EFJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 158

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it was then) (the Tribunal) dated 5 March 2021, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the visa).
2. The applicant requires an Extension of Time to seek judicial review pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
3. The Court had regard to both Applications on the date of hearing.
4. For the reasons set out below, both the Application for an Extension of Time and the Application for judicial review are allowed.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Iran.
2. The applicant first arrived in Australia on 6 March 2014 as the holder of a student visa.
3. On 3 April 2014, the applicant applied for the visa, claiming the following:

(a) While studying at Islamic Azad University, he faced threats and harassment for questioning Islam, including attempts by teachers to fail him.

(b) In 2007, he was violently attacked, and despite reporting it, the police took no action.

(c) He subsequently suffered multiple assaults, including a severe beating in 2008 that broke his jaw.

(d) In 2009, he began speaking out discreetly against the government. He was called to the University's Basij office, where he was pressured to become an informant on other students. This continued until 2011, when he believed another student informant had advised the Basij that he would no longer assist them. He was subsequently beaten and expelled from university.

(e) Following his expulsion, he worked in IT, secretly distributing uncensored news for two years until his activities were discovered, forcing him to flee to Malaysia.

(f) Upon returning to Iran, he was arrested, detained in Evin prison, and spent a month in solitary confinement. His release required his father to provide property as security. Following his release, he experienced severe mental health issues and sought therapy.

1. On 24 September 2014, the applicant attended an interview before the delegate.
2. On 7 October 2014, the applicant provided post-interview submissions addressing some of the credibility concerns expressed by the delegate during the interview.
3. On 10 March 2015, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa on the basis that they were not satisfied that s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act was met.
4. On 31 March 2015, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.
5. On 21 August 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.
6. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then). On 23 June 2020, the Court quashed the Tribunal's decision and remitted the application to be reconsidered before a differently constituted Tribunal: EFJ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 1844. The basis for that decision was that the Tribunal failed to engage with the full integers of the applicant's claims.
7. On 5 March 2021, a differently constituted Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the visa.
8. On 23 May 2024, the applicant lodged an application for an Extension of Time under s 477(2) of the Act to challenge Tribunal's decision dated 5 March 2021.

1. In SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719, the following matters were held to be relevant as to whether an extension of time should be granted:

(a) The extent of the delay.

(b) The explanation for the delay.

(c) Prejudice to the respondent due to the delay; and

(d) The merits of the proposed application.

1. The Court may extend the 35-day period if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time for filing of the Application.
2. The decision to grant an extension of time is a discretionary one: DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]:

The Application is brought under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. As the Minister has submitted, r 36.05 confers upon a court a broad discretion whether or not to grant an extension of time. The considerations generally relevant in determining whether an extension of time should be granted are well known. They include the length of the delay, whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, whether there is any prejudice to the respondents and the merits of the appeal if an extension is granted (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (per Wilcox J); Jess v Scott [1986] FCA 365; (1986) 12 FCR 187 (per Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ); Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] (per Spender, O'Loughlin and Dowsett JJ); Peck v Secretary, Dept of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 810 at [16]-[27] (per Foster J); SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 at [16]-[25] (per Cowdroy J)).

1. To the above, the Court would add that the greater the delay, the more persuasive the explanation for the delay has to be. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, there are no mandatory relevant considerations: Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 at [12]:

On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court's satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject-matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. The Application for judicial review and an Extension of Time was filed on 23 May 2024, some 1,140 days outside of the 35-day time frame prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act. This is a significant period of time which, in and of itself, mitigates against an extension being granted. As such, the reasons for the delay will need to be persuasive.
2. The applicant relies upon the following matters in relation to the delay:

(a) He engaged a lawyer, Ms Mouna Youssef, who informed him that she had "made arrangements for a fee exemption application and subsequently assured me that the fee exemption had been approved".

(b) In early 2024, after repeatedly attempting to contact his legal representatives, the applicant contacted the Court directly and found out his lawyer had not lodged the application.

(c) He subsequently read that Ms Youssef had been failed for forgery and fraud.

1. The applicant submits that the above unusual and unfortunate circumstances provide a reasonable and, indeed, exceptional explanation for the delay. Further, there is no material prejudice to the Minister. Whilst there is a public interest in the finality of judicial decisions, there is a countervailing aspect of public interest in maintaining the integrity of Australia's immigration procedures by ensuring asylum seekers' claims are properly assessed, particularly given the inherent sensitivity in refugee matters where an adverse decision may have very serious consequences for an applicant: CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46 at [36].
2. The first respondent's position is that the factors in this case tend against granting an extension of time. The first respondent submits that the applicant has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The applicant explains that he was led to believe by his former solicitor that she had filed an application to the Court on his behalf in 2021, but that he did not become aware that no application had been filed until he started making enquiries about his case three years later. Such an explanation is unbelievable and should be rejected.
3. The first respondent further submits that there is prejudice to the Minister in a grant of an extension of time of this magnitude, in that it is contrary to the orderly and proper administration of the Act: WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 at [44].

1. First, it must be acknowledged that the delay in this matter exceeds three years. This is an exceptionally long time. Accordingly, the reasons for the delay would similarly need to be exceptional.
2. In support of the application for an extension of time, the applicant relied on his two Affidavits, one sworn on 21 November 2025 (Exhibit 3) and the other affirmed on 23 December 2025 (Exhibit 4). Those affidavits set out the documentary history and text message communications between the applicant and Ms Youseff. The Court notes that a Costs Agreement signed by the applicant on 15 March 2021 included an amount of $9,500.00 for "Federal Circuit Court fees" (Exhibit 3, pg. 7). It is uncontested that the applicant initially paid Ms Youseff $5,000.00 and then made several instalment payments of $1,000.00 each. Receipts for the instalments appear in text message correspondence between the applicant and Ms Youseff (Exhibit 4, pg. 24, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41 & 42).
3. On 3 May 2021, Ms Youseff advised the applicant that his application for judicial review had been rejected on the basis that he did not meet the financial hardship test for a reduced filing fee (Exhibit 3, pg. 16). The applicant asked how much he was required to pay and was advised it was $4,190.00 (Exhibit 3, pg. 17). The Court notes that the amount the applicant was advised was incorrect, as the filing fee was $3,300.00. The Court can only conclude that this was deliberately misleading on the part of Ms Youseff.
4. There were further text messages, including the following from Ms Youseff: "Okay let me just pay it from trust please put the money in" (Exhibit 3, pg. 18). The Court notes that at this time, there was sufficient money in trust to pay the $3,300.00 filing fee.
5. Further text messages ensued with the applicant asking Ms Youseff at 3:11 PM on 3 May 2021: "Can you please let me know when you applied the application, I'm stressed out" (Exhibit 4, pg. 38). Ms Youseff responded: "What do you mean when I applied [name redacted] I gave you a copy and did it that day in the office" (Exhibit 4, pg. 38). The applicant responded: "I see but you didn't say it got rejected?" (Exhibit 4, pg. 38). Ms Youseff then replied: "I'll sort it don't worry" (Exhibit 4, pg. 38). Subsequently, the applicant made further instalment payments of $1,000.00 each into Ms Youseff's trust account (Exhibit 4, pg. 39). Under cross-examination, the applicant explained that he interpreted Ms Youseff's comment, "I'll sort it don't worry" as meaning she would attend to the filing of his application for judicial review. This was a reasonable conclusion to draw. Sadly, it did not occur. No application for judicial review was lodged while the matter was being facilitated by Ms Youseff.
6. The applicant had some other matters with Ms Youseff. The applicant continued to communicate with Ms Youseff but became dissatisfied with her non-responses. In February 2024, the applicant instructed new solicitors, who sought access to the applicant's file and Court Nook. In a letter dated 13 May 2024, Ms Youseff falsely told the applicant's new solicitors that "no Federal Court (sic) application had been filed" because the applicant did not authorise the withdrawal of the funds from the trust account in order to pay the application fee (Exhibit 4, pg. 131). That statement was self-serving and inconsistent with the text messages Ms Youseff had with the applicant, when she said, "I'll sort it". Ms Youseff claimed the applicant had been made aware and understood that fact. Again, that was a misrepresentation.
7. It is uncontested that Ms Youseff, in October 2024, was convicted and was gaoled for 12 months for forging documents in an attempt to cheat a client out of $133,000.00 (Exhibit 3, pg. 30). A Local Court Magistrate described Ms Youseff as "cunning and deceitful" (Exhibit 3, pg. 30).
8. The applicant is a migrant from Iran. English is the applicant's second language. The applicant does not possess any legal training or knowledge of the Australian legal system.
9. I accept the explanation that Ms Youseff deceitfully misled the applicant into believing that his application had been lodged. It was only much later that that the applicant learnt it had not. The applicant was more than reasonably entitled to rely upon the advice of his then legal advisor that his application had been lodged.
10. In my view, while the delay is extraordinary, the explanation is also extraordinary.
11. I accept there is no real prejudice to the first respondent other than the need for these types of matters to be finalised. I consider this factor to be neutral.
12. The final consideration for the grant of an extension of time is the merits of the proposed application. At an impressionistic level, for the reasons I set out below, the proposed grounds have merit.
13. In all of the circumstances, even with the extensive delay, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for an Extension of Time be granted.
14. I will now consider the grounds of judicial review.

1. At [1] - [5], the Tribunal set out the application for review and the background of the matter.
2. The Tribunal noted at [3] that the matter was remitted from the Federal Circuit Court because a differently constituted Tribunal had failed adequately to address the psychiatric evidence presented by the applicant as a reason for the inconsistencies in his claims.
3. At [6], the Tribunal outlined the statement the applicant submitted with his visa application.
4. At [7], the Tribunal noted that when the applicant was asked about the mental health treatment he had received in Australia, he replied that he had been on medication, however it hadn't helped him, so he no longer took it.
5. The applicant recalled seeing an Iranian psychiatrist in Chatswood around May/June 2015, and that he spoke to a psychologist in Iran by phone in 2018/19 [8]. No evidence was provided to the Tribunal to support this claim [8]. The applicant stated he consulted an Iranian psychologist by phone because of language and cultural barriers, and that he was last on medication in 2015 [9]. The applicant agreed to provide a copy of that prescription but failed to do so after the Tribunal hearing [9].
6. When asked if his claimed mental health condition had impacted his ability to give evidence in past hearings, the applicant claimed that it had, as he was stressed and agitated and couldn't express himself well and found it hard to focus [10].
7. The applicant claimed that if returned to Iran, he would be killed by the Iranian government and by people in general for his political opinion, sexual orientation, and conversion to Christianity [12].
8. When asked about his opinion on the government, the applicant claimed that the Supreme Leader tolerated no dissent and that the government should be removed [14]. The applicant stated that he had taken part in demonstrations, but after those demonstrations he had been beaten [14]. The applicant stated that he had no evidence that he was at the demonstrations, but he was hit on the legs, chest and arms.
9. The applicant stated that while at university, the Basij targeted him due to comments made by his teachers [15]. The applicant described repeated harassment, including being mocked, beaten, and assaulted [15]. On one occasion, while sitting in his car outside the university, the applicant was attacked, and his car was damaged [15]. The applicant claimed to have filed a police report, but the Iranian authorities advised they could not find the perpetrators and retained photographs of his injuries, which he requested copies of but was denied [16]. The applicant admitted that he did not take his own photographs of his injuries, explaining he was stressed and anxious, though the Tribunal noted inconsistencies in his reasoning [16].
10. The applicant claimed that in 2008, the Basij summoned him to their office, where, after giving an unsatisfactory answer, he was struck, his head hit a table, and he woke up in hospital with a broken jaw [17]. The applicant provided no photographic evidence of this injury. The applicant claimed the Basij continued to threaten him daily, including threats to kill him, which caused fear and disrupted his studies [17]. The applicant said he began speaking to other students about the situation until he was expelled from university in 2011 [17].
11. The applicant claimed that the Basij influenced teachers to lower his marks, stating that he had aimed for top grades but was told he had failed [18]. When shown his transcript indicating he had passed all subjects, the applicant said he had failed religion, maths, and physics multiple times before passing them [18]. The applicant asserted that Iranian transcripts only show passed subjects, however the Tribunal noted that other Iranian transcripts included failed subjects, which is standard practice [19].
12. At [23], when asked why his transcript didn't say he was expelled, the applicant claimed he had given the Tribunal a letter from the faculty saying he had been expelled. The Tribunal noted that it didn't make sense for the university to send him an expulsion letter and then issue a transcript stating that the applicant had not failed anything and had left voluntarily [23].
13. When asked why the Basiji focused so much on the applicant, given that he had no political profile and wasn't active, the applicant said he had never claimed he wasn't politically active. The applicant claimed that he came from a rich family, spoke his opinion and dressed and groomed himself well [25].
14. The applicant claimed that a week before leaving for Malaysia, plainclothes police officers began circulating his photo, asking whether anyone knew who he was [28]. The applicant stated he had no problems leaving the airport, as they did not know who he was.
15. At [35], the Tribunal noted that the applicant claimed he was arrested at the airport upon his return to Iran on 19 December 2013. The applicant was placed in a cell on his own and was tortured. The applicant was there for about a month and was released on bail after his father put up his residence as a bond.
16. At [40], the Tribunal noted that the applicant's claim to be a homosexual was raised late, after the delegate's decision, but prior to the previously constituted Tribunal hearing. The applicant stated he had always been gay, including while in Iran, but feared being openly gay there due to the risk of being killed. In Australia, the applicant initially did make a claim regarding his homosexuality as he considered it private and feared exposure through the Farsi interpreter. The applicant now feels safe, trusts people, and believes the Australian government can help.
17. The Tribunal put to the applicant that he had been confident enough to tell someone he had been horribly tortured, yet not about his sexuality [43].
18. The applicant claimed that he had always liked his Australian friend Dimitri and that they had been friends for a year [46]. When asked if he had sex with Dimitri, the applicant said he had started about six/seven months after he met him in 2016 [46]. When asked why he didn't bring a witness to attest to his homosexuality, the applicant claimed that he brought two people to his last hearing and had a letter from Dimitri, and the Tribunal could call him [46].
19. The applicant claimed that his conversion to Christianity changed his life, and he was introduced to it in 2018 by a roommate who invited him to Hillsong [48]. The Tribunal raised with the applicant that his conversion had occurred after his visa was refused [48].
20. It was put to the applicant that he wasn't filling the Tribunal with much confidence that he knew much about Christianity, to which he replied that he had a memory collapse, and he hadn't prepared himself for those kinds of questions [51].
21. The Tribunal noted that at the previously constituted Tribunal hearing, the applicant had claimed that he had been in a relationship with an Australian named Jule, who did not attend that hearing as a witness, yet at the presently constituted Tribunal hearing, the applicant had claimed that he had never been in a relationship with an Australian [64].
22. The Tribunal, at [70] - [74], set of the criteria for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations), and in accordance with the Ministerial Direction No. 84, took into account PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines, PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines, and country information prepared by the Department.
23. After taking into account the applicant's pieces of medical evidence that he presented, the Tribunal gave them little weight in explaining the various inconsistencies in his evidence, as well as the implausible and late claims made by the applicant [77].
24. At [78], the Tribunal found that the applicant's claims regarding his detention, arrest and torture in Iran had been fabricated and that the events as he described them never occurred.
25. The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence regarding his claims to be lacking in credibility. The Tribunal did not accept that the lack of credibility was due to any mental health reason or for an incorrect recording of his initial protection visa statement [82]. The Tribunal further found that the applicant was not a reliable, credible, or truthful witness and that he fabricated his claims to obtain a protection visa [82].
26. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant has, or ever had, any political profile with Iranian authorities, is, or ever was, wanted by the Iranian authorities, or has been, or would be, detained by the Iranian authorities for any political reason [83].
27. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant got into arguments with his university lecturers teaching religion who in turn reported him to other teachers and the Basij, and that as a consequence he was deliberately failed in several subjects and expelled from the university, mocked and beaten by the Basij, including having his jaw broken, or was attacked and beaten and had his car damaged car while waiting outside the university [84].
28. Regarding the applicant's political activities, due to several inconsistencies and implausibilities, the Tribunal did not accept that he attended political protests, spoke against the government to other students, or downloaded international news reports, turned them into flyers, and handed them out to people.
29. As the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant ever handed out flyers, it follows that it did not accept that plainclothes officers ever began handing out photos of him, asking whether anyone could recognise him, causing him, in turn, to leave for Malaysia [95]. Further, the Tribunal did not accept that on return to Iran, some compromising anti-government images were found on the applicant's laptop, he was arrested, detained, tortured and charged [96]. The Tribunal found the account of the departure, imagery storage, and subsequent discovery to be lacking in credibility.
30. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claim that he attended anti-government demonstrations in Iran, as it relied solely on his oral evidence, which was found to lack credibility, and his account of them was inconsistent [105].
31. In relation to the applicant's claim to be a homosexual, the Tribunal did not accept that he is, was, or would be perceived to be homosexual or that any of the gay relationships he claimed to have had in Australia or Iran ever occurred [106]. The Tribunal found that the claim's lateness, coming only after the applicant's visa application was refused, raised obvious concerns about its truthfulness [107]. The Tribunal did not accept that when the applicant arrived in Australia, he did not include his homosexuality in his claims as he believed it was a private matter and was concerned that the Farsi interpreter at his interview would leak that information [107]. Given that the applicant claimed that he was always worried in Iran that someone in the Basij would accuse him of being gay, and that the Basij beat or raped gay people, the Tribunal found it strange that this fear did not cause him to raise the issue simply because he believed his sexuality was a private matter [107].
32. At [108], the Tribunal noted that there was no mention of any issues regarding the applicant's sexuality in his discussions with one psychiatrist and two psychologists, one of whom was a Farsi speaker. For someone who claimed to have been confused and reticent to tell anyone about his sexuality, the lack of any mention of it with these mental health professionals was difficult for the Tribunal to believe.
33. The Tribunal further noted that during questioning by the previously constituted Tribunal, Jorge, one of the applicant's allegedly gay flatmates, was asked and denied that he himself was gay [109].
34. Whilst the applicant provided the Tribunal with a range of photographs with another man/other people in Iran and Australia in support of his claim to be gay, it placed little weight on them as none of them appeared to indicate someone in a gay relationship [111].
35. Although the applicant stated that the Tribunal could call Dimitri during the hearing, the Tribunal declined to do so [113]. The Tribunal noted that in the applicant's response to the hearing invitation, he was given the opportunity to indicate whether he wished to nominate a witness to give oral evidence. The applicant said that he would not be calling anyone. While the Tribunal could have satisfied itself that the person they were talking to was Dimitri, it decided that there was nothing that Dimitri could provide by way of oral evidence that could overcome its concerns with the applicant's claim regarding homosexuality, its lateness, the lack of persuasive photographic or social media evidence, and the previous denial of Jorge regarding his own homosexuality [113].
36. The Tribunal at [115] did not accept that the applicant is, or would be perceived to be, Christian. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had twice added significant claims, one regarding homosexuality and the other regarding a Christianity conversion, only after receiving the negative visa assessment [115].
37. At [124], the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
38. For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugee Convention [127]. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
39. Further, the Authority found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to Iran, there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm [125] - [126]. Therefore, the Authority found that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act [126].
40. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa at [130].

1. The applicant advances two grounds of judicial review contained in an Amended Application filed with the Court on 21 November 2025. They are as follows (less particulars):
   1. The Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to:
      1. illogical or irrational reasoning and findings; and/or
      2. a legally unreasonable process of reasoning in respect of a critical issue
   2. The Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to:

1. Unreasonably failing to exercise its discretion in s 427(1)(a) to call a corroborative witness; 2. Prematurely foreclosing its assessment of a critical claim without making an obvious enquiry from a corroborating witness; and/or

1. Constructively failing to exercise its jurisdiction.

1. By Ground One, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal's rejection of his claim to be homosexual was illogical and/or irrational and involved a legally unreasonable process of reasoning.
2. The Tribunal impugned the applicant for not mentioning his sexuality to mental health professionals as "difficult to believe" because he claimed to be reticent to tell anyone about his sexuality. Yet the applicant not divulging his homosexuality is entirely consistent with his claim that his sexuality was a matter that he was reticent to talk about. The applicant's claim to be "confused and reticent" about his sexuality could only logically explain non-disclosure, not contradict it. The Tribunal engaged in irrational reasoning by using the very quality that would logically support, and lead to, non-disclosure of the applicant's sexuality as a basis for disbelieving that non-disclosure.
3. The Tribunal at [108], found that it "appears anomalous that he [the applicant] was willing to speak about being sexually assaulted in prison to his Farsi-speaking psychologist, yet unwilling to discuss his sexuality". Such reasoning conflates and assumes a false equivalence and false correlation between the applicant divulging being assaulted and not disclosing his sexuality when there is no logical relationship between these matters. The Tribunal's reasoning rests on an unwarranted assumption that the two topics are equivalent in terms of ease or likelihood of disclosure, when there is no logical or evidentiary basis for treating them as correlated. To the contrary, there are various factors as to why such reasoning was not open, namely:

(a) The applicant being sexually assaulted related to something that was done to him, such that discussing it amounted to seeking help for harm suffered. By contrast, disclosing sexual orientation involves revealing an aspect of identity that may be subject to moral judgment, not sympathy as a victim. Discussing a traumatic event that occurred in the past is different from discussing an ongoing aspect of identity, particularly one about which the applicant himself claims to have been reticent to discuss.

(b) Being the victim of sexual assault is fundamentally different to being a person with same-sex attraction, particularly in a person from Iran, where same sex relations are taboo and proscribed, and a person acknowledging same-sex attraction may face moral condemnation and risk of harm from divulging their sexuality.

(c) Disclosure of assault related to a matter the applicant did not consent to, whereas disclosure of his sexuality would reveal a fundamental part of his identity.

1. The Tribunal's approach of finding the applicant's disclosure of being sexually assaulted, without divulging his sexuality, as probative of his claimed sexuality being fabricated, was illogical. The Tribunal's reasons are "underpinned by unexpressed and unwarranted assumptions not based in any evidence": DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2 at [45].
2. The aforementioned errors were material, as they infected a critical finding in respect of a claim which, if accepted, was capable of engaging Australia's protection obligations.
3. Kerr J explained in CBY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 878 (CBY15) at [90] that where a decision maker has cumulatively taken into account multiple factors in coming to a finding "a reviewing court is entitled to conclude, analogously to a table that is supported by several legs, that if one or more of the propositions on which the decision maker has relied as support for its conclusion are held to be legally flawed then the finding the decision maker has made may be bereft of lawful support."
4. To speculate about whether the other matters relied upon by the Tribunal could support or justify its decision to affirm the review would contravene the High Court's warnings in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12 (LPDT) at [29] and [36], and would "'[e]ither... involve the Court itself entering into a fact-finding exercise or it would involve the Court assuming some prejudgment on the Tribunal's part, if the erroneous aspects of its reasons were simply severed": AWU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 513 (AWU16) at [98].
5. It is not realistic to put various aspects of the applicant's evidence into hermetically sealed boxes or to approach the reasoning on the basis that this is how the evidence was approached. Given such, "it will not be possible, or realistic, for a reviewing Court to be confident that an error in one strand of credibility reasoning does not infect other strands": AWU16 at [20].
6. In these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude the outcome would "inevitably" have been the same if not for the Tribunal's error: LPDT at [16]. The Court should not speculate as to whether other reasons could have led to the same conclusion if the erroneous reasoning was severed, as that would involve a fact-finding exercise, contrary to the High Court's warnings in LPDT at [29] and [36].
7. By Ground Two, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error because it unreasonably failed to exercise its discretion under s 427(1)(a) of the Act to call a corroborative witness, which prematurely foreclosed its assessment of a critical claim without making an obvious enquiry from that witness, and thereby constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction.
8. The applicant claimed to have been in a relationship with a man called Dimitri. The applicant provided evidence, including a 'selfie' photograph of 'Dmitriy' posing shirtless, Instagram photos, and a photograph of him and a man who appears to be Dimitri kissing.
9. The Tribunal acknowledged the applicant requested it to call Dimitri during the hearing but declined to do so, reasoning "While the Tribunal could have satisfied itself that the person they were talking to was Dimitri, it decided that there was nothing that he could provide by way of oral evidence that could overcome the concerns that the Tribunal had with the claim regarding its lateness, the lack of persuasive photographic or social media evidence, contact with any gay organisations, and the previous denial of Jorge regarding his own homosexuality that was in direct contradiction of the applicant's claim" [113].
10. The Tribunal prematurely foreclosed its assessment of the applicant's claimed relationship with Dimitri without attempting to obtain oral evidence from Dimitri, finding "given I do not accept the applicant is gay, it follows that he and Dimitri are not, nor ever have been 'on and off' lovers" [112]. The Tribunal's statement that it did not call Dimitri because "there was nothing that [Dimitri] could provide by way of oral evidence that could overcome the concerns that the Tribunal had with the claim" implicitly presumed it was inevitable that Dimitri would lack credibility: DZAAN v Minister for Immigration [2012] FMCA 37 (DZAAN) at [68] and [114]. By not contacting Dimitri, the Tribunal effectively negated the value of his evidence, as concerns about the applicant's claim could have been readily tested by questioning Dimitri: SZNIL v Minister for Immigration [2009] FMCA 883 at [22]. Further, the Tribunal declined to give weight to "a photo of the applicant receiving a kiss on the lips from another unnamed man in Australia" [111], when any reasonable decision-maker ought to have perceived that the 'unknown man' was Dimitri and considered this when deciding whether to call him as a witness.
11. The Tribunal's decision not to call Dimitri was made immediately at the hearing, for a reason it resiled from in its ultimate decision. The Tribunal's stated reason for not calling Dimitri at the hearing was that it could not verify his identity. However, in its ultimate decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that it could have satisfied itself that the person it was talking to was Dimitri but decided there was "nothing" he could provide by way of oral evidence to overcome its concerns about the claim. The Full Court has held that the fact a witness was "to give evidence by telephone (and therefore could not be identified) could not, of itself, provide a basis for an unfavourable exercise of discretion": AYX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 103 (AYX17) at [90]. Yet that was the reason the Tribunal gave for not calling the witness at the hearing.
12. It was unreasonable for the Tribunal to reason as it did and refuse to call Dimitri at the Tribunal hearing, in circumstances where:

(a) The Tribunal had Dimitri's mobile number, and there was no obvious practical difficulty for it in obtaining oral evidence from him.

(b) The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was inconsistent in his claim regarding his alleged physical relationship with Dimitri and did not impugn any aspect of Dimitri's letter, which was, on its face, credible supporting evidence.

(c) Dimitri's letter indicated he could provide "additional evidence" in relation to a critical issue (viz. the applicant's sexual orientation).

(d) The timing of the Tribunal's decision to refuse to call Dimitri occurred before it had finished hearing evidence in respect of the claim.

(e) The Tribunal retracted the reason it gave for not calling Dimitri at the hearing and offered a different explanation in its ultimate decision.

(f) The Tribunal could not, as a matter of logic, know definitively what Dimitri's additional evidence would be, yet stated "nothing" he could say could overcome its concerns with the claim: DZAAN at [115].

1. The applicant's request that the Tribunal call Dimitri, and Dimitri's written request that the Tribunal call him for additional evidence, should have been taken up if the Tribunal was going to make significant findings rejecting the applicant's claim based upon his sexuality and his relationship with Dimitri. As the Full Court has confirmed, "It is one thing to hear evidence and reject it or to find that it is of no assistance. It is another thing to refuse to hear what is said to be corroborating evidence based on an assumption that it could not possibly be credible or could not possibly assist in assessing the credibility of the appellant": AYX17 at [81]. The Tribunal's decision is affected by the latter vice.

1. Ground One involves a challenge of legal unreasonableness to aspects of the Tribunal's reasoning towards the conclusion that the applicant was not, and would not be perceived to be, a homosexual, and had not engaged in gay relationships in Australia. The Tribunal addressed this claim at [106] - [114] of its reasons.
2. The applicant advances two principal contentions. First, one of the factors the Tribunal relied upon in rejecting the applicant's claim was that he had not mentioned to any of the three mental health professionals the fact that he was gay, and that this was difficult to believe because the applicant claimed to be reticent to tell anyone about his sexuality. The applicant submits that this was illogical. That is not so.
3. The standard by which administrative decisions are to be assessed for the purposes of discerning illogicality (or legal unreasonableness) is very high: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 (SZVFW) [11], [52], and [135]; Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; (2020) 385 ALR 212 at [26]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[135]. That is to prevent the Court from overstepping the mark on judicial review and engaging in merits review.
4. In the present case, while an available path of reasoning in respect of the applicant's failure to mention his sexuality to mental health practitioners was that it was consistent with, and supported, his claim to have been reticent to mention it to anyone, it was also available to the Tribunal to reason (as it appears to have) that a person who was reticent and confused about their sexuality would engage with mental health practitioners to discuss the subject. The Tribunal expressly rejected the applicant's claim that homosexuality being taboo in Iran meant that this conditioned him, and he did not feel confident to raise it. The Tribunal's reasoning was open to it.
5. Secondly, the applicant submits that the Tribunal drew a false correlation between the applicant's willingness to disclose a sexual assault and his willingness (or lack thereof) to disclose his sexuality. The Tribunal's stated concerns at [108] were open to it and did not lead the Tribunal into error. The Tribunal did not purport to assume how the applicant or any person might process and deal with a sexual assault compared with being homosexual. But the Tribunal's point, fairly made, was that suffering a sexual assault is, or might be taken to be, particularly traumatic and shame-inducing, and is a topic that a person would be hesitant to discuss even with a doctor. The Tribunal simply drew a parallel with a person who might be hesitant to discuss their sexuality.
6. It is also relevant that the applicant's challenge to the Tribunal's rejection of his homosexuality claim is directed to one ostensibly minor aspect of the reasoning process culminating in the Tribunal's conclusion. That is, in rejecting the homosexuality claim, the Tribunal relied upon:

(a) The lateness of the claim. The applicant did not raise the claim to fear harm for being a homosexual until after the delegate had refused his application: [107].

(b) The lack of credibility in the applicant's claim not to have raised the claim earlier because he considered it to be a private matter: [107].

(c) The applicant's credibility more generally: [107].

(d) The applicant did not reveal the claim to a psychiatrist and two psychologists: [108].

(e) A claimed former flatmate, whom the applicant said was homosexual, admitted to a different Tribunal that he was not: [109].

(f) The applicant did not seek out gay community groups in Sydney: [110].

1. Wigney J stated in Minister Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516, at [55]:

Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at 598-599 [83]-[84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out: SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 566; (2013) 135 ALD 276 at 291 [66]; SZWCO at [64]-[67].

1. Justice Wigney's approach was approved by a Full Court in Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; (2017) 255 FCR 81 at [35] (Charlesworth J, with whom Flick and Perry JJ agreed). To the extent that the approach is inconsistent with that of Kerr J in CBY15, the Court should prefer, and indeed is bound, by the authority of the Full Court. It may be, however, that Kerr J was intending to say no more than that if a particular finding or particular findings culminating in an adverse credibility conclusion are flawed such that the ultimate conclusion cannot stand, then the decision will reveal jurisdictional error. By reference to the present case, the impugned reasoning at [108] of the Tribunal's decision was not critical to the end result. They were severable from, and independent of, the other features identified by the Tribunal that led it to reject the applicant's homosexuality claim.
2. In these circumstances, as the applicant's challenge to the Tribunal's path of reasoning is limited to aspects of what is revealed in [108], the Court should find that even if that reasoning was defective, it was immaterial or not critical to the ultimate conclusion or result. The other factors identified by the Tribunal independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion.
3. In the Ground Two, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal unreasonably failed to exercise its power in s 427(1)(a) of the Act to call a corroborative witness and prematurely foreclosed its assessment of a critical claim without making an obvious enquiry from a corroborative witness.
4. It is not in contention that the applicant did not request that the Tribunal take evidence from Dimitri in accordance with the procedure under s 426 of the Act (since repealed). It is common ground that the applicant did not, within seven days of being notified under s 425A of the Act, give the Tribunal written notice that he wanted the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from Dimitri: [113]. Even if the applicant had done so, it would not have created an obligation on the Tribunal to call the witness, rather the Tribunal would have needed to have considered the applicant's request: s 426(3) of the Act. As the Full Court of the Federal Court observed of this scheme in AYX17 at [45]:

...the intention of the scheme is that the evidence of any witnesses proposed by an applicant should be part of the s 425 hearing process.

1. The Tribunal has the power to call witnesses outside the s 426 framework, for example, under s 427(1) of the Act. However, the analysis is not akin to a case where the Tribunal has failed to give proper consideration to a request made under s 426: AOO16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 424 (A0016) at [63] per Colvin J. In AOO16, Colvin J remarked upon the Tribunal's statutory duty to undertake a review of the kind provided for in Part 7, and that the Tribunal was not subject to a duty to inquire: [31]. His Honour also summarised the effect of key provisions of the Act in respect of taking evidence from witnesses: [32]. His Honour explained by reference to the circumstances in that case, where no s 426 request had been made, that it was necessary to treat cases like AYX17 with care. His Honour's analysis in a case where no s 426 request was made was to apply "duty to inquire" principles. His Honour went on to elucidate the question that is to be asked in such a case:

Therefore, it is only where the failure to take evidence from the particular person means that the whole review lacks the requisite reasonable character that jurisdictional error is demonstrated. That is because review for legal unreasonableness concerns the overall character of an administrative decision. Unreasonableness as to part is not sufficient to demonstrate jurisdictional error unless it founds a conclusion that the decision is unreasonable as to the overall outcome or the whole of the reasoning process used to support the decision: Tsvetnenko v United States of America [2019] FCAFC 74 at [82]‑[85].

1. As is well-established, legal unreasonableness, whether in relation to the exercise or non-exercise of a statutory power, or in relation to fact-finding, imposes a stringent standard: SZVFW at [11] per Kiefel CJ, [51]-[60] per Gageler J; [78] - [87] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, and [131] - [135] per Edelman J. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court should not be satisfied that the Tribunal's decision was rendered unreasonable because of its decision not to take evidence from Dimitri.
2. The Tribunal's decision that it would not call Dimitri because the Tribunal was not satisfied it could overcome its concerns with the claim was a rational and reasonable one. The Tribunal's approach was within the "decisional freedom" or range of discretion given to the Tribunal. It was not a matter for the Tribunal to take steps to obtain evidence for itself to enable the applicant to make out his case. Consistent with AOO16, the Tribunal's duty is to conduct a review, not to make inquiries. As Colvin J pointed out in AOO16 at [34], "when it comes to making inquiries as to matters not before the Tribunal, the reasonable performance of the statutory task to undertake a review does not extend beyond making obvious inquiries about critical facts." In that connection, the Full Court remarked in DXF22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 75 at [47] per Wigney, Hespe and Kennett JJ, that:

... since the decision in SZIAI it has been emphasised that any such cases must be rare and exceptional (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318; 164 FCR 151 at [60] (Kenny J)) and the fact that it is reasonable to make an inquiry does not mean that a failure to do so constitutes jurisdictional error (SZMJM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 309 at [30] (Bennett J); Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 184; 256 FCR 235 at [33] (the Court))

1. As the applicant himself emphasises, the Tribunal could not have known what Dimitri's additional evidence might be. That being so, it is unclear how calling Dimitri to give evidence was an "obvious" enquiry about a "critical fact". Ultimately, Dimitri might have given evidence that supported the applicant's claims, or he might not have.
2. For those reasons, there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal "foreclosing" its consideration of the applicant's claimed relationship with Dimitri without attempting to obtain oral evidence from Dimitri. That is because it was not necessary (in the jurisdictional sense) for the Tribunal to take evidence from Dimitri, and to assess that evidence, before it could draw conclusions about the applicant's claim to fear harm because he was a homosexual.

1. Ground One is a claim of illogical or irrational reasoning in relation to the applicant's claim of being homosexual, including that the Tribunal's ultimate outcome is based on unwarranted assumptions.
2. It is not disputed that the applicant did not initially raise a claim for protection based on being homosexual in his visa application. It was only in 2017 that this claim was raised. It is submitted that the applicant's reluctance to reveal his sexual identity was linked to his extreme shame, based on the fact that homosexuality is criminalised in Iran, with punishments ranging from flogging to the death penalty.
3. Given that the applicant claimed to have been the subject of sexual assault and torture by authorities in Iran, it is submitted that the applicant may have felt these claims were sufficient for the grant of a protection visa.
4. The Tribunal's reasoning is based on a multifaceted dismissal of the applicant's credibility, leading to the ultimate conclusion that the gay relationships the applicant claimed to have occurred did not occur.
5. The applicant submits that the reasoning of the Tribunal is illogical in that it found a failure to mention his sexuality to mental health providers was evidence of the claim being false. It is submitted that the applicant's reticence was understandable, noting he initially sought help after arriving in Australia and having claimed a sexual assault by the Basij while in custody, for a period in Iran.
6. Dr Foster, a psychiatrist, in a report dated 9 September 2014 (CB 91), diagnosed the applicant as suffering acute Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and prescribed medication. A counsellor, Ms Asprey, noted the applicant felt great shame after his prison ordeal, together with guilt that his parents had to sell the family home to secure his release from prison (CB 94 - 95).
7. If it is accepted that the applicant suffers from PTSD and suffered considerable trauma, including being sexually assaulted by authorities in Iran, great caution needs to be exercised in concluding that failing to divulge his sexuality initially is consistent with the fabrication of the claim.
8. It is now well established that the consideration of the evidence of victims of trauma may present particular difficulties. The fact that their evidence may be unsatisfactory in some ways, as to what might normally be expected, does not of itself mean that the evidence is fabricated or unreliable. The impact of the trauma they have suffered may manifest itself in many ways.
9. Further, as noted by Stewart J in EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518 at [149]:

Because of the approach taken by the Authority, the Minister's contention that certain findings (such as those conceded to be in error and those which I have found are not) did not contribute in any significant way to the ultimate finding made by the Authority in relation to the central narrative cannot be accepted. As Mortimer J pointed out in AWU16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] FCA 513 at [20]:

emphatic adverse findings on credibility may well, expressly or implicitly, be linked with one another so that it will not be possible, or realistic, for a reviewing Court to be confident that an error in one strand of credibility reasoning does not infect other strands.

1. I am satisfied that the Tribunal's finding, that the applicant's disclosure of having been sexually assaulted, without also divulging his sexuality, was probative of fabrication of his sexuality claim, is illogical. It was based on an unwarranted assumption that a victim of trauma, suffering acute PTSD, would disclose one matter but not another.
2. Having formed that conclusion, I am satisfied the error is material. I cannot be satisfied that this finding did not affect the other credibility findings that form the basis of the Tribunal's decision. As a result, the error is material.
3. Ground One has merit, and accordingly the orders sought by the applicant should be granted.

1. Although it is not strictly necessary to do so, given the history of the matter, it is appropriate to consider Ground Two. Ground Two is an assertion that the Tribunal unreasonably failed to exercise its power in s 427(1)(a) of the Act to call a corroborative witness, Dimitri.
2. There is no general obligation on a Tribunal to investigate an applicant's claims: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43]. The duty imposed on the Tribunal by the Act is a duty to review and not a duty to enquire. The exception is where there is an obvious failure by the Tribunal to make an enquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 at [25].
3. At CB 191 - 207, there are a series of photographs of the applicant with another man in affectionate poses. I am satisfied that the other man shown in the photographs is Dimitri.
4. At CB 209, there is a portion of a WhatsApp conversation and a photograph of a man whom I accept is Dimitri. It shows Dimitri wearing only 'bootie' shorts, with the applicant's response to the photograph being, "Omg Dimi you're unbelievable". The conversation between the two continues with the pair trying to organise a night out. At one point the applicant replies to Dimitri with, "Ready wanna go around Oxford Street". Although the identity of the person being referred to is unclear, the text message exchange between the applicant and Dimitri contains the expression "sweetie".
5. At CB 434 is a letter from Dimitri addressed to the Tribunal, dated 23 December 2020. The letter also records Dimitri's mobile telephone number. The letter relevantly states:

I have known [the applicant] for the last 6.5 years. I got in touch with Milad through working environment and became very close. My relationship with [the applicant] is ongoing and discreet. We both enjoy each others intimate company and meet each other from now and then. I would like to invite the honourable member of the tribunal to call me for additional evidence

1. It is uncontested that the applicant's response to hearing invitation, contained at CB 446 - 448, which was filled in by the applicant's solicitor did not include a request that the presiding member take oral evidence from Dimitri, or any other person under the heading 'Part 4 - Witnesses'.
2. At page 48 of the transcript prepared from the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing conduct on 5 March 2021 (Annexure C to the Affidavit of Abu Siddque sworn on 25 November 2025, pg. 57) the following appears:

Tribunal member: You didn't bring a witness here to attest to your homosexuality, why is that?

Applicant: Yeah, I bought it last time at my last hearing I bought two guys. And I also have Dimitri's letter on the--

Tribunal member: Yeah I've seen the letter. Well, why didn't he come in person? Why did --

Applicant: He was just working. He could like -- he doesn't mind anything. You can -- you can even call him and ask him.

Tribunal Member: No. I don't know Dimitri from a bar of soap. So why did -- why didn't he come to your last hearing?

Applicant: Mainly because of the COVID situation everyone is scared, no one wants to hang out or go outside.

1. At [113] in the Tribunal decision record, the Tribunal noted that in deciding not to call Dimitri, there was nothing that Dimitri could provide by way of oral evidence that could have overcome the concerns that the Tribunal had with the claim that the applicant was homosexual, particularly regarding its lateness, the lack of persuasive photographic or social media evidence, and the applicant's lack of contact with any gay organisations.
2. First, it is probably important to comment that, notwithstanding the informal nature of Tribunal hearings, the statement from the Tribunal member that they do not know Dimitri 'from a bar of soap' was less than professional. Second, as to what sort of photographic evidence that the Tribunal would have required to be provided that would have satisfied it that the applicant was homosexual is entirely unclear (and perhaps best left unsaid).
3. Given the failure of the applicant in the hearing response form to state that Dimitri would be called as a witness to give oral evidence, together with the unknown state of what additional oral evidence Dimitri could provide that would supplement the material already before the Tribunal, I am not satisfied that the decision not to call Dimitri to give oral evidence, noting the material already within the Court Book, meets the stringent threshold as to constitute legal unreasonableness. Accordingly, Ground Two has no merit.

1. As Ground One has merit, the Court will grant the orders sought in the application and remit the matter to the Tribunal for further consideration. The Court will hear from the parties as to the issue of costs.

1. The original protection visa application was submitted in April 2014. It is now February 2026. Thus, the matter has been under consideration for nearly 12 years without resolution. In accordance with the Court's Orders, the matter will be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration.
2. It is trite to say that the consideration of this matter has consumed considerable scarce public resources. A further Tribunal hearing will add to this cost. If the outcome is unfavourable, there is the potential for a further application for judicial review.
3. Consideration of merits is not within the Court's jurisdiction. The Court is cognisant of the significant deterioration of conditions within Iran, with reports of large-scale anti-government protests and a response from government security forces that has involved large-scale loss of life. As of the date of this decision, there is continuing uncertainty as to whether there may be foreign intervention in Iran by way of military strikes by the United States.
4. In all of the circumstances of this case, this may be a matter that might benefit from Ministerial intervention.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-eight (138) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.