Kankanamalage v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1368

1. This decision is about whether Disna Crishanthi Dimbulvitiy Kankanamalage and her husband should be granted an extension of time to seek a review of a decision of a Registrar of this Court.
2. In short, the background to the matter is as follows:

(a) a delegate of the relevant Minister refused Mrs Dimbulvitiy Kankanamalage a Regional Employer Nomination (Class RN) (subclass 187) visa because, at the time of the decision, Mrs Dimbulvitiy Kankanamalage did not have an approved nomination employer; a fact fatal to the application for her visa, and one that could never be cured;

(b) the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the Delegate;

(c) the Registrar dismissed Mrs Dimbulvitiy Kankanamalage's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The Registrar was satisfied the application to this Court had no reasonably prospects of success.

1. This review is a hearing de novo.[1] That is to say, this decision is not concerned with correcting any error on behalf of the Registrar but is "a fresh hearing which may result in a different order having the effect of undoing or revoking the decision of the registrar."[2]
2. However, the Court must first determine whether to grant an extension of time to file the review of the Registrar's decision. That is because the present application was filed 4 days late.
3. For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time is dismissed. Consequently, there is no application before the Court to review the decision of the Registrar. That means the decision of the Registrar (to dismiss the Applicants' application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal) prevails.

1. On 9 November 2017, Mrs Dimbulvitiy Kankanamalage (Primary Applicant) and her husband Sujeewa Prasad Kamburarawala Vithange (Secondary Applicant), citizens of Sri Lanka[3], lodged an application for Regional Employer Nomination (Class RN) (subclass 187) visas (Nomination Visa).[4]
2. The Primary Applicant was nominated for the position of Hair or Beauty Salon Manager by her employer Lancaster Enterprise Pty Ltd (Nominator).[5] The Primary Applicant commenced employment with the Nominator on 2 January 2017.[6]
3. On 22 June 2019 the Nominator's application was refused. The Nominator initially sought a review of that decision, but ultimately abandoned the review on 23 June 2020. That is to say, from 22 June 2019 the Primary Applicant did not have an approved nomination (a fact that could not be cured unless the review was successful).
4. Also, on 22 June 2019, a delegate from the then Department of Home Affairs (Delegate) wrote to the Primary Applicant, advising her that the nomination submitted by Lancaster Enterprise Pty Ltd listing her as their nominee had been refused. The Primary Applicant was invited to respond within 28 days, failing which the nomination visa would be refused. [7] No response was received.[8]
5. On 27 July 2019, the Delegate refused the Nomination Visa on the basis that the underlying nomination had been refused, and thus, the criteria in cl 187.233(3) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) was not satisfied.[9] The Delegate could make no other decision.
6. By operation of s 476(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Act), this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.
7. On 7 August 2019, the Primary Applicant applied to the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of the Delegate's decision.[10]
8. On 29 October 2020, the Applicants were invited by the Tribunal to attend a hearing on 9 December 2020.[11]
9. On 5 November 2020, the Applicants' representative responded to the hearing invitation advising that their clients would attend the hearing.[12]
10. On 11 November 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicants' representative inviting the Applicants, pursuant to s 359A (s 359A Invitation), to comment on or respond to information that the review application made by the nominator had been withdrawn. The opportunity to comment expired on 25 November 2020:[13]

The particulars of the information are:

• The application for approval of the nominated position made by LANCASTER ENTERPRISE PTY LTD (the nominator) was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration. The nominator sought a review of that decision, but they have now withdrawn that application for review. This means that the nominator's application for the nominated position has not been approved.

This information is relevant to the review because it is a requirement for the grant of

the visa that the position specified in your visa application is the subject of an

approved nomination.

If we rely on this information in making our decision, we may find that the position

specified in your visa application is not the subject of an approved nomination. This

would mean that you do not satisfy a requirement for the grant of the visa and that we

must affirm the decision that is under review.

1. On the same day, the Applicants' representative requested an extension of time to respond.[14] The extension of time was granted by the Tribunal until 2 December 2020.[15]
2. On 30 November 2020, the Applicants' representative provided a submission in response to the s 359A Invitation. The submission included details of the Primary Applicant's background, visa refusal and Tribunal withdrawal by the Nominator, and reasons why the Nominator did not pursue the review of the refusal of their nomination.[16]
3. On 2 December 2020, the Applicants' representative provided an updated response to the hearing invitation confirming their attendance at the hearing.[17]
4. On 9 December 2020, the Applicants and their representative appeared in person before the Tribunal.[18]
5. On 14 January 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision. The Tribunal found that the visa application could not succeed without an approved nomination.[19]

1. On 5 February 2021, the Applicants filed an application with this Court under s 476 of the Act (Originating Application), seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.
2. The Originating Application sought to quash the decision of the Tribunal (writ of certiorari) and have the matter remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law (writ of mandamus).
3. The Originating Application contained four grounds of review (addressed below).
4. On 27 June 2025, the First Respondent (Minister) filed a response which sought, among other orders, that the matter be summarily dismissed (Summary Dismissal Application) pursuant to r 13.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules).

1. On 10 June 2025, a Registrar of this Court made orders programming the Summary Dismissal Application for hearing. The orders directed the parties to file submissions. Orders were also made amending the name of the First Respondent to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2. On 27 June 2025, the Minister filed:

(a) an amended response;

(b) written submissions; and

(c) an Affidavit of Andrew James Price which annexed a screenshot from the Department's Integrated Client Service Engagement (ICSE) database confirming that the review application lodged by the Nominator in respect of the Delegate's decision dated 22 June 2019 was withdrawn on 23 June 2020.

1. On 11 July 2025, the Applicants complied with the Registrar's order and filed written submissions.
2. On 24 July 2025, the Registrar acceded to the Minister's application to summarily dismiss the Originating Application.

1. On 4 August 2025, the Applicants filed late the Review Application. The orders sought by the Applicants included that the matter be remitted to this Court for hearing before a Judge.
2. The matter was allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 18 August 2025. On the same day, the matter was listed for hearing on 21 August 2025.
3. On 18 August 2025, this Court informed the parties that the Review Application was made 4 days outside of the time prescribed by the Rules to seek such a review. The parties were provided with an opportunity to file written submissions addressing each of the factors relevant in the exercise of the Court's discretion to extend the time for the filing of the Review Application.
4. On 20 August 2025, in compliance with the Orders, the Minister filed submissions.

1. On 21 August 2025, the Review Application was heard by this Court in the Melbourne Registry. The:

(a) Primary Applicant appeared on her own behalf and on behalf of the Secondary Applicant; and

(b) Minister was represented by Matthew Daly, solicitor at Mills Oakley.

(a) explained to the Primary Applicant that:

(i) the Court cannot set aside the decision of the Tribunal unless there is an arguable case of jurisdictional error. The main categories of jurisdictional error were explained;

(ii) before the Court could consider the issue of jurisdictional error, it was necessary to determine whether to grant the Applicant an extension of time to file the review application; and

(b) confirmed with the Primary Applicant that she had read the email sent to the parties on 18 August 2025 which explained the principles relevant to granting an extension of time for filing a Review Application. The Court repeated those principles and invited the Primary Applicant to address the Court about each of the considerations relevant to an extension of time.

1. Noting that the Primary Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Primary Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on her grounds of review and to outline any other concerns she might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection[20].
2. Before the Court, the Primary Applicant made oral submissions. The Primary Applicant also handed up documents to the Court. These documents (addressed below) contained correspondence with this Court, to assist in explaining her delay in filing the Review Application.
3. Mr Daly made submissions on behalf of the Minister. The submissions are referred to below. Finally, the Primary Applicant was given an opportunity to make submissions in reply, which she took up. Those submissions primarily went to the merits of her claim and the general unfairness of the situation the Primary Applicant finds herself in. The Primary Applicant did not engage with the concept of jurisdictional error.

1. Section 256(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act) permits a party to a proceeding in which a delegate has exercised any of the powers of the Court to apply to the Court for review of that exercise of power. Such an application must be made within the time prescribed by the Rules or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules.
2. Rule 21.02 of the Rules states:

(1) For the purposes of subsection 256(1) of the Act, an application for review of the exercise of a power by a Registrar must be made within 7 days.

(2) The time prescribed by subrule (1) may be extended in a proceeding:

(a) by the Court or a Registrar on any terms that the Court or Registrar thinks fit; or

(b) with the consent of the parties to the proceeding.

1. The Registrar summarily dismissed the application on 24 July 2025. Pursuant to r 21.02 of the Rules, the Applicants had until 31 July 2025 to lodge a Review Application. As they did not do so until 4 August 2025, the Applicants are 4 days out of time.
2. Rule 21.02(2)(b) allows the Court to extend the time prescribed with the consent of the parties to the proceeding. The Minister does not consent.
3. It remains to be seen whether the Court will extend the time prescribed on any terms the Court thinks fit.
4. The broad discretion to extend time in r 21.02(2) of the Rules should be exercised in the context of the well-established factors guiding decisions whether to extend time in cases such as Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[21] and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[22]. These factors are:

(a) the extent of the delay;

(b) the explanation for the delay;

(c) prejudice to the respondent due to the delay; and

(d) the merits of the proposed application.

1. When determining if a proposed application has "merit" or an "arguable prospect of success", the Court will do so at a "reasonably impressionistic level".[23] Importantly, an applicant need therefore only identify an "arguable case" (which may not yet be fully developed) that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. In this regard, the Court will itself remain astute and alert to the possibility of a reasonably arguable error which may warrant an extension being granted.[24]
2. The discretionary power to extend time is broad and there will be circumstances where it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. In Tu'uta Katoa at [18], the High Court provided the following examples of such circumstances (references omitted):

For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that the case is strong or even "exceptional". In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is "reasonably arguable" or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless, but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion.

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant was invited to address each of the factors relevant to granting an extension of time for the Review Application.
2. The Minister made oral submissions and relied on its written submissions filed on 27 June 2025 and 20 August 2025, submitting that an extension would be futile because if the matter was remitted to the Tribunal it would have to make the same decision (because the Primary Applicant never had an approved employer nomination at the time of the decision - a fact that remains true today). The Court incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 28 to 36 of the Minister's outline of submissions filed 27 June 2025 and paragraphs 7 to 13 of the Minister's outline of submissions filed 20 August 2025.

1. Before the Court, the Primary Applicant accepted that the delay in lodging the Review Application was 4 days.
2. The delay is modest. However, the efficient administration of justice necessitates the observance of time limits. This factor modestly weighs against granting the Applicant an extension of time.

1. In her Review Application the Primary Applicant contended that,

(1) I submitted my application within the required time, but it got rejected due to some issues that I couldn't control, so I need just two days to resubmit it properly.

(2) Giving me two extra days won't hurt anyone but will make sure I get a fair chance to have my case heard in court.

(3) The delay happened but I acted quickly to fix the problem as soon as I found out.

(4) It's not fair to stop me from getting justice just because of these small timing issues when my case has real legal problems that need to be looked at.

1. The Minister took issue with the Primary Applicant's contention noting that it was not supported by any evidence.
2. Before the Court, the Primary Applicant explained she lodged her Review Application on 28 July 2025 (i.e. within time), but that this was rejected on 31 July 2025. The Primary Applicant tendered (without opposition from the Minister) correspondence from the Court about her attempts at filing. The initial application was rejected because it was not properly signed and executed. On 31 July 2025 the Primary Applicant relodged the Review Application however it was rejected for a second time. Finally, on 4 August 2025, the Primary Applicant took the appropriate steps to file the valid Review Application. This Court rejects the Primary Applicant's contention that the delay was something she could not control. The delay is entirely the fault of the Primary Applicant who should have taken appropriate care to lodge these documents correctly. Her unfamiliarity with the Court's practice and procedure is not an excuse for filing the Review Application first incorrectly, and then ultimately late.
3. The Court also notes that the Court's email of 24 July 2025 with the attached Orders of the summary dismissal did not explicitly mention that the Applicants had only seven days to seek review of the Registrar's decision.
4. Although ignorance of the law is not a reasonable excuse, the omissions in the Court's correspondence and lack of clarity may have contributed to the Primary Applicant's confusion. That omission may merit attention by those responsible for Court's information services to ensure unrepresented litigants receive clear guidance about applicable deadlines.
5. The Court acknowledges that the Primary Applicant is unrepresented. However, the Primary Applicant's explanation remains unsatisfactory. Given her desire to engage with the judicial review process, the onus remained on her to ensure that she filed her application within the set timeframe.
6. This factor weighs against granting the Applicants an extension of time.

1. The Minister accepts that there is no substantial prejudice that could not be remedied by a costs order. However, the "the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing".[25]
2. This factor is thus a neutral consideration in deciding whether to grant an extension of time.

1. The final and most significant factor in determining whether to grant an extension of time to file the Review Application is the merits of the review itself.
2. At the hearing, the Court took the Primary Applicant to the grounds of review contained within the originating application.

*** The Tribunal did not consider the situations that occurred around me which were beyond my control. 1. It is illogical from the tribunal to refuse my application as my employer decided to withdraw her application. My employer had waited for many days to support my nomination but due to the delay in the process she decided to withdrew. It is unreasonable from the Tribunal to not to consider this scenario. 2. All the documents are provided by my employer to our initial migration agent and migration agent failed to upload them. The Tribunal did not consider this fact and due to the error from the migration agent, it is very illogical from the Tribunal to refuse my application. 3. The Tribunal just relied on the nomination refusal but not on the circumstances that led to the refusal. It is illogical from the Tribunal for not following the proper judicial fairness and thereby the decision was made out of the jurisdictional error. 4. The Tribunal did not have a chat with my employer and ask for the reason for the withdrawal. The Tribunal just relied on my employer withdrawing her appeal and not the circumstances led to it. Also, the Tribunal did not consider my eligibility in other factors that were initially considered at the time of application.**

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant was taken to the Delegate's decision, which notified her that she did not have an approved nominator.[26] The Primary Applicant accepted this. The Primary Applicant also conceded that she did not have an approved nominator at the time of the Tribunal Hearing. That is to say, the factual underpinning for the refusal decision of the Delegate and the Tribunal is not contested by the Applicant.
2. The Primary Applicant argued the Tribunal failed to consider that her employer's nomination was withdrawn due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused the business to fail - a circumstance beyond her control. She stated that her sponsor was with her when she applied to the Tribunal, but withdrew due to business failure caused by the pandemic. All of that may be true, but it does not change the fact that at the relevant times the Primary Applicant did not have a nominating employer.
3. Consequently, the refusal of the visa was the only logical decision which the Tribunal could make given the Primary Applicant did not have a nominator. It is very clear that the Tribunal did the task required of it by the Act - to review the decision of the Delegate and determine whether the Applicant was subject of an approved nomination as required by clause 187.233(3).
4. Delays, lack of communication and the failure to provide documents by the actors involved in the visa application process does not change the fatal fact that the Applicant did not have an approved nomination.
5. It was the onus of the Primary Applicant to make her case before the Tribunal[27] at the hearing on 9 December 2020, which no matter how cl 187.233 is read was not a strong case given her Nominator had already withdrawn on 23 June 2020. Allegations about the conduct of the migration agent do not take her matter any further as a hypothetical migration agent acting in her best interests would not have been able to assist her. The Court does not accept that the Primary Applicant's Visa Application refusal at the Tribunal level was due to the conduct of the migration agent. Further, the Tribunal was under no obligation to investigate the circumstances around why the withdrawal was made. The Tribunal is "not required to obtain evidence. Thus, the Tribunal is under no duty to inquire."[28]
6. Ground One does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** At any stage, the Tribunal did not follow proper procedural fairness and the Tribunal considerations were illogical and unreasonable. So, the decision was a result of jurisdictional error.**

1. Ground Two lacks particulars. Bare assertions about procedural unfairness or that the Tribunal's findings were illogical and unreasonable findings do not establish jurisdictional error.
2. Further, it is very clear that the Tribunal afforded the Primary Applicant procedural fairness in inviting her to a hearing, conducting a hearing and considering all the material put before the Tribunal, including the allegations about the errors made by the previous migration agent.[29] However, in the absence of an approved employer nomination, the Tribunal made the only decision open to it.
3. Before the Court the Primary Applicant requested a "fair" outcome, citing:

(a) her extensive qualifications (a business management diploma and Master's degree);

(b) her professional experience (as a medical teacher, academic manager, English teacher, and manager of her husband's business);

(c) personal sacrifices made by the Applicant (not having children due to the PR process, not returning to Sri Lanka for her father's children);

(d) the alleged negligence of her previous migration agent, who she claimed had failed to submit required documents in 2019; and

(e) significant delays in the process (the Department responding 18 months later in 2019, and the Tribunal hearing also experiencing long delays), which meant her sponsor was no longer available.

1. Again, all of what the Primary Applicant submitted about the unfairness of her situation is likely true, however, it does not correct the enduring fact that, at the relevant time, she did not have an employer nomination.
2. Ground Two does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** The Tribunal did not take into consideration that the whole world is facing the panademic CORONA and my sponsor was also affected by it. It was not sustainable for him to run the business and sponsor me. The department has announced a number of connections to visa holder, who are affected by corona virus and lockdown announced by state governments. The Tribunal did not consider my hardship and make any reference to Ministerial Intervention as the Tribunal has the power to refer the matter to the Minister for their consideration. This constitute the denial of natural justice, therefore erred on the part of the Tribunal.**

1. It was not the statutory task of the Tribunal to consider the reasons for the refusal of the nomination. Any concerns that her employer had about the refusal were matters for the Nominator. The Nominator had its own pathway for review which it failed to pursue when it withdrew on 23 June 2020.
2. The Tribunal decision did consider Covid-19,[30] however it made the only decision that was open to it given the lack of an approved nomination. While accepting that the circumstances that led to the refusal of the nomination are not the fault of the Primary Applicant, nor her then employer/nominator (and that there is a degree of unfairness about all of that), this ground does not go any further than simple disagreement with the ultimate decision of the Tribunal. Although this Court is sympathetic to the plight of the Primary Applicant, all of the contentions in Ground Three are legally irrelevant to the decision making of the Tribunal.
3. Ground Three does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** I was never afforded another chance to secure another employer to support my nomination. I understand that it is in the wording of the legislation, however, delay in processing has contributed to the refusal and the department is partially responsible for the delays as well. Therefore, I should be given another chance to secure employment and link that employment to current application.**

1. Before this Court the Primary Applicant reiterated that she was not given an opportunity to secure a new employer sponsor.
2. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[31], where Mortimer J (Bromberg and Jagot JJ agreeing), stated that:

The words in cl.187.233 'position nominated in an application for approval that seeks

to meet the requirements of' reg 5.19 refer to a factual event: that is, the words refer

to an employer nomination which was in fact made, and about which the visa

applicant made the required declaration in the visa application. The 'position'

referred to is a particular job with a particular employer that exists at a particular point

in time, and in a particular set of factual circumstances. The point in time is the point

at which the employer nomination is submitted for approval under reg 5.19(1). It is to

that act that the visa applicant's declaration in the visa application is directed...An

examination of the nature and range of matters set out in reg 5.19 discloses an

intention that only very particular positions of employment, with a specified set of

attributes, which are to be verified through the mechanism of a ministerial approval of

an employer nomination made at the time of application, are intended to allow a visa

applicant to secure a visa of this kind. The scheme intends it to be a 'once off'

process, so that the visa application is considered against a specific employer

nomination and a specific approval of that nomination by the Minister (or his

delegate).

1. The Court as presently constituted is bound by those reasons. The point of time nature of these nomination visa applications does not afford the Primary Applicant another chance to secure employment.
2. Ground Four does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

Grounds in application for review of Registrar's decision

1. The Court has considered the "grounds of review" contained in the Review Application, on an impressionistic level, none of them (individually or cumulatively) disclose jurisdictional error. The grounds were mainly directed at the Registrar for not affording the Applicant procedural fairness or not applying the correct legal test in the summary dismissal decision. As explained above, this Court is conducting a hearing de novo. That is to say, this decision is not concerned with correcting any error on behalf of the Registrar.

1. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the Originating Application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error on an impressionistic level. The Court has also read the Primary Applicant's substantive grounds and the "grounds of review" in the Review Application as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part, and the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises out of the substantive application nor the Review Application. In any case the issue of futility renders the grounds for judicial review otiose.[32]

1. The matter can be simply disposed of on the basis of futility. At the hearing, this was explained to the Primary Applicant who was taken to paragraph 13 of the Minister's written submissions filed 20 August 2025. That is, even if the Primary Applicant was to establish an error on behalf of the Tribunal, it would be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal. The result would have to be the same. This is because at the relevant time the Primary Applicant did not have an approved employer nominator and nothing can cure that. The Delegate made the only decision they could in the face of that evidence. The refusal of the nomination and subsequent withdrawal from the review by the Nominator was fatal to the Primary Applicant's application for a visa. The Tribunal in a procedurally fair way put this to the Primary Applicant and provided her with an opportunity to respond.[33] When this Court put the issue of futility to the Primary Applicant she had no countervailing response.
2. Because the grounds of review have no merit because of the futility issue, an extension of time should not be granted for the lodgement of the application for review of the Registrar's Decision.

1. Taking into account all of the considerations above, particularly the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the Review Application, and the lack of any reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, the Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that time be extended in this matter.
2. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is dismissed.
3. In its submissions the Minister sought a further order that the "The Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs in a fixed amount of $1,675.75".
4. The Court explained to the Primary Applicant that:

(1) it had not made a decision about her application;

(2) the Minister is seeking costs in the event that it is successful;

(3) in deciding the question of costs, the Court is required to consider:

(a) whether it is appropriate that the Applicants should pay any costs at all, noting that the usual rule in courts in Australia is that an unsuccessful party pays the party/party costs of the successful party; and

(b) if the Court is so satisfied that the Applicants should pay costs, what is the reasonable quantum.

1. The Court then invited the Primary Applicant to make a submission about costs in the event that she is unsuccessful, and her application is dismissed. The Primary Applicant submitted, if the application were to be dismissed, "I'm not sure about that".
2. The Court is satisfied that costs ought to follow the event, and that it is appropriate to make an order in the amount sought by the Minister which is at the scale costs,[34] given the amount of work undertaken as evidenced by the court file.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (88) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[1] See also Bechara v Bates [2021] FCFAFC 34; [2021] FCAFC 34; (2021) 286 FCR 166, [1]-[7].

[2] BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 307, [11].

[20] [2019] FCA 600, [7].

[21] [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344.

[22] [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579, [12].

[23] MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391, [61].

[24] MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392, [113] ('MZAIB').

[25] EYY18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 947, [49], citing SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86, [6].

[27] Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 [169]-[170].

[28] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 [43].

[31] [2017] FCAFC 105.

[32] Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 438 at [68].

[34] Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2 pt 2 div 1.