PC v State of Queensland [2025] QIRC 274

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 4, s 129, s 130, s 131

A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 16

Ambrey v Oswin [2004] QSC 224

Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Howe [1922] HCA 50; (1922) 31 CLR 290

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33

Barker v Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority (2000) QSC 395

Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 349

Commonwealth v Bank of NSW (1949) 79 CLR 497

Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258

Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80

Duck v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 347

House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] NSWCA 44; (2000) 48 NSWLR 498

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8

Navaratnam v State of Queensland (Department of Employment, Small Business and Training) [2022] QIRC 427

Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541

Rajah Tasadduq Rasul Khan v Manik Chand (1902) LR 30 Ind App 35

Santos v Flour [2025] QSC 184

Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327

[1] The Appellant has lodged an appeal pursuant to s 130 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act'). Two interlocutory issues have arisen, one of which calls into question whether the appeal can be heard as a matter of jurisdiction.

[2] The jurisdictional interlocutory issue concerns whether the appeal has been filed within the 21-day time limit imposed by s 564 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). In determining this issue, it is necessary to identify which one of two items of correspondence is in fact the relevant "decision" being appealed.

[3] The Appellant has appealed a purported decision contained within a letter received from the Respondent on 17 January 2025 ('17 January 2025 letter'). If the 17 January 2025 letter is indeed the decision being appealed, the appeal lodged by the Appellant on 3 February 2025 was plainly filed within the 21-day limitation period.

[4] However, the Respondent says that the 17 January 2025 letter was not by definition a "decision" capable of being appealed. Rather, it was a response to concerns or complaints the Appellant raised about an earlier review decision delivered to him in email correspondence of 1 October 2024 ('1 October 2024 email'). The Respondent also argues that the Appellant's ostensible appeal against the 17 January 2025 letter is, in substance, an (out of time) appeal of the decision made in the 1 October 2024 email. The Respondent therefore argues that this appeal is without jurisdiction.

[5] The second interlocutory issue concerns disclosure of documents. The Appellant seeks orders compelling disclosure of an internal review report created as part of the process that resulted in the 1 October 2024 email. The Appellant also seeks disclosure of correspondence between two officers related to that review report. The Appellant says that these documents would assist him in arguing that the appeal was in fact filed within time, or alternatively, if out of time, that the appeal has merit.

[6] On 22 December 2022, the Appellant made a formal complaint about the Respondent's handling of allegations about alleged conduct by the Appellant ('Complaint'). The Respondent had found that the Appellant had allowed a conflict of interest to influence them in a recruitment process by providing beneficial treatment to a candidate.

[7] The Appellant claimed that the Complaint was a Public Interest Disclosure ('PID') pursuant to the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2010 (Qld). The Respondent determined, in a letter that the Appellant received on 3 March 2023, that the Complaint was not a PID ('PID Decision').

[8] Over a year later, the Appellant sought a formal internal review of the PID Decision. The Respondent granted an extension of time to allow the Appellant to lodge an internal review application. A formal internal review was then carried out by the Director ('the Director') of the Department which employed the Appellant ('the Department'). The Director outlined the outcome of that internal review in the 1 October 2024 email, confirmed the PID Decision, and found that the assessment of the Complaint was thorough.

[9] A little over two and a half months later, on 20 December 2024, the Appellant wrote to the Chief Human Resources Officer of the Department ('CHRO') taking issue with the 1 October 2024 email and its antecedent review process. In summary, the Appellant argued that the process the Director had carried out had not complied with the Respondent's Management of Complaints Procedure ('Complaints Procedure').

[10] The CHRO's reply was the 17 January 2025 letter to the Appellant. In it, the CHRO addressed the Appellant's concerns about the 1 October 2024 email and the process leading to the creation of it.

Whether the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter was a "decision"

[11] The Appellant essentially argues that the 1 October 2024 email did not complete the internal review and was therefore not a "decision". Rather, the Appellant says, the final outcome of the internal review, and therefore a "decision", only occurred when he received the 17 January 2025 letter from the CHRO .

[12] The Respondent argues that the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter was merely a reply to the Appellant's complaints about the earlier internal review process and resulting decision. The Respondent argues that the 17 January 2025 letter is not a "decision" at all because it determined no outcome in relation to the internal review and was only a response to the Appellant's concerns. The Respondent argues that the decision in the 1 October 2024 email was the only relevant decision because it was a determination via a formal internal review of the PID Decision.

[13] The appeal is brought as an appeal against a fair treatment decision. Section 129 of the PS Act defines "fair treatment decision" as a decision that a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable.

[14] The term "decision" itself is not defined in the PS Act. The explanatory notes to the Public Sector Bill 2022 (Qld), which introduced the PS Act, do not define the term "decision", nor do they provide guidance on the phrase "fair treatment decision".

[15] As noted by Herzfeld and Prince, the authors of Interpretation, a text cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Queensland,[1] the starting point for interpreting a word used in legislation is to give the word its ordinary meaning. That means the meaning that is the conventional one or within popular use in the general community.[2] This is often referred to as the "natural meaning" of the word having regard to the subject matter which it is connected to and its collocation.[3] Of course, words can have numerous meanings in conventional or popular use, which is where context also becomes relevant. Dictionary definitions can help in identifying a range of possible ordinary meanings of a word, although a court is not bound by dictionary definitions.[4] The Macquarie Dictionary has been held to be "the most authoritative Australian dictionary".[5] However, it has also been held that it would not be wise to restrict one's attention just to a single dictionary definition.[6]

[16] The Macquarie Dictionary relevantly defines "decision" as:

1. the act of deciding;
2. determination (of a question or doubt);[7]

1. to determine or settle (a question, controversy, struggle, etc.) by giving victory to one side.[8]

[17] The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary relevantly defines "decision" as:

1. the action of deciding a contest, dispute, etc.;
2. settlement, a final (formal) judgement or verdict.[9]

1. settle (a question, dispute, etc.) by finding in favour of one side;
2. bring to a settlement, resolve; influence decisively the outcome of (a contest etc.)".[10]

[18] The use of the word "decision" in the context of "fair treatment decision" is somewhat different to the use of the word in the context of other decisions in which public sector appeals may be brought. Section 129 of the PS Act defines all of the types of decisions which may be appealed under s 131 of the PS Act, save for s 131(1)(i), which deals with rights of appeal created by other Acts. Section 129 says:

(a) under section 115 not to convert the employment of a public sector employee mentioned in section 112 to a permanent basis; or

(b) under section 115 to convert the employment of a public sector employee mentioned in section 112 to a permanent basis in circumstances provided for under a directive made under section 115(8) about the hours of work offered when offering to convert the employment basis to a permanent basis; or

(c) under section 116 not to convert the employment of a public sector employee mentioned in section 113 (1) to a permanent basis, if the employee's right to make the additional request for review under section 116 arose from a decision under section 115; or

(d) under section 116 to convert the employment of a public sector employee mentioned in section 113 (1) to a permanent basis in circumstances provided for under a directive made under section 115 (8) about the hours of work offered when offering to convert the employment basis to a permanent basis, if the employee's right to make the additional request for review under section 116 arose from a decision under section 115 ; or

(e) under section 120 or 121 not to employ a public sector employee at a higher classification level, if the employee had been acting at, or seconded to, the higher classification level for a continuous period, as defined for the employee in a directive made under section 120 (7), of at least 2 years.

"directive decision" means a decision to take, or not to take, action under a directive.

"disciplinary decision" means a decision under a disciplinary law to discipline -

(a) a person (other than by termination of employment), including the action taken in disciplining the person; or

(b) a former public sector employee by way of a disciplinary declaration made under section 95, including if the disciplinary action that would have been taken was termination of employment.

"fair treatment decision" means a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable.

"promotion decision" means a decision to promote a public sector employee employed on a permanent basis.

"suspension without pay decision" means a decision to suspend a public sector employee under section 101 without entitlement to normal remuneration.

(b) a public sector employee, if a regulation has prescribed that the following provisions apply to the employee, without or without modification -

(ii) this part, in relation to a decision under chapter 4, part 4, division 3.

"work performance direction decision" means a decision of the commissioner under section 124(5)(b) to give a direction about rectifying a defect in the procedural aspects of the handling of a work performance matter, to the extent the direction affects the employee the subject of the work performance matter.

[19] What is notable about the definitions of all the other types of decisions against which an appeal may be brought is that they are generally more confined in scope. They tend to be decisions about being able to do or not do something quite specific. The subject matter of the decision is confined to certain matters, often to a certain section of legislation too. By contrast, the definition of a fair treatment decision is not confined to being able to do or not do something specific, such as converting employment to a permanent basis.

[20] Some context can be found in the co-allocation of the word "decision" with the words "fair" and "treatment". The word "treatment" is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary as:

1. the act or manner of treating;
2. action or behaviour towards a person, etc;[11]

1. the process or manner of behaving towards or dealing with a person or thing".[12]

[21] The word "fair" is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary as:

1. free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice;[13]

1. just;
2. unbiased;
3. equitable;
4. impartial;
5. legitimate;
6. in accordance with the rules or standards.[14]

[22] Turning to the jurisprudence on the meaning of "decision", the High Court of Australia in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond ('Bond')[15] considered the expression "decision to which this Act applies" in the context of administrative decisions pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('ADJR Act'). As part of that consideration, his Honour, Mason CJ, considered the word "decision" in isolation as well as within the context specific to the ADJR Act. In considering the word "decision" on its own, his Honour observed that it will "generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration".[16] His Honour concluded that the preferred meaning of a "decision" was an ultimate or operative determination, as opposed to merely expressing an opinion or making a statement which has no effect on a person.[17]

[23] In Bond, his Honour noted that the word "decision" has a variety of potential meanings and described two instances where the word took a narrow meaning in "curial or judicial proceedings".[18] However, his Honour emphasised that the meaning of "decision" needs to be determined having regard to the text, scope and purpose of the relevant statute it is used within.[19] When construing the word "decision" in the context of the ADJR Act, his Honour was concerned with distinguishing the concept of a "decision" from the concept of "conduct". His Honour noted that the ADJR Act provided for judicial review of "a decision to which this Act applies" (s 5) and "conduct [engaged in] for the purpose of making a decision to which this Act applies" (s 6).[20] "Conduct" was defined by s 3(5) of the ADJR Act as "the doing of any act or thing preparatory to the making of the decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation". His Honour avoided giving the word "decision" any meaning that would encompass procedural determinations in that case, noting that "acts done preparatory to the making of a "decision" are not to be regarded as constituting "decisions" for, if they were, there would be little, if any, point in providing for judicial review of "conduct" as well as of a "decision"."[21] His Honour further emphasised this point when he found that "[i]f "decision" were to embrace procedural determinations, then there would be little scope for review of "conduct", a concept which appears to be essentially procedural in character".[22]

[24] The thing to bear in mind is that unlike the situation that existed in Bond, the PS Act contains no analogous concept differentiating "conduct" from a "decision". The effect of that differentiation was an obvious factor in how his Honour construed the term "decision to which this Act applies" in Bond. Even so, Bond does provide guidance on construing the word "decision" generally.

[25] Bond also provides instruction on how the purpose of the relevant Act might influence the meaning of the term "decision" as used within it. Section 3 of the PS Act describes the main purpose of that Act as being to provide a framework for a fair and integrated public sector that serves the people of Queensland and the State. That purpose is to be achieved through the mechanisms set out in s 4 of the PS Act. Section 4(c)(v) says one such mechanism is the creation of a public sector that ensures fairness in the employment relationship and fair treatment of its employees by ensuring fair and accountable decision-making. Providing public sector employees with access to fair and independent reviews and appeals is also included as part of that mechanism. This is counterbalanced with the need for the public sector to be, as outlined in s 4(a)(iv) and 4(d)(v), managed efficiently.

[26] The PS Act shares similar purposes to the ADJR Act in the general sense that both seek to balance the need to provide for effective ways to redress grievances regarding administrative government decision-making, with the need for efficient use of government resources.[23] His Honour in Bond found that between these competing considerations, the need for efficient administration of government at some point must prevail.[24] In the context of the PS Act, the need for efficient administration of government similarly must prevail at some point.

[27] The word "decision" has also been judicially considered in this jurisdiction. In Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) ('Sime'),[25] McLennan IC considered whether the proposal of disciplinary action was a "decision".[26] After considering relevant authorities,[27] McLennan IC found that the proposal of a disciplinary penalty "is a procedural determination that further action may be taken" and so was "not a 'decision' that may be appealed at this time".[28]

[28] In Navaratnam v State of Queensland (Department of Employment, Small Business and Training) ('Navaratnam '),[29] Power IC considered a matter where the respondent directed an employee to return to work.[30] The employee argued that the decision was contained in correspondence sent in early May 2022.[31] The respondent argued that that correspondence merely confirmed an earlier decision directing the return to work, and that the actual decision was sent in a letter on 12 April 2022.[32] The respondent argued that the appeal was therefore filed out of time.[33] Power IC, after considering the correspondence, concluded that the early May 2022 letter merely confirmed the decision that was actually made on 12 April 2022. The result being that the operative decision was contained in the earlier 12 April 2022 letter.[34]

[29] In Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('Baskin'),[35] his Honour, Merrell DP, considered that the word "decision" generally means something "...which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration".[36] The respondent in that matter argued that the determination to continue the suspension of an employee after a periodic review of the suspension was not a "decision".[37] His Honour did not agree, finding that such a determination was a "decision" because it was operative and determinative of whether to continue the suspension.[38]

[30] Having regard to the foregoing law, I conclude that a "decision" needs to determine a controversy or issue with some finality. The words "fair" and "treatment" provide context, as does the relevant purpose of the PS Act and how it is to be achieved. Applying the above-mentioned dictionary definitions, Bond, and Baskin, a "fair treatment decision" must be one that is practically final or operative and determinative in its effect, having regard to the issue being considered and determined, which must concern the manner in which the employer has treated, or proposed to treat, the appellant. Mere expressions of opinion or statements that do not have an effect on a person will not be "decisions".[39] Applying Navaratnam and Sime, the substance of the relevant correspondence, or statement, is key. Not all correspondence sent in response to complaints raised by an employee will constitute a "fair treatment decision". That is a question of fact to be determined after considering the relevant correspondence or statement/s said to embody the relevant "decision", as opposed to ineffectual statements or expressions of opinion.[40] As such, each relevant piece of correspondence will be considered in turn below.

[31] The 1 October 2024 email advised the Appellant of the outcome of an internal review of the PID Decision. The email was, on my assessment, succinct and thorough. The Director advised that she had completed the internal review of the PID Decision, and she outlined her process, including all of the documents she had referred to and the scope of her review. The Director then set out four findings, stating reasons for each, as well as some recommendations. She confirmed the PID Decision. The Director advised the Appellant that she understood this may not have been the outcome he was seeking, but felt that it was important that he know that the correct processes were followed, albeit with some gaps identified in communications with the Appellant.

[32] The Appellant argues that the 1 October 2024 email cannot be a "decision" because it was incomplete in that it did not close out the internal review of the PID Decision. I am unable to agree with that submission. The Director's 1 October 2024 email concluded an extensive and formal review of the PID Decision. The review included traversing a large body of documents and findings that were supported by reasons. The 1 October 2024 email thereby resolved the Appellant's grievance concerning the PID Decision. In that sense, it was a final and operative determination of how the Appellant's Complaint was being treated. I also cannot accept the argument that the Director was delivering an update rather than an outcome decision in her 1 October 2024 email to the Appellant. In the Director's email, she makes it very clear that she is delivering an "outcome" when she says "While I understand this may not be the outcome that you were seeking...".

[33] The Appellant also argues that the 1 October 2024 email was produced by the Director in her capacity as the "reviewing officer" and was not produced by the "authorised delegate", the CHRO. It was the CHRO who was appointed by the person to whom the Appellant sent his complaints about the PID Decision outcome. In his submissions, the Appellant claims that the authorised delegate is the only person who, pursuant to the Complaints Procedure, may "discharge the requirements under Section 13" of that procedure. The argument seems to be that the Director was performing only a portion of the internal review process and that the internal review was not officially completed until a decision on it came from the CHRO as the "authorised delegate".

[34] The Appellant has attached a copy of the Complaints Procedure to his submissions. At clause 13, it is headed with two provisions. The first is a number and a title: "13. Conducting an internal review". The second heralds who it is that is responsible for carrying out that part of the procedure: "Responsibility: Reviewing Officer". Clause 13 of the Complaints Procedure also relevantly provides that it is the reviewing officer who conducts the internal review and who produces a written decision to the complainant. The Director was the "reviewing officer". That is admitted by the Appellant and is also obvious from the correspondence attached to the Appellant's submission. I cannot accept the argument that the Director was not sufficiently authorised to carry out the internal review of the PID Decision because it is very clear to me from the materials before me that she was. Her task was as she stated it to be in the 1 October 2024 email - to carry out the internal review of the PID Decision, give an outcome in writing to the Appellant stating her process, her findings, and reasons, as well as to confirm whether any further action was to occur. Whatever imperfections the Appellant might argue affected that process or the finer points of its delivery in the 1 October 2024 email (discussed below), that was the job that was done by the Director. In disposition of this point, I find that the internal review of the PID Decision was carried out by the Director and that she was properly authorised as the reviewing officer in accordance with the Complaints Procedure. Her 1 October 2024 email to the Appellant was clearly the decision regarding the outcome of the internal review of the PID Decision.

[35] The Director was brief and to the point, and her 1 October 2024 decision was conveyed by a simple email. But the need for efficient administration of government counterbalances the need to meet the objects of the PS Act relating to fair decision-making about the treatment of employees. I am mindful of the general observations by his Honour, Mason CJ, in Bond mentioned above. In the context of the relevant Act, in this case the PS Act, the need for efficient administration of government must prevail at some point.

[36] The Appellant also raises in his submissions the argument that the Director's 1 October 2024 email did not comply with dot point 3 of clause 13 d. of the Complaints Procedure. It relevantly provides that the reviewing officer's decision must outline any action that the authorised delegate proposes to take, or has taken, as a result of the outcome/s of the internal review. The Appellant's argument is that, because the Director failed to specifically address what the authorised delegate (the CHRO) had done or proposed to do, the 21 day limitation period did not begin to run until the CHRO conveyed that in the form of the 17 January 2025 letter. In short, the Appellant argues that, until the Complaints Procedure was complied with or "met", there was no "decision". The Appellant argues that that did not occur until the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter arrived stating she had not taken any action and did not intend to.

[37] I cannot accept this argument for two reasons. First, I do not accept the premise that a breach of the procedure, if that is what occurred, is anything more than just that - a breach of the procedure. That issue, if it exists, does not render the rest of the 1 October 2024 email something other than a "decision" to which appeal rights accrued, subject to the limitation period. Second, I am not persuaded that the Director did actually fail to meet any obligation imposed by the third dot point requirement. The obligation was to outline any action the authorised delegate had taken or proposed to take. In this case, however, there was none. So the obligation to outline any action taken or proposed was not breached. The dot point does not say that the reviewing officer must expressly state if the authorised delegate proposes to take no action and has taken no action.

[38] The next significant piece of correspondence was the Appellant's 20 December 2024 letter to the CHRO, which provides context to the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter in reply to him. In this 20 December 2024 letter, the Appellant complained that the review carried out by the Director, and her 1 October 2024 email, did not comply with the Complaints Procedure. Specifically, the Appellant alleged that the 1 October 2024 email was deficient in that it:

(a) did not outline how the internal review was conducted;

(b) did not detail the outcome of the internal review and reasons for same;

(c) did not outline any action that the authorised delegate took or proposed to take as a result of the outcome of the internal review; and

(d) was not sufficiently documented to be capable of further review if required.

[39] These were obviously all complaints about the internal review and the resulting decision within the 1 October 2024 email. The Appellant also sought provision of a copy of the internal review report. This request was made on the basis that he was unable to determine if he was dissatisfied with the outcome of the review due to the vagueness of the 1 October 2024 email and that the report would aid him in determining if he was dissatisfied. The Appellant further alleged that he had not been advised about his external appeal rights.

[40] The Appellant also complained that whatever action proposed by the review to be taken had not eventuated, and that at time of writing, over 240 days had passed. As noted above, the Appellant alleged that that was not in accordance with the Complaints Procedure. The Appellant also speculated that the internal review report likely contained information that should have been put to the decision-maker regarding the above-mentioned disciplinary findings, and that failing to do so was a denial of natural justice.

[41] The 17 January 2025 letter from the CHRO to the Appellant was in reply to the Appellant's 20 December 2024 letter. The CHRO replied to each of the Appellant's complaints about the review process and the outcome email of 1 October 2024. She set out the complaints as I have noted above.

[42] The CHRO expressed the view that the Director's review of the PID Decision was in compliance with the Complaints Procedure. She supported that view by pointing to the fact that the Director had outlined how she conducted the internal review, stated her findings, and gave reasons for them.

[43] As to the request for a copy of the internal review report, the CHRO denied that request. The CHRO reasoned that the Complaints Procedure did not require the Respondent to provide that report to the Appellant. The CHRO observed that the refusal to provide the report may impinge on the Appellant's right to recognition and equality before the law, and to take part in public life. However, the CHRO reasoned that such a limitation was justified in the circumstances where providing the report would limit the rights of privacy and reputation of others to whom the report referred.

[44] As for the complaint dealing with external review rights, the CHRO expressed the view that the Appellant clearly knew of those rights, as evidenced by his earlier correspondence referring to external review rights. The CHRO said that in any case there was no obligation on the Respondent to make the Appellant aware of his external review rights.

[45] The CHRO did not agree with the assertion that the initial discipline finding decision should be re-opened on the basis that alleged further evidence might exist which should be considered to potentially overturn the disciplinary finding.

[46] The CHRO also reminded the Appellant that a decision had previously been made that no action would be taken on the PID Decision review outcome until the Appellant's appeal in the Commission (not this matter) had been resolved. The CHRO pointed out that, for this reason, the 1 October 2024 email made no mention of any action items arising from the review outcome.

Conclusions on the status of each alleged "decision"

[47] I am of the view that the Director's 1 October 2024 email was a "fair treatment decision". It was a formal review of the PID Decision, and determined, with finality, the issues the Appellant raised with respect to the PID Decision. The Appellant could have challenged it by way of an appeal. But that appeal, like all such PS Act appeals, would have been confined to an inquiry about whether the Director's conclusions were open to her to reach based on the material before her at the time and whether the decision was therefore fair and reasonable.

[48] Some of the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter could constitute a fair treatment decision. It does not constitute a fresh (and therefore appealable) "decision" of the original PID Decision and the issues within the PID Decision. However, there are issues that are finally decided by the CHRO in her 17 January 2025 letter, including whether the Director 's review of the PID Decision complied with the Complaints Procedure, and whether the Appellant could have a copy of the internal review report.

[49] This is a question of fact to be determined by review of the Appeal Notice that the Appellant filed on 3 February 2025. It is clear that what the Appellant is actually seeking in this appeal is to overturn the conclusions reached in the Director's 1 October 2024 email. The Appellant's appeal does not actually challenge any of the abovementioned conclusions in the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter. The Appellant, to use his own words in the Appeal Notice, is "...appealing the outcome/decision of an internal review conducted by [the Respondent] into public interest/complaints I submitted to [the Respondent] on 22/12/2022." The Appellant also says in his Appeal Notice:

I am not satisfied with the outcome of the internal review, both the original PID/complaint determination and internal review determination as to whether my submission dated 22/12/2022 amounted to a public interest disclosure, and the management of the complaints made (under [the Department's] complaint management policy and procedure) and the outcomes communicated about the internal review.

[50] The Appellant does not, in his Appeal Notice, seek to appeal the abovementioned two new controversies that the CHRO's 17 January 2025 letter settled. I accept the Respondent's submissions in this regard. The appeal is properly characterised as a challenge to the 1 October 2024 email upholding the PID Decision.

[51] The Appellant sought to pivot in his submissions and said "it could also be argued, ... the decision that I am appealing is the decision of the CHRO (as communicated on 17 January 2025), to take no further action, to not vitiate the finding and action subject to [another public service appeal that is before the Commission] to not share with me a copy of the internal review report, to not share with me the spreadsheet, etc.". However, as I have observed above, these are clearly not the grounds of appeal as filed. The Appellant seems to acknowledge this fact with the submission "it could also be argued", which seems to me to be an attempt to very lightly place a mere afterthought before the Commission. I have carefully considered this submission and gone back over the appeal grounds in the Appeal Notice when doing so. It is abundantly clear to me that no such argument is stated in the Appeal Notice, which is instead focused on the matters decided in the 1 October 2024 email. I cannot accept the Appellant submission that it could be argued that he is appealing a different decision to the one he is in fact appealing.

The "fair treatment decision" within the 17 January 2025 letter

[52] Discussion of any appeal of the part of the 17 January 2025 letter constituting a "decision" is somewhat academic, as the Appellant's Appeal Notice did not advance any such appeal grounds. However, given the fact that all of the relevant material is in written form and is already before the Commission, to the extent that the 17 January 2025 letter might be a "fair treatment decision", and in the interests of addressing this point fully, I consider such an appeal would be without any real prospects of success for the following reasons.

[53] It is very clear that the CHRO decided to refuse to provide a copy of the internal review report by reasoning that there was no obligation to give the Appellant a copy of the report and that doing so would unjustifiably impinge on the human rights of those persons mentioned in it. In my opinion that was a conclusion that seemed to be entirely open to the CHRO to reach. It is hard to imagine how such a conclusion could not be found to be fair and reasonable.

[54] Likewise, the finding by the CHRO that the Director's 1 October 2024 email complied with the Complaints Procedure seemed to have been open to be reached. That is because the CHRO observed that the Director had followed the procedure by setting out how she conducted the review and the materials she reviewed to do so, stating her findings, and giving reasons for her findings. The CHRO reasoned that this met the standards of the Complaints Procedure. That seemed to have been open to her to conclude. Again, it is difficult to conceive as to how this finding would not be upheld as fair and reasonable.

[55] As to what the Appellant argued to be the "decision" to take no further action in the 17 January 2025 letter, that was not a "decision" in my opinion. The CHRO simply referred the Appellant back to a decision of 25 July 2024 that no further action would be taken on the outcome of an internal review, pending the outcome of another public service appeal by the Appellant that is presently being dealt with elsewhere in the Commission. This is clearly a statement about the ongoing effect of a previous decision. It is not a "decision". Any appeal of it would be misconceived and doomed to fail in my opinion.

[56] For the forgoing reasons, I conclude that this appeal is properly characterised as an appeal of a decision conveyed to the Appellant on 1 October 2024. Since this appeal was filed on 3 February 2025, it was filed beyond the statutory limitation period. Therefore, unless an extension of time is granted, no jurisdiction arises.

[57] The Appellant pleads an alternative case. He seeks an extension of time if his appeal is out of time, which is my finding. The disclosure orders that the Appellant seeks also go to that issue.

[58] The Appellant submits that disclosure of documents, namely the internal review report and correspondence between two officers, would assist him with proving that his appeal was filed within time. The Appellant has referred to the correct test for determining whether a document is directly relevant to an issue in the proceedings, which is a question of fact. The Appellant has also identified that the phrase "directly relevant" means something which tends to prove or disprove an allegation in issue. The Appellant says that he believes that the documents sought are directly relevant. Firstly, because they may provide evidence to support his claim that he is within time. Alternatively, if deemed to have filed his appeal outside of the limitation period, the Appellant says that the documents assist in demonstrating his case has merit, which is part of the consideration for an extension of time application.

[59] As to the first limb of this argument, the Appellant speculates on the nature and content of correspondence between the two relevant officers, which disclosure orders might reveal. The Appellant says that this correspondence would likely address the issue of whether each of those officers thought the 1 October 2024 email or the 17 January 2025 letter contained the relevant "decision".

[60] The fatal flaw with that argument is that it is a matter for the Commission to determine which item of correspondence was in fact the relevant "decision" being appealed. In doing so, the Commission will assess the substance and nature of what in fact the appeal seeks to address as well as each item of correspondence itself. What two officers thought might have been a "decision" is irrelevant. Their opinions will not assist in proving or disproving which of the two items of correspondence was in fact the "decision" being appealed.

[61] Another flaw with that argument is that I am not persuaded that such correspondence exists. Merely speculating that something of use might exist and fall from a disclosure order is not sufficient to warrant an order being made.[41]

[62] As an alternative, the Appellant argues that if his application is deemed to have been filed out of time, these documents will assist because they demonstrate his appeal has merit. The Appellant says that he needs the internal review report in order to put forward his best case. The argument advanced in support of that submission is that the Appellant will be able to compare the findings within the report to those in the 1 October 2024 email. The Appellant also says that it is highly likely that after his 20 December 2024 complaint about the Director's 1 October 2024 email was received, the CHRO and the Director would have corresponded by email about it and how to respond to it. The Appellant says such correspondence is "highly and directly relevant and not a fishing expedition". In support of that, the Appellant points to references to the internal report in the Respondent's submissions and in the 1 October 2024 email.

[63] I have dealt already with the argument which speculates that correspondence between two officers would assist in proving which item of correspondence was the "decision". The opinions of employees are not relevant to resolving that question.

[64] The argument which deals with being able to compare the internal report with the 1 October 2024 email is not developed further. The Appellant says it might assist him with any-merit based argument, it remains unclear what the Appellant believes such a comparison is likely to reveal. The Appellant does not explain how that comparative exercise would go to proving which item of correspondence is in fact the "decision" being appealed, nor does he explain how the exercise will assist in proving his appeal has merit. I am therefore not persuaded to accept the bare assertion.

[65] The Appellant also argues that failing to produce the investigation report invites a Jones v Dunkel inference.[42] That argument is not developed either. Reliance on Jones v Dunkel appears to be misconceived. In this matter there is no question arising as to failing to call a witness who likely has direct evidence relevant to resolving a fact in issue. Even if Jones v Dunkel could be applied to the report or the relevant correspondence, the Appellant has not demonstrated that either class of documents has potential to either prove or disprove the key issue in the jurisdictional question. That is, which of the two relevant items of correspondence constitutes the "decision" which is in fact being appealed in these proceedings.

[66] The Appellant states that he believes the internal review report potentially undermines the above-mentioned disciplinary decisions. The Appellant does not explain the basis for that opinion or say how that assists in proving or disproving which of the two relevant items of correspondence constitutes the "decision" being appealed. This submission inadvertently discloses that the intent behind seeking provision of these documents appears to be, at least in part, to aid in attempts to re-open and overturn the disciplinary finding. That would be an abuse of process if so.

[67] For the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded that the documents referred to would assist in proving the appeal is either in time or that the appeal has merit. On my assessment of the claim for disclosure, it appears to be a fishing expedition. It seems to be an attempt to procure documents that the Appellant speculates might assist him to see if he has a case to overturn his disciplinary finding rather than seeking to have before the Commission documents that will genuinely assist in resolving an issue in the current proceedings.

[68] The approach to take in assessing whether to grant an extension of time for filing an appeal such as this is the test set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen:[43]

(a) special circumstances need not be shown, but an applicant for extension must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;

(b) action taken by the applicant, other than by making an application under the appropriate Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question of whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;

(c) any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the granting of an extension;

(d) the merits of the substantive application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted; and

(e) considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of discretion.

[69] The delay in this case of 103 days after the 21-day limitation period expired is substantial.

[70] It is clear on the material that the Appellant has simply misunderstood, or perhaps not known about, the ability to appeal the decision within the 1 October 2024 email or the time limit to do so. The Appellant has chosen to internally challenge the outcome of the PID Decision and the subsequent review of it. In his complaints to the Respondent, the Appellant included a claim that the Respondent failed to advise him of his appeal rights. In the 17 January 2025 letter, and the Respondent's submission, the Respondent highlighted the fact that there is no obligation to do so. I also observe that external review rights are expressly mentioned in clause 14 of the Complaints Procedure, which the Appellant had at the time, and referred to in his 20 December 2024 letter to the CHRO.

[71] In any case, in A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations),[44] Martin P, as his Honour then was, relevantly said:

While I accept that the applicant was not aware of the time requirement, that cannot be a panacea for an error of this kind. The time provision is not hidden. Section 564 is quite clear.

[72] I accept the Respondent's submission that it was under no obligation to make any appeal rights or limitation periods known to the Appellant. The fact that it often does should not be mistaken for a legal or other obligation to do so.

[73] It is clear to me that the explanation for the delay is the Appellant's choice to pursue the matter internally, and his potential ignorance as to what decisions can be appealed to the Commission under s 130 of the PS Act, and when. In my opinion, neither reason is an acceptable explanation for the delay that would make it fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time. [45]

[74] There would be obvious prejudice to the Appellant in not having his appeal heard. If an extension were granted, the Respondent would be put to the prejudice of defending an appeal that it is otherwise entitled to take as not actionable. Whilst that prejudice is not so grave as that which would be suffered by the Appellant, an absence of prejudice to one side is not itself a basis to grant an extension.

[75] An appellant seeking an extension of time does not have to show special circumstances exist, but there must be an assessment of the substantive case's merit, to the extent possible at such an early stage. Having considered the Director's 1 October 2024 email, and the parties' submissions with respect to the merits of appealing it, I do not see any real prospects in a potential appeal of it. As I have noted above, the Director's email may have been brief, but it did not need to be otherwise. It was well reasoned and clear in why it upheld the PID Decision. It is difficult to see how one could even argue, let alone find, that it was not fair and reasonable given each finding appears to have been based on conclusions that seem to have been open to be drawn.

[76] The explanation for the delay in this case was choosing to pursue the matter internally combined with not knowing of appeal rights. In my opinion, allowing an appeal so far outside the statutory limitation period in those circumstances would be unfair to other appellants in similar situations who have had the statutory limitation period enforced and their applications refused.[46] For those reasons, I am not persuaded that this is a case that warrants the exercise of the discretion to extend time.

[77] I conclude that the Appellant has in fact appealed the "decision" within the 1 October 2024 email. I cannot accept the claim made later in submissions concerning this interlocutory process that any appeal was actually made against that part of the 17 January 2025 letter that was a "decision". The appeal is therefore filed outside of time and is without jurisdiction.

[78] I cannot accept the claims that the documents of which the Appellant seeks disclosure are directly relevant to either the question of which item of correspondence constitutes the "decision" being appealed, or whether the appeal has merit. The application for disclosure is therefore dismissed.

[79] I am not persuaded that this case warrants an exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time within which to file the appeal. The Appellant's application for allowing additional time to file an appeal is therefore dismissed.

1. The application by the Appellant for disclosure orders is dismissed.
2. The application by the Appellant for an extension of time to file an appeal is dismissed.
3. The appeal, being filed out of time, is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

NOTE: This Decision has been amended since release pursuant to orders made under r 97(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules (Qld).

[1] Santos v Flour [2025] QSC 184 (Freeburn J); Rusbridge v Lake Fox Limited [2024] QSC 279 [22] (Freeburn J); Pico Play Pty Ltd v Coast Entertainment Operations Limited [2025] QSC 227 [32] (Kelly J); Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd & Ors [2024] QSC 80 [54], [58] (Applegarth J).

[2] Herzfeld & Prince, Interpretation (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2024) [20.10] ('Interpretation'), citing, inter alia Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 ('Consolidated Wood Products'), 560.

[3] Interpretation (n 2) [20.10], citing Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Howe [1922] HCA 50; (1922) 31 CLR 290, 302.

[4] Interpretation (n 2) [20.40], citing, inter alia, Consolidated Wood Products (n 2) 560-562.

[5] Interpretation (n 2) [20.40], citing House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] NSWCA 44; (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 [33].

[6] Interpretation (n 2) [20.40], citing Consolidated Wood Products (n 2) 561.

[7] Macquarie Dictionary (online at 2 October 2025) 'decision' (def 1-2).

[8] Macquarie Dictionary (online at 2 October 2025) 'decide' (def 1).

[9] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed, 2003) 'decision' (def 1-2).

[10] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed, 2003) 'decide' (def 1-2).

[11] Macquarie Dictionary (online at 2 October 2025) 'treatment' (def 1-2).

[12] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed, 2003) 'treatment' (def 1).

[13] Macquarie Dictionary (online at 2 October 2025) 'fair' (def 1).

[14] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed, 2003) 'fair' (def 1-6).

[15] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33 ('Bond').

[18] Ibid [28], citing Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80_,_ 100; Rajah Tasadduq Rasul Khan v Manik Chand (1902) LR 30 Ind App 35, 39; and Commonwealth v Bank of NSW (1949) 79 CLR 497, 625.

[25] [2023] QIRC 327.

[27] Ibid [137]-[138], citing Ambrey v Oswin [2004] QSC 224 [32], citing Bond and Barker v Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority (2000) QSC 395.

[29] [2022] QIRC 427.

[34] Ibid [24]-[25], citing Bond.

[35] [2022] QIRC 349.

[41] Alister v The Queen [1984] HCA 85 [16] (Wilson and Dawson JJ).

[42] [1959] HCA 8.

[43] [1984] FCA 176, cited by Merrell DP in Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258 [16].

[44] [2019] ICQ 16.

[45] See for example, Duck v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 347 [42]-[46].