Criminal Law - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for appeal - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Family violence offences - Exceptionally vulnerable complainant - Assault - Two counts of assault on terminally ill female partner - Unintended and unforeseen injury particularly serious - Sentence of four years and three months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and nine months not manifestly excessive.

Judgment Number: [2020] TASCCA 9

1. This is a second sentencing appeal by the appellant, Leigh John Parker, in respect of two counts of assault on his female partner, to which he pleaded guilty. The plea of guilty to one of the counts was accepted by the Crown in satisfaction of a charge of causing grievous bodily harm.
2. The appellant was originally sentenced by Blow CJ on 28 November 2018 to imprisonment for four years and three months from 27 August 2018. His Honour ordered that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he had served two years and nine months of the sentence.
3. The appellant originally appealed against that sentence on only one ground, namely, that it was manifestly excessive. However, in the course of argument before the Court of Criminal Appeal in June and August 2019, leave was given to add two new grounds of appeal, challenging the manner in which the learned sentencing judge determined the factual basis for sentence.
4. The appellant contended that some of the circumstances of the crimes asserted by the Crown to the sentencing judge were materially different, in ways adverse to the appellant, as compared to the description of the circumstances of the crimes asserted by the appellant.
5. The Court of Criminal Appeal hearing that first appeal accepted that differences in the respective versions were not identified and resolved before the learned sentencing judge proceeded to sentence the appellant, substantially on the basis of the Crown statement of facts. The appeal was allowed and the sentence was quashed and the matter remitted to his Honour for re-sentencing.
6. After conducting a hearing as to the disputed facts, Blow CJ, on 18 December 2019, re-sentenced the appellant, to four years six months' imprisonment with effect from 27 August 2018 and ordered that he not be eligible for parole until he had served two years nine months of that sentence. That is to say, a sentence three months longer than the original sentence imposed, but with the same non-parole period.
7. The appellant has now appealed against that second sentence, on the sole ground that it is manifestly excessive. No specific error is alleged and no challenge is made by the notice of appeal to the factual basis of the sentence.

1. The frequently stated legal principles applicable to appeals against sentence on the ground of manifest excess or inadequacy are clear and well settled. They can be found succinctly stated in Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1 at [31]-[34], per Porter J, and in Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Pearce [2015] TASCCA 1, 28 Tas R 1 at [8], per Pearce J.
2. In accordance with the traditional formula as set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, it needs to be established that by reason of its severity, the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust, so as to give rise to the inference that there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion.
3. As Kourakis J said in A, MC v Police [2008] SASC 279, 102 SASR 151 at [88], "[a]n appeal ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive is really a convenient alternative expression of the complaint that the sentence is by reason of its severity, unreasonable or plainly unjust."

1. Given the history of this matter and the fact that the learned sentencing judge's comments on passing sentence involved the resolution of the disputed facts after the hearing of evidence, it is appropriate to set out those comments and findings in full. His Honour found and commented as follows:

"Mr Parker pleaded guilty in November of last year in relation to two assaults that he committed on the night of 27 September 2017. I sentenced him last November, but he successfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the matter has been remitted to me for him to be re-sentenced. In the original sentencing proceedings, I overlooked the fact that there were significant inconsistencies between the version of the facts asserted by the Crown and the version asserted by Mr Parker's then counsel. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the sentence that I imposed, the matter was remitted to me, and I have received evidence for the purposes of determining the factual dispute.

The victim of the assaults was Mr Parker's partner. Their relationship ended on the night in question. About four months before that night, the complainant was diagnosed with terminal ovarian cancer. As a result of that cancer she had a hysterectomy in July 2017. She subsequently underwent chemotherapy. Early in September 2017 she spent another week in hospital because of a blood clot. Mr Parker was in prison from April until August 2017, serving sentences for driving offences. After his release from prison in early August, he acted as his partner's carer.

On the night in question, the couple argued. At some stage during that argument, Mr Parker struck the complainant to the head with a teapot. Count 1 on the indictment relates to that assault. Count 2 relates to a subsequent assault, when Mr Parker pushed the complainant, causing her to fall over. It is common ground that that fall caused the complainant's hysterectomy wound to split open, and that her bowel commenced to protrude through the open wound.

At the hearing that I conducted in relation to the factual dispute, the Crown called the complainant and tendered a series of photographs. Mr Parker was not called as a witness, but his counsel relied on an audio-visual recording of a police interview with him that was conducted on the afternoon after the night of the assaults.

The complainant gave evidence to the following effect. Prior to the assaults, Mr Parker had been drinking beer for most of the day and pushing for an argument. By 6pm he was quite drunk. She had consumed only one glass of wine. There was an argument about some quail that they were going to have for dinner. Mr Parker threw the quail out of the house. After that he was repeatedly goading her. At some stage she decided to go to bed in order to get away from him. She went to the bedroom, got into her nightie, and took out her false teeth. Mr Parker kept walking in and out of the bedroom, arguing with her. At one point she was standing at the end of the bed when he pushed her onto the bed. She got back up. He left the room and returned with a teapot that had belonged to her mother. It had been in the lounge room. He hit her over the head with it. She had her back to him. It connected with the back of her head. She turned around. She felt blood on the back of her head. He pushed her again. She said, 'I felt something give in my stomach and I felt all this warm stuff. That's when I had to run, I just had to get away, so I ran through the lounge room, through the kitchen, to the deck.'

Mr Parker's version of events differs from that of the complainant in a number of significant respects, as follows:

• He contends that the complainant had also been drinking heavily. He said in his police interview that she had been drinking 'big goblets of wine'.

• He had a different version of the events leading up to him striking the complainant with the teapot. He accepted that the complainant had gone to the bedroom. He denied that he had repeatedly walked in and out of the bedroom, arguing with her. He told the police that she started to smash things in the bedroom, that he then went in and 'tapped her on the head with the teapot', and that he then smashed the teapot on the floor.

• He denied that he had caused the head wound by hitting the complainant with the teapot. He contended that she could have hit her head on a piece of furniture when she fell.

• He contended that the complainant had bitten him to the right ear. A laceration to that ear was visible in the recording of the police interview. The complainant said that she could have bitten Mr Parker's ear, but that she did not remember doing that.

• Mr Parker contended that the final push was something he did to get the complainant away from him after she had bitten him. He contended that he was then acting in self-defence, but accepted that he had used more force than was reasonable, and that that push therefore amounted to an unlawful assault.

Generally speaking, I consider that the complainant's sworn evidence is more reliable than Mr Parker's assertions to the police. At the beginning of his interview he said that he had been 'pretty pissed'. He did not remember that he had been cautioned by one of the interviewing officers the previous night. His original description of events during the interview omitted the assault with the teapot and the final push. He at first denied that the complainant had taken out her false teeth, but later conceded that she might have. He originally denied that she had changed into her nightie, but later conceded that that was possible. At one point he conceded some uncertainty as to whether the laceration to his ear had been caused by a bite.

The complainant was a confident witness. On a number of occasions, when asked about matters of detail, she said that she did not remember, but she did not say that more often than one might reasonably expect. She explained that she had only consumed one glass of wine because, following treatment she had received, the wine had an unpleasant metallic taste. She said that she could have bitten Mr Parker, but that she did not have her false teeth in. She said that she had no top teeth but some lower teeth. Mr Parker had a laceration to one side of his ear, not to both the front and back of it. It seems quite likely that that laceration was caused by the complainant biting him when her false teeth were out. However I am not able to make a finding to that effect because she did not claim any recollection of biting him and his account to the police is unreliable.

When there is a factual dispute in sentencing proceedings, facts asserted by the prosecution need to be established beyond reasonable doubt, but mitigating facts asserted by the defence need to be established only on the balance of probabilities. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant decided to try to end the hostilities on the night in question by going to bed, that she changed into her nightdress, and that she removed her false teeth. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Parker continued the hostilities by repeatedly walking in and out of the bedroom and arguing with the complainant, and that he hit her so hard on the head with the teapot that it caused her head injury. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the complainant bit Mr Parker. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he was using force in self-defence when he pushed her at the end of their altercation.

After the hysterectomy wound split open and the complainant's bowel commenced to protrude, she ran outside. She fell to the ground on the driveway. She lost and regained consciousness a number of times.

Mr Parker phoned 000 and asked for an ambulance. He admitted to the 000 operator that he had pushed the complainant over. He went to the complainant and put a blanket over her. He then went to the home of his next door neighbour, where he asked for a cigarette and said he thought that the complainant was dead. The neighbour found the complainant, who was bleeding heavily from her abdominal wound, as well as bleeding from the wound to the back of her head. Mr Parker made a second 000 call.

The complainant was taken by ambulance to the Royal Hobart Hospital. The injuries noted upon her arrival there consisted of an evisceration of the small bowel through her previous surgical wound, an abrasion over her nose, a laceration to the back of her head, grazes to her hands and her left knee, and bruises to her limbs. She underwent an emergency laparotomy. The laceration to her head was repaired using nine staples. She was in hospital for 23 days. She had to be re-admitted a week after her discharge as a result of an infection which required further surgery. She was discharged four days after her return to hospital.

The complainant had lived in Western Australia before coming to Tasmania in 2011 or 2012 and meeting Mr Parker. As a result of these assaults she went back where she came from, leaving behind all her friends, furniture and possessions, including items of great sentimental value. She now has the support of her two daughters. She had to get new doctors and a new palliative team. She is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the assaults. She sees a psychologist regularly, and at times needs to contact a counsellor at all hours of the day and night. She is not well enough to return to Tasmania to visit her friends, whom she would like to visit before she dies.

Mr Parker was arrested on the night in question and remained in custody until granted bail on 11 December 2017. He went back into custody on 21 November 2018, the day he pleaded guilty, and has remained in custody ever since. He was 54 years old when he committed these assaults and is now 56. He has many convictions for drink driving offences, the first of which was committed in 1981. He has been to prison on six occasions as a result. As a result of violence towards an earlier partner in 2007 and 2008, he has two prior convictions for assault and two for breaching a family violence order. In 2014 he breached another family violence order relating to the current complainant. As a result he was sentenced to 70 hours' community service and placed on probation for nine months.

In relation to the second of the assaults on the complainant, he was charged with causing grievous bodily harm, pleaded not guilty to that charge, and pleaded guilty to assault. The Crown accepted that plea. The crime of causing grievous bodily harm is committed if an assailant intends to cause grievous bodily harm, or if the assailant foresees that his or her physical act is likely to cause grievous bodily harm, and does that act with reckless indifference to that possibility: Vallance v The Queen [1961] HCA 42; (1961) 108 CLR 56; R v Bennett [1990] TASRp 6; [1990] Tas R 72. Because Mr Parker is to be sentenced only for assault in relation to the act that caused the hysterectomy wound to open, I must sentence him on the basis that he neither intended nor foresaw such serious harm: R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383. However the unintended and unforeseen consequences of an assault are still significant for sentencing purposes. This was a drunken assault on a terminally ill cancer patient only weeks after surgery, and it had extremely serious physical consequences and a terrible impact on the victim's mental health. It involved a breach of trust because it was committed against the complainant in her own home by the man to whom she had entrusted her safety.

There are some factors that count in Mr Parker's favour. He pleaded guilty, though the evidence against him was overwhelming. He admitted what he had done, first to the 000 operator and then to the police, on the night in question. He did the right thing by phoning for an ambulance, and not fleeing from the scene, but it would have been better if he had not left the complainant alone and bleeding in the dark and gone next door to ask for a cigarette. He sincerely regrets his conduct towards the complainant. He realises that his violence was associated with his alcohol problem. He spent a little over three months last year in detoxification and rehabilitation facilities operated by Missiondale, and expressed a wish to return to one of that organisation's residential programs when he could. Because of the steps he has taken towards rehabilitation, I will make provision for parole, but I think this is too serious a case for me to fix the shortest possible non-parole period.

Because of the vulnerability of the complainant and the terrible consequences that she has suffered, the only appropriate penalty is a substantial prison sentence. I will backdate the sentence to take account of the periods that Mr Parker spent in custody.

The sentence that I imposed last year for these assaults was four years three months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years nine months. When he appealed, Mr Parker contended that that sentence was manifestly excessive, but the Court of Criminal Appeal did not consider that contention because the factual basis of the sentence had not been resolved. There are a number of new factors that I need to take into account, some of which weigh in favour of a longer sentence, and one of which weighs in favour of a shorter one, as follows:

• I should attach less weight to Mr Parker's plea of guilty than I did last year. It can no longer be said that Mr Parker's plea of guilty saved the complainant from the ordeal of giving evidence. She gave evidence by video link from Western Australia, and did not appear to be distressed by the experience, but there remains a possibility that, during or after her cross-examination, she experienced more distress than I observed. Also, it cannot be said that the plea of guilty facilitated the administration of justice to the extent that a plea of guilty normally does.

• When I viewed the recording of the police interview, I learned that the complainant was more vulnerable on the night in question than I had understood her to be last year. Mr Parker told the interviewing officers that the complainant had noticed a bulge that was nowhere near her surgical scar, that she had shown it to her oncologist two weeks previously, and that she had been told that the bulge was caused by a hernia, that part of her bowel had come out, and that that would be treated after her chemotherapy had been completed. This was not just a case of a drunken man assaulting a terminally ill partner who had recently had a hysterectomy. It was worse than that because the victim had an untreated abdominal hernia, and Mr Parker knew about that.

• On the other hand, I think I must make some allowance for the fact that the sentencing of Mr Parker has been delayed by about 13 months as a result of the factual dispute not having been resolved last year when it should have been. Some allowance should be made in Mr Parker's favour for the mental anguish that he has suffered as a result of the delay. Section 402(4D)(d) of the Criminal Code requires me not to take into account any stress or anguish resulting from Mr Parker having to stand for sentence a second time, but in my view it does not preclude me from taking into account the likely psychological impact of 13 months' delay in the finalisation of the matter. I regard this as a small factor, and one that certainly must not be given any additional weight by reason of the error that led to the delay being mine and not somebody else's.

Taking these matters into account, I consider that the head sentence should be a little longer than the one I imposed last year, but I will fix the same non-parole period.

Leigh John Parker, I convict you and sentence you to four years six months' imprisonment with effect from 27 August 2018. You will not be eligible for parole until you have served two years nine months of this sentence. I direct that these offences be recorded on your criminal record as family violence offences."

1. The appellant's counsel, Ms Baumeler, accepts that the fact that the assaults occurred in the context of a domestic relationship is a serious aggravating feature, as is the fact that the complainant was suffering from a terminal illness and the appellant was her carer. However, she submits that there were other matters that, properly taken into account, should have mitigated the sentence that was imposed.
2. Counsel for the appellant submits that the consequences of the second assault were not foreseen nor intended by the appellant; that the sentence gave too much weight to the extent of the injuries and insufficient weight to those matters that could have lessened the sentence.
3. Counsel also submits that although sentencing statistics are of limited relevance "in this instance" they disclose that a sentence of four years and six months' imprisonment was significantly higher than any other sentence imposed for offending arising out of a domestic relationship. She argues that the crimes lacked many aggravating features present in other cases, such as prolonged violence over lengthy periods, deprivation of liberty, breaches of court orders, use of weapons, threats to kill, children being present, assault on a pregnant partner, attempts to have the complaints withdrawn or to pervert justice in some way, or a significant history of like offending.
4. Finally counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant pleaded guilty and this still should have attracted a discount.

1. In her written submissions, counsel for the State, Ms Shand, observed that the appellant had a number of prior convictions, including previous convictions for crimes of violence, and family violence offences, involving two different partners. She submitted that it thus could not be said that the current offending was atypical conduct, but rather, that these crimes were not committed "as an uncharacteristic aberration" but rather was demonstrative of the appellant's continuing disobedience of the law.
2. Counsel for the State accepted that the appellant was entitled to some consideration for his plea of guilty and its effect in avoiding the need for a contested trial, however, she submits, as the learned sentencing judge noted, the weight to be attached to the plea of guilty was less than had been the case on the previous sentence because it could no longer be said that the appellant's plea of guilty saved the complainant from the ordeal of giving evidence_._
3. Counsel for the State also argues that the weight to be attached to the plea of guilty was also tempered by the lateness of the plea, which came after an application to pre-record evidence had been made, and the fact that the plea was in response to an overwhelming Crown case: see Director of Public Prosecutions v Harington [2017] TASCCA 4, 27 Tas R 128 per Pearce J at [84].
4. The State accepts that the sentence imposed upon the appellant was high if one looks only at the numerical range of past sentences for assault, however, it is argued that the crimes committed were serious and there were a number of aggravating features to these crimes, which included that they were family violence offences, committed by a person in a position of trust on an exceptionally vulnerable person who suffered significant physical and psychological injuries as a result.

1. Family violence offences in the form of assaults were considered recently, in Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14. In that case the appellant's violence towards his partner involved two attacks upon her. The first comprised at least half a dozen forceful punches to her face with a closed fist. The second, inflicted very soon after the first, and after the complainant had phoned for help, involved another "half a dozen" punches to her head with a closed fist. The appellant had an appalling history of violent offending. As a result of the assaults the complainant received swelling and bruising to her face and a bloody nose. The Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal against a sentence of two years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
2. In submissions to the Court in that case, the Director of Public Prosecutions provided a table of sentences imposed in Tasmania in the period March 2013 to March 2018 for crimes of assault in family violence cases. The sentences ranged from community service to imprisonment for three years and six months (for eight violent assaults committed over a period of some hours).
3. Statistics were also provided to the Court in Gregson which had been gathered by the Sentencing Advisory Council. They showed a range of custodial sentences in the Supreme Court in the period 2001-2014, for single offences of assault, of 13 months to 24 months. Multiple offences resulted in a range of 2 to 42 months.
4. In the present appeal, counsel for the State provided the Court with a number of tables, of which the following, which displays data on sentencing outcomes for multiple offence counts, including at least one count of the principal offence of common assault, is the most relevant:

1. That data is collated by the Sentencing Advisory Council, (https://www.sentencingcouncil.tas.gov.au/statistics/supremecourt) and the tables show the statistical breakdown of sentences for sentencing outcomes for the offence of common assault in this Court between 2001 and 2014.
2. In Gregson, Martin AJ, with whom Blow CJ and Geason J agreed, noted at [33] that numerous authorities had emphasised that statistical information is helpful, but it does not establish a fixed range. He pointed out that the limited value of this information was explained in the majority judgment in Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45, 242 CLR 520, at [54] and [55].
3. Martin AJ observed at [34]:

"The following passage from the majority judgment in Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, 253 CLR 58 at [40] and [41] is also pertinent:

'[40] The setting of bounds to the available range of sentences in a particular case must, however, be distinguished from the proper and ordinary use of sentencing statistics and other material indicating what sentences have been imposed in other (more or less) comparable cases. Consistency of sentencing is important. But the consistency that is sought is consistency in the application of relevant legal principles, not numerical equivalence.

[41] As the plurality pointed out in Hili v The Queen, in seeking consistency sentencing judges must have regard to what has been done in other cases. Those other cases may well establish a range of sentences which have been imposed. But that history does not establish that the sentences which have been imposed mark the outer bounds of the permissible discretion. The history stands as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which those sentences both reveal and reflect. And as each of Buchanan JA and Kellam JA rightly observed in MacNeil-Brown, the synthesis of the "raw material" which must be considered on sentencing, including material like sentencing statistics and information about the sentences imposed in comparable cases, is the task of the sentencing judge, not counsel'." [Footnotes omitted.]

1. While finding that the sentence was at the upper end of the range of the appropriate range of sentences, but not manifestly excessive, Martin AJ noted that men who are minded to use physical violence against their female partners must understand that the community is greatly disturbed by this type of unacceptable conduct. His Honour pointed out that such violence is prevalent and warned that it will be met with significant terms of imprisonment. At [37] he said:

"The appellant is not to be punished again for his prior criminal conduct, but he is not entitled to any leniency. He has a history of violence towards women and, as I have said, the community is greatly disturbed by the prevalence of this type of conduct. Women in domestic circumstances are particularly vulnerable to the abuse of power and breach of trust by violent male partners: Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6 per Geason J, at [54]-[60]. Women who become victims in these circumstances, and other potential victims throughout the community, are entitled to such protection as the law is able to provide through the imposition of sentences that will act as both a personal and a general deterrent."

1. To my mind, those comments resonate in the present case. In my view, having regard to the work of the Court in recent times, and noting the "yardstick" of the available statistical and comparable sentencing data, the sentence imposed on the appellant was a heavy one, but it was not plainly unjust or unreasonable. As I have said in the past, vulnerable women such as the complainant are entitled to the protection of the law against brutal partners, and the community expectation is that such protection will be provided by the courts.
2. It is true that the appellant was sentenced on the basis that he neither intended nor foresaw the serious harm to the complainant. However, as the learned sentencing judge commented, the unintended and unforeseen consequences of an assault are still significant for sentencing purposes. In this case the consequences for the complainant were egregious.
3. Moreover, as his Honour noted, this was not just a case of a drunken man assaulting a terminally ill partner who had recently had a hysterectomy. It was worse than that because the complainant had an untreated abdominal hernia, and the appellant knew that. The breach of trust by the appellant as the complainant's carer was the greater because of that knowledge.
4. I note the submissions of counsel for the appellant that the sentence gave too much weight to the extent of the complainant's injuries and insufficient weight to matters that could have lessened the sentence. I also note the submission that the appellant's plea of guilty "should have attracted weight". It has been said on numerous occasions by this Court however, that where the sole ground of appeal is manifest excess, the question for the Court is whether the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. Questions of what weight the sentencing judge ought to have afforded specific features of the case do not enter into the equation.
5. I also note Ms Baumeler's submission that a sentence of four years and six months' imprisonment was significantly higher than any other sentence imposed for offending arising out of a domestic relationship. To the extent to which that submission might be borne out by the material brought to the attention of the Court in Gregson (above), and by counsel for the State in the present appeal, it remains that not every sentence need be in a range. As Underwood J (as he then was) observed in Inkson v The Queen [1996] TASSC 13; (1996) 6 Tas R 1 at [47], having regard to the range of sentences imposed for a crime does not mean that every sentence must fall within that range.
6. Given the wide latitude which must be afforded to sentencing judges, I am unable to view the sentence passed on the appellant as manifestly excessive. The sentence was a heavy one but as such, it could be justified, on the need for general deterrence alone. However, as was noted by a majority of the High Court in Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38, 249 CLR 600, general deterrence is not the only consideration in sentencing violent offenders. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ stated at [54]:

"... First, the proper role of the criminal law is not limited to the utilitarian value of general deterrence. The criminal law is more than a mode of social engineering which operates by providing disincentives directed to reducing unacceptably deviant behaviour within the community. To view the criminal law exclusively, or even principally, as a mechanism for the regulation of the risks of deviant behaviour is to fail to recognise the long-standing obligation of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence ...".

1. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I would prefer to refrain from characterising the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge as "heavy". The sentence was not, for the reasons given by Estcourt J, manifestly excessive. The impact of the appellant's crimes was a very important sentencing consideration. The appellant did not intend or foresee the terrible harm he caused. However, the likelihood of such harm would have been obvious to any reasonable person with knowledge of the complainant's vulnerability, and should have been obvious to the appellant.

1. I have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Estcourt J. I agree with those reasons.
2. I would like to make a couple of additional comments.
3. In respect of the weight to be attached to the plea of guilty, the state submits that any discount to the sentence was "to be tempered by the lateness of the plea, which came after an application to pre-record evidence had been made, and the fact that the plea was in response to an overwhelming Crown case ...".
4. The lateness of the plea is relevant to the discount: Director of Public Prosecutions v Broad [2018] TASCCA 5, 29 Tas R 89. The strength of the case is not: R v Sutton [2004] NSWCCA 225, 41 MVR 40; Broad (above) at [30]; Dunning v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 21 per Porter AJ at [42].
5. The strength of the Crown case is relevant to the issue of remorse because the plea might be considered to evidence such contrition: Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6, 209 CLR 339 at 350; R v Mak, R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381, 167 A Crim R 159; Broad (above) at [31]. In Sutton (above) at [12] the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal said: "The strength of the Crown case is relevant only to the evaluation of remorse and what weight should be given to that factor in determining the appropriate sentence." This was cited by Porter J in Dunning (above) at [43].
6. I agree with Estcourt J that the sentence imposed by the Chief Justice was a heavy one. I agree with his Honour's comments generally in respect of that point. I would add to those matters, that this Court has on a number of occasions emphasised the importance of general deterrence in sentencing for offences involving the infliction of violence on the vulnerable. Too frequently this occurs in a domestic or relationship context. Such conduct requires a sentence that reflects the insidious nature of such offending, and the importance of protecting those vulnerable to such harm: Price v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 22; Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6; Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14; Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson [2020] TASCCA 4.
7. The sentence imposed reflects that dicta.
8. These considerations, and the broad nature of the sentencing discretion, require the conclusion that the appeal is without merit.
9. I would dismiss the appeal.