section 87 of the native title act
3 Section 87(1) of the Act sets out the various conditions which will trigger the jurisdiction of the Court in the event that the parties reach agreement on the terms of an order in relation to the proceeding. The first necessary criteria is that the notice period under s 66 of the Act must have ended prior to the parties' written agreement being filed with the Court (s 87(1)). The National Native Title Tribunal's notification of the application was completed on 12 September 2001 and so that criteria is met. Secondly, the agreement of the parties must be on the terms of an order of the Court in relation to the proceedings, part of the proceedings or a matter arising out of the proceedings (s 87(1)(a)). In this instance the agreement of the parties relates to the whole of the proceedings and so that criteria is also met. Thirdly, the terms of the agreement must be in writing, signed and filed with the Court (s 87(1)(b)). Again, this criteria has been met with the filing of the signed Minute of Proposed Consent Determination of Native Title dated 10 November 2010.
4 Having satisfied those matters the fourth criteria is that the Court must be satisfied that the terms of the order sought or an order consistent with those terms would be within the power of the Court (s 87(1)(c)). An order will be within the power of the Court if it is consistent with s 94A of the Act, the rights and interests included in the proposed determination are recognisable by the common law of Australia and there is no other determination in existence over the area the subject of the proposed determination. I will return to s 94A of the Act and the rights and interests claimed below. The Newhaven Pastoral Lease area which is the subject of the proposed determination of native title is surrounded by lands held by various Aboriginal Lands Trusts. To the north and west is the Yunkanjini Aboriginal Lands Trust. The Ngalurrtju Aboriginal Lands Trust lies to the east of Newhaven and immediately south of Newhaven is the Haasts Bluff Aboriginal Lands Trust. No previous determination of native title has been made over the area the subject of this proposed determination.
5 Section 87(1A) provides that:
The Court may, if it appears to the Court to be appropriate to do so, act in accordance with:
(a) whichever of subsection (2) or (3) is relevant in the particular case; and
(b) if subsection (5) applies in the particular case - that subsection.
6 In this case, subs (2) is the relevant subsection and subs (5) does not apply. Subsection (2) of s 87 provides that:
(2) If the agreement is on the terms of an order of the Court in relation to the proceedings, the Court may make an order in, or consistent with, those terms without holding a hearing or, if a hearing has started, without completing the hearing.
7 The words in s 87(1A): "… if it appears to the Court to be appropriate to do so …" have been held to confer on the Court a discretion which, subject to the Court being satisfied about the pre-conditions mentioned above, is unfettered. However, like all discretions conferred on the Court, it must be exercised judicially and in exercising it, the Court must have regard to the objects of the Act, one of the most important being the resolution of disputes by negotiation and agreement, rather than litigation: Munn v Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109; [2001] FCA 1229 ("Munn") at [26] and [28].
8 In considering the effect of these words, it is important to identify what it is that s 87(1A) requires the Court to consider appropriate. The wording of the section makes it clear that the question for the Court is whether it is appropriate to make an order in the terms of the agreement reached between the parties. Therefore the central focus of the section is that agreement: Lovett v Victoria [2007] FCA 474 ("Lovett") at [37]; Nangkiriny v Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6; [2002] FCA 660 at [8]; James v Western Australia [2002] FCA 1208 at [4]; Ward v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848 at [9]; Cox v Western Australia [2007] FCA 588 at [12]; Brown v Western Australia [2007] FCA 1025 at [23]; Hughes v Western Australia [2007] FCA 365 at [9]; Kogolo v Western Australia [2007] FCA 1703 at [18] and Eringa v South Australia [2008] FCA 1370 ("Eringa") at [33].
9 As North J said in Lovett:
… when the Court is examining the appropriateness of an agreement, it is not required to examine whether the agreement is grounded on a factual basis which would satisfy the Court at a hearing of the application. The primary consideration of the Court is to determine whether there is an agreement and whether it was freely entered into on an informed basis ….
(emphasis added)
10 It follows that the critical issue is whether the existence of a free and informed agreement is founded in fact, not whether the matters dealt with in the agreement, specifically the existence of native title, are founded in fact. In Eringa, Lander J expressed it thus:
… the Court adopts a different approach to the task of deciding whether it is appropriate to enter a determination reached by agreement than it brings to the task of deciding whether native title should be recognised in a contested matter. In each case the definition of native title is the same. The Act requires the Court to set out details of the matters mentioned in s 225 in all determinations whether reached by agreement or contest. Although there needs to be some foundation upon which the Court can exercise its jurisdiction, in matters in which the parties have reached agreement on the terms of a determination the Court will have particular interest in whether the agreement has been freely entered into and on an informed basis …. If that question is answered in the affirmative, the Court will consider the fact that an agreement has been reached as weighing in favour of the making of a determination of native title …
(emphasis added).
11 In other words, if the material filed by the parties in support of the consent determination establishes a free and informed agreement, the Court will infer the existence of the native title that is at the heart of that agreement. I have emphasised the word "informed" because the process the State respondent party follows to inform itself is critical to this issue. In Munn, Emmett J observed that the Court's deliberations on an application under s 87:
… would include a consideration of the extent to which the State is a party, on the basis that the State, or at least a Minister of the State, appears in the capacity of parens patriae to look after the interests of the community generally. The mere fact that the State was a party may not be sufficient. The Court may need to be satisfied that the State has in fact taken a real interest in the proceeding in the interests of the community generally. That may involve the Court being satisfied that the State has given appropriate consideration to the evidence that has been adduced, or intended to be adduced, in order to reach the compromise that is proposed. The Court, in my view, needs to be satisfied at least that the State, through competent legal representation, is satisfied as to the cogency of the evidence upon which the applicants rely.
(emphasis added).
12 It is appropriate to make some comments about the difficult balance a State party needs to strike between its role in protecting the community's interests, including the stringency of the processes it follows in assessing the underlying evidence going to the existence of native title, and its role in the native title system as a whole, to ensure that it, like the Court and all other parties, takes a flexible approach that is aimed at facilitating negotiation and achieving agreement. In Lovett North J commented:
… There is a question as to how far a State party is required to investigate in order to satisfy itself of a credible basis for an application. One reason for the often inordinate time taken to resolve some of these cases is the overly demanding nature of the investigation conducted by State parties. The scope of these investigations demanded by some States is reflected in the complex connection guidelines published by some States.
The power conferred by the Act on the Court to approve agreements is given in order to avoid lengthy hearings before the Court. The Act does not intend to substitute a trial, in effect, conducted by State parties for a trial before the Court. Thus, something significantly less than the material necessary to justify a judicial determination is sufficient to satisfy a State party of a credible basis for an application. The Act contemplates a more flexible process than is often undertaken in some cases.
13 I respectfully agree with North J in these observations. In my view, it would be perverse to replace a trial before the Court with a trial conducted by the State party respondent and I do not consider that is what is intended by the provisions of s 87 of the Act.
14 It follows from all these considerations that the central issue in an application for a consent determination under s 87 is whether there exists a free and informed agreement between the parties. In this respect, the process followed by the State party respondent, particularly how it goes about assessing the underlying evidence as to the existence of native title, is critical. Other critical factors, all directed to the processes that lead to the agreement and what was agreed, that have been previously identified by the Court include: whether the parties have independent and competent legal representation: Munn at [29], [39] and [40] and Lovett at [39]-[40]; whether the terms of the proposed order are unambiguous and clear: Munn at [32]; and whether the agreement has been preceded by a mediation process: Nangkiriny v Western Australia [2004] FCA 1156 at [6]; Trevor Close on behalf of the Githabul People v Minister for Lands [2007] FCA 1847 at [6] and Lovett at [41]-[42].
15 The parties have filed a Statement of Agreed Facts and Joint Submissions in Support of the Proposed Minute of Consent Determination. These documents, taken together, describe the process and evidence used by the parties to reach the view that a credible basis exists for the application. In September 2009 the legal representatives of the applicant provided the Northern Territory with a Consent Determination Report prepared by Dr Lee Sackett and Ms Anna Meltzer based on historical ethnographic material and detailed fieldwork carried out in and around the determination area. The anthropological report was supplemented by a series of affidavits and witness statements from claimants attesting to their membership of one or more of the claimant landholding groups and their connections, under their traditional laws and customs, to the application area. The Northern Territory commissioned an anthropological assessment of the material by Emeritus Professor Basil Sansom which was in turn reviewed by the solicitors for the Northern Territory. It was on the basis of this material and the assessments undertaken that the solicitors for the Northern Territory were able to advise the applicant's solicitors on 18 February 2010 that they believed a proper basis existed for a determination of native title by consent.
16 I have already said that the proposed determination area is surrounded by Aboriginal Lands Trust lands and is situated in a remote part of the Northern Territory of Australia. The anthropological material produced for the land claims adjacent to the determination area as well as the historical ethnographic material of Baldwin Spencer and Frank Gillen, Norman Tindale, Ted Strehlow and others was studied and analysed by Dr Sackett and Ms Meltzer for the current claim. Importantly, the anthropologists also conducted fieldwork with claimants in order to gain an understanding and formulate expert opinions on the claimants' laws and customs.
17 I am satisfied that the steps taken by the parties as described in the materials filed in support of the determination, together with the fact that all parties have had the advantage of competent legal representation, indicates that their agreement is free and informed. I am also satisfied that the terms of the proposed orders are unambiguous and clear.