GVB18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1985

1. The background and procedural history of this matter was helpfully summarised in the Minister's written submissions filed on 16 July 2025, which I primarily adopt.
2. The applicant, a male national of Lebanon, first arrived in Australia on 12 October 2015 as the holder of a Subclass 573 Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector visa (student visa) granted on 18 September 2015.[1]

1. On 7 December 2015, the applicant applied for the protection visa.[2] His claims for protection were detailed in his protection visa application form and can be summarised as follows: [3]

(a) He is a Shia Muslim and his home in Lebanon is very near three Palestinian refugee camps where most people are members or supporters of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist organisations.[4]

(b) He had to enter the camps to purchase supplies and transit through them to access his home.[5] Every time he had to leave or return to his home, he:

(i) was interrogated, spat at, thrown to the ground, hit and punched (once until he was unconscious), and threatened with knives and guns;[6]

(ii) received death threats himself and others made towards his family members;[7] and

(iii) rejected ISIS attempts to convert him from a Shia to a Sunni Muslim, have him join their organisation, fight against the government in Syria, become a suicide bomber and enter paradise.[8]

(c) A friend of his joined ISIS, became brainwashed and then attempted to convince him to join ISIS and fight in Syria.[9]

(d) He did not seek help from within Lebanon as he was scared and emotionally unstable and did not want to leave his family.[10]

(e) There were daily conflicts in most parts of Lebanon and Syria. On 12 November 2015, there was a suicide bombing in Beirut targeting Shia Muslims.[11] He could not move to another part of Lebanon as there were bombings; he was worried for his and his family's safety. He also could not leave his work.[12]

(f) The Lebanese government was unable to help him as the army were helpless, afraid, lacking control and were themselves worried about terrorist attacks.[13]

(g) He applied for a student visa on the advice of his parents and uncles in Australia as a means of escape, despite having to relinquish a good job and income in Lebanon. [14] He could not flee to Turkey or Israel due to closed borders, and Syria was in the midst of war and unwilling to receive him.[15]

1. On 26 May 2016, the applicant attended an interview with a delegate. That interview was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages.[16] During the interview, the applicant provided the following additional claims:

(a) From the roof of his home, he could see ISIS members shooting from within the camps.

(b) He purchased supplies from outside of the camp as that was ordinarily the only place to buy groceries donated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

(c) He encountered Palestinians on their motorbikes frequently and they pointed guns at him and occasionally fired over his head.

(d) He was targeted by ISIS and its supporters because of his engagement with Educated Youth at Sidon University with whom he posted leaflets opposing the war in Syria in 2013 and 2014.

(e) He was threatened/attacked twice in January to February 2015, and he lost consciousness during another attack in March or April 2015.

(f) In March or April 2015, members of ISIS approached him and gifted him a mobile phone with an open line to ISIS. He received a call on this mobile phone from someone asking him to join ISIS but did not respond and later destroyed the SIM card and phone. Following this, he was trailed by ISIS on motorbikes who appeared to be signalling that they could get him at any time. [17]

1. On 10 June 2016, the delegate made a decision not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.[18] In terms of its fact-finding, the delegate:

(a) accepted as credible the following claims:

(i) that the applicant is a Shia Muslim;

(ii) that the applicant's parents, two brothers and two sisters continue to reside in Lebanon; and

(iii) the applicant's claimed residential and employment history.

(b) did not accept as credible, and thereby rejected, the following claims:

(i) that the applicant was subject to harassment, intimidation and death threats by ISIS and/or ISIS supporters in the Palestinian camp in Tyre;

(ii) that the applicant was subjected to death threats if he did not collaborate with ISIS requests;

(iii) that the applicant departed Lebanon in October 2015 in fear for his safety for the reasons claimed; and

(iv) that the applicant fears being killed by ISIS military groups in Palestinian camps in Tyre.[19]

1. On 4 July 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.[20]
2. On 29 October 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 19 November 2018.[21]

Pre-hearing request for information, submissions and evidence

1. On 9 November 2018, the Tribunal requested the applicant provide the following information by 16 November 2018:[22]

(a) country information supporting his claim regarding the presence of ISIS elements in the camps he mentioned at the time he alleged they were present; and

(b) a copy of the land title deed for his home as produced by the Lebanese Land Registry office (a web link to the Lebanese Land Registry website was specified within the Tribunal's letter) (authorised land title deed).

1. On 15 November 2018, the applicant's migration agent provided a response to the Tribunal which included: [23]

(a) a statement signed by the applicant and dated 14 November 2018 containing a further claim that the applicant's family are affiliated with Hezbollah (signed statement);[24]

(b) a certified translation of a letter issued by the head of the applicant's local Municipality in Lebanon dated 12 November 2018 attesting to the applicant's ownership of a home in that municipality (municipality letter);[25] and

(c) two media articles about the presence of terrorists in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (media articles).[26]

1. On 19 November 2018, the applicant attended a hearing conducted with the assistance of an interpreter facilitating communication in the English and Arabic languages.[27] At the hearing, the applicant introduced a new claim that there was a Syrian person near his rental home in Australia who had said they wished to return to Syria in order to kill the Shia.[28]

1. On 20 November 2018, [29] the applicant's migration agent provided the Tribunal with:

(a) a copy of a certified translation of Title Deed for property in Lebanon issued by the Land Registry Secretary responsible for the District of Tyre in Lebanon (title deed);[30] and

(b) a police event number in relation to a report purportedly made of the applicant's conversation with a Syrian person threatening Shia (provided further to a discussion with the Member at hearing).[31]

1. On 19 December 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.[32]

1. Following some preliminary remarks about the application for review and the applicant's claimed nationality, the Tribunal identified the relevant criteria to be satisfied for the grant of a protection visa and specified various mandatory considerations for protection status determination purposes.[33] It then proceeded to set out the applicant's claims and evidence raised before the Department and the Tribunal, including detail of issues and questions raised at hearing with the applicant and the applicant's responses.[34]
2. At the outset of its consideration of the applicant's claims and evidence, the Tribunal recorded its overall finding that the applicant's evidence in support of his claims lacked credibility. It stated it was not satisfied he was a reliable or truthful witness and concluded his claims had been fabricated for the purpose of obtaining a protection visa.[35] The Tribunal then focussed upon three aspects of the applicant's narrative: his residential location in Lebanon, ISIS' interest in the Palestinian refugee camps near that location and in him personally, and other claims relating to the applicant's political and other activities in Lebanon.[36]

1. While the Tribunal accepted the applicant had once resided in the general area in Southern Lebanon where he claimed that he had lived,[37] it was not satisfied the applicant lived adjacent to the Palestinian refugee camps as claimed for the following reasons:[38]

(a) The Tribunal was unwilling to rely on any document purporting to demonstrate land ownership in Lebanon unless it was an authorised land title deed as requested, a matter it explained to the applicant at hearing as country information indicated that official documents are easily fabricated in Lebanon.[39]

(b) The applicant did not supply an authorised land title deed as requested. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that his family's property had not yet been registered on the Lebanese government land registry website as country information indicated the digitisation of land records in Lebanon was completed in 2004.[40]

(c) There were discrepancies between the applicant's home address specified in his protection visa application form and the address specified in the title deed.[41]

1. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant had been of interest to ISIS for the following reasons:

(a) There was no country information, including the media articles provided by the applicant, indicating ISIS were present in the camps the applicant had claimed were in the vicinity of his home.[42]

(b) The media articles provided by the applicant referenced Palestinian refugee camps in other parts of Lebanon where there was terrorist activity.[43] The Lebanese security authorities were aware of the potential problem of ISIS recruiting Palestinians in Lebanon.[44]

(c) It is implausible that ISIS, who are implacably opposed to the Shia, would seek to recruit a Shia Muslim when there were significant numbers of unemployed Palestinian Sunni Muslims at their disposal.[45]

(d) The proposed ISIS recruitment methods of intimidation, violence and the gift of a phone were so bizarre they were implausible.[46]

(e) The applicant did not demonstrate any exceptional qualities that would justify the level of effort described to recruit him.[47]

(f) It is reasonable to believe that if ISIS did attempt to recruit Shia Muslims in Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah would likely intervene to prevent it. Relevant country information indicates ISIS was targeting Shia Muslims in Southern Lebanon rather than trying to recruit them.[48]

The applicant's political and other activities in Lebanon

1. As the applicant's oral testimony, including but not limited to his residential address, lacked credibility, the Tribunal also did not accept the applicant:

(a) purchased supplies at the camps;

(b) was required to transit through the camps to reach his home; and

(c) was in Educated Youth and posted leaflets opposing the war in Syria, particularly as this claim was also uncorroborated.[49]

1. Having considered its findings as they related to the accepted claims and evidence, the Tribunal determined the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. Relying on its anterior findings, the Tribunal was also not satisfied the applicant was owed complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate.[50]

1. On 31 December 2018, the applicant commenced proceedings by way of originating application. The applicant advanced two unparticularised grounds (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal Member requested prior to his decision information which was given to him yet he failed to understand and accept my risk and wrongly made a finding on credibility.
   2. The Tribunal misunderstood my claim and misapplied the law a matter which I believe is an error especially error of fact in as error of law.
2. In addition to, and in some instances by way of particularisation of these two grounds, the applicant raised ten points of complaint in his written submissions filed on 21 July 2025 (AWS) (reproduced below save for de-identification of the applicant's municipal location in Lebanon):
   1. I rely on my Application under Migration Act and continue to believe that the Member of the Tribunal failed to accept me as a person who has risk and continues to have risk if returned to Lebanon and the Member failed to take into consideration the extra information I provided which appears in Court Book ps.122-132.
   2. The Member's mind was infected by error of law when he asked questions such as "why they didn't kill me?" at point 21 of the decision and that the Member himself went regularly to Lebanon (at point 15 of the decision).
   3. The Member failed to accept my claim and attacked my credibility which is contrary to what happened to me.
   4. I also rely on my transcript filed in Court on 18 April 2019 and the fact that the Islamic State was interested in me individually and what happened to me applies to the information provided in the Court Book where Islamic terrorists activities cannot be denied.
   5. I gave my evidence in a very straightforward way and I do believe that the Member has some problem accepting my evidence and as a matter of fact in October 2024 my family home was shelled by Israel and my parents took refuge in Tripoli, North Lebanon and as a result of the airstrike by Israel my family lost 13 members.
   6. I received First Respondent's Outline of Submissions dated 16 July 2025. The First Respondent accepted on point 8 that I provided letter from Municipality of XX and at point 10 that I provided copy of title deed: XX.
   7. The Tribunal failed to consider my application for a visitor visa which has all my information to support my protection visa as to my location, my studies and my qualifications.
   8. I say that in support of my application for protection visa because my student visa does not dispute my address, my education and location. This is a factual error by the Tribunal not to consider information in my student visa.
   9. I draw the honourable Court's attention to the fact that the Member of the Tribunal has no right to attack me and my credibility as well as my address in Lebanon as stated in Court Book p.63.
   10. I continue to say Your Honour that what happened to me as genuine and the Member of the Tribunal was not fair towards me.
3. The materials before the Court include:

(a) the originating application for judicial review filed on 31 December 2018;

(b) an affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 31 December 2018, annexed to which is a copy of the Tribunal's notification of decision, decision record and statement of decision and reasons (the material beneath each annexure appears in the Court Book);

(c) a Court Book numbering 160 pages filed by the first respondent on 18 February 2019 (tendered into evidence at hearing on 23 July 2025 by the first respondent and marked as Exhibit 1R);

(d) a further affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed 18 April 2019, annexed to which is a copy of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing held on 19 November 2018 (Tribunal hearing transcript) (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 23 July 2025);

(e) written submissions filed on behalf of the first respondent on 16 July 2025 and 6 August 2025; and

(f) out-of-time written submissions filed by the applicant on 21 July 2025 and accepted for filing (AWS).

1. The applicant appeared at the hearing on 23 July 2025 as a litigant in person, assisted by an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. Mindful of the Court's duty to self-represented litigants, I explained the Court's role in undertaking judicial review and ensured the applicant had access to all relevant documents. I asked the applicant to explain the basis of each of his grounds and complaints, especially where they were unparticularised, and to indicate whether there was anything the Tribunal had done or not done throughout the review application process, including at the Tribunal hearing, which he considered unfair or unreasonable. Ms Warren, for the Minister, addressed orally the various matters raised by the applicant in his written and oral submissions. It became apparent, however, that the Court would be assisted by further written submissions from the parties in relation to various complaints raised by the applicant. Orders were accordingly made for the filing of post-hearing supplementary written submissions. The applicant did not avail himself of that opportunity. On 6 August 2025, the Minister filed supplementary written submissions.
2. The parties' written and oral submissions, where relevant, are addressed below.

1. In this judicial review proceeding, the Court's task is to determine whether the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s 474 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; HCA 2.
2. I have scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error, noting the Court's obligations towards litigants in person as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158; FCA 1392 at [58]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113]. I have also sought to read and understand the applicant's grounds and various complaints at their highest when assessing whether jurisdictional error can be established in this case.
3. Having read and understood the applicant's grounds and various complaints cumulatively, and excluding those matters which are incapable of suggesting error on the Tribunal's part, I understand the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's decision or approach in the following five respects:

(a) Issue 1: The Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's claims and evidence (raised by Ground 1; AWS [1] and [6])

(b) Issue 2: The Tribunal erred when making its adverse credibility findings (raised by Ground 1; AWS [3], [4], [5], [9] and [10])

(c) Issue 3: The Tribunal erred by failing to verify the applicant's claims about his residential location in Lebanon because it failed to examine information on that matter specified in his previous student visa application (raised by in AWS [7] and [8])

(d) Issue 4: The Tribunal Member was biased and improperly based his decision upon his own personal experience of Lebanon (raised by AWS [2])

(e) Issue 5: The Tribunal misunderstood the applicant's claim, made an error of fact and misapplied the law (raised by Ground 2).

1. I now turn to examine each of these five issues.

Did the Tribunal fail to consider the applicant's claims and evidence?

1. By Ground 1 and the points raised in AWS [1] and [6], the applicant contends the Tribunal failed to consider his claims and evidence. In particular, the applicant complains the Tribunal did not properly consider the signed statement, the municipality letter and the media articles that were provided to the Tribunal on 15 November 2018.
2. The Minister argued this contention fails as the Tribunal considered this material. In support of that argument, the Minister made the following submissions:

(a) The signed statement largely repeated claims the applicant had raised before the delegate, with the addition of the claim his family were 'affiliated' with Hezbollah. The Tribunal discussed those claims with the applicant at hearing and addressed the claims and evidence upon which material findings of fact were made in its decision. Specifically in relation to the additional claim that his family were 'affiliated' with Hezbollah, the Tribunal recorded in its reasons at [28] the applicant's clarification of that claim at hearing where he stated what he meant by his family's affiliation was their association and support.

(b) The Tribunal considered the municipality letter but was not satisfied that it substantiated the applicant's claim of residing adjacent to a Palestinian refugee camp. The submission of that evidence did not resolve existing credibility concerns regarding the applicant's residential location in Lebanon. Those concerns arose from his failure to provide an authorised land title deed, as requested, together with inconsistencies in his address details - specifically, the discrepancy between the information in his protection visa application and that contained in a land title deed submitted after the hearing.

(c) The Tribunal considered the media articles referred to at [35] of its reasons but found that they did not contain any information about the three camps near the area where the applicant claimed to have lived in Lebanon, nor did they provide any information regarding the presence of ISIS in those camps.

1. I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions on this issue. There is a difference between failing to consider a claim and failing to accept it: Saleh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 619 at [41]. It is evident from the Tribunal's reasons that the Tribunal was aware of the applicant's material, including the claims raised therein, and recognised the degree of its importance in terms of how it bore upon the applicant's case: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99; FCA 317 at [77] and [111] per Robertson J. It referred to that material to the extent it bore upon a dispositive issue: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; FCAFC 184 at [46]-[47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ. It further made reference to that material to the extent it was relevant to its findings on what it considered to be the material questions of fact: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; HCA 30 at [69] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed at [1]); ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 360 ALR 228; HCA 46 at [13]-[14] per Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ.
2. Having reviewed the evidentiary record, I am unable to identify any instance of the Tribunal having failed to consider any other claims or evidence before it. Therefore, the applicant's contention in relation to this first issue has not been made out.

Did the Tribunal err when making its adverse credibility findings?

1. By Ground 1 and the points raised in AWS [3], [4], [5], [9] and [10], the applicant contends the Tribunal erred in the making of its adverse credibility findings. In making its adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal focused upon three key aspects of the applicant's narrative: his residential location in Lebanon, ISIS' interest in him personally, and certain claims relating to his political and other activities in Lebanon. The applicant generally complains that those adverse credibility findings were reached by the Tribunal in a manner that was legally unreasonable. At hearing, the applicant specifically complained about the Member's reliance upon their own travel experience in Lebanon as a basis upon which to assess the credibility of the applicant's claim in relation to ISIS' attempt to recruit him. The applicant asserted at hearing before me that the Member must have visited Lebanon with diplomatic status and thereby had limited knowledge of the local realties faced by common people in Lebanon such as himself.
2. The Minister submits, and I agree, that the Tribunal's reasons are cogent and contain comprehensive adverse credibility findings.
3. In relation to the applicant's claimed residential location in Lebanon, the Tribunal had a cogent basis to reject the applicant's claims due to his inability to provide consistent information and failure to provide reliable corroborative land ownership documentation in the form requested by the Tribunal which demonstrated his connection with that residential location. Further, the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's evidence, along with the applicant's explanation for his inability to comply with the Tribunal's request for specific evidence, was logically supported by country information.
4. In relation to ISIS' interest in the applicant, the Tribunal considered the applicant's written claims, oral testimony, documentary evidence and country information in order to reach the conclusion that it was unable to accept the underlying thread of his narrative that ISIS had a presence in Palestinian refugee camps surrounding his home and had an interest in recruiting him. Its rejection of that narrative was based upon the absence of persuasive documentary evidence and a range of implausibilities in the claimed narrative.
5. First, the media articles submitted by the applicant did not detail the presence of ISIS in any of the three Palestinian refugee camps adjacent to the applicant's claimed residential location in Lebanon.
6. Secondly, various implausibilities in the applicant's narrative provided a logical basis for the Tribunal to find him to be an unreliable witness. The Minister correctly highlighted certain aspects of the applicant's narrative the Tribunal rationally found to be implausible, including:

(a) That it did not make sense that IS - who were implacably opposed to Shia - would seek to recruit the Shia Lebanese when there was an abundance of Sunni Palestinians: This was based on the Tribunal's assessment of country information that revealed that IS considered Shia were dissenters (CB 149 [37]).The Tribunal put this concern to the applicant, who had no meaningful response other than that they wanted "young men" (CB 147 [20]-[21]). The Tribunal's reasoning plainly had a rational basis.

(b) That the claimed methods of recruitment were so bizarre as to be implausible (CB 149 [38]): The Tribunal's reasoning in this regard was logical - it was bizarre that rather than attempt to persuade the applicant to join their cause, IS would threaten him over the course of several months; give him a mobile phone (which he accepted without question); and then he would hang up on the person who called.

(c) There was nothing special about the applicant that would justify the level of effort the IS put in trying to recruit him (CB 150 [39]): Again, this was logical in circumstances where the applicant had no meaningful explanation for why IS would spend months attempting to recruit him, particularly in light of its finding based on country information that IS were targeting Shia in Lebanon rather than attempting to recruit them.

1. The formulation or scope of what may be understood to be 'implausible' was encapsulated by the Full Court in BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [56]:

A finding that an alleged event is implausible is ordinarily a finding that it is inherently unlikely to have occurred; adopting the language of the High Court in WET040 (No 2), the event does not accord with the probabilities of ordinary human experience. It is not necessarily a finding that that event is beyond human experience of possible occurrences in the sense that it could not have occurred: the formulation tends to overstate what is ordinarily meant by "implausible".

1. Where a decision-maker finds an applicant's claim to be 'implausible', that finding must have a probative basis and not be the product of speculation or conjecture: see DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110; (2020) 278 FCR 529; FCAFC 110 (DQM18) at [52]-[58] per Bromberg and Mortimer JJ; EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518 (EVI19) at [73]-[81] per Stewart J. Put simply, there must be an evidentiary foundation for the decision-maker's finding as to implausibility, unless of course the finding can be said to be based on the probabilities of 'ordinary human experience'. For such a finding to be soundly based on the probabilities of 'ordinary human experience', the decision-maker must be equipped by probative material to assess what 'ordinary human experience' would be in the circumstances of a particular case, taking into account, for example, the cultural, geographical and other factors that bear upon the fact-finding exercise: see, for example, DQM18 at [58], EVI19 at [81]. Otherwise, the finding will be based on an unwarranted assumption: see BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573 at [6]- [7] per Perram J.
2. It is evident from the Tribunal's reasons that it regarded ISIS' motivation and the methods it employed to recruit the applicant as implausible, particularly the claimed gifting of a mobile phone to the applicant by two strangers on motorbikes and the applicant's acceptance of the phone because they said they would call him that evening. The Tribunal considered this aspect of the recruitment narrative - especially the unusual gifting of a phone - to be inherently unlikely for various reasons. In my view, the reasons given for rejecting that aspect of the narrative were neither illogical nor irrational. Specifically, the Tribunal's rejection of the claimed gifting of the phone on the basis of implausibility is properly understood as the Tribunal forming the view that the incident was inherently unlikely as it was beyond the realm of 'ordinary human experience'. There is nothing in the hearing transcript or elsewhere in the evidentiary record to suggest that the applicant provided persuasive evidence to support this claim beyond mere assertion that such an interaction was part of ISIS' recruitment practices or otherwise commonplace in Southern Lebanon.
3. Importantly, the Tribunal tested its concern about the plausibility of this claimed interaction with the applicant at hearing. The Member observed that, in his experience, a person in Lebanon would find it very strange for someone to give a phone to a stranger and for that person to accept it without question. In my view, that exchange demonstrates the Tribunal's willingness to engage with the applicant about the plausibility of his claim and indeed be open to persuasion as to the veracity of the claim by a variety of means, including as to whether it might fall within the realm of 'ordinary human experience' in Lebanon.
4. Insofar as the applicant contends that the Tribunal should not have tested his claim in that manner, it is permissible for a Tribunal Member to draw upon personal knowledge of a country or region when reviewing a delegate's decision, provided the applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond: BWC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 199 (BWC15) at [16], [21] per Bromberg J, citing NAEH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 927 per Branson J. The Tribunal Member properly afforded the applicant that opportunity before reaching an adverse finding about the implausibility of this particular claim.
5. The evidentiary record also reveals that at no point in his response at hearing or in post-hearing submissions did the applicant raise any concern that the Member's knowledge of life in Lebanon was limited because he was not Lebanese and lacked appreciation of local realities. While the applicant advanced that complaint before this Court, in the absence of such challenge having been made before the Tribunal, I see no error in the Tribunal's approach to this issue as part of its overall finding that the applicant's narrative concerning ISIS interest in him lacked credibility.
6. In relation to the applicant's other activities, there was a lack of corroborative evidence of the applicant's participation in the Educated Youth and the discrepancies regarding his address in Lebanon being close to three Palestinian refugee camps, as had been claimed, provided a sound basis to reject the related claims that he was required to transit through those camps to reach his home and that he had also purchased supplies at those camps.
7. It follows that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave, having been based on its assessment of country information, the absence of corroborative evidence, the submission of evidence with no probative value and the implausibility of the applicant's claims. These were matters that were logically probative to the question of credibility: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496; FCAFC 146.
8. Accordingly, the applicant's contention in relation to this second issue is not made out.

Did the Tribunal err by failing to verify the applicant's claims about his residential location in Lebanon because it failed to examine information on that matter specified in his previous student visa application?

1. By the points raised in AWS [7] and [8], the applicant contends the Tribunal erred in failing to verify his claims about his residential location in Lebanon because it failed to examine information on that matter specified in his previous student visa application. At hearing, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal should have considered the address provided in his student visa application to corroborate his claim about the location of his home in Lebanon.
2. The Minister submitted it is not in dispute that the applicant arrived in Australia on a student visa and further submitted the reference to a visitor visa in AWS [7] must be a typographical error as there is no record of the applicant having made a visitor visa application. I agree with those submissions as the evidentiary record reveals the applicant having only applied for, and been granted, a student visa.[51]
3. In relation to the information contained in the applicant's student visa application, the Minister observed the applicant did not provide his student visa application to the Tribunal for consideration and nor did he suggest to the Tribunal that it could corroborate his claims when questioned about the location of his home. The Minister argued that it was not for the Tribunal to make inquiries or make the applicant's case for him: Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; HCA 14 at [187]; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 65 ALR 549 (Prasad). Nor was it obliged to prompt and stimulate evidence in the form of an elaboration or explanation which he chose not to embark on at the hearing when challenged about his address: SZMDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1937; (2008) 105 ALD 499; FCA 1937. Nor can the Tribunal be said to have erred by failing to consider information not provided to it. That the applicant now, with the benefit of hindsight, suggests that he had been consistent about his address in the student visa application, contrary to the Tribunal's finding about the discrepancy in his evidence about that address at [40], does not only fail to reveal any error when considered against well-established principles, but is also not supported by evidence such that the Court could accept this assertion. In relation to the latter, the Minister concluded that the applicant has also not discharged his onus of demonstrating that any error in this regard (which was not conceded) was material: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321; HCA 12 at [14].
4. I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions on this issue. It was for the applicant to make out his case in relation to the location of his residence in Lebanon and provide the Tribunal with evidence in that regard. The applicant was provided with ample opportunity to provide evidence to the Tribunal in that regard and indeed availed himself of that opportunity. Further, the Tribunal's power to get information from an applicant that it considers relevant is permissive and not mandatory; and there was nothing in this case which suggested that it had improperly elected not to exercise that permissive power, particularly in circumstances where the applicant had provided evidence relating to his address in Lebanon to the delegate and the Tribunal and the Tribunal had requested specific evidence in that regard. Furthermore, given these circumstances, the making of an additional inquiry by the Tribunal as to the applicant's address listed in his student visa application was, in my view, not an 'obvious' inquiry in relation to a critical fact such that it gave rise to a failure to inquire on the Tribunal's part: Prasad at 563; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCATrans 165; (2009) 259 ALR 429; HCA 39 at [25]-[26].
5. Therefore, the applicant's contention in relation to this third issue has not been made out.

Was the Tribunal Member biased and was the Tribunal decision improperly based upon the Member's own personal experience of Lebanon?

1. By the point raised in AWS [2], the applicant contends the Tribunal Member was biased and improperly based his decision upon his own personal experience of Lebanon. At hearing before me, when pressed to further particularise his point on this issue, the applicant raised various additional matters. In essence, he:

(a) took issue with the Tribunal's disbelief of his account, despite his compliance in providing evidence to the Tribunal, and maintained that the Tribunal's disbelief was improperly influenced by the Tribunal Member's personal experience of regularly visiting Lebanon as a foreigner.

(b) reiterated his claims about the proximity of his home in Lebanon to the Palestinian refugee camps, though he could not recall whether the map at page 63 of the Court Book was drawn at the interview before the delegate or the Tribunal hearing.

(c) raised a concern about his exchange with the Member at the conclusion of the Tribunal hearing concerning a conversation with a Syrian neighbour in Australia, who allegedly stated that he intended to return to Syria to kill Shia. In response, the Member advised the applicant to report the matter to his local police station and to provide a copy of the police report.[52]

1. By way of response, the Minister submitted that the applicant had sought to argue bias was demonstrated by:

(a) the Tribunal asking him why ISIS didn't kill him;[53]

(b) the Tribunal Member having told the applicant of his own regular travel to Lebanon;

(c) the Tribunal's refusal to accept his evidence of his address in Lebanon; and

(d) the Tribunal requiring him to provide a police report regarding his claim that a Syrian neighbour in Australia told him that he wished to return to Syria to kill the Shia.

1. The Minister further submitted the applicant has not established actual or apprehended bias in respect of the Tribunal's decision-making. I agree. An allegation of bias is a serious allegation which must be firmly and distinctly made and clearly proven: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; HCA 17 (Jia) at [127]. An applicant must show that the Tribunal had a pre-existing state of mind which disabled it from undertaking, or rendered it unwilling to undertake, a proper evaluation of the matter: Jia at [35] and [72], or that a fair-minded informed person might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the review: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337; HCA 63 at [33].
2. I further agree with the Minister that no inference of bias or prejudgment can be drawn from the fact the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claims or made findings adverse to him. The robust and forthright testing of claims and evidence cannot sustain a finding of apprehended bias, let alone actual bias: SZOAF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 431 (SZOAF) at [17]. Further, the Tribunal was permitted to put its doubts and concerns to the applicant: Jatin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 150 at [21]. The fact that the Tribunal had doubts does not support an inference of prejudgment. Indeed, the proper expression of such doubts in protection matters, whether orally or in writing, is an inherent part of the discharge of the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations as enshrined in Part 7 of the Act.
3. The Minister drew my attention to various references in the Tribunal hearing transcript and decision demonstrating the Tribunal having asked detailed questions about the applicant's claims, thereby indicating a mind open to persuasion regarding his involvement in Educated Youth,[54] ISIS gifting him a phone,[55] ISIS recruitment methods more generally,[56] and the address of his home in Lebanon.[57] Having reviewed the evidentiary record, particularly the Tribunal hearing transcript, I agree with the Minister's characterisation of the Member's engagement with the applicant's claims at hearing being indicative of a mind open to persuasion. While I appreciate that some of the interactions with the Member at hearing were robust, particularly where the Member expressed disbelief in relation to some of the applicant's evidence about ISIS' attempts to recruit him, those expressions of disbelief were not of a character which demonstrated that the Tribunal was no longer open to persuasion. Rather, those expressions of disbelief were expressed at appropriate moments during the applicant's oral testimony in order to test the veracity of the applicant's narrative and allow him an opportunity to further clarify and persuade. The Member's language conveys scepticism rather than a fixed or unyielding attitude, indicating doubt rather than an unwillingness to be persuaded. I am not of the view that a fair-minded lay observer of that hearing, properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the relevant conduct, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions to be decided: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425; HCA 28 (Ex parte H) at [27]-[28] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ.
4. The Minister submits the exchange between the applicant and the Member regarding reporting to police the Syrian man for threatening Shia is to be understood in the context of the hearing. The exchange occurred at the close of a lengthy hearing during which the Member would have formed some view of the applicant's credibility. The Minister maintains it is unsurprising the Member expressed some frustration when the applicant raised a new unsubstantiated assertion at the end of the hearing and then sought the Member's guidance as to what he should do in order to provide corroborative evidence of that assertion so as to overcome any adverse credibility finding that might flow from the provision of a further unsubstantiated claim.
5. Having reviewed the evidentiary record, including the Tribunal hearing transcript, I consider the Member's interaction with the applicant to reflect an expression of frustration rather than a closing of the mind or an unwillingness to remain open to persuasion. It does not suggest any refusal to entertain the applicant's claim or to receive further supporting evidence. It was entirely proper for the Tribunal to scrutinise and question the applicant about an unsubstantiated assertion raised only at the conclusion of the hearing, particularly in seeking to understand its relevance to the protection claim and to assess its significance and credibility. The Tribunal's task is to ascertain which claims it is prepared to accept or reject as part of its fact-finding endeavour, and in discharging that task it is legitimate for it to focus an applicant's mind. The inquisitorial function of the Tribunal permits it some latitude in the form and manner it seeks to focus an applicant's mind in the hearing context. While the lawfulness of the approach taken will be context and case-specific, it is well established that such focus may well be sought by way of vigorous questioning: Ex parte H at [30].
6. In my view, the Member's expression of frustration was, though perhaps inelegant, a pointed attempt to emphasise the need for corroborative evidence, especially in relation to claims not previously ventilated. In that context, I regard the Member's conduct as falling within the range of permissible behaviour, consistent with what other courts have described as an expression of 'robust individuality [which] may at times be expected from persons charged with the difficult task of making decisions of this nature': SZOAF at [17] per Barker J, citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka [2001] HCA 23; (2001) 206 CLR 128; HCA 23 at [90]; NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 264; FCAFC 328 at [19].
7. In relation to the Member's indication to the applicant at hearing that he regularly went to Lebanon, the Minister drew my attention to the following observations by the Member to the applicant:

(a) a person in Lebanon would think it strange or illegal if someone gave them a gift of a phone and the recipient accepted it without question (a matter which went to the plausibility of the applicant's ISIS recruitment narrative);[58] and

(b) he had been in Lebanon in September and in 2016 and noted there were no explosions at those times (a matter which went to the assessment of whether the applicant could relocate to another part of Lebanon such as Beirut).[59]

1. For the reasons set out above at [46], these observations do not in and of themselves reveal error as it is permissible for the Member when performing the fact-finding task to use their own knowledge, provided the applicant is given an opportunity to respond: BWC15 at [16] and [21]. That knowledge may include personal or specialised knowledge, or a reference to that which is commonly known, which a Member has gained through first-hand experience of the applicant's country: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398; HCA 41 at [18]. In both instances, the Tribunal's reasons reveal the Member putting these observations to the applicant to allow him to respond.[60] Further, my review of the Tribunal hearing transcript reveals the applicant being unable to provide any meaningful response or challenge to the Member's reliance upon their personal knowledge of Lebanon when doubts were raised about the implausibility of the applicant's claimed ISIS recruitment narrative and the applicant's inability to relocate within Lebanon.
2. Finally, in relation to the applicant's submission that he drew the Member's attention at hearing to the hand drawn map of his home's proximity to the camps, the Minister submits that this claimed interaction is not borne out by the evidence as it does not appear in the Tribunal hearing transcript and therefore cannot be considered by this Court. Having reviewed the evidentiary record, I agree with that submission.
3. Therefore, the applicant's contention in relation to this fifth issue has not been made out.

Did the Tribunal misunderstand the applicant's claim, make an error of fact or misapply the law?

1. By ground 2, the applicant contends the Tribunal misunderstood his claim, made an error of fact and misapplied the law.
2. The Minister submits, and I agree, there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant's claim for protection. The reasons reveal the Tribunal having identified, read, understood and evaluated the various claims propounded by the applicant in support of his claim for protection, ultimately rejecting a number of them on credibility grounds. The reasons for rejection of those claims do not reveal any misunderstanding or misapprehension of the claims themselves, or more broadly the applicant's claim for protection. Therefore, this aspect of ground 2 does not reveal error.
3. The Minister further argues that while the applicant has not identified any error of fact, it is nevertheless well established that a mere error of fact based on a misunderstanding does not amount to jurisdictional error provided the Tribunal considered the applicant's claims: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51; (2010) 115 ALD 303; FCAFC 51 at [28]. Further, the Minister also observed that if an error of fact were to be found, the applicant is yet to demonstrate that the factual error was material to the outcome of the review. I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions and agree that this aspect of ground 2 does not reveal any error.
4. I further agree with the Minister that the applicant's contention that the Tribunal misapplied the law also cannot succeed. The Tribunal correctly identified and applied the law and I am unable to discern any indication of the Tribunal having misapplied the legislation. The Tribunal correctly applied the definitions of 'refugee' and 'well-founded fear of persecution' in ss 5H and 5J of the Act in finding that the applicant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.[61] It also considered the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.[62] The Tribunal's reasons demonstrate its awareness of the applicable tests,[63] which it also extracted in an attachment to its decision.[64] Further, the reasons at [33]-[42] illustrate its engagement with the applicant's claims against the relevant criteria. Where the Tribunal rejected those claims as lacking credibility, it followed that it did not accept there was a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm upon return for the reasons advanced. This reflects a proper application of the accepted facts to the applicable law. Accordingly, I find that this aspect of ground 2 also fails to disclose error.
5. I agree with the Minister that the applicant's contention that the Tribunal misapplied the law cannot succeed. The Tribunal correctly identified and applied the relevant provisions, and I am unable to discern any indication that it misapplied the legislation. In particular, the Tribunal properly applied the definitions of 'refugee' and 'well-founded fear of persecution' in ss 5H and 5J of the Act when finding that the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a). It also considered the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal's reasons demonstrate its awareness of the applicable tests, which it extracted in an attachment to its decision.
6. Therefore, the applicant's contention in relation to this sixth issue has not been made out.

1. For completeness, I agree with the Minister's submission that the applicant's references in AWS [5] to recent events, including those which occurred in Lebanon during October 2024, are misconceived. While I recognise those events are tragic, it must be understood that events that occurred after the Tribunal's decision are irrelevant to the identification of jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v EGZ17 [2022] FCAFC 12; (2022) 289 FCR 164; FCAFC 12 at [28]-[29] per Beach, Thawley and Cheeseman JJ.
2. Finally, as the applicant is a litigant in person, I have also reviewed the reasons of the Tribunal to determine whether there was any self-evident jurisdictional error: BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095 at [11] per Flick J. I have not identified any such jurisdictional error.

1. The applicant's grounds and complaints, when taken at their highest, do not disclose jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Therefore, for the above reasons, the application before this Court is dismissed.
3. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Papadopoulos.

[6] CB 30, [90]; CB 32, [92]; CB 33, [95].

[8] CB 30, [90]-[91]; CB 33, [95].

[13] CB 30, [91]; CB 33, [96]-[97].

[14] CB 30 to 31, [90]; CB 33, [97].

[28] Tribunal hearing transcript p 20 to 22; CB 148, [29].

[31] CB 137; Tribunal hearing transcript p 20 to 22; CB 148, [29].

[39] CB 119; CB 148, [24]-[25], CB 149, [33]-[34].

[40] CB 148, [24]-[25]; CB 149, [33].

[41] CB 25; CB 139 to 140; CB 149, [34].

[46] CB 146 [15]; CB 147, [16]-[23]; CB 149, [38].

[47] CB 147, [20]-[21]; CB 150, [39].

[52] Tribunal hearing transcript p 20-22.

[55] CB 146 to 147, [15]-[16]; CB 147 [18]-[19]

[56] CB 147, [20]-[22]; CB 147, [26].