he may thereupon practise as such or where the applicant does not intend to practise or to do so on admission is foreign to the purpose the power was originally intended to serve, namely to fill deficiencies in the number of persons then practising. ...

[T]he point to be made for present purposes is that the standards of fitness are to be determined by the qualities to be expected of an applicant practising as a barrister and on the basis that the Court will be able to have that confidence in and trust of the applicant as is necessary of a practising barrister. The assumption must be made that on admission he will embark on the professional career of a barrister. There is conferred on the Supreme Court the power and the duty to exercise control of those who practise as barristers to ensure they meet the required standards of fitness. It has and exercises the power in the public interest to admit only those who are fit to be barristers and enjoy the privileges and undertake the duties cast upon them by law.

128 Self-evidently, the question in this case does not involve admission as a barrister, but Moffitt P's remarks can readily be understood as applying in similar terms to the admission of solicitors. We note, however, that the legislative regimes governing admission in both Victoria and New South Wales have changed since Moffitt P expressed this concern.

129 Under the current legislative regime, the Admission Rules call for consideration of whether the applicant 'is currently unable satisfactorily to carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner'.[91] Further, the stated objective of Part 2.2 of the Uniform Law it is to provide a system restricting eligibility for admission to the Australian legal profession in order 'to protect the administration of justice and the clients of law practices'.[92] Prima facie, therefore, Moffitt P's concern has been reflected in the Victorian legislation and applicants for admission to legal practice must always satisfy the same high standards of fitness and propriety to be eligible for admission to the Australian legal profession, regardless of their intentions.

130 Nevertheless, such a view is displaced by the clear legislative distinction between applications for admission to the Australian legal profession dealt with under Part 2.2 and applications for a practising certificate dealt with under Part 3.3. Section 45(2) requires that LSB not grant a practising certificate unless it is satisfied the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. This is a separate assessment to that conducted at the time of admission.

131 In our opinion, there is not an unresolvable tension between the admission of a person to the Australian legal profession and the imposition of a condition (or the requiring of an undertaking) that he or she not engage in legal practice.. In this case, we will impose conditions such that Petsinis' practice will be exclusively confined to conveyancing and its associated legal work, a practice in which he has extensive experience.

132 We are satisfied that the application should be granted. We will declare that Petsinis is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession, subject to the conditions that:

(i) he will not apply for a practising certificate; and

(ii) he will confine his practice to conveyancing and 'conveyancing work' as defined under s 4 of the Conveyancers Act 2006.

133 We will further order that Petsinis be admitted to the Australian legal profession on such terms, upon his taking of an oath of office or making of an affirmation of office in the required form, and that he be reserved the right to apply to the Court, at any appropriate time, to have the conditions on his admission expunged.

[1] Fenral Nominees Pty Ltd v Legal Practice Board [2000] VSC 489 [124] ('Fenral Nominees'), discussed below at [34]-[41]. See also Reasons of the Board of Examiners dated 13 April 2015 [28]-[30] ('BoE Reasons') which note there is some disagreement as to exactly when the conduct commenced but demonstrate it was within the first few months of 1980.

[2] R v Petsinis (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hampel J, 29 June 1984). See also Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [16].

[3] See Hansen J's comments in Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [124]-[125].

[4] R v Petsinis (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hampel J, 29 June 1984).

[9] Ibid 2; Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [113].

[10] See Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [150].

[15] Legal Practice Act 1996, ss 327-328.

[16] Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [41].

[21] See, eg, ibid [114]-[115], [119], [126].

[28] See above at [26].

[29] Fenral Nominees [2000] VSC 489 [66].

[36] See Conveyancers Act 2006 sch 1 cl 9(2); see also sch 1 cl 2(3).

[39] Conveyancers Act 2006 s 4.

[43] See above at [26]-[31].

[50] [2005] VSC 332 [71].

[51] Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, sch 1.

[52] Schedule 1 applies as if it were an Act: see s 4.

[53] [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409.

[57] These rules are published on the NSW legislation website as required by s 431(1) of the Uniform Law.

[58] [1934] St R Qd 1.

[59] [1997] 1 Qd R 533.

[60] Re an Application by L for Admission as a Legal Practitioner [2015] ACTSCFC 1 [29]-[32] ('Re L').

[61] [1934] St R Qd 1, 9.

[62] [1997] 1 Qd R 533, 537 (Pincus JA and Byrne J).

[65] See Re L [2015] ACTSCFC 1 [27] (conditions were ultimately imposed in that case).

[66] [2008] WASC 269; (2008) 38 WAR 208, 214 [30].

[67] Legal Practice Act 2004 s 1.2.6(1)(c).

[71] Cf Re L [2015] ACTSCFC 1 [17].

[72] [1948] HCA 45; (1948) 77 CLR 403, 422.

[73] Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] HCA 87; (1909) 9 CLR 655, 681 (Isaacs J), cited with approval in Re Bridgman [1934] St R Qd 1, 8.

[74] See, eg, Dixon v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2012] WASC 79 [24]-[27]; Ex parte Lenehan [1948] HCA 45; (1948) 77 CLR 403, 426; Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] HCA 87; (1909) 9 CLR 655, 681.

[75] [1934] St R Qd 1.

[77] [2008] WASC 269; (2008) 38 WAR 208, [33].

[78] [1934] St R Qd 1, 9.

[79] Ex Parte Lenehan [1948] HCA 45; (1948) 77 CLR 403.

[80] Ex Parte Lenehan [1948] HCA 45; (1948) 77 CLR 403, 423 (Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ).

[82] [2002] NSWSC 967.

[85] Cf Johns v Law Society of New South Wales [1991] NSWCA 158.

[89] [1981] 2 NSWLR 372.

[91] Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules 2015 r 10(1)(k).

[92] Legal Profession Legal Uniform Law Application Act 2014 sch 1 s 15.