Brown v R [1985] TASSC 16

(1) that he is of good behaviour for a period of 2 years from the date of his release from prison;

(2) during that period he submits to the supervision of a probation officer and obeys all the reasonable directions of that officer including directions as to obtaining psychiatric counselling and treatment desired to reduce alcohol consumption.

1 Application for leave to appeal against a sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed on 5th October 1984 the order, in effect, being that the sentence was to be deemed to have commenced on 5th September 1984. That sentence was imposed in respect of an indictment containing six counts of unlawfully setting fire to property contrary to s269 of the Criminal Code. The sole ground in the application is that the sentence was manifestly excessive having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

2 The most serious fire was that the subject of count one, a fire which occurred on the property of G & M Geard at York Plains on or about 5th February 1983. The applicant worked on that property as a farm hand for a considerable number of years.

3 On the day in question the applicant went to Mr Geoffrey Geard's house in the late afternoon and told him that there was a fire on the property. The applicant and Mr Geard went to the fire. Mr Geard said the fire was about three kilometres from his home and, when he first saw it, it was about the size of the court room. Later it grew considerably and was burning in approximately two acres of gorse land when Mr Geard returned to the fire after collecting some fire fighting equipment. A number of people went to the site of the fire after seeing the smoke. On that evening it was decided that little could be done effectively about the fire and they should reassemble at the site on the following morning.

4 The following day 70 or 80 people attended the fire, their purpose being to make it safe. That was a Sunday the fire having been lit on the Saturday. On the Monday a smaller number of people patrolled with a view to preventing the spread of it.

5 The Tuesday brought unfavourable weather conditions, a hot northerly wind, and the fire spread. It was contained on that day after much effort but it had to be patrolled for several days after that. Mr Geoffrey Geard estimated that, by the time the fire died out, it had burnt over, roughly, 1,000 acres of grassland, bushland and forest. About a kilometre of fencing was destroyed on the Geard property, the cost of repair of which was about $1,000. Mr Maurice Geard's estimate of land burnt out was 800 hectares.

6 Mr Maurice Geard explained that the Tuesday was a day of total fire ban and "spotting" occurred from the centre of that fire. It was estimated that, at the height of the fire on Tuesday, the front of it was of the order of two kilometres wide. He estimated that on that Tuesday about 100 people were engaged with the fire. At one time on that day a group of men were withdrawn because of the dangerous nature of the fire in the extremely unfavourable prevailing weather conditions. The pull back was from bush land to barren paddocks where it was safe owing to the absence of fuel for the fire.

7 Another farmer, Mr Young, gave evidence about that fire. His property adjoined one of the Geard properties. As a result of this fire he suffered a loss of fencing which cost $1,800 to restore and a loss of timber of the order of $11,000.

8 Count 2 relates to a fire on 25th January 1984, also on the Geard properties at York Plains. This fire burnt out about four acres of light bush. It was extinguished in two hours. But it was patrolled once per day for the next 3-4 days.

9 The third count relates to another fire at York Plains, the date being 16th February 1984. On that day two fires were lit, one on a property belonging to the Geard brothers and known as "Lindhurst" and the other on a property called "Leamington" also belonging to the Geard brothers. The second of those fires is the subject of count 4. Mr Geoffrey Geard got to the fire the subject of count 3 soon after it was lit and it was put out within the hour. But as a precaution against fresh outbreak it was patrolled for several days. It burnt out about three acres of pasture where there were some trees also.

10 The fire the subject of the fourth count was located about a quarter of a mile from the fire the subject of the third count. That fire was burning in heavier bush. It was attended from 9.00pm until 2.00am. And people returned to it in the daylight hours of that day and kept it under control. It required some degree of patrolling for a week. It burnt out about ten acres of light bush.

11 The fifth and sixth counts relate to fires on 24th February 1984 at Andover and Nala respectively. The first of those fires burnt about an acre of grassland. The second fire was located about five miles from the first. It burnt about a quarter of an acre only.

12 The applicant's record of prior convictions disclosed a number of motoring offences arising out of the excessive use of alcohol. It also disclosed some other minor motoring offences and two apparently minor offences of stealing. It did not disclose any comparable offence.

13 There is the following passage in a statement the applicant made to the police on 27th February 1984:-

"I still don't know why I lit the fires. All I know is it only happens when I'm drunk. I've had a bit to do with the fire unit and I know what bush fires can do. But I never meant to hurt anyone. I'm glad no-one got hurt like. I'm sorry now that I've done done (sic) it. I'll never do it again because I'm not going to drink anymore. I knew all them days I lit the fires was permit days. But I just couldn't help it. I know you're not allowed to light fires on them days like I should have known better because that makes it worse. But you don't think of those things when you're drunk. I knew someone might have got hurt or even killed out of and I kept thinking that all the time. I'm just glad no one did get hurt. I've been worried about the fires ever since I lit the first one and I never thought about nothing like that until Mum died. Now I'm drunk nearly every night. I really need some treatment badly. I think that's about all I can say."

14 His Honour drew attention to the applicant's long record as a farm labourer with the Geard brothers on whose properties the first four fires were lit. He noted that the applicant had got on well with those gentlemen and had been treated well by them and yet most of these fires were lit on their properties and he was involved in the fighting of those fires.

15 His Honour referred to the reports which had been submitted to him and then said:-

"... It appears clear that, although you are of low intelligence, you are not mentally handicapped in any technical sense. But you do have a serious alcohol problem. You are quite a skilled farm labourer, though, you have done a large range of farming jobs and were well appreciated by your employers before these events. I have no doubt that you were fully aware of what you were doing and the seriousness of it.

It appears that there is no better explanation for your actions than that you have had family troubles with your now deceased father and the ill-health of your deceased mother and that in lighting these fires you were under the influence of alcohol and were trying in an irrational way to attract attention to yourself or perhaps to hit back at a world which you believed was treating you badly.

I must, however, have regard to the extreme danger caused by these kinds of actions and the great cost and damage to neighbours and the local community occasioned by them and must, as I see it, pass a substantial sentence of imprisonment to deter you and anyone else who might be tempted to do this sort of thing.

You are sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment to take effect from the 5th September 1984."

16 I have placed the above extract from the applicant's statement to the police side by side with the learned and experienced judge's principal comments on passing sentence in order to emphasise that I do appreciate that he took a serious view of the facts of this case and drew a very serious inference from those facts.

17 The serious inference which he drew was that there was a need for a sentence which was adequate to deter this offender from offending again and, secondarily, to deter others minded to behave in a similar way. I infer that his Honour was much influenced by the circumstance that the applicant was a farm worker who knew the seriousness of the first fire which he lit. Indeed, in his capacity as an employee of the Geard brothers, he fought that fire. He had this to say to the police about that experience:-

"I didn't light no other fires last year. It took 2 or 3 days to get the first one out and I worked on it all the time. I only got 2 or 3 hours sleep a night. I kept thinking to me self 'Why did I do it?'"

18 Notwithstanding that experience, his knowledge based on his experience as a rural worker of approximately 15 years' standing, and his experience with the country fire brigade, he was later to light no less than five other fires in the summer time. Not only that, he was to fail to give a rational explanation for his behaviour on any one of the six occasions. And he had said, I repeat: "I knew all them days I lit the fires was permit days. But I just couldn't help it. I know you're not allowed to light fires on them days. Like I should have known better because that makes it worse. But you don't think of those things when you're drunk."

19 It is plain that his Honour was troubled about the risk of a seventh time when he "just couldn't help it". I infer that his Honour felt that a long sentence would help him avoid the temptation he had failed to avoid six times. I infer also that his Honour was not impressed by the applicant's assertion in his police statement "I'll never do it again because I'm not going to drink anymore". That his Honour was not impressed by that is a circumstance which falls far short of the remarkable.

20 Up to this point I have sought to show that I do understand what his Honour did and why he did it. With great respect, I seek to show that I do understand what moved this very learned and deeply experienced judge. His Honour sentenced the prisoner, as I have said, on 5th October 1984. I infer that, on that day, his Honour was troubled by a thought which he very clearly expressed when he adjourned the proceedings on 6th September 1984. His view had not changed one iota. Indeed, given the paucity of additional material, there was no reason why it should have changed. On the earlier day he said:-

" Yes, one reason I ask for a further report is that, to me, as a layman, there is a lack of adequate explanation of the fact that the accused, with all his emotional and mental stresses and the like, should have not only lit one fire but lit a number of fires. That suggests to a layman like me that there is some propensity for lighting fires. I would like to hear what another psychiatrist says about that general question." (The emphasis is mine).

21 Hence the sentence of four years. Was it manifestly excessive? First of all, what does that question mean in a case like this one? As to that I adhere to what Neasey J and I both accepted in The Queen v Timbs, No 11/1974 (it does not matter that that was a Crown appeal) a proposition which I then expressed as follows:-

"The sole question in this case is this: is the sentence inadequate (here, of course, excessive) to such an extent as to satisfy the court that in some way the exercise of the discretion has been unsound?"

22 In applying that principle it is critical to keep in mind what this Court said in Papazoglou v The Queen, No 9/1963 ([1963] Tas SR 182). In that case, clearly, it adopted the following statement by Napier J, as he then was, in Wade v Trotter [1934] SASR 62 at p.64:-

"... I think that one of the functions of a Court of criminal appeal is to standardise - so far as that is possible - the penalties imposed in Courts of first instance ... There is no doubt that it is impossible to lay down a 'tariff', but it is manifest that the penalty for a particular infraction of the law ought not to vary - to any considerable extent - upon the mere accident of the complaint being heard in a particular Court or before a particular magistrate ........... when there has been a manifest departure from what I shall call the 'customary penalties in other Courts', then I think that it becomes the duty of this Court to examine the case, and to pass upon the propriety of the particular penalty, and for that purpose upon the propriety of the standard suggested by the customary penalties."

23 With great respect, following those legal principles, I am satisfied that this sentence should be set aside. It is manifestly excessive. With respect, I do not find anything wrong or improper about the standard suggested by the customary penalties imposed by this Court. That standard reserves a sentence of four years for very bad cases where the case put in mitigation was not strong so that such a grave penalty was clearly deserved. Here the case in mitigation was strong and, with respect, his Honour gave it wholly inadequate weight. Here, his Honour sentenced the prisoner on the basis that he was dealing with a bad and dangerous man who posed a great threat to the community and had done great harm to the community. But such a case was not established clearly; and such a grave result should not be attended with doubt. The truth was that the case was consistent with the prisoner being a shy, introverted and, hence, socially inadequate man; so weak, and yet so soft, he could not face his dying mother in a hospital ward so he ran out of the ward; so weak, and yet so soft, he still cries for her and cannot go to her grave; so weak, and yet so soft, he could not go to his father's funeral so he stayed away; so weak, and yet so soft that, notwithstanding that he had spent a lifetime of mother dependence, when the mother died, he tried to be a servant and provider to the father but he could not cope; so weak, and yet so soft, that he went berserk when his wife falsely alleged that she was suffering the fate of his beloved mother, cancer; so weak, and yet so soft, he ended up a bad alcoholic.

24 He came for sentence at 33 years of age. "By their fruits ye shall know them." What, then, was his record? That of a petty offender with a query as to alcoholism otherwise proved to be in fact the case.

25 But there was more than that to the case put by his experienced counsel, Mr Avery, in his strong plea in mitigation presented to the learned judge. The expert material could not be ignored; it was in any event, abundantly confirmed by other material and it showed that the man did have a low stress threshold, a low capacity to cope with responsibility. He was the child of people respected in the district and he himself had built up an impressive work record, particularly so when one considers his very low level of natural endowments. He had led an excessively sheltered[1] life having lived with mother and father most of his life in a rural setting. As is often the case in that social situation, mother was the dedicated domestic force. That force was prematurely and tragically removed 21 months before the first fire. But father remained until after these fires when he, too, died tragically. Father was an elderly dependent man in his seventies. The son tried to help him but he really was not up to it; he was an emotional boy on a strong woman's errand. My summation of the case is that his hopeless social position fed his alcoholism which "blew up" in desperate gravely anti social "lashing out" (compare the probation report and his Honour's finding).

26 A very significant aspect of the case is that, in the case of at least three of the fires, he reported them soon after he lit them. With respect, it misses the point entirely to brush that fact aside with the observation that that is a not infrequent feature of fire crimes. Indeed it is but that is because psychiatric disorder is a not infrequent feature of fire crimes. This man was specifically sentenced on the basis that there was no significant psychiatric disorder. The other side of that coin was that the reporting of the fires was a significant mitigating factor. It should also be noted that the evidence failed to disclose any significant degree of premeditation in any of the six cases.

27 Another aspect of the matter which influences my mind, and that despite the fact that it was not relied on by Mr Avery in his very able argument, is that I simply do not accept that a fire in the country is necessarily serious because it is lit in the summer on a fire permit day. Usually it will be serious, sometimes very serious. But sometimes it will not be serious because it was lit in a place where there was insufficient fuel to sustain it for long and the weather conditions were not conducive to the spread of it. On that basis, the first fire was a very serious fire but a number of the others were not proved to be serious fires.

28 The applicant was held in remand awaiting trial on these charges from 27th February 1984 to 6th July 1984, a period in excess of four months.

29 I have now endeavoured to present both sides of the matter. What is to be done? Experience teaches that once these things get off the rails you are not going to get them back on the rails satisfactorily again. He should be taught a lesson. But he has already been punished quite a deal.

30 I draw attention to the recommendation in the independent psychiatric report, sought by the judge himself, to the effect that he needs some counselling and to the probation report, again sought by the judge himself, to the effect that he will need supervision.

31 For these reasons I would make the following orders:-

1 Leave to appeal granted.

2 Appeal allowed.

3 The sentence imposed is set aside. In lieu thereof he is sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months, that sentence to operate from today. But the execution of the last 6 months of that sentence is suspended on the following conditions:-

(1) that he is of good behaviour for a period of 2 years from the date of his release from prison;

(2) during that period he submits to the supervision of a probation officer and obeys all the reasonable directions of that officer including directions as to obtaining psychiatric counselling and treatment designed to reduce alcohol consumption.

32 The question before this Court is whether a sentence of four years' imprisonment for unlawfully setting fire to property was manifestly excessive.

33 The applicant was charged with six counts of unlawfully setting fire to property contrary to s269 of the Criminal Code between 5th February 1983 and 24th February 1984. The details were as follow:-

(1) He set fire to bush land, commercial forest and fences on 5th February 1983. The fire took some days to extinguish. Fences and timber to the value of about $12,000 were destroyed.

(2) He set fire to grassland on or about 25th January 1984. About four acres were burnt and the fire was extinguished in about two hours.

(3) He set fire to grass and bushland on or about 16th February 1984. About three acres were burnt and the fire was put out within an hour.

(4) Later on the same day, he set fire to grass and bushland and this took some hours to extinguish.

(5) On or about 24th February 1984, he set fire to bushland. This burnt out about one acre and was quickly extinguished.

(6) Later on the same day, he set fire to bushland. This burnt out an area of about a quarter of an acre.

34 It is clear that the most serious fire was that which was lit on 5th February 1983. It required considerable efforts on the part of a large number of volunteer fire-fighters to extinguish this. All the fires were lit at times of high fire danger.

35 There was no proper explanation as to why the applicant lit the fires. There was no question of revenge - he had no grudge against his employer. It seems that he was a person of some diminished responsibility, who was unable to cope with stress. The fires were lit when he was undergoing some personal stress and when he had over-indulged in alcohol. He had no prior relevant convictions.

36 It is clearly established that an appeal court will not intervene in relation to a sentence unless the discretion of the sentencing authority has miscarried.

37 A list was tendered to this Court showing the sentences imposed over the last few years in respect of convictions for arson and unlawfully setting fire to property in this jurisdiction. That list shows that in only three cases has a sentence exceeding 18 months' imprisonment been imposed for these crimes. A sentence of four years' imprisonment was imposed upon Paul Anthony Ray in 1983 in respect of setting fire to a dinghy, outboard motor, fuel tank and boat to the value of $4,000 and of attempting to set fire to the Cosgrove High School and of actually setting fire to it and causing very substantial damage. A sentence of three years' imprisonment was imposed on John Kevin Barnes in 1984 in respect of a charge of arson relating to a house and contents valued at $35,000. A sentence of two years' imprisonment was imposed on Suzanne Patricia Lockley in 1983 for setting fire to a dwelling house of a value of $70,000.

38 In my respectful view, it was quite inappropriate for the upper limit of four years' imprisonment to have been imposed upon the applicant. I consider that the learned trial judge erred in treating this case, as being at the most serious end of the scale of arson and unlawfully setting fire to property. Nor do I consider that the learned judge gave sufficient weight to the diminished responsibility and other circumstances in relation to the applicant.

39 Another matter which needs to be mentioned is that the learned judge gave no credit to the applicant for a period of about four months which he had spent in custody prior to 5th September 1984 when the sentence of four years' imprisonment commenced.

40 Having regard to the period of about 11 months which the applicant has already spent in custody in relation to the present crimes, I would regard a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment to date from today as being appropriate.

41 This will take into account his diminished responsibility and the need for general deterrence. I am also prepared to agree to the suspension of the last six months of such sentence. Hopefully, this will aid his rehabilitation.

42 I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and set aside the sentence of four years' imprisonment. In lieu thereof the applicant should be sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment to take effect as from today with the last six months suspended upon the conditions set forth by Nettlefold J.

43 This is an application for leave to appeal against a sentence of four years' imprisonment passed upon conviction of six counts of unlawfully setting fire to property.

44 On the 5th February 1983 the appellant, who lived at York Plains, set fire to some grass on his employer's farm. About half-an-hour after lighting the fire he reported it to his employer and it was quickly brought under apparent control. However, a few days later the hitherto calm weather changed, became windy and the fire which had not been completely extinguished began to burn out of control. It spread to two adjoining properties, destroyed in excess of one kilometre of fencing, about 1,000 acres of grass and bushland and approximately $11,000 worth of millable timber. About 70 to 100 people who fought the fire were exposed to some risk of injury before it was finally extinguished.

45 On the 25th January 1984 the appellant again set fire to grass on his employer's property. This time the fire was quickly put out and only approximately four acres of light bush were destroyed.

46 On the 16th February 1984 the appellant lit two separate fires on property owned by his employers at Leamington. The first fire burned about three acres of pasture and was put out within an hour. The second fire was lit about a quarter of a mile away from the first. This time the fire took about five hours to bring under control and burned about 10 acres of bushland.

47 Finally, on the 24th February 1984 the appellant again lit two fires. The first was on the side of the road at Andover but spread to an adjoining property and the second was on a property owned by a Mr Cornish. Both fires were quickly extinguished and caused minimal damage to pastures and bushland.

48 Material put before the learned trial judge showed that the appellant, aged 33 years, was, at the time of the offences, a single man. His intelligence was in the dull-normal range. There was no evidence of psychiatric illness. Practically all his life he worked as a farm labourer. He was well regarded by his employers for whom he had worked for the past 15 years. For some few years prior to the commission of the first crime he lived in a house on his employer's property. In May 1981 his mother died. Following her death the appellant looked after his ageing father.

"It seems to be fairly obvious that with the death of his mother he lost the most important factor in his life; and faced with the responsibility of caring for his 78 year old father, this became too much for his meagre resources and he simply drowned his difficulties and sorrows in excessive drinking."

50 At the time the first crime was committed the appellant was alcohol dependent, then consuming three flagons of sherry a week and "as much beer as he could handle". He had no prior convictions of any relevance to the present offences.

51 A short time prior to lighting the first fire in 1984 the appellant took into his home a former girl friend by whom he had had a child twelve years earlier. This woman was married but separated from her husband and together with her five children began to live with the appellant and his father. After they had been living together for a short while the appellant was told that this woman was suffering from cancer, the disease which caused his mother's death in 1981. It was said that the difficult living conditions and the belief that his de facto wife might die as his mother had done placed additional stress upon the appellant, stress he was ill-equipped to manage. Between the date of the last fire and the trial the appellant's father, aged 78, died. Following the arrest of the appellant he was dismissed from his employment. By the date of his trial he had married the woman with whom he had been living and was residing with her at Gagebrook.

52 On each occasion the appellant lit a fire he was substantially affected by alcohol but could offer no explanation for his actions and none could be ascertained by either the psychiatrists or probation and parole officer who supplied reports to assist the court. It was clear that revenge against his employers was not a motivating factor as he had enjoyed a good relationship with them nor did it appear that the appellant experienced any gratification, sexual or otherwise, from lighting fires.

53 An inability to cope with stress coupled with an excessive intake of alcohol obviously played a part but the actual motivation for the commission of the crimes remained unascertained.

54 In his remarks on passing sentence the learned trial judge said:-

"It appears that there is no better explanation for your actions than that you have had family troubles with your now deceased father, and the ill health of your deceased mother, and that in lighting these fires you were under the influence of alcohol, and were trying, in an irrational way, to attract attention to yourself, or perhaps to hit back at a world which you believed was treating you badly."

55 The sole ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive having regard to all the circumstances of the case. This ground calls upon the appellant to satisfy this court that, "the nature of the sentence itself, when considered in relation to the offence and the circumstances of the case, (was) such as to afford convincing evidence that in some way the exercise of the discretion has been unsound." See Harris v R [1954] HCA 51; (1954) 90 CLR, 652 at 655.

56 Counsel for both the appellant and the respondent put before this court material detailing sentences imposed in this State during previous years for the crimes of arson and unlawfully setting fire to property. It is legitimate to have regard to such material upon an application for leave to appeal against sentence. Such material tends to demonstrate the "tariff" or "levels of sentences" imposed for similar offences. With respect to this, D.A. Thomas in Principles of Sentencing, at p.33 has this to say:-

"Whatever terminology is used, the central idea is that within the scope of any legal definition a variety of typical factual situations will recur; with each of these typical factual situations there are associated upper and lower limits within which the sentence should normally fall, in the absence of exceptional circumstances in the offence and without regard to mitigating features peculiar to the offender himself. The difference between the upper and lower limits applicable to a particular typical situation constitutes the 'range', 'bracket', 'normal- level' or 'pattern of sentence' for that variation of the offence. A sentence above the upper limit will be described as 'excessive', 'out of scale', 'beyond the range', and is normally reduced."

57 The material submitted showed that the sentence imposed in this case was at the top end of the range of sentences for arson and unlawfully setting fire to property. It showed that in only one other case in this State has the court imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment. On the 20th April 1983 Paul Anthony Ray was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on two counts of arson, one count of unlawfully setting fire to property and two counts of attempted arson. Four of these counts related to the Cosgrove High School and the cost of making good the damage caused was in excess of $400,000.00. The other count involved damage to property having a value of $4,000.00. The accused had no prior convictions for criminal offences.

58 Although it is trite to observe that no two cases are the same it can be said that the facts which gave rise to the imposition of a sentence of six months' imprisonment upon Giles Terry Cruickshank on the 7th June 1983 on six counts of unlawfully setting bush fires, bear some similarities to the facts in the present case. In the case of Cruickshank there was no evidence of mental disturbance, the accused was of low intelligence, the fires were set in bushland and no explanation other than stress arising from an unhappy matrimonial relationship coupled with the consumption of alcohol was offered to explain the commission of the crimes. That sentence appears to have been within the range of sentences for crimes of this kind.

59 In a useful review of sentencing patterns for arson reported as a note to R v Shaw (1980) 4 Crim LJ, 170, reference is made to the factors which are of significance when imposing sentence in cases of arson. The commentator observes that apart from New South Wales "sentences exceeding five years for 'domestic arson' are unknown except when occupants of the damaged dwelling have been injured and the arson charge was accepted by the Crown in discharge of an indictment containing a much more serious offence."

60 Arson and unlawfully setting fire to property are serious crimes which are often difficult to detect, have the capacity to cause serious damage to property and in some cases expose innocent persons to serious risk of injury or even death. The commission of these crimes justifiably cause widespread alarm and fear in the community and for these reasons prima facie, call for the imposition of a penalty which will operate as a deterrent not only to the offender but to others who might be like-minded. See R v Dowell, 6 A Crim R, 113.

61 However, in my respectful opinion, by the imposition of a sentence of four years (to be served in addition to a period of four months in custody while awaiting trial), the learned trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors which existed in this case with the result that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appellant is a person of low intelligence who committed the crimes without apparent motive while affected by alcohol and under stress that he was unable to manage. Although in the case of the first fire extensive damage to property was caused it could be said that such damage was at least partly due to a change in the weather conditions which occurred some days after the crime had been committed and after the fire had apparently been brought under control. No buildings were damaged and although firefighters were exposed to risks while trying to extinguish the first fire no person suffered injury. All the other fires caused only minor damage although of course, like the first fire, had the potential to become widespread. There was no element of revenge or financial gain in the actions of the appellant and on each occasion he quickly raised the alarm and assisted in extinguishing those fires he had lit. In my opinion, all of these matters call for the imposition of a sentence short of the upper end of the range of sentences imposed for crimes of this kind. The report of the probation and parole officer says this of the appellant:-

"My enquiries show that the accused is a shy, introverted person whose socialisation has been very restricted because of this. His drinking habits, which started at a very young age, have been a concern for many years and have been the usual release for his personality, which changes dramatically to one of attention-seeking and sometimes abusive when under the influence of liquor. This is the only other point which has surfaced that could possibly partly give some reason for the accused committing these offences. In explanation, (sic) he was believed to have fought all the fires which he is charged with lighting; he was an excellent firefighter and was always praised as such. No one I have spoken with has considered his acts to be ones of revenge or with the intent to harm any one."

62 The same report refers to this appellant needing supervision. Including the period in custody before trial, the appellant has now spent eleven months in gaol. In my view the appropriate sentence is 12 months' imprisonment to date from today with the execution of the last six months suspended. I agree with the orders proposed by Nettlefold J.

tasInLaw edit: The paper copy has "shelted"[.]