[2021] WASC 300
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2021-09-02
Smith J
Original judgment source is linked above.
ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Inglis [2016] WASCA 25
Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 498
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345
Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 229
Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (Unreported, NSWSC, 16 December 1993)
Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62
Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd [2013] WASC 386
Black Box Control Pty Ltd v Terravision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219
Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1
Brechin v Shire of Brookton [2002] WASC 228
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253
Cavill v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 108
Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137; (2015) 49 VR 402
Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd v Robinson [2016] FCAFC 17; (2016) 239 FCR 300
City of Noarlunga v Fraser (1986) 61 LGRA 324, 326
Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd [No 2] [2007] WASC 244; (2007) 35 WAR 394
Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd [2008] FCAFC 136; (2008) 249 ALR 458
Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 82; (1986) 161 CLR 500, 510
Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] NTSC 44; (1998) 146 FLR 37
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588
Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] WASCA 239
East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis) [2020] WASCA 147
Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 12; (2017) 261 CLR 544
Evans v Halliday [2021] WASC 85
Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437
Fitzgerald v CBL Insurance Ltd [2014] VSC 493
Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 413; (2009) 262 ALR 691
Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336
HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 13; (2008) 235 CLR 334
Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168; (2001) 51 NSWLR 572
Horsell International Pty Ltd v Divetwo Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 368
Insurance Commission (WA) v Kightly [2005] WASCA 154; (2005) 30 WAR 380
Johnson v American Home Assurance Co [1998] HCA 14; 192 CLR 266, 272 - 276
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1896] UKLawRpAC 12; [1896] AC 250
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361
Legal & General Insurance Ltd v Eather (1986) 6 NSWLR 390, 394
Lithgow City Council v Jackson [2011] HCA 36; (2011) 244 CLR 352,
Liyanage v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112; (2017) 51 WAR 359
Lumley General Insurance Ltd v Port Phillip City Council [2013] VSCA 367
Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19; (1952) 85 CLR 352
Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
March v E & M H Stramere Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506
Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 115; (2013) 45 WAR 297
McConnell Dowell Middle East LLC v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (No 3) [2009] VSC 94; (2009) 226 FLR 84
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [2018] WASC 144
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 2] [2018] WASC 391
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 4] [2018] WASC 210
Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [No 5] [2015] FCA 571
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104, 116 - 117
Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95
Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [No 3] [2017] FCA 1500; (2017) 123 ACSR 549
Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58
Poland v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 136
Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1
R v Rose [1965] QWN 35
Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367
Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165
Saraceni v Mentha [No 2] [2012] WASC 336
Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 857; 213 FLR 174
Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; 49 NSWLR 262
Servcorp WA Pty Ltd v Perron Investments Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 79
Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1994) 62 SASR 40; (1994) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-209
Shell Refining (Australia) Pty Ltd v AJ Mayr Engineering Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 94
Shire of Brookton v Water Corporation [2003] WASCA 240
Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 279
Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 80; (2019) 55 WAR 89
Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573
State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 59; (1969) 123 CLR 228
Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] UKPC 21; [1956] 1 WLR 965
Symeou v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-851
Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd [2021] FCA 95
The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239
The State of Western Australia v Johnston [2020] WASC 445
Todd v Altera at Lloyds [2016] FCAFC 15
Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165
Transfield Services (Australia) v Hall [2008] NSWCA 294; 75 NSWLR 12
Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720
V L Credits Pty Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1991] VicRp 71; [1991] 2 VR 311
Wallaby Grip Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2010] HCA 9; (2010) 240 CLR 444
Wellington Insurance Co Ltd v Armac Diving Services Ltd (1987) 37 DLR(4th) 462
Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H & R-E & W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380, 387 - 388
WorkCover (Qld) v Seltsam Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 457; (2001) 53 NSWLR 518
X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26
Young Investment Group Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2019] WASC 74
1.0 The action and the third and fourth party proceedings ‑ the parties and the result
1 In August 2014, Frederick William McMurray and Jennifer Grace McMurray purchased a house and land at 179 Wellington Street, Mosman Park, for $8,950,000.[1] The McMurrays intended to reside in the house with their children but before doing so they engaged a builder, Mosman Bay Construction Pty Ltd (Mosman Bay), to carry out renovations.
2 The renovations began in mid 2015 and were almost complete by 15 January 2016. By that time, the McMurrays had spent more than $1 million on the renovation works.
3 On 16 January 2016, and just before the renovation works were finally completed, the house was destroyed by a fire and had to be demolished.
4 These proceedings are substantially about one relatively straightforward issue of fact, and that is what was the cause of the fire, but these proceedings also raised a tangled web of issues going to liability that relate to the law of insurance because the McMurrays, through the second defendants, Russell Bresland and Bresland Consultants Pty Ltd (the Bresland parties), arranged to insure the house by AIG Insurance Australia Limited (AIG), and the builder, Mosman Bay, arranged for a separate insurer, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance (Tokio Marine), to insure the renovation works. This led to the McMurrays suing their broker, the Bresland parties, and the builder's insurer, Tokio Marine. It also led to AIG bringing third party proceedings against the builder of the renovations, Mosman Bay, and the builder's insurer, Tokio Marine, and Tokio Marine bringing third party proceedings against Mosman Bay and requiring Mosman Bay to bring fourth party proceedings against one of the subcontractors of Mosman Bay, Hans Bo Kristian Holgersson.
5 The trial of the McMurrays' claims and the third and fourth party proceedings occupied almost four weeks of hearing days, and was preceded by four interlocutory judgments,[2] the first of which resulted in an appeal to the Court of Appeal on a preliminary point involving interpretation of the Tokio Marine policy.[3]
6 Immediately after the fire, the McMurrays made a claim on the house insurance they had with AIG, and AIG denied liability. The McMurrays sue AIG for damages for breach of a contract of insurance to restore or repair, or replace or rebuild, the house up to the sum insured of $4,725,000, together with the reasonable costs necessary to demolish the damaged buildings and remove the debris.
7 In the main proceedings, the McMurrays' claim against:
(a) AIG is in contract. The McMurrays seek a declaration against AIG to the effect that in accordance with the terms of a contract of insurance against property damage, AIG is liable to indemnify them in connection with loss and damage caused to the house by the fire, and an award of damages;
(b) the Bresland parties is for breach of contract, tort or misleading conduct. The McMurrays sue the Bresland parties for damages, on the basis that if, as AIG contends, AIG is not liable because the contract of insurance contains an exclusion clause, the Bresland parties are in breach of contract of a retainer, breach of duty of care in negligence, and engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct in arranging insurance containing an exclusion clause. Even if the McMurrays are entirely successful against AIG, the McMurrays' claim against the Bresland parties is for the full amount of their proven loss on grounds that the AIG policy of insurance did not 'cover everything' (less the amount recovered from AIG and Tokio Marine); and
(c) Tokio Marine for breach of contract, claiming that the Tokio Marine insurance policy contained an extension clause by which Tokio Marine provided property insurance for the principals of Mosman Bay for the contract works carried out by Mosman Bay. Prior to trial, the McMurrays entered into an agreement with Tokio Marine to settle their claim.
8 AIG denies liability in the main proceedings under the contract of insurance on grounds that a contract works exclusion clause (Contract Works Exclusion clause) applies to exclude cover of the McMurrays' claim.
9 The basis upon which AIG claim that the Contract Works Exclusion clause applies is that:
(a) the fire was caused by the self-ignition (spontaneous combustion) of oil soaked rags, being used by painters, placed in a plastic rubbish bin in the front western room on the ground floor of the house; and
(b) this painting work was an excluded activity as it was an activity undertaken in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Works or Free Issue Materials and/or Property Damage to the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Works or Free Issue Materials as defined in the Contract Works.
10 The oil soaked rags, said by AIG to be the cause of the fire are claimed to be rags used by painters to apply a product known as Lobasol 'HS 2K ImpactOil and ImpactOil Colour' (Loba Oil) to stain various timber surfaces in the house. I have found in 4.5.3 below that the cause of the fire cannot be determined.
11 AIG brought third party proceedings against Mosman Bay and Tokio Marine. Prior to trial, AIG and Tokio Marine also entered into an agreement, which resulted in AIG's third party proceedings being discontinued against Tokio Marine.
12 AIG instituted third party proceedings against Mosman Bay on grounds that if the court determines that the Contract Works Exclusion clause does not apply to exclude the McMurrays' claim under the AIG policy, such that AIG is required to indemnify them in respect of the fire damage under its policy, then AIG will be subrogated to the McMurrays' rights against Mosman Bay under the terms of the McMurrays' construction contract that they entered into with Mosman Bay. AIG claims that the terms of this contract required Mosman Bay, among other obligations, during the renovations to bear the risk of loss of or damage to the works, and any structure on the site before Mosman Bay had possession of the Wellington Street property, and to take out and maintain insurance for the works and existing structures. I have found in 7.1 below that AIG has no right to institute a subrogated claim against Mosman Bay in its own name, and no right of subrogation can arise under its policy of insurance until it makes a payment to the McMurrays under the policy.
13 As part of the renovation works, Mosman Bay engaged subcontractors to carry out the painting works. There is an issue in the proceedings as to the identity of the subcontractors who entered into a contract with Mosman Bay to carry out the painting works. I do not find it necessary to determine this issue because I have found in 4.5.3 below that the cause of the fire cannot be determined.
14 In its third party proceedings against Mosman Bay, AIG alleges that the fire was caused by the negligence of Mosman Bay's painting subcontractor, Simmos Improvements. AIG alleges that the interior painting subcontractor was Simmos Improvements Pty Ltd.
15 Prior to the McMurrays' claims against Tokio Marine and AIG's claims against Tokio Marine being settled, Tokio Marine required Mosman Bay to institute fourth party proceedings against the first fourth party, a painter, Hans Bo Kristian Holgersson.
16 Mosman Bay alleged in the fourth party proceedings that the interior painting subcontract for the renovation works was entered into with Mr Holgersson who trades as Holgersson's Complete Home Service. Mr Holgersson pleads in the fourth party proceedings that the interior painting subcontract was formed jointly with himself and another painting subcontractor, being either a company operated by Mark Simpson, known as Simmos Improvements Pty Ltd, or by Mark Simpson personally. AIG, however, has not instituted third party proceedings against Simmos Improvements Pty Ltd or Mark Simpson.
17 The McMurrays have not sought to join Mr Holgersson, Mosman Bay or any contractors or subcontractors engaged by Mosman Bay as defendants. The McMurrays are of the opinion that there is no admissible expert or lay evidence establishing that the fire was caused by oil soaked rags or that painters placed oil soaked rags in a plastic rubbish bin inside their house. Consequently, the McMurrays argue that the allegation by AIG that the fire was caused by oil soaked rags has no foundation in evidence is speculative, and the cause of the fire cannot be ascertained.
18 On 17 December 2019, the McMurrays and Tokio Marine entered into a settlement of the McMurrays' claim for $1,476,000, being a $1,264,050 contribution to loss and interest, and $211,950 for contribution to costs. Following the settlement, the McMurrays' claim against Tokio Marine was dismissed by consent,[4] and AIG discontinued its third party proceedings against Tokio Marine on 18 February 2020.[5]
19 The settlement amount paid to the McMurrays by Tokio Marine was less than the full value of the McMurrays' claim against Tokio Marine, which was $1,963,819.00, being $1,378,788 for their loss, $303,031 for interest and $282,000 for legal costs.
20 As a result of the settlement agreement, Tokio Marine ceased to be a party to the proceedings, and Tokio Marine's third party proceedings against Mosman Bay were dismissed on 23 January 2020.[6]
21 In March 2020, Taylor Smart, lawyers for Mosman Bay, gave notice pursuant to O 8, r 7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) that they ceased to act for Mosman Bay, because Mosman Bay could no longer afford to fund its defence in the third party proceedings, and prosecute the fourth party proceedings against Mr Holgersson.
22 In these circumstances, the usual course would have been that the fourth party proceedings would have been discontinued or dismissed. However, Mr Holgersson wanted the fourth party proceedings to remain on foot because collateral attacks had been made by AIG and the Bresland parties in their defences to the McMurrays' claims against Mr Holgersson, and Mr Holgersson wanted to defend these attacks.
23 In AIG's and the Bresland parties' defences, allegations are made about who and what caused the fire that caused the total destruction of the Wellington Street house, and how that fire was caused, including the renovations and its other structures, which allegations relate to the acts of Mr Holgersson and others engaged by him to carry out the painting works.
24 On 18 March 2020, upon Mosman Bay having filed an undertaking on 18 March 2020 that it would not seek to remove itself from the proceedings if an order was granted giving its lawyers leave to cease to act, the court made an order enabling Taylor Smart to cease to be the solicitors acting for Mosman Bay. The effect of the undertaking given by Mosman Bay is that it was to remain a party but not take any further part in the proceedings. On this basis, Mr Holgersson in turn gave an undertaking to Mosman Bay, prior to Taylor Smart ceasing to act, that he would not seek any orders for costs against Mosman Bay, on and from 17 March 2020.[7]
25 Subsequently, an order was made on 4 August 2020 that evidence in the fourth party proceedings and the third party proceedings be evidence in the main action, and evidence in the main action be evidence in the first third party proceedings and first fourth party proceedings.
26 Consequently, at the trial, the parties before the court who appeared and were heard were the McMurrays, AIG, the Bresland parties and Mr Holgersson.
27 The McMurrays' claim against the Bresland parties depends almost entirely upon whether the McMurrays' claim against AIG succeeds in whole or in part. In turn, the McMurrays' claim against AIG depends upon whether AIG is entitled to rely upon the Contract Works Exclusion clause and, if the exclusion clause applies, whether AIG is liable for the damage to the house including the renovation works, or only damage to the house. I have found in 5.0 below that AIG is not entitled to rely upon the exclusion clause and it is liable to the McMurrays for the damage to the house including the renovation works.
28 It is the McMurrays' view that insurance contracts were in place for the house and renovation works, and their loss should be recovered from AIG, or the Bresland parties, less the amount that Tokio Marine has paid.
(a) the McMurrays' claim against AIG fails entirely, then the McMurrays' claim against the Bresland parties is for breach of contract, breach of duty of care in tort, and misleading conduct under the Australian Consumer Law essentially because the Bresland parties did not obtain the insurance against property damage to, or connected with, the renovation works. Consequently, the McMurrays claim that their claim for loss and damage against the Bresland parties is to be assessed on the basis of no insurance recovery for the loss and damage to their house as renovated, less the settlement amount paid to the McMurrays from Tokio Marine;
(b) AIG is liable to the McMurrays for the damage to the house including the renovation works, then the McMurrays' claim against the Bresland parties falls away;
(c) AIG is only liable to the McMurrays for the damage to the house but not the renovation works, the McMurrays claim against the Bresland parties their loss and damage to the house including the renovation works less what was paid by Tokio Marine and is payable by AIG.
30 The Bresland parties contend that if McMurrays succeed only against AIG in respect of damage to the house without the renovations works, the McMurrays have no claim against them for the shortfall between the amount paid to the McMurrays by Tokio Marine and what they are entitled to recover from AIG. This is said to be because the McMurrays as principals and Mr Holgersson as the subcontractor were insured under Tokio Marine's policy for the contract works performed by Mosman Bay, and the Tokio Marine policy is the exact type of policy the McMurrays' expert witness, Mr Atkin, testified was the most appropriate insurance cover for the McMurrays to have for the renovation works. I do not find it necessary to consider this issue because, for the reasons I give in 5.0 and 6.0 below, I have found:
(a) AIG is liable to the McMurrays for their loss and damage to the house including the renovation works; and
(b) the Bresland parties are not liable for any loss or damage to the McMurrays arising out of the fire that destroyed their house on 16 January 2016.
31 Each of the lay witnesses, with the exception of the director of Mosman Bay, Mr David William Walling, and the site supervisor employed by Mosman Bay, Mr Ralph Edgar Thomas, gave their evidence-in-chief in writing in witness statements.
2.1.1 The lay witnesses evidence adduced by the McMurrays in the main proceedings
32 Mr and Mrs McMurray both gave evidence. Mr McMurray's evidence was not substantially challenged in cross-examination by any party and Mrs McMurray was not cross-examined at all.
33 An accountant and Chief Financial Controller for the Sanwell group of companies controlled by Mr McMurray, Mr Bradley David Holt, whose duties included ensuring that insurance contracts were in place for the Sanwell companies, was called to give evidence on behalf of the McMurrays. His witness statement was tendered into evidence by counsel for the McMurrays, without any subsequent cross-examination.
34 By consent of the parties, a witness statement of a carpenter, Niall William Woods, employed by a contractor, Airport Cabinets and Carpentry, carrying out cabinet‑making work at the house on the day before the fire, was tendered into evidence.
2.1.2 The lay witness evidence adduced by the other parties in the main action, the third party proceedings, and the fourth party proceedings
35 The Bresland parties did not call any witnesses in defence of the McMurrays' action in the main proceedings.
36 AIG called Mr Walling to give evidence, and Mr Holgersson called Mr Thomas. Both Mr Walling and Mr Thomas gave their evidence-in-chief orally, and were cross-examined by counsel by all the other parties.
37 Mr Holgersson had not been working at the house for two to three weeks before the fire. Mr Holgersson gave evidence about the painting works and the contractual arrangements he had entered into with Mosman Bay and with another contract painter, Mr Mark Lawrence Simpson.
38 Mr Holgersson called Mr Simpson to give evidence. Mr Simpson was carrying out the interior painting works inside the house on the day before the fire and for several weeks leading up to the fire with two other painters, Mr Radford Milton and Mr Jason Roach.
39 No party made any serious challenge to the credibility or reliability of the evidence given by any of the lay witnesses.
40 Neither Mr Milton nor Mr Roach were called to give evidence by any party to the proceedings. The fact that they were not called and the inferences that can be drawn from their absence are considered in 4.5.1 below.
2.2 The forensic fire investigators and the forensic locksmith
41 There is an issue in the proceedings as to whether the forensic fire investigators are expert witnesses or lay witnesses who have an area of expertise in the investigation of fires.
42 The forensic fire investigators who gave evidence in these proceedings and produced written reports are as follows:
(1) Mark Stephen Pollard (called by the McMurrays);
(2) James David Manser (called by AIG); and
(3) Maurice Ernest Tong (called by AIG).
43 AIG also called Mr James Boyd Bell, who was, at the time of the fire, employed by the Department of Fire and Emergency Services as a fire investigator, and who took control of the property as the firefighters were putting out the fire.
44 I have found Mr Pollard, Mr Manser, Mr Tong and Mr Bell to be experts qualified to give evidence as to the area of origin, path of the fire and cause of the fire. My findings on this point are set out in 4.4.2.
45 I have found that the report, notes and oral evidence of Mr Bell are to be accepted into evidence (except as to some matters in his notes and report, which findings are made in 4.4.3 to 4.4.5 of these reasons) as evidence of an expert fire investigator who is required to exercise statutory powers to investigate, and to make a report as to the fire origin and cause of a fire to the Department of Fire and Emergency Services and others such as the Arson Squad of the Western Australian Police,[8] but whose opinion and findings were not intended to be conclusive, nor constitute a full investigation of all relevant factual circumstances of the fire.
46 The admissibility and reliability of the evidence of Mr Tong, Mr Manser and Mr Pollard, and the weight to be given to their evidence and the opinions stated in their written reports, is set out below in 4.4. For the reasons in 4.4.2, I have found that the reports and oral evidence of the forensic fire investigators is expert evidence as to the area of fire origin, the point of fire origin, and the cause of the fire. However, for the reasons that I have given in 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 and 4.5.3, I do not accept the evidence of Mr Manser as to the cause of the fire that occurred at the house in the early hours of 16 January 2016, and for the reasons set out in 4.5.3, I find that the cause of the fire cannot be determined on the balance of probabilities.
47 There is also an issue as to whether the evidence of the forensic locksmith, Mr Brian Peter Tisdale, is admissible. AIG objected to the admission of Mr Tisdale's report on grounds that his evidence goes to an issue not pleaded by the McMurrays in the main proceedings or by Mr Holgersson in the fourth party proceedings.
48 For the reasons that I give in 4.5.2, I have found that Mr Tisdale's report goes to issues relevant to the matters pleaded by: the McMurrays and AIG, the McMurrays and the Bresland parties in the main proceedings, and by Mr Holgersson in the fourth party proceedings.
49 The quantity surveyor expert evidence is relevant to the determination of the quantum of the McMurrays' claims of loss and damage.
50 Two expert quantity surveyors gave evidence. The McMurrays called Mr Shaun Walter Cugley and AIG called Mr Stephen Warne. These experts produced a joint memorandum and gave concurrent evidence.
51 Both experts gave evidence about the retrospective assessments they each made of the cost of the reconstruction of the original house excluding renovations and the reconstruction of the house as fully renovated.
52 The matters agreed by the quantity surveyors and the differences in their costs reconstructions are set out in 6.0 below.
53 The McMurrays called an insurance broker, Brian John Atkin, who produced an expert report in respect of the availability and price of insurance for an unoccupied domestic dwelling undergoing renovations in September 2015, and the appropriate insurance coverage for such a property undergoing renovations of a significant value.
54 Because I have found the McMurrays' claim for loss and damage against the Bresland parties falls away, I have not found it necessary to consider Mr Atkin's evidence.
3.0 The three main issues for determination in the proceedings
55 The matters in dispute in the proceedings essentially turn upon the answers to three questions.
(1) Is the court able to determine how the fire started, and what was the cause of the fire? In particular:
(a) did the fire start in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room;
(b) is there sufficient admissible evidence for the court to determine on the balance of probabilities that the cause of the fire was the self-ignition of oily rags in the bin in the entry to the dining room of the house;
(c) is there another possible cause of the fire if the court accepts there is some evidence from which an inference could be drawn that an intruder may have entered the house on the night in question and started a fire in, or in the vicinity of, the bin in the entry to the dining room; or
(d) is there insufficient admissible evidence before the court to determine the probable cause of the fire other than to find the origin of the fire was in the green rubbish bin?
(2) What is the proper construction of the Contracts Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy?
(3) What is the quantum of the loss and damage suffered by the McMurrays?
4.1 The purchase of the Wellington Street property, the renovation works contract with Mosman Bay and the background to entering into the AIG and Tokio Marine policies
4.1.1 The purchase of the property and entering into the AIG policy of insurance
57 After the McMurrays' case had closed, it was conceded in opening on behalf of the Bresland parties that if AIG successfully defends this action in reliance on the exclusion clause of the AIG policy:
(a) in the absence of Mr Bresland giving oral evidence at the trial of the action and any contemporaneous note, written record, or correspondence between the Bresland parties and the McMurrays supporting the claims made by the Bresland parties in their defence; and
(b) having heard from Mr McMurray, the weight of the evidence supports the McMurrays' claim that the Bresland parties failed to take reasonable care to ensure the McMurrays were insured for damage to the existing house in connection with the renovations.[9]
58 In light of this concession, is not necessary to set out all of the evidence that led to Mr Bresland (as agent for the McMurrays) entering into a contract of insurance with AIG to insure the Wellington Street property.
59 The Bresland parties acted as the McMurrays' insurance broker from about 2012. The Bresland parties had also acted as Mr McMurray's insurance broker for Mr McMurray's various businesses that form part of the group of companies known as the Sanwell Group.
60 In August 2014, Mr and Mrs McMurray made an offer to purchase the house and land at 179 Wellington Street in Mosman Park. At that time, the McMurrays owned a house and land at 21 Colonial Gardens, Mosman Park, and the house on that land was insured by Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd (Chubb).
61 Mr and Mrs McMurray completed the purchase of the house and land in Wellington Street, Mosman Park, for an amount of $8,950,000.[10]
62 In about August 2014, Mr McMurray telephoned Russell Bresland and told him they were about to buy a new house worth about $4.5 million, but would not be moving into the house immediately because they were going to carry out renovations to the value of $500,000 to $600,000. Mr McMurray also told Mr Bresland that they wanted the house to be insured, wanted the insurance to include cover for the renovations, and the house needed to be fully covered for every eventuality.
63 In response, Mr Bresland told Mr McMurray that he would arrange the appropriate cover. He also told Mr McMurray that there was only a month to run on their Chubb policy, so they would place the insurance with Chubb for the time being until renewals became due.
64 Prior to the settlement of the purchase of the house and land at Wellington Street, Ms Lim, on behalf of the Bresland parties, sent to Mr McMurray a renovations questionnaire from Chubb. Mr McMurray partially completed the form and returned it to Ms Lim on 28 August 2014. At that time, settlement had not occurred and Mr McMurray had not appointed a builder to carry out the renovation work.[11] On the questionnaire under the heading, 'Full description of works to be carried out', Mr McMurray wrote, 'alter internal doors, add walls, refit kitchen and bathrooms, add decks, modify windows'. He also wrote '$500,000' as the estimated cost for the 'internal refurbishment', '$75,000' for the estimated cost of the 'additional outside structure' and '$25,000' for the 'landscaping'.[12]
65 On 28 August 2014, Chubb issued a certificate of currency of building insurance for a sum of $4,500,000 for the Wellington Street house.[13]
66 Following negotiations between Chubb and Mr Bresland, on 1 September 2014 Chubb informed Mr Bresland on confirmation that the renovations were not structural in any way, and the construction was to be completed by an architect with a builder, it was willing to provide insurance for the Wellington Street property with a $1,000 deductible (excess) for each and every loss, except for a renovation deductible (excess) of $20,000 for all renovation related claims until all renovation work was completed.[14]
67 It appears that Mr Bresland was of the opinion that the Chubb terms for deductibles were too high.
68 On 16 September 2014, Mr Bresland sent an email to a representative for Chubb stating that the premium was 'absolutely ridiculous' for the Wellington Street property and that they would be putting this to market (that is, seeking other quotes to cover the house during the renovations).[15]
69 On 21 September 2014, Mr Bresland sought a quote from Chartis (at that time, part of AIG's business was also known as Chartis). The request for a quote proposed that the house be insured for $4,500,000, with an optional excess of $500, $1,000, $2,000 or $5,000.[16] In the Private Client Group request for a quote, under the heading, 'Residence Information', it was stated that renovations were planned within the next 12 months and that the type of renovations were, 'Internal - bring up to new standard $600,000'.[17]
70 On 24 September 2014, the AIG Private Client Group provided an insurance quote to Mr Bresland.[18] The quote was for house and contents cover for the Colonial Gardens property and for house insurance for the Wellington Street property, together with private collections cover for a painting. One of the proposed endorsements on the policy was the Contract Works Exclusion clause.
71 Mr Bresland telephoned Mr McMurray and recommended that on expiration of the Chubb policy that they take out a policy with AIG for the house for the duration of the renovations, as AIG insured high-end properties. Mr McMurray informed Mr Bresland that he accepted his advice to change insurers to AIG. He also told Mr Bresland again that he wanted cover for everything, every eventuality.[19]
72 When Mr McMurray spoke to Mr Bresland and accepted the change of insurance policies to AIG, he was not aware that the policy proposed by AIG contained a Contract Works Exclusion clause. It is clear that a copy of the AIG Private Client Group quote (which contained a copy of the Contract Works Exclusion clause) was not sent to Mr McMurray prior to this conversation, nor was the Contract Works Exclusion clause discussed with Mr McMurray during the conversation.
73 After he spoke to Mr McMurray, Mr Bresland accepted the AIG quote and cancelled the Chubb policy.
(a) the amount required to restore or repair, replace or rebuild, a structure with materials and workmanship of like kind and quality as the house and including fees from architects, surveyors and consulting engineers; up to the sum insured of $4,725,000; and
(b) the reasonable costs necessary to demolish damaged buildings and remove the debris.
75 The Contract Works Exclusion clause of the AIG policy provided:[22]
Notwithstanding any terms or conditions to the contrary no cover shall be provided under the Your Policy for:
- in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Free Issue Materials or Works;
- in connection with any Maintenance or Defects Liability Period; or
- which manifests, incurs or arises after any Maintenance or Defects Liability Period as a result of any activities or works undertaken during such Maintenance or Defects Liability Period:
2. Property Damage to the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Free Issue Materials
In the event of the operation of this exclusion no coverage shall be provided under Your Policy for Construction Materials, Rebuilding for Compliance, Precautionary Repairs, Rebuilding or Reconstruction Costs as more fully specified and defined in Your Policy
For the purposes of this exclusion the following definitions apply:
Damage means any loss, fine, penalty, cost, charge, liability, physical loss or Property Damage including any Earth Movement
Contract Work means any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit and which are incorporated or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure at the Location
Free Issue Materials means any and all building and construction materials (including debris) wheresoever located, or in transit and which are supplied or are to be supplied in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Works and shall include but not be limited to:
- temporary buildings and structures and their contents
Location means 179 Wellington Street, Mosman Park, WA 6012
Maintenance or Defects Liability Period means a set period of time as agreed to in writing by You which commences after completion of the Contract Work and attendant Works and during which any defects in the Contract Works is remedied by any third party or any maintenance obligations in respect of the Contract Work are undertaken by any third party.
Temporary Work means any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit that are necessary for access or support to the Contract Work and which will be dismantled and removed at the date of completion of the Contract Works or Works
Works means any and all operations or activities undertaken in connection with the Contract Work and/or Temporary Work
All other terms utilised in this exclusion shall be defined in accordance with the applicable definition of such terms as found in Your Policy
76 On 23 October 2015, Mr McMurray was sent copies of invoices for the renewal of a number of insurance policies by Mr Shu Wen Yeo, a senior associate employed by Bresland Consultants Pty Ltd (which invoices Mr McMurray had requested be sent to him so he could pay the amounts to renew the policies).[23] Attached to the invoices was a copy of the Contract Works Exclusion clause.[24]
77 Prior to the receipt of that email, Mr McMurray had not been provided with any document that revealed that the AIG policy contained the Contract Works Exclusion clause. On receipt of the email from Mr Yeo, Mr McMurray read the invoices but not the exclusion clause and did not become aware that the AIG policy contained the Contract Works Exclusion clause until after the fire destroyed the almost renovated house.[25] Mr McMurray's evidence is that Mr Bresland did not at any time before the fire tell him about the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy or to check Mosman Bay's insurance.[26] Nor did he give any advice to Mr McMurray about the exclusion clause.
78 The following uncontradicted evidence of Mr McMurray, and the contemporaneous documents, establish that the Bresland parties failed to bring the Contract Works Exclusion clause to Mr McMurray's attention prior to 23 October 2015, despite the fact that:
(a) on or about 24 October 2014, Mr Bresland met with Mr McMurray at Mr McMurray's office.[27] At that meeting, Mr McMurray had with him a bundle of documents provided to him by the Bresland parties that did not include the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy, and Mr Bresland did not tell Mr McMurray about the exclusion clause;[28]
(b) at a meeting at Mr McMurray's office on 2 September 2015, Mr McMurray had a bundle of insurance documents prepared by Bresland Consultants, titled 'Frederick & Jennifer McMurray schedule of insurances 2014/2015', that had been provided to him by Mr Bresland before, or at, that meeting, however:
(i) the bundle included a schedule for the AIG policy but did not include any document containing a statement about a contract works exclusion; [29]
(ii) Mr Bresland did not say anything about a contract works exclusion or any exclusion from cover in the AIG policy;[30]
(iii) Mr Bresland did not tell Mr McMurray to check the builder's insurance;[31] and
(c) on or about 12 October 2015, Mr Bresland met with Mr McMurray at Mr McMurray's office. Mr McMurray had with him a bundle of insurance documents provided by Bresland Consultants (that did not contain or include a statement about the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy) and Mr Bresland did not give any advice to Mr McMurray about any relevant term of any insurance contract identified in the folder of insurance documents and did not tell Mr McMurray about the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy.[32]
4.2 The McMurrays engage Mosman Bay to renovate the Wellington Street house
4.2.1 The terms of the contract between the McMurrays and Mosman Bay, and the Tokyo Marine policy of insurance
79 Mr McMurray came to engage Mr Walling's company, Mosman Bay, to renovate the house in late 2014 or early 2015 after receiving a recommendation from a friend who had previously engaged Mosman Bay to carry out renovation works to a similar property.
80 The McMurrays' architects wanted Mr McMurray to speak to two other builders but ultimately the decision was made to engage Mosman Bay to carry out the works to the house.[33]
81 It is common ground that the terms of the contract were cost (of works) plus a contractor's fee of 13% (margin).[34] Initially, the terms of the contract were not reduced to writing.
82 Mr McMurray does not recall having a discussion with Mr Walling about Mosman Bay taking out insurance for the renovation works, but it was Mr McMurray's expectation that Mr Walling would ensure that such insurance was arranged. Mr McMurray has some familiarity with building contracts and insurance for commercial works projects because he is a director of Sanwell Pty Ltd, which is part of the Sanwell group of companies that trades as Sanwell Plumbing and Civil and is engaged in the commercial construction industry providing hydraulic services for major construction projects.[35]
83 Mosman Bay commenced the renovation works in May 2015.
84 After the renovation works commenced, Mosman Bay provided invoices to Mr McMurray for payment for residential builders' warranty insurance and other insurances, such as workers' compensation insurance and construction costs insurance, for the Wellington Street property, which invoices were paid by Mr McMurray without question.[36]
85 One of the insurance policy invoices forwarded to Mr McMurray by Mosman Bay for payment was the Tokio Marine policy, which was an annual projects construction and legal liability insurance for alterations and additions to the current house at Wellington Street, and for construction costs, including principal supplied items, of $800,000 (to cover the Wellington Street renovation works).[37]
86 In October 2015, the McMurrays received a land tax assessment bill for the Wellington Street property and sought an exemption on grounds that the property was intended to be their primary place of residence. The Office of State Revenue informed the McMurrays that the exemption from land tax on the property would be granted if they provided, among other things, evidence of the building contract with the builder (Mosman Bay).[38]
87 As a result, the McMurrays and Mosman Bay entered into a contract in writing for the renovation works dated 16 February 2015.[39] The document executed by the McMurrays and Mr Walling (on behalf of Mosman Bay) is titled 'Commercial Cost Plus Contract' and 'Australian Building Industry Contract, ABIC CP - 2014 C'. The material contract terms are pre-printed and comprise standard commercial terms. The contract bears two logos on the document that indicate that the terms are authorised by the Australian Institute of Architects and Master Builders Australia. Particulars of the parties' details were completed by Mr McMurray in handwriting, and the document was executed by Mr McMurray, Mrs McMurray and Mr Walling.
88 When Mr McMurray gave evidence, it was his recollection that Mr Walling had provided the pre-printed form to him, but he could not say for certain whether Mr Walling gave the document to him or whether he provided to Mr Walling.[40] Mr McMurray did not review the pre-printed terms in the document carefully. His focus was to go through the form, fill out the relevant details, ensure that it was signed by all parties, and to send a copy to the Office of State Revenue.[41]
89 It is Mr Walling's recollection that Mr McMurray provided the pre‑printed form to him and that this was the first occasion he had executed a commercial cost plus contract in this form. However, the terms of this contract were not entirely unfamiliar to him. He said that Mosman Bay uses a pre‑printed non‑commercial (cost plus contract) form which provides for similar terms as the document he executed (on behalf of Mosman Bay) with the McMurrays.[42]
90 In these proceedings, who provided the pre-printed terms to whom is not material. The only substantial issue that arises out of the execution of this document is, if the court finds that AIG is liable to the McMurrays in their claim of breach of contract, whether AIG is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the McMurrays against Mosman Bay pursuant to the terms of this contract.
91 If AIG is entitled to exercise the rights the McMurrays have under this contract with Mosman Bay, AIG claims it is entitled to recover, any amount that it is required to indemnify the McMurrays, from Mosman Bay, pursuant to the indemnity clause in cl D1.4 and D2.1 of the contract, or alternatively under cl E2.1 of the contract.
92 The terms of the contract executed between the McMurrays and Mosman Bay, and AIG's claim for subrogation to the McMurrays' rights under this contract, are considered in 7.1 below.
4.2.2 The renovations - a refurbishment of the original house
93 As counsel for the McMurrays stated in opening, the renovation works can more properly be described as a refurbishment of the original house.
94 In essence, the layout and size of the original house remained substantially unchanged by the renovations. The interior renovation works were largely to strip out and demolish the existing fixtures and fittings, including tapware, cabinets, appliances, flooring, and windows, some, if not all, doors, including door and window frames, to create new openings, replace some ceilings and replace part of two walls in the entry.[43]
95 It appears that a full set of working drawings for the renovation works were not prepared by the McMurrays' architects. Mr Walling gave evidence that they did not know the full extent of the renovations at any stage. Instead, the architects came to site once a week, and provided instructions as to what work was required to be done.[44] Mr Walling's evidence on this point was not in contest and, in any event, this evidence is consistent with the drawings tendered into evidence. From those drawings, it appears clear that some of the renovation works that was planned to be carried out when council approval was given for the renovation works changed as the work progressed.[45]
96 From the drawings, and the description of work contained in a list of works comprising the renovation works, the works to the ground floor of the house and its surrounds were as follows.
97 To the exterior of the ground floor, new decking was added to the rear of the house and a fishpond was built under the bridge to the front entry of the house.
98 To the interior of the ground floor, new timber flooring was installed to most, if not all, of the ground floor. None of the locations of any of the internal walls of the house appear to have been moved or changed on the ground floor, except for the repurposing of some of the rooms, and the closing of an entry near the lift by installing a section of wall and removing part of a wall near the lift to create a new entry from the lift and laundry area.[46]
99 It appears from the layout of the existing house as built, and the drawings depicting the renovation works that were built or were in an advanced stage of completion, that by the end of the work day before the night of the fire:
(a) the kitchen, pantry, downstairs ensuite and powder room, dining/meals room, living room, laundry, lift and staircase on the ground floor remained in the same locations as they were prior to the renovations (although new fixtures and fittings had been, or were in the process of being, installed);
(b) the rear terrace area of the ground floor had been enclosed, and its use designated as a loggia (a gallery that can open to the elements with doors that open wide on both sides), and an enclosed bar had been, or was in the process of being, constructed to the eastern side of the loggia in what had been the rear terrace area. It does appear that a wall on the eastern side of the bar had been built to extend the area of the bar that was previously part of the rear terrace area;
(c) new decking had been built to wrap around the ground floor rear of the house, from the eastern side of the property from the bar area to the western side of the house around the existing pool;
(d) although it is not entirely clear, the only interior walls that appear to be have been removed, in part, or in whole, and replaced on the ground floor was a small area of wall near the lift, and an area of wall in the ground floor entry between the rooms proposed to be the dining room and the sitting room;
(e) part of the entry walls (to the dining room and the sitting room) were replaced with new timber frames with recesses for timber sliding doors or what are sometimes referred to as pocket doors;
(f) a gyprock lined and flat oak lined column (described by AIG as a faux column) was constructed in the dining room in the corner between the entry wall and the wall between the dining room and bathroom, which corner was near the stairs leading down to the spiral staircase;
(h) the walls of the entry were covered by linear oak battens on timber panels, and the timber sliding doors to the dining room and the sitting room were covered with a mirror face with linear oak battens affixed to the mirrored surface;[47]
(i) Loba Oil had been specified by the McMurrays' interior designer, Mr Lyon, to use on the wood wall panels and battens to match the new floorboards; and
(j) all of the oak timber lining in the dining room had been, or was in the process of being, stained by the painters using Loba Oil to match the new timber flooring. However, as set out below, there is no evidence that the painters were working inside the dining room on the day before the night of the fire.
4.3 The fire - the lay evidence and Mr Bell's evidence
100 Two hypotheses were considered by the fire forensic investigators (other than Mr Bell) as possible causes of the fire. The first, as already outlined, is that the origin of the fire was in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room and the cause of the fire was the self-heating of rags infused with Loba Oil placed in the bin by the painters. The second hypothesis is that an intruder entered the house sometime on the night of 15 or early morning of 16 January 2016 and lit a fire in or near the green bin in the entry to the dining room.
101 I will leave aside the issue as to whether it is open to deal with the intruder theory on the pleaded cases of the McMurrays and Mr Holgersson, before any finding can be made of how likely the possibility of an intruder lighting a fire was, when compared to the possibility that oil soaked rags were placed in the green plastic bin by the painters or someone else working at the house, and thereafter self‑heated and then ignited the contents of the bin.[48] Before that issue is considered, it is relevant to consider first the evidence about what renovation works were being carried out in the days leading up to the fire, and what the witnesses say about what was disposed of in the green bin and the skip bin on the verge. Second, it is relevant to consider whether an intruder could have accessed the house on the night of the fire without being seen by a CCTV camera that was located under the eaves of a house on the western side of the McMurrays' house and other CCTV cameras at the front of the McMurrays' property. It is also relevant to consider, in this context, Mr Tisdale's evidence that he found a lock picking device after the fire on the ground outside the laundry door of the McMurrays' house.
4.3.1 What renovation work had been completed and what painting work was in the process of being completed the day before the night of the fire
102 For several months before the fire, Mr Thomas was Mosman Bay's site supervisor, and foreman of the Wellington Street renovations. At the time he gave evidence he had ceased to be employed in the building industry.
103 Mr Thomas had keys to the house. He was on-site at the Wellington Street property all day, every day for some months prior to the fire. The only time Mr Thomas left the Wellington Street property (during working hours) was to visit the office of Mosman Bay.[49] It was his practice to be the last to leave work at the house each day, and to lock the house every day after all the workmen had left. Prior to the fire, he had on occasions left a key outside (for contractors to use to enter the house). However, at the end of the work day on the afternoon of the night of the fire, he did not do so because new kitchen appliances had been delivered for installation in the house.[50] In any event, it is common ground that the house was locked when the fire occurred.
104 Mr Thomas used a large table as a desk in the area designated as 'living' in the large back room adjacent to the loggia, where he kept copies of working drawings and plans.[51]
105 Although Mr Thomas had been engaged full-time coordinating the works by the contractors at the site on behalf of Mosman Bay and to keep the site clean and tidy for some months before the fire, he was not the on-site supervisor for Mosman Bay when the entry walls to the dining and sitting rooms were partly demolished and reconstructed. This work had been commenced and completed before he worked as the site supervisor for the Wellington Street renovation works.[52]
106 Despite the fact that Mr Thomas had not been present at the site when the entry walls had been demolished and reconstructed, when cross‑examined by senior counsel for AIG, Mr Thomas was asked to describe how the timber framework containing the sliding doors, the panelling battens and the faux column had been constructed. In response, he said:
(a) the timber framework for the doors was affixed by nails to the cavity brick walls;[53]
(b) the faux column inside the dining room was constructed of gyrock on the face of the column;[54]
(c) the panelling on the entry walls to the dining room and the sitting room (which overlaid the wall that comprised the frame for the sliding doors and brickwork) was painted black, and overlaid with 40mm x 40mm linear battens. Loba Oil was applied to the battens;[55]
(d) inside the dining room the walls were gyprock lined and were in the process of being prepared for wallpaper;[56] and
(e) the face of the sliding doors that faced the entry hallway was mirrored with linear battens.[57]
107 When a cabinet work and finishes drawing for the ground level, dated 11 August 2015,[58] was put to Mr Thomas, Mr Thomas agreed that the drawing showed that the faux column inside the dining room (which appears to have been built to match part of a brickwork column on the opposite side of the room near the front door) was panelled with flat timber.[59]
108 By the beginning of the work day on Friday 15 January 2016, it appears that the entry walls, all of the wood finishes, including the wood and the battens on the sliding doors to the entries to the dining and sitting rooms and the faux lined column in the dining room had been constructed. What had not been completed was the application of the final finish of Loba Oil by the painters to some of the woodwork on the walls of the house.
109 Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson both have their own contract painting businesses. However, from time to time for big jobs they often work together as joint contractors.
110 Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson agreed that in late October or early November 2015 that Mr Simpson would 'run' the internal painting works of the Wellington Street property job.[60] From this evidence, it can be inferred that it had been agreed by Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson that Mr Simpson would carry out the interior painting work and supervise the work of the other painters that they engaged to assist them (relevantly Mr Roach and Mr Milton). This inference is consistent with the evidence of Mr Simpson who, when cross‑examined by counsel for the Bresland parties, said he had supervised the work of Mr Roach and Mr Milton to ensure that the work was of the high standard required for the painting of a luxury home, and that the worksite was kept tidy.[61]
111 The painters had been applying Loba Oil to the wood surfaces on the walls throughout the house prior to the fire. Both Mr Simpson and Mr Holgersson gave evidence that they had not used Loba Oil before using it at the Wellington Street property as it is designed mainly for wood floor finishes.[62]
112 It appears that the staining work of the timber surfaces with Loba Oil in the house commenced sometime before Christmas 2015. Mr Holgersson carried out some of the work until he injured his knee prior to Christmas 2015,[63] which prevented him from doing any painting or supervising any painting work for a number of weeks. As a result of his injury, he did not attend the house during the period of at least two or three weeks prior to the night of fire.[64]
113 It is common ground that the painters ran out of supplies of Loba Oil three to four days, or up to a week, in the week before the fire. As a consequence, the staining of the timber was interrupted until a new supply of Loba Oil was ordered and became available at the site. It appears that the new supply arrived at the house and the staining of the timber work recommenced a day or so before the night of the fire.
114 It is Mr Thomas' evidence that the painters ran out of Loba Oil earlier than 10 January 2016 and it took about a week to replenish their supplies.[65] When Mr Simpson was asked in cross‑examination by counsel for the Bresland parties whether he could recall how long they had to wait for the new supply of Loba Oil, he said he could not recall. Nor could he recall whether the supply of Loba Oil arrived a few days before the fire. When he was asked whether it took a week or so to obtain a new supply of Loba Oil he said, 'yes', but he then said it might have been three to four days.[66] The significance of this evidence is that a fire occurred in the early hours of Tuesday 12 January 2016 in the skip bin located on the verge outside the front of the house. I return to this issue below in 4.3.2 and 4.4.9.
115 It appears that on that Friday 15 January 2016, the painters, Mr Simpson, Mr Roach and Mr Milton, did not apply Loba Oil to any timber inside the dining room, but applied Loba Oil to a small section of the linear oak battens affixed to the sitting room entry wall near the stairs (that is, a small section of the entry wall, opposite to the dining room entry wall).
116 It is Mr Thomas' evidence that on Friday 15 January 2016, the painters were spraying a ceiling black in the kitchen, dining room and lounge room, and late in the afternoon he saw the painters applying Loba Oil to one panel (of battens affixed to ply sheets) on the wall of the sitting room near the stairs in the entry to the house.[67]
117 Mr Thomas was interviewed by one of the insurance investigators shortly after the fire had occurred. When he was interviewed he marked up a plan of the ground floor showing the location of the wood panel where he saw the painters applying the Loba Oil in the afternoon on 15 January 2016 by making a note on the plan in the entry hall that read 'unfinished panel'.[68] When Mr Thomas was cross-examined by counsel for the McMurrays, he re-marked the plan in the same place where he had written the note 'unfinished panel' with an X in red. Mr Simpson gave evidence consistent with Mr Thomas' evidence on this point. Mr Simpson said that on the day before the night of the fire they were staining wood in the entrance way heading down towards the stairs towards the powder room (which is the entry wall of the outside of the sitting room).[69]
118 When being cross‑examined by senior counsel for AIG, Mr Simpson was asked to describe how they (he and the other painters) applied the Loba Oil to the wood panelling. He said that they applied Loba Oil that had been mixed with a hardening agent to the wood by using a brush. They then used a scraper to remove the excess oil, and a rag to feather in the oil to render the application of the oil consistent across the surface of the wood.[70] The rags they used for the staining work were white.
119 The rags used by Mr Holgersson, Mr Simpson and the other painters to apply Loba Oil were white rags pre-cut to approximately one foot² that had been purchased in bulk.[71] After the fire, a bag of unused white rags used for this purpose were found together with unopened tins of Loba Oil, and other painting supplies in the large living room in the middle of the back of the house near the kitchen bench.
120 Mr Holgersson described a similar process in his witness statement. He stated:[72]
(a) although he had never used the Loba Oil product, this did not present any difficulty as it was not unusual for an owner to specify a particular product;
(b) the initial application of the product was applied with a brush. Although a rag could be used to wipe up any excess or drips, he did not recall if he did so; and
(c) after the initial application, rags were used to take the product off the surface, so as to end up with the right colour stain. Too much product and the colour would not be correct.
121 There is evidence before the court that it may have been the case that it was not only the painters who applied Loba Oil to wood and finishes the day before the night of the fire. Mr Simpson in his witness statement states that on 15 January 2016, he heard Mr Thomas ask Mr Roach if he could borrow some of the Loba Oil product, as he had a small job that he needed to do on some beading.[73] However, this evidence is of no assistance in determining whether there were oily rags in the green bin in the front of the house on the night of the fire because this evidence was not raised or put to Mr Thomas by any party when he gave his evidence.
4.3.2 The disposal of the rags used by the painters to apply Loba Oil to the wood finishes
123 On the ground floor, on the day before the night of fire, there was one green rubbish bin, and it was in the dining room.
124 One of the contested factual issues is whether the green rubbish bin in the dining room had been moved from a position in the dining room, away from the entry area where the sliding doors opened, to another location in the entry to the dining room, close to where the sliding doors opened into the entry.
125 In particular, an issue arises on the evidence about whether the green rubbish bin in the dining room had been moved from the position that Mr Thomas said it was located when he locked up and left the house at 3.30 pm on 15 January 2016 to where the remains of the bottom of a green rubbish bin were found after the fire on the following morning (in the entry to the dining room, in the area of the opening to the sliding doors).
126 The most highly contested factual issue in the proceedings is whether, on 15 January 2016, the painters had placed any oily rags, which had been used to apply a consistent finish of Loba Oil to the wooden surfaces, in the green rubbish bin in the dining room. The second highly contested factual issue is related to the first and that is whether, when Mr Thomas locked up the house after everyone had finished work in the afternoon on 15 January 2016, oily rags used to apply Loba Oil were in the green rubbish bin. The third highly contested factual issue arises if it can be found that there were oily rags in the green rubbish bin and that is whether the oily rags self-heated and subsequently self‑ignited, causing the fire that destroyed the house and its surrounding structures.
127 Turning to the evidence about the use of the white rags and the contents of the green rubbish bin in the dining room at the end of the work day on 15 January 2016, it is not in contest that the white rags used to apply Loba Oil could not be reused once they became saturated with oil, as they could not be cleaned.
128 Mr Simpson knew that oily rags had a tendency to self-heat and self-ignite if not disposed of properly.[76]
129 Prior to the fire, Mr Simpson had worked with Mr Milton before for a few years and Mr Roach for a few months, and, until Mr Simpson left early on the day of the fire, they worked together at the Wellington Street site as a team carrying out the painting works.[77] Before they first started applying the Loba Oil product, Mr Simpson discussed with Mr Roach and Mr Milton about how the rags for the Loba Oil should be disposed of. He told them not to screw the rags up and put them in a confined space.[78] Mr Simpson regarded Mr Roach and Mr Milton as very experienced painters and relied upon each of them to dispose of the oily rags in this way.[79]
130 On the afternoon of the day before the fire, Mr Simpson left the site at about 2.30 pm to go to another job, and left Mr Roach and Mr Milton to continue the painting work at the Wellington Street property.
131 When Mr Simpson gave oral evidence, he said that the Loba Oil rags were disposed of first by drying the rags out by hanging them on the side of the skip bin outside the house on the verge, and then, once the rags were dry (either later that day or the next morning), disposing of them by placing them inside the skip bin.[80] However, in his witness statement, he stated that he provided some instructions to Mr Roach and Mr Milton before he left the site on the afternoon of 15 January 2016. His instructions were:
(a) he requested that they make sure before they left the site that they either put the (oily) rags in the skip bin outside, or lay them out flat near the store area across planks and ladders to dry out in the kitchen at the rear of the property; and
(b) he told them they were not to put (the oily rags) in the inside bins on each level of the house.[81]
132 Mr Simpson agreed, when cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG, that these instructions had been given to Mr Roach and Mr Milton at the beginning of the job (when they first started applying Loba Oil to the wooden surfaces) and not on the day before the fire. Mr Simpson then went on to qualify his evidence by saying that the practice of laying the used oily rags flat in the rear room where they kept their painting equipment was for the rags that 'weren't too far gone'.[82]
133 When re-examined, Mr Simpson said before he left the site on 15 January 2016 (being the only occasion on which he says he left the site early) he told the painters to make sure the rags went in the skip bin outside, that any rags that could be reused be put in the back area, and to make sure they left the place clean and tidy.[83]
134 In his witness statement, Mr Simpson said that as a painter with more than 25 years' experience he had never known of, heard of, or experienced self-ignition of material, including oil‑based stained material.[84] However, Mr Simpson's evidence on this point must be treated with some caution because he had never used the Loba Oil product prior using it on this particular job. In any event, when cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG, although senior counsel did not put to Mr Simpson that what he had said in his witness statement was incorrect, Mr Simpson conceded that he knew that vegetable oil products have a tendency towards self-heating and self-ignition if they are not disposed of properly, and this was something that he had learnt during his painting apprenticeship.[85] He also conceded that he knew (prior to the fire) if they were using rags to apply a product like Loba Oil, that the oily rags needed to be disposed of properly, and that if oily rags were screwed up and placed in a confined area they could self‑combust.[86]
135 It is of importance that when Mr Simpson was cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG it was not put to him that the evidence that he gave on oath was inconsistent with what he had said in his witness statement, or inconsistent with anything he had said to any person investigating the fire.
136 It is clear from the evidence that Mr Simpson closely supervised the work of Mr Roach and Mr Milton, which close supervision could be expected by a painting contractor when regard is had to the standard of workmanship required to complete painting works of very expensive refurbishment works for a luxury home.
137 It is also clear from the evidence of Mr Simpson that he regarded Mr Roach and Mr Milton as reliable, trustworthy and experienced painters, and that he relied upon them to do what he expected them to do.[87] However, on the afternoon before the night of the fire, when Mr Simpson left the house at 2.30 pm, the painters were still working, and he was not there to supervise or check whether they had disposed of the oily rags correctly.
138 The question is whether there is any admissible or reliable evidence that Mr Roach, Mr Milton or any other person placed any rags soaked with Loba Oil in the green rubbish bin after Mr Simpson left for the day.
139 On Monday 18 January 2016, the forensic fire investigator, Mr Manser, received instructions to conduct a forensic examination of the fire‑damaged house from lawyers acting for Tokio Marine. Part of his investigation involved arranging for persons to be interviewed who may have knowledge about the circumstances of the fire. Some of the persons interviewed by Mr Manser or other investigators employed by his firm, J Manser Fire and Marine, were Mr Thomas, fire investigator Mr Bell, Mr McMurray, Mr Simpson and Mr Milton. Mr Milton participated in an audio‑recorded interview with Ms Jenny Caldwell on 4 February 2016 for approximately 40 minutes.[88]
140 Attempts were made by AIG and Mr Holgersson to serve Mr Milton with a subpoena to attend court to give evidence in these proceedings, but the efforts of the process servers failed. Mr Holgersson and the Bresland parties objected to the transcript of the record of interview with Mr Milton and the other persons interviewed being admitted into evidence in the proceedings.[89]
4.3.3 The evidence of persons working on‑site about what was put in the green rubbish bin on the day of the fire and where the green rubbish bin was located in the dining room
142 On 15 January 2016, the painters used clean white rags that had been purchased for the job of applying the Loba Oil to the wooden surfaces. The white rags were mainly comprised of old t‑shirts and old sheets.[90] They also used a rag to cover a bucket, containing paintbrushes immersed in water, overnight in the dining meals area of the back room.[91]
143 The painters were not the only persons carrying out renovation work at the house who used rags. The carpenters used orange wet rags (similar to wet wipes pulled out of a plastic container) to remove liquid nails and glue from their hands.[92] One of these orange rags with a burnt edge was found by Mr Manser on 20 January 2016, buried in the debris along where the north side of the dining room stood prior to the fire.[93] One of the issues in dispute is whether it is open on the facts to infer that the orange rag found by Mr Manser had been placed in the green bin in the dining room prior to the fire on 16 January 2016. I return to this point below in 4.4.6.
144 It is clear from the evidence of those who worked on the Wellington Street property that Mr Thomas kept a clean and tidy work site. It is Mr Thomas' evidence that irrespective of whether he expected Mr or Mrs McMurray to visit the house after he left for the day, he would leave the house clean, tidy and locked.
145 It was Mr Thomas' practice to check whether the green rubbish bin on the ground floor needed to be emptied of smoko and lunch rubbish (lunch wraps, coffee cups, water bottles and the like) and, if so, he would empty the bin into the skip bin, or his labourer would do so.[94]
146 Mr Thomas said the green rubbish bins on each level of the house were for lunch waste and trade waste, and the skip bin on the verge was used for building waste.[95] Mr Thomas agreed that from time to time small pieces of wood, such as pieces of offcuts of battens, might be disposed of into the green rubbish bins. He also said that sawdust should not have been disposed of in the green rubbish bins, although this may have occurred.[96] He, however, had not seen any sawdust in the green rubbish bin in the dining room.[97]
148 When Mr Thomas was interviewed by the investigator after the fire, he was asked to mark on a drawing of the ground floor the location of the unfinished panels and where painting supplies were kept. [100] He was also asked to mark on the plan the location of the green rubbish bin. Mr Thomas marked the location of the green rubbish bin on the plan with a circle inside the room depicted on the plan as the dining room away from the sliding doors. It is his evidence that the circle that he marked on the drawing is exactly where he remembers he left the bin (before leaving the site on the day of the night of the fire).[101]
149 When Mr Thomas was re-examined, he was shown a photograph which shows a round flat circle (said by the forensic fire investigators to indicate where the green rubbish bin had stood during the fire) in the middle of the entry where the burnt out frames of the sliding doors to the dining room remained. When shown this photograph, Mr Thomas said the location of the remains of the bin (depicted in the photograph) was not where he had left the bin on the afternoon before the night of the fire.[102]
150 On the day before the night of the fire, when carrying out a final check of the house before leaving for the day (after the trades people had left for the day), Mr Thomas picked up a half empty water bottle and a drill bit, and threw them one to two metres from a standing position just outside the entry to the dining room into the green rubbish bin in the dining room.[103] Because he is 6 feet tall, he could see into the top section of the bin, which looked to be empty and, although he could not fully see into the bin, it appeared to him that it was reasonably empty.[104]
151 When asked whether he would have disposed of any rags into the green plastic rubbish bin if he had seen them lying around, Mr Thomas said that if he had seen them, and if they were clean rags, he would have put them in the bin, but if they were oily rags he would have disposed of them in the skip bin.[105]
152 It is Mr Thomas' evidence that there were also white bins in the house.[106] However, no evidence was given by any witness about what the white bins were used for, and no party in the proceedings made any submissions about this evidence.
153 Mr Simpson said, when being re-examined by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, that he did not hang rags over the side of the green plastic rubbish bin in the dining room or put rags inside the bin, and he did not ever see Mr Roach or Mr Milton do so either.[107]
154 Mr Simpson gave evidence that is consistent with the evidence given by Mr Thomas about what was to be disposed of in the green bin.
155 In his witness statement, Mr Simpson said that as Mr Thomas was quite strict about site cleanliness, for this purpose, there were green rubbish bins on each level of the building as well as the garage (basement) and that these bins could be used by all contractors on the site to ensure that all rubbish was placed in the bins and not left around on the site.[108] Mr Simpson also said in his witness statement that there was a skip bin positioned at the front of the property adjacent to the drive, and that 'these bins were used for all types of rubbish, cut material, wood, sawdust, rags, electrical cabling, tape, etc, basically anything that was found that the site'.[109]
156 When cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG, Mr Simpson said the green bin (on the ground floor) was used by everyone at the site to dispose of items such as coffee cups and smoko wrappers. He also said that he had not seen sawdust in the green bin, but conceded that he had not (at any time) inspected the contents of the green rubbish bin in the dining room because it was not his job to empty it.[110]
157 Mr Niall Woods was working at the Wellington Street house on most weekdays in the two to three weeks leading up to 15 January 2016, carrying out carpentry works. At some times during those weeks, he worked in the kitchen installing cabinets. He saw the painters rubbing a blue coloured wood stain with white rags onto the timber panelling that was on the wall surrounding the kitchen and living room. He did not recall seeing what the painters did with those rags after they had finished using them. He also saw the painters working in the entrance area of the house but he did not take notice of what they were doing because he was not carrying out any work in the front rooms on the ground floor.[111]
158 On Friday 15 January 2016, Mr Woods arrived at the property at about 9.00 am and worked in the gymnasium area of the basement until about 1.00 pm. Sometime during the day he saw Mr Simpson. At one point in the day Mr Woods walked up to the spiral staircase from the basement, entered the living room on the ground floor, saw Mr Thomas, picked up a vacuum cleaner near the office area and then took the vacuum cleaner back down the spiral staircase to the basement. He returned the vacuum cleaner to the office area in the living room a short time later.[112]
159 Mr Woods recalled seeing a black or dark green small round plastic bin that was moved around from time to time between the living room, dining room and the kitchen, and that was most often kept between the living room and the dining room, close to the office area.[113] Mr Woods did not recall seeing any other bins in the house. It is his evidence that he did not put anything into the bin and he did not see anyone else put anything in the bin, nor did he see the bin completely full.[114]
160 During the period when the renovation works were being carried out, Mrs McMurray visited the house often. She took cakes to the contractors at the house weekly or fortnightly, and in early January 2016 she visited the house every day.[115] In early January 2016, she saw painters working in the downstairs rooms at the front of the house and saw them painting walls and staining timber panelling. She also saw painting equipment stored in most rooms of the house. In particular, she saw painters' tins, paintbrushes with rags wrapped around them and buckets in the basement and rumpus room; a large plastic green bin with rubbish in it and painters' tins in the front dining room, painters' tins and paintbrushes with rags wrapped around them in the back room living area facing the river; and painters' tins, buckets and paintbrushes with rags wrapped around them in both of the kids' rooms.[116]
161 Mrs McMurray never saw the green rubbish bin full. She also observed that the bin did not have the same rubbish in it all the time, and from this observation she assumed it was emptied regularly. Mrs McMurray does not remember seeing rags in the green bin or draped around its rim.[117]
162 Mrs McMurray often visited the house with Mr McMurray to inspect it after all of the builders and contractors had left for the day, and often she checked the house at around 4.00 pm on weekdays on her way home from picking up her children from school.[118]
4.3.4 The McMurrays' visit to the house to monitor the water hose being used to fill the swimming pool in the backyard at 10.45 pm on 15 January 2016
163 On the evening of 14 January 2016, Mr McMurray went to the house to turn on a hose to fill up the pool. He left the hose running, looked around the house and then departed. He returned to the house on the morning of 15 January 2016 to check the water in the pool. When he left he again left the hose running.[119]
164 At approximately 10.30 pm on 15 January 2016, Mr and Mrs McMurray went to the house to check the pool. They parked on the road with their car facing an easterly direction. It was reasonably dark so Mr McMurray used his iPhone torch.[120] The McMurrays entered the backyard of the house via the eastern gate (to the side of and near the front of the house).[121] Mr McMurray had either a key or a remote control to open the gate.[122] Mr McMurray turned the tap off as the pool was full, and they left the house about 10.45 pm.[123] They did not enter inside the house.
165 As Mr McMurray was leaving the property and driving away in an easterly direction with Mrs McMurray in their car, he saw a man with a backpack[124] walking diagonally across a vacant block next to the house on the eastern side of their house, heading in a north‑west direction. When he saw the man, the man was midway between the outer boundaries of the vacant block. Mr McMurray did not recognise the man.[125]
166 Mr McMurray did not stop when he saw the man. He went home and went to bed. Mr and Mrs McMurray were woken by the police at about 3.00 am, who told them that their Wellington Street house was on fire.
4.3.5 The CCTV footage of the house on the night of 15 January 2016 and the early morning of 16 January 2016
4.3.5.1 Principles - The use of photographs and video footage
167 The principles applied to the use to which photographs and video footage can be put to make findings of fact by a court were very recently summarised by Hill J in Evans v Halliday as follows:[126]
Photographs and CCTV, if relevant to the issues in dispute in a matter, are admissible in evidence. However, as was noted by Tobias AJA, in QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd v Orcher:
the weight to be attached to them ... is very much dependant (sic) on the quality and clarity of the images they depict as well as the context in which they are taken. In my view they [CCTV footage] can be quite misleading particularly as in the present case where the situation the subject of the footage was very dynamic.
In Goode v Angland, Leeming JA summarised the use to which photographs and video footage can be put. His Honour stated that:
(a) Photographs and CCTV should not be used to make findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence. That is, they should not be the sole source from which primary facts are inferred unless the fact is apparent on the face of the photograph or footage.
(b) Photographs can be deceptive, particularly in relation to perspective and distance and should not 'trump' the direct evidence of witnesses 'that compelled acceptance'.
(c) Care must be taken in interpreting photographs particularly if there is no evidence as to the position of the camera, when the photographs were taken and if they are indistinct.
(d) Many of the warnings courts have given in relation to photographs are in relation to photographs taken after the events have occurred. Contemporaneous photographs or CCTV footage may provide cogent evidence which enables a court to resolve a disputed question of fact.
The warnings that have been given by courts include what is termed the 'sage advice' of Lord Reid that judges and lawyers are not experts in reading or construing photographs and should not adopt their own interpretation of photographic evidence on contested issues.
Expert evidence on CCTV footage and photographs is admissible where the expert has some special knowledge which will assist the court in interpreting the CCTV footage or where the fact is not revealed on the face of the photograph or the footage.
However, if a witness who has considered the CCTV or photographs seeks to give evidence of what they saw, this evidence will ordinarily not be admissible. If the witness is simply describing what they consider is depicted in the recording, their evidence is not admissible because the finder of fact can consider the recording and make their own decisions on what they are seeing.
Finally, expert evidence is not admissible on matters of 'ordinary human experience'.
168 The fire investigators were able to obtain CCTV footage from a fixed camera that was located on the upper storey and near the front of a two‑storey house that stood to the western side of the Wellington Street house. This camera had a view across a large tennis court to the entire western side of the McMurrays' house, including the fence.[127] I refer to this CCTV footage as the tennis court video.
169 A cabana on the tennis court was nine or 10 feet high, and was built against the McMurrays' western side fence and adjacent to the entry to the laundry door that was recessed on the western side of the McMurrays' house. The western boundary wall to the McMurrays' house, which abutted the cabana and ran the whole length of the western boundary, was brick and about six feet high.[128]
170 What is important about the tennis court video is that because of the height of the boundary brick fence on the McMurrays' property, which abutted the tennis court, and the large cabana on the edge of the tennis court, which also abutted the western boundary fence of the McMurrays' house, together with the fact that there were stairs and parts of a wall at the front of the McMurrays' house, a person or persons could enter the McMurrays' house from the eastern side and could not be seen by the CCTV camera that recorded the images seen in the tennis court video.[129]
171 Further, because of the height of the fence on the McMurrays' western boundary and the height of the cabana on the tennis court, a person could enter the laundry door to the McMurrays' house without being seen in the tennis court video's CCTV camera. Likewise, the vacant block abutting the house to the eastern side of the McMurray's house could not be seen from the camera that recorded the tennis court video.[130]
172 Also of importance is that there was a very low wall separating the tennis court to the western side of the McMurrays' house at the northern end of the McMurrays' property. As Mr Pollard points out in his fire investigation report, from the height of this low wall it can be inferred that this wall could easily be climbed over from the tennis court to the McMurrays' property. Also of importance is that the lowest point of this wall (being the northernmost end of the western boundary) could not be seen in the tennis court video.[131] Consequently, if a person entered the McMurrays' property over that part of the fence on the night of the fire, their entry to the McMurrays' property would not have been seen. However, to enter the McMurray's property from that point, one would expect they would have had to enter the tennis court and, if they did so, they may have been seen on the CCTV footage that was recorded from the house next door.
173 The tennis court footage from the house next door is not the only CCTV footage that is before the court. CCTV footage was tendered into evidence of the skip bin fire on 12 January 2016, and CCTV footage recorded from two points of the McMurrays' house on the night of the fire was also tendered into evidence.
174 The first CCTV video, recorded from the front of the McMurrays' house on the night of the fire, shows a very small section of the driveway only looking down, but shows nothing surrounding that very small section.[132] The second video, recorded on the night of the fire, shows a view from the front door of the McMurrays' house down the steps to a section of the lawn with more steps in the lawn, and part of the verge immediately in front of the McMurrays' property looking towards and across part of Wellington Street. It is to be noted that the security fence appears not to be visible in this video.[133]
175 Having viewed the CCTV footage in court and again when preparing these reasons, it is evident from the tennis court footage, recorded from the camera at the front of the house next door on the western side, that there were pedestrians passing and cars that stopped nearby, from which persons could have alighted on the street on the eastern side of the house, and which persons may not have been detected in the footage from any of the CCTV cameras.
176 It is common ground that a fire in the house was first detected, and a call was made to 000, at 1.21 am on 16 January 2016.[134]
177 The CCTV footage records the following images on the night of the fire at the following times, and from these images the following inferences of fact in (2) and (3) can be drawn:
(1) a car pulled up, lights flashed and the car later drove off at about 10.42 pm;[135]
(2) a person can be seen walking down the street on the other side of the road at about 10.44 pm.[136] This image is consistent with Mr McMurray's evidence that he saw a person walking down the street, away from the eastern side of the house with a backpack, across the vacant block, which is next to the house that immediately abutted the McMurrays' house on the eastern side at about 10.45 pm;[137]
(3) at about 11.44 pm, a vehicle drives past the McMurrays' house travelling along the road from east to west. At 11.45 pm, a male person is seen walking in the opposite direction to the vehicle, that had just passed from the east to west along the verge past the entry to the house and then disappearing from view on the eastern side of the house.[138] The CCTV footage from the front of the McMurrays' house looking over the entryway across to the verge shows the person walking along the street past the entry on the other side of road, walking in an easterly direction. This CCTV footage of the person is very clear, and records the image from a relatively close distance. The tennis court footage, recorded from the front of the house next door on the western side and across the tennis court to the McMurrays' property, is not so clear, and it has recorded images at or near the McMurrays' property at a much greater distance. However, in the tennis court footage sufficient light is seen around the front area of the McMurrays' property to also record a person walking along the verge of the McMurrays' house at that time, and the person can be seen to walk east, past and near the steps up to the entry at the front door before going out of sight. Another car then drives past from east to west. Its lights light up part of the front of the McMurrays' house. From these images of this person in the tennis court footage, it appears sight of the person is lost shortly before or at about the point where the path to the eastern gate meets the verge. These images are sufficiently clear from which an inference can be drawn that the person whose image is seen at this time, could have walked along the eastern side of the McMurrays' property and entered the eastern gate without being seen on any CCTV footage. This is because the person was recorded as being in very close proximity to the eastern gate and there is no CCTV footage available that shows the path towards and the entry to the eastern gate to the McMurrays' property. Further, there is other evidence that establishes that a person could have entered the property through the eastern gate and walked around the back of the property to the external laundry door without being seen on any CCTV footage; and
(4) a car travels east, lighting up the area, at 12.50.37 am. A second car travels east at 12.51.10 am. A third car travels west at 12.51.43 am. A fourth car travels west at 12.53.18 am. A person is seen walking west, on the opposite side of the road to the McMurrays' house, at 12.53.21 am. At 12.53.51 am, a fifth car travels east. The person continues walking west until, at 12.53.57 am, they are no longer visible. The clarity of this footage is, however, poor. None of the footage is clear enough to draw any inference that the person seen, or any person, may have approached and entered the eastern gate prior to walking west, past the house, on the opposite side of the road.
4.3.6 Mr Tisdale's evidence - what was found by the forensic locksmith
178 For the reasons given in 4.5.2 below, I have found Mr Tisdale's evidence relevant and admissible.
179 At the time of giving evidence, Mr Tisdale had worked as a forensic locksmith for over 20 years. In 2009, Mr Tisdale was awarded a Diploma of Engineering Technology Security Engineering from the Northern Melbourne Institute of TAFE. In 2011, he was awarded a Certificate IV in Security and Risk Management from the Sydney Institute. From 1994 to 2014, he lectured in locksmithing at the Challenger Institute of Technology, and from 2011 to 2014 he was an adjunct lecturer for Edith Cowan University in the School of Computer and Security Science.[139]
180 Mr Tisdale has carried out numerous forensic locksmith investigations, including those involving fires. He also provides advice to insurers and others on incidents involving the bypassing and manipulation of locks.
181 In or about late February 2016, Mr Tisdale was asked by Mr Manser if he would inspect the locks at the Wellington Street house. On 3 March 2016, Mr Tisdale inspected the premises with Mr Manser. Mr Tong and Mr Pollard were also present at the house during the inspection.
182 The purpose of Mr Tisdale's examination was to examine the locks on each entry to the house to determine whether there was any evidence of unauthorised entry. His investigation involved removing each of the locks from each of the gates and the doors to the house, together with the handles, and subsequently reinstalling each of the locks and door handles.
184 Except for the external laundry door, Mr Tisdale did not find any evidence that any of the locks on the doors or gates had been picked or manipulated.
185 Mr Tisdale was able to easily pick the external laundry door and the east side gate. Although the laundry door lock was a deadlock he was able to use the tool to open the laundry door relatively quickly (approximately 20 to 30 seconds). This is because there was a gap between the door and the architrave, which resulted in the auxiliary bolt not being depressed to engage the deadlocking function of the lock. After he used the tool to open the door, there were no marks left on the lock by the tool.[142] Consequently, the use of this tool by Mr Tisdale left no evidence that the lock had been picked. However, when Mr Tisdale removed the lock from the external laundry door and carried out further examination off‑site, he found that there was no evidence of the cylinder pins having been picked or manipulated open, but he found that the lock core had been damaged by a process called reaming, decreasing the security of the lock cylinder by making the tolerance of the lock cylinder greater. This meant a key close to the original biting could open the lock. He found that the marks identified on the locking bolt prior to using the wire to open the lock had similarities to marks used on the bolt to open the lock, and could have been made by the wire that he found outside the external laundry door, and said that the techniques used in manipulation will vary between individuals and leave different marks even when the same tool is used.[143]
186 Mr Tisdale formed the opinion from his examination of the marks on the laundry door lock bolt that the marks were not inconsistent with the wire having been used to open the laundry door.[144] However, when Mr Tisdale was cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG he agreed that there was nothing about the vertical mark on the locking bolt that suggested one way or another that the wire had been used on an earlier occasion (to open the external laundry door).[145]
4.4 The forensic fire investigation evidence; and are the forensic fire investigators experts and, if so, what is their field of expertise?
187 An expert is entitled to give an opinion based on what he or she has read in a textbook or learned journal. This is a permissible exception to the hearsay rule, whereby an expert is not required to prove the contents of a textbook or journal to which reference has been made.[146]
188 Each of the forensic fire investigators referred to the methodology of determining the area of fire origin, the point of fire origin and established methods of investigation of the path of a fire and the cause of a fire by reference to 'fire language'. In respect of the self-heating of combustible materials, the forensic fire investigators used various terms that in essence have the same meaning and they are 'self-ignition', 'autoignition' and 'spontaneous ignition'.[147]
189 A summary of the accepted principles of the process of self-heating is to be found in a report by Mr Tong dated 14 January 2018 in which he described the process of self-heating of vegetable oils leading to ignition by reference to a textbook, Babrauskas V, Ignition Handbook,[148] as follows:[149]
10.4 The key elements for self‑heating of vegetable oils leading to ignition are:
10.5 For the open flaming to result from self‑heating of such porous solid materials, it is necessary that:
(2) self‑heating of the material must be sufficient to lead to thermal runaway;
(3) thermal runaway must initiate self‑sustained smouldering;
(4) the smoulder front must reach the outside of the material (or the process must create large enough cavities) where flames can be established.' (Babrauskas 2003).
10.6 Babrauskas provides in detail at Chapter 9 page 369 on, how the process progresses from the commencement of self‑heating to spontaneous combustion.
4.4.1 Relevant principles - expert opinion evidence
190 J D Heydon, in the 12th edition of Cross on Evidence, summarised the following conditions for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence.[150] These are, first, it must be demonstrated that there is a field of specialised knowledge. Secondly, there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert. Thirdly, it must be demonstrated that the opinion proffered is wholly or substantially based on the witness' expert knowledge. Fourthly, the expert must identify the assumptions of primary fact on which the opinion is offered (assumption identification rule). Fifthly, the opinion is not admissible unless evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from an expert or from some other source, which is capable of supporting findings of primary fact (proof of assumption rule). Sixthly, there must be a demonstration that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it. Seventhly, the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached (statement of reasoning rule).
191 As to the first, second and third conditions of admissibility, the Court of Appeal, in Liyanage v The State of Western Australia summarised the circumstances in which expert opinion evidence will be admissible in a criminal trial:[151]
An affirmative answer must be given to at least the following four questions before 'expert' opinion evidence on a scientific subject matter will be admissible:
1 Is the opinion relevant; ie could the evidence rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings?
2. Is a person of ordinary experience unable to form a sound judgment on the subject matter without the assistance of an 'expert' witness with special knowledge or experience in the area?
3. Is the subject matter part of a body of knowledge or experience that is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience?
4. Has the witness acquired, by study or experience, sufficient knowledge of the subject to render her opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court?
192 In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar, Heydon J outlined the function of the assumption identification rule as follows:[152]
The rule facilitates the operation of the proof of assumption rule and other rules of admissibility. It helps to distinguish between what the expert has observed and what the expert has been told; to ensure that the expert is basing the opinion only on relevant facts; to ensure that experts do not pick and choose for themselves what aspects of the primary evidence they reject, what they accept, how they interpret it and what the court should find; and to ascertain whether there is substantial correspondence between the facts assumed and the evidence admitted to establish them.
193 The function of the proof of assumption rule was explained by Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar as follows:[153]
The function of the proof of assumption rule is to highlight the irrelevance of expert opinion evidence resting on assumptions not backed by primary evidence. It is irrelevant because it stands in a void, unconnected with the issues thrown up by the evidence and the reasoning processes which the trier of fact may employ to resolve them. If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity. Opinion evidence is a bridge between data in the form of primary evidence and a conclusion which cannot be reached without the application of expertise. The bridge cannot stand if the primary evidence end of it does not exist. The expert opinion is then only a misleading jumble, uselessly cluttering up the evidentiary scene.
194 Consequently, one of the most important rules for admissibility is that the admission of expert evidence is conditional upon proof of the assumed basal facts, that is, the factual basis of the opinion must be established by the evidence (basis rule).[154]
195 The requirement that an expert must state their reasoning by which an opinion is given was explained by Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar as follows:[155]
At common law there is no doubt that an expert opinion is inadmissible unless the expert states in chief the reasoning by which the expert conclusion arrived at flows from the facts proved or assumed by the expert so as to reveal that the opinion is based on the expert's expertise. The court does not have to be satisfied that the reasoning is correct: 'the giving of correct expert evidence cannot be treated as a qualification necessary for giving expert evidence'. But the reasoning must be stated. The opposing party is not to be left to find out about the expert's thinking for the first time in cross-examination.
4.4.2 Should the forensic fire investigators' evidence be accepted as expert evidence?
196 The McMurrays' counsel led evidence from Mr Pollard and tendered his fire origin and cause expert report on the basis that his evidence is not expert evidence but evidence by a fire investigator.
197 Despite this view of counsel, and the attempt to qualify the basis on which Mr Pollard was called, it is clear that, having regard to the experience, qualifications and the training Mr Pollard has undertaken in forensic fire examination, Mr Pollard, along with Mr Manser and Mr Tong, is amply qualified to give expert evidence in the areas of fire origin, the point of origin, fire language, fire paths and the cause of a fire.
198 Why counsel for the McMurrays took the view that Mr Pollard was not qualified to give expert evidence was not entirely clear. It appears the distinction that counsel for the McMurrays sought to draw between an expert witness who can give evidence as to a forensic fire investigation and the cause of a fire and a lay witness who has experience in forensic fire investigation (achieved through lengthy experience with investigating fires and having completed courses of study) is that the latter type of witness has expertise in the investigation of fires, such as the area of origin of a fire, and the path of a fire, but is not qualified to give admissible evidence as to the cause of a fire.
199 With respect, this submission is not correct. The cause of a fire may be straightforward, or it may not be capable of being determined. In some matters, the cause of a fire may be capable of being determined on the straightforward primary facts available, upon which assumptions can be made as to cause.
200 In other matters, the cause of a particular fire may be more complex and depend upon a number of variables. In some matters where critical variables cannot be clearly ascertained, it may not be possible to determine the cause of fire. This arises in this matter, and I return to this point below in 4.5.
201 It is clear from the evidence of Mr Bell, Mr Tong, Mr Manser and Mr Pollard that generally fires behave in particular ways, and leave characteristic damage. Consequently, forensic fire investigators, through their experience and training, are able to examine the scene of a fire after a fire has been extinguished and ascertain the typical features of damage characteristic to particular types of fires by reading the 'fire language'. From the specific characteristics of the damage left by a particular fire they are often able to determine where the fire started, and precisely how it spread. Fire investigators can, in some cases, determine precisely how a fire was caused. Although this is an ultimate issue to be determined by the court, it does not follow that an experienced forensic fire investigator is not qualified to offer an opinion as to the cause of a fire. Whether such an opinion will be accepted by the court will usually depend upon an assessment of the facts upon which that opinion is based, and whether those facts are reliably and cogently established by the admissible evidence before the court.[156]
[I]t is not the intention of this report to pass judgment on, or fix liability for, the loss of property or the effects upon the occupants, following the fire.
This report is based upon the evidence and information that was available at the time of investigation. It does not preclude other possible sources of ignition, given the production of additional factors or evidence after that date and at the time of writing this report.
203 In light of this disclaimer and the opinions expressed by Mr Bell in his report and oral evidence, although he is qualified as an expert fire investigator, I do not give his expert opinion the weight I give to the evidence of the other fire investigators. Further, Mr Bell's role in the investigation of the fire effectively ceased the day after the fire, and before others had commenced their investigations.
4.4.3 The investigation by Mr Bell, a fire investigation officer, from the Department of Fire and Emergency Services
204 Mr Bell was the first fire investigator at the scene of the fire. Mr Bell was at the time a fire investigation officer employed in the Fire Investigation and Analysis Unit of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services. He arrived at the Wellington Street property at 3.10 am on 16 January 2016,[159] as the firefighters were putting out the fire and took charge of the scene. Mr Bell remained at the house that morning until 10.22 am.[160]
205 By the time Mr Bell gave evidence at the trial, he had retired from the Department. Prior to his retirement, in December 2019, he had spent 10 years employed as a fire investigator for the Department. He became qualified as a fire investigator in 2009 by obtaining a Diploma of Fire Investigation through the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, and in 2016 he completed an Advanced Diploma of Fire Investigation through the Canberra Institute of Technology.[161]
206 From the time the firefighters arrived very early on the morning of 16 January 2016 until Mr Bell handed over the property to Mr Walling, the Department of Fire and Emergency Services had possession and control of the site pursuant to the Fire and Emergency Services Act 1998 (WA).
207 At the time Mr Bell first arrived at the Wellington Street property that morning, the fire was still being extinguished by the firefighters. Once the fire was under control, Mr Bell set about performing an examination and assessment of the scene to determine the cause of the fire.
208 When Mr Bell began his internal fire scene examination he looked at the fire language, meaning how the fire left indicators of how it travelled through the structure of the building. He described this as:[162]
Fire language is the - is the effect on the structure as the fire travels throughout the structure - the - the fire will - and the heat from the fire will leave - identifying factors. It will consume part of the structure. It will leave deposits on walls - ceiling, and it also leaves - indicators of - of the fire travel.
209 Mr Bell then went on to describe how he formed the view, from the fire language left by the fire, that the origin of the fire was in the room in the west corner of the ground floor (the dining room). He formed this conclusion because the steel ceiling frame in this room had a partial circular pattern in the eastern corner adjacent to the entrance foyer. This indicated to him that the fire had started below the point of the inverted cone. He explained:[163]
The partial circular pattern on the ceiling framework indicated that there was a fire plume - had developed below that point and a fire plume is in the - in the early or growth stages of the fire within that room where the fire developed, and the smoke and the heat goes in a up and outward movement and that's in a circular fashion.
... the pattern that - the fire plume pattern is basically like an inverted cone. The narrow - - - With the small end - - - ---Down where the fire seat is and then it goes up wider towards the, in this case where there's a - where the fire hits the ceiling in this - in this instances.
210 From his external examination of the front of the building he was able to ascertain that the greatest fire damage was in the dining room and that the fire vented from in that room to the outside. He described the fire damage as follows:[164]
[T]he fire had vented out of that window opening and then licked up onto the surface of the wall up there and burning the paint away and then leaving some soot deposits on the wall.
And is that - inside that wall, where the scorch mark is shown on the exterior, which room is that?---That is the western-most room and also called the dining room. Yes.
And does the - is there anything about the scorching which speaks to you as fire language?---The fire actually vented from in to out, and the level of damage compared to the window opening on the other side of the entry foyer was greater than that one, so the indicator was greater damage to that room.
211 He also described the damage inside the dining room, which indicated to him that the fire generated intense heat causing the plaster to fall off the walls, glass to shatter in the windows and wooden frames to be burnt:[165]
On the wall the - the plaster has 'spalled', as we call it - it has been heat affected and fallen off.
Is that on the left-hand side of the photograph?---Yes. That's on the left-hand side. Yes?---Yes.
And what about on the right-hand side of the photograph, the heavily charcoaled - - - ?---Yes. On the window timber - framed timber. So that's heavily charred and it's charred or consumes - partially consumed on the inside, indicating to fire travelled into out.
Sorry. I - would you repeat that last part? Your voice dropped off, I'm afraid?---Sorry. The timber-framing of the window is - is charred and partially consumed on the inside section, which indicates that the fire travelled from inside to inside the structure.
Yes. What's represented in the heavily charcoaled PCU, is that known as alligatoring?---In the terminology they - yes, use that term. Yes.
And returning to the photograph in the space that's available where the spalling is on the brickwork, in the left-hand side of the photograph there appears to be a return - a masonry return with some brickwork and some more spalling. Is there anything relevant about that portion of the photograph?---Again, there's spalling off the end wall - spalling in the wall and also the timber is partially consumed and heavily charred.
And what does the spalling on the wall indicate to you, if anything, in terms of fire language?---The spalling on the - large part of the wall is the wall that is opposite the window and the - that indicates what when a room is fully involved in fire the air entrainment from - coming in through the window increases its fire intensity and its - impacts on the wall opposite the opening.
And it appears through what's shown in this photograph that there - on the left-hand side - well, what does that portion of woodwork, if I've got it right, or metalwork hanging down indicate?---There was a suspended ceiling and that's part of the ceiling steel framework to support that.
And is there anything from the fire language you observe which indicated how the fire had behaved in this room?---And - the - the main fire language I indicated was that part of that steel framework - there was that partial - a circular pattern that had caused heat demarcation on that steelwork.
Thank you. And did you have any understanding about whether the building was fully enclosed or not, at the time of the fire?---My understanding that all the windows were secure that were still intact, not fire affected, and that there were still remains of glass within the - those two windows at the front of the property down the bottom. But I had no observations of any opening windows or doors.
Did you make any observations relating to whether or not there had been any collapse of structures above roof - of a head height, that is, ceilings and above?---Within that room of origin?
Yes?---Yes. Yes, the ceiling structure had collapsed in that area and the other timber fixing had been either consumed or heavily charred in that area. And how, in your experience, does that occur?---That occurs generally when the room has undergone 'full room involvement' as we call it. So the - the room is fully involved in the fire and the - then it's starting to vent out into the foyer and vent out the window.
And how does the fire come to be able to vent out of the windows, windows generally fail early in the fire development as in this case, the windows were nearly ceiling height and the - as the fire plume initially develops in the early stages, that will create a hot gas layer within the room and that hot gas layer can be upwards of 400 degrees and that will cause glass to fail, and glass generally fails easily when there is a temperature difference between the glass and the protected glass in the framework.
And is there fire language in the photographs which I've shown you up to this point which demonstrates that that's what occurred in this case?---Yes. The - the fire language that occurred - it - yes. The - all these combustible items within that room were on fire and that's including the flooring and all the fittings.
212 From his observations, Mr Bell concluded that the dining room had been fully involved in the fire, but he could not say whether a flashover had occurred. A flashover is a term used to describe the simultaneous combustion of all combustible materials within a particular place.[166]
213 One of the steps Mr Bell took to ascertain what caused the fire in the dining room was to dig out most of the debris and material on the floor and then hose down the floor. When asked why he did that he said it was general practice to put water on the floors because any residual ignitable liquids show up in a rainbow form. However, when he hosed the floor in the dining room it did not show any residual ignitable liquids. After clearing out the debris from the room, Mr Bell located an unburnt round area on the floor in the entry to the dining room where the sliding doors had been, and the base of the remains of the green rubbish bin in the debris.[167]
214 Mr Bell made enquiries of the firefighters who first arrived on the scene as to what methods they had used to force entry into the property and was informed that:
(a) the chain securing the security fencing around the front of the property was cut, and the panels in the steel framed gate (that was locked) on the left-hand side of the property (southern side) were knocked out;[168]
(b) the driveway gate was opened by loosening the bolts to release the chain;[169]
(c) the eastern gate (on the right-hand side of the property) was forced using a hooligan tool;[170] and
(d) no doors or windows had to be forced (although the doors were locked, the windows in the front rooms and front door had shattered).[171]
215 When cross-examined by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, Mr Bell agreed that the six-foot cyclone mesh security fence on the verge did not extend across the entire front of the property. It ran from the western side across two thirds of the property to just before the edge of the driveway on the east side.[172]
216 In the fire investigation report, Mr Bell recorded the following matters:
(1) The Department of Fire and Emergency Services received a call that there was a fire at the Wellington Street property at 1.21 am on 16 January 2016, and that a fire and rescue services crew from Claremont attended to investigate and suppress the fire. On arrival, the incident controller station officer could not determine the origin and cause of the fire, and called in the fire investigation and analysis unit to attend.[173]
(2) The owners of the property visited on the evening of Friday 15 January to top up the pool around 8.30 pm.[174] They did not enter the premises; they walked around the back via the eastern side. They stated that they did not see or hear anything unusual during their visit.[175]
(3) The home is being refurbished by Mosman Bay. The home was due to be completed in a few weeks' time. Claremont crews attended a fire in a skip bin at the front of the premises on the morning of (Tuesday) 12 January, four days prior to the current fire. This fire was recorded as suspicious.[176]
(4) The front verge of the property is secured by cyclone fencing and a skip bin is located on the verge adjacent to the driveway.[177]
(5) After recording in some detail the extensive damage sustained by fire and heat to the house that could be seen from the outside (and before conducting an internal examination), under the heading 'Right hand side (southern‑eastern)', he stated that the external examination revealed that the most fire damage to the top floor area was around the central section, and that two hypotheses of the origin of the fire were still valid. These were: whether the fire started in the upper floor and dropped down into the ground floor or whether the fire started in the ground floor and spread to the upper floor.[178]
(6) The internal examination of the central hallway area on the ground floor, which encompasses the staircase, displayed the following fire patterns:
- Failure of the ceiling panels exposing the smoke stained concrete slab
- A 'V' pattern was evident on the timber wall panelling indicating the smoke and heat travelled from the front of the premises to the rear.
- There is evidence of plaster spalling in the upper section of the wall adjacent to the timber panelling
- Smoke staining on the walls of the stairwell increased towards the upper parts.
- A section of plaster spalling was evident in the bulkhead at ceiling level of the staircase which faces the front of the property.
- No smoke staining was evident on the external walls at the ground level of the staircase.
These observations of the central hallway indicated the fire started in the front section of the ground floor; spreading through to the hallway and then via the staircase void to the upper floor.[179]
(7) The entrance foyer on the ground floor displayed clean burn to the underside of the concrete slab. Distortion to the upper parts of the aluminium door frame was also evident. The heavily charred bottom two metres of the timber dividing panel on the southern side was the only remaining evidence of the timber panelling and doors on either side of the entrance foyer. The room on the western side (the dining room) displayed the most fire and heat damage of the rooms on the ground floor.[180]
(8) Under the heading 'Area of Origin', it is recorded that the area of origin is the room on the western side of the ground floor (the dining room). The following observations were made:[181]
(9) Under the heading 'Potential Heat/Ignition Sources', Mr Bell considered and excluded the failure or malfunction of electrical equipment or lighting on grounds that there was no power turned on to any part of the building at the time of the fire. He also discounted smoking or discarding of cigarettes on grounds that the timeline from when the premises were vacated to the fire being reported (being approximately seven to eight hours) did not support the theory of a cigarette smouldering and developing into a flaming fire.[182]
(10) Mr Bell considered under the same heading (referred to in (9)) whether spontaneous combustion of oil soaked rags within a plastic rubbish bin was the potential heat/ignition source of the fire, and concluded that: (a) the point of origin of the fire was rags within the plastic rubbish bin; and (b) the oil soaked rags contaminated with staining oil that has the potential to self‑heat when not disposed of by the manufacturer's recommendations was the cause of the fire, which cause determination (of the fire) was to be recorded as accidental.[183] Mr Bell then stated in his report that this theory was confirmed by the following:[184]
(a) Mr Walling who informed him that he had spoken to the painters after the fire and that they had cleaned up all their rags and placed them in the rubbish bin located in the western room of the ground floor (the dining room);
(b) Mr Thomas who informed him that the painters were sealing, scraping and wiping up the residue from the timber staining of the timber fittings within the front rooms on Friday 15 January; and
(c) the label on the container of the product the painters were using to stain the timber clearly states the danger of self-igniting.
217 When Mr Bell gave his evidence‑in‑chief, it emerged that after he had spoken to the electrician and then to Mr Thomas,[185] but before he spoke to Mr Walling on the morning of the fire, he had formed the theory that the origin of the fire was in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room and that the cause of the fire was the self-ignition of oil soaked rags in the bin. His evidence on this point when being examined in chief by senior counsel for AIG was as follows:[186]
And did you identify what appeared to you to be the point of origin of the fire---Yes. I - it was. Yes, the point of origin. Yes. And where was that---That - the point of origin in our terminology is where the heat source and the materials first ignite and that was, in my opinion, was in the rubbish bin.
And what are the factors which you observe which led you to form that opinion---The area of origin was that front room of the premises - from the western corner and within that room the identifiable heat sources that I observed in that room - again, with the circular pattern on the ceiling, indicated that that was the - earlier fire development within that room. So the area of origin then reduced to whereabouts that bin was. So the rubbish bin was then the area of origin. And then, further, talking to Mr Thomas and the getting an idea or telling what activities were done within the premises the preceding day, that, he said, 'Yes, there was some staining in, putting in, back with the timber products within the property', and he pointed out that the - the oil products they used and - and I checked that and - yes, had a - the theory that the oil stained rags would have self-heated and then ignited in - within the rubbish bin.
218 Senior counsel for Mr Holgersson objects to the evidence of Mr Bell about the conversation he had with Mr Walling about Mr Walling's conversation with 'the painters' (Mr Simpson) on the morning of the fire, on grounds that Mr Bell's evidence on this point is inadmissible as it is 'hearsay on hearsay'. Counsel for the McMurrays and counsel for the Bresland parties also made the same objection. My ruling on this point is set out below in 4.4.4 and 4.4.5. For the reasons I give in 4.4.4 and 4.4.5, I have found Mr Bell's record of this conversation in his report and field notes should not be admitted into evidence.
4.4.4 Are Mr Bell's field notes a 'business record' and is a note in the field notes recording a conversation that he had with Mr Walling the morning after the fire about what Mr Simpson had said to Mr Walling about placing oily rags in the bin admissible, pursuant to s 79C of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA)?
219 As part of his investigation that morning, Mr Bell took a number of photographs and made field notes of the steps he took in the investigation process using a pro forma document, which provides guidelines and prompts that fire investigators employed by the Department follow when investigating a fire.[187]
220 Early in the morning, Mr Walling arrived at the property and spoke to Mr Bell. By that time, Mr Bell had formed the opinion that the fire had started in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room, and that it was his view that oily rags in the bin had self-ignited.
221 Mr Bell spoke to Mr Walling about his theory about what might be the cause of the fire and that rags had been placed into the green rubbish bin in the dining room, and then Mr Walling, in the presence of Mr Bell, telephoned Mr Simpson.[188]
222 AIG seeks to tender into evidence Mr Bell's field notes, including his notes of this conversation, as a 'business record' pursuant to s 79C(2a) of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) as it concedes that some of the matters noted by Mr Bell would otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay. In particular, AIG seeks to tender into evidence Mr Bell's note of the telephone conversation Mr Walling had with Mr Simpson, which includes a note of what Mr Walling informed Mr Bell had been said to him by Mr Simpson.[189]
223 Plainly the note of the conversation is hearsay, and, in part, is hearsay on hearsay. It is a note of a conversation heard by a person (Mr Bell) who was not a party to the conversation, who heard only the first speaker (Mr Walling) and recorded what was told to him by the first speaker (Mr Walling) that the second speaker had said (Mr Simpson).
224 AIG submits that the hearsay material in Mr Bell's Department of Fire and Emergency Services field notes is admissible hearsay because it conforms with the requirements of s 79C(2a) and (3) of the Evidence Act.
225 The statement that is sought to be admitted by AIG in Mr Bell's field notes is as follows:[190]
Dave contacted the painters in my presence; they confirmed they gathered the rags they used to clean up the wood/timber staining & placed them in the bin in the front western room at the approx 3 pm on Friday 15/1/16.
226 Mr Bell's field notes record that Mr Simpson informed Mr Walling, who in turn informed Mr Bell, that the painters had placed rags in the bin. AIG contends that Mr Simpson confirmed in cross-examination he was in no doubt that the bin being spoken of by Mr Walling was the 60 litre green rubbish bin in the front western room.
227 AIG argues that the telephone call between Mr Walling and Mr Simpson and the contents of it were confirmed by each of them. Whilst Mr Walling and Mr Simpson both agreed that a conversation took place, it cannot be found that they both confirmed the contents of the conversation were as set out in Mr Bell's field notes.
228 Mr Walling was called to give evidence by AIG and Mr Simpson was called by Mr Holgersson.
229 When Mr Walling gave his evidence‑in‑chief, senior counsel for AIG led from Mr Walling the following evidence about what he was told by Mr Bell when he arrived at the site and the conversation he had with Mr Simpson about whether rags had been placed in the bin by the painters:[191]
And doing the best you can, can you put whatever it was that Mr Bell may have said to you and in turn, what you may have said back to him or to anyone else that we will, perhaps, discuss - as if it's happening now in the first person - - -?----Yes.
In relation to Mr Bell, what did he say to you?---Mr Bell and myself were probably the first ones to go inside the property after it was extinguished and he looked for a while and he - he - there was a spot on the floor and the - in one of the rooms where there was a plastic rubbish bin and he says - he said to me, 'That's where the fire started'.
And did - which room was that in?---It was in the room on the left-hand side which I think was going to be the dining room.
And did he say anything to you about what may or may not have caused the fire?---He did. He said, 'It had started from the bins', and I think that's maybe when he asked me about the rags - what the painters were doing.
So - - -?---And I did know that had been staining the timber.
And did you know what they had been using to stain the timber?---There was still some canisters of the stain in the other room of the house that hadn't been touched. So I think I got one of them and gave it to Bell.
And what did you understand the painters were doing in order to apply the stain to the timber?---They were using rags.
And did you observe that work occurring from time to time?---During the week I had seen that. Yes.
And did you, at any stage, telephone any other person to determine - sorry, to ask any questions about the fire?---Yes. When Mr Bell suggested that it was from the rubbish bin and had there been any rags in there, I rung the painter.
Yes. Now, when you say, 'the painter', who did you call---Mark Simpson.
And what did you say to Mr Simpson?---I said to Mark Simpson, I said, 'Did you put any rags in the bin?'
That's the evidence-in-chief. If your Honour pleases.
230 Importantly, Mr Walling was not asked whether, when he spoke to Mr Simpson, he asked Mr Simpson whether the painters had put any rags in the green rubbish bin. Mr Walling's evidence simply was that he asked Mr Simpson whether he had put any rags in the bin.
231 When Mr Walling was cross-examined by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, he was asked whether he recalled signing a witness statement dated 30 July 2019 in which he said that some time later, he and Mark (Simpson) were talking about the bin and that Mark had said to him that when he referred to the bin in that conversation, he meant the skip bin outside, and Mr Walling was asked whether that it happened to which Mr Walling replied 'yes'.[192]
232 When Mr Simpson gave his evidence‑in‑chief, and when he was cross‑examined, he was not asked about this later conversation. Importantly, although he was asked about the conversation he had with Mr Walling on the morning after the fire about the bin inside the house on the ground floor, Mr Simpson was not asked about what he said to Mr Walling. The only cross‑examination on this point was made by senior counsel for AIG who put to Mr Simpson that when he spoke to Mr Walling on the morning after the fire that Mr Walling told him that the fire investigator (Mr Bell) had told him that the fire had started in the bin within the house, to which Mr Simpson said, 'He wasn't too sure but yes, he said it might have'.[193] It was then put to Mr Simpson by senior counsel that, 'You knew at that point, when he said that to you, I take it you knew which bin he was referring to?' to which Mr Simpson replied, 'yes'.[194] Senior counsel then put the question, 'And you understood him to be ringing you to find out whether or not the painters had put rags in the bin so as to cause the fire, correct?'. Before Mr Simpson could answer the question, senior counsel for Mr Holgersson interrupted and objected to the question on grounds that it was not clear whether the question related to the bin inside the house or the skip bin. Rather than responding to the objection, senior counsel for AIG simply said to Mr Simpson, 'You understood when I asked you about the questions I was asking you, I was asking you about the plastic bin inside the house', to which Mr Simpson said 'yes'.[195]
233 Senior counsel for AIG returned to this issue but did not put to Mr Simpson what he had said to Mr Walling in the telephone conversation the morning after the fire. Senior counsel simply put to Mr Simpson:[196]
You had received a phone call from Mr Walling the day after or the day off the fire, because it spanned over the night, in which he asked you directly about rags with LobaOil and the plastic bin. Is that correct?‑‑‑Yes.
Because he wouldn't have been asking about any other rags, would he?‑‑‑No.
234 Consequently, it is clear that the content of Mr Bell's field notes record of what is stated to have been said by Mr Simpson by Mr Walling in his conversation with Mr Walling were not put to Mr Simpson. In particular, it was not put to Mr Simpson that in the telephone call he had with Mr Walling on the morning after the fire he told Mr Walling that the painters had put Loba Oil soaked rags in the bin, and when he said that he was referring to the green rubbish bin in the dining room.
235 Section 79C of the Evidence Act provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), in any proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact or opinion would be admissible, any statement in a document and tending to establish the fact or opinion shall, on production of the document, be admissible as evidence of that fact or opinion if the statement -
(a) was made by a qualified person; or
(b) directly or indirectly reproduces or is derived from one or other or both of the following -
(i) information in one or more statements, each made by a qualified person;
(ii) information from one or more devices designed for, and used for the purpose of, recording, measuring, counting or identifying information, not being information based on a statement made by any person.
(2) Where a statement referred to in subsection (1) is made by a qualified person or reproduces or is derived from information in a statement made by a qualified person, that person must be called as a witness unless -
(f) having regard to the time which has elapsed since he made the statement and to all the circumstances, he cannot reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement; or
(g) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, undue delay, inconvenience or expense would be caused by calling him as a witness; or
(2a) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), in any proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact or opinion would be admissible, any statement in a document and tending to establish the fact or opinion shall, on production of the document, be admissible as evidence of that fact or opinion if -
(a) the statement is, or directly or indirectly reproduces, or is derived from, a business record; and
(b) the court is satisfied that the business record is a genuine business record.
(2b) Where a statement referred to in subsection (2a) is made by a qualified person that person shall not be called as a witness unless the court orders otherwise.
(3) This section makes a statement admissible notwithstanding -
(a) the rules against hearsay; or
(b) the rules against secondary evidence of the contents of a document; or
(c) that the person who made the statement or the person who made a statement from which the information in the statement is reproduced or derived is a witness in the proceedings, whether or not he gives evidence consistent or inconsistent with the statement; or
(d) that the statement is in such a form that it would not be admissible if given as oral evidence,
but does not make admissible a statement which is otherwise inadmissible.
(a) for the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible as evidence, draw any reasonable inference from the form of contents of the document in which the statement is contained, or from any other circumstances;
(6) For the purposes of this section a court may, in its discretion, reject a statement notwithstanding that the requirements of this section are satisfied with respect thereto, if the court is of the opinion that the probative value of the statement is outweighed by the consideration that its admission or the determination of its admissibility -
(a) may necessitate undue consumption of time; or
(b) may create undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or in proceedings with a jury mislead the jury.
236 The relevant effect of s 79C(2a) of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) is that a statement in a document tending to establish a fact or opinion may be admissible, notwithstanding the rules against hearsay,[197] in any proceedings where direct oral evidence of the fact or opinion would be admissible, if the statement is, or directly or indirectly reproduces or is derived from, a business record, and the court is satisfied that the business record is genuine.[198]
237 For the purposes of s 79C of the Evidence Act:[199]
(a) a 'business record' means 'a book of account or other document prepared or used in the ordinary course of a business for the purpose of recording any matter relating to the business';
(b) a 'statement' includes 'any representation of fact or opinion whether made in words or otherwise';
(c) 'derived' means 'derived, by the use of a computer or otherwise, by calculation, comparison, selection, sorting, consolidation or by accounting, statistical or logical procedures'; and
(d) a 'qualified person' in relation to a statement, unless the statement must be made by an expert, means 'a person who had, at the time of making of the statement, or may reasonably be supposed to have had at that time, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement'.
The purpose of s 79C being remedial is important. The section is intended to provide for the proof of what might otherwise be hearsay evidence. It does so by enabling evidence of a fact or opinion to be admitted when it is found in a statement or document tending to establish that fact or opinion and to be admitted as evidence in circumstances where direct oral evidence of a fact or opinion would otherwise be admissible.
239 Section 79C(1) and s 79C(2) apply to documents in general and s 79C(2a) and s 79C(2b) apply solely to business records.[201]
240 In Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Buss JA set out the relevant procedure to invoke the business records provision in s 79C(2a):[202]
In McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 2] [2010] WASC 153, Beech J noted the significance of the phrase 'prepared or used' in the definition of 'business record' in s 79B [30]. The presence of these alternatives means that two questions arise when considering whether a document is a business record, namely:
(a) was the document 'prepared' in the ordinary course of a business for the purpose of recording any matter relating to the business [30]; or
(b) was the document 'used' in the ordinary course of a business for the purpose of recording any matter relating to the business [31]?
241 Buss JA then went on to observe in Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA):[203]
Section 79C(2a) makes statements in a document admissible. It does not make the document itself admissible. The existence of an admissible statement in a document therefore does not make the balance of the document admissible, if it is otherwise inadmissible. See Re Marra Developments Ltd & The Companies Act [1979] 2 NSWLR 193, 198 (Needham J).
In Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence, (8th Aust ed, 2010), the following observations are made in relation to the business records legislation in Western Australia and elsewhere:
'The business records legislation is remedial legislation intended to remove the difficulty or, in some instances, impossibility of proving certain business facts by admitting material which in common experience is likely to be accurate, and should be construed liberally and not pedantically [35195].'
See also Re Marra Developments (202); Cavill [208] (Miller JA).
242 It does not appear to be in dispute that Mr Bell's investigation notes are a business record. In any event, this point cannot be contested.[204] However, as observed by Buss JA in Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), s 79C(2a) does not make all of the statements in a document admissible.[205]
243 In Beamish v The Queen, the Court of Appeal found that s 79C(1) and s 79C(2a) apply to statements made by a qualified person, including statements tendered for the truth of the contents recorded in a document by third party.[206] Section 79C(1) and s 79C(2a) also apply to statements that are not made by a qualified person. Those sections also apply to representations and computer generated statements. However, in this matter the statement sought to be admitted can only be admitted if it was made by a qualified person.
244 In this matter, the statement which is sought to be adduced into evidence in Mr Bell's investigation field notes and recorded in his report is a statement by Mr Walling. Consequently for the statement to be admissible under s 79C(1) and s 79C(2a), Mr Walling must be a qualified person for the purposes of s 79C. In respect of the answer to the question Mr Walling put to Mr Simpson in the conversation the morning after the fire, Mr Walling cannot be found to be a qualified person within the meaning of the defined term in s 79B. This is because Mr Walling cannot be found to be a person who had, at the time of making the statement to Mr Bell, or may reasonably be supposed to have had at that time, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement that is personal knowledge of the content what was said to him by Mr Simpson.
245 In any event, pursuant to s 79C(3), the statement made by Mr Walling in Mr Bell's investigation field notes is not admissible as it would be otherwise inadmissible, as it is hearsay on hearsay.
If I am wrong on this point, and the field note and the record of that note in the report made by Mr Bell about what he recorded that Mr Walling had told him meets the requirements of s 79C, I would not admit the evidence and reject it pursuant to s 79C(6) because I am of the opinion that the probative value of the statement is outweighed by the consideration that its admission would create undue prejudice to Mr Holgersson, as party to the fourth party proceedings, because the precise contents of the field note were not put to Mr Simpson or Mr Walling. In respect of the remainder of the field notes that record what was done and seen by Mr Bell at the Wellington Street property on the morning of 16 January 2016, these notes are clearly relevant and admissible. Consequently, the remainder of the notes are admitted into evidence. This is because these notes are a contemporaneous record, and relevantly record what actions were taken by Mr Bell who had the statutory responsibility on behalf of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services to investigate the cause of the fire, and who was qualified to do so, having considerable expertise in carrying out similar investigations. The field notes are also relevant because they record the basal facts and assumptions Mr Bell took into account, including a record of the persons that he spoke to and his external and internal fire scene examination, in forming his opinion as to the point of origin and cause of the fire. I find Mr Bell's opinion as to the cause of the fire should not be given much weight as his investigation effectively ceased on the morning after the fire and he did not have an opportunity to consider Mr Tisdale's report. I also did not find his evidence about the cause of the skip bin fire to be reliable. I deal with this point in 4.4.9 below. I have also made specific findings about his evidence in 4.5.3 below.
4.4.5 Is the statement recorded in Mr Bell's field notes about what Mr Simpson said to Mr Walling admissible as part of the res gestae?
246 AIG relies on the statement recorded in Mr Bell's field notes and recoded in his report as being made by Mr Simpson as being admissible hearsay because it is part of the res gestae, being an immediate reaction to a question posed to him by Mr Walling in circumstances where there had been a significant fire at the premises causing enormous damage in respect of which there might be expected to be questions asked about liability.
247 AIG also argues that Mr Simpson is a person who might be expected to have personal knowledge of the fact because of his involvement in the works and the role that he performed in relation to Mr Roach and Mr Milton, whether they were employees or contractors, effectively reported to him, and there is no reason to suppose that he simply made a wild guess.
248 In a criminal law context, in Poland v The State of Western Australia Mazza JA explained the doctrine of res gestae as follows:[207]
The basic legal principles applicable to statements made as part of the res gestae are well settled and were recently described by Buss JA (with whom Newnes JA and I agreed) in Armstrong v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 42; (2012) 220 A Crim R 274 [46] ‑ [50], as follows:
'In general, a statement made spontaneously by an observer or participant during or immediately after an event which culminates in the charging of a criminal offence is admissible in evidence at the trial as part of the res gestae.
In Ratten v The Queen [1971] UKPC 23; [1972] AC 378, Lord Wilberforce said that "if the drama, leading up to the climax, has commenced and assumed such intensity and pressure that the utterance can safely be regarded as a true reflection of what was unrolling or actually happening, it ought to be received" (389 - 390).
"[H]earsay evidence may be admitted if the statement providing it is made in such conditions (always being those of approximate but not exact contemporaneity) of involvement or pressure as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused (391)."
This approach was approved by the High Court in Walton v The Queen [1989] HCA 9; (1989) 166 CLR 283, 295 (Mason CJ), 304 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey JJ) and Pollitt v The Queen [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558, 582 ‑ 583 (Brennan J).
In Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; (1999) 196 CLR 297, Gaudron and Kirby JJ made these observations:
'The principle expressed in Ratten is crucially dependent on the virtual certainty of the statement in question being true and, to that extent, it reflects the common law's bias against the reception of hearsay evidence. That is because it is not logically necessary for the possibility of concoction to be excluded before a statement is probative of the fact asserted in it. Rather, all that is necessary is that the statement be consistent with the fact to be proved and its making so connected to that fact that, when taken in conjunction with other evidence in the case, it bears on the probability of that fact having occurred.
The nature and degree of the connection necessary before a statement is probative of the fact asserted in it will, of course, depend on the nature of that fact and, if it be different, the fact ultimately to be proved. Even so, the connection will ordinarily be found in the close contemporaneity of the statement with the fact in issue and the consideration that the statement is a statement of the kind that might ordinarily be expected from the maker if the fact were true. Similarly, a statement that is closely contemporaneous with the fact in issue and is contrary to what would ordinarily be expected if that fact were true rationally bears on the improbability of its having occurred [55] - [56].'"
See also Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 114.
The observation made by Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Papakosmas that the doctrine is 'crucially dependent on the virtual certainty of the statement in question being true' may invite consideration of whether a judge must consider the reliability of the evidence. In that case, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J referred (at [22]) with apparent approval to the decision in the House of Lords in R v Andrews [1987] AC 281 (HL). Andrews has some factual similarity to the present case. The victim was attacked and stabbed with two different knives and then robbed. Within minutes of the attack, and bleeding profusely from a deep stomach wound, he went downstairs to the flat for assistance. The police and ambulance were immediately telephoned and, within a matter of minutes, the police arrived, shortly followed by an ambulance. One of the attending police officers, whilst administering first aid, asked the victim how he had received his injuries. The victim replied that he had been attacked by two men, and named them, one of them being the appellant. The victim was later placed on life support, but died two months after the attack. The appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary and manslaughter. During his trial, the prosecution sought to adduce evidence of the victim's statement to the police officer as evidence of its truth pursuant to the doctrine of res gestae. The evidence was admitted for this purpose.
The House of Lords (Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Griffiths, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Ackner) held that the ruling was correct. In his speech, Lord Ackner summarised the admissibility of evidence under the res gestae doctrine. In the course of doing so, he said:
'As to the possibility of error in the facts narrated in the statement, if only the ordinary fallibility of human recollection is relied upon, this goes to the weight to be attached to and not to the admissibility of the statement and is therefore a matter for the jury. However, here again there may be special features that may give rise to the possibility of error. In the instant case there was evidence that the deceased had drunk to excess, well over double the permitted limit for driving a motor car. Another example would be where the identification was made in circumstances of particular difficulty or where the declarant suffered from defective eyesight. In such circumstances the trial judge must consider whether he can exclude the possibility of error. (301).'
Plainly, it is necessary for a judge to consider the likelihood of deliberate concoction or distortion on the part of the maker of the statement. Beyond this, in the ordinary case, the question of the reliability of the evidence is one for a jury, not for a judge: R v Duong [2011] SASCFC 100; (2011) 110 SASR 296 [40] (Doyle CJ). However, as Lord Ackner recognised, there may be special features in a case that require a judge to consider whether the possibility of error can be excluded.
249 Whilst in criminal proceedings it is a matter for the jury to consider whether the evidence sought to be admitted as res gestae is reliable, in a civil trial this is a matter for the trial judge. Thus it is up to the judge to determine whether the evidence should be admitted.
250 However, as Mazza JA made it clear in Poland v The State of Western Australia in the passages referred to, there may be circumstances which go to the matters in the res gestae evidence that could, in some circumstances, result in it not being admitted.
251 In the absence of cross-examination by AIG of Mr Simpson about precisely what he said to Mr Walling in the conversation that occurred the morning after the fire, admission of this evidence is prejudicial to the first fourth party, Mr Holgersson.
252 Even if I was to admit the field note of the conversation, and what is stated by Mr Bell about this conversation in his report, I do not find the evidence to be sufficiently cogent to be reliable upon which a finding could be made that Mr Simpson or Mr Roach or Mr Milton put rags soaked with Loba Oil in the green rubbish bin on 15 January 2016.
253 In the field note of the conversation sought to be admitted, Mr Bell records that (Mr Simpson said) the painters had gathered the rags they used to clean up the wood/timber staining and placed them in the bin at approximately 3.00 pm on Friday 15 January 2016. However, it is not in contest that Mr Simpson had left the site at about 2.30 pm that afternoon, and Mr Roach and Mr Milton were still working,[208] and Mr Thomas was still present at the house. In the absence of any cross‑examination of Mr Simpson about the contents of this note, and the fact that when he left for the day the other painters were still working, I cannot find the content of this record to be cogent or reliable. For these reasons I must disregard it.
254 In any event, as senior counsel for Mr Holgersson points out the failure to cross‑examine Mr Simpson on this point means it is now not open to AIG to maintain that Mr Simpson's evidence‑in‑chief on this point should not be accepted.[209]
255 Mr Manser is a consultant forensic fire investigator.
256 Mr Manser was engaged by lawyers acting for Tokio Marine to investigate the fire. Mr Manser prepared a lengthy and comprehensive report setting out the results of his investigation. He was called to give evidence by AIG because, by the time of the trial, Tokio Marine had ceased to be a party to the proceedings.
257 His training in fire investigation commenced when he joined the forensic branch of police service in South Australia in 1988. He attended internal courses and training in fire investigation over a 10‑year period when he worked in the forensic branch. In 1998 he left the police service to have a break and in the year 2000 he obtained a graduate certificate in fire investigation from Charles Sturt University. During that year he also commenced a fire investigation and marine cargo surveying business. Since 2000, Mr Manser has attended fire investigation training conferences every two years. Since that time also, he has on a yearly basis, run one day training courses for the Department of Fire and Emergency Services Academy in Western Australia for police and fire service investigators and, in 2019 and in 2020, he has given guest lectures at Murdoch University on the topic of fire investigation as part of a degree course of study in forensic science.
258 I did not find Mr Manser to be an entirely reliable witness.
259 First, although Mr Manser is a very experienced fire investigator, there are some inaccuracies in his report, dated 28 May 2016, which inaccuracies I have found affect his opinion that the most probable cause of the fire was a result of the self-heating of cloth rags, used by the painters to wipe up oil.[210]
260 Second, insofar as Mr Manser relies upon the results of two experiments conducted by him as supporting his opinion of the probable cause of the fire, as Mr Tong has made very clear in his evidence, some of the inferences that Mr Manser has made in respect of these experiments are not open to be drawn. For this reason also, I do not find Mr Manser's evidence about the experiments (that he conducted in an attempt to generate a fire in several green rubbish bins in which oil soaked rags had been placed) to satisfy the conditions of admissibility of expert opinion. This is because if there were rags with Loba Oil on them in the green rubbish bin on the night in question, the amount of Loba Oil infused into the rags, whether such rags would have been scrunched or laid flat, and the quantity of those rags, and the quantities of other combustible material in the bin, is not known.
261 In these circumstances I am not satisfied that Mr Manser's experiments have any probative usefulness, other than to show, as Mr Tong points out, a propensity of Loba Oil soaked rags to self-heat. This is because of the quantities of Loba Oil, the quantities of oil infused rags, clean rags and the sawdust placed in the bins in the experiments, do not rest on any proven primary facts. Nor is it known whether, if there were oil infused rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night of the fire, the rags were scrunched or folded flat. As such, this evidence does not meet the proof of assumption rule identified by J D Heydon, considered in 4.4.1 of these reasons. Consequently, as Mr Tong points out in his fifth report, none of the experiments can be found to be a reliable reconstruction of what would or could have occurred inside the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room on the night of the fire.
262 I have, however, found that the evidence of the experiments can be admitted solely on the basis that it is evidence that scrunched up rags infused with Loba Oil have the propensity to self-heat.
263 An important part of Mr Manser's findings as to the cause of the fire relies upon the interpretation of what was said in interviews by Mr Thomas, Mr Simpson and Mr Milton, when they each were interviewed by Ms Caldwell, who was assisting Mr Manser. From assumptions made by Mr Manser about what had been said by these three in interviews conducted on 3 and 4 February 2016, and his observations when he viewed the fire at the house on three separate occasions, Mr Manser concluded that rags that had Loba Oil on them had been either placed in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room, or arranged around the rim of the green bin to dry out on the day before the night of the fire.
264 I have had regard to the entire transcript of the interview Ms Caldwell conducted with Mr Thomas on 3 February 2016. This is because when Mr Thomas was cross-examined by senior counsel for AIG, he conceded that subsequent to the interview he had received a copy of the transcript, had read it and was satisfied that to the best of his knowledge it was a correct record.[211] In light of this concession by Mr Thomas, it is open to find, and I do find, that what was said by Mr Thomas in that interview is relevant and admissible.
265 However, I have not had regard to what was said by Mr Simpson in the interview that was conducted with him by Ms Caldwell on 4 February 2016. This is because Mr Simpson had not received a copy of the transcript of the interview or read it,[212] and when he was cross‑examined he was only asked two questions about what he had said when he was interviewed by Ms Caldwell. Senior counsel for AIG asked Mr Simpson about what he had told Mr Roach and Mr Milton about not screwing up oily rags and putting them in a confined space. Senior counsel then put to Mr Simpson that what he had said to Ms Caldwell in the interview (on this point) was consistent with the evidence he had given in the trial, and Mr Simpson agreed.[213]
266 I have, however, had regard to what is stated in the transcript of the records of interview with Mr Simpson and Mr Milton on 4 February 2016 for the purpose only of ascertaining what were the factual assumptions made by Mr Manser when he formed the opinion that the most likely cause of the fire was the spontaneous combustion of rags infused with Loba Oil in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room in the early hours of 16 January 2016. This is because to assess whether Mr Manser's opinion is admissible on this point, or whether his evidence should be given any weight, the facts upon which Mr Manser relied must be proved by admissible evidence in the proceedings. As set out above in 4.4.1, regard can be had to the basal facts assumed by an expert in considering whether an expert opinion should be accepted. If the basal facts are not proved, the expert opinion, insofar as it relies upon proof of those facts, is inadmissible.
267 Further, in Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd [No 2] as E M Heenan J quoted from an article by Dr Rosemary Pattenden:[214]
It is unobjectionable ... when the expert relates the basis of his opinion to the court he does so in order to explain why he formed a particular opinion - not prove that which he was told out of court. It is desirable because without knowing on what information the expert drew in forming his opinion the weight to be placed on his opinion cannot begin to be assessed. Further, the fact that the opinion rests on facts learnt at second-hand may be an important factor in deciding how much weight to attach to the opinion.
268 However, for the reasons below, it was not correct for Mr Manser to find that Mr Thomas said to Ms Caldwell in the interview that there were rags put in the green rubbish bin in the dining room when he was interviewed on 3 February 2016. Nor is it correct to find that Mr Simpson had said when he was interviewed that oily rags were put in a bin in the hallway.
269 In his investigation of the cause of the fire that destroyed the McMurrays' house, Mr Manser conducted most of his investigation together with Mr Tong. Later, he and Mr Tong shared the information that they had collated with Mr Pollard.
270 Mr Manser, Mr Pollard and Mr Tong had worked together in the past. Mr Manser first came to know Mr Pollard when they worked together in the South Australian police force in the forensic investigation branch.
271 Mr Manser, Mr Bell, Mr Tong and Mr Pollard all followed the same methodology of investigation. Except for Mr Pollard, they each took their own photographs. Mr Pollard also like the other fire investigation, reviewed information and reports collated and written by others, and photographs taken by others.
272 In his written report, Mr Manser stated that the methodology he used is an internationally accepted method of fire investigation referred to in the NFPA 921 - Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations.[215]
273 Mr Manser, like Mr Bell, took photographs of the outside and the inside of the house on 20 January 2016 and 1 February 2016.[216] He then, like Mr Bell, examined the fire language left by the fire by first examining the area of least damage and then working towards the area of most damage in the house, which he stated is a good indication of where the origin of the fire was.[217]
274 As a result of his investigation, Mr Manser formed the opinion, together with Mr Tong and Mr Pollard, that the area of origin of the fire (as opposed to the point of origin) was the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room.[218] Mr Manser said that he did not form this view until he had gathered all of the information, which took some weeks to complete.[219] Mr Manser formed that opinion because of the following observations:[220]
7.5 During the renovations the original masonry brick walls dividing the ground floor hallway from the east and west front ground floor rooms had been demolished and replaced with a timber wall into which sliding timber doors were hung. The surface of those timber walls was clad in oak veneer with oak timber battens fixed at intervals to the surface. It was in this area the painters were working to day prior to the fire.
7.6 A 20mm thick (with a 6mm top layer of oak) timber floor had been installed on the floor of the front ground floor rooms. It was glued to the concrete slab with the long axis of each timber board east west flowing across the front rooms. Following installation, to protect the new floor from the other works being completed, it was covered in a layer of thin foam and then a layer of thick plastic taped into place.
7.7 A suspended ceiling had been installed in those rooms with bulkheads around the edges. Any combustible materials were evenly distributed through those three rooms except for the installation of a timber pillar in the north eastern corner of the western side room to replicate the appearance of a concrete pillar in the opposing corner. This was apparently done for aesthetic purposes. Two timber walls containing hidden timber sliding doors divided the east and west front rooms from the hallway.
7.8 Glass windows were fitted into aluminium frames across those two front rooms. Some of the lass was laminated and other sections were safety glass. At the time the fire occurred the windows of the front ground floor rooms appear to have been closed. One window, in the centre section of the eastern side room window (1 of 3 panels of windows) as found to be open but it may have fallen into that position when the plastic window runners melted during the fire.
7.9 The double front doors were constructed of metal frames infilled with glass at the top and metal panels at the bottom.
7.10 The area of fire origin was determined by analysing the patterns of fire damage in those three rooms and the rest of the house. The area of fire origin is bounded by the hallway wall on the eastern side, the front doors on the southern side, three steps down into the stairwell on the north side and the western side front room.
7.11 The most amount of fire damage was in the west side front room on the ground floor and the least amount of fire damage on the ground floor was in the opposite north eastern corner of the house overlooking the river. Half a 'V' pattern of fire damage extended from the bottom of the eastern of three steps leading from the hallway down into the open plan kitchen/dining room area up and across the wall. Half a 'V' pattern of fire damage extended from the lower side of the metal front doors up and across to the eastern side of the bottom metal panel. Half a 'V' pattern of damage to the top sections of the aluminium window frames on the southern side of the western front room also indicated an area of origin. 'V' patterns of fire damage are important indicators of the area of fire origin.
7.12 The surface of the timber floor was evenly fire damaged across the surface of the western side ground floor room and the hallway with less damage apparent in the eastern side ground floor room. There was less fire damage to the walls and window frame in the east side room than the west side room.
275 Consequently, Mr Manser formed the opinion that the area of origin of the fire was in the entry to the dining room on the southern side of the room where the remains of the green bin were found. Mr Manser marked the location of where the remains of the bin were found, on top of the remains of the base, with a yellow number 5,[221] and took a photograph of the dining room looking towards where the entry was before the fire and the wooden sliding doors, and marked various locations by placing yellow numbers 1 to 11 on the floor.[222]
276 It was agreed by Mr Manser and all of the other fire investigators that the location of where the green bin had been in the entry to the dining room during the fire was indicated by circle of unburnt timber floor, approximately 300mm in diameter, in what had been the entry between the sliding doors to the dining room.
277 The plastic base of the green rubbish bin was located by Mr Manser on the top of debris along the northern wall of the dining room. Adhered to one side of the plastic base were the remains of a plastic foam sheet, which had been used to cover the timber floor in the dining room, the entry and the other front room, and on the other side of the plastic base was a layer of compacted sawdust.[223]
278 Mr Manser excavated all the debris from the dining room and found, near the circular unburnt section of the floor in the entry to the dining room (where the green rubbish bin had been during the fire), a broken drill bit. In his report, Mr Manser states that Mr Thomas had said he disposed of that broken piece of drill bit in the bin in the days prior to the fire occurring.[224] Mr Manser also states that Mr Thomas recalled (when he left for the afternoon) that the green bin was either in the doorway between the hallway and the dining room or inside the dining room near the north wall.[225] However, this finding is not correct. Mr Thomas stated, when he was interviewed by Ms Caldwell on 3 February 2016, that he remembered seeing the drill bit on the floor when he was walking out and leaving the house (after locking up) on the afternoon of 15 January 2016, and that the last thing he did was to throw the drill bit into the green bin from a distance of one and half metres as he walked past the entrance to the dining room.[226] Mr Thomas was also asked when he was interviewed to mark on a drawing of the ground floor of the McMurrays' house where the bin was located when he left for the day. Mr Thomas marked the location of the bin well inside the dining room, and at a point that could be described as towards the eastern side of the dining room, away from the entry sliding doors.[227]
279 Mr Manser excavated the debris from the entry hallway and the dining room and located an orange commercial cleaning cloth that was burnt along one edge in the debris. The location where Mr Manser found the orange cloth is marked with a yellow number 8 in the photograph that is annexed to these reasons as Annexure I, which is a location within the dining room and close to a brick wall between the dining room and the entry hall near the stairs to the back room.
280 In his written report, Mr Manser drew the following inferences about what was in the green rubbish bin on the night of the fire:[228]
The contents of the bin, other than the steel drill bit, were not able to be located. Mr Thomas and the Painter Mr Milton advised this bin likely contained, or had arranged around the rim, Loba Oil soaked rags. It is presumed that while the fire was being extinguished, a stream of high pressure water used by the Fire Fighters has dislodged the bin base from its original location, and what was left of its contents, spreading it across the room. It is further understood from DFES that the first arriving Fire Fighters kicked in the panels of the gate in the fence on the western end (nearest the tennis court) and directed a stream of water from their hoses through the west side ground floor window.
Subsequent excavation of the debris from the hallway on the west side front room located one prepared commercial cleaning cloth burnt along one edge and a section of severely fire damaged cloth.
The commercial cleaning cloth was located in the pile of debris along the north side of the west ground floor room. That cloth was orange in colour and burnt along one edge. It was similar to a commercially available cleaning cloth Mr Thomas advised he had been using and may have been in the bin.
Remains of a second cloth were located in the debris in the north eastern corner of the hallway adjacent to the stairs. That cloth appeared to be in layers and was completely burnt. Only sections of the carbonised cloth material remains that disintegrated if carelessly handled. Both remains were retained and later submitted for analysis of any chemical that they may contain.
281 What Mr Manser does not mention in his report is that when Mr Bell commenced his investigation of the fire, he dug out the remains of the dining room (referred to as the western side ground floor room in Mr Manser's report). It is notable that Mr Bell did not locate or see a burnt orange cloth in the dining room on the morning of 16 January 2016. Mr Manser did not locate the orange cloth until he cleaned out all the debris in the dining room on 1 February 2016 with Mr Tong (being approximately two weeks after the fire). On that day, there was a howling wind roaring through what was left of the front doors and out the back doors. When Mr Manser found the piece of burnt cloth, he was concerned that it might blow away so he put a shovel over it to protect it whilst he obtained an exhibit tin to place the cloth in.[229]
282 When cross-examined about the location of the orange rag by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, Mr Manser conceded that he did not know where the orange rag had come from.[230] He also conceded that it was possible that the orange rag could have blown into the room after the fire from another location.[231] In re-examination, Mr Manser qualified this evidence by stating that because he found the orange rag buried in the debris, and it is not uncommon to find undamaged materials at the site of a fire, it was his view that the location of where he found the orange rag was consistent with the rag having been in the room during the fire.[232]
283 When he was interviewed by Ms Caldwell, Mr Simpson said that the rags that were used to apply the Loba Oil were never scrunched up, they were always laid out flat to dry out as it was known that oily rags self‑heat and that oily rags had been left to dry out on the side of a bin that was kept upstairs on the first floor.[233]
284 When Mr Milton was interviewed by Ms Caldwell, he did not say that he put any oily rags in the bin. He said that the rags they used were left on the floor as they were working, and Mr Thomas was going around picking up rags behind them, keeping the job site clean, which was part of his job. He, however, said that when he left at 3.15 pm on Friday 15 January 2016, the rags that they had used (to apply Loba Oil) had been left on the side of the bin so they could air out, so as to use them when they returned to work or, if not, they would be put in the skip bin. When asked how many rags were left on the side of the bin, he said three or four or five. He also made it clear when interviewed that the reason why the rags were left to dry out was because 'they could self‑combust'. When asked further about the rags on the floor by Ms Caldwell, he said that he was sure that Mr Thomas had gone around and picked them up, but he was not too sure whether Mr Thomas had put them in the skip bin or in the bin.[234]
285 Importantly, it is not clear when Mr Milton said in the interview that Mr Thomas was picking up rags on the floor, whether he was referring to oily rags on the floor, rags used for other purposes or clean rags that had not been used to apply oil.
286 Although Mr Manser stated that the cleaning cloth was similar to a cloth Mr Thomas advised he had been using and may have been in the bin, when Mr Thomas was interviewed by Ms Caldwell on 3 February 2016, he made no mention of any commercial cleaning cloth being placed in the bin, and he made no mention in his interview of any rags in the bin despite Mr Manser's summary of the witness evidence at par 6.2 of his report recording that Mr Thomas recalls the bin contained rags, pieces of cut-off timber, a broken drill bit and sawdust.[235]
287 Mr Manser sent the orange cleaning cloth that he located in the dining room to GKA Analytical Services (GKA), together with other samples, including a sample of the Loba Oil and the burnt cloth. His purpose for doing so was to confirm that the cloth rags located in the area of the fire origin contained vegetable oils, and to exclude another ignition source using an ignitable liquid to promote a fire in the area of fire origin.[236]
288 A forensic scientist employed by GKA, Alexander Visotin, analysed the orange cleaning cloth using gas chromatography - mass spectrometry and found that the orange cleaning cloth contained high concentrations of monounsaturated fatty acid methyl esters and concluded that it contained vegetable oil residue that had a low propensity for self-heating.[237] Mr Visotin found no oil residue in the burnt cloth. In his second supplementary report, Mr Visotin stated that the sample of the Loba Oil was determined to have a high propensity for self-heating. He, however, was unable to state whether the vegetable oil residue found in the orange cleaning cloth was degraded Loba Oil or vegetable oil residue from another source. It is clear from his observations that he also concluded that there was a lack of polyunsaturated fatty acids in the orange cleaning cloth, which indicated that the vegetable oil residue found in that cloth had a low tendency towards self-heating. He also relevantly stated that this result does not eliminate the possibility that a substance with a higher tendency towards self-heating was present (in the orange cleaning cloth) prior to the fire, but was thermally degraded.[238]
289 Mr Manser did, however, find it necessary to take steps to ascertain whether a person or persons had entered the house unlawfully that night and set fire to any available combustible materials in the area of the fire origin. After observing that there was no evidence of unlawful entry to any of the doors and windows of the ground floor of the building, along with the doors/gates in the front fence prior to the fire occurring, Mr Manser engaged a forensic locksmith, Mr Tisdale, to examine the ground floor door and window locks, and the gate locks across the front of the house.
290 In Mr Manser's report he records that Mr Tisdale:[239]
[L]ocated a tool on the step outside the laundry door on the western side of the house that could be used as a lock manipulation device. That tool, a piece of bent spring wire, could only manipulate the lock of the laundry door outside of which were it was found and the front gate on the eastern side of the front fence behind the bin. The Forensic Locksmith demonstrated how easy it was to use that tool to manipulate the bolts of those locks. The source of that tool could not be determined. A photograph of the tool was shown to the building supervisor, Mr Ralph Thomas, and he had not seen it previously. How or why that particular tool was outside the laundry door is not known. Entry to the house by a person or persons prior to the fire occurring, however unlikely and for whatever purpose, could not be eliminated by the investigation.
291 Mr Manser, with the assistance of Mr Tong, and in the presence of Mr Bell, conducted the first experiment on 15 March 2016 at the Department of Fire and Emergency Services training academy in Forrestfield. Three 60 L plastic bins were each loaded with sawdust and wooden blocks. To bin numbers 1 and 2, 300g of rags wiped through Loba Oil mixed with hardener were added, and rags wiped through the oil mix were draped around the top of the edge of bin 3. Extra clean rags were added to bin 2 to replicate rubbish.[240] The test commenced at 8.56 am and concluded at 5.25 pm. The test had to be terminated due to time constraints with access to the Academy facilities. It was hoped that self-heating of the rags leading to thermal runaway and ignition could be achieved in one of the bins.
292 In the experiment conducted on 15 March 2016, bin number 3, which had oil infused rags draped around the bin circumference, did not show any propensity to self-heat. Bin number 1 rose in temperature from 36.1 at 9.43 am to 56.2° at 5.15 pm. Bin number 2, containing the additional clean rags on top of the oily rags, rose in temperature from 38.9° at 9.43 am to 133.5° at 5.25 pm. Although there is no mention of the ambient temperature on the day of the experiment, it appears from the photographs attached to report of the experiment that the experiment was conducted in a hot fire training container, and Mr Manser recorded in his diary the temperature of the preceding days as 40° to 41°.[241]
293 Although the temperature rose in bin number 2, it did not achieve thermal runaway and it appeared that from 3.45 pm to 5.25 pm the rate at which the temperature rose in bin number 2 was 11° from 3.45 pm to 4.00 pm (being 79.2° to 90.4°), and then the rate began slowing but still rising to 98.6° at 4.15 pm, 107.6° at 4.30 pm, 115.1° at 4.45 pm, 122.5° at 5.00 pm, 129.1° at 5.15 pm and then to the highest temperature of 133.5° at 5.15 pm.[242] Consequently, the rate of the increasing temperature in bin 2 was at the highest rate of 11% at 4.00 pm, and then the rate of the rise in temperature in bin number 2 slowed until the experiment was terminated at 5.25 pm.
294 Although Mr Manser does not mention it in his report, in Mr Tong's fifth report he records that the three bins were left overnight, and that he and Mr Manser returned to the Department of Fire Emergency Services training area the next day to examine the contents of each bin. The examination revealed that none of the contents of any of the bins exhibited any evidence of discolouration or charring that was indicative of the internal temperatures of the bins having approached thermal runaway, and the contents of bin number 2 were removed by Mr Manser at 11.00 am.[243]
295 Mr Manser conducted a second experiment at the training academy in Forrestfield over a 24-hour period from 10.30 am on Tuesday 19 July 2016 to 10.30 am the following day.[244] The experiment was conducted again in a steel sea container that was normally used to demonstrate flashover fires to trainees and firefighters.
296 On this occasion Mr Manser used four 60 L plastic bins, in each of which he put 1.7 kg of sawdust, spread evenly over the bottom. In bin numbers 1, 2 and 4, he placed approximately 300 g of cotton painters' rags soaked in 500 mL of Loba Oil and hardener. In bin number 3, he placed approximately 300 g of soaked cotton painters' rags in 500 mL of Synteko oil.
297 In bin number 1, the Loba Oil rags were folded into pads and arranged on top of the sawdust and then approximately another 300 g of painters' rags were placed loosely and randomly on top of the oil soaked rags. The outside of the bin was wrapped with a single electric blanket connected to a 240 V power supply. The electric blanket switch was left on during the experiment on the highest setting.
298 In bin number 2 and bin number 3, the oil soaked rags were scrunched up and placed on top of the sawdust and then approximately 300 g of painters' rags were placed loosely and randomly on the top of the mass of oil soaked rags in each bin. The outside of both of these bins was then wrapped in a 4 cm thick layer of wool insulation held in place with tape.
299 In bin number 4, the oil soaked rags were folded and placed on top of the sawdust (the control bin that only contained sawdust and folded Loba Oil soaked rags without any insulation or external heating).
300 When giving evidence, Mr Manser explained that the reason why he put Synteko oil soaked scrunched up rags in bin number 3 was because when he purchased the Loba Oil from the supplier he was informed that Synteko oil had a greater propensity to self-heat than Loba Oil.[245]
301 Mr Manser recorded the temperatures of each of the bins, including the ambient temperature, over the 24‑hour period except for the period between 11.00 pm and 12.30 am when he fell asleep.[246]
302 During the 24‑hour period, the ambient temperature ranged between 25.3° at 2.00 pm on 19 July 2016 and 16.6° at 3.00 am on 20 July 2016. The oil soaked rags in bin number 1 (wrapped in the electric blanket on high) and bin number 4 (the control bin) showed little signs of self‑heating. Bin number 3 (containing the scrunched up Synteko oil soaked rags with clean rags over the top) showed some signs of self‑heating between 3.00 pm on 19 July 2016 until 7.00 pm on the same day and then the temperature in that bin dropped consistently through to 10.30 am the next morning. Bin number 2 (containing scrunched up Loba Oil soaked rags with clean rags over the top) did show signs of self‑heating. At the commencement of the experiment at 10.30 am on 19 July 2016, the temperature inside the bin was 12.7°. At 10.30 pm that night, the temperature inside the bin achieved 178°, but then dropped at 1.00 am to 172° and then continue to drop rapidly thereafter.[247]
303 Although the second experiment conducted by Mr Manser showed that the scrunched up Loba Oil soaked rags in bin number 2 had the propensity to self‑heat, the contents of the rags in that bin did not achieve thermal runaway to the point shortly before spontaneous combustion. Mr Manser explained that to achieve thermal runaway to the point of self-combustion of cotton rags, a temperature of 70° more than 178° must be achieved.[248] There were no signs of thermal runaway leading close to spontaneous combustion because there was no smouldering of the oil infused rags. In this experiment, none of the rags in bin number 2 showed any charring, only some browning.[249]
304 Mr Manser did not regard the experiments to be a failure. He formed the opinion that on both occasions, an exothermic reaction in the mass of rags soaked in Loba Oil had been observed and that, had that reaction continued, a fire would have occurred.[250] I do not accept his opinion on this point.
305 Mr Manser formed this opinion because it was his view that the ambient temperature surrounding bin number 2 (and the other bins) had begun to decline when the temperature inside the steel container, which he was using to conduct experiments in, became cold. In particular, it was his view that the reaction relies upon the temperature increase (in the bins) being greater than the loss of temperature. He also said that the colder temperatures strip away the small amount of heat that was being generated inside the bins.[251]
306 The first difficulty with the ambient temperature theory is that this theory was not demonstrated in bin number 1. This was the bin in which there were folded Loba Oil rags with cotton painters' rags on top and the outside of the bin was wrapped in a single electric blanket on high during the entire experiment. Although the electric blanket was on high during the entire experiment, the outside temperature of the bin did not remain constant. For example, the outside temperature of the bin at 10.30 pm on Tuesday 19 July 2016 was 18.7°. The ambient temperature at that time was 9.0° and the temperature inside the bin was 27.8°. From that point in time, the outside temperature of the bin declined overnight and did not reach a higher temperature until 8.30 am the next morning when the ambient temperature was 9°, yet the temperature inside bin number 1 climbed slowly and was 34.7° at 8.30 am. Consequently, it appears, at least in respect of bin number 1, it could not be said that as the ambient temperature declined that the temperature inside the bin declined.
307 The second difficulty with this theory is that: (a) although perhaps this inference may be able to be drawn in respect of bin number 2 in the middle of the night when bin number 2 reached its maximum temperature at 10.30 pm and the ambient temperature at that time was 9°; (b) when the ambient temperature began to increase the following day from its lowest point of 6° (at and between 3.00 am to 7.30 am) to increase to 9° at 8.00 am up to 13° at 10.30 am, the temperature in bin number 2 did not increase, but continued to drop until 10.00 am, and at 7.30 am, the temperature inside bin number 2 had fallen to 39°, after four and a half hours of an ambient temperature of 6°, and it continued to decline to 22.1° at 10.00 am and then only increased slightly to 23° at 10.30 am.
308 Much the same result could be seen in bin number 3, which contained the scrunched up Synteko oil soaked rags. This bin achieved a maximum temperature of 60.4° at 4.30 pm on Tuesday 19 July 2016, when the ambient temperature was 15.5°. From the highest internal temperature in that bin, the internal temperature of the bin declined consistently to 6.6° at 10.00 am and 10.30 am the following day, despite the fact that the ambient temperature on Wednesday morning had begun to climb from 6° at 7.30 am to 13° at 10.30 am.
309 In any event, the conditions of the experiments could not have replicated any possible fire in the green rubbish bin in the dining room. This is because, even if there were oily rags in that bin, it was not known how many rags would have been in the bin and how much other combustible material was in the bin. When Mr Manser was asked why he placed approximately 1.7 kg of sawdust in each bin of the second experiment, he was unable to explain and conceded that he did not know how much sawdust was in the green rubbish bin on the night in question. He simply said that he put 1.7 kg of sawdust because he had observed on the base of the green bin that there was a layer of sawdust.[252] The oil soaked rags Mr Manser placed in each of the bins were soaked in 500 ml of oil. However, he conceded that if there were painters' oily rags in the bin on the night in question, he did not know whether they were soaked with oil or had a light coating of oil on them.[253] He also conceded that he did not know if such rags would have been scrunched or folded inside the bin.[254]
310 When asked, in light of the fact that both experiments did not result in any of the bins catching fire, why he did not conclude that the fire was more likely to have been deliberately lit by persons unknown rather than the self-heating of rags, Mr Manser said in an exchange with senior counsel for Mr Holgersson:[255]
Because I - my experiments didn't fail. One of them got to 178 degrees Celsius. It was way above ambient temperature before the temperature went out of a - for reasons that - that I've already discussed. I saw no evidence at the house other than the piece of wire picked up by the locksmith that the house had then unlawfully entered.
Yes. Is that the answer? Is that correct?---I have no reason to think about, in my conclusion, why (indistinct) would attend the house and deliberately set fire to it.
You're a very experienced fireman, police officer, and fire investigator. That's one thing that has become clear from your history. And I'm putting to you a proposition that you would have seen both as a police officer - I would submit to you that you've seen it, both as a police officer and as a fireman and as an investigator. Somebody gets in, wants to steal things, finds there's nothing yet in the house to steal, in anger or whatever, sets fire to the house. That has happened, hasn't it, in your experience?---On very rare occasions. And the reason I say that is because somebody attending the house for the purpose of stealing something valuable and then setting fire to the house, draws attention to what they're doing. In my experience, it's more likely that the person - a person or persons attending a particular place with the intention of stealing stuff and then not finding anything, would slink away into the night because they don't want to be detected.
311 Importantly, however, Mr Manser conceded that if there is no admissible evidence that there were (oily) rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night in question, then the theory that the rags in the bin caused the fire falls away.[256]
312 Mr Tong, like Mr Manser and Mr Pollard, is a former police officer.
313 Mr Tong was engaged by AIG immediately after the fire to investigate the fire origin and the cause of fire at the Wellington Street property.[257]
314 Prior to commencing his fire investigation practice, risk management and training consultancy in the private and government sectors in 1992, Mr Tong had been a member of the Western Australian police force for 20 years. During his police career, he had held a number of very senior positions in the criminal investigation branch, the police counter terrorist hostage negotiators squad, the detective training school, and had been the officer in charge of the police arson squad from 1985 to 1991.[258] In 1988, he was awarded a Churchill Fellowship to study fire investigation practices in the United States of America, Canada and England.
315 Since 1992, he has investigated fires for the insurance industry, the legal profession, federal, state and local government departments, various directors of public prosecutions, the Australian Defence Force and affiliated entities, and other corporate sector clients. He has also acted as a consultant for state and territory police and fire services, and has conducted selected cold case reviews for police services.
316 Mr Tong also has extensive experience in training and lecturing in fire investigation. Of particular relevance he has: (a) written, compiled and conducted the inaugural Western Australian Police Fire Investigation Course and conducted fire investigation courses for the Department of Fire and Emergency Services of Western Australia; (b) conducted seminars on fire investigation for the Bush Fires Board of Western Australia; and (c) conducted seminars for the insurance industry. He has also conducted and written courses on fire investigation for institutions in other states of Australia and has given guest lectures at Murdoch University and Edith Cowan University.
317 Mr Tong has been accepted as properly qualified to give expert evidence in fire investigation in this court.[259] He has also given expert evidence in fire investigation in the District Court, in other courts in Western Australia and the Coroner's Court in New South Wales.
318 Of all of the forensic fire investigators who gave evidence in these proceedings, I found Mr Tong the most impressive. This is substantially because Mr Tong appeared to have the most comprehensive knowledge of the variable factors affecting whether organic oils had the propensity to self-heat to the point of self-ignition, and he did not overstep his area of expertise or opine on matters outside his area of expertise. Nor did Mr Tong, unlike Mr Manser, draw inferences from theoretical possibilities. Mr Tong drew inferences only on observations that he had made, or on factual information had been provided to him that was independently verifiable, such as information stated in Mr Visotin's analysis certificates and reports and Mr Tisdale's expert report.
319 After Mr Bell handed over the Wellington Street property to Mosman Bay, Mr Tong was the first forensic fire investigator to visit the house and commence an investigation into the possible cause of the fire. He first visited the house on 18 January 2016. On that occasion he was alone. He conducted a preliminary visual examination and took photographs of the exterior front and internal ground floor rooms.
320 On the second occasion Mr Tong visited the house, he was in the company of Mr Manser. This visit took place on 20 January 2016. On that occasion, both he and Mr Manser took photographs, and Mr Tong made a GoPro video of the house by walking through to record the condition of the house after the fire.[260]
321 Mr Tong visited the house again on 1 February 2016 with Mr Manser. On that occasion they were able to make detailed examination of the first floor as safe access had been provided by that time by Mosman Bay. He was with Mr Manser when Mr Manser found a burnt orange cloth in the debris in the entry hallway.[261] Mr Tong later received analyst certificates and reports made by Mr Visotin in respect of his analysis of the items Mr Manser had sent to GKA Investigation Group.[262]
322 Mr Tong attended the damaged house on two more occasions. He inspected the house again on 3 March 2016 in company with Mr Manser and Mr Pollard, and on 4 March 2016 he inspected the house again in company with Mr Pollard and Mr Manser, together with Mr Tisdale.[263]
323 Mr Tong submitted five fire origin and cause reports to AIG. These are dated 9 February 2016, 15 February 2016, 22 May 2016, 14 January 2018 and 1 February 2018.
324 The opinions of Mr Tong in the first three reports were based upon the evidence that he had directly observed, and evidence provided to him as a result of the first experiment with the Loba Oil infused rags, the reports and analysis certificates provided by Mr Visotin (of the samples sent to GKA Investigations Group by Mr Manser), a report by an electrical expert, Mr Guy Tomlinson (who concluded that no electrical circuits in the area of fire origin were energised), CCTV footage and Mr Tisdale's report.[264]
325 Mr Tong produced the two further reports. In each of these reports he was asked to assume particular facts and then answer questions in light of those assumed facts.[265] When Mr Tong was cross-examined by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, he made it clear that he regarded the opinions stated by him in his fourth and fifth reports not to be opinions based upon his own investigation and the evidence that was available to him at the time he compiled the first three reports.[266] He also made it very clear that at the time he gave evidence it was his opinion that the origin of the fire was the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room, but the probable source of ignition and what caused the fire to start in the green rubbish bin could not be determined.[267] As to the probable source of ignition and his finding that the cause of the fire could not be determined, the basis of his opinion emerged clearly when he was cross-examined. It was because he was unable to obtain any evidence whatsoever of what was in the bin immediately prior to the fire,[268] and he regarded what he had been told by Mr Bell (that the painters may have disposed of rags impregnated with oil in the rubbish bin) to be unconfirmed hearsay.[269]
326 Mr Tong also made it clear when he gave his evidence that it was, and it remained his view (at the time of giving evidence) that it was, a potential but unproven hypothesis that the cause of the fire was the self-heating of cloths impregnated with Loba Oil discarded in the green rubbish bin at the point of fire origin.[270]
327 The fifth report written by Mr Tong was the only report of Mr Tong that was tendered by AIG when he gave his evidence‑in‑chief. However, the other four reports are in evidence, which together with the fifth report form part of Exhibit A.
328 In his fifth report, Mr Tong stated that in his experience one of the most common environments where fires are ignited by self-heating of vegetable oils is in waste disposal or rubbish bins.[271]
329 In his fifth report, after reiterating the details of his observations and the findings made by him when conducting each of fire scene examinations of the damaged house, which included his findings about the point of origin of the fire (being the green rubbish bin that had been located in the middle of the entry to the dining room towards the north‑eastern wall), Mr Tong then went on to set out what is known about the propensity for the ignition of combustible materials to occur resulting from self-heating oil:[272]
10.8 The process is progressive with the initial temperature rises being gradual until a critical point is reached where thermal runaway commences and temperatures rapidly increase until the auto‑ignition temperature of an exposed material is reached, usually the material in which the oil is impregnated. The process generally takes time, and a specific time frame for spontaneous combustion to occur cannot be accurately predicted. The propensity for ignition to occur is governed by numerous factors including:
330 When cross-examined by counsel for the Bresland parties about the necessary conditions for self-heating of Loba Oil soaked rags to achieve thermal runaway, Mr Tong said:[273]
That's a bit of a broad question. There are a number of factors as are detailed in the report that must be present for thermal runaway to result but there is always a risk of self-heating leading to thermal runaway and I probably should take the opportunity of - our learned friend clarifying that autoignition temperature of the LobaOil has nothing to do with its capacity to self-heat and make surrounding combustible materials reach their autoignition temperatures. So the key element of the LobaOil is that it can self-heat when exposed to atmosphere sufficiently raise surrounding materials including the rag itself that it's soaked into to come to ignition temperature. So it doesn't always happen and it happens rarely, thank goodness, but it certainly can happen and does happen.
And there's no theoretical calculations or equations that you've provided that would assist with determining in what circumstances the Loba oil‑soaked rags would reach thermal runaway?---No.
331 The opinions stated by Mr Tong in his fifth report are based upon the assumption of the following facts:[274]
4.3.1. the following are the quoted assumptions of fact provided on pages 3 and 4 of the letter from Wotton Kearney:
'16.1 The Fire commenced at or about 1.21am on Saturday, 16 January 2016.
16.2 For a number of months prior to the Fire, the House had been undergoing extensive renovations, which were nearing completion.
16.3 On Friday, 15 January 2016, the renovation activities carried on at the House included works by the painters to stain various timber surfaces located in the front ground floor rooms of the House.
16.4 The timber staining product applied by the painters on 15 January 2016 was a two‑component product (that is, an oil and an associated hardener) consisting of the following:
(a) Loba HS 2K ImpactOil Color Anti‑slip (R10); and
(b) Loba HS 2K Impact Oil Hardener.
16.5 The painters applied the Oil to the timber surfaces with a brush then scraped the excess Oil off the timber surfaces. The excess Oil was wiped up with rags.
16.6 The Oil‑soaked rags were left by the painters inside a 20‑litre plastic rubbish bin located in the ground floor room on the front, Western side of the House.
16.7 In the alternative to paragraph 16.6 above the painters draped the Oil‑soaked rags over the edge of a plastic rubbish bin located in the ground floor room on the front, Western side of the House.
16.8 In both scenarios postulated in paragraphs 16.6 and 16.7 above, the plastic rubbish bin contained, among other things, sawdust and off cuts of timber.
16.9 The painters ceased their staining activities and left the House at approximately 3.00pm on 15 January 2016.
16.10 The site supervisor left the house at approximately 4.00pm on 15 January 2016. One of the last things the site supervisor did before departing the house at 4.00pm was to throw a broken drill bit into the rubbish bin located in the ground floor room at the front, Western side of the House (referred to at paragraphs 16.6 to 16.8 above).'
332 In respect of these assumptions of facts, Mr Tong opined in his fifth report that:
(a) if the oil soaked rags were inside the bin, that the contents as described, provided the required environment for the oil impregnated rags to self heat and proceed to thermal runaway and spontaneous ignition. Therefore, he further opined, there was a strong likelihood that the fire was caused by self‑heating of the Loba Oil soaked rags inside the bin;[275]
(b) if the oil soaked rags were only draped over the edge of the bin, and not bunched but hanging flat, there was no likelihood that self-heating could occur leading to thermal runaway and spontaneous ignition; or
(c) if oil soaked rags draped on the edge of the bin had subsequently fallen off the edge and inside the bin, if they had dried sufficiently and the exothermic reaction had ceased before they fell into the bin, then self-heating could not occur.
333 Alternatively, he opined that if the rags had been added to the top of existing rubbish and remained uncovered, then the likelihood of thermal runaway occurring would be demonstrated by the way they were lying in the bin. If they were lying in a way that a substantial proportion of their surfaces was exposed to air, then it was likely that the exothermic heat would be safely dissipated without self-heating occurring to dangerous levels. If they were bunched or became covered by extra rubbish being added to the bin on top of them, then self-heating could occur.[276]
334 When Mr Tong gave evidence he made it very clear that these opinions in his fifth report were based solely upon those assumed facts and not on his own observations and investigation into the fire origin and cause of the fire.
335 On the first day he visited the damaged house on 18 January 2016, Mr Tong very quickly identified the point of origin of the fire as being the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room. He recorded this finding in his first report dated 9 February 2016.[277] In his later reports he did not depart from this finding. When he was cross-examined, Mr Tong explained at length why it was clear to him that the fire had started in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room, because he considered there was sufficient evidence in the remains of the partition wall that the bin was placed next to to point to a finding that the fire had spread into that wall from the bin.[278] He explained this clearly in the following exchange with counsel for the McMurrays about matters he stated in his second report:[279]
Figure 29 [of his second report[280]] shows the remains of the base of the stud walls with the remains of the sliding door visible to the right, as indicated, which are mirror fragments. I concluded that those mirror fragments which were from the sliding which recessed back in between the two - the opening and the stud walls, or the centre of the stud wall when it was opened, proved that the door was partially in the open position, close to the rubbish bin, at the time of the fire. But there's nothing in those images that point specifically to the rubbish bin, is there?---Well, 25 [being figure 25 of his second report[281]] shows the proximity of the bin to that end of the wall, on that north-west side.
It does show that. But it doesn't show fire moving from the bin to the area near the wall, does it?---The damage to the end of the studs and - as shown in number - figure 30 [of his second report[282]], in comparison with figure 31 [of the second report[283]] which is the wall on the opposite side of the opening into the dining room shows far more fire penetration from the end closest to the bin than on the other stud wall, which I concluded indicated that the fire had spread into the wall from the direction of the bin.
... figure 29, on page 904. It's not exceptionally clear in the black and white photograph that I'm looking at. But it shows the bevelling and charring to the ends of the bottom plate of the stud wall, indicating, in my interpretation, a fire spreading from the opening of the doorway into the wall at that point.
Well, all it shows is that there was fire damage, doesn't it? It doesn't show any relationship between different points in that room?---Well, it does if you equate it back to the overall photograph shown in figure 24 on page 901 and figure 25 on 902. It shows that the position of the bin was in closer proximity to that northwest side of the opening where the glass door would have been - sliding door was protruding, and therefore was exposed quicker and to a rapid involvement of heat from a fire in the rubbish bin.
Sorry, what indicates that?---The proximity of the position of the 60‑litre rubbish bin to the protruding door coming out of the stud wall on the northwest side of the opening to the dining room, and the damage to that wall in comparison to the other wall on the opposite side of the opening indicated to me that fire from a burning bin had spread into the wall because of the proximity of the partly protruding door, providing an available fuel to ignite from heat energy being developed by the fire in the bin.
All right. Well, in all of that, you have just presumed that a fire started in a bin, haven't you? You haven't looked at fire indicators in the damage between the bin and the areas that you have indicated?---Well, I took into account the nature of the way fire develops and spreads, and it was my opinion that the opposite wall had then sustained less damage on the exposed end of the stud wall and therefore it's not a primary structural component that ignited, whereas on the other side of the bin - that was closest to the bin, or the bin was closest to it, had sustained more damage at ground level, and the interesting thing to me in that was that items at floor level generally during the normal development and spread of a fire in a room or compartment are the last areas to be attacked by the developing fire or the fire and therefore, normally, stay more intact than other components in the higher levels of the room. The fact that we had two identical walls situated in this one position where one side of the opening, that wall, was considerably less fire damaged than the one on the other side indicated to me that the wall on the other side, ie, where the glass door had been protruding out, had been involved in fire earlier and had therefore sustained more low level fire damage.
The location of the bin, or what you presume was the location of the bin, it was roughly equidistant from each side of what you presumed had once been the structure that kept the doors?---No, it was actually closer to the northwest side of the opening than it was to the one on the southeast side.
What did ceiling damage tell you, if anything?---The ceiling damage showed that flashover had occurred in both rooms, and the ceiling had collapsed - the suspended ceiling had collapsed and fallen, exposing the underside of the concrete raft of the first floor above, and that was uniform throughout that front area.
336 In light of these observations of the fire damage to the dining room the sitting room in the entry, Mr Tong found that the fire had ignited in the green rubbish bin and spread to the closest wall. The wall that he identified as the closest wall was the north-west side of the stud wall, which the north-west glass door retracted into. This was the stud wall containing the sliding glass door that was furthest away from the front door to the house and closest to the stairs going down into the large living room towards the back of the house. Importantly, he did not make this finding by regard to what might have been in the bin when the fire started. Mr Tong explained this point and referred to the additional evidence that he had regard to at the conclusion of his investigation in support of this finding:[284]
[I]n my opinion, the evidence conclusively showed that the fire point of origin was at the location of the rubbish bin.
And that's because there were bits and pieces of fire damage that you had observed?---It was my interpretation of the fire indicators - of spread and behaviour. Based also upon the evidence of the first witnesses that I was given - that when the fire was first seen, it was in that room. The evidence of the CCTV footage that clearly showed the first signs of fire coming out or being behind the window of that particular room. And the identification from general information that had been received that there was nothing in that room apart from the rubbish bin in the doorway. Therefore I concluded - - -
All right?--- - - - that the rubbish bin was the only potential ignition point, or point of origin, for the fire.
Well, all of that really is evidence to identify area of fire origin, isn't it?---Closer than that. When looking at areas of fire origin, which is the general location where a fire commences, I then look for potential ignition sources, which are the available hear sources, and available fuel to ignite. And therefore then determine the events that occurred to bring those two factors together in such circumstances that a fire resulted. Whilst I was not provided with the specific contents of the rubbish bin, I was provided with information that the rubbish bin was the only item in an otherwise empty room. And so therefore I concluded that that was the probable fire point of origin.
There won't necessarily be an identifiable clear pathway between the primary fuels that ignite and those that subsequently catch fire as a result of that. Radiant heat energy is the most - strongest and common form of transfer of heat, and that doesn't leave any evidence that you can see. So you just have to look at proximity and determine whether it is likely that the heat from a burning 60-litre rubbish bin containing rubbish would be enough to ignite an adjacent wall end and timber components that were close to it, and my conclusion was that that was the case.
Right, based on assumptions about what was in the bin, is that right?---No, I was making no assumptions at that stage, and hence my determination that in my opinion, based upon the evidence available to me, I could not determine the cause of the fire, but I could conclude that the fire breached into or approached into that end of that stud wall from the position of the bin.
337 In Mr Tong's third report, dated 22 May 2016, he summarised what could be drawn from an experiment conducted on 15 March 2016 at the Department of Fire and Emergency Services hot fire training area. In this report, he stated that the experiment demonstrated that the product (Loba Oil) self-heated when impregnated rags were placed in a 60 L plastic rubbish bin with other rubbish. He observed that the experiment did not lead to thermal runaway and ignition, and noted the temperature was still climbing when the experiment was discontinued.[285] The bins were left in place and the next day, when Mr Tong and Mr Manser returned, no evidence of thermal runaway of any of the three bins was observed.[286] When cross-examined by counsel for the McMurrays, Mr Tong conceded that the experiment did no more than show that in certain circumstances, with certain materials, Loba Oil is capable of self-heating.[287]
338 In his fifth report, Mr Tong made it clear that the findings that could be drawn from first experiment conducted on 15 March 2016 were limited. He stated:[288]
It is important to note that reconstructive experiments of this type cannot exactly replicate environments and events of a specific fire that has occurred. They are designed to demonstrate the propensity for fire to ignite and develop within the parameters specific to an environment and circumstance.
339 In his third report, Mr Tong also stated that the Department of Fire Emergency Services fire investigation report recorded 'that rags were soaked with Loba ImpactOil were disposed of into the bin by the painters during the afternoon prior to the fire. The oil poses a high risk of self heating leading to ignition'.[289] When being cross-examined by counsel for the McMurrays, Mr Tong explained that statement in his report was not based on what he had read in the Department of Fire Emergency Services report, but was based upon: (a) Mr Visotin's analyst certificates and reports; (b) what was stated on the back of the tin of Loba Oil; and (c) his own research of the technical data sheet issued by Loba Products.[290] In particular he referred to the technical sheet that he obtained from Loba Oil's website, not the material data safety sheet, and he stated that this sheet clearly warned of the high risk of self-heating and fire if rags soaked with the product were not disposed of in either water or some other safe manner to prevent oxidisation and self-heating occurring.[291] Mr Tong further explained the basis of his opinion when he was asked a question in cross‑examination by counsel for the Bresland parties about the material data safety sheet. His response was as follows:[292]
Based upon the information that I had been provided by the - Mr Bell, the investigator, from the DFES Fire Investigation and Analysis Unit, I considered that there was a potential for self-heating of rags impregnated with the LobaOil, and I needed to be able to ascertain what the manufacturer had to say about that risk. I had seen that there was a clear warning on the tins to the effect that it was highly volatile and capable of self-heating. And so therefore, based on that, I looked at both the material safety data sheet, which made no reference to the same high risk. But a technical data sheet of the same product on the same side reproduced the clear warning that the rags, or any other absorbent materials, must be disposed of safely, preferably in water in a sealed container.
340 Consequently, the effect of Mr Tong's oral evidence, and the opinions expressed by him in his first three reports, is that although the origin of the fire can clearly be determined to have been in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room on the night of the fire, in the absence of any evidence about what was in the bin at the time the fire started, the sources of ignition and the cause of the fire cannot be determined. Further, it is also his opinion that based upon Mr Visotin's analysis and reports, the technical data sheet and what is stated on the back of the tins of Loba Oil by the manufacturer of the product, when rags are infused with Loba Oil those rags have the capacity to self-heat, but it cannot be found that ignition will occur but it does happen, and it happens rarely.
341 Mr Tong did consider the intruder theory in his third report, but was not asked any questions about this theory when he gave oral evidence. In his report, dated 22 May 2016, he stated that:
The locksmith report identified that the laundry door lock on the north west side of the dwelling could be manipulated externally to open the door. The locksmith located a formed piece of metal, commensurate with a manipulation tool, lying on the step outside the door. A scratch mark on the lock's tongue indicated that it had been manipulated at some time. No evidence has been identified that links this evidence with the cause of the fire and any manipulation of the lock is likely to be coincidental.
342 This point raised by Mr Tong in respect of the intruder theory is dealt with in 4.3.6 and 4.5.
343 At the time of giving evidence in these proceedings, Mr Pollard had over 30 years' experience in fire origin and cause investigation.
344 Mr Pollard is a former police officer who commenced his own fire investigation consultancy in 2005. He was attached to the South Australia police force's fire investigation unit from January 1987 until January 1991. He left the police force in South Australia in January 1991 and was employed by IAG Insurance Ltd as its national fire investigator until 2005.
345 His professional qualifications include obtaining a Certificate IV in fire scene investigation from the Emergency Services Academy NT and a certificate in fire technology for which he received an award for student of the year for academic achievement from Gilles Plains TAFE. He also has an advanced certificate in scientific content analysis (verbal and written interpretation). Mr Pollard also regularly attends seminars relating to fires and fire technology. Like Mr Manser and Mr Tong, Mr Pollard has delivered lectures at various training seminars. These include delivering lectures on fire scene examination and investigation to the International Association of Arson Investigators, the New South Wales Association of Fire Investigators, and the International Association of Auto Theft Investigators in Australia and New Zealand.
346 Mr Pollard was instructed by the McMurrays to attend the house and conduct an examination of the scene of the fire damage with a view to determining the cause of the fire.
347 Mr Pollard conducted an examination of the fire scene at the house over two days on 3 and 4 March 2016. Mr Pollard, like Mr Tong, did not overstep or opine on matters that were not based on his expert knowledge or beyond the facts found in his investigation.
348 However, Mr Pollard's own investigation was limited because the fire scene had been disturbed by others, including Mr Tong and Mr Manser, prior to the commencement of his investigation.[293]
349 There is little difference between Mr Tong's, Mr Manser's and Mr Pollard's findings in respect of the area of origin of the fire, except that, Mr Pollard found that the origin of the fire was the dining room (referred to in his report as the study), and that it started in the immediate area of the bin, but he could not say that it started in the bin.[294] His opinion in respect of this issue appears be based on the fact that by the time he commenced his investigation, the dining room had been partially cleared of debris, and the remainder of the debris in that room was cleared by himself and Mr Manser. However, it was Mr Pollard's opinion that the clearing of the remainder of the room did not provide any further evidence.[295]
350 In his report, Mr Pollard stated that it was not possible to determine the cause of the fire, due to the disturbance of the fire scene and the extent of the damage.[296] When he was cross‑examined by senior counsel for AIG, he conceded that when he first investigated the fire, prior to reviewing the CCTV footage and Mr Tisdale's report, he was of the opinion that the most probable cause of the fire was the presence of rags in the green rubbish bin (in the dining room), which had self‑heated.[297] However, after he had reviewed the CCTV footage and considered Mr Tisdale's report, it was his opinion that he could not eliminate the possibility that the fire had been caused by someone who entered the house through the external laundry door.[298]
351 Mr Pollard was not present when Mr Manser conducted the experiments at the training facility of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services, nor did he receive a copy of the results of those experiments.[299]
4.4.9 The fire in the skip bin on Tuesday 12 January 2016
352 In Mr Bell's field notes, he noted that there had been a fire in the skip bin on the verge of the McMurrays' house at 6.00 am on Tuesday 12 January 2016. When asked about this fire by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, and whether it was because Mr Bell had to consider whether the cause of the fire of the house was arson, Mr Bell indicated that arson is always a cause that is considered and that, in the case of the skip bin fire, the attending fire crews had determined that the fire was suspicious.[300] Mr Bell took the step of viewing available CCTV footage of the skip bin at the time the fire had occurred and formed the view, after having observed from that footage that no person could be seen approaching the bin up to half an hour before the fire was detected, that it would have been a heat source within the bin that caused the skip bin fire.[301]
353 However, having viewed the CCTV footage of the skip bin fire tendered into evidence, I do not accept the opinion of Mr Bell that you could infer that no person approached the skip bin prior to the fire starting. The CCTV footage of the skip bin fire that is in evidence comprises two videos, which have been recorded from the same camera that recorded the tennis court video on the night of the fire. The CCTV footage of the skip bin fire only shows a very small image of, at best, part of the western edge of the skip bin. The CCTV footage does not show the eastern or northern sides of the bin. It must also be noted that the CCTV footage shows that the skip bin was not within the confines of the security fence across the front of the property.
354 There is evidence, however, that rags used by the painters to apply Loba Oil were disposed of in the skip bin. Although the self-heating of Loba Oil soaked rags scrunched up adjacent to combustible material is a possible cause of the skip bin fire, such a possibility is, in my view, speculative. This is because there is evidence that the painters had not used any rags for between three days and a week prior to Monday 11 January 2016, as their supply of Loba Oil had run out and they were awaiting delivery of an additional supply of the product, which product did not arrive on-site until a day or so before Friday 15 January 2016.[302] Consequently, if there were any Loba Oil rags in the skip bin in the early hours of Tuesday 12 January 2016, those rags would have been in the bin since about Thursday the week before.
355 The evidence of Mr Simpson is that any Loba Oil rags in the skip bin should have been dry rags, as they were hung over the side of the skip bin until dry before being disposed of,[303] and from the evidence of the fire investigators it can be inferred those dry rags were unlikely to have self-heated. However, when Mr Thomas was asked about what he would do if he had seen an oily rag in the dining room, he said he would not put it in the green rubbish bin but would have thrown any dirty rag in the skip bin.
356 Whilst there is evidence that rags that had been used by the painters to apply an even coat of Loba Oil to the wood finishes were disposed of in the skip bin, in light of the evidence of Mr Simpson that these rags were not disposed of until they were dried, but in light of the evidence of Mr Thomas that some oily rags could have been thrown in the skip bin prior to them being dried, it is possible that the skip bin fire was caused by rags soaked with Loba Oil, which self-heated. However, Mr Thomas' evidence is not sufficiently certain for this possibility to be more than mere conjecture. In addition, this possibility is even less certain because the painters could not have been using any rags to apply Loba Oil for several days before the skip bin fire. Further, there is no evidence about what else was in the bin in the early hours of 12 January 2016, and the CCTV footage of the skip bin fire does not exclude the possibility of a person approaching the skip bin from the eastern side of the property and starting a fire in the skip bin, either intentionally or accidentally.
357 For those reasons, I find that the cause of the fire in the skip bin cannot be determined. I also find that it cannot be established on the evidence before the court that there was any link between the fire that destroyed the McMurrays' house in the early hours of 16 January 2016 and the fire in the skip bin.
4.5.1 What inferences, if any, should be drawn by the fact that Mr Milton and Mr Roach have not been called to give evidence by Mr Holgersson
358 AIG argues that the two people best placed to shed light on whether or not rags were in fact disposed of in the green bin were Mr Roach and Mr Milton. Neither of them were called to give evidence. AIG contends that their absence has not been explained in the way discussed in Jones v Dunkel.[304]
359 The rule in Jones v Dunkel was explained by the plurality in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd:[305]
The rule in Jones v Dunkel is that the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case. That is particularly so where it is the party which is the uncalled witness. The failure to call a witness may also permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party that failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn.
The rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference, not that evidence not called by a party would have been adverse to the party, but that it would not have assisted the party.
360 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar, it was pointed out that any inference to be drawn from the absence of evidence does not permit discounting the cogency of evidence that has been called:[306]
Disputed questions of fact must be decided by a court according to the evidence that the parties adduce, not according to some speculation about what other evidence might possibly have been led. Principles governing the onus and standard of proof must faithfully be applied. And there are cases where demonstration that other evidence could have been, but was not, called may properly be taken to account in determining whether a party has proved its case to the requisite standard. But both the circumstances in which that may be done and the way in which the absence of evidence may be taken to account are confined by known and accepted principles which do not permit the course taken by the Court of Appeal of discounting the cogency of the evidence tendered by ASIC.
Lord Mansfield's dictum in Blatch v Archer that '[i]t is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted' is not to be understood as countenancing any departure from any of these rules. Indeed, in Blatch v Archer itself, Lord Mansfield concluded that the maxim was not engaged for 'it would have been very improper to have called' the person whose account of events was not available to the court.
361 The principles of the rule in Jones v Dunkel that apply where the inference sought to be drawn relates to the absence of a witness who is not a party to the proceedings were comprehensively summarised by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] as follows:[307]
[T]he rule in Jones v Dunkel is grounded in commonsense. It falls to be applied in the accordance with the circumstances of the case. The trier of fact is the person in the best position to assess the importance that the testimony of a witness would play, or would likely have played, in relation to the issue concerned. The circumstances of this case compel a sparing use of the principle.
Nonetheless, I should outline what I apprehend to be the basic jurisprudence that has developed in relation to the rule and that has governed the way in which I have approached its application.
The unexplained failure by a party to give evidence or to call a witness or tender certain documents may, in appropriate circumstances, lead to an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case: Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, 308, 312 and 320 ‑ 321.
The failure to call a witness or tender documents can allow evidence that might have been contradicted by such witness or document to be more readily accepted. Further, where an inference is open from facts proved, the absence of the witness or document may be taken into account as a circumstance in favour of the drawing of the inference: Jones v Dunkel 308, 312 and 320 ‑ 321; RPS v The Queen [2000] HCA 3; (2000) 199 CLR 620 [26]. But the absence of a witness or document cannot be used to make up any deficiency in the evidence. Thus it cannot be used to support an inference that is not otherwise sustained by the evidence. The rule cannot fill gaps in the evidence or convert conjecture and suspicion into inference: Jones v Dunkel 308, 312 and 320 ‑ 321; Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] HCA 18; (2000) 200 CLR 121 [53]; Hesse Blind Roller Company Pty Ltd v Hamitovski [2006] VSCA 121 [28].
The principle can operate against a party who bears the burden of proof or against a party who does not bear the onus: Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168; (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 [16].
Whether the failure to call a witness or tender a document gives rise to any inference depends upon a number of circumstances. In Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437, 449 ‑ 450 Mahoney JA (Priestley and Sheller JJA agreeing) said that the significance to be attributed to the fact that a witness did not give evidence depends in the end upon whether, in the circumstances, it is to be inferred that the reason why the witness was not called was because the party expected to call him feared to do so. There are circumstances in which it has been recognised that such an inference is not available or, if available, is of little significance. A party may not be in a position to call a witness. The party may not be sufficiently aware of what the witness would say to warrant the inference that he feared to call him. The party may simply not know what the witness will say. A party is not required, under pain of the drawing of an adverse inference, to call a witness 'blind'.
These statements were referred to with approval by Miller J in Hewett v Medical Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 170. See also Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (7th Aust ed) [1215]; Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) [2000] FCA 1084, (2000) 103 FCR [358].
No adverse inference can be drawn if the failure to call a witness is explained by, for example, illness or other unavailability or by loss of memory: Cross on Evidence [1215]; Hewett [205].
The hostility of a witness towards a party may be an adequate explanation for the failure to call that witness: Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573, 581; Cross on Evidence [1215].
Where the rule would otherwise operate, the onus is upon the party failing to call the witness to establish the unavailability of the witness: Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573, 581; Cubillo (No 2) [356].
The significance of the inference depends on the closeness of the relationship between the absent witness and the party who did not call the witness: Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2001] FCA 1040; (2001) 110 FCR 157 [64]; Cross on Evidence [1215]. Thus no inference will arise where the relationship with the party criticised for not calling the witness has ceased and a relationship between the witness and the opposing party has begun: Shum Yip Properties Development Pty Ltd v Chatswood Investment and Development Co Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 13; (2002) 40 ACSR 619 [64].
The rule only applies where a party 'is required to explain or contradict' something. What a party is required to explain or contradict depends on the issues in the case as thrown up in the pleadings and by the course of the evidence in the case. No inference can be drawn unless evidence is given of facts requiring an answer: Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings [51]; Cubillo (No 2) [355]; Ronchi v Portland Smelter Services Ltd [2005] VSCA 83 [81]; Hesse Blind Roller Company Pty Ltd v Hamitovski [2006] VSCA 121 [28]; Cross on Evidence [1215].
When no challenge is made to the evidence of witnesses who are called, no Jones v Dunkel inference can arise in respect of other witnesses who could have been called to give the same evidence: Cross on Evidence [1215]; Cubillo (No 2), 120; Hesse Blind Roller [29]; Ronchi v Portland Smelter Services Ltd [81].
As it is expressed in Cross on Evidence [1215], the rule does not require a party to give merely cumulative evidence. However, potential evidence will not be regarded as cumulative unless it could not have affected the complexion of the evidence already called: Ronchi [85]. The rule as to cumulative evidence does not provide a shield against a justifiable criticism that a party has deliberately kept less favourable witnesses from testifying: Packer v Cameron [1989] SASC 1948; (1989) 54 SASR 246, 253; Cubillo (No 2) [360]; Ronchi [85].
In the case of a witness who is not a party to the proceedings, the rule cannot be applied unless it would be natural for a particular party to call the witness: Cross on Evidence [1215]. This requirement was discussed by Glass JA in Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191, 201 ‑ 202. Glass JA said that it would be natural to expect that a witness would be called by one party rather than the other where:
(a) the witness would be expected to be available to one party rather than the other;
(b) the circumstances excuse one party from calling the witness but require the other party to call him or her;
(c) the witness might be regarded as in the camp of one party so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him or her;
(d) the knowledge of the witness may be regarded as the knowledge of one party rather than the other; or
(e) a witness's absence should be regarded as adverse to the interests of one party rather than another.
See also O'Donnell v Richards [1975] VicRp 89; [1975] VR 916, 920 ‑ 921; Cubillo (No 2) [356]; Cross on Evidence [1215].
A party is not necessarily to be expected to call the party's own employees although the higher the office of the employee within the party the more reason there is for thinking that the employee's knowledge is available to the employer party rather than to any other party: Cross on Evidence [1215]; Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VicRp 86; [1974] VR 722; Ronchi [33].
In order for the principle to apply, the evidence of the missing witness must be such as would have elucidated a matter: Payne v Parker, 202; Cubillo (No 2) [360]. It is not enough to conclude that a party may have knowledge. Unless the tribunal of fact concludes, on the balance of probabilities, that the missing witness would have knowledge, there is no basis for an adverse inference from the failure to call the witness.
362 Consequently, the absence of the witness cannot be used to make up any deficiency of evidence.[308] Although in the main proceedings AIG bears the onus of proof in respect of the application of the Contract Works Exclusion clause, and AIG has not taken any action to date to sue Mr Holgersson, as Owen J in the foregoing passage points out, the rule can operate against parties not bearing the burden of proof and parties which do not bear it as well.[309]
364 The onus of establishing unavailability is on the party against whom the rule in Jones v Dunkel operates.[312]
5.4.2.2 Can Mr Milton and Mr Roach be found to be in the camp of Mr Holgersson and, if so, has the failure to call either of them to give evidence been satisfactorily explained?
365 Mr Holgersson tendered into evidence two affidavits in support of his submission that he was not in a position to call Mr Milton.[313] These affidavits provide evidence that despite making five separate attempts by process servers to serve him during the months of September and October 2019, three attempts in February and March 2020, one attempt on 31 July 2020 and a final attempt on 3 August 2020, at his address in Bayswater in Western Australia.[314] Mr Holgersson also argues there is evidence that shows that Mr Milton could not readily be said to be in Mr Holgersson's camp or a witness who would give evidence favourable to Mr Holgersson's case and contrary to AIG's case.
366 On each attempt to serve Mr Milton, a business card was left on Mr Milton's front door on which was written a request to contact the process servers. On 9 March 2020, a process server, Ms Beverly Ward from Australia Wide Investigations Pty Ltd, received a telephone call from Mr Milton from a mobile telephone number. Ms Ward took a note of the mobile number and sent Mr Holgersson's lawyers an email on 10 March 2020 in which she set out what was said by Mr Milton in the telephone call as follows:[315]
[L]ate yesterday, I received a call from Mr Milton, who was angry that I keep leaving cards in his mailbox and front door.
Mr Milton, said if this is about the matter of the fire and him being a witness, he is not interested at all, he wants no part of any matter.
He said he wishes, he had never even given a Statement, back then.
Mr Milton told me not to come to his property ever again.
367 AIG claims that Ms Ward's evidence does no more than establish that several attempts were made to communicate with Mr Milton, which were unsuccessful, and that her evidence is not an adequate explanation for failing to procure a witness and to produce him to give evidence at the hearing, particularly when Mr Milton is able to shed light on central facts.
368 AIG claims that, in the circumstances, Mr Holgersson should have sought an order for substituted service on Mr Milton of a subpoena under O 72 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). Even if such an application was open to be made, it would be unlikely to be granted in circumstances where the witness is not a party to the proceedings, and where the consequence for failing to appear in answer to a subpoena constitutes a contempt of court. These circumstances are entirely different to the consequences that flow from an order granting substituted service of an application or a writ where the consequences are that the opposing party to the application or a writ can seek orders in default of an appearance.
369 Senior counsel for Mr Holgersson points out that Mr Milton has not been engaged by him since January 2016. Despite senior counsel for AIG's valiant attempts to persuade me that Mr Milton can be said to be in the camp of Mr Holgersson or could give evidence to assist Mr Holgersson's case, I do not agree. In circumstances where Mr Milton has resisted all attempts to be served, and it is clear he is hostile to Mr Holgersson, it cannot be inferred that he would give evidence favourable to Mr Holgersson if he was compelled to attend. A party is not, under pain of a detrimental inference, required to call a witness blind.[316] In any event, even if Mr Milton could be said to be in the camp of Mr Holgersson, I am satisfied that Mr Holgersson has more than taken adequate steps to subpoena Mr Milton without success, such that I am satisfied that adequate explanation has been given for the failure to call Mr Milton.
370 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that a Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn in respect of any failure by Mr Holgersson to call Mr Milton.
371 There is a dispute as to whether it is procedurally unfair that AIG should seek to have a Jones v Dunkel inference drawn in respect of the fact that Mr Holgersson has not called Mr Roach to give evidence. The resolution of this dispute turns in part upon what was said by counsel on behalf of Mr Holgersson and AIG shortly before the trial commenced at a directions hearing on 4 August 2020. The directions hearing took place the day after Mr Winburn-Clarke had filed an affidavit on 3 August 2020 setting out his enquiries and the contents of two telephone conversations that he had with Mr Roach about what Mr Roach could recall about instructions he had received as to how to dispose of oil soaked rags and where he had put oily rags when he had worked at the McMurrays' house. There is also a dispute about the admissibility of what Mr Winburn-Clarke states Mr Roach told him in an earlier telephone conversation in September 2019, and in a telephone conversation on 28 July 2020.
372 Despite the fact that AIG objects to the paragraphs of Mr Winburn‑Clarke's affidavit that set out the contents of these conversations, plainly this evidence is not admissible to establish the truth of what was told to Mr Winburn‑Clarke by Mr Roach, but is admissible to establish the fact that the statements were made by Mr Roach to Mr Winburn‑Clarke. It is also relevant evidence as the basis of why Mr Holgersson made the decision not to call Mr Roach, and is relevant to the issue of whether the absence of Mr Roach is explained. This principle is well‑established by the leading statement on this point in Subramanian v Public Prosecutor.[317]
373 Annexure BCW1 to the affidavit sworn by Mr Winburn-Clarke on 3 August 2020,[318] is an affidavit sworn by Mr Winburn‑Clarke on 25 March 2020 in which he deposes that in or about September 2019, he caused enquiries to be conducted by instructing a private investigator in Auckland, New Zealand, to make enquiries to locate Mr Roach. The private investigator, Paragon Investigations, made enquiries and sent an email to Mr Winburn‑Clarke on 12 September 2019 attaching a photograph of a van on which the name of Mr Roach's painting business and mobile telephone number was written in signwriting.[319]
374 In or about September 2019, Mr Winburn‑Clarke telephoned Mr Roach in New Zealand, who informed him that he had a very limited recollection of the matter but, amongst other things, he said he would have followed any instructions given to him by his supervisor, who he thought was Mr Milton.[320]
375 Apart from Mr Roach's mobile telephone number and the incorporated address of his trading company, Mr Winburn-Clarke had no further details for Mr Roach.[321]
376 In early July 2020, Mr Winburn‑Clarke made further attempts to telephone Mr Roach, which were unsuccessful. On 28 July 2020, he made a further attempt to telephone Mr Roach at an unusual hour in New Zealand and Mr Roach answered the telephone. In that telephone conversation, Mr Roach advised Mr Winburn‑Clarke:
10.2 he was at the premises the subject of the proceedings for approximately 4 days in total and of those, spent approximately half a day staining timber columns using the Loba product and wiping off the excess with rags;
10.3 he had been told by Mr Holgersson to place the oil soaked rags on ladders at the rear of the premises nearby to the kitchen once they had been used, to dry;
10.4 whatever rags he used he left on the ladder in the kitchen area as instructed. He did not ever put oil soaked rags in the bin at the front room of the premises or in a skip bin outside the premises;
10.5 he never saw anyone place oil soaked rags in a bin in the front room nor did he see anyone hanging them on the side of a bin in the front room;
10.6 there was another painter at the premises whose name he did not specifically recall but may well have been a Mr Radford Milton;
10.7 he did not pay attention to what Mr Milton was doing or the manner in which he dealt with any oil soaked rags;
10.8 he was available to give evidence by way of video link from New Zealand from 10 August 2020.
377 At the directions hearing on 4 August 2020, the following exchange occurred between senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, the bench and counsel for AIG, Mr Russell:[322]
Mr Roach finally spoke to Mr Winburn-Clarke a few days ago and probably because Mr Winburn-Clarke phoned him at about 9.30 pm to 10 pm New Zealand time. At other times he has tried to phone him it has been earlier in the evening and Mr Roach hasn't answered the phone. He was more forthcoming than the call that Mr Winburn-Clarke made and which he answered in September last year, seems to have been more willing to talk to Mr Winburn-Clarke and even to the extent of saying he would give evidence. Now, we've set out in Mr Winburn-Clarke's affidavit what we think he will say. We haven't prepared a witness statement and we haven't listed him as a witness, simply because for the last 12 months we've had no luck in getting him. We still don't know where he actually lives. We only have a phone number. So we thought it appropriate that we bring these matters to the attention of the other parties and of course to your Honour.
We are happy to call him, but, equally, we don't care if he comes or not, because nothing he says is any different than what the evidence of Mr Simpson and Mr Holgersson will be in any event. We're happy to list him as a witness and we're happy to have orders made that he give evidence either by telephone or by video conference or by Skype. He tells Mr Winburn-Clarke that he has a camera on his laptop. But we can't guarantee he will even give the evidence, your Honour. Given the fact that on previous occasions Mr Winburn-Clarke has phoned the number given that he obtained through investigation agents and Mr Roach hasn't even answered the phone, there is every possible that we will make an arrangement for him to give evidence at a particular time in this trial and he won't be available. Having provided that caveat, we're happy to do whatever the court would like us to do, if your Honour has an interest in hearing from him. You might say you don't have any interest unless somebody wants to call him. We will call him, but we think probably we should call him and other parties can then ask him questions, but he's not somebody we would regard as being a friendly, cooperative witness and he may or may not be available on the day nominated. We will certainly make the arrangements, but we can't guarantee it. That's as far as we can take it, I'm afraid, your Honour.
RUSSELL, MR: Yes. Well, your Honour, the first we heard of it was the letter that came to your Honour's associate, so we were a bit taken by surprise by that. And then in preparation for this directions hearing we now have the affidavit of Mr Winburn-Clarke. And I hear what my friend, Mr Zilko, says in relation to whether or not he's going to be called. I'm not entirely sure whether or not that means that they are actually calling him. I think he said he's happy to call him, whether or not your Honour wanted him. But it sounds as though the position that we're in is that the witness is proposed to be called and there's effectively a substance of the evidence in Mr Winburn-Clarke's affidavit at paragraph 10.
RUSSELL, MR: Well, in the light of that, there's not really much I can say. It's not as if we can say that we're prejudiced by the late notice. If they call him, they call him. It's not as if we can call a rebutting witness or put on any additional evidence. But as I say, the letter that came to your Honour's associate was the first we had heard of it.
SMITH J: All right. Mr Russell, refresh my memory as to what Mr Simpson has said in his witness statement. It seems to be largely consistent with - - -
SMITH J: There doesn't seem to be anything new in what Mr Roach has told Mr Winburn-Clarke.
RUSSELL, MR: No. I don't think I can tell your Honour that we're prejudiced by it, so that's really the - we sort of take a neutral position in that sense.
ZILKO, MR: Sorry to interrupt again, but can I just perhaps press that a little. I mean, we don't want to go to the trouble of setting up a video conference with potentially a witness who won't even be there on the day unless some other party in these proceedings wants that witness to be called. That's really why we put this material on. It's not different in any way from what Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson will say anyhow, but we thought that it was our duty to the court and to the other parties to bring it to the court's attention once we had made contact with him, just so people could say whether they wanted him to be called and cross-examined. If nobody wants him to be called so that they can cross-examine him, we won't go to the trouble. And really the only party that might want to do that, I would have thought, are the two defendants, but if that's not wanted, we won't go to the trouble, your Honour.
RUSSELL, MR: Well, just to respond to that your Honour. It's really a matter for Mr Zilko. If he wants to lead that evidence in his case then he can. If he comes along he can be cross-examined, no doubt, but it's really a forensic decision for him. So I'm not going to say anything further about whether or not he ought to be called.
SMITH J: Mr Hancy, did you wish to be heard in respect of whether Mr Roach should be called or not?
SMITH J: Well, I think probably the best way to deal with it is, given this matter is listed for four weeks, there will be sufficient time for parties to review their positions once the trial has commenced, because certainly the court can arrange for Mr Roach to either give his evidence by telephone or by video. I don't think we can do it by Skype, but we can certainly do it by Teams, Microsoft Teams, providing Mr Roach has the correct technology on his computer, but you can download Microsoft Teams as a free app on - - -
ZILKO, MR: Yes. Well, as long as he cooperates and he's happy to that, we will try.
378 It is clear that no notice was given to Mr Holgersson that they wished to cross‑examine Mr Roach until 21 August 2020, being 11 days after the commencement of the trial.
379 On 21 August 2020, almost at the end of Mr Holgersson's case, when AIG's objections to Mr Simpson's witness statement were being dealt with, senior counsel raised an objection to part of Mr Simpson's witness statement on the basis that neither Mr Roach nor Mr Milton were being called to give evidence.[323]
380 Senior counsel for AIG then appeared to indicate that they would have some difficulty if Mr Roach was called to give evidence because he had not delivered a statement, but said that AIG was going to rely on the fact that he was not being called to give evidence.[324]
381 Senior counsel for AIG, in answer to a question from the bench, stated that if Mr Roach was called AIG would wish to cross‑examine him. It is clear from the transcript that this exchange constituted the first notice given to Mr Holgersson that Mr Roach was required for cross‑examination. Senior counsel for Mr Holgersson protested and said it was unfair for this notice to be given at such a late stage of trial, given the difficulties in calling Mr Roach to give evidence.
382 Mr Holgersson submits that a Jones v Dunkel inference should not be drawn against him for not calling Mr Roach to give evidence, for the following reasons:
(1) Mr Roach worked for Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson for a few months four and a half years ago. Mr Roach lives in New Zealand. It is not known how long he has lived there, but he obviously has a business there because investigators took a photograph of the side of his van, which showed his phone number.
(2) AIG could have attempted to ring Mr Roach to find out what he could tell them.
(3) Mr Roach is someone Mr Holgersson has had trouble contacting.
(4) Mr Winburn‑Clarke managed to speak to Mr Roach late one night in New Zealand, and he gave a recollection of events that is consistent with Mr Simpson's evidence, apart from thinking that Mr Holgersson was supervising him.
(5) It cannot be found that Mr Roach is in Mr Holgersson's camp. He was not available to Mr Holgersson, to the extent that he still does not know his address, and is someone who he had to use an investigator to find.
383 Consequently, Mr Holgersson submits that Mr Roach is a cumulative witness, who need not be called, especially if they are not part of the calling parties' employment or organisation. Further, it is said the non‑calling of Mr Roach is fully explained.
384 In addition, Mr Holgersson argues that the rule in Jones v Dunkel does not allow parties to ambush their opponents, as Mr Holgersson argues, AIG sought to do by the late notice given on 21 August 2020 that Mr Roach should be called. I do not accept this point. Mr Holgersson's case did not close until the following Monday, 24 August 2020. If there had have been an unsuccessful attempt to arrange for Mr Roach to give video evidence from New Zealand I would have taken a different view of this point. However, after this issue was raised on 21 August 2020, no steps were taken by Mr Holgersson to ascertain whether arrangements could be made for Mr Roach to voluntarily give evidence.
385 Further, I do not agree that Mr Roach can be characterised as a cumulative witness, that is, a witness who would add nothing to the evidence of Mr Simpson. This is simply because it is Mr Simpson's evidence that when he left the McMurrays' house at about 2.30 pm on 15 January 2016, Mr Milton and Mr Roach were still working. I do, however, note that it appears from the evidence of Mr Thomas that Mr Milton and Mr Roach did not continue working for very long after Mr Simpson left for the day.
386 However, I agree with the submission made by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson that, given that Mr Roach only worked for Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson for a few months, and prior to the trial over four years had elapsed since Mr Roach had worked for either of them, and it is apparent that they had no ongoing relationship, Mr Roach cannot be regarded to be in the camp of Mr Holgersson.
387 For these reasons, it is not open to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference against Mr Holgersson.
388 In any event, in light of what Mr Roach told Mr Winburn-Clarke, it is difficult to draw an inference that, if Mr Roach was called, his evidence would be adverse to the case of Mr Holgersson.
389 If I am wrong and a Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn that either the evidence of Mr Milton or Mr Roach would not have assisted Mr Holgersson's case, then it is not open to draw the inference that is sought to be drawn by AIG.
390 AIG seeks to draw an inference from their absence, which, if drawn, would offend the rule in Jones v Dunkel. This is because AIG seeks that the court draw an inference, from their absence and from other circumstantial evidence, that the fire started in the green plastic rubbish bin in the dining room through self-heating and the auto ignition of Loba Oil soaked rags that had either been placed in the bin, or found their way into the bin through inadvertence, inattention, or in circumstances that no witnesses could be expected readily to recall. Insofar as AIG seeks that this inference be drawn by the application of the rule in Jones v Dunkel, it is not an inference open to be drawn as to do so would be to correct a deficiency in the evidence, which inference cannot be drawn.
4.5.2 Causation and the onus of proof that the cause of the fire was the self-heating of Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room; and is the intruder theory open to be considered on the pleadings?
391 The claim against AIG turns on the cause of the fire, and the effect of the exclusion clause in respect of Contract Works.
393 AIG claims that is not open to the McMurrays (or the other parties) to rely upon a case, which is based upon an intruder starting a fire, that has not found its way into any pleading. In respect of the McMurrays' pleaded case, AIG argues that a reply should have been filed by the McMurrays (and defences by the Bresland parties and Mr Holgersson) that raised the intruder theory and pleaded the material facts that they say establish that the fire was caused by arson, thereby eliminating the Contract Works Exclusion clause, and re-enlivening the AIG policy.[327]
394 With respect, this pleading point is misconceived.
395 AIG have pleaded that the Contract Works Exclusion clause of its policy of insurance applies. AIG pleads, in par 7(b) of its further amended defence (as an alternative to its plea in par 6), in answer to the McMurrays' plea in par 6 of their statement of claim against AIG (that AIG is required to pay the McMurrays in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy amounts as particularised), that the fire was caused by self-ignition of rags infused with Loba Oil placed in the bin (in the front dining room of the house) by painters engaged to assist in the course of activities undertaken as part of, or in connection with, the renovations referred to at par 6(a)(i) (being pursuant to the construction contract between the McMurrays and Mosman Bay). AIG also pleads in par 6(a)(ii), which it repeats in par 7(a) of its further amended defence, that the renovation works constituted 'Contract Work', or 'Works' or 'Temporary Work', as defined in the Contract Works Exclusion clause. The matters pleaded in par 7 are also relevantly pleaded in the alternative plea in par 8 of AIG's further amended defence. The McMurrays plead in reply, in their par 3, that they join issue with AIG upon its defence.
396 Importantly, Mr Tisdale's report and oral evidence are relevant to the plea by AIG in par 7(b) of its further amended defence, being its plea in the alternative as to the grounds upon which it denies liability that 'the fire was caused by self-ignition of rags infused with a product known as ... Loba ... Oil ... that were placed in the Bin (in the front Dining room of the House) by painters engaged to assist in the course of activities undertaken as part of or in connection with the renovations ...'. The Bresland parties repeat in par 46(b)(i) the allegations AIG make against the McMurrays in AIG's further amended defence in pars 7(a) and 7(b). The McMurrays plead in reply to the Bresland parties in par 21 that they join issue with the Bresland parties upon their re-amended defence.
397 The onus is on AIG to prove the Contract Works Exclusion clause is enlivened by its pleaded facts. Clearly, what AIG must prove by its alternative pleas in par 7 or par 8 of its further amended defence is that the cause of the fire was part of, or an incident of, the Contract Work (as defined).
398 In par 23(b) of Mosman Bay's amended statement of claim against Mr Holgersson, Mosman Bay pleads that AIG has pleaded that the cause of the fire was the spontaneous combustion of the rags being used by the painters to apply Loba Oil, which were in the plastic rubbish bin located in the front western room, and claims in par 25 that if the fire was caused by the spontaneous combustion of the rags then the painters failed to exercise due care and skill by failing to ensure that the rags used to apply the Loba Oil were properly disposed of in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. In par 20(a) of Mr Holgersson's amended defence to Mosman Bay's amended statement of claim, Mr Holgersson admits that AIG has made the allegations as pleaded in par 23(b) of Mosman Bay's amended statement of claim, and in par 23(a) Mr Holgersson pleads 'Holgersson denies that the cause of the Fire was due to the failure of the Joint Contractors, or their subcontractors, to exercise due care and skill'.
399 All the pleadings by AIG, the Bresland parties and Mr Holgersson directly and squarely raise a factual causal issue, and that is, what was the cause of the fire that destroyed the house. Mr Tisdale's report and oral evidence goes directly to, and is relevant to, this factual issue. As Mr Holgersson points out in his closing submissions, evidence that is relevant is admissible. Evidence will be relevant if it could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.[328] On this basis alone, it is plain that Mr Tisdale's evidence is relevant and therefore admissible.
400 In circumstances where it is not known exactly what was in the green rubbish bin on the night of the fire, but it was known there was some sawdust, a water bottle and drill bit, and that the painters were, on the afternoon before the night of the fire, using white cotton rags to evenly apply Loba Oil on wooden surfaces, and that an organic oil, such as Loba Oil, has the propensity to self-heat.
(a) there was a green rubbish bin in the dining room of the McMurrays' house before the fire;
(b) the green rubbish bin contained rags that had been used by painters on the day of the fire to apply or remove Loba Oil and hardener; and
(c) the rags in the green rubbish bin containing the Loba Oil and hardener self-heated leading to sufficient rises in temperature of the rags and adjacent ignitable materials to the point of thermal runaway and then to spontaneous combustion, which resulted in open flaming creating a fire, and that the fire spread and destroyed the house.
402 AIG seeks to prove these matters by some direct evidence such as the evidence of Mr Thomas that at the end of the working day on 15 January 2016 there was a green rubbish bin in the dining room when he locked up the house that afternoon. As to the other matters, AIG seeks to prove those matters by direct evidence and by circumstantial evidence, and from inferences that can be drawn from circumstantial evidence. As to drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence, the Court of Appeal recently remarked that:[329]
[I]t is also well‑established that causation may be proved by inference. If direct proof is not available, an inference of causation may be drawn if the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently strong and coherent to support a definite inference to that effect. Before such an inference can be drawn, there must be more than two conflicting inferences of equal probability.
The drawing of an inference has been described as 'an exercise of the ordinary powers of human reason in the light of human experience'. A court must, of course, avoid conjecture, but the distinction between permissible inference and conjecture occurs on a continuum in which there is no bright line division.
403 The difficulties in drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence are illustrated by the facts of the leading authority of Luxton v Vines.[330] In that matter, the plaintiff fell ill while riding his motorcycle along a road at night. He left the cycle at the side of the road and set out to walk to the nearest town, keeping to the extreme left side of the road. He looked back and saw the lights of a motor car coming towards him from the rear. He did not remember anything else until he found himself lying in the roadway. He had sustained injuries which, according to medical evidence, were of a character unlikely to have been suffered if he had merely fallen through illness or had been run over after having fallen, but likely to have been caused by his having been struck with considerable violence while standing upright. The majority of the court found that the circumstances were not sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of a supposed driver of a motor vehicle. This was because the majority found it was impossible to reconstruct any materials the manner in which the plaintiff and the supposed car or vehicle came into contact. It could only be done by conjecture, and there were a number of conjectures open, equally plausible. One was his feeling of illness coupled with his medical history, which made a loss of consciousness something more than a logical possibility and could be placed in the category of a reasonable probable hypothesis. However, there was no high degree of probability of each probable hypothesis for the cause of his injuries. Some of them implied negligence in the driver of the vehicle but it was not enough as some of them did not and there was no reason for rejecting the latter in favour of the former. Consequently, the action failed as there was no high degree of probability on the one side than the other.[331]
404 Where direct proof is not available, it is not enough to find causation on conflicting inferences that have equal degrees of probability. This point was made clear in Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd:[332]
Of course as far as logical consistency goes many hypotheses may be put which the evidence does not exclude positively. But this is a civil and not a criminal case. We are concerned with probabilities, not with possibilities. The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence while [in] the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged. In questions of this sort where direct proof is not available it is enough [if] the circumstances appearing in the evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference: they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture ... But if circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then though the conclusion may fall short of certainty it is not to be regarded as a mere conjecture or surmise.
405 In Lithgow City Council v Jackson, Crennan J similarly said:[333]
Whilst 'a more probable inference' may fall short of certainty, it must be more than an inference of equal degree of probability with other inferences, so as to avoid guess or conjecture. In establishing an inference of a greater degree of likelihood, it is only necessary to demonstrate that a competing inference is less likely, not that it is inherently improbable.
406 Turning to this matter, AIG must prove each of the matters in (a), (b) and (c) of [401] of these reasons. Although there can be no contest in respect of (a), before (c) can be considered, AIG must prove each of the matters stated in (b) and then also prove each of the facts in (c), which all have a causal connection in the sense of a chain of events in a particular order.
407 The experiments conducted by Mr Manser and Mr Tong show that without self-heating a rise in temperature of Loba Oil infused rags will not occur. From this evidence, the court only has before it the chemical parameters required for the process to lead to ignition of combustible materials as summarised by Mr Tong, which indicate there must be a sufficient rise in temperature for thermal runaway to occur, and once thermal runaway occurs there must be spontaneous combustion, which then must progress to open flaming. The proof of these matters are indispensable links (links in a chain and not strands in a cable) as they are discrete steps that must be proven in their order before the next step. That is, the proof of the facts to establish each step is a necessary condition for establishing a further and different fact.[334] Although in some circumstantial cases causation may be established by a process that combines primary facts like strands in a cable rather than links in a chain.[335] In this matter, causation of the fire by oily rags in the green rubbish bin cannot be established on the basis of strands in a cable.
408 AIG argues that it is able to establish its case by relying on a collection of circumstances which combine to form a cable of sufficient strength to bear the weight of the inference of fact sought to be established. In support of this submission it relies upon the leading observations made by Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness.[336] In particular, that evidence of possibility, including expert evidence of possibility expressed in opinion form and evidence of possibility from epidemiological research or other statistical indicators, should be regarded as circumstantial evidence which may, alone or in combination with other evidence, establish causation in a specific case.[337] In East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis), the Court of Appeal remarked about these observations that:[338]
Evidence of possibility, including epidemiological studies, can therefore be regarded as circumstantial evidence which may, alone or in combination with other evidence, establish causation in a specific case. As in any circumstantial case, an inference as to the probabilities may be drawn from a number of pieces of particular evidence, each piece of which does not itself rise above the level of possibilities.
409 AIG submits that the court should, indeed must, draw the inference that the fire started in the green plastic bin through the self-heating and autoignition of Loba Oil soaked rags that either had been placed in the bin in the western front room, or found their way into the bin through inadvertence, inattention or in circumstances that no witnesses could be expected readily to recall.
410 Factual causation is to be determined by the application of common sense to the facts of each case.[339]
411 Where inferences are sought to be drawn about causation based upon the sequence of events and the probability of a particular cause, the court is entitled to accept an expert opinion about that probability in the absence of any alternative explanation. In Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez,[340] an employee developed Dupuytren's contractures in one hand which was a condition involving a contraction of fibrous tissue in the palm of his hand. The employee's hand was operated on to remove the tissue and subsequently developed a re-occurrence of the condition. In an action for damages against the employer for negligence, the medical evidence revealed there was controversy about the aetiology of Dupuytren's, and in particular as to the causal connection between its occurrence and manual labour. A specialist gave evidence that although the aetiology of Dupuytren's contractures was not specific, one suggested cause of it was repetitive trauma, which included manual working. Consequently, the specialist's expert opinion was that the employee's injury could have (that is, it was possible it) played a part in the condition of the employee's hand. The majority of the court found that it was open to the jury to infer that, on the probabilities, the original injury to the employee's hand caused or materially contributed to the occurrence of Dupuytren's contractures in that hand. Mason J found:[341]
In my opinion this evidence left it open to the jury to infer that on the probabilities the injury caused or materially contributed to the occurrence of the condition. In drawing such an inference the jury was entitled to have regard, in addition to the matters referred to by Dr Sweeney in his evidence, to other significant circumstances: (a) that before the accident the respondent had suffered no disability in his right hand; (b) that the condition made its appearance shortly after the accident; and (c) that no alternative cause was established or indeed suggested in evidence. The combination of these circumstances, taken together with Dr Sweeney's evidence, provided in my opinion a sufficient basis from which the jury could draw an inference favourable to the respondent.
412 In X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal, Mahoney JA observed that it is proper that a careful and critical approach be adopted when a matter of importance as to causality in fact is to be decided, not for reasons that are otherwise apparent, but because an expert says that it should be so.[342] His Honour went on to find that it was open at trial to accept expert evidence that there was a causal connection between a child's brain problems and a syphilitic infection, in the absence of no alternative cause. In making this finding, his Honour observed:[343]
The principles by the application of which the experts reached their conclusion have caused me some hesitation. As I have suggested, there are different processes of reasoning which may be involved in the derivation of conclusions by experts. (I am speaking of causality in fact and not of causal relations as that term is used in the law: see generally Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337 at 350-353.) There are at least three processes involved. The scientific principles in question, for example, those of the laws of physics, may be sufficiently certain to warrant the conclusion that, if there is a consequence B, the cause of it must, in the given factual context, have been A. In other cases, the expert witness may be able to reason from the condition B to the conclusion that its cause was A because the course of the development of the condition from cause to consequence is so certain that B must have come from A. It may be known that the aetiology of B biologically must lead back to A.
The difficulty involved in reasoning of the relevant kind has been recognised in the cases. Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720; affirming [1975] 2 NSWLR 190, is an example of this. In that case, the plaintiff had, before the accident, suffered no disability in his right hand; the relevant condition, 'Dupuytren's contracture', appeared shortly after the accident; and no alternative cause was established for it or even suggested: see per Mason J (at 724D-E). The difference in this Court was whether evidence of that kind could justify a finding that the accident caused the condition (at 193-196; 197-198; 199-200). The High Court held (Stephen J dissenting) that it could: see, eg, per Mason J (at 724), Murphy J (at 725).
But the inference from B to A because, essentially, B has followed A, can be drawn only in limited circumstances. Its weight depends upon there being no other acceptable alternative cause available. And the strength of the inference is affected by, for example, the number of times that B has been seen to follow A in the relevant factual context.
413 The onus is on AIG to prove that the oily rags in the bin theory is a possibility and not speculative but can be inferred from all of the admissible evidence. It says there is no conflicting or competing inference. By this submission, and by the application of the principles referred to above, it is for AIG to prove not only that there were painters' rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night of the fire, but also that it is possible that those rags would been scrunched and not folded, and those rags self-heated sufficiently to the point of thermal runaway and finally to the point of spontaneous combustion. To establish this possibility, there must be no conflicting or competing inference that is equally possible. It is in respect of this later point that Mr Tisdale's evidence is relevant.
414 The other parties to the proceedings say there is an equal possibility that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence before the court and that is the intruder theory.
415 For these reasons, the intruder theory is open to be considered on the matters pleaded by AIG in pars 6, 7, and 8 of its further amended defence to the McMurrays' statement of claim against AIG, and by the Bresland parties in par 46(b)(i) of their further re-amended defence to the McMurrays' amended statement of claim against the Bresland parties. It is also relevant to the matters pleaded by Mr Holgersson in pars 20(a) and 23(a) of Mr Holgersson's amended defence to Mosman Bay's amended statement of claim against Mr Holgersson. This is because the evidence that goes to the intruder theory, in particular Mr Tisdale's evidence, is relevant to that issue and it is for AIG to establish there is no conflicting or competing inference that is equally possible to the oily rags in the bin theory.
416 If I am wrong about the pleading issue and that it is not open on the pleadings to raise the intruder theory, as Mr Holgersson points out in his closing submissions, pleadings are only a means to an end and that if the parties enlarge the issues or disregard the strict parameters of the pleadings at trial, it is impossible for any of the parties to hark back to the pleadings and treat them as governing the area of contest.[344]
417 Ordinarily, the question of whether the parties have chosen to go outside of the pleadings is to be answered by inference from the way in which the trial was conducted. In this respect, as Mr Holgersson points out AIG was on notice from 5 September 2019 that Mr Tisdale's evidence and conclusions would be relied upon by Mr Holgersson, and no objection was taken to his evidence until three working days before the trial began, despite the fact that order 16 and order 21 of the orders made by Chaney J on 24 August 2017 provide that:
16 Any party who intends to object to the admissibility of any statement or any part thereof shall, by the expiry of 10 working days from receipt of such statement, advise the party serving the statement of his objections and the grounds thereof. By the expiry of 10 working days from the receipt of the statement of objections, the party serving the statement shall inform the other party whether any of the objections are conceded.
21 Except with the leave of the court, no party may object to any evidence in a statement served pursuant to this order other than on grounds set out in a notice of objection served on the party delivering the witness statement.
418 As Mr Holgersson also points out, AIG has never made a direct claim against him. It has only made a claim against Mosman Bay. In circumstances where it was clearly unfair to Mr Holgersson and his solicitors not to give notice of an objection to Mr Tisdale's evidence prior to three working days before trial, if it were necessary, I would allow Mr Holgersson to amend his further amended defence to Mosman Bay's amended statement of claim in the terms of the minute filed on 31 August 2020, which minute seeks to amend par 22 by introducing a plea in response to Mosman Bay's par 25 that 'the spontaneous combustion of rags is a speculative hypothesis only. Another equally likely, if not compelling, hypothesis is that an intruder entered the property and set fire to the House'.
419 The only party that contends it cannot be found that the fire originated in the green rubbish bin is the McMurrays. Other than Mr Pollard, all the other forensic fire investigators agree that the fire originated in the green rubbish bin. Mr Pollard formed the opinion that he could not determine the origin of the fire because by the time he commenced his investigation the dining room had been partially cleared, and that he was of the view that because of the disturbance of the fire scene he could not determine the origin or cause of fire. On this basis, I find Mr Pollard's opinion to have less weight than the evidence of the other fire investigators. On his own admission, his opinion on this issue is less reliable than Mr Bell and Mr Tong. Mr Bell arrived at the house before daylight, when the firefighters were still putting out the fire, on the morning of 16 January 2016. He was the fire investigator who made a comprehensive record of the fire damage to the house by making notes and taking photographs. He was the person who found the base of the green rubbish bin and was the first person to partially excavate the dining room. Mr Tong was also on the scene fairly quickly. He commenced his investigation two days after the fire, on Monday 18 January 2016.
420 The McMurrays argue that to determine that the point of origin of the fire was the green plastic rubbish bin requires assumptions about the heat source and/or the contents of the green plastic rubbish bin. With respect, I did not understand the evidence of Mr Tong and Mr Manser (that the origin of the fire was the green rubbish bin) to be based on any assumptions as to the heat source and contents of the bin. Mr Bell's evidence could be construed on this basis, because Mr Bell formed the view that the area of origin of the fire was in the dining room based upon the extent of the damage in that room, and that the fire started in the bin because he had formed the theory that the oil stained rags in the bin would have self-heated and ignited.[345]
421 Mr Tong and Mr Manser took a different view. Their evidence on this point is consistent.
422 Mr Tong formed the view from his interpretation of the spread and behaviour of the fire, which he observed from the damage to the house, and from the CCTV footage, which showed that the fire first started in the dining room, that the evidence conclusively showed that the fire's point of origin was at the location of the green rubbish bin. In particular, he formed this view on the basis of information provided to him, that the only item in the dining room when the fire occurred was the rubbish bin and that the room was otherwise empty. He concluded that the rubbish bin was the probable fire point of origin. However, he did not form this opinion based on any assumptions about what might have been in the bin that night.[346]
423 Although Mr Manser's report was about the area of fire origin and the cause of fire rather than the point of fire origin,[347] his evidence, like the evidence of Mr Tong, was that he did not consider what the contents of the bin were when he formed the view that the bin was the point of origin of the fire, and that he formed this view solely on the damage left by the fire and the patterns of fire damage.[348]
424 Having heard the evidence of all of the four fire forensic investigation experts, I prefer the evidence of Mr Tong and although I find Mr Manser's evidence to be unsatisfactory in respect of other issues), I accept Mr Manser's evidence on this issue because it is consistent with the evidence of Mr Tong.
425 I prefer the evidence generally of Mr Tong to the evidence of Mr Bell. First, because Mr Tong has far more experience in forensic fire investigation than Mr Bell, and I find his findings to be reliable and credible not only generally but particularly on this point. Second, Mr Bell jumped very quickly to the fire caused by the oily rags in the bin theory, without first concluding all of his enquiries and gathering all relevant available evidence and information.
426 For these reasons, I find that the area of origin of the fire was the dining room and that the point of origin of the fire was the green rubbish bin.
4.5.3.2 Is it open to find that there were oily rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night of the fire?
427 There is no admissible direct evidence given by any witness that rags used by the painters to apply Loba Oil were placed in the green plastic rubbish bin in the dining room. In particular, no witness who gave evidence at the trial said that they saw anyone put oily rags or hang oily rags on the outside of the green rubbish bin in the dining room.
428 Mrs McMurray visited the house every day and she never saw rags in any green plastic rubbish bin or rags hanging over the side of any green plastic rubbish bin.[349]
429 Mr Simpson denied that this was ever done by him or Mr Roach or Mr Milton.[350] His evidence was that if the rags were reusable, they were laid out at the back of the house on the ladders, and if they were not re-usable, they were hung over the sides of the skip bin at the front of the house until they were dry and then thrown in the skip bin.[351]
430 AIG says this evidence by Mr Simpson should not be accepted because of what Mr Simpson told Mr Walling when Mr Walling spoke to Mr Simpson the morning after the fire, in the presence of Mr Bell. It is Mr Walling's evidence that when he spoke to Mr Simpson that morning, he asked Mr Simpson if he had thrown rags in the bin and Mr Simpson said 'yes'.[352] However, it is also Mr Walling's evidence that he subsequently spoke to Mr Simpson about this telephone call, Mr Simpson told him that when he said he threw used rags in the bin, he was referring to the skip bin.[353]
431 AIG argues that Mr Simpson's evidence about hanging oily rags to dry on the skip bin should not be accepted because after the fire there were no rags of any kind hanging over the edge of the skip bin. In support of this submission, AIG referred to photographs taken by Mr Bell very early in the morning after the fire had been extinguished by the firefighters. In two of photographs taken by Mr Bell at the front of the house very early that morning, prior to the sun rising, the skip bin can be seen.[354] However, it cannot be inferred that there were no rags left to dry over the side of the skip bin on the afternoon of 15 January 2016. This is because it can be inferred that when the firefighters took down part of the security fence, they put a large section of the fence on top of the bin. In fact, the section of the security fence on top of the bin covers the entire skip bin and could have dislodged any rags hanging over the edge. It must also be noted that the photographs only show two sides of the skip bin and, apart from some pieces of timber sticking out of the top of the skip bin, the contents of the bin cannot be seen in the photographs.
432 When Mr Simpson was cross-examined about this conversation by senior counsel for AIG, although Mr Simpson was asked whether he understood that Mr Walling was ringing him to find out whether or not the painters had put rags in the bin so as to cause the fire, this question was objected to by senior counsel acting for Mr Holgersson, and the question was not repeated by senior counsel for AIG. Mr Simpson was simply asked whether he understood from the questions that he was being asked about the plastic bin inside the house, to which Mr Simpson said 'yes'. This cross-examination of Mr Simpson about the telephone call about the bin in the house and the rags is too vague to draw any inference that any of the painters put Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room. This is because there were a number of bins in the house, and rags were used for different purposes, including orange rags. In particular, it is Mr Thomas' evidence that he and his labourer would sometimes place used cleaning cloth rags in the plastic bin, but these rags were not rags with Loba Oil on them because they were smelly.[355] In any event, as I have found in 4.4.4 of these reasons, it was not put to Mr Simpson that when he spoke to Mr Walling on the telephone on the morning immediately after the fire he told Mr Walling that the painters had put Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room.
433 In any event, Mr Simpson could only give evidence about what he saw Mr Roach and Mr Milton do with the rags that they were using that afternoon to apply Loba Oil. Mr Roach and Mr Milton were still working on the afternoon of 15 January 2016, when Mr Simpson left at 2.30 pm. Mr Thomas was still at the house and remained until all of the workmen, including Mr Roach and Mr Milton, left for the day. When he locked up and left for the day, he did not see any rags hanging over the bin in the dining room. Nor did he see anyone during the day put any oily painters' rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room. For the reasons I have found in 4.5.1, no inference can be drawn against Mr Holgersson for not calling Mr Milton or Mr Roach to give evidence.
434 For these reasons, I find that AIG has not proved that there were Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the entry area of the dining room at the time of the fire started.
435 Given that the painters were using rags to apply Loba Oil on a small section of the wood panelling on the afternoon before the night of the fire, and it is established that rags soaked with Loba Oil have the capacity to self-heat, is it open to infer by the fact that a fire occurred in the green rubbish bin on the night in question that some of these rags found their way into the green plastic rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room and caused the fire that destroyed the house? On the evidence before the court, it is possible that some of these rags were in the bin. However, is this possibility sufficient to establish that AIG is entitled to rely upon the Contract Works Exclusion clause?
437 First, the theory that the fire was caused by oil soaked painters' rags in the bin, as Mr Tong pointed out, depends upon a number of variables. Merely a propensity for Loba Oil to self-heat when infused into combustible materials, such as painters' cotton rags, on its own is only the first link in the chain to spontaneous combustion of the rags or other surrounding combustible material. Prior to spontaneous combustion thermal runaway must occur. In this matter, the experiments conducted by Mr Manser and Mr Tong establish that one of the variables affecting the likelihood of the fire being caused by spontaneous combustion of Loba Oil soaked painters' cotton rags would depend upon whether it is established on the facts that scrunched up (and not folded) Loba Oil soaked painters' cotton rags were inside the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night of the fire.
438 Organic vegetable oils can undergo a process of self-heating through exothermic reaction. However, this process does not always occur. Mr Tong made this clear. Also the experiments conducted by Mr Manser and Mr Tong made this clear. Mr Tong's evidence is that although fires are known to be caused by the self-heating of organic oils, it rarely occurs.
439 Further, and importantly, beyond self-heating, it has not been proved in this matter that, even if Loba Oil soaked rags were in the green rubbish bin on the night of the fire and they self-heated, they would have reached the point of achieving thermal runaway, then smouldering until finally producing open flame. In any event, it appears that the conditions necessary for such a process to occur are not only variable but it appears that science has not yet got to the point where it can be conclusively proved that an organic vegetable oil is the cause of the ignition.
440 This was made clear by Mr Visotin's sample analysis supplementary report, dated 4 March 2016. In his report, Mr Visotin relevantly stated that, generally, only unsaturated fatty acids (particularly polyunsaturated fatty acids) will undergo self-heating to the point of autoignition, and that different oils have different propensities towards self-heating, based on their fatty acid content. He compared linseed oil, which contains many polyunsaturated fatty acids and will self-heat readily, to coconut oil, which is unlikely to self-heat as it contains few polyunsaturated acids.[356] Mr Visotin was able to identify through his analysis of the specific compounds of the sample of Loba Oil that it had a high propensity for self-heating.[357] However, Mr Visotin in his report also stated that vegetable oil residue (which he refers to by the acronym 'VOR') analysis is an emerging forensic discipline and that:[358]
Unfortunately there is a scarcity in research on the topic, which is slowly being remedied. Current research has identified the possibility of determining how a sample of VOR was ignited. By analysing VOR for the presence of specific compounds, it can potentially be determined whether the VOR self-heated to autoignition, or whether ignition was piloted by another heat source. However, this research is in its infancy.
441 It is Mr Manser's evidence that organic oils that have been soaked in material, such as cotton or rags, are known for causing fires, for example, in laundries when drying towels (in dryers) from day spas that are infused with massage or other organic oils.[359] However, in this case, we are dealing with a fire in a plastic rubbish bin and not a fire inside a dryer in a laundry. Consequently, I do not find Mr Manser's evidence on this point to have any probative force.
442 Second, to prove that Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room near the entry caused the fire that destroyed the house, AIG must establish there is no conflicting possibility that is equally possible.
443 The only other possibility is the intruder theory. AIG make a submission that it is for the other parties to establish the intruder theory, and because this theory raises a serious allegation of a person deliberately lighting a fire in the McMurrays' house, it is an allegation of arson and to establish this theory the court must apply the Briginshaw standard of proof.[360] However, this submission is misconceived. It is not for the other parties to establish the intruder theory, it is for AIG to establish that the oily rags in the bin theory has a greater degree of probability than the intruder theory.
444 Having considered all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, and the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, I am not satisfied that the oily rags in the bin theory has a greater degree of probability than the intruder theory. When all of the relevant evidence is considered, both theories are simply possibilities, in respect of which to choose between them would be a matter of mere conjecture and thus, on this basis, the cause of the fire that destroyed the McMurrays' house on the morning of 16 January 2016 cannot be found.
445 The reasons I have made this finding that the intruder theory cannot be dismissed as merely speculative, are as follows.
(1) The evidence of Mr Tisdale is that the lock picking tool found on the ground outside the laundry door could be used not only to open the laundry door in about 30 seconds, but also easily be used to open the east gate.
(2) The evidence of Mr McMurray and the CCTV footage establishes that a person could enter the eastern side of the property through the eastern gate and walk around to the laundry door without being seen by the camera located across from the tennis court of the house next door. Mr McMurray estimated the journey from the east gate to the laundry door to be 30 to 40 seconds.[361]
(3) The temporary security fencing at the front did not cross the whole of the front of the McMurrays' property, so that a person could enter the eastern gate without having to negotiate the security fence.
(4) The tennis court footage taken from the arrival of the McMurrays on the night of 15 January 2016 at about 10.37 pm identifies a person who may have entered the house. The tennis court footage shows Mr McMurray enter the property through the eastern gate at 10.37 pm and disappear from view, even though he was using his iPhone as a torch. A few seconds later the same thing happens with Mrs McMurray. On each occasion, they pause before entering the property. At 11.45 pm a male person is seen to walk in an easterly direction along the verge past the entry on the McMurrays' house side of Wellington Street and very close to the entry to the eastern gate of their property before going out of sight at about the same point that Mr and Mrs McMurray did when they walked along the path to the eastern gate. From the CCTV footage taken from the front of the McMurrays' house and the tennis court video, it can be inferred that this person had an opportunity to enter the McMurrays' house through the eastern gate and through the laundry door if that person had a lock picking device.
(5) The fire was first seen by neighbours at 1.02 am. As Mr Holgersson points out, there were many reasons why a person might enter a house of this kind, and in the course of entry either accidentally or intentionally light a fire. Such circumstances are not unknown to this court who until very recently had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with criminal proceedings for the offence of arson. It might be thought that nobody would be in the house since it was being renovated and it might be thought that something of value might have been placed in the house that could be stolen. As Mr Manser conceded, in his experience as a police officer and a forensic fire investigator, on rare occasions a fire is found to have been caused by someone who breaks into a house to steal something valuable.[362]
(6) There is one piece of evidence that is consistent with someone having entered the house after Mr Thomas left and locked the house up at the end of the day, that is not consistent with the oily rags in the bin theory and is consistent with the intruder theory, and that is Mr Thomas' evidence that the green plastic rubbish bin was inside the dining room and one to one and a half metres away from the sliding doors.[363] Mr Thomas not only marked the location of this bin on a plan when he was interviewed on 3 February 2016, but his evidence is that he threw a drill bit and an empty water bottle into this bin when he left for the day, and that he was in the entryway about one and half metres away from the bin. The uncontradicted evidence of Mr Bell, Mr Tong, Mr Manser and Mr Pollard is that during the fire this bin was located almost in the middle of the entry to the dining room, close to and between the sliding doors. Mr Thomas' evidence on this point is cogent and consistent with the whole of his evidence. Importantly, it is particularly cogent because he marked the location of the bin on the plan 14 days after the fire.
446 Even if Mr Thomas' recollection is wrong, the intruder theory still remains a possibility for the cause of the fire, which possibility is no less than the possibility that the fire was caused by the self-heating of oily rags in the bin.
447 For these reasons, I find the cause of the fire that destroyed the McMurrays' house on 16 January 2016 cannot be determined.
5.0 AIG denies it is liable to indemnify the McMurrays for the damage caused by the fire
5.1 Relevant principles of construction of insurance contracts
448 In Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd, the plurality set out the following established principles:[364]
In determining the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract, it is necessary to ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That inquiry will require consideration of the language used by the parties in the contract, the circumstances addressed by the contract and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract.
Ordinarily, this process of construction is possible by reference to the contract alone. Indeed, if an expression in a contract is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances (events, circumstances and things external to the contract) cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning.
However, sometimes, recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contract is necessary. It may be necessary in identifying the commercial purpose or objects of the contract where that task is facilitated by an understanding 'of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating'. It may be necessary in determining the proper construction where there is a constructional choice.
449 To these general principles of construction, the principle that definitions do not have substantive effect and should not be construed in isolation from the operative provision or provisions in which the definitions appear must also apply.[365] The usual rules of construction of contracts require that the relevant definitions are to be inserted into the operative provisions of a contractual term.[366]
451 Where a formula of words has been accepted by the courts, the parties are taken to have included that accepted meaning into the words chosen.[369]
452 AIG submit that if an exclusion clause in an insurance policy is open to two interpretations, one of which would inappropriately circumscribe the cover provided by the ensuring clause, and one which would not, the latter is to be preferred. However, this submission is not an entirely correct statement of the law. In Transfield Services (Australia) v Hall, which is an authority relied upon by AIG for this proposition, Campbell JA stated:[370]
In construing any exclusion, the language of which admits of more than one interpretation, the court takes into account both the contra proferentem principle (which is well established in insurance law, whatever its status might be in other areas of contractual interpretation: North v Marina [2003] NSWSC 64; (2003) 11 BPR 21,359), and the principle that it would not give effective business operation of a contract if an exclusion clause inappropriately circumscribed the cover provided by the insuring clauses: Fitzpatrick v Job [2007] WASCA 63; (2007) 14 ANZ Ins Cas 61-731 at [270]. This court has recently applied Chemetics and Fitzpatrick v Job, in Vero Insurance Ltd v Power Technologies Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 226; (2007) 5 DDCR 206 at [147]- [149]. The High Court refused special leave to appeal from the decision in Vero on 7 March 2008.
453 In Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd, Pullin JA observed that the court will not pervert the meaning of the clear language of a contract of insurance, even when applying the contra proferentem rule.[371] In Darlington Futures Limited v Delco Australia Pty Ltd, the plurality pointed out that where an exclusion clause is ambiguous it is to be construed against the insurer contra proferentem:[372]
[T]he interpretation of an exclusion clause is to be determined by construing the clause according to its natural and ordinary meaning, read in the light of the contract as a whole, thereby giving due weight to the context in which the clause appears including the nature and object of the contract, and, where appropriate, construing the clause contra proferentem in case of ambiguity.
454 However, the contra proferentem principle is, in any event, a last resort in construction.[373]
455 In Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Limited v Robinson, the Federal Court restated the current principles that apply to the construction of contracts of insurance and, in particular, exemption clauses:[374]
'A policy of insurance, even one required by statute, is a commercial contract and should be given a businesslike interpretation. Interpreting a commercial document requires attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances which the document addresses, and the objects which it is intended to secure.'
In the same case, at 600‑603 [74], Kirby J reiterated some of the principles which govern the resolution of ambiguities in phrases in commercial contracts, including insurance policies. Of present relevance are the following propositions extracted from [74] in his Honour's judgment:
(a) As a species of commercial contract, an insurance policy must be interpreted to give to the words used their ordinary and fair meaning (Australian Casualty Co Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 (Federico) at 520-521 and at 525);
(b) The meaning to be given to an insurance policy must take into account the commercial and social purposes for which it was written (Legal & General Insurance Australia Ltd v Eather (1986) 6 NSWLR 390 at 394 and at 405). The Court is not entitled to make a new contract for the parties which is at odds with the contract upon which they have actually agreed (Johnson v American Home Assurance Co [1998] HCA 14; (1998) 192 CLR 266 (Johnson v AHA) at 272 [19]). Maxims and rules of construction, developed as tools to aid the task of interpretation, are subordinate to the primary duty which is to uphold the contract between the parties as properly construed;
(c) Notwithstanding the primary duty of courts to give meaning to the words in an insurance policy, it has been recognised that, in cases of ambiguity, a 'liberal approach' will generally be adopted in the construction of insurance contracts (Johnson v AHA at 274 [19] and Federico at 520); and
(d) In relation to principle 4 articulated by Kirby J, his Honour said:
'Courts now generally regard the contra proferentem rule (as it is called) as one of last resort because it is widely accepted that it is preferable that judges should struggle with the words actually used as applied to the unique circumstances of the case and reach their own conclusions by reference to the logic of the matter, rather than by using mechanical formulae. Nevertheless, dictionaries, facts and logic alone will sometimes not provide an answer to the contest before the court. In those cases:
"it is not unreasonable for an insured to contend that, if the insurer proffers a document which is ambiguous, it and not the insured should bear the consequences of the ambiguity because the insurer is usually in the superior position to add a word or a clause clarifying the promise of insurance which it is offering".'
The passage from the judgment of Gleeson CJ in McCann to which we have referred at [98] above was specifically approved by the High Court in CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse [2008] HCA 30; (2008) 235 CLR 103 (Porthouse) at 116 [43]. Also, in the same case (at 116 [43]), the High Court cited with apparent approval 600‑603 [74] in the judgment of Kirby J in McCann.
Very recently, the Full Court addressed the fundamental characteristics of a policy of insurance and explained the distinction between such a contract and contracts of guarantee and indemnity in Todd v Alterra at Lloyds Ltd (on behalf of the underwriting members of Syndicate 1400) [2016] FCAFC 15 (Todd). At [35]‑[44], Allsop CJ and Gleeson J said:
35 The nature or character of a contract of insurance is "elusive" to define: Parkington M et al, MacGillivray and Parkington on Insurance Law (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) [1] at 1. The working definition given over 100 years ago by Channell J in Prudential Insurance Company v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1904] UKLawRpKQB 138; [1904] 2 KB 658 at 663-664 remains the foundation of analysis: for a monetary consideration (the premium) the person (the underwriter) agrees to pay to the other (the insured) a sum of money or some benefit upon the occurrence of one or more specified events. Other relationships could well fit such a simple mould. One needs, however, before identifying or characterising the contract as one of insurance, to elaborate upon each element ‑ premium, promise to pay, sum of money or other benefit, upon a specified event ‑ not by way of further definition, but by reference to the purpose and character of the arrangement to share the risk of, or spread the loss from, unhoped-for, but possible, contingencies that may or may not happen (in life insurance, as to timing of an ultimately certain contingency).
36 The categorisation or characterisation of contracts of guarantee, of indemnity and of insurance, requires, above all, an understanding of their purpose and nature. All, at one level, contain an element of indemnity; all can be said at one level of abstraction to be contracts of indemnity (subject to the qualification expressed earlier as to different types of insurance). But each has a relevant difference from the other; and contracts of guarantee and indemnity, for the operation of the principle in Ankar, are to be categorised and characterised as quite different from contracts of insurance.
37 Each of a guarantee and an indemnity has the object or purpose of making good the financial position of a creditor of someone other than the guarantor or indemnifier. The two categories do this by different means: the guarantor as surety assumes a secondary obligation to the primary obligation of the principal debtor. In a contract of indemnity the indemnifier is primarily liable to the creditor, not collaterally. This difference in character, ascertained by construction, is important in the identification of the parties' mutual rights and obligations. But both are a species of financial accommodation to support the credit risk of the principal debtor and to hold the creditor harmless.
38 A contract of insurance has the object or purpose of sharing the risk of, or spreading loss from, a contingency. Relevant to its character as insurance will be how the contract came to be effected, its nature and purpose and how it is to be performed: see generally Seaton v Heath; Seaton v Burnand [1899] UKLawRpKQB 67; [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792-793 (Romer LJ).
39 The protection of the guarantor or indemnifier by the principle of construction referred to in Ankar had its origin in the nature and common circumstances of the formation of contracts of guarantee: Tricontinental at 693-694. The importance of how the contract of guarantee commonly comes about can be seen in the judgment of Bayley B in Nicholson v Paget [1832] EngR 220; (1832) 1 C & M 48 at 52; [1832] EngR 220; 149 ER 309 at 311, cited in Andar 217 CLR at 433 [18].
40 Ultimately, of course, such tasks of categorisation or characterisation depend on the context, in particular, the purpose of the enquiry. From the nature, character and purpose of insurance there is no reason, and no precedent, for according an insurer the tenderness accorded to guarantors and indemnifiers as reflected in the general principle recently restated in Bofinger 239 CLR at 292 [53].
41 With respect, the proposition in Miskovic [Miskovic v Stryke Corporation t/as KSS Security (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1495; (2011) 16 ANZ Ins Cas 61-873] [that, in case of any doubt as to the proper construction of an insuring clause in a policy of indemnity insurance, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the insurer] is wrong.
42 The principles, otherwise, to apply in relation to the interpretation and construction of insurance policies as commercial contracts were not in dispute. Such principles can be found in authorities dealing with the construction of commercial contracts, to some of which reference was made in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407; 76 NSWLR 603 at 618-619 [19]- [23]; and also in authorities dealing specifically with contracts of insurance: McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Limited [2000] HCA 65; 203 CLR 579 at 589 [22] (Gleeson CJ), 600-603 [73]-[74] (Kirby J); Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Limited [2005] HCA 17; 221 CLR 522 at 528-529 [15] and [16] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Australian Casualty Co Limited v Federico [1986] HCA 32; 160 CLR 513 at 520-521 (Gibbs CJ), and see also the valuable discussion of principle by Kirby J (though in dissent) in Johnson v American Home Assurance Company [1998] HCA 14; 192 CLR 266 at 272-276 [19]. The principles need not be restated here beyond some essential considerations, which for present purposes can be taken to be that the policy is to be given a businesslike interpretation, paying attention to the language used by the parties in its ordinary meaning, and to the commercial, and where relevant, the social purpose and object of the contract, in the context of the surrounding circumstances, including the market or commercial context in which the parties are operating, by assessing how a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language. Preference is to be given to a construction supplying a congruent operation to the various components of the whole.
43 The importance of the commercial purpose in the interpretation and construction of a policy can be seen in the cases referred to by McHugh JA (as his Honour then was) in Legal & General Insurance Australia Ltd v Eather (1986) 6 NSWLR 390 at 405.
44 To refer to "social" purpose (where relevant) is not to detach the process of interpretation and construction from the objective enquiry as to the meaning of a document regulating the private rights of the parties. It is to identify the reality that in some circumstances a policy of insurance as a commercial document will find its place in some aspect of the organisation of society through the rights and obligations thereby created by it. That place or purpose will have its weight in the description of meaning to the words in question.
456 Defined terms appear in capital letters throughout the AIG policy. The terms are either expressly defined in the Contracts Work Exclusion clause in the endorsement to the policy schedule of the AIG policy, or otherwise found elsewhere within the AIG policy.
457 When the specific definitions that apply are inserted into the Contract Works Exclusion clause where they first appear in each subclause, it reads as follows:[375]
Notwithstanding any terms or conditions to the contrary no cover shall be provided under the Your Policy for:
1. Damage [any loss, fine, penalty, costs, charge, liability, physical loss or Property Damage including any Earth Movement]:[376]
- in connection with the Contract Work [any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit and which are incorporated or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure at the Location],[377] Temporary Work [any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit that are necessary for access or support to the Contract Work and which will be dismantled and removed at the date of completion of the Contract Works or Works], Free Issue Materials [any and all building and construction materials (including debris) wheresoever located, or in transit and which are supplied or are to be supplied on connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Works and shall include but not be limited to: any and all plant, tools and equipment; or temporary buildings and structures and their contents] or Works [any and all operations or activities undertaken in connection with the Contract Work and/or Temporary Work];
- in connection with any Maintenance or Defects Liability Period [a set period of time as agreed to in writing by You which commences after completion of the Contract Work and attendant Work and during which any defects in the Contract Works is remedied by any third party or any maintenance obligations in respect of the Contract Work are undertaken by any third party]; or
- which manifests, incurs or arises after any Maintenance or Defects Liability Period as a result of any activities or works undertaken during such Maintenance or Defects Liability Period:
2. Property Damage[378] [physical damage to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property] to the Contract Work [any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit and which are incorporated or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure at the Location], Temporary Work [any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit that are necessary for access or support to the Contract Work and which will be dismantled and removed at the date of completion of the Contract Works or Works] or Free Issue Materials [any and all building and construction materials (including debris) wheresoever located, or in transit and which are supplied or are to be supplied on connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Works and shall include but not be limited to: any and all plant, tools and equipment; or temporary buildings and structures and their contents]
In the event of the operation of this exclusion no coverage shall be provided under Your Policy for Construction Materials, Rebuilding for Compliance, Precautionary Repairs, Rebuilding or Reconstruction Costs as more fully specified and defined in Your Policy.
458 By letter to the McMurrays, dated 7 June 2016,[379] AIG denied that it was liable to indemnify the McMurrays on grounds that the AIG policy Contract Works Exclusion clause entitled it to deny liability to indemnify the McMurrays because:
(a) experts have concluded that the only possible cause of the fire is the timber oil soaked on the rags in the rubbish bin. There is no other sensible explanation for how the fire started; and
(b) as the painting was an activity undertaken in connection with the construction work and the damage to the home was caused by the disposal of bags in the rubbish bin during that activity, the damage exclusion operates to exclude cover for the claim.
459 In effect, AIG's decision to deny liability was on the basis that the fire was caused by the self-ignition of oil soaked rags placed in a plastic rubbish bin in the house in the course of activities undertaken as part of, or in connection with, the works under the construction contract, and the damage to the house was damage to 'Contract Work' as defined in the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy, or was connected with damage to Contract Work (as defined).
460 AIG claims that a fire in the green rubbish bin in the dining room triggers the words in the Free Issue Materials and Works definitions, that is, as I understand the argument, the fire in the green rubbish bin, irrespective of its cause, was damage connected with the Works, or the Contract Works or Free Issue Materials.[380]
461 AIG also argues that the Contract Works Exclusion clause is engaged because it excludes Property Damage to the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Free Issue Materials, and that includes any damage which emanates from, or has a connection with, the performance of the Contract Works and the presence of Free Issue Materials, which is Property Damage (being physical damage to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property) to the house.[381] This submission appears to rely upon cl 1 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause. The consequence of this argument, if accepted, is that AIG have no liability to pay the McMurrays for any damage to the existing house or to the house as renovated. Put another way, the exclusion applies to any damage that happens as a result of the Contract Works taking place.[382]
462 Although AIG spent almost no time making submissions in writing about the effect of cl 2 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause, it has pleaded reliance on this clause in par 6(a)(ii) of the first defendant's further amended defence. AIG says that cl 2 only applies to the renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay. In oral submissions, senior counsel informed the court that it was thought that it was common ground that the renovation works themselves were not covered because those works were covered by the Tokio Marine policy.[383] However, that is clearly not the case as both the McMurrays and the Bresland parties argue that the Contract Works Exclusion clause did not apply to the renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay, on grounds that the clause only applies to the construction of a structure that is not part of the house.
5.3 The evidence relevant to the determination of whether the Contract Works Exclusion clause operates so as to enable AIG to deny liability
463 The express terms of the Contract Works Exclusion clause require particular facts to be found to bring AIG within the scope of the exclusion.
464 AIG in its opening submissions claims that when regard is had to the commercial purpose of the Contract Works Exclusion clause, the objective intention was coverage was excluded for damage that came about from activities occurring in connection with the renovations to the house. Put another way, AIG claims the cover mapped out by the AIG policy is cover for the whole of the house for damage that came from activities occurring that were not connected with the renovations.
465 It is also argued by AIG that the Contract Works Exclusion clause is engaged not only by damage in connection with structures constructed, or in the course of construction, but also by damage in connection with any and all operations, or activities undertaken in connection with any and all structures constructed, or in the course of construction.
466 To the extent that those activities needed to be in connection with a structure, AIG contended that structure should be found by the court to be either:
(a) the timber panelling (oak battens and oak panels) and (sliding) doors, including the frames constructed for the sliding doors to the entry to the dining room; or
(b) the newly installed wood floors at the front of the house; and
the activity in connection with either of those structures was the staining of the timber panelling and doors (including the oak battens and flat oak panelling) at the front of the house with Loba Oil to match the newly installed wood floors.
467 AIG also pleads in its further amended defence that the green plastic bin in the front dining room had been put in there by Mosman Bay and had been used by tradespeople working on the renovations at the house to dispose of rubbish generated by the work carried out on-site, and the contents of the green plastic bin in the dining room constituted 'Free Issue Materials', and the bin itself was used in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Free Issue Materials or Works (as defined in the Contract Works Exclusion clause).[384] The particulars of the contents of the green plastic bin are pleaded as rubbish including timber shavings, sawdust, sandpaper, cleaning cloths and rags.[385] However, as found in 4.3.3, there is no evidence that any of these items other than sawdust (found by the fire investigators still stuck to the remainder of the bottom of the green rubbish bin after the fire)[386] were in the bin on the night of the fire. There is evidence, however, that the green rubbish bin was used by people working on-site to dispose of the smoko and lunch rubbish, being lunch wraps, coffee cups, water bottles and the like.[387] There is also evidence that from time to time small pieces of wood, such as pieces of offcuts of battens, may have been disposed of into the green rubbish bin.[388] However, there is no evidence that there was such material in the bin on the night of the fire. Further, it appears that there was only one carpenter working on-site that day and it was Mr Woods, who was working in the basement.[389]
468 In closing submissions, AIG argued that the frame to the dining room into which the sliding doors retracted when open was a new masonry structure, which was constructed following the partial demolition of the original masonry wall. In particular, the wall into which the recessed sliding doors were installed and onto which battens were applied is a structure because it was being built in place of the old wall, and the battens and the door formed part of the structure.
469 Having reviewed the plan of the ground floor of the original building as constructed, and the plan of the ground floor depicting renovations including the timber finishes, together with the photographs taken by Mr Bell the morning after the fire, there is no evidence before the court that the frame constructed during the renovations for the sliding doors to the dining room in the sitting room were constructed of masonry.
470 To the contrary, to the extent that inferences can be drawn from the plans and these photographs, it appears that part of the original masonry brick walls to the dining room and the sitting rooms were removed, including the original doors to those rooms and frames for the recess sliding doors were constructed of timber, and affixed to the remaining masonry (existing brick) walls by steel bolts.
471 However, whether the frame for the new wooden sliding doors was in part newly constructed brickwork (masonry) or constructed entirely of timber is irrelevant and immaterial to the determination of whether the frame containing the new sliding doors, which form part of the new wall to the dining room, constituted a 'structure' within the meaning of the word as it appears for the second time in the definition of Contract Work in the Contract Works Exclusion clause. This is because whether composition of the new frame was wholly wood, or part wood and brickwork, is not determinative or relevant to whether the new frame constructed as part of the renovation works is a structure within the meaning of the Contract Works Exclusion clause.
472 Mr Thomas' evidence is that the construction of the new entry walls with cavity sliding doors and the new column in the dining room were decorative changes and not structural changes to the original house. I understood that when Mr Thomas said that this work was not structural he used the term 'structural' as it is known in the building trade as work that affects the structural integrity of the building, that is, internal or external load-bearing components of a building that are essential to the stability of the building or any part of it. Such items include foundations and some floors, walls, columns and beams, if they are load-bearing.
473 What constitutes a structural change to a building in the sense of load‑bearing is different to the meaning of the term 'structure' in the Contract Works Exclusion clause and characterisation of the changes to the walls and doors of the entry as 'decorative' is not relevant to whether the:
(a) laying of the wood floor;
(b) construction of frames with recessed timber sliding doors;
(c) oak timber cladding and battens on the walls and doors; or
(d) the addition of a gyprock faux column clad with oak wood panelling in the dining room;
each constitute a 'structure' which is incorporated into a permanent structure at the house within the meaning of the Contract Works Exclusion clause.
474 One relevant background fact is that prior to the McMurrays and AIG entering into the policy of insurance, Mr Bresland completed a Chartis Private Client Group Quotation Request, dated 21 September 2014, in which it was typed under the heading 'Residence Information' two relevant questions, which were answered as follows:[390]
Renovations planned within next 12 months? Yes/No Yes
If Yes, what type of renovations are planned? Internal - bring
475 On 24 September 2014, the AIG Private Client Group provided an insurance quote to Mr Bresland for house insurance for the Wellington Street property, which proposed the Contract Works Exclusion clause as an endorsement on the policy. After speaking to Mr McMurray, Mr Bresland accepted the quote, and AIG issued the policy.
5.4 Construction of the Contract Works Exclusion clause
476 The threshold issue to be considered is whether the exclusion clause applies to the renovations to the house carried out by Mosman Bay, specifically whether the Mosman Bay contract work can be characterised as the construction of any and all structures which are incorporated into a permanent structure at 179 Wellington Street, within the meaning of the definition of Contract Work in the exclusion clause. This issue is the threshold issue because the express terms of the Contract Works Exclusion clause only exclude damage in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Free Issue Materials or Works, and the definitions of Temporary Work, Free Issue Materials and Works expressly refer to work that is necessary for access or support to the Contract Work (in respect of Temporary Work), and in connection with the Contract Work (in respect of Free Issue Materials[391] and Works).
477 The McMurrays in their submissions refer to the decision of Mildren J in Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd in which his Honour was called upon to consider the meaning of the expression 'artistic work' in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which was defined to include a building or model of the building, and a building was in turn defined to include a structure of any kind.[392] His Honour was referred to a number of authorities that discuss what is a 'structure', in the context of other legislation, and said that he did not think assistance was gained from considering those authorities, as the word must take its meaning from the purpose and context of the relevant legislation in which it is to be found. His Honour then went on to consider the meaning of the word structure in the context of the Copyright Act.[393]
478 In Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd, s 32(3) of the Copyright Act provided that copyright subsists in an original artistic work that is a building situated in Australia; or an original artistic work that is attached to, or forms part of, such a building. The question in that case was whether the defendant had breached the plaintiff's copyright in a 'plug' being the model from which was created a mould for the manufacture of pre-cast fibreglass swimming pools. His Honour found the plug and the mould were not a building. Although the findings in this authority about what constituted a 'structure' within the meaning of the Copyright Act do not assist in determining the meaning of 'structure' and 'structures' in the Contract Works Exclusion clause, his Honour made the following general observations about the word 'structure':[394]
Dictionary definitions suggest that a structure is 'something built or constructed; a building, bridge, dam, framework etc' (Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed, Delbridge et al, The Macquarie Library); 'a thing which is built or constructed; a building, and edifice. More widely any framework or fabric of assembled material parts': New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) Lesley Brow, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
I was referred to a number of authorities which discuss what is a structure, in the context of other legislation. I do not think assistance is gained from considering these authorities, as the word must take its meaning from the purpose and context of the relevant Act in which it is to be found. For example, in R v Rose, it was held that a caravan was a structure within the meaning of 'building or structure' in s 1 of the Criminal Code (NT) (where the words were included in the definition of 'dwelling-house'), so that Gibbs J accepted a plea of guilty by the defendant, who broke into a caravan used as a residence, to a charge of breaking and entering a dwelling-house. I do not consider that a caravan, which is obviously not intended to remain permanently in one place, is a structure for the purposes of the Copyright Act. In the context of the Copyright Act, there is no requirement that the building or structure be occupied for human habitation, or that it is even occupied by living species at all, as it obviously includes bridges and dams, which are not inhabited. At least some structures designed for the keeping of animals, produce, plants or fish such as stables, silos, greenhouses or fish ponds would be included. Thus, there is no necessity for a structure to have steps, doors, a roof, or windows. In the case of dams, or large storage tanks, these could well be structures even though they are designed to store water or fuel. I think that the word 'structure' implies something which is of some substance, and is usually erected upon or constructed upon or in the ground with an element of permanence, although it need not be a fixture, so that prima facie, a prefabricated building which is designed to be removed may be a structure, and may still remain a structure even though it is in the process of being removed or is left temporarily unattached to the soil. I do not see why buildings, and therefore structures, need be built from concrete or stone; surely the form of building material used is not important, so long as the building or structure is a thing of some permanence. It flows from this that it is not necessary that the building or structure be built up from the ground in situ. Modern materials and methods of construction include buildings which are prefabricated off‑site; nevertheless I do not see why such buildings are not 'buildings' in the ordinary sense of the word, if the intention is that the building when delivered on-site will become permanently, or relatively permanently, fixed to the ground.
479 In the decision of R v Rose,[395] referred to by Mildren J in this passage, the question for determination by Gibbs J was whether a caravan was a 'dwelling-house' which was defined in the Criminal Code (NT) to include any building or structure, or part of a building or structure, which is for the time being kept by the owner or occupier for the residents therein or himself, his family, or servants, or any of them. In a very short decision Gibbs J, after finding out the caravan in question was a residence, turned to the question of whether it was a structure and observed:[396]
The word 'structure' in its most natural and ordinary meaning is a building, but the word is capable of having the wider meaning of anything constructed out of material parts, and in that sense undoubtedly would include a machine and a caravan. Since the section of the Code uses the expression 'building or structure' it must be concluded that the use of the word 'structure' was intended to add something to the meaning of the section, and if it were construed simply to mean 'building' it would add nothing. It seems to me therefore that the use of the words 'or structure' has an enlarging effect and it includes material constructions which do not come within the description of buildings. Therefore it seems to me that it is proper to accept the pleas because the caravan was a dwelling‑house within the meaning of the definition.
480 In City of Noarlunga v Fraser, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was called upon in a planning appeal to consider whether the building of a yacht was exempted from planning legislation. The questions on the appeal were whether the yacht itself or the activity of its construction constituted a development in relation to land within the meaning of s 47(1) of the Planning Act 1982 (SA).[397] The term 'development in relation to land' was defined in the Planning Act to mean the erection, construction, conversion, alteration of or addition to a building on the land. A building, in turn, was defined under the Planning Act to mean a building or structure or a portion of a building or structure, whether temporary or permanent, moveable or immoveable. Consequently, the question was whether the activity of building a yacht was the erection etc of a building (structure). In considering whether the yacht was a structure, White J observed:[398]
In an imaginative but I fear fallacious argument, Mr Hayes QC suggested that 'the tentacles' of the Act now reach deeply and minutely into every aspect of activity upon or use of land which would hitherto have been considered ridiculous unless exempted specifically. This was, he said, due to the suspension of s 56( I )(a) from operation and the width of the definition of 'building' to include portions of structures. Technically, anything made of parts by man is a 'structure'. One limb of the definition of 'development of land' includes not only buildings but structures. These structures are, however, affected by the same implied fixture-like qualities as buildings as mentioned above. One must look at the 'structure' (in a figurative sense) from that end of the telescope marked 'land' and 'development of land' and 'building on the land' and not through the other end marked 'dictionary definition of structure'.
A structure must mean something different from 'building', as his Honour observed, and the inclusion of 'structures', 'temporary' and 'movable' was 'obviously designed to widen the scope of the definition still further'. The question remains - how much further was it designed to widen the scope? I would answer: 'Somewhat further than permanent fixed buildings on the land but only to a sensible degree.' A wider definition than 'land and buildings' was required to avoid artificial circumvention of the Act. In one case, for example, motel units having every appearance of being permanent buildings were whisked away overnight because they were said to be movable fixtures and not part of the land.
If structures included every type of constructed thing falling within the dictionary definition, that is, if there were not some limit to the nature, type, or size of structure in which planning authorities are to be interested, then property owners and occupiers are at risk for constructing or adding to or altering (or allowing others so to do) the most minute 'structures' on the land without consent, even those of the most temporary and harmless kind. An owner could not construct a cubbyhouse in a tree or a dolls' house or child's tent on the ground in the backyard, even overnight, without consent - or, if they were already there, he could not alter or add to them without consent. A small helium balloon already tied to a tree could not be deflated (altered). A needle is a structure within the dictionary definition. If a needle were also a structure under the Act, a philosopher who wished to push a needle slightly into the soil of the backyard in order to test the number of angels capable of dancing upon its point, would first have to apply for consent. A more homely house-owner might wish to place four sleepers or slabs of wood around some sand to make a sandpit for his children in the corner of the backyard.
481 All of these authorities have considered the meaning of 'structure' in a statutory context, and do not provide a great deal of assistance in construing the term 'structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located or whilst in transit and which are incorporated or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure' within the meaning of the Contract Works Exclusion clause. However, what these decisions do illustrate is that the limits of the word 'structure' are to be found within its context, and where the context is used in the construction of a particular structure, such as a house and other structures, that unless the context requires otherwise, the term must mean something more than the component parts of a structure.
482 If the Contract Works Exclusion clause is construed to apply only to any structure that is incorporated into a permanent structure that is not the existing house, the consequence is that irrespective of whether any particular facts upon which a causal or consequential relationship with the Contract Work, Temporary Work, Free Issue Materials or Works is established, cl 1 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause will not be engaged. Nor will cl 2 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause be engaged, which excludes Property Damage to the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Free Issue Materials.
483 AIG were aware, when it proposed the terms of the policy to Mr Bresland, that the McMurrays wanted to insure the house for $4,500,000 (without cover for any contents) and that they intended to carry out $600,000 of internal renovation work.
484 As counsel for the Bresland parties points out, Free Issue Materials are 'building and construction materials (including debris) wheresoever located, or in transit and which are supplied or to be supplied in connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Works' by the party to the contract who is not carrying out the work. The term 'Free Issue Materials' itself in the clause is undefined in respect of who is to supply. The definition simply defines the scope of such materials that are covered by the definition of Free Issue Materials and they are plant, tools and equipment etc. The term 'free issue materials' is a well-known term for building and construction materials supplied by the owner, either themselves or through contracts with others.[399]
485 In this matter, the Free Issue Materials are the building and construction materials supplied by the McMurrays, pursuant to the terms of the building contract with Mosman Bay. Pursuant to cl N1(3)(e) of the contract between the McMurrays and Mosman Bay, the cost of building work did not include items to be supplied and installed by the owner, shown in schedule 8 or specifically identified elsewhere in the contract documents.[400] Pursuant to schedule 8 of the contract, there were no items to be supplied and installed by the owner, but kitchen appliances were items to be supplied by the owner and installed by Mosman Bay.[401]
486 Importantly, other items not included in the cost of the building work were expenses incurred by the contractor (Mosman Bay) for the first cost of small tools including hand-held electrical tools, ropes, brushware and other similar items, but the cost of replacement of such items were included as a cost of building work, and thus part of the contract price for the renovation works.[402] It is clear that rubbish bins of the kind of the green rubbish bins kept inside the house by Mosman Bay were of the kind of items contemplated as the property of Mosman Bay, the cost of which did not form part of the contract for the renovation works, unless the bins had to be replaced.
487 As counsel for the McMurrays pointed out, AIG does not plead that the green rubbish bin in the dining room on the night of the fire was Free Issue Materials, but the contents of the bin were Free Issue Materials.[403] In any event, the argument put by AIG that the bin, or the contents of the bin, constituted Free Issue Materials, must fail because the contents of the bin have been found to be a drill bit, a water bottle, and some sawdust. None of these items, nor the bin itself, can be found to be Free Issue Materials.
488 Leaving aside the terms of the Contract Works Exclusion clause, the express terms of the AIG policy provide for insurance of structures, being the house (capitalised as House in the policy and a defined term) as a structure, and Other Structures. The policy also provides for specific conditions that are to apply in respect of alterations, additions and renovations.
489 The language used in the Contract Works Exclusion clause, insofar as the term 'Contract Work' refers to 'any and all structures constructed or in the course of construction wheresoever located ... which are incorporated or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure at the Location' (179 Wellington Street), is language that is to be interpreted consistently with the language used in the terms of the policy. What emerges from the express terms of the AIG policy is that if the term 'structure' is construed in the clause as a building or a substantial built form that has a particular purpose, which can contain either built form of contents or is designed to contain contents once constructed, such as furniture in a granny flat, and not merely items installed or constructed in the course of, alteration, renovation or refurbishment work to the house, AIG cannot rely upon the exclusion clause to exclude its liability to pay for the damage to the house and the renovations.
490 For reasons that follow, when all of the AIG policy terms and conditions are considered, this construction of the word 'structure' must be applied. Alternatively, although it is a principle of last resort, I have found that the terms of the policy as a whole, including the Contract Works Exclusion clause, are ambiguous and have applied the principle of contra proferentem, and have construed the clause against AIG.
491 The effect of Section I of the policy is to provide that the Product Disclosure Statement, the policy, the policy schedule and any endorsements that may be issued from time to time, set out the contract between the McMurrays and AIG, and that these documents should be read as one document.
492 To properly construe the Contract Works Exclusion clause, regard must be had to the following clauses in Section III of the policy:
The amount We will pay for each House at each location is shown in Your Policy Schedule. Your Policy Schedule indicates the Payment Basis:
and You do not advise Us of the construction, the most We will pay in settlement for a covered loss is the lesser of the Reconstruction Cost less Depreciation or the Sum Insured for Your House shown for that location in Your Policy Schedule.
If You have a covered loss and do not repair or replace the lost or damaged property within 180 days from the date of loss, We will only pay the repair or replacement costs less Depreciation, unless You have been prevented from repairing or replacing the lost or damaged property due to factors outside of Your control.
4. Additional Covers - House Section[406]
These covers are offered in addition to the Sum Insured shown in Your Policy Schedule for Your House cover unless stated otherwise. Your Excess applies to these covers unless stated otherwise.
In the event of a covered loss to Your House or Other Structures, We will pay for required stabilisation, excavation or replacement of land under or around Your House or Other Structures.
We will pay up to 10% of the amount of a covered loss to Your House or Other Structures for this cover.
We cover any Other Structures for a covered loss under this Policy. We will pay up to 25% of the amount of the Sum Insured for Your House for the Other Structures sited in the same location as Your House stated in Your Policy Schedule, unless a higher amount is stated in Your Policy Schedule.
The same Payment of a Loss Payment Basis applied to Your House will apply to the Other Structures.
We will pay the necessary costs in conforming to any laws or regulations after a covered loss for the repair, replacement or demolition of Your Residence or any Other Structure covered under this Policy.
This cover will not apply if You decide not to repair or replace Your Residence or any Other Structures at the same location.
493 The following capitalised terms referred to in these clauses are defined in Section II (General Definitions):
means the main dwelling, including service pipes, cables and underground tanks supplying the main dwelling at each location named in Your Policy Schedule.
means any outdoor structure You own that is situated within the grounds at a location listed in Your Policy Schedule that is:
This includes, but is not limited to: swimming pools, cottages, garages, tennis courts and cabanas in such grounds.
means the lesser of the amount at the time of the loss required to:
means any of the following which is listed in Your Policy Schedule:
494 It is notable that there are some capitalised terms in cl 2(I) of Section III of the AIG policy that are not defined terms, such as 'Additional Building Cost' and 'Rebuilding Cost'.
495 When the term 'Reconstruction Cost' is read into each of the subclauses of cl 2(I) it is clear that this clause expressly contemplates the restoration, repair, replacement or rebuilding of a structure (whereby the word structure is not capitalised) and includes fees from architects, surveyors and consulting engineers, which contemplates that AIG will pay for the cost of the rebuilding of the House and Other Structures. In particular, the reference to a structure in this clause when the definitions of 'House' and 'Reconstruction Cost' and 'Other Structures' are read into the clause, includes both the House, being the main dwelling, and Other Structures, being any outdoor structure. No other kinds of structures are contemplated by these provisions. In particular, these provisions do not contemplate that the timber panelling and doors pleaded as structures in [8(b)] of AIG's further amended defence are structures.[412]
496 Importantly, cl 2(I) expressly refers to the undertaking of alterations, additions or renovations to the House or Other Structures, which cost a specified amount, and if notice is not given to AIG the amount paid in the event of physical loss or Property Damage will be reduced. Consequently, this clause contemplates that providing notice is given, in the absence of any particular exclusion as contemplated by cl 1, that physical loss or Property Damage to the House or Other Structures, whilst the House or Other Structures are being altered etc, will be paid in accordance with the payment basis in subclauses (a) and (b). There is nothing in this clause that provides for any deduction of the value of the alterations, additions or renovations.
497 It is clear that Free Issue Materials and Temporary Work have no application on the facts of this particular matter.
498 The words 'structure', and 'any and all structures which are incorporated into or are to be incorporated into a permanent structure', within the meaning of Contract Work or Works (the latter being any and all operations or activities undertaken in connection with the Contract Work), could be said to be ambiguous, in the context where no mention is made of renovations, alterations or additions and the terms 'structure' and 'structures' are not defined in the clause, but there is a reference to incorporation into a permanent structure.
499 This is because under the general terms of the AIG policy there are only two types of structures: the House and Other Structures (which can only be outside the House). These provisions of the policy do not contemplate that doors or doorframes are structures. However, the words in the Contract Works Exclusion clause of the definition of Contract Work are 'all and any structures constructed ... incorporated ... into a permanent structure'. These words could be said to extend the meaning of a structure beyond the House and Other Structures, to include structures incorporated into either the House or an Other Structure. It would be nonsense, as counsel for the Bresland parties submits, to say that a structure in this context would include such things as a door handle, which a person is contracted to come and replace. If so, this exclusion would apply to damage caused by a handyman replacing a door handle, even if it was the only work that he or she was contracted to carry out. Such an interpretation would not give effective business operation to the contract.
500 A structure in the context of a policy of insurance of a residential property that is not the subject of an express defined term must necessarily mean more than the component parts of a structure such as, floors, walls and doors, or tiles or paint. Having found this, however, it can be contemplated that some items could constitute a structure installed in the permanent structure of the House, and they could be items that have their own independent use or contents, such as a fireplace or a hydraulic turning circle for vehicles in a garage.
501 However, what cannot be ignored in this particular matter is that the works that Mosman Bay carried out for the McMurrays were refurbishment work. Put another way, it was as contemplated by the general terms of the AIG policy renovation work. It was not work to create a separate structure, such as a granny flat that did not form part of the House. The structure of the house itself substantially remained unchanged. What did change were the finishes on the walls, floors, fixtures and fittings. Yet, the Contract Works Exclusion clause makes no mention of renovation work to an existing structure. If AIG wanted to exclude renovation work, it could have expressly said so.
502 I have applied the principle of contra proferentem, and find that AIG should bear the consequences of the ambiguity. AIG had the opportunity to frame the terms of the Contract Works Exclusion clause so that it clearly included renovations, alterations and additions.
503 Having found that the Contract Works Exclusion clause did not apply to the renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay, the cause of the fire that destroyed the house is immaterial.
504 However, if I am wrong in the construction of the Contract Works Exclusion clause and the terms 'structure' and 'structures' in the meaning of the term Contract Work, includes the oak lined mirror fronted sliding doors and the wooden frames in which the sliding doors retracted, I would find that cl 1 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause is not engaged. This is because I have found that the cause of the fire in the green rubbish bin that was located at the time of the fire close to, and immediately adjacent to, the sliding doors and the door frame cannot be determined. It is simply not enough to find that the fire that destroyed the house started in the green rubbish bin to engage cl 1, as it cannot be found that the fire in the bin was damage in connection with the Contract Work or Works. In particular as to the Works, it cannot be found that the activity of applying Loba Oil to the panelling was an activity in connection with the Contract Works. On the facts that I have found, I am not satisfied that AIG has proved that there is any connection.
505 Although the parties spent a great deal of time making submissions about the meaning of the words 'in connection with', I do not find it necessary to review all of the authorities on the interpretation of these words. At a very minimum, AIG must show some consequential link between the Contract Work or Works and the fire. Put another way by senior counsel for AIG, the phrase 'in connection with' is a relational term of considerable width, satisfied by a link or in association summed up in the phrase 'having to do with'.[413] However, in the authority referred to by senior counsel, McColl J also observed that the question is what kind of relationship will suffice to establish the connection.[414] Clearly on the facts found in 4.0 of these reasons, AIG has not been able to establish any relationship between the fire and the Contract Work or Works.
506 I would, however, find that cl 2 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause excluded the Contract Works, Temporary Works (if any were in existence and were damaged by the fire), Free Issue Materials (if any were on-site and damaged by the fire) and the Works was engaged, if I was to find that the terms 'structure' and 'structures' included all of the renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay. This is because, pursuant to cl 2 of the Contract Works Exclusion clause, it is not necessary to find any connection between the cause of the fire and the property damage. The consequence of this finding would be that it was only renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay that were excluded by the Contract Works Exclusion clause and not the damage to the existing house (as built prior to the renovation works).
507 Two expert quantity surveyors gave evidence at the trial. The McMurrays called Mr Cugley and AIG called Mr Warne.
508 Although I am satisfied that the work carried out pursuant to the contract with Mosman Bay can more properly be described as refurbishment work rather than renovations, in dealing with the quantity surveyor evidence I have referred to this work as renovation work because that is the term used by Mr Cugley and Mr Warne in their reports and in their oral evidence.
509 Both Mr Cugley and Mr Warne hold professional qualifications in quantity surveying and have over 20 years of professional experience in quantity surveying in the construction industry. Both have extensive experience in cost estimation across a broad range of sectors, including large commercial developments.
510 Mr Cugley has experience in cost assessments of high-end luxury housing. In his curriculum vitae, Mr Warne describes his experience in the last 10 years as being almost exclusively within the traditional commercial construction sector.[415] However, when he gave oral evidence, he stated that he was currently involved with a luxury build of approximately $5,000,000 of a house that had just reached practical completion in Mosman Park and had been involved in another house in Cottesloe with a build cost of $2,500,000, and an upper storey renovation of a heritage listed home in Mount Lawley. Mr Warne also has experience in cost management of the lower end of the residential housing market, having worked in the past for a project home builder.
511 Mr Cugley attended the Wellington Street property and viewed the remains of the house, predominantly the basement construction. He assessed the cost of rebuilding the renovated house on the basis that some parts of the house could be retained, and calculated a provisional allowance to remediate retained items based on what he had seen and his knowledge of what expenses he would expect would need to be incurred to remediate those retained items to a standard suitable for a new build.
512 Mr Warne viewed the Wellington Street property from the kerb but did not go on-site.
513 In Mr Cugley's first report, dated 16 March 2016, he conducted a retrospective construction cost assessment of the house to identify the anticipated current construction costs of the house without making any allowance for any modifications, alterations or additions to the property following completion of the initial construction of the house.[416] He concluded that the total anticipated current construction cost as at March 2016 was $4,895,000, inclusive of GST. Following the provision of additional information, Mr Cugley revised his original report.
514 In his final report, dated 2 June 2017, Mr Cugley identified items within the original report that were replaced in the renovation works, with the assistance of Mr McMurray.[417] Although Mr McMurray identified specific retained intact items and items of renovation included in the building cost assessment which should be deducted, Mr Cugley made it clear when giving evidence that Mr McMurray did not assess the cost of these items. These items were costed by him in his first report.[418] The retained items were valued at $685,223 and items that should be deducted (replaced items) were valued at $255,875.
515 Mr Cugley made an allowance of $200,000 for the remediation of retained items to accommodate any additional work associated with remediating works that had been left in place, to a standard suitable for new construction.
516 Mr Cugley assessed the cost of the original house as if built at the time of his assessment, added the actual cost of the renovation works, and deducted the cost of the items that were replaced by the renovation works. Mr Cugley did not include the cost of retained items, that is items that were not damaged by the fire, such as the basement, the swimming pool, concrete in pad footings, and concrete in slabs. Mr Cugley also deducted $127,264 for the value of works included by Mosman Bay in renovation works that would not be required if works were incorporated into a complete new build (i.e. demolition of existing works associated with renovation).[419]
517 Mr Cugley also adjusted the builder's margin from 13% (charged by Mosman Bay) to 10% (based on incorporation of the renovation scope of works into a singular new build) and separately calculated the builder's margin to build the existing house at 15%.[420]
518 Mr Warne was not able to comment on the sum of $127,264 that Mr Cugley deducted from the cost of the renovation work for the unnecessary works, if incorporated into a new build, although he did agree that if Mr Cugley's methodology was adopted it would be appropriate to deduct the cost of works that were demolished.[421]
519 Mr Cugley's approach relies upon the actual costs incurred in construction of the renovated works by Mosman Bay and the retention of items that could be remediated following the fire. Mr Cugley applied rates that he regarded as reasonable and appropriate for the construction of a bespoke, high-end luxury residence.
520 The approach adopted by Mr Warne was to reconstruct an entire build of the house and other structures incorporating the renovations. Mr Warne applied rates that were substantially derived from rates that apply to commercial construction work and rates published in the Rawlinson's Australian Construction Handbook 2017 (Rawlinson's).
521 One of main differences between the methodology adopted between Mr Warne and Mr Cugley to come to the total cost to reconstruct the house as renovated at the time of the fire is whether Mr Warne's evidence that substantial economies could be achieved in incorporating the renovations into a new build from the ground up should be accepted. Mr Cugley disagrees with the application of this assumption to a rebuild of the McMurrays' house as renovated at the time of the fire. It is his opinion that a one-size-fits-all approach cannot be applied to the construction of a bespoke luxury residence, which residences he says are more driven by the selection of items by clients, which are not necessarily dictated by cost.
522 At the conclusion of the trial, the McMurrays provided three schedules setting out alternative scenarios of their loss and damage, the first of which sets out their claim on the basis that AIG is found liable for the reconstruction of the house, including the renovations, as it was at the time of the fire. This schedule is based upon Mr Cugley's assessment of the cost of reinstating the house with the renovations, which assessment separately assesses the cost of the renovations as adjusted to the cost of reconstructing the remainder of the house.
523 In this schedule, the McMurrays' claim is particularised as $1,439,678, inclusive of GST, for the cost of the renovations as adjusted (inclusive of items supplied directly by the McMurrays, which total $145,519) plus an amount of $3,706,472, inclusive of GST, for the cost of building the existing structure as adjusted, being a total of $5,146,150 inclusive of GST.[422]
524 Although Mr Warne said when giving concurrent evidence that he had no criticism of Mr Cugley's methodology, he qualified this concession by stating that adding the total cost, or adding the cost of the contracted renovation works, was not entirely appropriate. This is because it is his view that only a portion of the works would have attracted a premium (additional cost) to complete as alterations and additions work of small volume. It appears, however, he did not interrogate the figures calculated by Mr Cugley (in the methodology applied by Mr Cugley).[423]
525 Mr Warne estimated the total rebuild by assuming total destruction of the house and all structures, excluding the cost of excavating soil and rock that would have been necessary to build the basement, and then estimating the total amount to reconstruct the house, including the basement and other structures as at the date of his report, in the same size, shape and form, as it would have been at the time of the fire in its almost completed renovated state.
526 Mr Warne opined that: (a) if the finally completed house was reconstructed in its entirety, economies could be achieved, and those economies would be magnified, potentially, against renovation and addition rates of work; and (b) these economies would extend to cost of trade rates and the margin charged by the builder.
527 Although AIG did not provide a schedule in closing of the final figures assessed by Mr Warne, in his report dated 5 February 2018, Mr Warne assessed the cost to reinstate the house as it existed in its almost fully renovated state immediately prior to the fire as being $4,404,000, inclusive of GST, and the house reconstructed as originally built without the renovations as $3,657,000, inclusive of GST. The difference between these two figures represents the added cost of the renovations of an amount of $747,000, inclusive of GST. If GST is excluded, the difference is approximately $600,000.[424]
528 It is noted that Mr Cugley assessed the cost of reconstructing the house as originally built without the renovations as $3,690,196, inclusive of GST. On the face of the total amounts assessed by Mr Warne and Mr Cugley to rebuild the house without the renovations, it could be assumed there is little dispute between them as there is little difference between the final figure for the total cost of a rebuild of the house without the renovations reached by each of them. However, comparison of these amounts is difficult because Mr Cugley's method of assessing the cost of rebuilding the original house does not require the rebuilding of retained items such as the basement.
529 In the methodology applied by each expert, there is also a difference between them as to rates for items, including some trade rates, the amount allowed for preliminaries, an appropriate percentage for the builders margin, and whether the percentage allowance for professional fees of 15% should be discounted.
530 The difference between the assessments of Mr Cugley and Mr Warne for the cost of reinstating the house with the renovations (excluding all client supplied items by Mr Cugley and excluding some client supplied items by Mr Warne) is an amount of $742,150, inclusive of GST, or approximately $600,000, exclusive of GST, the former amount being the difference between the amount of $5,146,150 assessed by Mr Cugley and $4,404,000 assessed by Mr Warne.
531 One of the critical disputes between the quantity surveyors is whether the renovation works would have cost approximately $600,000, exclusive of GST, as estimated by Mr Warne, or the amount the works actually cost, being works carried out on a cost (builder's margin) basis of actual cost as adjusted by Mr Cugley. Mr Cugley assessed the cost of the scope of items of the renovation to be $1,023,535 (excluding client direct supplied items) based on incorporation of renovation scope of works into a singular new build.[425] He calculated this amount by deducting the amount that he estimated as the value of works included in the renovations works that would not be required if works were incorporated into a complete new build. This he calculated as an amount of $127,264.[426]
532 When regard is had to the nature of the renovation work, it is clear why there is such a difference in the cost assessments by Mr Cugley and Mr Warne of the cost of this work. Mr Warne has assumed that there will be substantial economies in incorporating the renovation work to the construction of the house when building it from scratch. He has also applied rates, a preliminaries allowance, and professional fees that are lower than the rates applied by Mr Cugley.
533 For reasons that follow, it is clear that the rates that were applied by Mr Warne in his assessment of the cost of the renovation works are lower than some of the rates that were paid by Mosman Bay to its subcontractors, such as painting.
534 I accept the replacement cost construction assessments carried out by Mr Cugley and not those carried out by Mr Warne. Whilst there was some discussion during closing as to whether it would have been open to the court to accept in part the cost construction assessments of each of the quantity surveyors, having reviewed all of their evidence, together with the documentary and other relevant oral evidence in this matter, the court is not in a position to properly do so. This is because the methodology applied by Mr Cugley and Mr Warne is completely different and, in any event, it is clear to me that the methodology applied by Mr Cugley more properly reflects the true cost of constructing a substantial luxury residence, which residences are usually only built in Perth in the most affluent suburbs.
535 The reason why I prefer the cost assessments made by Mr Cugley to those made by Mr Warne is as follows.
536 First, in general, I found the methodology adopted by Mr Cugley in making an assessment of the cost to reconstruct the McMurray house with the renovations to be more reliable, and a better reflection of the cost to restore or repair or replace or rebuild the house and its surrounding structures with materials and workmanship of the like kind and quality as constructed as at the date of the fire, as required by the express terms of AIG's policy, than the methodology adopted by Mr Warne.
537 Second, I found the analysis of Mr Warne in some respects lacked rigour because: (a) he had not interrogated some of the calculations used in the methodology applied by Mr Cugley, and simply rejected Mr Cugley's methodology on the basis that it is his opinion that it is a general rule that rates that apply to renovation and addition work are more expensive than the rates that apply to build from the ground up; and (b) he had not obtained instructions about at least one item that would be required to be installed if the house as renovated was reconstructed (and that is the type of roof tiles installed on the roof of the house).
538 Third, one of reasons why I have preferred the methodology of Mr Cugley is because the methodology adopted by him is more consistent with the nature of the specific renovation works carried out by Mosman Bay, which were substantially bespoke, and were not renovations or additions works that involved substantial structural changes to a building or substantial changes to the internal uses of a building.
539 It is Mr Warne's evidence that renovation-type and addition-type works of luxury homes are generally more expensive to construct because such works are more time consuming and present a number of challenges in integrating new works into old works. Mr Warne also said that because of these factors the cost of construction of renovation-type and addition‑type works for luxury homes pushes up the rates of margins applied by the head contractor.
540 The difficulty with these generalised contentions is that in closing submissions it was conceded by counsel for AIG that the renovations to the McMurrays' house were, in a large part, to strip out all the fixtures and fittings of the existing house, together with doors and windows, back to what could be characterised as lock-up in a build that had commenced from the ground up to the stage of lock-up. From this concession it can be inferred that at least a substantial part of the renovation work carried out by Mosman Bay was work that would have been carried out at the same stage as it would have been if the house as renovated were incorporated in a single construction project. Consequently, from this concession it is difficult to draw an inference that there would be substantial economies in integrating new works with old works in the construction works performed by Mosman Bay. These works involved minimal changes to the footprint of each level of the existing house, and constituted for a large part the stripping out and replacement of fixtures and fittings, including doors, windows, floors, ceilings cabinets, and repainting. The renovation works were substantially a refurbishment of the house as it existed with little structural changes, or any real change to the size of the house. Further, there were no works that could be properly characterised as addition works.
541 Mr Warne's assessment does not appear to take account of the fact that the quality of work required to construct the McMurrays' house, in particular their renovations, was not only of a very high standard, requiring a high level of skill, and requiring extra time spent to allow for that work to be carried out, but also the nature of the works was bespoke.
542 Fourth, I have made this finding because it is clear to me that the rates applied by Mr Warne are too low for a luxury house of the standard that, but for the fire, the McMurrays intended to make their home, following the completion of renovations. This is made clear when the rates applied for kitchen equipment and painting works assessed by Mr Warne are compared to relevant parts of the documentary evidence and the evidence of Mr Simpson (in respect of the nature of specialist painting works for a high-end luxury residence).
543 Fifth, I have made this finding because, having heard Mr Cugley and Mr Warne give evidence, it appears clear that Mr Cugley made more than a superficial inspection of the site and made a more detailed assessment of the actual materials the house had been constructed of, and the fixtures and fittings installed during the renovations.
6.1.2.1 Rates generally allowed by Mr Warne for items of construction of the house as renovated
544 The dispute between the quantity surveyors as to rates relates principally to the number of hours of work and skill necessary to complete particular work and, in respect of some items, the cost of materials.
545 The rates applied by Mr Warne are in general the rates that would apply to commercial developments. Mr Warne also had regard to a guide published as to construction costs by Rawlinsons.
546 Mr Warne opined that commercial rates are adequate and appropriate for residential construction because in general his experience is that commercial rates are more expensive than residential rates for works, which higher rates arise mainly around requirements by subcontractors to comply with commercial realities of site safety and other matters. Notwithstanding this view, Mr Warne is of the opinion that luxury residential construction rates and commercial rates are comparable. He did, however, concede that there are economies, in a repetitive commercial build, which are not achieved in building a luxury home, but said that if you compare other aspects of construction, such as erecting formwork or pumping and placing concrete, the timeframes for those activities in both types of construction are very similar.
547 It is Mr Warne's evidence that the rates he applied were fair and reasonable, and are rates that could be achieved if the house was tendered to an open market of four competitively tendered builders who are appropriately credentialed to build a house of this type. Mr Cugley agrees that there would be four contractors available in this top end of the luxury residential market to submit prices for a project like this, but no more.
548 Mr Cugley disagreed with Mr Warne's analysis of the cost of trade rates for a high-end luxury home being comparable to commercial trade rates. Mr Cugley said there are number of differences in the type of work that results in higher rates for the high-end luxury residential market which are as follows:
(a) there is a limited availability of trades that can perform work to an exceptionally high standard, so the volume of available resources is small;
(b) the level of required set out and pre-planning to complete finishing items for trades associated with a luxury residence is significant;
(c) the required level of quality and required level of finish is also significant; and
(d) the overall sequencing of workmanship in a luxury residence is different to a commercial project and a house of a lesser standard, as the trades that are completing the work in a luxury residence essentially work uninterrupted, so that they can complete their work without it being damaged by others.
549 For these reasons, Mr Cugley said that because work takes longer, it costs more because there is more time involved, and it costs more because there are fewer specialist trades available to complete works to a high standard.
550 Mr Cugley also said that rates applied by Mr Warne are too low because those rates do not take account of the nature of the high quality of fixtures and fittings, and required standards of finishing works, of a luxury house. Mr Cugley said, for example, the finish required for tiling in a commercial building is nowhere close to the same degree of finish required for a luxury home. He then went on to say a commercial building would usually be tiled with ceramic tiles, whereas a residence of the kind being renovated by the McMurrays would be tiled with stone or porcelain tile, which tiles require a higher level of workmanship to ensure that joins align, grouting is consistent and falls are adequate, which exceeds the level of workmanship a commercial tiler would carry out in a commercial build.
551 In respect of the rates for masonry items, it is Mr Cugley's opinion that the rates included by Mr Warne for masonry items are not only more suited towards a commercial project or a residence that is not a luxury residence, he is also of the opinion that there may be items of cost missing from the allowances made by Mr Warne for the construction of the basement retaining walls.[427] He explained that he formed this opinion because it appeared that the method of completing the basement construction had overlooked its proximity to the neighbours. This is also an issue that arises in respect of the amount allowed by Mr Warne for temporary piling in the amount he allowed for preliminaries.
552 Mr Warne costed the reconstruction of the renovated house as at the date of the fire from the ground up, by assuming that all existing structures had been removed on-site leaving a hole in the ground where the basement had once stood. Consequently, his estimation of the cost of reconstruction does not take account of removing any rock or other material from the site to construct the basement.
553 It is Mr Cugley's opinion that the method of construction required to construct the basement 2m from a neighbouring property would have required a degree of temporary retaining, which is generally not shown on drawings because it is a buildability item, and a contractor would be expected to make due allowance within their pricing for items of that nature. He opined that you cannot excavate a basement like the one constructed under the McMurrays' house in such close proximity to the neighbouring property without an appropriate form of temporary retaining because without adequate retaining there is a risk that soil could collapse, leading to damage to neighbouring properties.[428]
554 Mr Cugley formed the view that the costs of temporary works required to construct the basement, given its proximity to the boundary, is in the order of $237,000.[429]
555 Mr Warne disagreed. He allowed $251,060 for earthworks, part of which was for temporary support, and $438,360 for site works, but he also allowed for temporary support of ground during the construction of the basement wall, within the preliminaries allowance. He took a different view to Mr Cugley as to what amount should be allowed for temporary support. It is his view that, assuming the basement was 3 m deep and 2 m off the boundary, the excavation of the ground to a certain extent could be over excavated, so that only the lower portion of the excavation would need to be supported with material such as corrugated iron and bits of timber and the like. Consequently, his opinion is that the extent to which the ground would need support would cost much less than $270,000 and would be in the order of a maximum of $10,000, which amount was accounted for in the allowance for preliminaries.[430]
556 Mr Cugley disagreed, and said he did not think the use of roof sheeting other than materials that provide a degree of structural adequacy would be suitable to withhold soil from falling into a basement.[431]
557 In the absence of structural engineering evidence about what temporary retaining structure would be necessary for the construction of the basement as constructed during the original build, I am unable to resolve this dispute.
558 However, this dispute does not relate to the methodology adopted by Mr Cugley in assessing the cost of rebuilding the house, including the renovations, following the fire, because the methodology adopted by Mr Cugley does not require any assessment of the cost of reconstruction of the basement. Mr Cugley's methodology contemplates retaining the existing basement and allowing an additional amount for rectification works to bring the basement up to the standard required for a new build.
559 Because I have preferred the methodology adopted by Mr Cugley, it is not necessary to resolve this dispute about this item of the works.
6.1.2.3 The cost of kitchen equipment and the chandelier
560 An obvious example of a cost estimate made by Mr Warne that is too low relates to kitchen equipment. In his final report, he makes an allowance of a total amount of only $22,300 for kitchen equipment when assessing the house built with the renovations, including some kitchen equipment that appears not to have been delivered or destroyed by the fire. The items assessed by him that do not appear to have been fitted immediately before the fire are two double door fridges, a freezer, a microwave, two dishwashers, an icemaker and a bar fridge, which items Mr Warne costed at a total of $11,800.[432] The remaining items Mr Warne costed at $10,500 are categories of items that in fact had been purchased by the McMurrays from Winning Appliances (installed and destroyed) totalled $28,161.[433] The items purchased by the McMurrays were two Quasair extractors, two cooktops and three ovens. Clearly, an allowance of $10,500 for kitchen equipment that actually cost $28,161 is not only far too low but is contrary to the express terms of the AIG policy, which requires AIG to pay the rebuilding cost on the basis of the 'Reconstruction Cost' to restore or repair or replace or rebuild a structure at the same location with materials and workmanship of like kind and quality.[434] Clearly, the allowance of $10,500 would not provide for the replacement of materials (being kitchen equipment) of a like kind and quality as required by the express terms of AIG's policy of insurance.
561 Mr Cugley in his assessment accounted for the kitchen items purchased by the McMurrays by not only adding the actual cost of these items to the cost of the renovations, but by deducting the $30,000 allowance he had made in his original report for kitchen appliances that were renovation items that had been removed.[435]
562 Mr Warne also did not appear to make any allowance in his assessment of electrical work for a chandelier of like kind and quality that had been supplied by the McMurrays at a cost of $46,909.50.[436] Mr Warne allowed a total amount of $123,150 for electrical work, which, excluding the basement, terrace and balcony areas, was $45,400 for the ground floor and $42,200 for the first floor. Although it is not clear whether the chandelier had been installed on the ground floor or the first floor, it is clear that the amounts allowed for by Mr Warne did not include a chandelier of a like kind and quality to the one that had been supplied by the McMurrays.
563 In respect of trade rates generally for the smaller volumes of renovation work it is Mr Warne's opinion that the completion of this work cannot often be carried out in full days, or full days to complete work cannot be provided to a subcontractor, who is required to pay their workforce for a full day, the effect of which is that the wage component of the work becomes elevated because of time constraints or where the full value of labour cannot be realised.[437]
564 Mr Cugley said that he would expect that, in a house that is being constructed that is not of luxury standard, there would be multiple trades working in an area together, such as carpenters maybe fixing skirtings while electricians are fixing light fittings. In a luxury house, he would expect that those trades would work uninterrupted so that they can complete the work to a high standard, a high quality.[438]
565 Mr Warne disagreed, he said that whilst he acknowledged that luxury trades are more expensive than what might be paid for project homes trades, his recent experience was that he had observed multiple trades working at the same time to a very high standard on a luxury home project in Mosman Park around the corner from the McMurrays' site.[439]
566 Mr Warne said, for example, in respect of painting works in the construction of a complete house, the works generally reach a position where a painter can start on-site and can work for a period of a week or two, carrying out a range of painting work through the whole of the house. In contrast, he said it may be that in performing renovation works that painters are required to attend site to paint a certain amount of work that needs to be done before scaffolder access is exhausted. They then would need to demobilise from site or retreat from site, and then come back to site to do another portion of the works when they have access. It is the piecemeal nature of renovation and addition work that leads to higher trade labour rates and margins.[440]
567 No evidence was given by any of the persons who performed work on the site, in particular by the painters, Mr Simpson and Mr Holgersson, the site supervisor, Mr Thomas, or the principal of Mosman Bay, Mr Walling, that the cost of performing any particular work was elevated because of either time constraints or because workers could at times only perform work at site for part of the day. In the absence of any objection, I do not rule this evidence by Mr Cugley or Mr Warne on this point to be inadmissible. However, in circumstances where Mr Thomas gave uncontradicted evidence that he worked as Mosman Bay's on-site supervisor all day every day for several months before the fire, and in the absence of any cross-examination of him in respect of this point, I do not give Mr Warne or Mr Cugley's evidence on this point much weight.
568 When the evidence given by Mr Simpson about the painting work and the documentary evidence of the quotes submitted by Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson are considered, together with the allowances made for painting by both Mr Cugley and Mr Warne, this evidence supports the opinions given about labour trade rates by Mr Cugley.
570 It is Mr Cugley's evidence that a higher rate is necessary for painting works of a high-end luxury home to reflect the additional labour (time) required to complete painting to a standard higher than is expected by either a commercial project or a house of a lesser standard. Mr Cugley opined that it takes approximately twice the time, that is twice the labour component, to complete painting to a high standard that is required to paint a house of this nature.
571 Mr Warne disagreed. He said in his experience an appropriate rate for painting of a high-end luxury house is to use the same rate that he used for suspended ceiling and plasterboards which was $13m2, and he was not of the opinion that the cost of painting works would be significantly more expensive in a luxury residence to achieve the level of workmanship required. However, he did acknowledge that in economic, low-end suburban houses on the outskirts of the city, lesser rates are applied for painting, in part because of the lesser coats of paint applied.[443]
572 Mr Warne's opinion about an appropriate rate for painting work for a high-end luxury residence is inconsistent with the evidence given by Mr Simpson and inconsistent with the evidence of Mr Cugley. In the following exchange with counsel for the Bresland parties, Mr Simpson relevantly said:[444]
PYNT, MR: Thank you, your Honour. Mr Simpson, before the work that you did at 179 Wellington Street, did you only
PYNT, MR: ever do luxury houses---No just luxury houses but that was a lot of my area, yes.
And in terms of painting work, the difference between painting work at a luxury house compared with painting work at any other house is the quality of products you use---A lot of the same products. But obviously the quality has got to be second to none.
I see. But this is in terms of quality of product, you're talking about---Yes. Yes.
And the time you take to do the work. Is there a difference there between a luxury home and - - ----Yes, I would say so. - - - about roughly how much longer do you think you would take with a luxury home Just ball-park---Well, obviously they're a lot bigger in size, for one. But you would probably spend a lot more time doing preparation and making sure everything was filled properly and sanded properly and everything like that.
And when you're - okay. And does it - is there a difference between the number of coats of paint that you apply---On a brand new house, obviously yes, everything gets four coats. If it's a repaint, it's usually only two coats.
573 It is notable that the painting works undertaken by Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson were largely a complete repaint of the exterior, with some resealing of existing walls in a dark dado finish,[445] a repaint of some existing surfaces in the interior and the painting of some new surfaces, such as the staining of the wooden batten surfaces, and the preparation of other surfaces for wallpaper. For the interior painting, on 26 October 2015, Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson estimated the cost of this work to be between $52,000 and $65,000, including the cost of all paints, materials, GST and labour.[446] For the exterior painting, Mr Holgersson and Mr Simpson submitted a quote of $38,499, including all paints, materials GST and labour costs.[447] The total amounts of quotes for the exterior and internal painting for the renovation works exceeded the amounts assessed by Mr Warne and Mr Cugley.
574 Mr Cugley is critical of the rate applied by Mr Warne for the cost of roof tiles. Mr Warne applied a rate of $80m2 for a Bristile or similar manufacturer clay roof tile, glazed to look like slate.
575 He also stated that a rate of $80m2 per would be more suited to a house constructed in a suburban location of an average quality, such as a standard four by two-style domestic house with a clay tile roof, which also requires a different method of installation to slate tiles.
576 Mr Cugley observed that the tiles had been placed on the roof at a significant angle which contributed to a higher rate for the installation of roof tiles and a rate of $80m2 was insufficient:
(a) to include sarking (a pliable membrane that sits under the roof) and timber battening; and
(b) did not take account of the porte cochere (covered) entry statements, which had been excluded from the costs in the roof and roof plumbing trade rates breakdown by Mr Warne.
577 It is Mr Cugley's view the rate assessed by Mr Warne for a tile that was to be placed at a significant slope, and not a terracotta or clay tile, was too low.
578 Mr Cugley formed his opinion about an appropriate rate for tile roof cladding, based on the documentation and photographs of the house. These indicated that the roof tiles on the original house were slate or imitation slate, which he said would be in the order of $250m2.
579 In response, Mr Warne said that he had taken account of the pitch of the roof and the requirements of labour but conceded that the rate he had applied would not have included for a material other than a glazed clay tile, but he did not have any specific specification about what tiles were on the roof of the house prior to the fire.
580 Given that Mr Warne had not assessed the rates for this work based upon the type of roof tile on the house as originally constructed, I prefer the evidence of Mr Cugley on this issue.
581 Mr Warne assessed the cost of the total quantity of steel required to construct the house, as renovated, as $82,008 by applying a rate of $9,000 per tonne.
582 It is Mr Cugley's opinion that to complete the complexity of structural steel work for a high-end, luxury, architecturally designed house, given the low quantities of steel required and the amount of steel, an appropriate rate is $15,000 per tonne.[448] Mr Cugley also said that it is the complexity of the structural steel that would drive a high rate for the steel work, in addition to the overall low quantity.
583 Although Mr Warne conceded that the greater the volume, or the greater the weight of steel, economies can be achieved resulting in a lesser price, he said that those economies would not be significant (in a larger project) and the influential factor is that the larger the pieces of steel the greater the tonnage compared to the man hours required to fabricate it. In his opinion, in fabrication of large quantities of steel a lesser proportion of man hours per tonne is required to carry out the fabrication work. Thus, he opined, the work to fabricate steel for a whole of a house would generally result in a reduced ratio between the weight of steel and man hours required to fabricate the steel.[449]
584 As to the complexity of the work required to complete the fabrication of steel for the renovated McMurrays' house, Mr Warne agreed that complexity was one of the reasons why he struck a rate of $9,000 per tonne, and that but for this complexity he would have applied a commercial rate of $5,500 per tonne.[450]
585 Mr Cugley disagreed and said that either in 2016 when the demand for structural steel was very high during the currency of the construction of the Gorgon project, or in 2020 a rate of $5,500 per tonne for commercial structural steel fabrication work was not commercially available.
586 The dispute in respect of this item turns solely on the cost of fabrication of steel for the house and not on any assessment of the complexities of the steel fabrication required for the house. In the absence of any admissible evidence of the cost of commercial rates for fabrication of steel in 2016 and 2020, I am not able to resolve this dispute on this particular item.
587 Although I am unable to resolve this dispute, I do not find it determinative in the finding that I have made to accept the methodology applied by Mr Cugley because:
(a) there is only a difference of $36,342 in the total amounts assessed by Mr Cugley and Mr Warne for structural steel; and
(b) for the reasons I have already given, I prefer the methodology of and prefer the evidence of Mr Cugley to the evidence of Mr Warne where their opinions are in conflict.
588 Mr Warne applied a commercial rate of $90m2 for suspended ceilings. Mr Cugley is of the opinion that this rate is inadequate for small areas in isolated rooms in a luxury residence, where workmanship is more difficult than a commercial installation and a higher quality of workmanship is required to eliminate issues such as glancing light or shadows on the ceiling. In his opinion, the rate that Mr Warne should have applied is $150m2. Mr Cugley said the commercial rate applied by Mr Warne is an appropriate rate for large volumes of ceilings and where a lesser standard of workmanship is required.
589 In response, Mr Warne said on a commercial project with large volumes of suspended ceilings, the rate could be as low as $75m2. He conceded that the standard of finish in a luxury residence had to be a higher quality than you would expect in an average home and as a result would cost more. Consequently, he claimed that he took account of these factors by applying a rate of $90m2. In particular, he had regard to the fact that suspended ceilings were required to be installed into bedrooms and small rooms, and formed the opinion that the rate he applied was adequate to achieve a standard of workmanship that is acceptable in a luxury residence.
590 For the reasons I have already given, I generally prefer the evidence given by Mr Cugley to the evidence of Mr Warne where their opinions conflict. For this reason, I accept the evidence of Mr Cugley in respect of this item.
591 Professional fees are fees charged by consultants, including architects and structural engineers who are engaged to design and quantify the work forming the build.
592 Although Mr Warne and Mr Cugley agree that 15% is an appropriate rate to apply for professional fees, Mr Warne discounted this rate to 8% because the task of a quantity surveyor in the reconstruction was the re‑documentation of an existing building to the same size and shape build which had already been designed by an architect. Consequently, it is his view that it would not be necessary to engage an architect for the rebuild of the McMurrays' house as renovated.
593 AIG points out that Mr Cugley accepted that 25% of an architect's total fees would not be required. Mr Cugley, however, maintained that it would be necessary to engage an architect to carry out some work because a rebuild of the house as renovated would require re‑documenting. Further, savings would be minimal and may be overtaken by additional work required by consultants to document the project by using three-dimensional format modelling, which would result in additional costs associated with software systems. He also said that they would not be able to reuse the original architectural drawings of the house because the quality and extent of documentation required by a builder today is much higher and requires more detailed information than is contained in the drawings that he had examined for the original house.
594 It appears clear from the evidence of Mr Warne and Mr Cugley that each had only been provided with the original architectural drawings and plans that have been submitted to the council for building approval before the house was first built. However, there is no evidence before the court that the original working drawings for the construction of the house could not be obtained. It is clear from the evidence that no working drawings were created for the renovation work.
595 In the absence of evidence as to whether the original working drawings for the house could not be made available, and thus requiring substantial redrawing of all plans and drawings for the house, I am not satisfied that the rate of 15% for professional fees applied by Mr Cugley should be accepted. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the figures for professional fees set out in the McMurrays' further schedule of loss and damage house with renovations, dated 31 August 2020, should be recalculated and amended to 8%.
596 Preliminaries are the costs associated with building a project that are not accounted for as labour or construction materials, such as scaffolding, temporary piling and cranage. Both Mr Cugley and Mr Warne agree the percentage rate for preliminaries should be 15%.
597 However, Mr Cugley is of the opinion that the amount of $380,000 allowed by Mr Warne is insufficient because in his opinion an amount needed to accommodate the costs of the temporary sheet piling is in the order of $270,000. Consequently, it is his opinion that the amount allowed by Mr Warne would be an insufficient amount of money per month for the builder to adequately supervise the project and to pay for other items that are required, such as scaffolding, cranage, and other temporary services.
598 The dispute about the amount allowed for preliminaries by Mr Warne is not a dispute that is capable of resolution in the absence of structural engineering evidence about whether it would be necessary to provide for within this amount substantial temporary retaining for the basement if reconstructed of an amount of $270,000, or a very simple form of retaining using corrugated iron and timber which would only require the allocation of $10,000 of the preliminaries allowance. However, as I have found in respect of the rates applied by Mr Warne for masonry items in 6.1.2.2, the fact that I am unable to resolve this dispute is not material because the methodology adopted by Mr Cugley (which I have preferred) does not entail the reconstruction of the basement, but simply rectification works to the basement following the fire.
599 Margin is the percentage a builder charges on top of the cost of materials and labour. It is not in dispute that the usual range of a builder's margin for a home building contract is 10% to 15%.
600 Mosman Bay applied a margin of 13% for the renovation work on a cost-plus basis. It is Mr Walling's evidence that:
(a) if Mosman Bay had entered into a fixed price contract for the renovations, he would have charged a margin of 15% to 16%; and
(b) where a client agrees to cost-plus terms he always applies a lower percentage because there is no risk involved in the job.
601 The effect of Mr Walling's evidence is that if a builder underestimates the price to construct a particular project on terms of a fixed price building contract the consequences of that factor may flow into the builder's margin.
602 Mr Cugley discounted Mosman Bay's margin of 13% to 10% on the basis that the renovation work would be incorporated into a new build and applied a margin of 15% to the remainder of the cost of building the existing house, whereas Mr Warne applied a margin of 10% to the entire build.
603 Mr Cugley is of the opinion that to complete a luxury house of this kind a builder would charge a margin of 15%. This is because the program of works necessary to construct a house of this kind normally extends over a long period of time with a relatively low capital cost compared to a commercial project. Therefore, he said the amount as a percentage that a builder would need to charge on a smaller capital value over an extended period of time needs to be a higher percentage so they can maintain the business. Unlike large commercial construction builders, who have multiple projects on the go at the same time with a larger turnover, in the boutique luxury residence market, a builder may only have a couple of projects under construction at any one point in time.
604 Mr Warne said he made an allowance of 10% to reflect that his estimate for the work was for the whole of the build tendered competitively to a minimum of four suitable builders. Mr Warne, however, did say that if the renovation works were assessed separately, an appropriate rate of margin would be 15%.
605 Given that the percentages applied by Mr Cugley, 10% to the renovated works and 15% for the remainder of the build, are within the usual range of percentages of margin applied by builders, and that I have preferred in general the methodology applied by Mr Cugley to that applied by Mr Warne, I have accepted the evidence of Mr Cugley in respect of his assessment of this item.
6.2 Amounts claimed and assessed by Mr Cugley that are agreed
606 The parties agree that the McMurrays properly claim:
(a) $167,803 for demolition, cleanup and maintenance, for works carried out to demolish and remove the remains of the house and structures, and clean the site; and
(b) $22,870 for insurance to cover the demolition works and public liability for those works.
607 AIG contends that the McMurrays are only entitled to claim the actual loss of the 'Reconstruction Cost' within the meaning of that term in the AIG policy of the house as renovated and that damages are to be assessed at trial in light of events then known to give effect to the compensatory principle of damages.
608 The amounts in the McMurrays' schedule of damages are inclusive of goods and services tax (GST). Because the house has not been rebuilt, and the land sold by the McMurrays, AIG points out that no GST has been incurred. It is said to therefore follow that because GST is only payable on amounts actually expended, the expense will not be incurred, and therefore the McMurrays will not be out-of-pocket if an award is made exclusive of GST.
609 AIG is unable to point to any authorities in support of its argument. In response, the McMurrays referred to the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd, in which GST was excluded from an award of damages to Canturi in negligence. Canturi was awarded damages of an amount exclusive of GST equal to the cost of restoration of premises to their former condition, because Canturi was entitled under the Goods and Services Act 1999 (Cth) to receive an input credit for any GST payments incurred in making good its damage. Consequently, the court found there was no impediment to Gagner receiving the full benefit of the input credit as it was not a loss suffered by Canturi.[451]
610 There is no evidence before the court that the McMurrays, in their capacity as owners of the house the subject of the proceedings, were registered as a business entity to pay GST and to receive input credits for any GST paid in connection with the construction of the house. Consequently, the principle referred to by Campbell JA in Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd that in assessing damages the court is to take account of any events that have occurred between the time of the accrual of the cause of action and trial that bear upon the damage a plaintiff has actually sustained,[452] does not assist AIG's argument.
611 The argument put by AIG is simply not open in light of the express provisions of the policy.
(i) If the Payment Basis is Rebuilding Cost, We will pay the Reconstruction Cost of your House, up to the Sum Insured shown for that location in your Your Policy Schedule, for each Occurrence.
(ii) For a covered total loss, We will pay the Reconstruction Cost up to the Sum Insured shown for that location in Your Policy Schedule, for each Occurrence, whether or not You actually rebuild Your House or Other Structures.
613 Reconstruction Cost is defined to mean:[455]
the lesser of the amount at the time of the loss required to:
with materials and workmanship of like kind and quality and includes fees from architects, surveyors and consulting engineers. It does not include any amount required for the excavation, replacement or stabilisation of land under or around a structure.
614 These express provisions of the policy make it clear that the McMurrays' loss is to be assessed as if the house was reconstructed as renovated at the time of the fire, the cost of which to the McMurrays would include the payment of GST.
615 For these reasons, I accept the McMurrays' loss and damage should be assessed inclusive of GST.
6.4 Architect, structural engineer, and quantity surveyor fees incurred post the fire
616 The McMurrays claim professional fees for architects ($39,483), a structural engineer ($9,344) and a quantity surveyor ($6,050), who were each engaged after the fire to work out what could be done with the damaged house and surrounding structures after the fire, and how much it would cost. These costs are claimed separately by the McMurrays as additional costs from their claim for loss to rebuild the renovated house.[456]
617 The items claimed are agreed as to the total of the invoices but not as to liability or entitlement. AIG submits, and I agree, that to the extent that each of these consultants were engaged to carry out this work, these costs are disbursements (litigation costs), and not costs flowing from AIG's breach of contract, as there is no contractual entitlement to these fees payable pursuant to the terms of the policy.
618 It is agreed that if AIG is found liable on the basis that it was obliged to rebuild the house, with the renovations, the court should reduce damages AIG is liable to pay by the amount of the settlement sum.
619 The McMurrays in their schedule of loss and damage of the house with the renovations, in which they set out the total loss as claimed against AIG, expressly deduct an amount of $1,264,050 paid by Tokio Marine, being its contribution to the McMurrays' loss, and a component for interest (being about an amount of $40,306).[457]
620 The McMurrays claim interest against AIG on the sum of damages awarded, calculated from the date of loss to the date of judgment, pursuant to s 32 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), at an annual rate of interest of 6% or as prescribed from time to time for the purposes of s 8 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA).
621 An insurer liable to make a payment to an insured under a contract of insurance is, pursuant to s 57 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), liable to pay interest on the day from which it was unreasonable for the insurer to have withheld payment. The rate of interest is, by the operation of s 57(3), the rate prescribed by, or worked out in a manner prescribed by, the regulations. Section 57 applies, by operation of s 57(4), to the exclusion of any other law (including a law of a State) that would otherwise apply. Consequently, the McMurrays' claim for interest can only arise pursuant to s 57 of the Insurance Contracts Act, and not s 32 of the Supreme Court Act or s 8 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act.
622 In this matter, the McMurrays are entitled to payment of the amount of their loss and damage, from the time when AIG received the claim and had a sufficient opportunity to consider it, including time to conduct reasonable investigations where these were thought to be necessary. AIG is obliged to pay the McMurrays' claim from the date by which a reasonable period for the investigation and consideration of the claim, having regard to its complexities, had passed.
623 There is a dispute between the parties as to when it should be found the reasonable period allowed to AIG ended.
624 The McMurrays claim that the authorities establish that a reasonable period for an insurer to make a decision on a claim where arson is suspected is, at most, a period of two months.[458]
625 The cases referred to by the McMurrays do not greatly assist in the determination of what is a reasonable period. This is because what is a reasonable period is a factual question, which can only been answered with regard to the individual circumstances involved in the assessment of any particular claim.[459]
626 It does not depend on the bona fides of the insurer or whether it has good reason for not making payment before the end of the reasonable period.[460]
627 In support of their argument, the McMurrays contend that the costs of the renovations were readily ascertainable at the time of the fire, plans to calculate the reconstruction costs were available, and a report from a quantity surveyor could have been obtained within a month, as was the case with Mr Cugley's first report. They also point out that AIG had Mr Tong's third report by 31 May 2016 and denied liability on 7 June 2016. Tokio Marine disputed liability on the ground that the McMurrays were not an insured, a decision that required no time to make. The McMurrays argue the absolute outer limit of the date when interest should begin to run is 7 June 2016.
628 AIG did not address this point in their submissions.
629 The Bresland parties claim that interest should start to run at the end of a reasonable period of time when Tokio Marine would have had to investigate the claim to determine and work out how much it had to pay. They say a reasonable period would not have come to an end until after the McMurrays had served Mr Cugley's final retrospective construction cost assessment, dated 2 June 2017, and Mr Warne had delivered his first report on 5 February 2018. This they say is because it was not until Mr Warne's first report had been served by AIG that Tokio Marine would have known what they had to pay.
630 Alternatively, the Bresland parties argue it is open to the court to find that the reasonable period ended after there had been conferral about the disputes arising out of the McMurrays' loss and damage in a joint conference of quantity surveyor experts on 25 October 2018.
631 In determining what is a reasonable period, I accept the argument put on behalf of the McMurrays that by the time Mr Tong had delivered his third report, on 7 June 2016, AIG and Tokio Marine had a reasonable amount of time to investigate the fire.
632 However, because both AIG and Tokio Marine entered into contracts of insurance that applied to the McMurrays' claims arising out of the fire that destroyed their house, this factor complicated the basis upon which their loss and damage should be assessed. I am of the opinion it was not until after Mr Cugley had delivered his final report on 2 June 2017, and after a further 14 days for AIG and Tokio Marine to consider that final report, that a reasonable amount of time for AIG and Tokio Marine to assess how much they should each pay for the claim had expired.
633 This is because by 16 June 2017 both AIG and Tokio Marine had for their consideration Mr Cugley's final report, which assessed the costs of the renovations separate from the costs of rebuilding the existing house with retained items.
634 For these reasons, I am of the opinion that interest is payable on the McMurrays' loss and damage on and from 16 June 2017.
6.7 Is any damage or loss claimable by the McMurrays against the Bresland parties?
635 The McMurrays claimed against the Bresland parties that they are entitled to an award of damages that would put them in the position that they would have been in if the Bresland parties had not been in breach of contract, breached their duty of care in tort or had not engaged in misleading conduct. Their claim against the Bresland parties was for the full amount of their proven loss, on the basis that Bresland Consultants was contracted to procure cover for everything, for every eventuality. This obligation was in addition to any requirement to exercise reasonable care.
636 As set out above in 4.1.1, the Bresland parties concede that they failed to take reasonable care to ensure the McMurrays were insured for damage to the existing house in connection with the renovations.
637 At the outset of the trial, the McMurrays were seeking to claim against the Bresland parties costs for accommodation and storage, which items were not sought to be recovered against AIG. By the end of the trial, counsel for the McMurrays informed the court that recovery of the cost of these items was no longer pursued.[461]
638 At the end of the trial, counsel for the McMurrays also informed the court that if the court finds that AIG is liable to the McMurrays for the loss and damage to the house as renovated based on Mr Cugley's assessment of the cost of reconstruction, no identifiable loss or damage is left to be claimed by the McMurrays against the Bresland parties.[462] Having made this finding, it is not necessary to consider the argument put on behalf of the McMurrays against the Bresland parties and the relevance of the evidence given by the insurance broker, Mr Atkin, about the effect of the provisions of the Tokio Marine policy.
639 In particular, it is not necessary to consider the argument put on behalf of the McMurrays that if in the event the methodology of Mr Warne had been preferred by the court, the evidence of Mr Atkin relevantly establishes that the Tokio Marine policy had separate cover for the renovations and additional cover not taken out by Mosman Bay to cover the existing house and other structures, which required the cost of the renovations and the cost of the existing house to be costed separately. The McMurrays' claim raised a separate argument as to why the methodology of Mr Cugley should be separately applied against the Bresland parties.
640 This argument, if accepted, could have resulted in AIG being liable to the McMurrays for the total cost of the reconstruction of the house as renovated, costed by Mr Warne, and the Bresland parties would be liable for the difference between the amount assessed by Mr Cugley and Mr Warne.
641 However, I do not find it necessary to resolve the dispute between the McMurrays and the Bresland parties as to whether the effect of Mr Atkin's evidence would lead to such a finding as contended on behalf of the McMurrays.
642 For these reasons, I find that the Bresland parties are not liable to the McMurrays for any loss or damage arising out of the fire that destroyed their house on 16 January 2016.
7.0 Consequences that flow to the determination of the third and fourth party proceedings from the findings that the cause of the fire cannot be found, and AIG is required to pay damages to the McMurrays for their loss and damage to the house and other structures as renovated as at the date of the fire
7.1 AIG's third party proceedings against Mosman Bay
643 Subrogation is an equitable remedy. There is no all-embracing theory that explains when subrogation will be permitted. The equity arises from the conduct of the parties on well-settled principles and in defined circumstances which make it unconscionable for the defendant to deny the plaintiff's right.[463]
644 Subrogation may arise by contract, statute or under the general law.[464]
645 Subrogation means the transfer of rights from one person to another without assignment or assent of the person from whom the rights are transferred.[465] The principle allows one party to 'stand in the shoes' of another and exercise the rights available to that other party.
646 Subrogation applies only to indemnity insurance contracts, and not to contingency insurance contracts. A policy that compensates an insured for actual financial loss suffered is one of indemnity.[466]
647 In Insurance Commission (WA) v Kightly, Steytler P reviewed the established cases on this point, and said the equitable doctrine of subrogation:[467]
[P]revents the insured from making a double recovery, once from the insurer and once from the tortfeasor (in a tort case) in circumstances in which the insurer has undertaken to indemnify the insured against actual financial loss. It does that by giving two rights to the insurer. First, it gives to the insurer the right to require the insured to pursue any remedy available against the tortfeasor for the benefit of the insurer. Second, it gives to the insurer the right to recover from the insured any benefit received by the insured in diminution or extinction of the loss against which the insured has been indemnified. Brett LJ in Castellain v Preston [1883] UKLawRpKQB 69; (1883) 11 QBD 380 at 388 described the doctrine in the following way:
[A]s between the underwriter and the assured the underwriter is entitled to the advantage of every right of the assured, whether such right consists in contract, fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted on or already insisted on, or in any other right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal or equitable, which can be or has been exercised or has accrued, and whether such right could or could not be enforced by the insurer in the name of the assured by the exercise or acquiring of which right or condition the loss against which the assured is insured, can be, or has been diminished.
In the same case (at 401-402) Bowen LJ said, of the principle which must be applied, that:
It is a corollary of the great law of indemnity, and is to the following effect: That a person who wishes to recover for and is paid by the insurers as for a total loss, cannot take with both hands. If he has a means of diminishing the loss, the result of the use of those means belongs to the underwriters. If he does diminish the loss, he must account for the diminution to the underwriters. In Simpson v Thomson (1877-78) LR 3 App Cas 279 at 284 it is said by Lord Cairns LC:
I know of no foundation for the right of underwriters, except the well known principle of law, that where one person has agreed to indemnify another, he will, on making good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed to all the ways and means by which the person indemnified might have protected himself against or reimbursed himself for the loss.
When the nature and purpose of the equitable doctrine is understood in this way, it is easy to understand why it has often been said to apply only in cases of indemnity insurance: State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 59; (1969) 123 CLR 228 at 240-241 per Barwick CJ; and Legh-Jones (ed), MacGillivray on Insurance Law (10th ed, 2003), p 578 [22]-[25]. It is also easy to understand why it has not ordinarily been held to apply to life insurance (see, for example, Solicitors' and General Life Assurance Society v Lamb (1864) 10 LT 702; Dalby v India and London Life-Assurance Co [1854] EngR 920; (1854) 139 ER 465 at 474 (although this has been questioned by some commentators: see, for example, R Hasson, Subrogation in Insurance Law - A Critical Evaluation (1985) 5(3) Oxford J Legal Stud 416 at 418)). In Gould v Curtis [1912] UKLawRpCh 106; [1913] 3 KB 84 at 95-96, Buckley LJ said, in this regard, that:
The obligation in a policy of life insurance is not based upon any doctrine of compensating the person for the event. Money is no compensation for death. An insurance upon life is the creation in favour of a person who has an insurable interest of an obligation to pay money in an event, namely, the contingency of human life.
649 Because of the absence of any legal relationship between an insurer and other party liable to the insured in respect of the loss, unless direct action in its own name is authorised by statute,[470] the insurer cannot sue in its own name,[471] and the insured must agree to lend his or her name to the action. Any refusal to do so may be met by an order in equity requiring such cooperation.
650 In Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H & R-E & W Pty Ltd, Ipp J explained the consequences of this established rule to a claim of subrogation made by an insurer in its own name as follows:[472]
Ordinarily, the right of subrogation entitles the insurer to the advantage of every right of the assured, whether such a right is contractual, tortious, legal or equitable, "by the exercise or acquiring of which right or condition the loss against which the assured is insured, can be, or has been diminished" (per Brett LJ in Castellain v Preston [1883] UKLawRpKQB 69; (1883) 11 QBD 380 at 388).
But the right of subrogation does not entitle the insurer (in the absence of an assignment) to proceed in its own name against the alleged wrongdoer. The insurer is required to obtain authority from the assured authorising the insurer to proceed in the assured's name against the wrongdoer. If the assured refuses to give such authority the insurer can bring proceedings to compel it to do so: see Esso Petroleum Ltd v Hall Russell & Co [1989] 1 AC 643 at 663. Although no allegation as to the right of subrogation has to be made in the statement of claim, the defendant may raise the absence or inadequacy of that right in its defence; it is then for the insurer to justify its right to proceed in the name of the assured. The other side of the coin is that, where an insurer sues an alleged wrongdoer in its own name, purporting - wrongly - to exercise the right of subrogation, the third party may defend the claim by disputing the existence of any right on the part of the insurer to so bring the action in question: Esso Petroleum Ltd v Hall Russell & Co.
In Lord Napier & Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713 it was held that the right of subrogation arises from an implied promise by the assured, in the policy of insurance, to allow the insurer to take proceedings against the wrongdoer (who causes loss covered by the policy) in the assured's name. Thus the right arises in law, albeit that it is enforceable in equity to the extent necessary to reimburse the insurer who has indemnified the assured against the loss.
651 Because a party seeking equity must do equity, the subrogated insurer may, by the withholding of the remedy, be prevented from pursuing its right of subrogation where it has no real right to subrogation as to the particular claim, or where it is acting unjustly or inequitably towards the defendant or the insured.[473]
652 An insurer under a contract of indemnity insurance is entitled, once it has indemnified the insured for the loss concerned, to receive and exercise all rights accruing to the insured (in the insured's name) by virtue of the circumstances of the loss or by which the loss can be diminished.[474]
7.1.2 Is AIG's claim against Mosman Bay in the third party proceedings justiciable?
653 AIG argues that if the McMurrays have proved their entitlement to an indemnity under the AIG policy for the loss and damage to the house and other structures, including the renovations, they are entitled to be subrogated to the McMurrays' rights against Mosman Bay, pursuant to the express terms of the contract entered into by the McMurrays and Mosman Bay dated 16 February 2015.
654 Although Mosman Bay filed on 23 April 2019 an amended defence to AIG's amended statement of claim, and a counterclaim against AIG, Mosman Bay has not taken part in the proceedings since 18 March 2020.
655 In AIG's amended statement of claim against Mosman Bay, it pleads that if the Court determines that the Contract Works Exclusion clause does not apply to exclude the McMurrays' claim under the policy, such that AIG is required to indemnify the McMurrays in respect of the fire damage under the policy, then AIG will be subrogated to the McMurrays' rights against Mosman Bay as pleaded at pars 10 to 29.[475]
10 The Plaintiffs, as owner, and Mosman Bay, as contractor, entered into a contract on 16 February 2015 (the Construction Contract) in respect of "works" to the House described as "Renovation & Minor Additions" (the Works).
11 It was a term of the Construction Contract that Mosman Bay would, from the time it was given possession of the site of the House to the day the architect issued the notice of practical completion of the Works, bear the risk of loss of, or damage to, among other things:
(a) the Works; and
(b) any structure on the site before Mosman Bay took possession of the site (Existing Structures),
12 It was a term of the Construction Contract that Mosman Bay must, while it bears the risks described in clause D1, including those alleged in paragraph 11 above, indemnify the Plaintiffs in respect of any liability arising from negligence or breach of contract or breach of statutory duty by Mosman Bay or any of its employees, agents, licensees or subcontractors (cl D2.1).
13. It was a term of the Construction Contract that Mosman Bay would take out and maintain insurance naming itself, its subcontractors and the Plaintiffs as insureds against loss of or damage to the items referred to in subclause D1.4, including, among other things, the Works and the Existing Structures (cl E2.1).
657 In pars 27 to 29 AIG then pleads against Mosman Bay:
27 Mosman Bay procured insurance from Tokio Marine in respect of the works to the House under the Construction Contract comprising Annual Projects Construction and Legal Liability Policy number E108357-113910 (the Contract Works Policy).
28 In breach of the term of the Construction Contract alleged in paragraph 13 above, the Contract Works Policy did not provide insurance to Mosman Bay or the Plaintiffs against loss or damage to Existing Structures.
29 The Plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage by reason of that breach.
(a) The cost of proceeding against Mosman Bay, which would have been avoided if Tokio Marine had been liable for damage to Existing Structures.
(b) To the extent that Mosman Bay is unable to meet any award of damages in respect of the loss and damage alleged at paragraph 26 above referable to Existing Structures, any such deficiency which would have been met by Tokio Marine if it had been liable for damage to Existing Structures.
658 In its prayer for relief, AIG claims against Mosman Bay a declaration that Mosman Bay is liable to the McMurrays in respect of the fire damage and seeks an order that Mosman Bay pay damages to the McMurrays in respect of the fire damage plus interest. It also seeks an order for costs.
659 In support of its claim of subrogation against Mosman Bay, AIG points out that cl 13 of Section VII of the McMurrays home policy provides:[477]
In the event of any payment under this Policy, We shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to all of Your... rights of recovery in respect of the payment. You... shall execute all papers required and shall do everything necessary to secure any rights, including the execution of any documents necessary to enable Us effectively to bring suit in the name of You... whether such acts shall be or become necessary before or after payment by Us.
660 The McMurrays have not instituted any proceedings against Mosman Bay. Despite the fact that AIG pleads that Mosman Bay is liable to the McMurrays, AIG brings this action in its own name, and not in the name of the McMurrays.
661 The McMurrays bring an action against AIG for damages for breach of contract and they also seek in their prayer for relief a declaration that, in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy, AIG is liable to indemnify them in connection with loss and damage caused to the house by the fire on 16 January 2016.[478]
662 The McMurrays argue that AIG is not entitled to the benefit of the equitable doctrine of subrogation, having decided to deny indemnity under its policy to the McMurrays, and expose itself to a suit or an action in damages, the result of the McMurrays' action against it. Thus, it is said, AIG has not indemnified anyone, and it follows that they have no subrogation rights against anyone.
663 The argument put on behalf the McMurrays is in part correct. The claim made against Mosman Bay by AIG must fail.
664 First, AIG cannot institute a subrogated claim in its own name. In the absence of any evidence that the McMurrays have assigned their rights to AIG, AIG can only institute a subrogated action against Mosman Bay in the McMurrays' names, as they are the insured. It is a derivative action whereby the insured is the person who obtains judgment, which can be satisfied only by payment to her or him, or her or his agent.
665 Second, pursuant to cl 13 of Section VII of the policy, no entitlement to subrogate any claim is conferred upon AIG until it has made a payment to the McMurrays, pursuant to its contractual obligations owed to the McMurrays to provide an indemnity for their loss and damage to the house and other structures as a result of the fire.
666 For these reasons, AIG's claim against Mosman Bay in the third party proceedings should be dismissed.
667 The effect of part of the McMurrays' argument appears to be that no indemnity on the part of AIG can arise because if the court makes a finding that AIG to liable to the McMurrays in damages for breach of contract, and makes an order requiring AIG to pay damages, the payment by AIG as required by the order cannot constitute a payment made pursuant to an insurer's requirement to indemnify an insured. If this is the point that is sought to be made by the McMurrays, it appears not to be supported by authority. Although it is not necessary to express a concluded view on this point, as it is clear that AIG has no basis at this point in time to bring a subrogated action against Mosman Bay in its own name. However, because the issue was raised on behalf of the McMurrays, I offer the following observations by way of obiter.
668 In Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd,[479] the respondent insurer made a claim for recovery of an undivided sum it had paid in settlement of an action. It was argued that the total sum paid by the insurer pursuant to a deed of release entered into in proceedings where the insurer had denied liability for the insurance claim except in respect of a payment of one sum that was expressed to be an indemnity payment. It was argued that the whole of the settlement sum was not made by the insurer in relation to an indemnity for loss under the policy.[480] It was also submitted that the court should only decline to adjust the apportionment of funds by reference to equitable principles where the parties expressly disavow their subrogated right or expressly state that a payment was not by way of indemnity, neither of which the insurer submitted were present.[481]
669 This argument was rejected by Allsop CJ. His Honour found the relevant question is whether it can be taken (whether from express words or inferred or implied from the circumstances) that the payment or some part of it was mutually intended to be an indemnity for the insured loss and in that sense be under the policy.[482] In considering whether the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal delivered by McLachlin JA in Wellington Insurance Co Ltd v Armac Diving Services Ltd,[483] conflicted with the basal authority of the Privy Council in a Queensland appeal, King v Victoria Insurance Company Limited,[484] Allsop CJ said:[485]
The expression of the matter by McLachlin JA in Wellington at 465 can be seen to accord with King as far as it goes: Subrogation arises if payment is made even if not legally required under the policy, if it was honestly intended to be in satisfaction of a loss under the policy. There is, however, nothing in King which requires the fashioning of a rule based on, and limited to, the precise facts of King: that is, one limited to circumstances where the parties (mistakenly) believed the policy to apply, and honestly paid under the policy on that belief. The likely breadth of circumstances of bona fide settlement of insurance claims is wider than that.
Thus, certainly where there is no dispute as to coverage, and the parties to the contract of insurance honestly intend a satisfaction of or reduction of loss under the policy, the strict legalities of contractual cover will not prevent the equity arising. As noted by the authors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, LexisNexis, 2015) at 387 [9-290], subrogation as an equitable principle arises to give effect to the equities between the parties on payment rather than in working out their strict contractual rights. Although McCardie J in John Edward and Company v Motor Union Insurance Company Limited [1922] 2 KB 249 said at 255 'the essence of the matter is that subrogation springs not from payment only but from actual payment conjointly with the fact that it is made pursuant to the basic and original contract of indemnity', in the light of King, his Lordship is to be understood as concluding 'pursuant to a bona fide and reasonable belief that it is required by the basic and original contract of indemnity and there is such a contract': see Meagher, Gummow and Lehane (2015) at 387 [9‑290].
Wellington is not inconsistent with King. It is clear that there need not strictly be liability under the indemnity policy. There must, however, be a policy of indemnity out of which the right of indemnity springs: State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 59; 123 CLR 228 at 240 - 241, together with payment: John Edwards. A bona fide (even if mistaken) belief of the application of the policy and a payment thereunder will also suffice to raise the equity: King. If the parties are in dispute as to the extent of response of a policy there is no reason in equity or in principle why moneys paid in a bona fide compromise of a claim made under the policy should not be able to be treated as giving rise to the equity of subrogation to the extent that the payment can be seen as mutually intended to reduce the loss claimed under the policy of indemnity, by acceptance in the compromise of the insured's claim, even if the primary position of the insurer (which may in fact be correct) is that it is not liable to the extent claimed and to the extent paid under the compromise. It is difficult to see why the same conclusion should not apply to the compromise of a dispute as to whether the policy responds at all, at least to the extent that the payment can be seen as ex gratia, the insurer reserving its rights. This expression of the matter conforms with how Jacobs JA (with whom Mason JA (as the Chief Justice then was) and Manning JA agreed) expressed the matter in Sydney Turf Club v Crowley [1971] 1 NSWLR 724 at 730:
If an insured claimed to be indemnified by one insurer and that insurer disclaims liability, but honestly and by way of ex gratia payment with reservation of his rights pays the amount of the claim, then he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the real insurer.
Disputes are common between insurers and insureds about matters such as whether a policy applies, whether a claim can be refused, what is the proper amount of indemnity for a given casualty, even whether the policy can be avoided or the insurer's position determined on a hypothesis different from the circumstances of the policy's creation (see, for instance, ss 28(3), 29(3) and 29(6) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)). Often, indeed usually, such disputes will be the subject of compromise and agreement. Sometimes significant legal and other associated costs will be expended by the parties in assessing, formulating and pressing their contentions. It may not be easy to formulate a form of compromise which contains provision for a payment that can fairly be seen to be referable to the policy - whether by admission that payment falls within an obligation to pay, by recognition that there is doubt about the obligation to pay but the parties will compromise their claims by agreeing that there is an obligation to pay, or by agreeing that there is no admission of an obligation to pay but nevertheless payment ex gratia will be made reserving rights as if it did. The above is not exhaustive. The circumstances are countless. Where a payment is made to resolve such a dispute about coverage, the question arises whether any payment or some part of any payment by the insurer engages the doctrine of subrogation. The analysis derived from King and Sydney Turf Club is practical and built on considerations of equity and commercial good sense.
The extent to which a payment by the insurer is to be characterised as payment of indemnity under the policy is a matter of financial importance to both insurer and insured. To the extent that the insurer pays under the policy and the insured is indemnified under the policy (the two being equivalent) each has an interest in any recovery action and any proceeds of recovery.
The equities of subrogation and of recoupment depend upon substance and not form, and upon the practicalities of application of commercial good sense and right behaviour, including the duty of good faith. The question of the meaning of legal instruments of compromise is important, but may not be comprehensively determinative.
From King and Sydney Turf Club, and recognising the purpose of the equity based on the principle of indemnity, the conception of payment under the policy in circumstances where there has been a dispute about coverage can be articulated as follows: Was the payment (and in what amount) made in such circumstances as to lead to the conclusion that the parties to the insurance policy and to the dispute honestly and bona fide treated the payment (whether or not disputed or compromised) as a payment representing a reduction of the loss covered by the policy and so indemnity under the policy, and so negate any proposition that the payment was unrelated to the policy and voluntary or that it was related to some other consideration bargained for that is not capable of characterisation as indemnity under the policy.
670 In this matter, for the reasons that I have given, it is clear that the relief sought by the McMurrays in their statement of claim against AIG should be granted.
671 It follows, therefore, that a declaration should be made in the terms sought by the McMurrays, that AIG is liable to indemnify the McMurrays (in connection with loss and damage caused to the house by the fire), and an order requiring AIG to pay the McMurrays damages for breach of the contract of insurance.
672 When the observations of Allsop CJ in Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Limited are considered, it appears that the consequence of the making of a declaration and order in these proceedings, if followed by a payment made by AIG to the McMurrays in satisfaction of the order requiring payment of damages, is that it is doubtful an argument could then be made that the payment could not be properly characterised as a payment representing an indemnity as required by the express terms of the home policy. This is because the payment of damages for breach of the contract of insurance could only be said to flow from the court's declaration that AIG was liable to indemnify the McMurrays, as the breach itself was a breach of the obligation to indemnify.
7.2 The fourth party proceedings - Mosman Bay's action against Holgersson
673 In the fourth party proceedings against Holgersson, Mosman Bay pleads in par 26 of its amended statement of claim against Holgersson that if the cause of the fire was due to the failure of the painters (defined as employees, subcontractors or agents of Holgersson)[486] to exercise due care and skill, then Holgersson, by the acts or omissions of the Painters breached: (a) the implied term of the Interior Painting Subcontract[487] (to perform the Interior Painting Subcontract with due care and skill); and (b) its duty of care to Mosman Bay.[488]
674 Mosman Bay pleads in par 27 of its amended statement of claim against Holgersson that as a result of Holgersson's pleaded breaches of duty in par 26, it pleads it has suffered loss and damage, and will suffer further loss and damage if it is held to be liable to the McMurrays.
675 Although Mosman Bay's plea in par 26 is a plea relating to loss and damage in respect of liability to the McMurrays, in the absence of any pleaded action by the McMurrays against Mosman Bay this plea can only be understood to be operative if AIG was found liable to the McMurrays, and, in turn, Mosman Bay was found liable to AIG on the basis that Mosman Bay was found liable to indemnify the McMurrays in respect of the fire damage because the cause of the fire was the spontaneous combustion of rags, infused with Loba Oil in the green rubbish bin in the dining room.[489]
676 Having found in 4.5.3 that it cannot be established that Loba Oil soaked rags in the green rubbish bin in the dining room caused the fire that destroyed McMurrays house on 16 January 2016, Mosman Bay's claim against Holgersson must fail.
677 For these reasons, an order should be made that the fourth party proceedings against Holgersson be dismissed.
Mosman Bay Constructions Pty Ltd progress claims and list of works comprising the renovation works
Floor plan of the original ground floor of the McMurrays' house as built dated 19 March 2003 and showing revisions on 1 July 2003
Floor plan prepared by the McMurrays' architects and interior designer showing renovations to the ground floor of the McMurrays' house, including timber finishes, dated 11 August 2015
Mr Thomas' markings in red on a floor plan of the ground floor of the house, showing location of bin and painting work in the entry
A photograph of the type of green rubbish bins that were located on each level of the house, including the dining room
A photograph of the dining room which shows a round flat circle (said by forensic fire investigators to indicate where the green rubbish bin had stood during the fire) in the middle of the entry of the dining room
A Nearmap view showing the location of the tennis court, in between the McMurrays' house and the house to the western side where the CCTV camera was located, and also showing the McMurrays' house after it had been damaged by the fire and the house on the eastern side of the McMurrays' house and the vacant block
Copies of a series of photographs that show views of the front and rear of the house after the fire
A photograph of the dining room entry and sitting room of the McMurrays' house taken after the fire, with the base of the remains of the green rubbish bin placed on top of the round flat circle in the entry
A copy of the plaintiffs' further amended schedule of loss and damage, subtitled 'house with renovations'
A copy of the list of owner supplied goods and services for the renovation work
I certify that the preceding paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CITATION : MCMURRAY and JENNIFER GRACE MCMURRAY -v- AIG INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LTD [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 (S)
BETWEEN : FREDERICK WILLIAM MCMURRAY and JENNIFER GRACE MCMURRAY
HANS BO KRISTIAN HOLGERSSON trading as HOLGERSSONS COMPLETE HOME SERVICE
Costs - Applications for indemnity and special costs orders - Applications for costs of successful defendant and successful fourth party against unsuccessful defendant in main proceedings - Sanderson and Bullock orders - Turns on own facts
Ben-Pelech v Royle [2020] WASCA 168 (S)
Blatchford v Laine [2018] WASC 207 (S)
Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S)
Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S); (2003) 28 WAR 95
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [2018] WASC 144
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 2] [2018] WASC 391
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452 (S)
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 4] [2020] WASC 210
McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300
Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S)
Swansdale Pty Ltd v Whitcrest Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 129 (S)
Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114
678 On 16 January 2016, and just before renovation works were finally completed, a house owned by plaintiffs, Frederick William McMurray and Jennifer Grace McMurray (the McMurrays), was destroyed by a fire and had to be demolished. The McMurrays' main claim was against the first defendant, AIG Insurance Australia Ltd, who insured the house.
679 The trial of the main proceedings, the third party proceedings and the fourth party proceedings was substantially about one issue of fact, and that is what was the cause of the fire, which occupied the majority of the time taken in the trial, and from which complex issues of law flowed.
680 There were two competing hypotheses for the cause of fire. The first was that the fire was caused by the self‑heating of Loba Oil soaked rags in a green rubbish bin in the dining room, which were used by painters the day before the night of the fire to apply Loba Oil to timber panelling. The second competing hypothesis was that an unknown person entered the house on the night of the fire, and in the course of entry either accidentally or intentionally lit a fire inside the house.
681 The three main issues for determination in the proceedings were as follows:[490]
(1) Is the court able to determine how the fire started, and what was the cause of the fire? In particular:
(a) did the fire start in the green rubbish bin in the entry to the dining room;
(b) is there sufficient admissible evidence for the court to determine on the balance of probabilities that the cause of the fire was the self-ignition of oily rags in the bin in the entry to the dining room of the house;
(c) is there another possible cause of the fire if the court accepts there is some evidence from which an inference could be drawn that an intruder may have entered the house on the night in question and started a fire in, or in the vicinity of, the bin in the entry to the dining room; or
(d) is there insufficient admissible evidence before the court to determine the probable cause of the fire other than to find the origin of the fire was in the green rubbish bin?
(2) What is the proper construction of the Contracts Works Exclusion clause in the AIG policy?
(3) What is the quantum of the loss and damage suffered by the McMurrays?
682 The legal issues raised in the trial went to the proper interpretation of the express terms of the contract of insurance between AIG and the McMurrays; the doctrine of subrogation; the quantum of the McMurrays' loss and damage; evidential issues about whether the forensic fire investigators were qualified to give expert evidence, and the admissibility of part of their evidence and admissibility of documentary records.
683 The McMurrays were successful in the trial of the action (the main proceedings) against the first defendant, AIG, in their claim in contract for an indemnity pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy for the loss and damage to their house, including renovation works carried out by the first third party, Mosman Bay Construction Pty Ltd (in liq) (Mosman Bay), on grounds that AIG was unable to prove that it was entitled to rely upon a contract works exclusion clause of the contract of insurance.[491]
685 The consequence of the McMurrays obtaining judgment against AIG for the full amount of their proven loss and damage is that the action against the second defendants, Russell Bresland and Bresland Consultants Pty Ltd (the Bresland parties) (the insurance brokers who arranged the McMurrays' policy of insurance with AIG), in effect fell away.
686 At the time a fire destroyed the entire house including the renovations, Mosman Bay had taken out an insurance policy to cover the renovation works with the third defendant, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd (Tokio Marine). Prior to the trial of the action, the McMurrays settled their claim against Tokio Marine for $1,476,000, being $1,264,050 for contribution to loss and interest, and $211,950 for contribution to costs. Following the settlement, the McMurrays' claim against Tokio Marine was dismissed by consent.[494] The settlement amount paid to the McMurrays by Tokio Marine was less than the full value of the McMurrays' claim against Tokio Marine, which was $1,963,819.00, being $1,378,788 for their loss, $303,031 for interest, and $282,000 for legal costs.[495] As a result of the settlement agreement, Tokio Marine ceased to be a party to the proceedings, and Tokio Marine's third party proceedings against Mosman Bay were dismissed on 23 January 2020.[496]
687 The McMurrays did not join Mosman Bay as a defendant to the main proceedings. AIG instituted third party proceedings against Mosman Bay and Tokio Marine. Tokio Marine caused Mosman Bay to join Mr Hans Bo Kristian Holgersson who, together with another person, contracted with Mosman Bay to carry out painting works as part of the renovations.
688 Prior to the trial, AIG discontinued its third party proceedings against Tokio Marine.
689 In March 2020, Taylor Smart, lawyers for Mosman Bay, gave notice that they ceased to act for Mosman Bay, because Mosman Bay could no longer afford to fund its defence in the third party proceedings and prosecute the fourth party proceedings against Mr Holgersson.
690 Mr Holgersson wanted the fourth party proceedings to remain on foot because collateral attacks had been made by AIG and the Bresland parties in their defences to the McMurrays' claims and Mr Holgersson wanted to defend those attacks.
691 In AIG's and the Bresland parties' defences, allegations were made about who, how and what caused the fire that caused the total destruction of the house, including the renovations and its other structures. Those allegations related to the acts of Mr Holgersson and others engaged by him to carry out the painting works.
692 On 18 March 2020, upon Mosman Bay having filed an undertaking on 18 March 2020 that it would not seek to remove itself from the proceedings if an order was granted giving its lawyers leave to cease to act, the court made an order enabling Taylor Smart to cease to be the solicitors acting for Mosman Bay. The effect of the undertaking given by Mosman Bay was that it was to remain a party but not take any further part in the proceedings. On this basis, Mr Holgersson, in turn, gave an undertaking to Mosman Bay, prior to Taylor Smart ceasing to act, that he would not seek any orders for costs against Mosman Bay, on and from 17 March 2020.
693 Subsequently, an order was made on 4 August 2020 that evidence in the fourth party proceedings and the third party proceedings be evidence in the main proceedings, and evidence in the main proceedings be evidence in the first third party proceedings and first fourth party proceedings.
1.2.1 The McMurrays' costs of the action against AIG
694 The McMurrays seek an order that AIG pay to them their costs of the action against AIG (including any reserved costs) on an indemnity basis or, in the alternative, to be taxed without regard to scale limits for the following items: writ of summons; statement of claim; giving discovery; inspection; proceedings in chambers including obtaining consent orders; preparation of case; trial - fee on brief; trial - second and each successive day of trial; trial (instructing legal practitioner attending trial); trial (attending on reserved judgment); appeals - preparing appeal for hearing; and appeals - counsel fee on hearing, including preparation and pre-trial, mediation, conferrals or other conferences.
695 AIG do not dispute that it should pay the McMurrays' costs including any reserved costs in the McMurrays' action against it,[497] and although it contends that there is no basis for an indemnity order, and does not oppose the making of a special costs order, it argues that the McMurrays' costs should be taxed without regard to the scale limits for:
(a) preparation of case in so far as total hours and total amount are concerned, but the limits in respects of the hourly rates of practitioners be taxed in accordance with the scale limits;
(b) trial - fee on brief and first day of trial; and
(c) the hourly rate of counsel for work done by the McMurrays' counsel, Mr Hancy, under the scale items of trial - second and each successive day of trial; trial - attending on reserved judgment; pre-trial, mediation, conferrals or other conferences.
1.2.2 The McMurrays' costs of the action against the Bresland parties and Tokio Marine, and the Bresland parties' costs of defending the action against the McMurrays
696 The McMurrays seek an order that AIG pay their costs of the action against the Bresland parties,[498] including any reserved costs. In the alternative, the McMurrays seek an order that the Bresland parties pay their costs of the action against the Bresland parties. The McMurrays contend the Bresland parties should bear their own costs of the action, or recover them from AIG.
697 The McMurrays also seek an order that AIG pay the costs of the action against Tokio Marine, including any reserved costs in that action. The McMurrays contend that if such an order is made, requiring AIG to pay the costs of the McMurrays' claim against Tokio Marine, the amount of costs recovered by the McMurrays from Tokio Marine will partially satisfy the costs liability of AIG.
698 AIG opposes these orders, and seeks orders that:
(a) the Bresland parties pay the McMurrays' costs of the action against the Bresland parties;
(b) there be no order as to the Bresland parties' costs of the action brought against them by the McMurrays; and
(c) no order be made in relation to the McMurrays' costs of the action against Tokio Marine.
699 The Bresland parties seek orders that the McMurrays pay their costs of the action, to be assessed if not agreed, and AIG indemnify the McMurrays for their liability to the Bresland parties. In the alternative to these orders, the Bresland parties seek an order that AIG pay their costs of the McMurrays' action, to be assessed if not agreed.
1.3 Costs orders sought in the third party and fourth party proceedings
700 AIG seeks an order that it pay Mosman Bay's costs of the third party proceedings and fourth party proceedings, to be taxed. Mosman Bay, which is now in liquidation, agrees that this order should be made.
701 Mosman Bay also seeks an order that AIG pay Mr Holgersson's costs of the fourth party proceedings, to be taxed. Further, Mosman Bay seeks an order that AIG pay its costs of the application for costs in the third party and fourth party proceedings, to be taxed.
702 Mr Holgersson seeks an order that AIG pay his costs of the fourth party proceedings, to be assessed if not agreed, on an indemnity basis, or alternatively a special costs order, as follows:
(a) on a solicitor-own client basis, applying item 35 of the 2020 scale 'other work';
(b) alternatively, without regard to:
(i) the limits on the daily and hourly rates in Table A of the relevant Legal Profession (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determinations for Senior Counsel (Mr Matthew Zilko SC and Mr Joshua Thomson SC); and
(ii) the scale limits for the following items (references to items are to the 2020 scale);
(A) senior counsel fee on brief and at trial, including closing submissions (items 22(a) ‑ (d) and (g)); and
703 If Mr Holgersson is unsuccessful in his claim for costs against AIG, he seeks orders that Mosman Bay pay his costs of the fourth party proceedings until 16 March 2020, including all reserved costs, and thereafter there be no order as to his costs, subject to a right of indemnity from Tokio Marine, to be assessed on the same basis as he seeks orders against AIG. To the extent that leave is required of the court to make any orders against Mosman Bay, Mr Holgersson seeks an order that leave be granted.
704 AIG contends there should be no order as to Mr Holgersson's costs of the action generally, or the fourth party proceedings.
705 Tokio Marine (which is now a non‑party to the proceedings) opposes the orders Mr Holgersson seeks against it. Tokio Marine contends that Mr Holgersson's application in relation to costs against it be dismissed, and that Mr Holgersson pay its costs of opposing the application for costs.
2.0 The indemnity costs orders sought by the McMurrays and Mr Holgersson against AIG
706 The basis of the McMurrays' claim for indemnity costs against AIG is that AIG's defence to their contractual claim of indemnity was hopeless, and the way in which AIG handled their claim, and its conduct in the litigation was unreasonable.
707 The basis of Mr Holgersson's claim for indemnity costs against AIG is that AIG persisted in what should, on a proper consideration, have been seen to be a hopeless case in relation to its spontaneous combustion hypothesis.
708 The principles relevant to the grant of costs on an indemnity basis are well-established and were comprehensively summarised by the Court of Appeal in Swansdale Pty Ltd v Whitcrest Pty Ltd as follows:[499]
1. A superior court, in its inherent jurisdiction, may make an indemnity costs order (see also Supreme Court Act 1935 s 37, and Legal Profession Act 2008 s 280).
2. An indemnity costs order departs from the usual costs disposition order, whereby costs are awarded on a party/party basis: EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59.
3. The court's discretion as to the making of an indemnity costs order is a discretion that must be exercised judicially. In Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397, 400 Woodward J said:
'Courts in both the United Kingdom and Australia have long accepted that solicitor and client costs can properly be awarded in appropriate cases, where "there is some special or unusual feature in the case to justify the court exercising its discretion in that way".' (emphasis added)
4. To obtain an indemnity costs order, it is not the case that the successful party needs to show a collateral purpose, or establish some species of fraud against the unsuccessful party. In J‑Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) (No 2) [1993] FCA 70; (1993) 46 IR 301 303 French J by reference to the observations of Woodward J in Fountain Selected Meats, said:
'It is sufficient, in my opinion, to enliven the discretion to award such costs that, for whatever reason, a party persists in what should on proper consideration be seen to be a hopeless case.'
5. Furthermore, in Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (Unreported, FCA, 3 May 1991) (referred to by Ipp J in Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190, 191) French J observed:
'The categories in which the discretion may be exercised are not closed.'
6. Competing principles need to be balanced in assessing the making of a potential award of indemnity costs. In Quancorp Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1999] WASCA 101 [7], Wheeler J observed:
'On the one hand, a party should not be discouraged, by the prospect of an unusual costs order, from persisting in an action where its success is not certain. Uncertainty is inherent in many areas of law, and the law changes with changing circumstances. It is inappropriate that a case be too readily characterised as "hopeless" so as to justify an award of indemnity costs to the successful party. However, where a party has by its conduct unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation, it is appropriate that the party so acting should bear that increased cost. Persisting in a case which can only be characterised as "hopeless" is an example of the type of conduct which may lead the court to a view that the party whose conduct gave rise to the costs should bear them in full.'
7. An indemnity costs order may be appropriate in situations which are shown to involve some element of improper, or at least unreasonable, conduct by a party or the party's legal advisers: see Colgate‑Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225, 233 (Sheppard J), referred to by Pullin J in Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S); (2003) 28 WAR 95 [9].
8. A properly crafted special costs order may obviate the need for an indemnity costs order, where components of cost scale items are allowed above the applicable scale ceiling: see Flotilla [20] ‑ [24].
9. An indemnity costs order may not be appropriate if the claimed costs would be likely to be recovered under the standard order for party and party costs, or under a special order raising or removing a scale ceiling allowance: Flotilla [11]. In Unioil (No. 2) (193), Ipp J observed:
'However, counsel for the plaintiffs was unable to identify any costs so incurred that would not be covered by an order for party and party costs. An order for indemnity costs on this ground is therefore not warranted.'
10. Nonetheless, an indemnity costs order will constitute an appropriate sanction marking the disapproval of improper or unreasonable conduct: see Brookvista Pty Ltd v Meloni [2009] WASCA 180 [32], Flotilla [25]. In Flotilla Pullin J said [26]:
'A solicitor should not, in my view, resort to an application for an indemnity costs order merely to secure the recovery which could be achieved by a properly formulated special costs order, unless the unsuccessful party's conduct is genuinely to be impugned by the successful party.'
2.2 Should indemnity costs orders be made against AIG?
710 For the reasons that follow, the conduct of AIG, and its legal advisers, in the proceedings was not such as to warrant the censure of an indemnity costs order.
711 The basis of the McMurrays' and Mr Holgersson's argument that AIG's defence to their action was hopeless is there was no admissible evidence to support the facts and factual allegations relied upon by AIG. I do not agree.
712 Although the court found that there was no direct evidence of the cause of the fire, there was admissible circumstantial evidence that oil soaked rags have a propensity to self‑heat and cause surrounding materials to ignite and then to cause a fire.[500] There was also admissible evidence that there were some materials that may have been capable of being ignited in the green bin in the dining room on the night of the fire.[501]
713 However, whether there were Loba Oil soaked rags in the green bin in the dining room on the night of the fire was an issue that turned in part on the oral evidence of lay witnesses who were working at the house the day before the night of the fire, and consideration of the admissibility of the evidence of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services investigator Mr Bell.
714 As to the admissibility of Mr Bell's evidence about what he was told on the morning after the fire about whether the painters had put any oily rags in the green bin, the arguments put by senior counsel on behalf of AIG on this issue were complex, raised issues of statutory construction of s 79C of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) and the principle of res gestae. Although these arguments failed, they could not be characterised as hopeless or bound to fail.
715 As AIG points out in its written submissions, it was AIG's case that the point of origin of the fire was in the green rubbish bin in the dining room (which was disputed by the McMurrays), and this fact was found to be proven.[502]
716 AIG's case did not turn solely on whether the cause of the fire was the self‑heating of Loba Oil soaked rags and the combustion of materials in the green rubbish bin. Its case also relied upon an argument that the fire in the green rubbish bin, irrespective of its cause, was 'damage' connected with the Works, or the Contract Works or Free Issue Materials, so as to engage the Contract Works Exclusion clause in the contract of insurance.[503] Although this construction of the Contract Works Exclusion clause was rejected, the argument put by AIG could not have been said to be not arguable. The argument put by AIG on this point required lengthy consideration.[504]
717 In addition, AIG argued that the Contract Works Exclusion clause excluded loss and damage to the renovations, which argument, if successful, would have resulted in AIG only being liable to indemnify the McMurrays for the house as unrenovated.[505] The argument put by senior counsel for AIG on this point also could not be characterised as hopeless or without merit.
718 I also do not accept the McMurrays' submission that there were aspects of the conduct of AIG's lawyers that manifested AIG's refusal to accept that it did not have the evidence to justify refusing to indemnify the McMurrays, by:
(a) seeking expert evidence from Mr Tong that was based on assumptions not supported by evidence; and
(b) seeking, at a late stage, to adduce expert evidence from Mr Visotin.
719 As to Mr Tong, he produced five reports, each of which were tendered into evidence. When he gave evidence, he made it clear that he regarded the opinions stated by him in his fourth and fifth reports not to be opinions based upon his own investigations and the evidence that was available to him at the time he compiled the first three reports.[506] This is because in the fourth and fifth reports, he was asked to express opinions upon assumptions of assumed facts posed by AIG's lawyers, which facts and assumptions were found not to be admissible because the factual basis of the opinion had not been established by the evidence. Put another way, these facts failed the basis rule.[507] Given that these two reports occupied very little time or argument in the proceedings, it cannot be found that the production of these reports would justify an indemnity costs order.
720 As to the application to adduce expert evidence from Mr Visotin, this application was heard on 3 June 2020. On the same day, an order was made to dismiss AIG's application, and for it to pay the costs of the plaintiffs, the Bresland parties and Mr Holgersson. In addition, order 9 of the order granted liberty to the McMurrays to apply for a special costs order (in respect of the application). Importantly, the McMurrays did not seek liberty to apply for an indemnity costs order in respect of the application. For this reason, there are no grounds for applying for an indemnity costs order in respect of the application. In any event, the application did not raise complex issues and involved the application of well‑established principles.[508] Nor were any findings made by the court in rejecting the application that the conduct of AIG in bringing the application was unreasonable.[509]
721 The McMurrays also complain that one of AIG's instructing solicitors impeded the process of the trial by attempting to prohibit communications between a witness and counsel for the McMurrays and senior counsel for Mr Holgersson by telling the witness they did not have to speak to them. Whilst I agree that this conduct was in itself inappropriate, as it is well‑established there is 'no property' in a witness, this issue was raised in open court and was resolved by a short adjournment to enable counsel for the McMurrays and senior counsel for Mr Holgersson to speak to the witness.[510] Consequently, it cannot be found that this conduct increased the costs of the proceedings, or otherwise extended the duration of the proceedings.
722 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that any indemnity costs orders should be made against AIG.
3.0 The applications for special costs orders by the McMurrays and Mr Holgersson
723 The principles which govern when it is appropriate for the court to make a special costs order are not in dispute. These principles were summarised in McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] as follows:[511]
By s 280(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), a party's recoverable costs are confined, in effect, by the scale limits. Section 280(2) operates as an exception to s 280(1) of the Legal Profession Act.
Section 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act provides that a court may make a special costs order where it is of the opinion that 'the amount of costs allowable in respect of a matter under a costs determination is inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter'.
Section 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act is protective of the successful party to the litigation and, on that account, also serves the administration of justice by facilitating, within the limits imposed by the statutory criteria, the operation of the general principle that a successful party is entitled to its costs of the litigation. Even where orders are made pursuant to s 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act, it nevertheless remains the task of the taxing officer to consider the reasonableness of, and necessity for the work undertaken, and to make a judgment about the remuneration reasonably required.
The court must form an opinion about two matters before it can make an order pursuant to s 280(2). First, it must form an opinion that the maximum amount allowable under the relevant scale item is inadequate, in that, there is a fairly arguable case that on taxation the costs allowed by the applicable legal costs determination may properly be allowed in an amount that is greater than the limit imposed by the costs determination. Second, it must form an opinion that the amount allowed is inadequate because of the 'unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter'. This requires that there be a causal connection between the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter and the inadequacy of the costs allowable under the relevant costs determination.
An assessment of whether an amount of costs allowed in respect of a matter under a legal costs determination is inadequate, is not to be determined by the court in a precise way.
724 If the preconditions for making a special costs order are met, then the court may do all or any of the following:[512]
(a) order the payment of costs above those fixed by the determination;
(b) fix higher limits of costs than those fixed in the determination;
(c) remove limits on costs fixed in the determination;
(d) make any order or give any direction for the purposes of enabling costs above those in the determination to be ordered or assessed.
725 In Blatchford v Laine, Vaughan J also pointed out the following propositions that are established by the authorities:[513]
First, the court is in a position to form the opinions required under s 280(2) as matters of impression, rather than science or mathematics, when it has heard the matter and is familiar with the way in which the case was conducted and the issues were litigated. While the court may be assisted by evidence as to the time spent and fees charged, the questions are quintessentially matters of impression rather than of detailed evaluation, precision or science. In particular the assessment of whether there is 'unusual difficulty, complexity or importance' is essentially a value judgment taking into account the court's experience of the usual run of civil cases.
Second, as to the first question, a 'fairly arguable' case will not be established merely because a party has incurred greater costs than those allowable under the relevant costs determination.
However, depending on the case, it may be relevant that a party has applied significantly more resources for the various steps in the litigation than those contemplated under the relevant costs determination. Viewed in the context of the difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter, that circumstance may sustain the conclusion that there is a fairly arguable case that those items and the costs allowable in respect of the matter is inadequate.
This is because, as to importance, the significance of the issues at stake is relevant to the degree of work properly and reasonably done in preparing for and presenting the case at trial. The same consideration applies where a matter is unusually difficult or complex.
Third, the court's power to make an order under s 280(2) is enlivened by satisfaction of any of the factors of 'unusual difficulty', 'complexity' or 'importance'.
Fourth, the word 'unusual' in s 280(2) qualifies only the term 'difficulty' and not the terms 'complexity' or 'importance'.
Fifth, the question of whether there is 'unusual difficulty' involves an evaluative judgment by which the court compares its experience of the particular case and the usual run of civil cases determined in the court. Indeed, that is the approach to all three descriptors. In O'Rourke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd Martin CJ stated:
'... the word "unusual"' means unusual having regard to what one might describe as the usual run of civil cases. The question is not, for example, in this case, whether this was an unusually difficult, complex or important case for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land which at the time the contract was entered into was not sub‑divided. Rather the question is whether this was an unusually difficult, complex or important case, having regard to the usual run of civil cases determined in the Supreme Court and generally in the District Court, because, of course, the Scale is generally applicable to proceedings in both Courts.'
Sixth, the question of 'importance' allows the court to have regard to the significance of the issues that arose in the litigation. Importance can arise either because of the significance of the issues to the parties or because of the significance of the issue to other prospective parties or to the public or the community generally.
Seventh, the question of unusual difficulty, complexity or importance arises in respect of the proceedings as a whole and not in respect of each individual item in the costs determination. The adjectival characteristics of unusual difficulty, complexity or importance qualify the issue, dispute or controversy before the court rather than the work done or services provided in respect of each applicable item.
Eighth, where orders are made under s 280(2)(b) or (c) the taxing officer must still consider the reasonableness of and necessity for the work undertaken and make a judgment as to the costs that ought reasonably be allowed.
Significantly, an application under s 280(2) must fail unless the court characterises the matter - ie the issue, dispute or controversy before the court - as being one or more of: (1) unusual difficulty; (2) complexity; or (3) importance.
726 AIG does not dispute that a special costs order should be made in favour of the McMurrays and Mr Holgersson[514] in respect of some items, which are as follows:
(a) in respect of the Murrays' costs:
(i) AIG accepts that, given the McMurrays' role in the proceeding (for example preparing the trial bundle), the amount of hours for the preparation of case item is likely to exceed the scale limit and should be lifted. However, AIG does not accept that the hourly rates for the solicitors should also be lifted in circumstances where no reason is given other than the fact of their rates just being higher than the scale;
(ii) given the length and complexity of the trial, AIG accepts that the trial - fee on brief item is likely to exceed the scale limit and should be lifted. In light of the fact that other parties briefed senior counsel (AIG and Mr Holgersson) and Mr Hancy's rate is less than senior counsel's rate in the scale, AIG accepts that for work performed by Mr Hancy, the hourly rate for counsel ought to be lifted. This will also affect trial second and each successive day of trial; trial (attending on reserved judgment); appeals - counsel fee on hearing including preparation; and pre-trial mediation, conferrals or other conferences. This may also affect statement of claim and proceedings in chambers. Further, AIG says the limits in respect of these items should only be lifted for work performed by Mr Hancy in respect of the hourly rate he charged;
(b) as to Mr Holgersson, AIG does not contest the uplift of the hourly rate for senior counsel for fees on brief and at trial, including closing submissions (items 22(a) ‑ (d) and (g)). However, AIG submits there is no evidence led by Mr Holgersson to enable the court to form the view that there is a fairly arguable case that, on taxation, the costs allowed for preparation of case (item 19) may properly be allowed in an amount greater than the limit imposed by the costs determination. AIG also claims that Mr Holgersson did not brief any experts and only called two lay witnesses, Mr Simpson and himself, to give evidence. Accordingly, AIG says there is no basis upon which the court could form an impression that the scale amount for preparation of the case would be insufficient.
3.2 Overview of the proceedings - were the proceedings[515] factually and legally complex, unusually difficult or important?
728 The trial of the main proceedings and the third and fourth proceedings was heard over 15 days over four weeks in August and September 2020. On 2 September 2021, judgment was delivered, together with lengthy reasons for decision. Prior to the trial, four interlocutory judgments were delivered, including a determination of a preliminary issue which was the subject of an unsuccessful appeal by Tokio Marine.
729 I agree that the matter was unusually difficult and complex in contrast to the usual run of civil cases determined in the court, having regard to the number of the legal issues that were in dispute which arose, in part, because of the number of parties in the proceedings, in particular, the fact that there were two insurers of the house and the renovations, AIG and Tokio Marine. The case also involved the consideration of a large number of documents.
730 Although the proceedings largely concerned issues of fact, in particular who or what caused the fire that destroyed the renovated house, there were complex legal issues raised in the case which included subrogation in insurance, construction of insurance contracts and commercial contracts generally and some aspects of expert evidence, and admission of some documents. However, overall, the complexity of the proceedings substantially arose out of the factual dispute as to the origin and the cause of the fire.
731 The proceedings involved a considerable number of factual disputes that related to the issue of who or what caused the fire, and the consequences of the damage to the renovated house, which Mr Blundell summarises in his affidavit as arising out of the following:[516]
(a) 26 witness statements;
(b) a number of documents in the online brief;
(c) investigation records of interviews with potential witnesses;
(d) initial investigations by the Department of Fire Emergency Services investigators;
(e) testing and experimentation of the possibility of spontaneous combustion by the fire investigators engaged by the parties;
(f) lengthy examination of CCTV, and consideration of photographic evidence;
(g) evidence of an electrical expert and a forensic locksmith;
(h) establishing the costs of the original house, the renovations and the prospective rebuild of the house as renovated, and the task of separating the costs of a completed building into its original structure prior to renovations and as renovated at the time of the fire; and
(i) collating and considering evidence in, and from experts in the fields of: fire investigation and fire cause; chemist and chemistry and spontaneous combustion; forensic locksmith evidence; electrical and wiring; quantity surveying and costs of building; and insurance broking and available insurance.
3.2.1 Assessment of the McMurrays' application for special costs orders against AIG
732 The McMurrays seek orders for particular items that the hourly and daily rates for counsel and instructing solicitors be lifted, and the hourly limits also be lifted.
733 For the reasons that I give in 4.2 of these reasons, I am satisfied that AIG should pay 50% of the McMurrays' costs of their action against the Bresland parties, but not their action against Tokio Marine.
734 Having regard to the evidence of the McMurrays' solicitor, Mr Blundell,[517] and my experience as the case manager of this matter for the past three years, and as the trial judge, I am of the opinion that there is an arguable case that a taxing officer may find the costs allowable under the relevant determinations for some of the items claimed by the McMurrays to be inadequate and that it was necessary for significantly more resources to complete the tasks allowed for under those items. This is because the intertwining factual and legal issues raised in these proceedings and the number of parties in the proceedings resulted in more time to complete the work claimed in respect of the items.
735 A total of 42 subpoenas were issued by the parties, a number of which were for the production of documents prior to trial. In turn, this led to a large number of documents being included in the trial bundle, which were only a proportion of the documents discovered, such that the amount of hours allowed by the scale for discovery (item 7), inspection (item 8) and preparation of case (item 19) is inadequate, and should be lifted.
736 With the exception of the interlocutory hearing on 3 June 2020 (which was a hearing of the application by AIG to adduce expert evidence from Mr Visotin, following which an order was made that the McMurrays have liberty to apply for a special costs order in respect of that application), it is unclear on the materials relied upon by the McMurrays (other than for the work performed by Mr Hancy) how an impression could be formed that, for any other chamber summons in the proceedings, it was necessary to incur costs in excess of the scale.
737 It is noted, however, that Mr Hancy appeared on behalf of the McMurrays on 3 June 2020 and that AIG agree that, in respect of any work performed by him in the proceedings, that work performed by him should be assessed, at the rate that he charged for that work. I agree that the time limits for proceedings in chambers in item 10(a) for the hearing of this application (being the application determined on 3 June 2020) should be lifted. This is because, as Mr Blundell points out in his affidavit, Mr Visotin's proposed evidence sought to address a new line of enquiry which was an issue not previously addressed by Mr Visotin.[518] I accept that additional work would have been necessary and more preparation time was required than the determinations for this item allow, given that a consideration of the report by Mr Visotin required a consideration of all of the expert reports by the forensic fire investigators for preparation for this hearing.
738 In addition, I note that although there have been four interlocutory judgments delivered prior to the trial, two of those judgments were the subject of the delivery of reasons for decision in respect of costs, and costs orders were made in respect of those two interlocutory decisions.
739 The first interlocutory judgment, which was the judgment on a preliminary issue delivered by Chaney J, the McMurrays' costs were reserved by an order made by consent on 9 May 2018. AIG did not participate in the hearing of the preliminary issue, nor in the appeal against the decision. The only parties that appeared in the hearing of the preliminary issue were the McMurrays, Tokio Marine and Mr Holgersson. For the reasons I give in 4.2, I am not satisfied that an order should be made that AIG pay the McMurrays' costs of their action against Tokio Marine.
740 In addition, there is no basis in respect of which it is open to the McMurrays to claim that the costs payable by AIG are to be taxed without regard to the scale limits for appeals - preparing appeal for hearing, appeals - counsel fee on hearing, including preparation.
741 There has only been one appeal heard and determined in the proceedings, and final orders as to costs were made by the Court of Appeal. The appeal was instituted by Tokio Marine,[519] against a decision made by Chaney J on a preliminary question involving the proper construction of the policy of insurance taken out by Mosman Bay, in respect of whether the Tokio Marine policy provided legal liability insurance cover to Mr Holgersson.[520] AIG did not participate in the appeal. On 13 August 2019, the Court of Appeal ordered, among other orders, that the appeal be dismissed and that Tokio Marine pay the McMurrays' costs of the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed. In light of this order, the basis of assessment of the costs of the appeal is not open to be considered by this court. First, the Court of Appeal was seized of the issue of costs of the appeal. Second, and in any event, the order made by the Court of Appeal was a final order. There was no order made by the Court of Appeal that the costs of the appeal be costs in the main proceedings.
742 As AIG points out in its written submissions, the mere fact that a party's counsel or instructing solicitor has charged at a rate higher, or even significantly higher rate than prescribed in the applicable costs determination, does not of itself justify lifting the scale.[521]
743 As set out above, however, AIG accept that the hourly rates for all work performed by Mr Hancy should be lifted to the hourly rate he charged. However, I am not satisfied that there is evidence before the court to justify an order to lift the hourly rates for any of the items for the work performed by any of the McMurrays' senior and junior practitioners.
744 An order should be made that AIG pay the McMurrays' costs of the action against it, including any reserved costs, to be assessed if not agreed, in respect of the following items without regard to the scale limits as follows:
(a) the hourly rates of limits be lifted for all work performed by Mr Hancy in respect of the hourly rate he charged, including, but not limited to, any of the items referred to in subpar (b) of this paragraph;[522]
(b) the total hours and total amounts of the limits of the scale items of the following items be lifted:
(i) giving discovery;
(ii) proceedings in chambers (for the application heard on 3 June 2021 - item 10 (a)); and
(iii) preparation of case; trial - fee on brief.
4.0 Should AIG pay the McMurrays' costs of their action against the Bresland parties, the costs of the Bresland parties in defending the action and the McMurrays' costs of their action against Tokio Marine?
745 In Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers, Newnes JA outlined the following principles:
(a) The court has a very wide discretion in relation to costs. It is a discretion to be exercised judicially. In the exercise of the discretion, the fundamental question must always be what is just in the particular circumstances of the case.[523]
(b) The court's discretion as to costs exists to enable the court to do justice between the parties in the particular circumstances of the case. Therefore, where a Bullock or Sanderson order is sought ultimately the question must always be whether it is just that, as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant, the unsuccessful defendant should bear the burden of the successful defendant's costs.[524]
(c) The exercise of the relevant discretion is not amenable to hard and fast rules, but normally a Bullock or Sanderson order will be made only where:
1. the plaintiff's claims against two or more defendants are substantially connected or interdependent;
2. the plaintiff acted reasonably in suing the successful defendant; and
3. there is something in the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant which makes to just to move the burden of the successful defendant's costs from the plaintiff to the unsuccessful defendant.[525]
746 Furthermore, Newnes JA explained there are no practical differences between a Sanderson and Bullock order:[526]
It has long been accepted that where a plaintiff succeeds against one defendant but fails against another defendant in an action against them for substantially the same relief, the court may order that the costs of the successful defendant be paid, directly or indirectly, by the unsuccessful defendant. Where the court makes a Sanderson order, the unsuccessful defendant is ordered to pay the successful defendant's costs of the action direct to the successful defendant: Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] UKLawRpKQB 161; [1903] 2 KB 533. Where the court makes a Bullock order, the unsuccessful defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the costs for which the plaintiff is liable to the successful defendant: Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1906] UKLawRpKQB 151; [1907] 1 KB 264; Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation [1948] HCA 46; (1948) 77 CLR 544, 572.
Generally there is no practical difference between the two forms of order, except where the unsuccessful defendant is insolvent, or there is at least a real risk that he is impecunious. Then the insolvency (or the impecuniosity) of the unsuccessful defendant is a factor to be taken into account as part of the overall circumstances for the purpose of determining which form of costs order should be made as a matter of fairness: Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002, 1011; State of Victoria v Horvath (No 2) [2003] VSCA 24 [15].
747 I agree that a Bullock order should be made against AIG in respect of the McMurrays' costs of their action against the Bresland parties. However, I am not of the opinion that AIG should pay the McMurrays' entire costs of their action against the Bresland parties. It is my view that AIG should pay 50% of the McMurrays' costs of the action against the Bresland parties.
748 The McMurrays succeeded in their claims in contract and tort for breach of a retainer against the Bresland parties and breach of duty, which claims did not involve AIG. The Bresland parties should not be entitled to their costs for defending their failure to take reasonable care.
749 The McMurrays' claim against the Bresland parties was in the alternative to their claim against AIG, and was interconnected.
750 Until the trial, the issues between the McMurrays and the Bresland parties of breach of the retainer (breach of contract claim) and breach of duty of care (claim in tort) were in issue. After the McMurrays' lead witness and documentary evidence in respect of this issue, counsel for the Bresland parties conceded the breaches had been made out. As AIG point out, the breach of retainer and breach of duty on the part of the Bresland parties did not involve AIG, and it could not have been known by AIG that Mr McMurray did not become aware of the Contract Works Exclusion clause until after the fire.
751 Because the McMurrays were entirely successful on this issue against the Bresland parties, the Bresland parties should pay the McMurrays 50% of the McMurrays' costs of their action against them. As the McMurrays point out in their written submissions, there was wrongful conduct by the Bresland parties that led to the litigation, and but for the findings against AIG, the Bresland parties would have been liable to pay damages to the McMurrays. For this reason also, the Bresland parties should pay 50% of the McMurrays' costs against them and bear their own costs of defending the McMurrays' action.
752 A Bullock order against AIG is appropriate for 50% of the McMurrays' costs of bringing the action against the Bresland parties. This is because the McMurrays' action against the Bresland parties was necessary; if AIG's defence succeeded in whole or in part, the Bresland parties would have been liable to pay damages to the McMurrays.
753 The McMurrays commenced the action initially against AIG only by writ of summons dated 11 November 2016. In its defence dated 12 December 2016, AIG denied liability and sought to justify that denial by reference to the Contract Works Exclusion clause. By raising that defence, AIG focused on the conduct of the Bresland parties, as insurance brokers, in failing to ensure that the McMurrays had insurance cover for all eventualities, including the damage caused by renovation activities. In response to AIG's defence, on 14 December 2016, the McMurrays filed a minute of proposed amended writ of summons to add the Bresland parties as a second defendant. Consequently, I am satisfied it was reasonable for the McMurrays to sue the Bresland parties.
754 The Bresland parties, in their reply submissions on costs dated 28 October 2021, submit that if they are to be brought into account for defending the failure to take reasonable care issue, it should be by qualifying an order that the McMurrays or AIG pay their costs of defending the action by their not being able to recover their costs on that issue only; or by being ordered to pay the McMurrays' costs of that issue only. In part, this submission has some merit. However, having case managed these proceedings for some years and having been the trial judge, it is my view that the breach of duty issues occupied at least 50% of the matters raised between the McMurrays and the Bresland parties. It is my view that an order should be made to require payment of costs assessed as a percentage rather than by issues, because it would be difficult for the taxing officer who assesses the bill to assess which work was performed for particular issues.
755 At the trial, the Bresland parties prepared detailed closing submissions dated 28 August 2020 that supported the McMurrays' case as to why AIG was liable to indemnify the McMurrays under the AIG insurance policy. I also agree that AIG's conduct led to the McMurrays joining the Bresland parties to the litigation because it created uncertainty as to who was the proper defendant. In these circumstances, it is this conduct (leaving aside the breach of retainer and breach of duty issues) that makes it just to move 50% of the burden of the Bresland parties costs from the McMurrays to AIG.
756 It is immaterial that it was not until the end of the trial that the McMurrays decided not to pursue claims against the Bresland parties for the costs of accommodation and storage of items, costs which they were not seeking from AIG. These amounts were small, and if pressed, the issue whether those amounts should be recovered or not would have occupied very little time in the proceedings. It is also immaterial that it did not become clear to the court until commencement of the trial that the McMurrays' case was that if they succeeded against AIG on the basis of Mr Cugley's assessment of the costs of construction, they would have no claim against the Bresland parties. The Bresland parties have put no material before the court to establish that this issue was not raised with them prior to the commencement of the trial.
(a) an order should be made that AIG pay 50% of the McMurrays' costs of the action against the Bresland parties, including any reserved costs, to be assessed if not agreed;
(b) an order should be made that AIG pay 50% of the costs of the Bresland parties of defending the McMurrays' action against them, to be assessed if not agreed; and
(c) an order should be made that the Bresland parties pay 50% of the McMurrays' action against them, to be assessed if not agreed.[527]
758 In circumstances where the McMurrays entered into a settlement agreement with Tokio Marine, including a contribution to the McMurrays' costs of the action against it, there is no basis for the McMurrays to now seek an order that AIG pay their costs of the action against Tokio Marine.
759 Mosman Bay (now in liquidation) seeks, and AIG concedes, that AIG should pay Mosman Bay's costs of the third party proceedings and fourth party proceedings, to be taxed. AIG makes this concession because it was found that AIG's action against Mosman Bay was a subrogated claim brought under the construction contract between Mosman Bay and the McMurrays was not permitted to be made in the name of McMurrays prior to indemnifying them for their loss.[528] AIG concedes that it should pay Mosman Bay's costs of the fourth party proceedings because it is open to infer that Mosman Bay would not have sued Mr Holgersson had the third party proceedings not been commenced.
760 Mosman Bay also seeks an order that AIG pay its costs of its application for costs in the third party and fourth party proceedings to be taxed. I agree that an order should be made that AIG pay Mosman Bay its costs of the application for costs, to be assessed if not agreed. This is because, prior to the concession by AIG, the liquidators for Mosman Bay caused to be filed detailed written submissions setting out its reasons why AIG should pay its costs.
761 There is a contest between AIG, Mosman Bay and Mr Holgersson as to who should pay Mr Holgersson's costs.
762 Both Mr Holgersson and Mosman Bay contend that AIG should pay Mr Holgersson's costs for the fourth party proceedings.
763 For the reasons I give in 2.2, I am not satisfied that AIG should pay Mr Holgersson's costs on an indemnity basis.
764 AIG claims that it should not have to pay Mr Holgersson's costs because it did not sue Mr Holgersson and its conduct did not induce or cause Mr Holgersson's involvement in the proceedings. Further, AIG contends that Mr Holgersson sought to involve himself after Mosman Bay withdrew from the proceedings, and an inference should be drawn that he would have sought to involve himself in the proceedings even if he was not sued by Mosman Bay. Consequently, AIG contends it is not just to move the burden of Mr Holgersson's costs to AIG by a Sanderson or Bullock order.
766 As Mr Holgersson and Mosman Bay point out in their submissions, the interests of justice require that AIG pay Mr Holgersson's costs of the proceedings, including all reserved costs and the first fourth party's application for costs.
767 First, the fourth party proceedings did not involve private issues between Mosman Bay and Mr Holgersson. AIG's claims against Mosman Bay in the third party proceedings inevitably lead to the fourth party proceedings. This is because the catalyst for the entire proceeding was AIG's denial of liability under its policy of insurance with the McMurrays on the basis that the fire was caused by self‑ignition of rags infused with Loba Oil (spontaneous combustion) placed in the bin (in the front dining room of the house) by painters engaged by Mr Holgersson on 15 January 2016 using those rags to wipe excess Loba Oil from timber surfaces in the house, which were part of activities undertaken as part of, or in connection with, the renovations of the house.
768 Second, whether or not AIG's spontaneous combustion hypothesis was correct was the critical factual issue, which issue occupied the majority of the time at trial, on which AIG lost.
769 Third, having denied liability, AIG brought third party proceedings against Mosman Bay and its insurer, Tokio Marine, on the erroneous basis that if AIG was required to indemnify the McMurrays, then it would be subrogated to the McMurrays' rights under the terms of the construction contract that they had entered into with Mosman Bay. Tokio Marine required Mosman Bay, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract between them, to bring fourth party proceedings against Mr Holgersson. This was squarely a claim that the fire was caused by the negligence of painters engaged by Mr Holgersson. In those circumstances, the fourth party proceedings resulted directly from the conduct of AIG, were defensive in nature, and Mosman Bay acted reasonably in bringing them.
770 Fourth, AIG's claim that the Contract Works Exclusion clause was engaged put Mosman Bay at risk of liability for the whole of the McMurrays' loss caused by the fire (to the extent that it was uninsured by Tokio Marine). Mosman Bay was squarely at risk in the third party proceedings if it was found that the fire was caused by Mosman Bay's painting subcontractor, and if it was found that the exclusion clause was engaged. To address that risk, Mosman Bay sought an indemnity from Mr Holgersson by way of the fourth party proceedings. Importantly, when considering Mr Holgersson's application for security for costs against Mosman Bay, it was found that, in the context of Mr Holgersson's application for security for costs, Mosman Bay 'had no practical alternative but to commence the fourth party proceedings in defence of the third party proceedings brought against it by AIG'.[529]
771 Fifth, even though Mosman Bay withdrew from taking any active part in the proceedings due to its financial circumstances (which ordinarily would have resulted in the dismissal of the fourth party proceedings), it was reasonable for Mr Holgersson to continue to play an active part in the proceedings to defend the collateral attack which had been made on him by AIG in pressing its spontaneous combustion hypothesis. This was particularly so in circumstances where the limitation period for claims against Mr Holgersson had not expired and he remained exposed to the risk of such claims. Defending the collateral attack was necessary for Mr Holgersson to continue to be involved in the proceedings after Mosman Bay withdrew.
772 I am also of the opinion that the scale limits for preparation of case should be lifted. Although Mr Holgersson did not call any expert fire investigation witnesses, he did cause to be filed a forensic locksmith witness statement and expert report (Mr Tisdale) and called Mr Tisdale in support of his case.[530] Senior counsel and his instructors were required to engage with all of the issues raised by AIG in respect of the fire investigation and fire cause evidence, as analysis of this evidence was central to the factual issues raised about the cause of the fire.
773 For these reasons, it is not necessary to consider Mr Holgersson's alternative argument that Mosman Bay pay his costs subject to an indemnity from Tokio Marine. Consequently, it is not necessary to consider the written submissions on this point by Tokio Marine and Mosman Bay (in respect of any liability of Mosman Bay to pay Mr Holgersson's costs prior to 17 March 2020).
774 I do, however, agree that Mr Holgersson should pay Tokio Marine's costs of opposing Mr Holgersson's claim for an indemnity order against it for costs.
775 For these reasons, the orders sought by Mr Holgersson in par 2.2 of his re‑amended minute of proposed orders as to costs dated 10 November 2021 should be made.[531]
776 I will hear the parties further as to the specific orders that should be made to reflect these reasons.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[2] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [2018] WASC 144; McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 2] [2020] WASC 391; McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452; and McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 4] [2018] WASC 210.
[3] Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114.
[5] Consent order made 18 February 2020.
[21] Exhibit A, 468, 730 - 780, especially 747 - 748, 752 and 778.
[22] Exhibit A, 144 - 145 (as contained in the quote dated 24 September 2014), 542 and 778 - 779 (the policy).
[26] Exhibit 2, [38], [41]; ts, 12 August 2020, 657 ‑ 658 and 669.
[28] Exhibit A, 231 ‑ 274; Exhibit 1, [44] - [51].
[29] Exhibit 1, [80] ‑ [89]; Exhibit A, 457 - 463.
[30] Exhibit 1, [80] - [89]; Exhibit A, 457 - 463.
[32] Exhibit 1, [90] ‑ [111]; Exhibit A, 560 ‑ 625.
[34] ts, 12 August 2020, 958; Exhibit A, 794.
[36] ts, 12 August 2020, 664 ‑ 665; Exhibit A, 390 - 397.
[39] Exhibit A, 276 - 346, see in particular 280.
[43] Annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'A' is a list of progress claims (issued by Mosman Bay) including a list of works that comprised the renovation works; Exhibit A, 1370 - 1371.
[45] Compare the site & ground level plan approved by the Town of Mosman Park on 6 March 2015 (Exhibit A, 3350) with the site & ground level plan cabinet work and finishes plan bearing a date of 11 August 2015 (Exhibit A, 3427).
[46] Exhibit A, 3247 and 3286; Exhibit 3 and Exhibit B, 54 - 57; ts, 18 August 2020, 1013 - 1014; see also plans shown as Annexure B attached to these reasons (original ground floor as built - post tender dated 19 March 2003 and showing revisions on 1 July 2003) and Annexure C attached to these reasons (plan showing renovations to the ground floor, including timber finishes, dated 11 August 2015).
[48] This issue is considered in 4.5.2 below.
[51] ts, 18 August 2020, 1005 - 1006, 1011.
[56] ts, 18 August 2020, 1028; see also the evidence of Mr McMurray; ts, 12 August 2020, 640, his recollection was that the walls of the dining room were to be lined with wallpaper.
[62] Exhibit 23, [24] - [25]; Exhibit 25, [33].
[68] Exhibit 15 and ts, 18 August 2020, 999 - 1000. Attached to these reasons as Annexure D is a copy of the plan.
[71] ts, 19 August 2020, 1119; ts, 21 August 2020, 1293.
[72] Exhibit 25, [33], [35] and [36].
[75] Attached to these reasons and marked as Annexure E is a photograph of the type of green rubbish bins that were located on each level of the house, including the dining room. The rubbish bin in the dining room is referred to in these reasons as the green rubbish bin.
[77] ts, 24 August 2020, 1329, 1331; Exhibit 23, [35].
[90] ts, 21 August 2020, 1293 - 1294; Exhibit 16, photograph 8.
[91] ts, 21 August 2020, 1325; Exhibit 11, photograph 10 (as seen in right bottom corner).
[92] Exhibit 16, photograph 20; Exhibit 24; Exhibit 26; ts, 21 August 2020, 1274 - 1275, 1293.
[93] Exhibit A, 1735 [7.17]; Exhibit 26.
[95] ts, 19 August 2020, 1041, 1048 - 1050.
[100] Exhibit 15 and the drawing annexed to these reasons as Annexure D.
[101] ts, 18 August 2020, 996 and the drawing annexed to these reasons as Annexure D.
[102] ts, 18 August 2020, 1037; Exhibit 12, photograph 6; see also ts, 18 August 2020, 996. A copy of this photograph is annexed to these reasons as Annexure F.
[105] ts, 18 August 2020, 1042 - 1045.
[109] Exhibit 23, [30] - [31]; ts, 24 August 2020, 1314.
[113] Mr Woods took a photograph inside the house from the entry area looking through to the back room which shows the green bin in the foreground near the bottom of the stairs of the entry area; Exhibit A, 3012.
[124] When cross-examined by senior counsel for Mr Holgersson, Mr McMurray said he did not recall that the man had a backpack.
[126] Evans v Halliday [2021] WASC 85 [56] - [61] (Hill J) (footnotes omitted).
[127] Annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'G' is a Nearmap view showing the location of the tennis court in between the McMurrays' house and the house to the western side where the CCTV camera was located, the McMurrays' house after it had been damaged by the fire, the house on the eastern side of the McMurrays' house and the vacant block.
[128] Mr Bell's evidence (ts, 14 August 2020, 898) and Mr McMurray's evidence (ts, 12 August 2020, 675).
[129] Mr Bell's evidence (ts, 14 August 2020, 899 - 900).
[130] Annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'H' are copies of a series of photographs that show views of the front and rear of the house after the fire. It is noted that after the fire the cyclone security fence had been moved to encompass the width of the verge, whereas prior to the fire the skip bin was located on the eastern side of the driveway, and had not been behind the enclosed security fencing; see Mr Manser's report: Exhibit A, 1729 [6.3].
[131] Exhibit A, 2274 [9.7]; Exhibit A, doc no 148 (CCTV footage).
[143] Exhibit A, 1478 [5.3] - [5.7].
[146] Heydon, J D, Cross on Evidence (12th ed, 2020) [29150].
[147] See Mr Manser's evidence on this point: ts, 19 August 2020, 1134 - 1135.
[148] Babrauskas V, Ignition Handbook, Fire Science Publishers, Issaquah; see Exhibit A, 2883; see also Mr Pollard's evidence: ts, 20 August 2020, 1164.
[149] Exhibit A, 2869 ‑ 2870, [10.4] - [10.7].
[150] Heydon, J D, Cross on Evidence (12th ed, 2020) [29045].
[151] Liyanage v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112; (2017) 51 WAR 359 [122] (footnotes omitted).
[152] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 [65] (footnotes omitted).
[153] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 [90] (footnotes omitted).
[154] Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165 [60] (Heydon JA); Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 229 [29] (Steytler J, Murray &Wheeler JJ agreeing); see also Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1, 3 (Anderson J); Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 [85] (Heydon JA); Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 [32], [37], [66], [100].
[155] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 [91].
[156] See, for example, a recent assessment of whether expert evidence given by electrical fire and electrical accident investigators as to fire origin and cause in a criminal trial of one count of murder, in which it was alleged that an act of the accused caused the death of the deceased by intentionally driving a vehicle into a tree that caused the vehicle to be set alight with fire in The State of Western Australia v Johnston [2020] WASC 445 [377] - [407] (McGrath J).
[161] ts, 14 August 2020, 852. It is not clear whether Mr Bell had completed his Advanced Diploma of Fire Investigation prior to his investigation of the Wellington Street property fire on 16 January 2016.
[162] ts, 14 August 2020, 862; Exhibit B.
[174] The uncontested evidence of Mr McMurray, supported by the CCTV evidence, is that this occurred at 10.30 pm.
[178] Exhibit A, 825. It is clear that from Mr Bell's examination of the internal parts of the house that he concluded that the fire started on the ground floor and spread to the upper floor.
[195] ts, 24 August 2020, 1312 - 1313.
[199] Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 79B.
[200] Cavill v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 108 [211].
[201] Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 [152], applied Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] WASCA 239 [111] (Buss JA).
[202]Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] WASCA 239 [121] - [126].
[203] Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] WASCA 239 [124] - [126].
[204] See Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 [159] in which the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Western Australian Police Force was relevantly a business and that the departmental documents in its files are business records.
[205] Donohoe v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] WASCA 239 [125].
[206] Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 [147] - [168].
[207] Poland v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 136 [219] - [222].
[209] Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367, 374 (Wells J), Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336, 343 (Kirby P; Mahoney and Clarke JJA agreeing).
[210] Exhibit A, 1740 - 1741, [8] - [9]; ts, 19 August 2020, 1127.
[214] Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd [No 2] [2007] WASC 244; (2007) 35 WAR 394, 406; applied Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [No 5] [2015] FCA 571 [13] (Edelman J); and Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 80; (2019) 55 WAR 89 [370].
[215] Exhibit A, 1732, [7.1]. Mr Tong also referred to this reference among others; Exhibit A, 2883.
[216] ts, 19 August 2020, 1076; Exhibit 19.
[218] ts, 19 August 2020, 1126 - 1127.
[220] Exhibit A, 1733 - 1734, [7.5] - [7.12].
[221] ts, 19 August 2020, 1077 - 1078; it is noted that Mr Bell had earlier located the plastic bin base on the morning after the night of the fire. It is also noted that Mr Manser's opinion of the origin and path of the fire is consistent with the opinions expressed by Mr Bell and Mr Tong.
[222] Annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'I' is a copy of Exhibit 16, photograph 11.
[227] See Annexure D of these reasons.
[228] Exhibit A, 1735 [7.15] - [7.18].
[232] ts, 19 August 2020, 1146 - 1147.
[237] Exhibit A, 1783, analysis certificate WS1.
[238] Exhibit A, 1788 [2.3] - [2.4].
[245] ts, 19 August 2020, 1121 - 1122.
[246] Exhibit A, 2646; ts, 19 August 2020, 1140.
[255] ts, 19 August 2020, 1113 - 1115.
[256] ts, 19 August 2020, 1122 - 1123.
[259] Mr Tong gave evidence about a fire resulting from smouldering grain on a waste disposal site in Brechin v Shire of Brookton [2002] WASC 228 [25] - [29] (Sanderson M). An appeal against the Master's decision did not raise the issue as to whether Mr Tong should be accepted as an expert and was dismissed in Shire of Brookton v Water Corporation [2003] WASCA 240.
[261] ts, 20 August 2020, 1213; Mr Tong could not recall when he gave evidence whether he was present when Mr Manser put an orange cleaning cloth in a tin that he found in the debris. However, in Mr Tong's fifth report he states that in his examination of the fire scene on 1 February 2016, while he and Mr Manser were searching debris in the dining room, he saw another piece of partially burnt cloth in the fire debris near the north-eastern wall and he observed Mr Manser package that artefact in the exhibit tin, which he sealed and labelled in his presence; Exhibit A, 2884 [6.1].
[264] ts, 20 August 2020, 1227 - 1232; it was only by the third report that Mr Tong had all of this information and evidence. It is to be noted that Mr Tomlinson's expert report, referred to by Mr Tong, is not before the court.
[269] ts, 20 August 2020, 1226; Exhibit A, [2.10] (first report), 837, 876 [2.10] (second report), 1710 - 1711 [2.10] (third report).
[275] Exhibit A, 2919 - 2920, [10.26.1] - [10.26.6].
[276] Exhibit A, 2920 - 2921, [10.26.10] - [10.26.12].
[277] Exhibit A, 836 [2.8]; Mr Tong explained when he gave evidence that the reference to a 20 L plastic rubbish bin in [2.8] was a typographical error and should be corrected to 60 L: ts, 20 August 1236.
[279] ts, 20 August 2020, 1208 - 1210.
[284] ts, 20 August 2020, 1230 - 1232.
[290] ts, 20 August 2020, 1227 - 1228; Exhibit C, 19 - 26.
[293] For example, Mr Pollard found he was unable to comment on the security of the front perimeter of the McMurrays' house due to the disturbance of the fire scene; Exhibit A, 2273 [9.4].
[295] Exhibit A, 2276 [9.21] [9.25].
[298] ts, 20 August 2020, 1168, 1178 - 1180.
[299] ts, 20 August 2020, 1176 - 1177.
[304] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, 321 (Windeyer J).
[305] Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361, 384 - 385, [63] ‑ [64] (Heydon, Crennan & Bell JJ) (footnotes omitted).
[306] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345, 412 [165] - [166] (footnotes omitted).
[307] The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239 [1001] - [1017]. Although the decision is reported in (2008) 39 WAR 1, these passages are not reported, see 139.
[308] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, 308 (Kitto J), 311 - 312 (Menzies J). See also Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137; (2015) 49 VR 402 [208]; applied Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58 [235] (Vaughan JA).
[309] See also Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168; (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 [16].
[310] Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 498, 513; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345 [232].
[311] Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336, 343 (Kirby P).
[312] Smith v Samuels (1976) 12 SASR 573.
[313] Exhibit 29, being an affidavit of Ms Beverly Ward sworn 17 August 2020, and Exhibit 30, being an affidavit of Mr Byron Andrew Winburn-Clarke, sworn 3 August 2020, which annexes two further affidavits; the first being an affidavit of Mr Byron Andrew Winburn-Clarke, sworn 25 March 2020, and an affidavit of Ms Beverly Ward, sworn 26 March 2020.
[316] Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437, 449 - 450 (Mahoney, Priestley and Sheller JJA); applied The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239, [1008]; see also Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345, [265].
[317] Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] UKPC 21; [1956] 1 WLR 965, 970 (PC).
[325] Wallaby Grip Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2010] HCA 9; (2010) 240 CLR 444, [25].
[326] ts, 11August 2020, 605; and AIG's opening outline of submissions, filed 22 March 2020, [25].
[327] ts, 27 August 2020, 1468 - 1470.
[328] HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 13; (2008) 235 CLR 334, 351 [5] - [6] (Gleeson CJ).
[329] East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis) [2020] WASCA 147, [264] - [265] (footnotes omitted).
[330] Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19; (1952) 85 CLR 352.
[331] Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19; (1952) 85 CLR 352, 359 - 360 (Dixon, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).
[332] Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1, 5 (Dixon, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) (footnotes omitted).
[333] Lithgow City Council v Jackson [2011] HCA 36; (2011) 244 CLR 352 [94].
[334] See the discussion on the distinction between links in a chain and strands and cable in East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis) [2020] WASCA 147, [294] - [298].
[335] East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis) [2020] WASCA 147, [281].
[336] Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; 49 NSWLR 262, 274 - 276, [79] - [91]
[337] Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; 49 NSWLR 262 [79], [89].
[338] East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis (by his next friend Christopher Graham Ellis) [2020] WASCA 147, [280] (footnote omitted).
[339] March v E & M H Stramere Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506, 515 (Mason CJ).
[340] Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720.
[341] Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1996) 50 ALJR 720, 724.
[342] X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, 31.
[343] X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, 32 - 33.
[344] First fourth party's closing submissions, filed on 28 August 2020, [56]; citing Civil Procedure Western Australia, [20.0.5A].
[346] ts, 19 August 2020, 1230 - 1232.
[351] ts, 24 August 2020, 1319, 1321; Exhibit 23, [37].
[352] ts, 17 August 2020, 956 - 957; see 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 of these reasons.
[354] Exhibit 20, photographs 5 and 9.
[355] ts, 18 August 2020, 1044 - 1045.
[360] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[362] ts, 19 August 2020, 1115 - 1116.
[363] Annexure D of these reasons is a copy of a drawing of the ground floor of the McMurrays' house on which Mr Thomas marked, on 3 February 2016, the location of the green rubbish bin well inside the dining room and away from the entry to the dining room.
[364] Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104, 116 - 117, [47] - [49] (French CJ, Nettle & Gordon JJ) (footnotes omitted).
[365] Black Box Control Pty Ltd v Terravision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219 [42(11)]; applied in Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114 [51].
[366] Black Box Control Pty Ltd v Terravision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219 [42(11)]; applied in Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114 [51].
[367] Young Investment Group Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2019] WASC 74 [102] (Quinlan CJ); applying Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253 [98] (Heydon & Crennan JJ).
[368] Young Investment Group Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2019] WASC 74 [102] (Quinlan CJ); applying Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 [40] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan & Heydon JJ); Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 12; (2017) 261 CLR 544 [16] (Kiefel, Bell & Gordon JJ).
[369] Todd v Alterra at Lloyds [2016] FCAFC 15 [42] ‑ [43]; Johnson v American Home Assurance Co [1998] HCA 14; 192 CLR 266, 272 - 276 [19]; citing Legal & General Insurance Ltd v Eather (1986) 6 NSWLR 390, 394 (Kirby P).
[370] Transfield Services (Australia) v Hall [2008] NSWCA 294; 75 NSWLR 12 [191].
[371] Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 115; (2013) 45 WAR 297 [105].
[372] Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 82; (1986) 161 CLR 500, 510 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane & Dawson JJ); applied in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Inglis [2016] WASCA 25 [25] ‑ [26] (McLure P).
[373] Johnson v American Home Assurance Co (1998) [1998] HCA 14; 192 CLR 266, 275 [19] (Kirby J); applied in Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd [2013] WASC 386 [26] (Hall J); Servcorp WA Pty Ltd v Perron Investments Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 79 [161] (Buss JA; Martin CJ & Murphy JA agreeing).
[374] Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd v Robinson [2016] FCAFC 17; (2016) 239 FCR 300 [98] ‑ [101].
[375] The terms of the clause appear in bold and the defined terms are inserted in italics. The definition of each term has only been inserted the first time that term appears in cl 1 and cl 2, and not for subsequent appearances.
[376] 'Earth Movement' is not specifically defined, but is the subject of a specific exclusion in the policy, cl 8(V); Exhibit A, 755.
[377] 'Location' is defined in the exclusion clause definition section to mean '179 Wellington Street, MOSMAN PARK WA 6012'.
[378] 'Property Damage' is not defined in the exclusion clause definition section, but is defined in the main body of AIG policy; Exhibit A, 747.
[380] ts, 28 August 2020, 1502 - 1503.
[384] First defendant's further amended defence filed on 5 June 2019, [6(a)(iii)] - [6(a)(v)].
[385] First defendant's further amended defence filed on 5 June 2019, [6(a)(iii)].
[391] As set out below, although the definition of Free Issue Materials refers to all building and construction materials (including debris), located, supplied, or are to be supplied 'on connection with the Contract Work, Temporary Work or Works', the word 'on' appears clearly to be a typographical error and must be read as 'in'.
[392] Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] NTSC 44; (1998) 146 FLR 37.
[393] Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] NTSC 44; (1998) 146 FLR 37, 42.
[394] Darwin Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Kruhse Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] NTSC 44; (1998) 146 FLR 37, 42 ‑ 43.
[395] R v Rose [1965] QWN 35
[396] R v Rose [1965] QWN 35, 43.
[397] City of Noarlunga v Fraser (1986) 61 LGRA 324, 326 (White J).
[398] City of Noarlunga v Fraser (1986) 61 LGRA 324, 330 ‑ 332 (Jacobs & O'Loughlin JJ agreeing).
[399] See for example Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [No 3] [2017] FCA 1500; (2017) 123 ACSR 549; ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665; Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd [2008] FCAFC 136; (2008) 249 ALR 458; Shell Refining (Australia) Pty Ltd v AJ Mayr Engineering Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 94.
[402] Cl N1(2)(l) and N1(3)(b); Exhibit A, 328 ‑ 329.
[403] First defendant's further amended defence, filed on 5 June 2019, [6(a)(iv)], [6(a)(v)].
[412] First defendant's further amended defence, filed on 5 June 2019, [8(b)].
[413] ts, 11 August 2020, 608; adopting what was said by McColl J in Horsell International Pty Ltd v Divetwo Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 368; applied in Lumley General Insurance Ltd v Port Phillip City Council [2013] VSCA 367 [111] (Santamaria JA).
[414] Horsell v Divetwo Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 368 [172] ‑ [173]; applied in Lumley General Insurance Ltd v Port Phillip City Council [2013] VSCA 367 [111] (Santamaria JA).
[415] Exhibit A, 2930; ts, 13 August 2020, 798.
[418] Exhibit A, 1433 - 1443, 2731 - 2732; ts, 1 September 2020, 1690 - 1691.
[422] Annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'J' is a copy of the plaintiffs' further amended schedule of loss and damage, subtitled 'house with renovations'.
[424] ts, 13 August 2020, 752, 833; Exhibit 9, [22].
[433] Exhibit A, 1369; annexed to these reasons and marked with the letter 'K' is a copy of the list of owner supplied goods and services for the renovation work.
[441] Mr Warne's summary page has a total of $52,661 for this item; see Exhibit A, 2941.
[444] ts, 24 August 2020, 1329 - 1330.
[451]Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 413; (2009) 262 ALR 691 [135] - [157] (Campbell JA) (MacFarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreed).
[452] Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 413; (2009) 262 ALR 691 [53] - [56] (Campbell JA).
[458] Symeou v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-851, 75,334 (suspected arson - two months); V L Credits Pty Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1991] VicRp 71; [1991] 2 VR 311 (suspected arson - three months); Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1994) 62 SASR 40; (1994) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-209 (suspected arson - ten weeks).
[459] McConnell Dowell Middle East LLC v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc (No 3) [2009] VSC 94; (2009) 226 FLR 84 [21] (Hansen J).
[460] Bankstown Football Club Ltd v CIC Insurance Ltd (Unreported, NSWSC, 16 December 1993), Cole J; Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 857; 213 FLR 174 [7] (Nicholas J); Fitzgerald v CBL Insurance Ltd [2014] VSC 493 [415] (Sloss J).
[462] ts, 1 September 2020, 1684, 1718.
[463] McMurray and McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452 [53] (Smith J).
[464] McMurray and McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452 [56] (Smith J).
[465] Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, 104 (Lord Diplock); cited in Saraceni v Mentha [No 2] [2012] WASC 336 [238] (Corboy J).
[466] See the discussion by Steyler P in Insurance Commission (WA) v Kightly [2005] WASCA 154; (2005) 30 WAR 380 [29] in which his Honour distinguished a personal accident policy that provided for a specified lump sum compensation in the case of the loss of a limb, which could not be characterised as an indemnity policy, in contrast to a policy that compensates the insured for actual financial loss suffered as a consequence of an injury caused by accident, which is a policy of indemnity.
[467] Insurance Commission (WA) v Kightly [2005] WASCA 154; (2005) 30 WAR 380 [26] - [28].
[468] Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H & R-E & W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380, 387 (Ipp J).
[469] Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H & R-E & W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380, 387 - 388 (Ipp J) (Malcolm CJ and Pidgeon J agreeing).
[470] WorkCover (Qld) v Seltsam Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 457; (2001) 53 NSWLR 518.
[471] Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 279, 286.
[472] Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H&R-E&W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380, 387 - 388 (Malcolm CJ and Pidgeon J agreeing).
[473] Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H&R-E&W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380.
[474] State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 59; (1969) 123 CLR 228, 240 - 241 (Barwick CJ).
[475] First defendant's amended statement of claim against the first and second third parties, filed 26 February 2019, [9].
[476] First defendant's amended statement of claim against the first and second third parties, filed 26 February 2019.
[478] Plaintiffs' statement of claim against first defendant, filed 25 November 2016, [11].
[479] Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd [2021] FCA 95.
[480] Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd [2021] FCA 95.
[481] Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd [2021] FCA 95 [62].
[482] Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Ltd [2021] FCA 95 [97].
[483] Wellington Insurance Co Ltd v Armac Diving Services Ltd (1987) 37 DLR(4th) 462.
[484] King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1896] UKLawRpAC 12; [1896] AC 250.
[485] Technology Swiss Pty Ltd v AAI Limited [2021] FCA 95 [99] - [108].
[486] First third party's amended statement of claim against the first fourth party, filed 23 January 2018, [15].
[487] Pleaded in the first third party's amended statement of claim against the first fourth party, filed 23 January 2018, [13].
[488] Pleaded in the first third party's amended statement of claim against the first fourth party, filed 23 January 2018, [14].
[489] First defendant's amended statement of claim against the first and second third parties in the third party proceedings, filed 26 February 2019, [14] - [26].
[490] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [56].
[491] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300.
[492] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [426].
[493] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 4.5.3, [419] ‑ [447].
[494] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [18].
[495] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [19].
[496] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [20].
[497] Although the McMurrays have not said so expressly, this should include reserved costs of the hearing in chambers on 11 April 2019. The only parties who appeared at that directions hearing were AIG and the McMurrays and the reason why an order was not made that costs be in the cause was that counsel for the McMurrays, Mr Blundell, foreshadowed that an application may be made in respect of AIG's defence if certain issues raised in correspondence were not dealt with by way of amendments to AIG's defence to the McMurrays' action; ts 214 ‑ 226.
[498] The McMurrays seek a Sanderson or Bullock order.
[499] Swansdale Pty Ltd v Whitcrest Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 129 (S) [10]; most recently applied by the Court of Appeal in Ben-Pelech v Royle [2020] WASCA 168 (S) [6] - [8].
[500] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [189], [261] ‑ [262], [324] ‑ [331].
[501] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [146], [277], [467].
[502] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [426].
[503] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [460] ‑ [461].
[504] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [476] ‑ [506].
[505] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [462], [476] ‑ [503].
[506] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [325].
[507] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [192] ‑ [194].
[509] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300.
[511] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 3] [2019] WASC 452 (S) [8] ‑ [12] (footnotes omitted).
[513] Blatchford v Laine [2018] WASC 207 (S) [43] ‑ [53] (footnotes omitted).
[514] In the event that the court rejects AIG's argument that it should not be liable for Mr Holgersson's costs.
[515] The main proceedings and the third and fourth party proceedings.
[516] Affidavit of Mark Alan Richard Blundell sworn 14 October 2021 [30] ‑ [31] and [34].
[517] Affidavit of Mark Alan Richard Blundell sworn 14 October 2021.
[518] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 4] [2020] WASC 210 [47].
[519] Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114.
[520] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [2018] WASC 144.
[521] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S) [22]; citing Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S); (2003) 28 WAR 95 [22].
[522] This would cover but should not be limited to his work drafting writ of summons and statements of claim, scale items of trial, attending on reserved judgments, pre‑trial mediation, conferrals and other conferences.
[523] Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S) [22].
[524] Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S) [35].
[525] Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S) [35].
[526] Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S) [23] ‑ [24] (Wheeler and Buss JJA agreed).
[527] The McMurrays do not seek any special costs order against the Bresland parties.
[528] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 5] [2021] WASC 300 [653] ‑ [672].
[529] McMurray v AIG Insurance Australia Ltd [No 2] [2018] WASC 391 [87] ‑ [88].
[531] Set out in [25(b)] of these reasons.
(1992) 29 NSWLR 336
(2008) 235 CLR 334
(2001) 52 NSWLR 705
(2009) 226 FLR 84
(1996) 15 WAR 1
(1974) 9 SASR 367
(1976) 50 ALJR 720
(2010) 240 CLR 444
(1991) 23 NSWLR 26
(1992) 174 CLR 558
(2000) 199 CLR 620
(2001) 110 FCR 157
(1998) 192 CLR 266
(2003) 28 WAR 95
(2016) 239 FCR 300
(2011) 243 CLR 588
(1992) 27 NSWLR 437
(2001) 51 NSWLR 572
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2011) 243 CLR 361
(1986) 6 NSWLR 390
(2011) 244 CLR 352
(1952) 85 CLR 352
(2013) 45 WAR 297
(2015) 256 CLR 104
(2019) 55 WAR 89
(1976) 12 SASR 573
(2001) 53 NSWLR 518
(1999) 196 CLR 297
(2011) 110 SASR 296
(2000) 200 CLR 121
(1989) 54 SASR 246
(1988) 12 NSWLR 337
(1986) 160 CLR 513
(2008) 235 CLR 103
(1988) 81 ALR 397
(2012) 247 CLR 345
(2017) 261 CLR 544
(2009) 262 ALR 691
(1994) 62 SASR 40
(1951) 217 ALR 1
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2011) 243 CLR 253
(2015) 49 VR 402
(2007) 35 WAR 394
(2008) 249 ALR 458
(1986) 161 CLR 500
(1998) 146 FLR 37
(2005) 30 WAR 380
(2017) 51 WAR 359
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(1969) 123 CLR 228
(2004) 219 CLR 165
(1999) 20 WAR 380
(1989) 166 CLR 283
(1993) 46 IR 301
(1997) 18 WAR 190
(1993) 46 FCR 225
(1948) 77 CLR 544
(2008) 39 WAR 1
(1996) 50 ALJR 720