IN THE MATTER OF ENTERVIEW PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION); EX PARTE ALLMARK as joint and several liquidator of ENTERVIEW PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) [2025] WASC 374 (9 September 2025)

(d) the need for Ms Allmark and Mr James to give security pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court O 51 r 3 be dispensed with.

1. By this application, Ms Allmark and Mr James also seek directions that they are justified in how they propose to deal with the Trust Property pursuant to s 90‑20 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), being sch 2 to the Corporations Act, and further and alternatively, pursuant to the Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 92. The directions sought are in the following terms:[2]

1. Any acts by the Receivers in their capacity as the liquidators of the Company are not invalid by reason of any removal or disqualification of the Company as trustee of the Injena Trust arising by virtue of the appointment of liquidators to the Company.
2. The Receivers, in their capacity as liquidators of the Company and Receivers, are justified in treating:

7.1 all of the assets of the Injena Trust as assets beneficially held by the Company, as bare trustee, subject to any charge or lien that the Company has over the assets of the Injena Trust to secure the payment of any debts properly incurred by the Company as trustee; and

7.2 all liabilities incurred by the Company in the conduct of its business as liabilities of the Injena Trust.

1. The Receivers, in their capacities as liquidators of the Company and Receivers are justified in distributing the Trust Property as follows:

8.1 first, paying the amount of the Plaintiffs' costs of this application on an indemnity basis;

8.2 second, paying the Receivers for their remuneration, costs and expenses;

8.3 third, paying the Receivers for their remuneration costs and expenses incurred in their capacity as liquidators of the Company;

8.4 third, in accordance with the priority regime established by sections 555, 556, 560 and 561 of the Act, after payment of the costs, expenses and remuneration of the Receivers and in their capacity as the liquidators of the Company, to the admitted creditors of the Company; and

8.5 fourth, distribute any surplus thereafter to the beneficiaries of the Trust.

1. Further to the above, orders are sought which concern service of the court's orders, there being liberty to apply, and costs.[3]

1. The application is supported by the affidavit of Ms Allmark sworn on 25 August 2025, to which seven documents were attached. The following overview is drawn from that affidavit.
2. The application is made in circumstances where:

(a) the Injena Unit Trust was established pursuant to the Injena Unit Trust Deed dated 9 July 2012;

(b) there are two original and present unit holders of the Injena Unit Trust, namely, Ezekiel Mashet Amudala (the director of Enterview), and Fiona Anne Amudala (who was previously but is not now a director of Enterview);

(c) Enterview in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust traded the business known as Baythe Linen and Laundry, which provided commercial linen hire and laundry services to hotels, resorts, Airbnb short-term rental accommodation businesses and restaurants located in the south west of Western Australia;

(d) Enterview operated the business, and held assets and property, solely in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust;

(e) on 7 August 2025 Ms Allmark and Mr James were appointed as the joint and several liquidators of Enterview upon resolution passed at a general meeting of members of Enterview pursuant to the Corporations Act s 491(1);

(f) Enterview ceased trading upon being placed into liquidation;

(g) at the time of the appointment of the liquidators, Enterview was the sole trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, had incurred substantial debts which it owed its creditors in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, and held assets as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust;

(h) Ms Allmark has not identified any evidence that Enterview had ever operated, or owned assets or property in its own right;

(i) under the terms of the Injena Unit Trust Deed, particularly by operation of cl 11.2, on the appointment of Ms Allmark and Mr James as liquidators, Enterview was automatically disqualified from holding the office of trustee of the Injena Unit Trust;

(j) the liquidators wish to realise the assets of the Injena Unit Trust and apply the proceeds to discharge the liabilities incurred by Enterview in its capacity as trustee, and distribute any remaining proceeds according to law and in terms of the orders sought in the application; and

(k) while the value of the liabilities of the Injena Unti Trust are yet to be fully ascertained, on the basis of the value presently known to Ms Allmark, Ms Allmark does not expect that the realised proceeds of the Injena Unit Trust assets will be sufficient to discharge all of the liabilities of Enterview as trustee.

1. On 20 August 2025 Ms Allmark and Mr James issued an initial circular to the creditors of Enterview in which, among other things, they described what had happened in the liquidation so far.[4] It was there recorded that Ms Allmark and Mr James, as liquidators, had upon their appointment undertaken an assessment of the financial position of the business operated by Enterview, and by reason of there being no available working capital, had made the decision to cease operating the business; had advertised for urgent expressions of interest in the assets of the business by 15 August 2025; had received expressions of interest in the assets of the business from unrelated parties; and were liaising with the secured creditors who had registered security interests over all the assets of the business in relation to the expressions of interest that had been received.
2. Among other things, Ms Allmark attached to her affidavit a copy of the Injena Unit Trust Deed, and the liquidators' initial circular to creditors dated 20 August 2025.

1. The application was also supported by the service affidavit sworn on 5 September 2025 by Desirée Bernedette Pavey, Special Counsel employed by Lavan, the solicitors for the plaintiffs. Ms Pavey deposed to the provision of the originating process and Ms Allmark's affidavit on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the beneficiaries of the Injena Unit Trust, the creditors of Enterview, the Australian Taxation Office (which is also a creditor of Enterview), and the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations of Western Australia through its FEG online portal.
2. The originating process and the affidavit of Ms Allmark were served on ASIC on 26 August 2025. I am satisfied that service on ASIC was effected a reasonable time before the hearing of the application (which had been listed on 9 September 2025), as required by Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 2004 (WA) r 2.8.
3. ASIC did not give the plaintiffs notice of an intention to be heard, and consistent with ASIC's policy regarding court applications made under ch 5 and sch 2 of the Corporations Act, it was not anticipated that ASIC would provide formal correspondence in respect of this application as the court had not specifically requested ASIC's assistance nor had it ordered ASIC to respond in writing to the application; and ASIC had not been named a party in this application.
4. No person or entity that was given notice of the application has appeared at the hearing of the application. I also understand that no person has given notice to the plaintiffs or their solicitors that they wished to be heard on the application.[5]

Should Ms Allmark and Mr James be appointed as receivers and managers of the Trust Property?

1. The legal principles that govern this application are well known and were summarised by me in In the matter of LC Investments (WA) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2025] WASC 89.[6] They were also summarised in the plaintiffs' outline of submissions filed on 7 September 2025, at pars 6 to 12.
2. Where a company has been removed as trustee of a trust under the terms of the trust deed, the company holds the trust assets as bare trustee and does not have the right to retain them as against the new trustee.[7] While the company's right of indemnity and accompanying equitable lien over the assets of the trust survives the appointment, the liquidator of the company does not have the power to sell assets to satisfy its right of indemnity absent intervention by the court.[8] The liquidator, in essence, has two options. First, to apply for an order that confers power on the liquidator to deal with the assets of the trust or, secondly, to apply to be appointed as receiver and manager of the trust. The court can either grant relief authorising the sale of trust property or appoint the liquidator as receiver over the trust assets.[9]
3. Courts are generally willing, upon an appropriate application, to make orders permitting the liquidator of a (former) corporate trustee to sell trust assets. This is because the trust assets are not property of the company but are trust property in which the company has an interest by way of lien or charge to secure its right of exoneration.[10] Any proceeds from the exercise of a corporate trustee's right of exoneration can only be applied to satisfy the liabilities of the trust.[11]
4. The court has power, pursuant to the Supreme Court Act s 25(9) and the Rules of the Supreme Court O 51 r 1, to appoint a receiver where it appears to be just and convenient.
5. Appointing a liquidator or administrator of a corporate trustee as a receiver of a trust's assets facilitates and simplifies the external administration of the corporate trustee by providing for the trust's business and assets to be under the same control as the corporate trustee while it is in external administration. This aids in the vindication of the trustee company's right of indemnity out of the trust's assets.[12]
6. Once the sale of the trust's assets has occurred, the proceeds may be appropriated by way of exoneration as part of the conduct of the liquidation in accordance with the statutory priorities set out in pt 5.6, div 6 of the Corporations Act.[13] This includes the costs of the liquidation. Further, orders may be made nunc pro tunc to authorise any sale of assets that have already occurred.[14]
7. In this present case, at the time of the appointment of the liquidators, Enterview was the sole trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, had incurred substantial debts which were owed to its creditors in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, and held assets as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust. Further, Ms Allmark deposes that she had not identified any evidence that Enterview has ever operated, or owned assets or property in its own right.
8. On the evidence read, it would appear that there is no risk of the Trust Property being applied to general creditors (as opposed to creditors of the Injena Unit Trust) as there would appear to be no such creditors. Accordingly, it would appear that no prejudice to creditors would be occasioned by permitting the liquidators to realise the Trust Property to satisfy those creditors' claims (if the proceeds from that realisation are sufficient to do so).
9. The disqualification of Enterview as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust (without relief from the court) is preventing the liquidators from carrying out their statutory obligations under the Corporations Act. In the circumstances deposed to, I accept that it is appropriate that the liquidators be appointed receivers and managers of the Trust Property. Otherwise, there will be no other trustee or other entity with power to realise assets so as to pay the creditors of Enterview, with respect to the debts which it incurred in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust.
10. Further, and in the absence of any relevant conflict, I note that it is commonly the case that the court will appoint the liquidator of the corporate trustee as receiver without security.[15] There is no reason in the circumstances of this case to do otherwise, particularly as Ms Allmark and Mr James will remain subject to the continued supervision of the court. Therefore, the need for them to give security under the Rules of the Supreme Court O 51 r 3(1) will be dispensed with.
11. Ms Allmark and Mr James also sought orders that they be authorised to take possession of, preserve, maintain and realise the assets comprising the Trust Property; and that they have all the powers that a receiver has in respect of the business and property of a company under the Corporations Act s 420 (other than in s 420(2)(s), (t), (u) and (w)) as if the reference in that section to 'the corporation' were a reference to the Injena Unit Trust, including, without limitation, the power to do those things described at pars 3.1 to 3.5 of the originating process (reproduced at [2(b)(i)] to [2(b)(v)] of these reasons).
12. I accept that such an order is appropriate and expedient in the circumstances. I also accept that Ms Allmark and Mr James ought be entitled to be paid the costs, expenses and remuneration incurred by them as liquidators and as receivers and managers from the Trust Property, including the costs of and incidental to this application.
13. The orders promoted contemplate that Ms Allmark and Mr James will provide a copy of the court's orders to ASIC, the beneficiaries of Injena Unit Trust and any creditors (or persons claiming to be creditors) of Enterview or the Injena Unit Trust whose contact details are known to them within seven days of the date of the court's orders; and that persons affected by them may apply to vary or set aside the orders (if made) on seven business days' notice to the plaintiffs and to the court. In the disposition of this application, I take comfort from there being no appearance by ASIC or by any person who had been given notice of the application, and further from the proposed obligation of service of the orders upon persons affected.
14. The proposed obligation to serve the court's orders, and the express allowance for any aggrieved party to apply to this court to vacate or vary the proposed orders, affords protection to persons affected from possible prejudice that might otherwise arise from this application. While the plaintiffs' proposed orders contemplate that the plaintiffs would provide a copy of the court's orders to affected persons within seven days, and that there would be granted to them liberty to apply on not less than seven business days' notice, I do not consider such timeframes to be necessary or appropriate in the circumstances. Rather, notice of the orders will be given within three business days; there will be liberty granted to any person affected by the orders to apply to vary or set aside the orders on not less than three business days' written notice to the plaintiffs and to the court; and there will be liberty granted to the plaintiffs to apply to the court for orders discharging and releasing the receivers on no less than three business days' notice.
15. I am otherwise satisfied that in all of the circumstances, the orders sought by the plaintiffs are consistent with the legal principles outlined above, and that discretion ought be exercised in favour of the appointment of the liquidators as receivers and managers, and in favour of the making of orders substantially in the form promoted in the originating process.
16. While it was not sought by the originating process, in circumstances where the liquidators are both to be appointed as receivers and managers over the Trust Property, a further order will be made to the effect that a function or power of a receiver and manager of Trust Property may be performed or exercised by any one of Ms Allmark and Mr James, or by two of them together.

Direction pursuant to s 90-15(1)

1. Division 90 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) concerns the review of an external administration of a company, which may be undertaken by the court (div 90 subdiv B), or by another registered liquidator (div 90 subdiv C).
2. By s 90-15(1) the court is afforded a plenary power by which it may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company,[16] and without limiting subsection (1), examples of the types of orders that the court may make are listed in s 90-15(3).
3. While s 90-15(3) does not limit subsection (1), it provides context for the proper construction of what will be orders in relation to the external administration of a company.[17] Relevantly, included by way of example is an order determining any question arising in the external administration of the company.[18] Section 90‑15(4) contains a non-exhaustive list of matters that the court may take into account in exercising the discretion under s 90‑15.
4. The court's power under the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) s 90‑15(1) is expressed in broad and unconfined terms,[19] and the ambit of s 90‑15 has not yet been fully considered by the authorities.[20] That said, it is well settled that the power in s 90‑15(1) to make such orders as the court thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company, which includes the power to make an order determining any question arising in the external administration of a company, is wider than the power previously contained in s 479(3) and s 511 of the Corporations Act,[21] and accommodates the determination of substantive rights. Of course, such power cannot be

exercised without affording potentially affected parties an opportunity to be heard.[22]

1. The scope of the power to give directions and advice contained in the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) s 90‑15 is arguably the same as, or likely wider than, the scope of s 90‑15 predecessors.[23]
2. As observed by Stewart J in Krejci, in the matter of Union Standard International Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) at [8]:

The court's power under s 90-15(1) includes a power to give directions about a matter arising in connection with the performance or exercise of an administrator's functions or powers: Reidy, in the matter of eChoice Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2017] FCA 1582 at [26] - [27] (Yates J). In this respect, s 90-15(1) confers a power to give directions that was previously conferred by ss 447D(1) and 479(3) of the Act concerning administrators and liquidators, respectively: see Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20; 93 ALJR 807 at [166] (Gordon J); Reidy at [27] (Yates J); and Kelly (liquidator), in the matter of Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 780 at [30] (Gleeson J). The principles governing directions to administrators and those governing directions to liquidators are relevantly analogous: Re Ansett Australia Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 90; 115 FCR 409 at [43] (Goldberg J).

1. As to the function and scope of s 90‑15(1), I adopt the observation made by Stewart J in Krejci, in the matter of Union Standard International Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) at [9], which follows the decision of Goldberg J in Re Ansett Australia Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 90; (2002) 115 FCR 409 at [44]:

The function of a judicial direction of this kind is not to determine rights and liabilities arising out of a particular transaction, but to confer a level of protection on the administrator. An administrator who acts in accordance with a judicial direction, having made full and fair disclosure to the court of the material facts, has 'protection against claims that they have acted unreasonably or inappropriately or in breach of their duty in making the decision or undertaking the conduct' proposed.

1. The value of a direction is to protect the external administrator from liability for breach of duty or unreasonable behaviour provided that full disclosure has been made to the court.[24]
2. Whether to exercise the power under s 90‑15(1) will often be informed by the principles that applied on such an application to the court for directions.[25] The approach of the court on an application for directions by an external administrator are well-established. The court will not give an administrator or a liquidator a direction if the direction relates to the making of a business or commercial decision. There must be something more before the court will give a direction. The 'something more' may be a legal issue of substance or procedure or an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness. Put differently, there must exist some issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment.[26]
3. In GDK Projects Pty Ltd, in the matter of Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 541 at [33], Farrell J recognised the power in s 90‑15(1) to be 'in its terms, unconstrained', but held that 'despite the breadth of the power ... it is difficult to envisage circumstances where the power could be exercised if the court could not be satisfied that it would be just and unless the applicant had demonstrated sufficient utility to the external administration'.
4. Cognisant of the nature of the court's power (described above), I accept that the court's power under s 90‑15(1) to make orders extends, in appropriate circumstances, to giving directions of the kind sought by the plaintiffs by this application.
5. I also accept that by operation of s 90‑20 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), Ms Allmark and Mr James have standing to apply for relief pursuant to s 90‑15 by virtue of being officers of Enterview.[27]
6. Further, the directions sought are in relation to the external administration of Enterview, thus within the scope of s 90‑15(1). (For the purposes of s 90‑15(1), a company is taken to be under external administration if (among other things) a liquidator has been appointed in relation to the company.[28])
7. Having regard to the investigations undertaken by the liquidators, the evidence of Ms Allmark, and that there is no evidence that Enterview traded or held assets other than in its capacity as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, the plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that it is appropriate to give directions in the form sought by the application, that Ms Allmark and Mr James in their capacities as receivers and managers and as liquidators, will be justified and acting reasonably in treating:

(a) all of the assets of the Injena Unit Trust as assets beneficially held by Enterview, as bare trustee, subject to any charge or lien that Enterview has over the assets of the Injena Unit Trust to secure the payment of any debts properly incurred by Enterview as trustee; and

(b) all liabilities incurred by Enterview in the conduct of its business as liabilities of the Injena Unit Trust.

1. In the circumstances deposed to I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to direct that any acts by Ms Allmark and Mr James in their capacity as the liquidators of Enterview are not invalid by reason of any removal or disqualification of Enterview as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust arising by virtue of the appointment of liquidators to Enterview.
2. The court is also asked to give a direction to the plaintiffs that they would be justified in taking a particular approach in respect of the distribution of the Trust Property.[29] In doing so, the court is not determining the rights of any of particular creditor. The effect of the order is to afford the plaintiffs protection from claims against them provided they act in accordance with the court's directions.
3. Further, I note the evidence of Ms Allmark as to the steps that have been reasonably taken by the plaintiffs as liquidators to date, particularly in relation to the realisation of the Trust Property, which is intended to be for the benefit the creditors of the Injena Unit Trust. Consistent with the principle in Re Universal Distributing Company Limited (in liquidation) [1933] HCA 2; (1933) 48 CLR 171, the plaintiffs' reasonable costs and expenses (including their reasonable remuneration) associated with this should be paid from the assets of the Trust Property in priority to the claims of the creditors and unit holders of the Injena Unit Trust.
4. I am satisfied in the circumstances deposed to that the exercise of power to give these directions is just; that by the evidence of Ms Allmark, the plaintiffs have demonstrated clear utility to the external administration of Enterview; the relief sought is not in any way inconsistent with the objects of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations); and there exists an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment.

1. For these reasons, I am satisfied it is appropriate to make the orders pressed on behalf of Ms Allmark and Mr James. (Those orders are now extracted and reproduced at sch A to these reasons.)
2. As to the costs of and incidental to this proceeding, Ms Allmark and Mr James seek that the costs of and incidental to this proceeding be costs and expenses in the liquidation of Enterview. In conjunction with this proposed order, Ms Allmark and Mr James seek a direction that in their capacities as liquidators of Enterview and receivers, they are justified in distributing the Trust Property by first, paying the amount of the plaintiffs' costs of this application on an indemnity basis.
3. There is no conduct on the part of Ms Allmark and Mr James that would ground the exercise of discretion so as to make a costs order against them personally. It is appropriate in all of the circumstances that the costs of and incidental to this proceeding, be costs and expenses in the liquidation of Enterview. Further, as the activities of Enterview were only as trustee of the Injena Unit Trust, it follows that, save for its right of exoneration and the supporting lien, Enterview has no assets of its own (that is, held in its own right). In all of the circumstances, it is appropriate that the costs of this application be met from the Trust Property, and I am satisfied that granting the requested direction is just and is not in any way inconsistent with the objects of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Originating process filed 25 August 2025, pars 3 - 5.

[2] Originating process filed 25 August 2025, pars 6 - 8.

[3] Originating process filed 25 August 2025, pars 9 - 13.

[4] Affidavit of NJ Allmark sworn 25 August 2025, NJA-7.

[5] Plaintiffs' outline of submissions filed 7 September 2025, par 30.

[6] Where the principles summarised by Hill J in Re Aqua Blue Plumbing (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liquidation); Ex parte Ross Stephen Thomson as liquidator of Aqua Blue Plumbing (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2024] WASC 177 at [11] ‑ [20], and in Gregory Bruce Dudley and Jerome Hall Mohen as joint and several liquidators of NLR (WA) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Bragg [2024] WASC 501 at [13] ‑ [16], were adopted and applied.

[7] Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1344 [50] (Brereton J).

[8] See Jones v Matrix Partners Pty Ltd; Re Killarnee Civil & Concrete Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCAFC 40; (2018) 260 FCR 310 [44], [85] ‑ [91] (Allsop CJ), [139], [142] (Siopis J), [198] (Farrell J); Caterpillar Financial Australia Ltd v Ovens Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 677 [22] ‑ [28] (Gordon J). See also Brereton, in the matter of MyHouse (Aust) Pty Limited (administrators appointed) [2020] FCA 610 [30], referenced in the plaintiffs' outline of submissions filed 7 September 2025, par 10.

[9] Jones v Matrix Partners Pty Ltd; Re Killarnee Civil & Concrete Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) [44] (Allsop CJ), [196] (Farrell J).

[10] Cremin, in the matter of Brimson Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCA 1023 [49] (Moshinsky J).

[11] Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20; (2019) 268 CLR 524 [40] (Kiefel CJ, Keane & Edelman JJ), [106] (Gordon J).

[12] In the matter of Mecfab Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 46 [9].

[13] Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [55] ‑ [58] (Kiefel CJ, Keane & Edelman JJ), [95] ‑ [97] (Bell, Gageler & Nettle JJ), [171] (Gordon J).

[14] Jones v Matrix Partners Pty Ltd; Re Killarnee Civil & Concrete Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) [91], [152], [198] (Farrell J)

[15] In the matter of Hercules Car Parking Systems (Victoria) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 409 (Brereton J).

[16] Section 90-15(1) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).

[17] Frigger v Mervyn Jonathan Kitay as liquidator of Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd [2022] WASC 347 [23].

[18] Section 90-15(3)(a) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).

[19] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Jones [2023] WASCA 130 [306]. See also, Kelly (as joint and several liquidators of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 096 980 522)) v Loo (No 8) [2020] FCA 533; (2020) 144 ACSR 292 [51], cited in Krejci, in the matter of Union Standard International Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 1111 [7].

[20] In the matter of Broens Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747 [39]. See also Re Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd (ACN 003 528 345) (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 481; (2018) 125 ACSR 355 [7] - [8], cited in Ex parte Frigger [2020] WASC 365 [12].

[21] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (in liquidation) ACN 008 636 575; In the matter of FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (in liquidation and subject to a scheme of arrangement) ACN 000 327 855; In the matter of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (in liquidation and subject to schemes of arrangement) ACN 008 482 291 [2018] NSWSC 1886 [4] ‑ [5].

[22] Re Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd (ACN 003 529 345) (in liq) [8], citing Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) (ACN 084 358 592) v Balanced Securities Ltd (ACN 083 514 685) [2007] FCA 1443 [49] ‑ [51] referring to Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) [1994] FCA 1031; (1994) 49 FCR 334, 352; Re Willmott Forests Ltd (ACN 063 263 650) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 125; (2012) 88 ACSR 18 [45] ‑ [46]; In the matter of ICS Real Estate Pty Ltd (in liq); and In the matter of Independent Contractor Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 479 [25]. See also In the matter of Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (ACN 095 474 736) [2021] VSC 51 [35]; and Hill, in the matter of Autocare Services Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2021] FCA 167 [44].

[23] Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [166] (Gordon J); Kelly (as joint and several liquidators of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 096 980 522) v Loo (No 8) [52] (Gleeson J), quoting Ample Source International Limited v Bonython Metals Group Pty Limited (in liquidation), in the matter of Bonython Metals Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) (No 8) [2018] FCA 1614 [89] (Gleeson J).

[24] Re Ansett Australia Ltd (No 3) [44] (Goldberg J); In the matter of Nexus Energy Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1041 [12] ‑ [13]; Nipps v Remagen Lend ADA Pty Ltd; Re Adaman Resources Pty (No 4) [2021] FCA 644 [38]; and Re GGA Lifestyle Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed); Ex parte Woodhouse [2019] WASC 167 [21], citing Re GB Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 674, 679 ‑ 680 (McLelland J).

[25] Re GGA Lifestyle Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed); Ex parte Woodhouse [18] (Vaughan J), citing In the matter of Broens Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747 [39] (Gleeson J). See also Whalley, in the matter of Poles & Underground Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2017] FCA 486 [41] (Gleeson J); and Krejci (liquidator), in the matter of Community Work Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 425 [45] ‑ [47] (Gleeson J).

[26] Re Ansett Australia Ltd (No 3) [65] (Goldberg J); adopted in In the matter of Nexus Energy Ltd [12] ‑ [13] (Black J); Nipps v Remagen Lend ADA Pty Ltd; Re Adaman Resources Pty (No 4) [38] (Banks‑Smith J); and Re GGA Lifestyle Pty Ltd [19] - [20]. See also Re ONE.Tel Ltd [2014] NSWSC 457; (2014) 99 ACSR 247 [33] (Brereton J).

[27] Section 90-20(1)(d) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), read with s 9 of the Corporations Act (pt (f) of the definition of 'officer').

[28] Section 5-15(c) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).

[29] Originating process filed 25 August 2025, par 8, reproduced at [3] above.