I shall return to this matter.
15 The defendant's principal witness was Ms O'Connor, credit controller. She deposed to certain facts concerning the faxing of the "Account Facility Application" (or copies of it), including the matter of a tick or cross in the box against "Are order numbers required?". Her account and that of Mr Murphy are inconsistent. Ms O'Connor also deposed to conversations she had had with Mr Murphy and another employee of the plaintiff over the period April to July 2002. This evidence conflicts with Mr Murphy's assertion that, on receipt of the statutory demand in October 2002, he had found no evidence within the plaintiff of dealings with the defendant. In particular, Ms O'Connor said that she spoke to Mr Murphy by telephone on 14 July 2002 to ask him, "When can I expect payment for April and May?", to which Mr Murphy said, "I have approved them for payment; I will call you back". In addition, Ms O'Connor testified to having spoken on 9 July 2002 with Stephen Dale, another employee of the defendant, who told her that the plaintiff wanted to hire a machine, to which she replied, "No, I need the balance of April and May paid first". Mr Murphy has deposed that he does not recall ever having had a conversation with Ms O'Connor of the kind she said occurred on 12 June 2002.
16 The defendant has adduced certain further evidence calculated to show financial unreliability on the part of the plaintiff. I attach no real weight to that. The question before me is not whether the plaintiff is a financially respectable and financially responsible company. It is whether it may properly be said, on the whole of the evidence, that a genuine dispute exists as to the existence of the debts the subject of the statutory demand. Because the plaintiff now accepts the invoice for $1,278.31 in respect of purchase order 11160, the inquiry as to genuine dispute relates to the balance.
17 The test to be applied in cases of this kind has been established in several well known cases, of which those most often quoted are Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290, Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785, Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452 and Re Morris Catering (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601. Those cases refer to tests of "plausible contention requiring investigation", "real and not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived" and "perception of genuineness (or lack of it)".
18 These tests, applied in the context of a summary procedure where it is not expected that the court will embark on any extended inquiry, mean that the task faced by a company challenging a statutory demand on the "genuine dispute" ground is by no means at all a difficult or demanding one. The company will fail in that task only if it is found upon the hearing of its s.459G application that the contentions upon which it seeks to rely in mounting its challenge are so devoid of substance that no further investigation is warranted. Once the company shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow. The court does not engage in any form of balancing exercise between the strengths of competing contentions. If it sees any factor that, on rational grounds, indicates an arguable case on the part of the company, it must find that a genuine dispute exists, even where any case apparently available to be advanced against the company seems stronger.
19 If the defendant were to sue at common law for the debts it alleges, it would have to prove the relevant contract with the plaintiff in respect of each of the separate hirings referred to in the invoices annexed to the affidavit that accompanied the statutory demand. If it was a term of trade applicable to all dealings between the parties (or all after a certain time) that a purchase order should not be recognised unless an order number was given, it would be for the defendant, as plaintiff, to show that that term had been complied with. The defendant would also have to show that the person who placed the order did so with actual or ostensible authority of the plaintiff.
20 The matters emerging from Mr Murphy's evidence relate to these aspects of the defendant's hypothetical cause of action in debt. They show that there is a serious question to be tried as to the terms of the standing arrangement that existed between the parties from late May 2002 by virtue of the Account Facility Application, at least so far as any requirement for the giving of order numbers is concerned. They also show that, with the exception of items in fact ordered by Johnson and Chaplin (or Capling), there is a triable issue as to whether the person who apparently acted for the plaintiff in placing orders did so with the actual or ostensible authority of the plaintiff. There is also a triable issue as to whether on 14 July 2002, the plaintiff, through Mr Murphy, acknowledged to the defendant, through Ms O'Connor, indebtedness of the plaintiff for "payment for April and May" and, if so, just what the acknowledgment meant. Beyond that, however, I do not think that the matters put forward by the plaintiff call in question the existence of the debts said to be evidenced by the several invoices. In particular, I do not accept Mr Murphy's statement - not ultimately pressed, I think - that, as at October 2002, there was no reference in the records of the plaintiff to dealings with the defendant, except one in 1998. Apart from anything else, there must have been evidence of the fax exchanges concerning the Account Facility Application.
21 As far as the subcontractors' evidence is concerned, I think the most that can be said about it is that it tends to support the plaintiff's contention that representatives of subcontractors did not have actual authority of the plaintiff to hire equipment from the defendant and that any equipment owned by the defendant and made available to a subcontractor by the plaintiff was, on the balance of probabilities, hired by the plaintiff from the defendant. However, as the subcontractors' evidence does not identify particular items of equipment, it is not possible to make any connection between the items to which they referred and the items in the invoices in question.
22 Against this, however, must be balanced a particular aspect of Mr Murphy's evidence. I have quoted part of his affidavit of 13 December 2002 concerning the invoice raised by reference to order number 11160. I have also referred to Mr Murphy's evidence that Mr Johnson and Mr Chaplin were, at relevant times, employees of the plaintiff. There is no reference in his evidence to the "contact" person shown in this particular invoice, being "Steve Sulliavan" (presumably "Sullivan"). It is thus not known whether he was an employee of the plaintiff or of a subcontractor.
23 I proceed now to consider the several invoices, copies of which are the annexures to the affidavit of Ms O'Connor of 10 October 2002 which in turn is an annexure to the affidavit of the defendant's solicitor, Mr Li, of 4 July 2003. For reasons stated in my judgment of 4 July 2003, I consider that version of the annexures to Ms O'Connor's affidavit to be the correct one. It is appropriate to consider the invoices in two groups, one for hirings commencing before 31 May 2002 (the earliest date on which a contract in terms of the Account Facility Application was in force) and the other for subsequent hirings.
24 The first group consists of 26 invoices showing "date and time out" entries ranging from 11 April 2001 to 10 May 2002. In none of these is an order number shown. That, however, is of no moment since, on the evidence before me, any requirement that the defendant recognise only those orders accompanied by an order number did not arise until the terms of the Account Facility Application became binding as between the parties. In two cases, the space labelled "Order No" contains "Gary Johnson", with another name appearing under "contact". The "contact" spaces in the several invoices show various names including, in four cases, "Gary Johnson". Mr Johnson is acknowledged by Mr Murphy to have been an employee of the plaintiff. Indeed, he was a project manager and, whatever may have been the plaintiff's internal protocols as to authority to enter into hiring agreements (a matter as to which both Mr Murphy and the plaintiff's managing director gave evidence), a person in that position would have to be regarded as possessing ostensible authority in that regard. There is in evidence a purchase order of the plaintiff's upon another supplier placed by Gary Johnson.
25 The second group consists of 16 invoices bearing "out" dates between 4 June 2002 and 17 July 2002. Among these is the invoice for $1,278.31 which has been paid. Of the others, four bear an order number (being 11117 in each case) and the remainder show no order number. The four, however, show Mr Verko as "contact".
26 My conclusion in relation to the sums claimed in the invoices (other than the one that has been paid) is that no genuine dispute has been shown in respect of those pre-dating 31 May 2002 in which Gary Johnson, the plaintiff's project manager, is shown as "contact". These are invoices for $1,202.52, $2,087.86, $2,087.86 (again) and $943.60, being a total of $6,321.84. In respect of the remaining invoices, there is a triable issue in relation to the authority of the person who placed the order and, in the case of those relating to orders after the Account Facility Application terms were in force, in relation to the absence of order numbers in those cases where there was no number shown in the invoice.
27 In terms of s.459H, I am satisfied that there is no genuine dispute in relation to the sum of $6,321.84 mentioned in the preceding paragraph plus the sum of $1,287.31 the subject of the invoice already paid by the plaintiff. I am satisfied that there is a genuine dispute as to so much of the total of $27,989.66 specified in the statutory demand as exceeds the sums to which I have just referred, that is, as to $20,389.51. On that basis, the court is compelled by s.459H to set aside the statutory demand.
28 There is, however, an aspect of this case that warrants more than simply an order setting the demand aside. I have quoted the passage from Mr Murphy's affidavit of 13 December 2002 in which liability was accepted for the sum of $1,278.31 covered by the invoice showing order number 11160. I have also mentioned that the "contact" named in that invoice is Steve Sullivan. What I have not mentioned is that, at the time he swore his affidavit and accepted responsibility for the sum of $1,278.31, Mr Murphy did not know who was named as "contact" in the invoice. This is because, he said, a copy of that invoice was not served on the plaintiff with the statutory demand.
29 The evidence does not show whether Steve Sullivan was an employee of the plaintiff or an employee of a subcontractor on the Chullora project to which the invoice related. The point is that Mr Murphy was willing to accept, at that point, an invoice containing an order number, regardless of the identity of the "contact". This has particular significance in relation to the four invoices dated 4 June 2002 in which order number 11117 was quoted but the contact was shown as Mr Verko. These are four of a total of nine invoices containing Mr Verko's name. It is clear, as stated in my earlier judgment, that Mr Murphy had before him only some of the invoices annexed to the affidavit accompanying the statutory demand. He refers to five as carrying Mr Verko's name. The absence of reference by him to an order number on any of these suggests that the five he had did not include the four showing the order number 11117 as well as Mr Verko's name. The emphasis placed by Mr Murphy in an earlier part of his affidavit upon the significance of order numbers might well have left him no credible option but to adopt in relation to those four the approach he took to the invoice which carried both an order number and Mr Sullivan's name.
30 In short, while I have concluded that there is a genuine dispute, I have significant doubt, based on the quality of the plaintiff's evidence, whether the contest between the parties will eventually be resolved in favour of the plaintiff. This, in my view, makes it appropriate that the order setting aside the statutory demand not be unconditional. Because a genuine dispute has been established, action by the defendant to vindicate the rights it considers itself to have as a creditor of the plaintiff must be by way of debt proceedings at common law. In the particular circumstances to which I have referred, however, the defendant should not have to pursue those proceedings on an entirely speculative basis, assuming it chooses to pursue them at all. It is appropriate that they be pursued in a context where the plaintiff causes funds sufficient to meet the claim to be set aside and held pending its resolution. This should be achieved by making the s.459H order subject to an appropriate condition under s.459M.
31 The order of the court is accordingly that the statutory demand a copy of which forms part of the annexure A to the affidavit of Jason Li affirmed 4 July 2003 and filed in court that day be set aside on condition that if within 28 days after the making of this order the defendant serves on the plaintiff an originating process filed in a court of competent jurisdiction by which the defendant sues the plaintiff to recover any of the debts claimed in invoices copies of which form part of the affidavit of Brenda O'Connor affirmed 10 October 2002 a copy of which affidavit forms part of the annexure A to the said affidavit of Jason Li the plaintiff shall within 14 days after such service pay into court in the proceedings initiated by that originating process a sum equal to the aggregate of the debts sought to be recovered in the proceedings, such payment in being on the footing that the sum paid in shall remain in court to abide the outcome of those proceedings.
32 There remains the question of costs. In light of the results both in my earlier judgment and in this judgment, I direct that written submissions on costs be filed by the parties by delivery to my Associate within 21 days.
**********