The Family Law Act
30 Mr Meyrick relies on s 60B, s 60CC, s 61C, s 66C and s 67B of the Family Law Act. These all appear in Part VII of the Act, which is headed 'Children'.
31 In so far as it is relevant, s 60B provides as follows:
(1) The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
(a) ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b) protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c) ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d) ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
(2) The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests):
(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b) children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c) parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children …
…
(4) An additional object of this Part is to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.
32 Section 60CC appears in subdivision BA. That subdivision commences with s 60CA, which provides that, 'In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration'. Parenting orders are defined in s 64B and may deal with a number of matters including with whom a child is to live (s 64B(2)(a)) and the allocation of parental responsibility (s 64B(2)(c)). Section 60CC(2) and s 60CC(3) set out a number of matters to which a court must consider in determining what is in the child's best interests. Section 60CC(2) sets out two 'primary considerations':
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
33 Section 60CC(2A) provides that in applying those considerations, the court must give greater weight to the second of them. Section 60CC(3) sets out a number of 'additional considerations' which include:
(a) any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views;
(b) the nature of the relationship of the child with:
(i) each of the child's parents; and
(ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
(c) the extent to which each of the child's parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:
(i) to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and
(ii) to spend time with the child; and
(iii) to communicate with the child;
(ca) the extent to which each of the child's parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent's obligations to maintain the child;
(d) the likely effect of any changes in the child's circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:
(i) either of his or her parents; or
(ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;
…
(i) the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child's parents;
(j) any family violence involving the child or a member of the child's family;
…
(m) any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.
34 Section 61C(1) provides that each of the parents of a child who is not 18 has parental responsibility for the child. Section 61B defines 'parental responsibility' as 'all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children'. Section 61DA provides that when making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child's parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
35 Section 66C(1) provides that, subject to various matters, the parents of a child have the primary duty to maintain the child. The court is required to take that and other matters into account in determining financial contributions towards the financial support necessary for the maintenance of a child (s 66K(1)) and in making an order determining that it is proper for a step-parent to have a duty of maintaining a step-child (s 66M(3)) and determining the financial contribution of the step-parent (s 66N).
36 Section 67B provides that the father of a child who is not married to the child's mother is liable to make a proper contribution to certain child bearing expenses.
37 The asserted repugnancy between those provisions and the decision that the Tribunal made here in relation to the best interests of Child B is said to have operated in two different ways. The first is that the finding that the best interests of the child did not weigh for or against the revocation of the cancellation of the visa effectively denied the child the 'interests' said to arise out of the provisions. The interests identified appeared to be the interest in having a meaningful relationship with both parents and the interest in having shared parental responsibility. The second is (in the alternative) that if Direction 65 authorises 'such an outcome', it is ultra vires.
38 For a number of reasons, I do not accept those contentions.
39 First, the finding that Child B's interests neither weighed for or against revocation did not deny the child any of the asserted interests. For one thing, it was neutral. So it did not weigh against the interests. In Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 15; (2015) 256 CLR 203 at [67], French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held, in relation to a ministerial direction not materially different from Direction 65:
It is not necessary here to seek to chart the boundaries of the Tribunal's obligation to inquire after the best interests of the children of an applicant for review. There may be cases, hopefully rare, where the evidence presented by the parties does not alert the Tribunal that minor children in Australia may be affected by the decision. There may also be cases where the evidence is such that the only determination which can be made in obedience to cl 9.3(1) of Direction 55 is that cancellation is neutral so far as the best interests of any minor child are concerned. In this regard, it is to be noted that cl 9.3(1) requires a 'determination about whether cancellation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child' (emphasis added). Sometimes the best decision 'about' whether cancellation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child may be that it is neither.
40 So there was nothing inherently objectionable about the neutrality of the Tribunal's finding here. Mr Meyrick's counsel relied on statements by Barker J, apparently to the contrary, in Paerau v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 28; (2014) 219 FCR 504 at [56]-[81]. His Honour was in dissent on that point. At [27] Buchanan J said:
In my respectful view, there could be no objection in any case to the AAT concluding that the best interests of a child did not weigh either for or against the cancellation of a visa, so long as the available material was assessed conscientiously. That is not the same as not stating a conclusion about the issue at all. Similarly, in a case where the evidence did not permit a proper conclusion about the issue, there could be no objection to the AAT saying so, as it did in the present case.
41 Perry J found (at [117]-[118]) that the Tribunal in the matter before the Full Court correctly concluded that there was insufficient probative material before it to make the determination required by the provision of the applicable ministerial direction that was equivalent to para 13.2(1) of Direction 65. In the course of making that finding her Honour did, however, say:
In other words, fairly read, I do not consider that the Tribunal was having regard to the primary consideration of the best interests of the minor children in Australia in describing the consideration as 'neutral', but rather intended to restate in a different way that it could not have regard to the consideration at all.
So it may be that her Honour considered that a 'neutral' determination would be impermissible. But to the extent that she and Barker J held that view it cannot, with respect, stand with the subsequent observations of the plurality of the High Court in Uelese. See also Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127; (2017) 254 FCR 295 at [40].
42 In any event it was not the determination about the best interests of Child B which (as Mr Meyrick's submissions put it) denied her a parental relationship with her father. It is the mandatory cancellation of his visa, combined with other provisions of the Migration Act which require that he be removed from Australia (see s 189, s 196, s 198), that will do that (if that is indeed the effect of his removal). The point of substance is that even if one accepts that it is the Tribunal's decision not to revoke the cancellation that has that effect, that is a decision which is the result of weighing a number of different factors, of which the interests of Child B was but one. The finding about those interests was an evaluative finding of fact that was either right or wrong. Mr Meyrick did not attack its correctness or reasonableness as a finding of fact, and in the context of judicial review of an administrative decision his scope to do so would have been limited. Nor did Mr Meyrick make any broader submission that the provisions of the Family Law Act on which he relied did not leave it open to the Minister or the Tribunal to refuse to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the visa on the basis of all relevant factors. Once those possibilities are discarded, there is no basis to single out a finding concerning but one of many factors as being repugnant to the asserted interests even if by itself it would be contrary to those interests (which in fact it was not).
43 The incoherence of the idea that the finding about Child B, without more, is repugnant to the provisions of the Family Law Act on which Mr Meyrick relies becomes apparent when one considers the finding about the best interests of Child A, Child B's then 12-year-old sister. The Tribunal found that Child A's best interests were likely to be served by revocation of the cancellation of Mr Meyrick's visa, but only to a marginal extent. It could be said that this finding, too, effectively denied Child A's relevant interests, because it was not strong enough. Had the finding been that it was strongly in Child A's best interests to revoke the cancellation, that might have tipped the balance of the ultimate decision. But Mr Meyrick makes no challenge to the Tribunal's actual finding. Understandably so; it cannot be a jurisdictional error for a decision-maker to decline to place a finger on the scales, as it were, in order to make a finding of fact that is calculated most likely to achieve an outcome thought to be consistent with values reflected in the Family Law Act. Setting aside the claim of ultra vires, for there to be an error in failing to make a decision that is consistent with those values, it is necessary for those values to affect the construction or application of specific provisions of the Migration Act or of Direction 65 and to show that here, the Tribunal construed or applied those provisions incorrectly.
44 Second, I do not accept that the Tribunal has made any such error of construction. In the end, Mr Meyrick's counsel only identified one specific provision which, he submitted, should have been construed in a particular manner in light of the Family Law Act (or any of the other sources of rights or principles on which he relied). That was para 13.2(4)(a) of Direction 65, which requires the decision-maker to consider, where relevant:
The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen. Less weight should generally be given where the relationship is non-parental, and/or there is no existing relationship and/or there have been long periods of absence, or limited meaningful contact (including whether an existing Court order restricts contact) …
45 Counsel submitted that this could be reconciled with the interests that are said to be recognised by the Family Law Act, by reading the word 'relationship' in the second sentence as not including the relationship between a parent and his or her biological child. That was because it could not be said that such a relationship was ever 'non-existent'. Counsel illustrated the point by submitting that even if a biological parent has never met a child, they still have a parental relationship. If that reading of the paragraph is correct, then the Tribunal erred in finding that the fact that Mr Meyrick had never met Child B was a reason to give less weight to the importance of his relationship with the child.
46 Counsel relied in that regard on the strong presumption that a legislature does not intend to contradict itself when it enacts different pieces of legislation: Butler v Attorney-General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268 at 276 (Fullagar J). But what needs to be construed here is an instrument made by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act, so it is not that presumption, exactly, which applies. Nevertheless I will assume, favourably to the argument, that I should start with a presumption that Direction 65 should be read consistently with the Family Law Act if it is reasonably open to do so. I will also assume, for the moment, that if Direction 65 is not read down as counsel submits, it will indeed be inconsistent with that Act.
47 Nevertheless, I do not consider that it is open to read para 13.2(4)(a) down in the manner submitted. It is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the second sentence of the paragraph, having regard to its wording and syntactical arrangement, and it is inconsistent with the intent that can be discerned from the paragraph as a whole. There is no express limitation of the word 'relationship' so that it does not encompass parental relationships, as it normally would. Nor can that limitation be implied. The implication is to the contrary: in using the phrase 'where the relationship is non-parental', the first part of the second sentence conveys that some relationships to which the paragraph refers are parental. Reading the word to exclude parental relationships would make that phrase tautologous. Also, by following the phrase with 'and/or there is no existing relationship' (emphasis added), the provision makes the further implication that there can be circumstances involving parent and child where there is no existing relationship between them.
48 Counsel's submission seeking to contradict this last proposition mixes different senses of the word 'relationship'. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it in two potentially relevant ways: (1) 'The state or fact of being related; the way in which two things are connected; a connection, an association. Also: kinship'; and (2) 'A connection formed between two or more people or groups based on social interactions and mutual goals, interests, or feelings'. A child will always have a relationship in the first sense with his or her 'biological' father, even if they have never met, will never meet, and are unaware of each other's existence. They are related to each other by kinship or blood. But para 13.2(4)(a) is using the word in the second sense. It requires the decision-maker to make a qualitative assessment of the relationship, informed by matters such as the actual history of the dealings between the non-citizen and the child and their feelings towards one another. So, a relationship can be parental in that second sense, even if the non-citizen is not related to the child by blood. And if a non-citizen and his or her biological child in fact have had nothing to do with each other, it will be open to characterise their relationship, understood in the second sense, as not an 'existing relationship'.
49 With that in mind there is no difficulty in discerning the intent of para 13.2(4)(a) as a whole. It requires the decision-maker to consider both the nature and duration of the relationship (in the second sense) between the child and the non-citizen. Sometimes the nature will be such that the best interests of the child favour non-revocation; for example if the relationship is abusive. But in other cases, the nature of the relationship will be positive, so that its existence may weigh in favour of revocation.
50 The paragraph describes four circumstances, one or more of which may be present in any particular case, which require the decision-maker to give the nature of the relationship less weight in the overall consideration of the best interests of the child. The first circumstance is that the non-citizen is not a parent of the child (there is no apparent restriction there on how the word 'parental' should be understood). The second circumstance is that the non-citizen and the child do not have an 'existing relationship'. The third circumstance is that there have been long periods of absence, which evidently means long periods during which the child and the non-citizen have been apart. The fourth circumstance is that there has been limited meaningful contact.
51 Each of those circumstances is a matter which 'generally' (the word the sentence uses) means that the impact of separation or disruption to a positive relationship will be less grievous to the child. So if one or more of the four circumstances applies to the relationship, the interests of the child in maintaining it may have less weight than they would otherwise have. That can be the case for non-parental relationships and for parental ones, for example, for a parental relationship that has been attenuated by long periods of separation.
52 For those reasons I do not accept that the word 'relationship' in para 13.2(4)(a) can be read as applying only to non-parental relationships. And even if it could, that would not take account of the third and fourth circumstances, which do not use the word 'relationship' and are plainly capable of applying to relations between parent and child. So it is not open to read the paragraph down so as to make it consistent with the asserted interests, even applying the presumption in Butler v Attorney-General (Vic). It follows that the approach the Tribunal took does not demonstrate any misconstruction of the paragraph.
53 Third, approaching the question from the point of view of how the Tribunal applied the paragraph does not assist Mr Meyrick's argument. The paragraph directed the Tribunal to give less weight to the relationship between Mr Meyrick and Child B because he had never met Child B, and that is what the Tribunal did. The fact that the direction is expressed in less than categorical terms, by saying that less weight 'should generally be given', does not mean that the Tribunal had room to apply it a different way so as to make it consistent with the asserted interests. Those words permit a decision-maker to depart from the approach if the specific circumstances of the case require it, but there is nothing specific about the asserted interests here; to the contrary, the submissions made on Mr Meyrick's behalf rely essentially on the universality of the asserted right to a relationship with both parents and the principle of shared parental responsibility.
54 At the hearing, the argument of counsel for Mr Meyrick resolved to a submission that the Tribunal was required to exercise the discretion conferred by s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act in a way that is informed by the values to which the Family Law Act gives statutory recognition, as well as the values reflected in the Convention and the common law. But the authorities on which he relied do not rise so high. Those authorities mostly concerned international treaty obligations, and so are relevant to Mr Meyrick's arguments based on the Convention. But even assuming that the Family Law Act does recognise the importance of a child being brought up by both her parents and the importance of shared parental responsibility, and even assuming that the status of these values are the same as the status of rights or values recognised by international treaties, the cases which concern the application of those values only recognise that a decision-maker may take them into account as a relevant matter in the exercise of certain discretions. I have been referred to no authority to the effect that a decision-maker commits an error, let alone a jurisdictional error, if he or she does not take them into account.
55 In Royal Women's Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2006] VSCA 85; (2006) 15 VR 22 at [75]-[77], Maxwell P summarised the position of international treaties which have not been adopted by statute into domestic law as follows:
First, the provisions of international treaties are relevant to statutory interpretation. In the absence of a clear statement of intention to the contrary, a statute (Commonwealth or State) should be interpreted and applied, as far as its language permits, so that it conforms with Australia's obligations under a relevant treaty.
Secondly, the provisions of an international convention to which Australia is a party - especially one which declares universal fundamental rights - may be used by the courts as a legitimate guide in developing the common law. The High Court has cautioned that the courts should act with due circumspection in this area, given that (ex hypothesi) the Commonwealth Parliament itself has not seen fit to incorporate the provisions of the relevant convention into domestic law.
Thirdly, the provisions of an international human rights convention to which Australia is a party can also serve as an indication of the value placed by Australia on the rights provided for in the convention and, therefore, as indicative of contemporary values.
56 None of this means that an administrative decision-maker commits a jurisdictional error if he or she does not give such a contemporary value weight in the exercise of a discretion. It is trite law that the ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision, and that if such considerations are not expressly stated in the statute, they may be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Migration Act: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 (Mason J). There is no express requirement in the Migration Act or Direction 65 that a body making a decision under s 501CA(4) must take the asserted Family Law Act interests into account, and no argument was advanced as to how any implied requirement might arise.
57 Consistently with that, in Schoenmakers v Director of Public Prosecutions (1991) 30 FCR 70 at 75 (a decision on which Mr Meyrick relied even though it was overruled in United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60; (2001) 209 CLR 165) French J held that where certain statutory provisions 'do, as in the case of the Extradition Act [1988], allow for normative judgments of the special circumstances under which bail may be granted, then the presumptions arising under the common law and in relevant international instruments may be taken into account' (emphasis added). In McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 at 962F, Miles J observed that provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and various international instruments 'contain provisions and establish standards which may be relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion' (emphasis added). In R v Togias [2001] NSWCCA 522; (2001) 127 A Crim R 23 at [85], Grove J said of the Convention on the Rights of the Child that '[i]ts proclamation and discernible aims are available to be considered in a sentencing exercise and should be so considered in an appropriate case' (emphasis added). There is no need to multiply the examples further. None of these authorities establish that an administrative decision-maker commits a jurisdictional error in failing to give weight to a right, value or interest recognised by statute, international instrument or the common law. I therefore do not accept that Mr Meyrick has established any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal in failing to give weight to the interests said to be recognised by the Family Law Act.
58 Fourth, I do not, in any event, accept the assumption made in the preceding discussion, that Direction 65 is inconsistent with the Family Law Act. It would be wrong to take one provision from that legislation out of its context in order to characterise it as right or interest which must always take precedence over other considerations. While the use of the terminology of 'rights' in s 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Family Law Act may make that approach tempting, when those provisions are read in the context of the Act as a whole it is clear that even that Act does not treat the 'right' of children to know and be cared for by both their parents and their 'right' to spend time on a regular basis with both their parents as inviolable in all circumstances.
59 Section 45(2) itself describes the 'rights' as principles underlying the object of Part VII of the Family Law Act, so arguably they go no further than that Part. And importantly, the principles are qualified by an acknowledgement that they do not apply when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests. In other words, they are qualified by the very thing which, in accordance with Direction 65, the Tribunal was treating as a primary consideration: the best interests of Child B. So at that level Direction 65 is consistent with s 45(2). The Tribunal has made a finding about the primary consideration of the best interests of the child, which is also consistent with s 45(2).
60 It is true that at the next level of detail down, para 13.2(4) of Direction 65 identifies various circumstances which can point to a conclusion that revoking the cancellation of the visa is not in the best interests of the child. But neither those more detailed provisions nor the Tribunal's findings made pursuant to them are inconsistent with the Family Law Act. In s 60CC(2) and s 60CC(2A) the 'primary consideration' for the purposes of parenting orders of the 'benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents' is expressly subordinated to the other primary consideration of 'the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence'. I have added the emphases there because, while there is no suggestion that Mr Meyrick has abused his children, the Tribunal's findings show that it was concerned that Child B may be exposed to family violence.
61 Then, when one reaches the additional considerations in s 60CC(3), one finds a range of matters, some of which may favour a parenting order that results in a particular parent looking after and spending time with the child, and others which may point the other way. There is no absolute right of a child to be brought up by both parents which overrides all other considerations. In short, like para 13.2 of Direction 65, s 60CC(3) guides the court in what must always be a considered weighting of the factors relevant to each case.
62 Indeed, many of the mandatory considerations in s 60CC bear a resemblance to factors which are mandatory considerations, where relevant, under Direction 65. For example, the court must consider:
(1) any views expressed by the child (s 60CC(3)(a)) - compare Direction 65 para 13.2(4)(f);
(2) the nature of the relationship of the child with each parent (s 60CC(3)(b)(i)) - compare Direction 65 para 13.2(4)(a);
(3) the likely effect on the child of any separation from either of his or her parents (s 60CC(3)(d)(i)) - compare Direction 65 para 13.2(4)(d); and
(4) any family violence involving the child or a member of the child's family (s 60CC(3)(j)) - compare Direction 65 paras 13.2(4)(g) and 13.2(4)(h).
63 So the importance of a child knowing and being cared for by both parents, as recognised in Part VII of the Family Law Act considered as a whole, is not inconsistent with Direction 65. To the contrary, the values and objects embodied in each are consonant with those of the other. They are not on all fours in every respect and one would not expect them to be; they are different instruments which in different ways govern quite different subject matters. But there is no fundamental inconsistency. Direction 65 recognises the importance of a child having a relationship with both parents, where that is not contrary to the child's best interests. It does so, for example, by requiring the decision-maker to assess what is in the child's best interests having regard to matters such as the nature of the relationship with the non-citizen and the impact of separation on the child.
64 An examination of the process the Tribunal followed here also shows that it applied Direction 65 in a way consistent with Part VII of the Family Law Act. In its reasoning as summarised above, the Tribunal had regard to a range of factors. Some of them pointed towards revocation being in the best interests of Child B. They included the apparent willingness on the part of both parents that Mr Meyrick develop a positive relationship with the child. So the Tribunal accepted that the child may benefit from Mr Meyrick's support and involvement in her upbringing. But there were factors pointing in the other direction. Given his history of offending and unmet treatment needs, there was a risk that he would not be a positive role model. And there was no submission in this proceeding that the Tribunal was wrong to have regard to the contention made on behalf of the Minister that Mr Meyrick had a propensity towards domestic violence. In the absence of some challenge to the correctness of that view, it was not, and could not have been, contended that the Tribunal was wrong to have regard to it as a factor in favour of non-revocation.
65 In short, as will often be the case, there were factors pointing both ways. Of course, if the non-citizen has a history of abusing the child, that will be a powerful factor against a finding that it is in the child's best interests to revoke the cancellation. It will no doubt make even a neutral finding about that matter unlikely. I repeat that there is no suggestion of such abuse in Mr Meyrick's case. But that is hardly the only possible circumstance which indicates that cancellation of the visa is in the best interests of the child. And as Uelese confirms, sometimes the considerations will be equally balanced, so the finding is a neutral one.
66 As for the other 'interest' on which Mr Meyrick relies, parental responsibility, his submissions did not make it clear how Direction 65 is inconsistent with that. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility embodied in s 61DA of the Family Law Act relates solely to the decision-making responsibilities of both parents: see Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum (2006) at [128]. The other provisions on which Mr Meyrick relies relate essentially to the financial responsibility of a parent to maintain the child. If Mr Meyrick is forced to go to the United Kingdom without the children, that will inevitably make it harder for him to discharge those responsibilities. But it can hardly be asserted that the additional difficulty reveals any fundamental inconsistency between Direction 65 and Child B's asserted interests in that regard. No argument to that effect was developed. And any attempt to do so would face the obvious problem that a wide range of administrative actions taken by government may significantly impede an individual's capacity to discharge parental responsibilities. Any submission that those actions are thereby invalid would be an ambitious one to make.
67 Since there is, in my view, no inconsistency between Part VII of the Family Law Act and Direction 65, it follows that I do not accept the submission that the latter was ultra vires due to repugnancy with the former.
68 Generally, the approach which Mr Meyrick's counsel asks the court to take involves removing particular provisions out of their context in Part VII of the Family Law Act and elevating them to absolute requirements, so that any decision said to be inconsistent with them involves jurisdictional error. It will be apparent that I do not accept that any part of that approach is correct.