DWK20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1559

1. The applicant seeks an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) within which to commence an application for judicial review.
2. The applicant seeks an extension of time because, it is submitted, a letter of notification of a decision of a delegate of the respondent (Minister) is a "migration decision" within the meaning of ss 476 and 477(1) of the Act. The time within which to make an application for judicial review to this Court is within 35 days of the date of the migration decision (s 477(1)).
3. The date of the purported decision was 28 October 2015, when a delegate of the Minister notified the applicant by email that his application for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (visa) was refused. This application was not lodged with the Court until 24 August 2020, almost five years after the purported migration decision was made.
4. This is not a conventional application for an extension of time within which to commence an application for review pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act. There has been no decision by the former Administrative Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) or the former Immigration Assessment Authority from which the applicant seeks judicial review. Instead, the applicant seeks declaratory relief from the Court that the Minister failed to lawfully notify the applicant of the decision to refuse to grant him the visa. This is because the letter of notification of the delegate's decision is said to not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. In that regard, the basis for a claim to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is similar to the claims made by the applicants in BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189 (BMY18) and Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31 (Singh 2020).
5. The applicant also seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to lawfully notify the applicant of the 28 October 2015 decision to refuse to grant him the visa.
6. References hereafter in these reasons to 'CB' pages are references to the Court Book that was tendered and admitted as evidence at the hearing before this Court and designated 'R3'.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 13 May 2015 (CB 19). He applied for the visa on 31 July 2015 (CB 1-35).
2. The applicant claimed to have borrowed money from an illegal money lender (loan shark) in Malaysia to help his parents rebuild their business. He could not repay the loan and he claims that he was attacked and threatened with serious harm if he did not repay the loan. The applicant claims that after these threats to his safety, he tried to relocate to another part of Malaysia, but the loan shark found him and assaulted him. He fears that if he returns to Malalysia he will be killed and local Malaysian authorities will not assist him or provide adequate protection (CB 30, 59).
3. On 28 October 2015, a delegate of the Minister sent the applicant a letter by email to the applicant's nominated address. The letter notified the applicant that his application for the visa had been refused. The letter attached a copy of the assessment of the application and the decision of the delegate refusing to grant the visa (CB 55-71). As was observed in BMY18 and Singh 2020, the form of the letter is important. The letter was relevantly in the following form on page one and at the top of page two (CB 55-6):

Decision on Protection (subclass 866) visa

I wish to advise you that the application for a Protection (subclass 866) visa has been refused

for the following applicant(s):

[Redacted]

After careful consideration of all the information you have provided, a delegate of the

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was not satisfied that you met the relevant criteria for the grant of this visa as set out in Australian migration law.

This application was refused because you did not satisfy subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). That provision requires you to be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations or a member of the same family unit as such a person.

The attached Decision Record provides more detailed information about this decision and the applicant(s) it applies to.

Review Rights

The department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision.

An application for merits review of this refusal decision must be given to the AAT within the prescribed timeframe. This timeframe commences on the day on which you are taken to have been notified of this decision and ends at the end of 28 days.

Please note that this review period is prescribed in law and an application for merits review may not be accepted after that date.

1. The letter then identifies where applications for merits review to the Tribunal may be made. On page three of the letter the following appears (CB 57):

Financial or case worker assistance

If you are receiving Status Resolution Support Services (SRSS), you are refused a protection visa, and you do not lodge an application for review with the AAT, you will be transitioned out of the SRSS programme within seven business days from the end of the prescribed timeframe for seeking merits review.

Receiving this Letter

As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.

1. Subsequently the applicant made two applications for merits review to the Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded on each occasion that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct a merits review. On the first occasion (1 March 2016), the application for review was not lodged with the Tribunal within the time required by s 412(1)(b) of the Act and reg 4.31 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). On the second occasion (24 June 2021), because (inter alia) the letter of notification sent 28 October 2015 was a valid notification letter under s 66(2)(d)(ii) (applying the reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Singh 2020) and therefore the application for review (filed 5 May 2020) was also out of time. Copies of the Tribunal decisions dated 1 March 2016 and 24 June 2021 were tendered by counsel for the Minister at the hearing of this application for an extension of time and marked exhibits 'R1' and 'R2' respectively.
2. The applicant did not seek judicial review of the Tribunal decisions.
3. Meanwhile on 24 August 2020 (before the second decision of the Tribunal was delivered), the applicant filed the application for an extension of time which is now before the Court and an application for judicial review seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus in relation to the notification letter.[1]

1. The application for an extension of time was listed for hearing before this Court on 10 August 2025 at Melbourne and in person.
2. The applicant appeared in person, self-represented.
3. Mr McDermott of counsel appeared for the Minister.
4. The only affidavit filed in support of the application for an extension of time was an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 21 August 2020. That affidavit referred to the making of the delegate's decision and the letter of notification dated 28 October 2015. Copies of the notification letter and decision record were annexed. There was no explanation for any delay in bringing the application or as to why the applicant did not apply to the Tribunal to review the delegate's decision within the time required by the Act and Regulations. Further, there was no explanation given as to why it would be necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time in accordance with s 477(2) of the Act.
5. On 30 May 2023 a Registrar of the Court ordered that the applicant file and serve written submissions, any amended application with proper particulars and any additional evidence on which the applicant seeks to rely at least 28 days before the date fixed for this hearing. No further documents were filed or served by the applicant.
6. In the application for an extension of time lodged 24 August 2020 the applicant identified the following grounds for an extension:
   1. The failure to lawfully notify the applicant of the 28 October 2015 decision to refuse his application for a Protection is ongoing, and the extension of time is justified on this basis alone.
   2. The respondent will suffer no prejudice if the extension of time is granted.
7. The applicant was not represented and the Court was mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9], Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [24] and more recently by Hill J in AYJ22 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 510 at [23]-[24] that it is appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given a reasonable opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to the application to the Court. Therefore, the applicant was invited to tell the Court why an extension of time should be granted and why the Court had jurisdiction to hear the proposed application for review of the purported migration decision.

1. The applicant submitted that the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in BYN18 was authority for the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review because he was not lawfully notified of the delegate's decision and he was also "denied procedural fairness".
2. As the applicant was self-represented, the Court has construed this submission to be that the decision in BYN18 is authority for the proposition that in certain circumstances a notification by a Minister of a decision can be a "migration decision", within the meaning of ss 476 and 477(1) of the Act and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application for judicial review (if an extension of time is granted). The submission that the applicant was denied procedural fairness appears to be based on a general assertion that the applicant should not be denied a hearing either by the Tribunal or this Court regarding the validity of the letter of notification.
3. The applicant claimed that when he received the notification letter he was not made aware of the time within which he could seek to review the delegate's decision, and that it was not until he sought advice from a union delegate in 2020, that he became aware of his right to apply to the Court for an extension of time to review the validity of the notification letter. There was no affidavit evidence filed by the applicant to that effect.

1. On behalf of the Minister, Mr McDermott of counsel relied on an outline of written submissions and a list of authorities filed with the Court on 28 July 2025.
2. Firstly, it was submitted that the sending of a notification letter was not a "migration decision" for the purposes of s 476(1) of the Act because any decision to send the notification letter was a primary decision by the delegate and not a reviewable privative clause decision or a purported privative clause decision within the meaning of the s 476 of the Act. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an application for judicial review under s 476 of the Act. Further, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend time within which to bring an application for judicial review because the applicant has no right to seek judicial review in relation to the delegate's notification. Put simply the application was incompetent and should be dismissed (Reliance was placed on the decision of Chung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 442 at [19] per Conti J (Chung) and MZXMI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1162 per Gordon J (MZXMI) as to why a notification letter was not a "migration decision").
3. Secondly, the applicant has not complied with s 477(2) of the Act because there has been no application supported by affidavit evidence explaining why it is necessary and in the interests of justice to invoke the discretion of the Court to extend time.
4. Thirdly, even if the jurisdiction of the Court was enlivened there was no proper explanation of why there was a five-year delay in bringing the application and that it would be "anathema of the administration of justice to countenance such a lengthy delay without reasons proffered by the applicant." In the absence of evidence of injustice, no relief should be given by this Court (reference was made in oral submissions to the recent decision of AWS25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 869 per Judge Ladhams as to the absence of evidence explaining delay).
5. At the hearing before this Court, Mr McDermott also referred the Court to the decisions in BMY18 and more relevantly Singh 2020, as to the question of whether the nomination letter complied with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. Reference was also made to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64 (DFQ17). It was submitted that the notification letter used by the delegate in this case was substantially the same as and consistent with the findings of Thawley J in Singh 2020 and therefore the notification letter did comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act.
6. Counsel for the Minister also referred to the two decisions of the Tribunal in March 2016 and June 2021 from which there was no application for judicial review by the applicant. In particular, the second decision where the Tribunal considered the validity of the notification letter after the decisions in both BMY18 and Singh 2020. No application for judicial review was pursued following the outcome of that application for review. No explanation was forthcoming from the applicant as to why he did not exercise his right to seek review of that decision to this Court.
7. It was submitted that the application for an extension of time is incompetent and should be dismissed with costs.

1. In reply, the applicant asserted that he was unable to file an application for review following the Tribunal decisions because of financial hardship and inability to access legal assistance. He was not aware of his rights to review the Tribunal decisions until seeking advice from a union delegate, who told him he had been denied procedural fairness. Following that advice, he lodged this application. The applicant claimed he was otherwise unfamiliar with the practices and procedures of the Court and Tribunal and was unsure of his options.

1. The issues to be determined by this application are, whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for judicial review under s 476 of the Act in relation to a "notification letter" given by the Minister to the applicant under s 66 of the Act, and if so, whether an extension of time should be granted as a matter of discretion pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act to permit the applicant to seek a remedy from the Court.

Is the Notification Letter a Migration Decision?

1. In BYN18 the Court set out in detail at [10]-[13] the relevant statutory framework that creates the jurisdiction of the former Federal Circuit Court and now this Court, to review a migration decision under the Act. The Court said:

[10] The provisions of the Act relevant to the jurisdiction exercised by the FCC are ss 5, 474, 476 and 477. Section 476 sets out the parameters of the jurisdiction conferred on the FCC in relation to "migration decisions". Section 477 confers a statutory power to extend the time within which a proceeding with respect to which the FCC has jurisdiction may be commenced.

[11] Section 477 relevantly provides:

Time limits on applications to the Federal Circuit Court

(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35-day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:

(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

[12] Sections 476 and 477 both refer to a "migration decision" which is relevantly defined in s 5 to mean:

migration decision means:

(a) a privative clause decision; or

(b) a purported privative clause decision; or

...

[13] The phrase "privative clause decision" is defined in s 474 which relevantly provides:

Decisions under Act are final

(1) A privative clause decision:

(a) is final and conclusive; and

(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and

(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.

(2) In this section:

privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).

(3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:

(a) granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;

(b) granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);

(c) granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;

(d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;

(e) making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;

(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;

(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;

(h) conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;

(i) a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision: ...

1. Those provisions and the definitions are substantially the same following the creation of this Court and remain in the current version of the Act. Counsel for the Minister also referred to the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180; [2016] HCA 29 at [60], [61], [63] and [68] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ regarding the jurisdiction of the former Federal Circuit Court and this Court. The Court considered the words 'in relation to migration decisions' contained in s 476(1) and said that they were 'not words of expansion'. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the Court's jurisdiction within the confines of the statutory framework.
2. In Chung at [19], Conti J held that a notification letter that merely communicated a decision of a delegate of the Minister did not involve the making of a decision within s 474(3) of the Act, particularly where the decision-maker is subject to a statutory obligation to do so. The notification letter in this case was a notification of that kind.
3. In MZXMI at [12], Gordon J reached the same conclusion citing with approval the decision of Conti J in Chung.
4. In BYN18, the Full Court of the Federal Court came to a different conclusion but in relation to a different obligation to notify under the Act. In that case, the Court was not considering notification under s 66 of the Act but instead notification under s 501CA of the Act, which required the Minister to make a determination as to the way in which notification is to be given to the person concerned (BYN18 at [19] per Nicholas, Markovic and Lee JJ). That was a different notification process that required an administrative decision capable of review. Importantly, in that decision at [7] the Court did not disagree with or disapprove of the reasoning of Conti J in Chung or Gordon J in MZXMI in relation to notification under s 66 of the Act.
5. Section 66 of the Act requires the Minister to give notification of a refusal to grant a visa in the prescribed way. It does not require there to be an administrative decision or reviewable decision to do so and the words used in s 66 do not give the delegate or the Minister any choice or discretion to give or not to give a notice in the prescribed way. The giving of notification of a decision to refuse a visa is not of itself a 'migration decision' withing the meaning of the Act. There is nothing in the reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court in BYN18 that means that this Court is not bound to follow the decisions in Chung and MZXMI as to the construction of s 66 and the ability of this Court to review the validity of a notice given by a delegate, as opposed to a decision of the Tribunal as to the validity of a notice. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the conduct of the delegate in giving the notification letter.
6. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to extend the time within which to bring the application for declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus directed to the Minister in relation to the notification letter.

1. However, if I am wrong about the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application, I would not in any event exercise the discretion to extend time under s 477(2) of the Act.
2. The factors which the Court should consider in determining whether to grant an extension of time include whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay, the length of the delay, the merits of the application for review and any prejudice that may be suffered by the Minister, noting that the absence of prejudice is not sufficient basis alone to grant an extension (see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 (Hunter Valley) ; SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28 (Tu'uta Katoa)).
3. In Tu'uta Katoa, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keanne and Gleeson JJ said at [12] (when considering s 477A(2) of the Act which is in substantially the same terms as s 477(2) of the Act):

[12] On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s477A(2)(a) and the courts satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to 3rd parties in the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low; the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. In SZTEF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 at [44], Wigney J said:

[44] Section 477(2) does not define or confine the matters that the Federal Circuit Court can or should have regard to in considering the interests of the administration of justice. In Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1984] FCA 176; (1983) 72 FLR 291 at 297, Lockhart J said the following in relation to power to extend the time in which an application may be made under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act):

... the court should not surround the exercise of its discretion with unnecessary constraints such as a requirement that there be special circumstances or considerations of that kind. The statute does not require them. Nor should the courts. It is best left to the good sense of the judge hearing each case to determine whether, on the evidence before him, the court's discretion should be exercised in favour of granting an enlargement of time to bring an application for an order for review.

1. In this case, there is no acceptable explanation of the delay in making the application for an extension of time and no satisfactory explanation by the applicant, by affidavit, as to why he did not exercise his rights to review the decision to refuse the visa or the validity of the notification letter in a timely manner. It was submitted that the applicant did not know of his rights of review and was not able to seek legal advice due to his financial circumstances however ignorance of his rights is not without more a satisfactory explanation, As Foster J observed in SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38]:

[38] In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. Whilst one may have considerable sympathy for a litigant in person who does not know that he may have a capacity to bring a judicial review application in the Federal Magistrates Court and therefore fails to do so within the stipulated time frame, ignorance of those requirements (without more) is generally not regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay.[2]

1. Here, there was no satisfactory explanation of a delay of five years between notification of the delegate's decision on 28 October 2015 and the lodging of the application to this Court on 24 August 2020. The applicant submitted that he did not know of his right to seek review to this Court until sometime in 2020 when he sought assistance from a union delegate but that does not explain why he did not exercise his right to review the decision of the delegate to the Tribunal within the time required by s 412(1)(b) of the Act and why he did not seek to review the decision of the Tribunal on 24 June 2021 (R2) where the Tribunal found that the notification letter complied with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act.
2. There is also no evidence of the applicant's financial circumstances to support his claims that he was unable to afford legal representation or assistance and there is no evidence of any steps taken to seek assistance or understand the rights of review. The applicant did not deny receipt of the notification letter but there is no explanation of what if any steps he took to pursue the right to review that was referred to in it.
3. In the absence of affidavit evidence explaining the delay (which is substantial) and why it is necessary and in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension there is no persuasive reason to exercise the discretion to extend time.

1. The Minister does not identify any prejudice that would be suffered by the Minister if an extension of time was to be granted. The absence of prejudice is not of itself a reason to grant an extension (Hunter Valley at 348-9 and SZTRY v Minister for Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 88 at [6]). Here, the broader interests of the administration of justice, including the finality of litigation and the expectation of other litigants awaiting hearings in this Court weigh against an extension of time, especially where the applicant has already sought to review or test the validity of the notification in the second application for review to the Tribunal (see Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929 at [62] per Gyles J).

1. When considering the merits of the grounds of review for the purpose of an extension of time the Court need only adopt an impressionistic approach (see GOK18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 169 at [32] per Collier, Rangiah and Derrington JJ).
2. The ground identified by the applicant for which declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus are sought is that the notification letter does not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act and therefore it was unlawful notification. Counsel for the Minister appropriately drew the Court's attention to the decisions in BMY18 and Singh 2020.
3. In BMY18 the Court held that a notice under s 66 of the Act must set out the information required by s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act, in a way, which is not only complete but 'clear as well' (BMY18 at [30]). In that case, the Court also considered the decision in DFQ17, where the notification letter was not clear and the Court found it to be essentially incomprehensible in the circumstances. However, the form of letter in BMY18 and DFQ17 was different to the form of notification letter here.
4. In this case, the form of letter was substantially the same as the letter used in Singh 2020 which was found to be valid. The form of the letter is set out above because, as Thawley J observed in Singh 2020 at [23], cases concerning s 66(2)(d)(ii) hinge upon a simple factual inquiry into whether or not the notification letter states the time within which the application for review may be made. Here, the letter clearly identifies that the time to seek review is within 28 days of the date on which the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision and that, because the notification letter was sent by email, he is taken to have received it on the day on which it was transmitted. The letter does not suffer from the defects identified in BYM18 or DFQ17.
5. Further, in the second Tribunal decision (R2) the Tribunal reached the same conclusion as to the notification letter. There was no application to review that decision and no explanation as to why it was wrong or beyond jurisdiction. In the circumstances, the merits of the application appear to be poor and the interests of the administration of justice weigh against providing the applicant with an opportunity to relitigate matters considered and rejected by the Tribunal.
6. Because the merits of the application for relief to this Court are poor and in the absence of a credible and compelling explanation as to why the discretion to grant an extension of time should be granted it is not necessary and in the interests of justice for the Court to extend time under s 477(2) of the Act.

1. The application to this Court is not within the jurisdiction of the Court because the giving of a nomination letter by the delegate of the Minister is not a migration decision for the purpose of s 476 of the Act. Further, an extension of time to bring an application for judicial review is dismissed because in the circumstances of this case as described above it is not necessary and in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension under s 477(2) of the Act.

1. The Minister seeks an order that the applicant pay the costs and disbursements of and incidental to this application fixed in the sum of $4,189.38. That is the scale amount provided for in Sch 2, Pt 2, Div 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and is appropriate in the circumstances of and due to the complexity of this case. Costs will follow the event.

1. The application for an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act filed 24 August 2020 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements of and incidental to this proceeding fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett.

[1] Presumably this application was filed following delivery of the reasons for judgment in BYN18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 80 (BYN18) which was delivered on 14 May 2020 and which was shortly after the lodging of the second application for review by the Tribunal on 5 May 2020.

[2]See also AZAFF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 176 at [41]- [44] per Collier, Farrell and Abraham JJ (AZAFF)).