consideration
15 Ground 1: The first ground of appeal claims that the Tribunal was biased. This ground is explained by written submissions filed by the appellant. The bias alleged is, as I understand it, a reference to the content of the country information that the Tribunal relied on at [64] - [66] of its reasons for decision. Tied to the reference to that material is a further claim that in effect the Tribunal failed to give proper accord to the letter provided by the appellant, dated 15 March 2009, confirming that he was the "elected organising secretary" in a local branch of BNP Youth Wing. The appellant takes issue with the Tribunal's finding at [70] that no dates are provided and that the letter is vague. The appellant also says that the Tribunal member "invented" the words that "the applicant was in the BNP's Youth Wing" in [70], which is totally incorrect. The appellant says that "the Tribunal mislead the contents of the letter, which is an issue to consider by this honourable court". The appellant considers all of this demonstrates that the Tribunal was not fair minded.
16 It is clear from the material before the Court that his Honour gave comprehensive and thorough consideration to the appellant's claim that the material demonstrated that the Tribunal was bias. In my view, his Honour was correct to conclude that there was no evidence of bias (either actual or apprehended).
17 The Federal Magistrate correctly laid out the test of whether a fair minded lay observer would apprehend bias on the part of the Tribunal requires something more than a feeling that conventions of discretion and prudence have been breached. Something more is required and the apprehension must be firmly established: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Epeabaka [2001] HCA 23; (2001) 179 ALR 296 (Epeabaka), at [15]; and at [53] - [65], [89] - [95]. The test is an objective test, viewed through the eyes of the reasonable or fair minded lay observer: NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 264 (NADH), at [21]; SZJKU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 308, at [36]. Robust and forthright testing of the appellant's claims by the Tribunal does not sustain a finding of apprehended bias. Indeed, displays of robust individuality may at times be expected from persons charged with the difficult task of making decisions of this nature: Epeabaka at [90]; NADH at [19]. It is for the Tribunal to get to the truth of the matter and it is proper for the Tribunal to focus an applicant's mind: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425, at 435 [30].
18 It was open to the Tribunal, as the Federal Magistrate found, to look closely at and ask questions of the appellant about the information he provided to it concerning his claims and in particular the authenticity of documents such as the letter provided. Plainly it was open in the circumstances to the Tribunal to consider that the letter was not genuine due to its lack of dates and vague contents and generally to the reliability of the appellant as a witness. Such analysis does not of itself indicate any bias on the part of the Tribunal.
19 To the extent that the appellant complains that the Tribunal was not itself biased but was misled by the materials before it, the question of the use to be made of the letter was always going to be an issue, it having been raised by the delegate at the earlier interview with the appellant. The Tribunal, from the country information it had, was alert to the fact that sometimes materials provided to the Tribunal that purport to be from a country of origin may not be authentic. The materials were of course provided by the appellant himself. There does not, in the circumstances, seem to be any proper basis for suggesting that the Tribunal was misled by any materials such that it thereby was biased in its treatment of the issues it had to decide.
20 So far as the appellant's complaint is concerned that the statement by the Tribunal that "the applicant was in the BNP's Youth Wing" is totally incorrect, it seems to owe it self to a number of statements made including the statement made in writing by or on behalf of the appellant attached to his initial application for a protection visa. In [3] of that statement, he says that in 1994 "I was elected as the General Secretary of the College Committee Chatradal and this year I contested for student union election and became the General Secretary of the College Union Committee. At this the … BNP … was in power under the leadership of Prime Minister … Zia". This of itself seems to verify the concise statement made by the Tribunal. To the extent that the Tribunal's reasons do not exactly replicate the statements made in the letter, it is plain that they repeat the substance thereof. No error is revealed by this approach.
21 So far as the appellant complains that the Tribunal relied on country information provided by the Department, the Tribunal was entitled to regard it: see NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2004] FCAFC 10, at [11].
22 In essence, by ground one, the appellant seeks to challenge the merits of the decision by the Tribunal which were otherwise open to the Tribunal on the materials before it.
23 In my view, this ground of appeal does not have merit and must be dismissed.
24 Ground 2: The second ground of appeal is that the Federal Magistrate made an error of law by failing to consider an "integer" of the appellant's claims, namely the appellant's claim that he had been falsely accused of murder. This ground of review was addressed by His Honour under the heading "Ground 4": see SZOAF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor [2010] FMCA 44, at [58] - [59]. There, his Honour referred to the Tribunal's decision at [74] noting that the Tribunal did consider the claims that the appellant had been falsely accused of murder.
25 In his written submissions, the appellant says that he was charged in a murder case and challenges the Tribunal's finding that it "does not accept" that he was falsely charged: see [86] of the Tribunal's reasons. The appellant says the Tribunal did not make any sort of queries about the genuineness of the murder case. He says there are reasons to accept the appellant. He says the Tribunal was biased by the country information which is contradictory information.
26 The Federal Magistrate dealt with these issues at [52] and following in his decision. There it noted that at the hearing the Tribunal put to the appellant its concern about the inconsistency in his evidence where it is said that he continued in college until 1996, but also that he went into hiding after the 1995 murder charge. The Federal Magistrate, at [53], pointed out that in dealing with this (and other issues) the Tribunal ultimately found the appellant to be an unreliable witness. Ultimately, as the Federal Magistrate pointed out, at [55], the Tribunal at [86] rejected the appellant's claim that he had been falsely charged with murder in 1995. This was one of several claims made by the appellant rejected by the Tribunal.
27 I agree that on the materials before the Tribunal, it was open to the Tribunal to make the finding of fact it did in this regard. No error of law was demonstrated and in these circumstances no error is revealed in the analysis of the Federal Magistrate.
28 The Tribunal in these circumstances was not under any duty to inquire further into the authenticity of the appellant's claims that he was charged: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) ALR 429; 83 ALJR 1123, at [24] and [25].
29 This ground must fail.
30 Ground 3: The third ground claims that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not considering the appellant's situation in returning to Bangladesh in circumstances where political change had come into effect.
31 In his written submissions, the appellant says that the Tribunal knew that there were political changes coming into effect, he says the "appellant's party men has become subject to oppression including in false cases by the ruling Awami League after arrival into power on 29 December 2010 backed by army" and that the Tribunal did not ask any questions about the prevailing situation in Bangladesh which will be adverse to the appellant's life and liberty. At the hearing the appellant corrected the date to 2008. He contends that the task of the Tribunal was to determine whether the appellant might be subject to adverse action, such as detention or arrest and whether that would constitute persecution on Convention grounds.
32 This appears to be a new ground in that it was not raised before the Federal Magistrate. It was however argued before the Tribunal. The Minister does not press the point that leave may be required to argue this ground and says it fails on the merits.
33 I note that at [92] of its reasons the Tribunal accepted that the Government had changed in Bangladesh on the occasions and with the results the appellant describes. The Tribunal concluded, however, that on the evidence presented to it the Tribunal "gives these past and current political conditions no weight". This was because the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had "any significant interest in any political party in Bangladesh". The Tribunal there also noted that the appellant had barely resided in Bangladesh over the previous 15 years and did not accept that he would be imputed by any person or party in Bangladesh to have a significant interest in political group or political opinion in that country.
34 Given the Tribunal's findings in that regard, and its general concerns about the credibility of the appellant, this ground has no chance of success. The Tribunal made findings of fact and no issue of legal error arises.
35 So, whether ground three is to be construed as a new ground not raised in the Court below, or a repetition of a claim addressed by the Tribunal in [92] of its reasons, it necessarily must fail.