DIXON -v- LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2012] WASC 79 (14 March 2012)

The evidence amply supported the conclusion of very serious unprofessional conduct in failing to make the necessary disclosure by deliberately concealing the true position from his wife, who was the applicant before the Family Court, and, more importantly, from the Court itself. Further, the practitioner was guilty of illegal conduct in the form of perjury committed by the deliberately false statements made in his affidavits. That was a form of perjury which related directly to the practitioner's duty as an officer of the Court and to the integrity of the proceedings before the Court. [10]

4 The applicant's misconduct extended beyond Western Australia. It involved his swearing false declarations in 2002 and 2003 to the regulatory authorities in Queensland. On the basis of false declarations that he was not the subject of local disciplinary proceedings, when he clearly was, the applicant was able to secure admission and then obtain practice certificates for a time, until the Queensland regulatory authorities became aware of the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in Western Australia in the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. As a result the applicant's entitlement to practice law in the State of Queensland ended in 2003. In December 2005, the Full Court ordered that the applicant be struck off in Western Australia.

5 In December 2010 the applicant applied, pursuant to provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (the 2008 Act) seeking what is effectively, his readmission. The 2008 Act, unlike its predecessors, does not differentiate as between applications for admission and readmission.

6 By Pt 4 Div 4 of the 2008 Act, it is the obligation of the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia (the Board) to consider all applications by persons for admission then, by reference to s 30(b), to:

advise the Supreme Court as to whether it considers that -

(i) the applicant is eligible for admission; and

(ii) the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted; and

(iii) the application is in accordance with the admission rules.

7 There is no controversy that the applicant is now eligible for admission. Furthermore, his admission application meets the 'admission rules'.

8 The fundamental question is whether the applicant is now a fit and proper person to be admitted as a legal practitioner in this State.

9 The court has received a compliance certificate from the Board, in accordance with the provisions of s 31 of the 2008 Act. It states, amongst other things, that the applicant is, in accordance with s 31(1)(a)(ii), a fit and proper person to be admitted.

10 Notwithstanding a compliance certificate from the Board, this court renders its own assessment as to the fitness and propriety of any applicant for admission: Mungar v Legal Practice Board of WA [2009] WASC 135 [19]. That is not to deny a certificate is a matter of significance, or that the views of the Board are not accorded due respect.

11 But the ultimate decision concerning what is here, effectively readmission, is for this court to render, on its own assessment of the evidence. That approach was explained in Re Stokes; Ex Parte Stokes [2008] WASC 269; (2008) 38 WAR 208 by Martin CJ (with whom Murray and Templeman JJ agreed). Referring to observations of Moffit P in Re B [1981] 2 NSWLR 372, 378, Martin CJ said:

Accordingly, although the certificate of the Board under s 34 of the [2003] Act is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court, it is the court which must determine whether, in the end, an applicant for readmission is a fit and proper person to be readmitted. That is why it is necessary for the court to receive and fully evaluate the evidence which was before the relevant Committee of the Board prior to the grant of its certificate. While the findings made by the Committee of the Board after hearing and receiving the evidence and the submissions of the parties will obviously be of significance to the court, those findings will not be determinative of the view to be formed by the court on the subject of readmission. [30]

12 Re Stokes was decided under the 2003 Act. But, as the court explained in Mungar [21], the position under the 2008 Act is essentially unaltered.

13 The Board's compliance certificate for the applicant was issued on 24 October 2011. It followed a comprehensive inquiry made by the Admissions Committee (the Committee) of the Board, that spanned hearings on 30 May and 15 June 2011. The Committee provided its advice of 27 pages to the Board on 20 October 2011. The advice comprehensively explains the nature of the Committee's inquiries and conclusions.

14 The court has had the assistance of the Committee's advice, including all foundational documentary materials upon which it was based. The materials include a transcript of the Committee's inquiries across two hearing days, plus all written materials the Committee considered.

15 Materials before the Committee included the applicant's witness statement and his oral testimony (tab 16); medical evidence (to which reference will be made); a number of impressive personal references from longstanding friends and professional colleagues; evidence adduced to the Committee from Dr BEF Hockings, a longstanding friend (ts 40 45); the evidence of Ms McMahon, a legal practitioner and longstanding friend of the applicant; and from Mr JM Hall, another longstanding colleague and golfing associate of the applicant (ts 52 57). A reference was also provided from the applicant's exwife. She supports his application for readmission in circumstances where their relationship has improved and is now cordial and supportive. Other references spoke of the applicant's more settled disposition and as to his general good character.

16 We have assessed all those materials, in addressing the basal question as to whether or not the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession: see s 26(1)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act. For the purposes of the exercise this court 'may rely on the advice of the Board' (s 26(2)) and the Board's advice may be contained in a 'compliance certificate' (s 26(3)).

17 A 'fit and proper person' is a recurrently mentioned requirement throughout Pt 4 of the 2008 Act; see in that respect s 20(a) and s 22. The latter provision works by reference to identified considerations called 'suitability matters'. They are defined under s 8 of the 2008 Act; see also s 26(1)(a)(ii), s 30(b)(ii) and s 31(1)(a)(ii). One specified consideration listed as a suitability matter, by s 8(1)(h), is

whether the person's name has been removed from -

(i) the local roll, and has not since been restored to or entered on a local roll; or

(ii) an interstate roll, and has not since been restored to or entered on an interstate roll; or

(iii) a foreign roll.

18 The requirement that an applicant for admission to legal practice be a fit and proper person, is the fundamental consideration. The threshold is applicable to an applicant's entitlement to be admitted (or readmitted) as a member of the legal profession, as well as to circumstances bearing upon a striking off of a legal practitioner from the Roll. It is necessary to elaborate upon the requirement.

19 In the context of a legal practitioner who is struck from the Roll, it is helpful to mention some recent observations made in this court in Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Bachmann [2011] WASC 309 [46]. There a Full Bench, comprising Martin CJ, Heenan and Jenkins JJ, said:

The critical consideration to be addressed by the court is whether the practitioner has been shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner: Ziems (297 298); A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253 [15]; Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Thorpe [2008] WASC 9 [43]. Fitness to practise law requires that the practitioner must command the personal confidence of his or her clients, fellow practitioners and judges: In re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409, 420 (Dixon J), Thorpe [43], and Brennan [11]. Fitness to practice is to be decided at the time of the hearing, not as at the time the relevant conduct was entered into: A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [21].

20 It is not possible to further distil an inquiry as to fit and proper beyond the fundamental notion, which, at the end of the day, is the ultimate question: Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279, 297 298 (Kitto J) and Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association [1960] HCA 40; (1960) 104 CLR 186, 189. It is a question that requires the court to make a value judgment about the presenting circumstances at a particular point in time. This is a judgment about which reasonable minds may differ. In Ziems, there were differing conclusions in the High Court over the appropriateness of striking off a barrister, after he was convicted for vehicular manslaughter. The majority judges, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ, reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court). In lieu of disbarment, they imposed a period of suspension for the duration of the barrister's imprisonment. In contrast, Dixon CJ and McTiernan J would have upheld the decision of the Full Court to strike the practitioner from the Roll of Barristers. However, it should be noted that in Ziems the underlying misconduct arose in the barrister's personal, not his professional capacity. That is not this case.

21 Case authority at the highest levels addresses the nature of a court's inquiry as to the fitness and propriety of a practitioner seeking readmission. The decisions of the High Court in Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] HCA 87; (1909) 9 CLR 655 and Ex parte Lenehan [1948] HCA 45; (1949) 77 CLR 403 were readmission applications. In the latter decision, Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ said (422):

The decisions cited refer to cases where a solicitor who had been on the roll was struck off the roll. When such a person applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to the probable permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal. A solicitor may be restored to the roll after he has been struck off, but the power to reinstate should be exercised with the greatest caution and only upon solid and substantial grounds.

The question to be decided is not one of law to be determined by reference to previous decisions. The duty of the court is to determine in what manner the court should exercise its discretion in the particular circumstances of each case.

(our emphasis in bold, citations omitted)

22 In Lenehan, Rich J (who with Starke J dissented in the result), observed (426):

Applications by persons seeking admission and those to strike solicitors off the roll impose on the court a painful and disagreeable task. But it is necessary and must be exercised with firmness in the interests of the public. Solicitors are officers of the court and the public expects that the court will, so far as it can, ensure upright and honourable conduct on the part of its officers. The interests of the court, the public, the profession and of the applicant must be considered (cf In re Kearney (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 87, 89). The public must not be exposed to improper officers of the court (Re Hill [[1868] LR 3 QB, 545]).

(our emphasis in bold)

23 Fitness and propriety have also been considered by the High Court in the related context of a striking off application. Cases in this category include In re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409 (failing to disclose on application for admission to the Roll of Barristers a conviction for breaking, entering and stealing); Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the effect of a conviction for vehicular manslaughter as regards the penalties of either suspension or striking from the Roll); Clyne v The New South Wales Bar Association (professional misconduct arising out of maintenance, intimidation and unsubstantiated inflammatory character attacks in an opening address); New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt [1968] HCA 20; (1968) 117 CLR 177 (gross overcharging) and A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253 (convictions for sexual offences against children and failure to disclose similar offences).

24 At the intermediate appellate level, Doyle CJ in Re Harrison; Application re Readmission [2002] SASC 335; (2002) 84 SASR 120 helpfully summarised readmission principles as to the fitness and propriety of an applicant, removed from the Roll in 1983, and then refused readmission in 1992. Referring to New South Wales Bar Association v Davis [1963] HCA 31; (1963) 109 CLR 428, 432; Ex parte Lenehan (422); and Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher, Doyle CJ observed:

It is also relevant to recall that in such a matter the court acts in the public interest, and not with a view to punishment. The court is concerned to protect the public. It is not concerned with punishment of a practitioner who has done wrong, although the removal of the practitioner's name from the roll of practitioners will operate as a punishment, and a refusal to restore the name of a former practitioner to that roll may seem to be a form of punishment. The court's concern is to protect the public and the administration of justice by preventing a person from acting as a legal practitioner if that person is not fit to remain a member of the profession: see Law Society of South Australia v Murphy (1999) 201 LSJS 456 at 460-461 and Law Society of South Australia v Rodda [2002] SASC 274; (2002) 83 SASR 541 at 545 [20]- [22].

... A legal practitioner is held out by the court as a person fit and proper to discharge an important responsibility. A practitioner is an officer of the court, and is involved in the administration of justice. Legal practitioners are also held out to the public as persons upon whom the public may rely, and in whose integrity they may trust. The court cannot hold a person out to the public as a fit and proper person to be a practitioner, if it is not satisfied that this is the case. As I have said, this has nothing to do with questions of punishment or reform or rehabilitation. As I said in Rodda at [29], another factor to consider is the reputation and standing of the legal profession. The court must consider whether public confidence and trust in the legal profession would be eroded if a person were permitted to remain or to become a member of the profession, notwithstanding the past conduct that is in question. [60] [61]

(our emphasis in bold)

25 Doyle CJ's observations in Rodda [29] mentioned above have been referred to with approval by Murray and Beech JJ in Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Pepe [2009] WASC 39 [9]. There, at [9] and [10], their Honours refer to a need to preserve the standing and reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of the community and, at [10], to the maintenance of proper standards in the legal profession.

26 As to serious misconduct, it is helpful to refer to the precursor readmission application, Re Harrison, considered by a South Australian Full Court comprising King CJ, Prior and Debell JJ (Re Harrison (1992) 168 LSJS 84) (8):

Whatever may be thought as to the weight to be attached to the Board's finding as to lack of candour and as to whether they presented an obstacle to the success of the application, the fatal obstacle to the application is not any deficiency in the conduct of his case before the Board of Examiners, but the conduct which led to his striking off. It was not the conduct of a young and immature person nor an isolated act committed under stress. The applicant's conduct in his midforties towards the clients who placed their trust in him was flagrantly dishonest. That conduct, together with his behaviour in the subsequent proceedings, demonstrates a character so flawed as to preclude readmission to the legal profession.

(our emphasis in bold)

See also Murray and Beech JJ in Pepe [10] as regards very serious cases.

27 It will be appreciated, from many authorities concerning striking off and readmission, that a court, in exercising a protective jurisdiction, does not act punitively. It acts in the public interest. Aspects of the public interest, arising in assessing fitness and propriety, do involve the encouragement of rehabilitation and redemption of practitioners, struck from the Roll. There is also an allied economic interest in potential service to the community by persons appropriately equipped providing legal services. Those considerations are clearly relevant and important. We acknowledge their force. But the range of public interest considerations in play clearly extends more broadly. It must extend to encompass, as well, the interests of the court and a maintenance of the high reputation and standards in the legal profession: see Ziems (286); Re Maraj (A Legal Practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12, 25 (Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Franklyn JJ agreeing); Re Harrison [61] (Doyle CJ); Pepe [10] and [11].

28 Here, the applicant seeks readmission after just over six years from when he was struck off. Placing heavy reliance upon two paragraphs in Re Stokes; Ex parte Stokes, the applicant contends that he is now a fit and proper person, for the purposes of readmission. The Board supports his readmission. It is contended that the applicant, now approaching 64 years of age, has finally displayed insight and remorse regarding his earlier catalogue of professional misconduct, spanning over 11 years.

29 The applicant's basal plea as regards his present fitness and propriety and suitability for readmission as a legal practitioner is encapsulated under his written outline of submissions at par 7:

Essentially (in the present instance) this Honourable Court must be satisfied on the materials before it that the Applicant is a fit and proper person which in turn basically means it must be satisfied that there is no significant risk of repetition of the conduct which gave rise to the striking off: Re Stokes at [32].

(our emphasis in bold)

30 The governing premise of the applicant's argument is that an assessment of the risk of a repetition by him of the professional misconduct which gave rise to his striking off is 'basically' the exclusive consideration for this court (and for the Board) in assessing fitness and propriety at this time. As we will explain, the premise is too narrowly framed.

31 In Re Stokes, the readmitted practitioner had been struck off the Roll for a period in excess of 16 years. His removal was occasioned by misconduct relating to his false declarations and trust account irregularities: Re Stokes at [9] [12]. On the readmission application in Re Stokes the Chief Justice observed:

An applicant who has been previously struck from the roll must bear a much heavier and distinctly different onus to that borne by an applicant seeking admission for the first time. In the case of an applicant for readmission, the applicant carries the onus of proving that there is no significant prospect of repetition of the conduct of the kind which resulted in the removal of his or her name from the roll - see Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 499; [2002] 2 Qd R 583 at [18]. In this context it is worth repeating that the jurisdiction of the court in respect of the maintenance of the roll of practitioners is not a jurisdiction exercised for the purpose of punishing practitioners, but for the purpose of protecting the community (Clyne v The New South Wales Bar Association [1960] HCA 40; (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201 - 202), which depends upon the provision of legal services by practitioners of appropriate character, honesty and integrity.

However, if the court can have the requisite confidence that there will be no significant risk of repetition of the misconduct which resulted in the removal of the practitioner's name from the roll, there is a public interest in the restoration of the names of such persons to the roll. That public interest derives in part from the fact that such persons will be in a position to serve the community by providing legal services, but also from the encouragement of rehabilitation and redemption of those whose conduct has, in the past, prevented them from conducting their profession - see Kirby P in Kotowicz v Law Society of New South Wales, unreported; NSWCA; 7 August 1987. [32] [33]

32 Referring to an apparent vulnerability in the legal profession to mental illness and then the need for the community to have confidence in the capacity of those admitted to practise law, the Chief Justice also observed:

However, where the court can be satisfied by evidence that the incapacity, which resulted in appropriate steps being taken to protect the community, is no longer present, it will equally be in the interests of the community to take steps to enable the practitioner to resume the delivery of services. [34]

33 It will be noted that the Chief Justice's reasons in Re Stokes mention Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 499; [2002] 2 Qd R 583, a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. Reference is also made to the dissenting reasons of Kirby P in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in Kotowicz v Law Society of New South Wales (Unreported, NSWCA, 7 August 1987). It is necessary for us to consider both these decisions in order to appreciate the context of the observations found in the reasons in Re Stokes. We examine those cases in evaluating the foundational submission which essentially is that, by reason of the medical evidence adduced to the Committee, a depressive illness from which the applicant was suffering across the period of his professional misconduct is now resolved or controlled. It is said, in consequence, that there is now no significant risk of any repetition of professional misconduct by the applicant.

34 However, as we have discussed above, to the extent the foundational submission proceeds from the premise that the court's protective jurisdiction does not extend beyond making an assessment of the likelihood of the disqualifying conduct being repeated, it is, with respect, clearly incorrect. It seeks to misapply, out of context, observations made in Re Stokes.

35 Gregory v Queensland Law Society was a readmission application. McPherson JA agreed with the reasons and conclusion of Thomas JA that the applicant should not be readmitted. The court applied what may be seen as orthodox readmission principles, by reference to the leading case authorities, to which we have referred. Under 'Relevant principles' Thomas JA said:

In proceedings for striking off a legal practitioner, and in proceedings for the readmission of a practitioner after striking off, the Court is not concerned with the question of punishment. The basic question for the Court upon an application of the present kind is whether the applicant has shown that he is now a fit and proper person to practise. Relevant principles have been restated in a number of relatively recent decisions of appellate courts in Australia. These decisions emphasise that the power to reinstate should be exercised with considerable caution and only upon solid and substantial grounds. [17]

(our emphasis in bold, footnotes omitted)

36 Those remarks preceded observations at [18], as referred to by Martin CJ in Re Stokes. Thomas JA then observed:

The Court exercises a protective, not a punitive role, having primary regard to the protection of the public interest and the interest of the profession. [18]

(our emphasis in bold, footnotes omitted)

We note from Gregory, Thomas JA's express acknowledgement of the interest of the (legal) profession. Thomas JA referred to Re Giles (Unreported, ACTFC, 17 June 1994) and to Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (201). Thomas JA continued:

One useful way of dealing with the matter is to ask whether in all the circumstances the Court is justified in putting the applicant before the public as a fit and proper person to follow the honourable calling of solicitor. It is recognised that a solicitor applying for reinstatement is in a different and more disadvantageous position than an original applicant, because he must displace the prospect of continuance of conduct of the kind which resulted in his removal. I also agree with de Jersey CJ's further comments in [Janus v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180] that 'one should in this inquiry focus on the applicant's intrinsic character, and not be unduly distracted by his good fame, whether within the legal profession or the wider community'. [18]

(footnotes omitted)

37 Reference to Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association draws in observations of Dixon CJ (with McTiernan, Fullagar, Menzies and Windeyer JJ), who observed as regards professional misconduct by a barrister (in using improper tactics before a Magistrate) (201 202):

It shows that tactics which ignore elementary ethical standards may be successful up to a point, and so reinforces our view that only disbarment can meet such a case as the present. Although it is sometimes referred to as 'the penalty of disbarment', it must be emphasised that a disbarring order is in no sense punitive in character. When such an order is made, it is made, from the public point of view, for the protection of those who require protection, and from the professional point of view, in order that abuse of privilege may not lead to loss of privilege.

(our emphasis in bold)

38 Observations made in Gregory at [18] as regards the court's protective role, explicitly envisage a task that extends beyond a mere assessment of the applicant's likelihood of a future infliction of harm upon potential clients if readmitted. The protective role is clearly recognised to extend as well to the protection of the reputation and standards of the legal profession. This is hardly surprising, they being indispensable components in the overall administration of justice.

39 Kotowicz v Law Society of New South Wales concerned an application in the New South Wales Court of Appeal where the applicant sought restoration to the Roll of Solicitors. Samuels and Mahoney JJA concluded, chiefly from considerations arising out of the applicant's lack of candour in his dealings with the regulatory authority, that the applicant should not be readmitted. The majority judges both applied the orthodox readmission principles as stated in Ex parte Lenehan (422), to which we have referred.

40 Kirby P reached a different conclusion. He would have readmitted the applicant. In reaching that dissenting conclusion, Kirby P summarised the case authority, stating 10 principles. On analysis, those principles appear to be largely orthodox. They included:

(a) the nonpunitive nature of the jurisdiction being exercised by the court;

(b) the heavy onus carried by the applicant seeking to reestablish fitness to be restored to the Roll;

(c) need for the applicant to demonstrate his fitness and propriety on 'solid and substantial grounds';

(d) a disadvantageous position, compared to an original applicant, of a person seeking readmission to the Roll, on the basis of a need to displace the decision to remove reached on the basis that the solicitor is 'probably permanently' unfit to be on the Roll, and the absence of all presumptions as to fitness that might otherwise follow for an original applicant;

(e) the fact that the court's readmission decision, in each case, depends ultimately upon facts proved.

41 Principles 7, 8 and 10 identified by Kirby P in Kotowicz involved considerations as to an applicant's rehabilitation, redemption and the economic benefit to the community from the provision of legal services. But it is axiomatic, reading the reasons in context, that Kirby P did not suggest that principles 7, 8 and 10 were exclusive considerations in a court's exercise of its protective jurisdiction. There were 10 principles mentioned. This is also apparent in Kirby P's ninth principle in Kotowicz, concerning the sheer gravity of some disqualifying conduct. His Honour said (23):

In the case of some offences, committed over an extended period, with deliberate intent and resulting in severe losses by clients, it will be difficult to contemplate any circumstances in which the offender will be restored to the Roll. But where the offences are isolated, where there is no evidence of prolonged deliberate conduct and where, to the full extent possible in the circumstances, the funds of clients have been restored so that there is no eventual pecuniary loss, the public interest which this court protects includes the public interest, certain matters being affirmatively proved, in the restoration of the practitioner to the Roll.

(our emphasis in bold)

42 On a fair reading of Kirby P's dissenting reasons in Kotowicz (and the Chief Justice's subsequent reference to them in Re Stokes), they provide no basis to support a contention that this court's consideration of the public interest under its protective jurisdiction, is exclusively confined to rehabilitation and redemption of the disqualified practitioner, demonstrated by an absence of any significant risk of repetition of the disqualifying misconduct. Those considerations are undoubtedly important and will be recognised as carrying considerable force. But they comprise aspects of a protective inquiry. They raise considerations which are to be weighed along with all other important public interest considerations, including the interests of the court and the protection of the high reputation and standards of a legal profession, generally.

43 In the present circumstances, the Board issued its compliance certificate after receiving the advice of its Committee of 20 October 2011, concluding that the applicant had been assessed to be a fit and proper person. It is necessary for us to assess the advice. Before doing that, however, we will summarise some uncontroversial matters as regards this readmission application.

Uncontroversial propositions as regards this application for readmission

(a) The time for assessment as to the fitness and propriety of the applicant is at the time of assessing his readmission application.

(b) The disqualifying conduct of the applicant in the present case, albeit arising, in part, in an acrimonious and drawn out family law dispute with his exwife, was misconduct in his professional, rather than in his personal, capacity.

(c) The applicant in the period in question, was a senior member of the profession (in years) with experience in handling Family Court litigation.

(d) For reasons unclear, the applicant was not charged with perjury under s 124 of the Criminal Code, notwithstanding that he clearly swore false affidavits on no less than five occasions and gave false evidence to the Family Court. By s 125 of the Criminal Code, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a person who commits perjury is a term of imprisonment of 14 years.

(e) A heavy onus rested upon this applicant in pursuing his readmission to persuade the court of his present fitness and propriety from an evidentiary platform which was solid and substantial: see Lenehan (422).

45 Before assessing the basis upon which the Committee and the Board reached views that the applicant was now a fit and proper person for readmission to the legal profession, it is necessary to describe with more detail the chain of professional misconduct that led to his removal from the Roll in December 2005, after three decades as a practitioner in Western Australia.

46 These facts are extracted from materials provided to the court by the Board in the advice and incorporated documentary materials. They constitute sustained professional misconduct which was, on any view, disgraceful.

47 The core facts constituting the applicant's disqualifying conduct can be summarised, in as neutral terms as we can, by this chronology:

Applicant separated from his wife of some 12 years.

Proceedings commenced by applicant's wife in the Family Court of Western Australia.

Deposits $1,730.40 into an offshore bank account in Singapore (the Singapore savings account). The transfer to the offshore account is accepted by the applicant to have been an attempt to hide his assets from his wife in the Family Court proceedings then pending.

Signs a false certificate certifying that his discovery in the Family Court proceedings was complete when it was not.

Deposits a further $1,100 into the Singapore savings account.

Swears his first false affidavit stating that he has no other assets or income and specifically not mentioning the funds in the Singapore savings account.

Deposits $1,475 into the Singapore savings account.

Deposits a further $17,136.39 into Singapore term deposit (another offshore account).

Deposits a further $10,000 into Singapore savings account.

Signs a second false certificate in the Family Court certifying that his discovery was complete, when it was not.

Swears a second false affidavit stating that he had no other assets, failing to mention the offshore accounts.

Signs what is a third false certificate certifying that discovery in the Family Court proceedings was complete, when it was not.

Files a schedule of assets in the Family Court without mention of the Singapore savings account, or Singapore term deposit.

Swears third false affidavit stating that he had no other assets or income, again not mentioning the Singapore accounts.

Sends a letter to his Singapore bank instructing the bank to alter the nature of the account to a joint account held by the applicant and his mother.

Swears a fourth false affidavit stating he had no other assets or income. In light of the existence of the Singapore accounts, this was false.

Swears fifth false affidavit stating he had no other assets or income.

Gives false evidence to the Family Court of Western Australia as to a 'gifting' of the funds in the Singapore savings account to his mother.

Reasons for decision published by Holden CJ in the Family Court expose concealment of funds in the Singapore bank accounts.

In a wake of the observations by Holden CJ, the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia commences investigations. Applicant does not cooperate with the Legal Practice Board's inquiries. Denies any unprofessional conduct.

Ceases legal practice in Western Australia and travels overseas.

Disciplinary proceeding references R12A and R12B commenced against the applicant in Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal of Western Australia by the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee (LPCC).

Applies for a practising certificate in Queensland. False statutory declaration stating that he is not the subject of disciplinary proceedings, when that is plainly not so.

Hearing before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. Applicant calls mother as witness. Puts to her a false proposition that money in the Singapore savings account was a gift, knowing that proposition to be false.

In legal practice in Queensland with Roberts Nehmer McKee.

Makes a (second) false declaration concerning the nonexistence of disciplinary proceedings concerning him whilst seeking a renewal of Queensland practice certificate.

Hearing proceeds before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. Does not attend.

Removed from the Roll of Practitioners in the State of Queensland.

Struck off Roll of Practitioners by order of a Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

48 The written submissions by the Board to this court support the applicant's readmission. They do so principally by reference to the same observations in Re Stokes at [32] and [33], to which we have referred. The Board submitted at par 13:

If the Court can have the requisite confidence that there is no significant risk of repetition of the misconduct which resulted in the applicant's removal from the roll, there is a public interest in the applicant's readmission. That public interest is in part derived from the fact that the applicant can serve the community by providing legal services, but also from encouragement of the rehabilitation and redemption of those whose conduct has prevented them from practising (Re Stokes at [33]).

49 That stance reflects the advice of the Board's Committee.

50 The Committee's assessment appears to have been strongly influenced by the evidence, opinions and written reports of a consultant clinical psychiatrist, Dr Dennis Tannenbaum.

51 The Board's submissions provide a convenient summary of the evidence and findings reached by its Committee, particularly influenced by Dr Tannenbaum's advice. At par 20 the Board said:

Accordingly, the [Committee] found that:-

(a) a person of Mr Dixon's background was extremely vulnerable to the development of depression and anxiety disorders (Advice [65]);

(b) from 1990 until 1993, Mr Dixon was suffering from severe depression and alcohol dependency triggered by his son's illness, with underlying extreme vulnerability to loss as a manifestation of feelings from childhood (Advice [66]);

(c) Mr Dixon's severe depression and related alcohol dependency from 1990 to 1993 caused his erratic and selfdestructive behaviour Advice [68]);

(d) there was nothing to suggest that Mr Dixon's severe depression, and the resultant erratic and selfdestructive behaviour, did not continue (Advice [71]) and in 1997 his psychiatric condition had changed little, but his behaviour was perhaps more irrational than before (Advice [73]);

(e) at the time of the events which led Mr Dixon being struck off he was suffering from severe depression exacerbated by alcohol dependence (Advice [76]). While the disclosure of his fraud was likely to have caused the acute depression in 1997, he was set on that path by the events in 1990 and his feelings developed in childhood (Advice [77]);

(f) in both 2010 and at the time of the hearing, Mr Dixon was no longer suffering from depression or an alcohol dependency and his mental health is unproblematic (Advice [81]);

(g) a risk remained that Mr Dixon might develop severe depression in the future, but depression caused by an external stress could be managed by treatment, which, given that Mr Dixon was older and wiser, would be far more effective than previously (Advice [82]).

(original emphasis)

52 It is necessary for us to assess the advice of the Committee in more depth.

53 Between pars 11 and 14 of its advice, the Committee identified the approach it would follow in the exercise upon which it was about to embark for the purpose of its assessment of the fitness and propriety of the applicant, under s 30 and s 31 of the 2008 Act. The Committee said:

1. The sole issue is whether the Board considers Mr Dixon a fit and proper person to be admitted, having regard to what has been stated by the Full Bench in Stokes at [32].
2. The Full Bench in Stokes explained the manner in which the Court sought [sic, ought] to be satisfied that the applicant for readmission was fit and proper, and although the jurisdiction of the Court and that of the Board in these applications are not coextensive, the central matter identified by the Court in Stokes is that to which the Board must necessarily have regard in exercising its power.
3. This central matter is whether 'there is no significant prospect of repetition of the conduct of the kind which resulted in the removal of his or her name from the roll'.
4. This focus upon the risk of repetition of the misconduct that gave rise to striking off, in turn requires the Board, in exercising its jurisdiction, to, first, examine the reasons why the applicant was struck off; second, determine whether the causes which gave rise to these reasons still exist, or have been ameliorated or eliminated; third, if not eliminated, to consider the risk of repetition and, fourth, if the causes of the misconduct have been eliminated or ameliorated to a degree such that the risk of repetition is sufficiently low, whether in all other respects the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a member of the legal profession in this State.

54 It is clear that the Committee focused, almost exclusively, upon what it assessed as a 'central matter'. This it saw as the prospect of a repetition of the disqualifying conduct which led to the applicant's removal from the Roll.

55 Immediately it may be seen, with respect, that the focus of the Committee's inquiry was too narrow. The Committee has applied out of context the observations in Re Stokes. As we have explained, properly understood, the observations in Re Stokes do not exclude from consideration the important, wider policy issues concerning the reputation and standing of the legal profession. They are also key ingredients within an overall protection of the public interest. The Committee's narrowness in approach then flowed through to the Board's issue of its compliance certificate under s 31 of the Legal Profession Act.

56 But apart from the unduly narrow approach of principle to assessing the applicant's fitness and propriety, it is apparent that the Committee's recommendations were influenced by the reports and testimony of Dr Tannenbaum. Dr Tannenbaum rendered an assessment as to the present state of the applicant's mental health, in light of a history of the applicant's prior depressive illness.

57 Because of the importance of this psychiatric evidence, it is necessary to collate it to some extent. We address that task next.

58 Dr Tannenbaum's evidence included his testimony to the Committee on 15 June 2011 (ts 4 29) and his two written reports, being:

(a) a report of 30 May 2001, prepared for the applicant's then solicitors; and

(b) the report of 12 October 2010, prepared for the applicant's current solicitors.

59 Dr Tannenbaum had treated the applicant intermittently since 1990, preceding the separation from his (now) exwife and ensuing (protracted) matrimonial proceedings.

I attempted marital therapy with both in 1990 but this did not lead to resolution and there was considerable stress and distress and by the middle of 1992 the issues had [gone] to court and there was constant pressure and difficulties between 1992 and 1993 related to the separation and settlement and substantial deterioration of his practice, depression and requirement to take antidepressants in view of his dysfunction and alcohol difficulties.

There was a significant gap after 1993. In 1997 he again relapsed. At this time there were continued stressors still with his exwife and it took until December 1998 for him to stabilise and cease alcohol. He was again seen in 1999. He had continued difficulties and still noted marital problems.

He decompensated substantially during 1999 related to multiple problems and the need to wind up his practice and he was seen through 1999 to 2000 and was last seen on the 3rd March 2000. At this time he was looking at some time away and was looking at his future.

61 The report of May 2001 followed the applicant last being seen by Dr Tannenbaum on 3 March 2000.

62 The 2001 report observed, as to the applicant's then condition:

Haydn Dixon was seen in the context of the emergence of marital difficulties through that period through to the development of his significant major depression and multiple crisis. He also had a significant alcohol problem.

63 As to prognosis, Dr Tannenbaum concluded in 2001:

Mr Dixon essentially lost his ability to practice, but following time away seemed to have reconstituted his defences. I do not know currently how he is coping or his level of function.

His prognosis relates to repeated and concurrent difficulties, which led to decompensation. Should he be able to resume his career and live a more stable life, he would be able to function better, one would hope, but I have never seen him where there has been any period of stability since his initial contact in 1990.

64 The applicant visited another specialist psychiatrist Dr Julian Boulnois, in Southport, Queensland, in 2005. Following a oneoff consultation, Dr Boulnois prepared a report of 23 May 2005, for the applicant's then solicitors.

65 It is apparent Dr Boulnois had been provided by the solicitors with a copy of Dr Tannenbaum's report of May 2001. At page 3 Dr Boulnois, referring to the applicant's denial of any deep feelings of depression (as to which Dr Boulnois was not convinced) and a noted exhibition of anxiety and avoidance by the applicant, said:

Therefore at this time [the applicant] does suffer from a mental illness, chronically so, but stable and stationary, or such is my opinion, and mild to moderate in its overall effect, as such he is suffering from no mental illness, in my opinion, that denies him responsibility for his actions and certainly there is no evidence of psychotic disorder which would either disorient him in time place or person, affect in any capacity his short term memory, or deny him access to what might be referred to as reality. As such, strictly speaking, he is suffering from no form of mental disorder which would deny him at this time access to a role within the legal profession; however in spite of what I have said, I would certainly commend that [the applicant] would be extraordinarily well advised to consider that psychiatric treatment in a formal sense should take a part in his every day life.

66 Dr Tannenbaum's 12 October 2010 report was prepared after only one review and consultation. Prior to 2010, the applicant had not been seen by Dr Tannenbaum since March 2000.

67 In 2010, Dr Tannenbaum noted the applicant's return to Western Australia, cessation of alcohol consumption while in Queensland and reduction in the quantity of antidepressants taken. He observed that the applicant's moods had remained stable. They had not required any level of significant further treatment. Dr Tannenbaum observed:

[Mr Dixon] returned to Western Australia to rejoin his family, and is now looking after his elderly mother and is working as a courier.

Mr Dixon has returned to a small level of alcohol consumption which I have advised him to cease, as he remains at significant risk with it, but his mood remains stable and he has a stable relationship ... Mr Dixon is looking after his mother who is frail and is deteriorating fairly quickly.

68 At page 3 of his 2010 report Dr Tannenbaum, referring to his 10 year treatment of the applicant (between 1990 and 2000), said: 'Even though there were short periods where he was able to get reestablished and functional again, his difficulties continued intermittently for that entire 10 year period'.

It appears that the last 10 years have been a lot better for Mr Dixon, with him steadily accepting responsibility for his misdeeds, and living a simpler, but productive, life.

70 As to fitness to resume legal practice, Dr Tannenbaum gave this opinion:

As far as I am able to establish, his future risks are low. His moods have remained stable, and he has largely remained off alcohol and has not resumed excessive drinking.

Were he to return to practice, I would suggest that this be on an initially supervised basis, and preferably within an ongoing program for practitioners who have previously been impaired, however at the same time even though I recognise that these may be appropriate safeguards, I do believe that his future risk is quite low and that he is a very different person to the man that I knew in the past.

71 It is clear Dr Tannenbaum did not see the applicant between 2000 and 2010. Reference to Mr Dixon's improvement within that timeframe jars somewhat against the applicant's presenting condition, as observed by Dr Boulnois in May 2005, and particularly against Dr Boulnois' recommendation that psychiatric treatment in a formal sense be a part of the applicant's everyday life.

72 Dr Tannenbaum's evidence on 15 June 2011 confirmed both his 2001 and 2010 reports. He had not seen the applicant since one consultation that preceded his 2010 May report. He confirmed (ts 7, line 20) the applicant's ongoing vulnerability to developing depression and anxiety disorders.

73 Dr Tannenbaum identified what he termed a 'psychological reset' over a 10 year period (by reference to point 3 of his report) between 2000 and 2010 (ts 18, line 20). He was not aware if the applicant was currently on antidepressant medication in 2011. (We were told, on 22 December 2011, he was not.)

74 Dr Tannenbaum mentioned the applicant's reduced alcohol consumption (reduced to two glasses of wine a night, from an earlier consumption pattern of a bottle and a half of wine per day) (ts 22).

75 Dr Tannenbaum confirmed to the Committee the standing of his recommendation that the applicant cease all consumption of alcohol, indicating, by reference to past history, that any level of consumption by the applicant was 'probably not a wise idea' (ts 22).

76 Dr Tannenbaum did not agree with Dr Boulnois' view that psychiatric treatment in a formal sense, should form a part of the applicant's everyday life. He described that as a 'fairly extreme view' (ts 25). But he also added:

But can I say that there is a difference between what treatment would be and if he would be returned to practice, where I do believe he would need to be part of an ongoing support program.

77 We would summarise, from the state of this medical evidence, that:

(a) There are significant time periods when the applicant was not treated by any psychiatrist: 1993 1997, then 2000 - 2010 (apart from seeing Dr Boulnois in Queensland in 2005) and currently.

(b) Apart from Dr Tannenbaum's May 2010 report (prepared on the instigation of the applicant's solicitors, for a purpose of furthering his application for readmission), the applicant is not under any ongoing regime of psychiatric care. That is against Dr Boulnois' contrary recommendation in 2005 (albeit, Dr Tannenbaum considers that an extreme view).

(c) Dr Tannenbaum's opinion is that, the applicant in 2011 being 'older and wiser', it is probable that he would seek out psychiatric assistance were he to encounter (after readmission to legal practice) future depressive illness lapses, to which it is accepted he remains vulnerable.

(d) The applicant does not appear to accept that he had suffered from a depressive illness. This was notwithstanding a regime of prior psychiatric treatment or the antidepressant medication the applicant was prescribed and consumed from as early as 1990.

(e) The applicant has had a psychological 'reset', assessed by Dr Tannenbaum to have occurred over the 10 year period leading up to his May 2010 report. However, when the applicant was assessed by Dr Boulnois in 2005, the applicant was said to require ongoing psychiatric treatment.

78 Even delimiting the ambit of the Committee's assessment to a socalled 'central issue' over a likelihood of repetition of the disqualifying conduct, the Committee, at the end of its deliberations, was troubled by three particular matters.

79 These were, first, the applicant's apparent lack of awareness or appreciation, or alternatively an unwillingness to accept, he had actually been diagnosed as having suffered from severe depression or that he had actually received treatment (i.e. antidepressant medication) for that condition. The Committee said:

1. He seemed at times not to accept that the medication which he had taken for years was antidepressant medication. His evidence in this respect was difficult to comprehend - indeed baffling, particularly as he had undergone many years of regular psychotherapy, been prescribed and taken different antidepressant medication over many years and read Dr Tannenbaum's various reports and sat through his evidence at the Board where these matters were explained by Dr Tannenbaum clearly and in detail.
2. Were the Board to conclude that Mr Dixon does not believe or accept that the explanation for his earlier conduct, or some of it, was severe depression, then it is difficult to conceive of him ever being readmitted.
3. Difficult though it is to adequately understand, the best that can be made of this aspect of Mr Dixon's evidence is that he sought in his evidence to not be seen to rely upon his medical condition as an excuse for his earlier conduct.
4. That said, it is evident that Mr Dixon in the past was prepared to seek specialist medical assistance and treatment and that he is aware of his frailty. He gave moving evidence concerning his feelings about the death of his brother and his guilt about his own conduct concerning his former wife and children.

80 The second matter of concern, mentioned by the Committee at par 105, was whether the motivation for the applicant in seeking readmission was primarily financial. That concern appeared to arise out of the applicant's casual or flippant manner of selfexpression when giving his evidence before the Committee. The Committee dismissed that concern on the basis of what it perceived to be the applicant's 'false bravado'. That analysis of the applicant's evidence was open to the Committee who saw and heard his evidence.

81 The third matter related to the false declarations by which the applicant effectively procured his admission to practice as a legal practitioner in the State of Queensland. The Committee said:

1. The third matter of concern is a substantial one indeed. Although severe depression commencing in 1990 and persisting through to 1997 is an explanation for Mr Dixon's conduct that gave rise to being struck off by the Full Bench, it is a less plausible explanation for other conduct described above. In particular, his deceit in Queensland commenced in 2002 and persisted for some time. His dealings with the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal and even up to the hearing before the Full Bench in December 2006 [sic, 2005] when he was struck off showed no insight into his conduct, let alone remorse.
2. Based upon the report of Dr Boulnois from 2005, outlined above, we find that in 2005 Mr Dixon's depressive illness continued and seems to explain his conduct throughout this period. Indeed, his conduct after 2002 was singularly selfdestructive and defied rational explanation.

82 After referring to further observations of the Full Bench in Mungar at [23] (which refer in turn to the observations in Re Stokes concerning the public interest in encouraging rehabilitation and redemption), the Committee concluded:

1. There is a real public interest in rehabilitation and redemption and Mr Dixon wishes profoundly, for his own selfesteem (quite properly) and for his family, to be rehabilitated in the eyes of the community and of the profession. Whether redemption is accorded him will depend on many things that will follow this decision, but his desire to redeem himself was genuine and was accompanied by an appreciation that admission, let alone readmission, to legal practice is a very great privilege. This understanding suggests that the conduct which led to Mr Dixon's shame and the removal of this privilege are unlikely to recur.

83 It is clear that the first and third concerns were correctly identified as proper concerns by the Committee. But to our mind they were not adequately resolved, to the clear and convincing standard that is required by evidence. The applicant's 'baffling' refusal to accept he had been affected by depression in the past provides no basis for any proper confidence that a future manifestation of the depressive condition, arising by reason of an external stressor in legal practice, would actually lead the applicant to seek out proper psychiatric treatment. Speculation that the applicant would seek out such treatment, because he is now older and wiser, is not convincing. That is particularly so bearing in mind significant gaps in the applicant's history of prior psychiatric treatment now identified. The hopeful outcome accepted by the Committee, on Dr Tannenbaum's advice, is not satisfactory.

84 Likewise, the seriously deceitful conduct the applicant engaged in, in Queensland across a period between August 2002 and May 2003, is to us insufficiently explained. The explanation that it was attributable as well to the depressive condition by reference to the report of the Brisbane psychiatrist who saw the applicant in one consultation in 2005 is inadequate in our opinion for such a serious concern.

85 The problem, with respect, with the Committee's conclusions in respect of those two concerns, both of which, in our view, were substantial, is that they are not based upon a sufficiently solid and substantial foundation in fact to support a readmission application. That standard needs to be satisfied before the applicant can be said to have shown a principled basis for his readmission. It has not. At this level, a strong measure of assuredness, not hopeful speculation, is called for.

86 Under principle 7 in Kotowicz, Kirby P observed (22):

Nonetheless, relevant to the decision to be made is any evidence concerning the reputation which the claimant holds, the employment which he has pursued, any community activities he has engaged in, the time which has passed within which to assess the question posed for the Court and, if the time be long, whether the applicant would be sufficiently knowledgeable to rejoin a learned profession without retraining. As these questions are asked in the context of the exercise of a jurisdiction for the protection of the public, it is plainly important to have regard to any dealings which the claimant has had, since removal, with the public, insofar as these may demonstrate such a change as converts the claimant from an unfit person to a person fit to be restored to the roll.

87 Those remarks are relevant a part of the considerations applicable to this applicant in the period subsequent to his removal from the Roll in December 2005. In that timeframe he has obviously returned to Western Australia and has led a simpler life working as a courier in that period (see Dr Tannenbaum). He has also looked after his ageing mother. But the details of what he has done in this period remain sparse.

88 This is not a case where a disgraced applicant, by a catalogue of good works, has rendered substantial public service to the community since striking off, with these public works being assessed as exhibiting some measure of public atonement or expiation for past wrongs.

89 It is pleasing that the applicant now leads a simpler life, has better relations with his family members, is more stable and enjoys better mental health. But there are no public contributions to be weighed in his favour.

90 In the present case, a litany of serious professional misbehaviour, exhibited by the applicant whilst a senior member of the legal profession across more than a decade, was truly disgraceful. The applicant engaged in calculated, sustained professional misconduct that is not explicable as a youthful indiscretion or isolated error of judgment. Perjury by swearing false affidavits and giving false testimony to a court are extreme transgressions of the criminal laws of this State. Had such acts been carried out by a member of the public, there was every prospect, upon conviction, the offender would have received a custodial sentence. The applicant can count himself lucky that he was not prosecuted for his repeated acts of perjury. For a legal practitioner with experience in the field of family law litigation, to engage in such sustained calculated criminal misconduct, almost beggars belief. That his conduct was manifested in and around a family law dispute and intended to financially harm only his exwife, rather than a client, can be no excuse. The professional misconduct was a repeated betrayal of the oath or affirmation which every legal practitioner takes upon admission in Western Australia to truly and honestly conduct themselves as an officer of the court.

91 Acrimonious drawn out Family Court proceedings provide some insight towards difficult personal circumstances. So does a depressive illness. In the end, however, that condition does not excuse or exculpate the applicant from carrying full responsibility for his sustained misconduct. Giles JA said in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Farran [2003] NSWCA 372, having accepted certain psychiatric evidence, that:

Although the psychiatric and psychological evidence explained loss of judgment and insight, it did not negate appreciation that he was doing wrong [13].

92 Whilst the applicant's depressive illness provides insight, there can be no suggestion he did not know what he was doing, or was not in control of his actions across his 11 years of professional misconduct, including acts of perjury: see also Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v De Pardo [2007] WASC 266 [12] (practitioner's defrauding of Centrelink).

93 In the present case, the sheer gravity of the professional misconduct, perpetrated over such a sustained period, is irreconcilable with a rational conclusion that the applicant can now be accepted as a fit and proper person in the sense that he is suitable for readmission to an honourable profession.

94 The sheer weight of the applicant's misdeeds did not just bring disgrace upon himself. They also besmirched the reputation of the legal profession in two states. In the face of such misconduct, a public interest in entrenching proper standards of conduct is clear. So also is sending a strong and unequivocal message to wouldbe entrants to and members of the legal profession that misconduct of this character will never be tolerated. If it happens, the consequences must not be in doubt. A likely terminal outcome to the right to continue in an honourable profession must be appreciated by the profession and the wider community. This must be seen as more than mere rhetoric.

95 Sir Owen Dixon, in dismissing an application for readmission in remarks over 65 years ago in Re Davis (concerning disbarment of the barrister in respect of nondisclosed youthful convictions for breaking and entering and stealing), made observations which remain apposite. Having identified many favourable considerations towards that applicant who faced disbarment, Dixon J said (426):

He has shown industry, perseverance and courage amidst the most adverse circumstances, and has overcome many disadvantages and obstacles encountered particularly in his early years. His mental breakdown and even his descent into criminality will evoke much human sympathy. It is always so upon moral questions, particularly when a man, whose conduct or actions have been in many respects praiseworthy, mars his life by a crime.

But, though concern for an individual who is overtaken by the consequences of past wrongdoing is a very proper human feeling, it is no reason whatever for impairing in his interests the standards of a profession which plays so indispensable a part in the administration of justice.

96 Those observations apply with equal force to the circumstances of the present application.

97 The application for readmission must be refused.