Legal framework
29 Item 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule provides relevantly:
(1) The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company.
Orders on own initiative or on application
(2) The Court may exercise the power under subsection (1):
…
(b) on application under section 90-20.
Examples of orders that may be made
(3) Without limiting subsection (1), those orders may include any one or more of the following:
(a) an order determining any question arising in the external administration of the company;
…
Matters that may be taken into account
(4) Without limiting the matters which the Court may take into account when making orders, the Court may take into account:
(a) whether the liquidator has faithfully performed, or is faithfully performing, the liquidator's duties; and
(b) whether an action or failure to act by the liquidator is in compliance with this Act and the Insolvency Practice Rules; and
(c) whether an action or failure to act by the liquidator is in compliance with an order of the Court; and
(d) whether the company or any other person has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of an action or failure to act by the liquidator; and
(e) the seriousness of the consequences of any action or failure to act by the liquidator, including the effect of that action or failure to act on public confidence in registered liquidators as a group.
30 In Reidy, In the Matter of eChoice Limited (Admin Apptd) [2017] FCA 1582, Yates J at [27] proceeded on the basis that an application by an administrator for directions about a matter arising in connection with the performance or exercise of an administrator's functions or powers would fall within the purview of the statutory power in s 90-15 to make an order that determines a question arising in the external administration of a company. His Honour applied the principles which have guided the Court's jurisdiction under the former s 447D(1) of the Corporations Act, mentioning in particular Goldberg J's summation in In the matter of Ansett Australia Ltd and Korda (No 3) [2002] FCA 90; (2002) 115 FCR 409 ("Re Ansett"), referred to below.
31 Prior to its repeal and the enactment of the Insolvency Practice Schedule in 2016, s 479(3) of the Corporations Act allowed a court-appointed liquidator to apply to the court for directions in relation to a matter arising under a winding up. The function of a liquidator's application for directions under s 479(3) was to give the liquidator advice as to the proper course of action to take in the liquidation: Re MF Global Australia Limited (in liq) [2012] NSWSC 994; (2012) 267 FLR 27 at [7].
32 In Re Addstone Pty Ltd (in liq) (1997) 25 ACSR 357, Mansfield J stated at 363:
While the court may be reluctant to give directions where purely commercial considerations are relevant to the liquidator's decision, even in relation to the conduct of litigation, there will be circumstances where it is or may be appropriate to do so. One of those circumstances may be where the liquidator's proposed decision is the subject of criticism by a particular creditor or creditors as being unreasonable or mala fides.
33 In that case, pursuant to s 479(3), his Honour directed that a liquidator would be acting appropriately in discontinuing appeals then on foot.
34 In Re Ansett, concerning s 479(3), Goldberg J explained at [44]:
When liquidators and administrators seek directions from the Court in relation to any decision they have made, or propose to make, or in relation to any conduct they have undertaken, or propose to undertake, they are not seeking to determine rights and liabilities arising out of particular transactions, but are rather seeking protection against claims that they have acted unreasonably or inappropriately or in breach of their duty in making the decision or undertaking the conduct. They can obtain that protection if they make full and fair disclosure of all relevant facts and circumstances to the Court. In Re G B Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 674, McLelland J said at 679-680:
The historical antecedents of s 479(3)..., the terms of that subsection and the provisions of s 479 as a whole combine to lead to the conclusion that the only proper subject of a liquidator's application for directions is the manner in which the liquidator should act in carrying out his functions as such, and that the only binding effect of, or arising from, a direction given in pursuance of such an application (other than rendering the liquidator liable to appropriate sanctions if a direction in mandatory or prohibitrary form is disobeyed) is that the liquidator, if he has made full and fair disclosure to the court of the material facts, will be protected from liability for any alleged breach of duty as liquidator to a creditor or contributory or to the company in respect of anything done by him in accordance with the direction.
Modern Australian authority confirms the view that s 479(3) 'does not enable the court to make binding orders in the nature of judgments' and that the function of a liquidator's application for directions 'is to give him advice as to his proper course of action in the liquidation; it is not to determine the rights and liabilities arising from the company's transactions before the liquidation': [cases cited omitted].
35 At [65], Goldberg J concluded:
[T]he prevailing principle adopted by the courts, when asked by liquidators and administrators to give directions, is to refrain from doing so where the direction sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision, either committed specifically to the liquidator or administrator or well within his or her discretion, in circumstances where there is no particular legal issue raised for consideration or attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the decision in respect of which the directions are sought. There must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision. It may be a legal issue of substance or procedure, it may be an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness, but some issue of this nature is required to be raised. It is insufficient to attract an order giving directions that the liquidator or administrator has a feeling of apprehension or unease about the business decision made and wants reassurance. There must be some issue which arises in relation to the decision. A court should not give its imprimatur to a business decision simply to alleviate a liquidator's or administrator's unease. There must be an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment.
36 In Cosmoluce v Tsagaris [2010] NSWSC 1115, McDougall J said (at [15]):
In considering whether or not to grant approval, or to give directions, the Court does not attempt to second guess the liquidator. It pays appropriate respect to the commercial judgment of the liquidator, without going so far as rubber stamping it. As Giles J said in Re Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liquidation) (1992) 9 ACSR 83 at 85-86, the Court respects the liquidator's decision, and generally will not interfere unless there is some apparent want of good faith (I say straight away that there can be no suggestion of that in this case) or some error of law or principle apparent on the face of the material, or some real ground of doubt as to the prudence of the settlement. The Court does, as his Honour made clear, undertake some assessment, on a legal basis, of the merits of the claim, and it expects a liquidator to obtain advice from the lawyers that he or she has retained.