Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Arson - Instigated others to set fire to former wife's home and shed - Motivated by retribution - Family violence - Term of imprisonment of fifteen months with three months suspended with eligibility for parole after six months manifestly inadequate.

Judgment Number: [2026] TASCCA 1

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v DAVID CONRAD WOOLLEY

1. Sentence of imprisonment for 15 months from 8 September 2025, 3 months of which was suspended with parole eligibility after six months quashed.

4 Respondent sentenced to imprisonment for four years from 8 September 2025.

5 Respondent not to be eligible for parole until he has served two years of that term.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v DAVID CONRAD WOOLLEY

1. This is a Crown appeal against sentence. The respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of arson. He was sentenced by Shanahan CJ on 8 September 2025 to imprisonment for 15 months. Three months of the term was suspended for 18 months from release. His Honour ordered that the respondent not be eligible for parole until having served six months of the operative part of the term.
2. The appeal was heard on 3 March 2026. The sole ground was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. Arson is the most serious property crime. The property destroyed in this instance was a residential dwelling subject to a tenancy agreement. The appellant instigated others to set fire to the house and, three days later, the shed. As a result of the crimes, the owners of the house suffered a very significant financial and emotional impact. The tenant was the appellant's wife. All of her possessions, and the possessions of their children, were lost. The dominant factor in sentencing was that these crimes were acts of family violence committed by the appellant in the course of a relationship breakdown, solely motivated by a wish to intimidate and harm his wife. In that context, the sentence was erroneously lenient.
3. At the conclusion of oral argument the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed on 8 September 2025, and remanded the respondent in custody for re-sentence on 26 March 2026. These are the Court's reasons for those orders and for the re-sentence.

1. The first fire was lit on 2 November 2023 and the second on 5 November 2023. The respondent was then aged 40. He was married to Stacey Leggate and they had three children together, the oldest of whom was 14. During the relevant period, although the respondent and Ms Leggate were still married, their relationship was at an end. He believed, despite her denials, that she had been having an affair. In September 2023 Ms Leggate entered into an agreement to rent a house in Blair Street, Lutana. The respondent lived at the property with Ms Leggate and their children, but he was not party to the rental agreement and was staying there until he found somewhere else to live. The property was owned by Tim and Jayne Palfreyman and insured through Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd.
2. On 28 September 2023 there was an electrical fire in the meter box. The occupants temporarily vacated the house until repairs were undertaken. Ms Leggate and two of the children, along with the respondent, went to stay with Ms Leggate's sister. The oldest child stayed with his grandmother. Although Blair Street was unoccupied, most of the belongings of Ms Leggate and her children were left there, both in the house itself and in the shed at the rear.
3. In October 2023 the respondent entered into a sexual relationship with Nicole Humes. Ms Humes lived near Blair Street. On 1 November 2023 the respondent spoke to Ms Humes on the phone and asked her to find someone to "burn down" the Blair Street house. He told her that he had left the door of the house open. On the following day, through a series of text messages, he repeated his request for her to have the property burned down "that evening". Ms Humes asked her son, who was then aged 15, to light the fire. At about 11.30 pm on 2 November 2023, Ms Humes' son, his partner, and a number of unknown individuals, walked from Ms Humes' home to Blair Street with 500 millilitres of petrol in a drink bottle. After he arrived at the house he opened the front door, poured the petrol in the entryway and on the front deck and set fire to it using a cigarette lighter. The house caught fire and was extensively damaged. The repair cost was subsequently estimated at $350,000.
4. Throughout the events immediately surrounding the lighting of this fire, the respondent requested Ms Humes to keep him informed. He asked for photos and details about the response of the emergency services. In accordance with his request, Ms Humes sent him a photo of the fire, which was visible from her home, and told the respondent when the fire service arrived. During the following morning, 3 November 2023, the respondent congratulated Ms Humes for the result. However, when he realised that the shed at the property had not been burned he sent her text messages in these terms:

"There is stuff in the shed of hers to burn that too, please. LOL XXXX"

1. The respondent sent a further text message asking that the shed be burnt that day:

1. Following these further requests, Ms Humes directed her son to go back and burn the shed. Throughout 4 and 5 November 2023, the respondent repeatedly asked Ms Humes when the next fire would be lit. He told her that the shed door was open. At about 11.30 pm on 5 November 2023, Ms Humes' son again walked to Blair Street with petrol which he poured inside the shed and set alight with a cigarette lighter. The fire was extinguished by the fire service, but not before the shed was extensively damaged and the contents destroyed. The loss was estimated at $70,000. Part of the timber boundary fence was also burnt. Again, the respondent asked Ms Humes to keep him informed about the fire and the response of emergency services. When Ms Humes told him by text message that she heard an explosion from the fire he replied:

1. The police investigation revealed the text message exchanges between the respondent and Ms Humes. The respondent was interviewed on 31 January 2024. He admitted that he asked Ms Humes to light the fires. He also admitted that his motivation was to "get back at" Ms Leggate because he believed she had had an affair which, he thought, she lied to him about. The purpose of the fires, he said, was to "hurt her." He claimed that he "had a rough idea who would light the fires" but did not know it would be Ms Humes son. He falsely claimed that he did not think that his requests that the house and shed be burned would be followed through. He admitted having told Ms Humes on 2 November 2023 that the front door of the house would be unlocked and on 5 November 2023 that the roller door of the shed would be unlocked.

1. When sentenced the respondent was 41. He had a relatively industrious background having held positions variously in concreting, wood cutting and fibreglassing. He was employed as a tyre fitter for log trucks but had ambitions to commence his own landscaping and gardening business. The sentencing judge was provided with a report from a general practitioner who described the respondent as, in February 2025, having symptoms "consistent with anxiety and depression" for which he was prescribed medication. There was no evidence that the respondent had any mental condition or impairment which had any causal connection with the crimes or was otherwise relevant to sentence. Some other information about the respondent was contained in a report prepared on 4 August 2025 of his suitability for a home detention order. His upbringing was unremarkable. He had been employed since leaving school in year 10. He had no history of abuse of alcohol or illicit drugs. He claimed he was, for the year prior to preparation of the report, in a "loving and stable relationship".
2. The respondent had some record of offending but it was of little relevance to these crimes. As a youth he was ordered to perform community service for aggravated burglary, stealing and possessing stolen property. He was fined for destroying property in 2002 when he was 19. In 2007 he was fined for common assault and breaching bail. In 2012 he was fined for common assault and made subject to a conditional undertaking for breach of a family violence order. In 2013, the respondent was sentenced to a wholly suspended term of two months and a period of probation for possession of stolen property. In 2014 he breached that suspended sentence by making a false statutory declaration and false statements for which he was given a further three month suspended term and a further period of probation. The appellant had no prior convictions for arson or fire lighting.

1. Counsel for the respondent submitted that there were a number of mitigating matters to be taken into account when considering the adequacy of the sentence. She correctly submitted that the respondent was entitled to mitigation from his admissions to the police and from his plea of guilty. The plea was entered on 8 October 2024, just over nine months after he was charged. The sentencing judge stated simply that he had taken the plea into account. Independently of subjective considerations, the plea had utilitarian value[1]. It saved the State the expense and inconvenience of a trial in circumstances in which there was a considerable demand on the resources of the court. It also avoided the need for Ms Leggate and Mr and Mrs Palfreyman to suffer any additional trauma or concern arising from having to give evidence, although little evidence would have been required from those persons and such evidence as was required would likely have been uncontentious.
2. It was a question for the sentencing judge whether remorse, a willingness to facilitate the course of justice and an acceptance of responsibility were to be inferred from the plea. It was open to infer that, by his admissions and the plea, the respondent had demonstrated some willingness to facilitate the course of justice and accepted some responsibility. There had been no expression of remorse by the respondent other than the bare assertion to that effect by the respondent's counsel at the sentencing hearing. In his sentencing remarks, the sentencing judge said only that he accepted that the respondent was "now remorseful", and that it appeared that the respondent's level of insight had "improved since the material time". Sometimes, a plea of guilty and early co-operation with the investigating police can be an indication of prospects of rehabilitation and a reduced need for specific deterrence_[2]_. However, as an indication of remorse, as was said by Redlich JA and Curtain AJA in Phillips[3], "the conduct and statements of the offender over time provide a more informative and precise guide than the plea alone as to whether genuine and deep contrition exists". In this case, the weight attributable to remorse was slight. As the sentencing judge correctly noted, the respondent engaged in a determined and sustained course of conduct, and was responsible for a second fire despite having had "ample opportunity to reflect on [his] conduct after the first fire." His immediate reaction was not remorse, but to gloat over the result of both fires. Around the time of sentence he attributed the crimes, to the author of the pre-sentence report, to "bad decisions" and "poor mental health", a response more indicative of self-pity. His response was reported only as being "able to identify victims of his offending behaviour, particularly his ex-partner and children" and an acknowledgment of "areas he still needs to address, specifically his mental health and specialised psychological services."
3. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondent that the crimes were, for the respondent, "out of character" and an "aberration at a time of significant emotional stress and upheaval." These were not factors which deserved much weight in this case. The sentencing judge correctly noted that there were two separate instances of offending. Neither were spontaneous. Both were calculated and planned. The respondent facilitated the crimes by, on two separate occasions, leaving doors open. Moreover, the fact that the crimes were committed at a time of emotional stress and upheaval raised other issues concerning the strong need for general deterrence arising from the family violence context which will be dealt with later in these reasons.
4. It was submitted also on behalf of the respondent that his substantial potential liability, likely greater than $400,000, under the compensation orders made by the sentencing judge, was a factor to be taken into account in his favour in sentencing. The submission must be rejected. The sentencing judge made compensation orders in favour of the owners, Mr and Mrs Palfreyman, and Mrs Leggate, not in specific sums but "in an amount to be assessed". Under the Sentencing Act, s 68(1), a sentencing court may order an offender to pay compensation for that injury, loss, destruction or damage found to have occurred. Orders in those terms are routinely made by the Supreme Court, but the power to award compensation may be exercised only if the facts sufficiently appear from any evidence or material presented to the court, or from the available documents, together with any admissions made by, in this case, the respondent. No sum has yet been assessed in this case. There is no mechanism for assessment were there to be any dispute. In light of the statements of this Court in Attorney-General for Tasmania v B[4] about the circumstances in which a court might exercise the power to order compensation, it cannot be determined whether an amount will ever be assessed under the orders. As Crawford CJ pointed out in that case[5], subject to statutory provisions to the contrary, the general purpose of legislation which gives a court dealing with an offender the power to order the offender to pay compensation to a victim is to provide a summary and inexpensive method of compensating the victim, usually designed for cases in which the entitlement is clear and not intended for cases involving complicated or extensive inquiry or investigation. The amount awarded is merely on account of the damages which the injured party might recover in a civil court, even though it is taken to be a fine enforceable under the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005[6]. In any event, orders for compensation are not additional punishment. They are orders made under Part 9 of the Act, "in addition to sentence". The purpose is to recompense the victim. There is appellate authority for the proposition that there is no reason in principle, or arising from the terms of the statutory provisions, why the making of an order for compensation should operate as a mitigating factor in the determination of sentence.[7]
5. The final argument advanced by counsel for the respondent as relevant to the adequacy of the sentence was what was referred to the "willingness" of the respondent to give evidence at the trial of Ms Humes. When the respondent was sentenced, Ms Humes had pleaded not guilty to arson and a trial was possible. Before the sentencing judge, the respondent's counsel said:

"He's aware that he may be required or is compellable to give evidence against his - it wasn't really his girlfriend, he says, at the time. That he's aware of that, he's prepared to engage and assist in that ... way."

1. When the sentencing judge enquired whether there was any account of the assistance the respondent had given, some further indication of a commitment to give evidence or anything else that his Honour should be aware of to take into account in sentencing, counsel responded only:

"he's aware of what his responsibility is, and he's prepared to be involved in the process...That's as high as I can take it."

1. For many reasons, it is the policy of the criminal law to allow a reduction in sentence in return for co-operation with the police and for giving evidence in relation to co-offenders. In Brennan v Tasmania[8], Martin AJ, with whom Blow CJ and Wood J relevantly agreed, recognised the importance of encouraging offenders to co-operate with authorities. The reasons include that it is inherently right to assist in the prosecution of offenders guilty of serious crime. It encourages guilty persons to disclose and provide evidence to the police and to courts with the aim of bringing other offenders to justice.[9] Sometimes, such co-operation indicates contrition and insight on the part of the person to be sentenced. An indication of a willingness to give evidence, if it becomes known, may make life more difficult both in prison and possibly after release. As Martin AJ also explained, many factors influence the degree to which a sentence of imprisonment should be ameliorated by reason of an offender's co-operation with authorities, including the value of the co-operation, and the degree of risk to the safety and welfare of the offender accompanying the co-operation.
2. In this case, the supposed offer deserved either no, or very little, weight. It smacked of a last minute and half-hearted attempt to obtain some benefit in sentencing and amounted to little more than a recognition that, following resolution of the criminal proceedings against him, he may be compelled to give evidence against a co-accused. His counsel stated that the respondent was "prepared to engage and assist", but there was no indication of any prior correspondence or communication to the prosecuting authorities of a preparedness to give evidence at Ms Humes' trial or explaining what evidence the respondent could give. The prosecution gave no indication that the respondent's evidence would be of value to the prosecution, or even that it would be required to strengthen the prosecution case against Ms Humes. The learned sentencing judge did not state that he gave any discount for the indication, still less specify a discount for future co-operation.

1. The principles which govern Crown appeals against sentence on the ground of manifest inadequacy were stated by this Court in this State in DPP v Swan[10] and subsequently in DPP v Harington[11] and DPP v King[12]. The appellant must first establish that the sentence is erroneously inadequate in the sense described in DPP (Acting) v Pearce[13]. The appellant must then persuade the court that the residual discretion not to interfere should not be exercised.

1. The sentence imposed in this case was erroneously lenient. As was stated at the outset of these reasons, and has been stated in many cases in this State and elsewhere, arson is regarded as the most serious of all property crimes. It is often difficult to detect, has capacity to cause serious damage to property and in some cases expose persons to serious risk of injury or death[14]. Factors relevant to the seriousness of the crime include the motive with which the offence was committed, the extent of the damage which results, the extent to which the offence endangered human life, and the nature of the property damaged[15]. Punishment and deterrence are the dominant sentencing factors.[16]
2. Sentences for arson were reviewed by this Court in 2006 in Oliver v Tasmania[17] and in 2013 in Groenewege v Tasmania[18]. In Oliver, Tennent J referred to a passage in Professor Warner's text Sentencing in Tasmania, 2nd ed, which stated, citing the 1985 case of Brown[19], that "four years' imprisonment is regarded as the top end of the range for arson, reserved 'for very bad cases where the case put in mitigation was not strong to that such a grave penalty was clearly deserved'." Tennent J also referred to a submission which sought to demonstrate a range of penalties for arson during the previous five years which ranged from fines to terms of imprisonment in the region of three years. Her Honour, however, pointed out that "what the sentences highlighted was the range of variables which affected the court's sentencing decisions and the caution which should be exercised in using such sentences as a definitive guide." The Court concluded that the sentence of three years' imprisonment imposed in that case was not manifestly excessive.
3. In Groenewege, the appellant contended that a term of imprisonment of four years and six months for arson combined with one count of common assault was manifestly excessive. The facts of that case were similar to the present. The appeal was dismissed. The arson charge concerned the almost total destruction of a dwelling house which was the home of the appellant and his wife and four children (boys) aged between 7 years and 3 years. The complainant in the assault matter was the appellant's wife. She had been subjected to other controlling, abusive and threatening behaviour. Earlier in the day of the fire the appellant had placed his hands around her throat and applied pressure. The appellant pleaded guilty. One contention advanced by the appellant was that the sentence was "considerably outside the established range of sentences for arson." The principal judgment was written by Porter J. His Honour first noted a sentence imposed in 2011 by Blow J (as he then was) in a case of Capell. In that case, the accused was sentenced to imprisonment for six years and six months after having been found guilty by a jury of arson and a consequential crime of wounding, when a bystander was injured by flying glass when the fire caused an explosion. The accused had set fire to business premises in a revenge attack, with the fire spreading to adjacent shops. The target business was completely destroyed and substantial damage was caused to four other premises. The total damage bill was about $1.9 million. In his sentencing remarks, Blow J noted that in "recent decades, except in cases involving fatalities, it seems no one has been sentenced to more than four years' imprisonment for arson in Tasmania."
4. In response to the suggestion that the sentence imposed on Mr Groenewege was outside the range Porter J continued:

"...establishing a proper range in relation to the crime of arson was a difficult exercise because the crime can be committed by way of a specific intention or recklessness, and because motives and damage caused may vary considerably. There is no doubt that arson is a crime which does not readily lend itself to standardisation and the establishment of a range."

1. Previous sentences may be a yardstick by which the Court can achieve consistency in sentencing and application of relevant sentencing principles[20]. However, as counsel for the appellant correctly pointed out, this Court is concerned with the application of principle[21]. Even if a range may be established for arson, the fact that a sentence may fall within the range does not mean that the sentence under appeal is not manifestly inadequate. In Oliver, Underwood CJ cited with approval the passage of the reasons of Hunt CJ at CL in R v Ellis (1993) 68 A Crim R 449 at 461:

"What must be looked at is whether the challenged sentence is within the range appropriate to the objective gravity of the particular offence and to the subjective circumstances of the particular offender, and not whether it is more severe or more lenient than some other sentence which merely forms part of that range."

1. Underwood CJ also referred with approval to the view expressed by Wright J in Dowie v The Queen[22] that it is the seriousness of the conduct, rather than the category of crime of which the offender has been convicted, which is of paramount importance.
2. In this appeal, counsel for the respondent submitted that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was within his Honour's wide sentencing discretion and was "well within the range of sentences imposed for the crime of arson." Both counsel accepted that sentences for arson ranged from orders with no custodial component at all to the term of four years and six months imposed in Groenewege. We would also refer to the sentence imposed in Capell in 2011. Even if the sentence were within the range of sentences for arson generally, that does not preclude a finding that the sentence was manifestly inadequate when the nature and gravity of the respondent's criminal conduct is properly assessed.
3. These were serious cases of arson. There were two counts. Both fires were intentionally lit. The respondent instigated and strongly and repeatedly encouraged the lighting of the fires, facilitated both crimes by leaving doors open and involved others in his criminal enterprise. Although he claimed to not have known that the person who lit the fires was a 15 year old boy, he admitted that he had a "rough idea" of who might be involved. He was at least reckless about the identity of that person. As events were described, the manner in which the fires were lit put that child and those who were with him at considerable risk. The level of the respondent's criminal culpability was very high, higher than the others he involved, even though he did not personally light the fires. Both fires carried risk to others as well, both those sent to fight the fires and residential neighbours.
4. However, it was the motive for these crimes which was strongly aggravating and deserved particular weight in sentencing. The respondent was motivated by a wish to do as much harm to his wife as he could. He took a particular interest in the progress of both fires and celebrated the result. He sent someone back to burn the shed when it was not burnt the first time around. His aim was to seek retribution in the aftermath of a broken relationship. In Groenewege, Porter J found it unnecessary to decide whether the label of family violence could be correctly applied to the crime of arson in these circumstances. However, his Honour was satisfied that the underlying breach of trust was effectively the same[23] and that "to intentionally deprive a spouse of his or her home in such a way amounts to very hurtful subjugation, and exploits a position of vulnerability." We agree. Moreover, we do not share Porter J's hesitation in describing crimes of this nature as family violence. They were acts of emotional abuse and intimidation. Though his wife did not own the house, the crimes involved damage to her property and the property of their children. Even since Groenewege, community attitudes to offences committed within relationships, whether or not it is described as family violence, have hardened as understanding of the prevalence of, and harm caused, by such offences increases. As was recently stated by Jago J, with whom Estcourt J and Porter AJ agreed, in Lockwood v Tasmania[24]:

"Family violence has long been recognised as a grave, insidious and all too prevalent problem within the community. In sentencing any such crime, general deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the community are prominent sentencing considerations. It is also important that the sentence 'vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, express the community's disapproval of the offending and afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence.'"

"Nationwide, courts are recognising the very strong need to condemn family violence and to sentence in a manner that ensures violence within domestic settings is adequately punished, and that the sentences which are delivered have a strong element of both personal and general deterrence. Community expectation is that the Court will do what it can in sentencing, to provide protection to vulnerable complainants. It is necessary for the sentences imposed to make it very clear that courts, and the community at large, are exasperated by the continuing endemic of family violence, and those who perpetrate it will be met with a strong sentencing response."

1. Although this case did not involve direct application of physical violence, the comments just quoted apply with equal force. For any crime involving the intentional infliction of harm on a party to a significant relationship, especially in circumstances of relationship breakdown or tension, the duty of sentencing courts is to communicate censure and denunciation for such offences. As Porter J said in Groenewege, such crimes cannot be tolerated. Sentences must serve, as far as a court can achieve, to deter such crimes for fear of the consequences.
2. Although, as always, the victim impact statements given to the sentencing judge were to be treated with the required circumspection, they reflected the type of impact to be expected in a case like this. There were six victims, Ms Leggate and her three children and Mr and Mrs Palfreyman. Mr and Mrs Palfreyman suffered a very large loss both in financial and emotional terms. Although the house was rented out, it had been their first home. Ms Leggate's victim impact statement conveyed her despair and heartbreak at the loss of all of her possessions, and all her children's possessions. Many were irreplaceable, including photographs and keepsakes. Her mental health was impacted and she required counselling. The children's sleep and behaviour was affected, especially when the respondent's responsibility for the fires became known to them.
3. A sentence of imprisonment for 15 months, with three months suspended, and eligibility for parole after only six months, fell erroneously short of reflecting the gravity of these crimes.

1. In considering the residual discretion, that is, a discretion to decline to interfere with the sentence even though the sentence is erroneously lenient[26], the purpose of Crown appeals is to be borne in mind. The primary purpose is to lay down principles for the governance and guidance of sentencing courts[27]. Crown appeals also serve to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice by the intervention of this Court in the case of a manifestly inadequate sentence[28]. As McHugh J said in Everett v The Queen[29]:

"Uniformity of sentencing is a matter of great importance in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice in any jurisdiction. Sentences that are higher than usual create justifiable grievances in those who receive them. But inadequate sentences also give rise to a sense of injustice, not only in those who are the victims of the crimes in question but also in the general public. Inadequate sentences are also likely to undermine public confidence in the ability of the courts to play their part in deterring the commission of crimes. To permit the Crown, as well as convicted persons, to appeal against sentences assists in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice."

1. The principles governing Crown appeals and the residual discretion were also recently and comprehensively summarised by Bell CJ in the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales in R v White[30]. In this case, to decline to intervene would perpetuate a manifest injustice[31]. With respect to the sentencing judge, the sentence is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime as to disturb the public conscience. It is a proper occasion to remind sentencing courts and the community of the seriousness with which crimes involving family violence are to be regarded.
2. There was no delay on the part of the Crown in lodging the appeal. It was prosecuted and brought to hearing as soon as reasonably practicable. A custodial sentence was imposed at first instance, although for an inadequate term. The respondent would have become eligible to apply for parole only a few days after the appeal was heard. That imminent eligibility was a factor which inclined towards exercise of the residual discretion[32]. However, the appeal was determined before the applicant actually became eligible to apply for parole. It may be that he may have successfully applied, but in this case that factor is outweighed by the need to uphold proper sentencing standards and correct an injustice.
3. For those reasons, we declined to exercise the residual discretion, allowed the appeal and set aside the sentence. We will re-sentence the respondent.

1. The matters which led to the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly inadequate also guide the determination of the proper sentence. The Court is of the opinion that, when all factors relevant to sentence are taken into account, a more severe sentence is warranted in law and should have been passed.[33] There is a strong need to impose a sentence which reflects the need to punish the respondent, denounce his conduct and deter him and others from future offending of this nature. He is to be sentenced for two crimes, both involving separate culpability.
2. This Court may take into account any matter relevant to the sentence that had occurred between when the sentence was imposed and when the appeal was heard.[34] While in custody the respondent was given responsibility as a wardsman. His period in custody so far had been difficult because of frequent lockdowns. We take those factors into account.
3. The respondent is convicted on both counts. We would impose one sentence, a term of imprisonment of four years from 8 September 2025. He is not eligible to apply for parole until he has served half of that term.

[1] Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013] TASCCA 5 per Estcourt J at [41]; Dunning v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 21.

[2] Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6, 209 CLR 339 per Kirby J at [65].

[3] Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140, 37 VR 594.

[4] [2010] TASCCA 6, 20 Tas R 277.

[7] R v Ross [2007] VSCA 213, 17 VR 80, per Vincent JA, with whom Chernov JA and Whelan AJA agreed, at [19]. See also Director of Public Prosecutions v Energy Brix Australia Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 116; (2006) 14 VR 345, [2] per Buchanan JA.

[8] [2022] TASCCA 7, citing Malvaso v The Queen [1989] HCA 58; 168 CLR 227 at 239, York v The Queen [2005] HCA 60, 225 CLR 466 at [3] and [21]-[23].

[9] Director of Public Prosecutions v Dunne [2021] TASCCA 5 at [19].

[10] [2016] TASCCA 9, 26 Tas R 32.

[11] [2017] TASCCA 4, 27 Tas R 128.

[12] [2020] TASCCA 8, 32 Tas R 156.

[13] [2015] TASCCA 1, 28 Tas R 1.

[14] Brown v The Queen [1985] TASSC 16 per Underwood J at [60].

[15] Biruta v Western Australia [2019] WASCA 52 at [35].

[16] Brown, Unreported 16/1985, Biruta at [35].

[17] [2006] TASSC 95.

[18] [2013] TASCCA 7.

[20] R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, 259 CLR 256 at [22].

[21] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 per Allsop P at [303]-[304].

[22] [1989] TASSC 44, [1989] Tas R 167 at 185.

[23] See Parker v The Queen [1994] TASSC 94 per Underwood J at 11.

[24] [2025] TASCCA 6 at [11], citing Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600. See also Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14 at [30] and [37].

[26] Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49, 244 CLR 462 at [1].

[27] Green at [1], Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49, 181 CLR 295 at 300; Lacey v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2011] HCA 10, 242 CLR 573 at [16].

[28] Harington, above, at [96], citing Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49, 181 CLR 295 at 306 and R v Stoupe [2015] NSWCCA 175 at [115]- [116].

[30] [2025] NSWCCA 111 at [33]- [44].

[31] Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; 249 CLR 600 at [76].