1. I find Dr George Varnavides guilty of contempt of the Tribunal by practising dentistry at 405 Rathdowne Street, Carlton, on six patients on twenty separate dates over the period 29 October 2004 to 30 July 2005, as set out in the amended charge dated 14 February 2006, in wilful disobedience of the injunction granted by Justice Morris, President, on 12 August 2004 prohibiting Dr George Varnavides from practising dentistry until 16 January 2006 or until further order.

2. Pursuant to section 137(5) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 ("the VCAT Act"), I commit Dr George Varnavides to prison for a term of three months.

3. Pursuant to section 137(8) of the VCAT Act, I issue a warrant for the committal of Dr George Varnavides to prison, in the form prescribed in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 1998.

4. Pursuant to section 138 of the VCAT Act, the operation of paragraphs 1-3 of this order is stayed for 14 days.

5. After the elapse of 14 days referred to in paragraph 4 of this order, if the principal registrar has received no notice of application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the principal registrar of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is to serve the warrant for committal on Victoria Police for execution.

6. I order Dr George Varnavides to pay the applicant's costs of this proceeding on Scale D of the County Court Scale on a party/party basis, such costs to be assessed by the principal registrar in default of agreement.

Mr I Alger of counsel, instructed by P.W. Sotir & Co.

1 On 18 November 2005, Dr Varnavides pleaded guilty to contempt of this Tribunal by practising dentistry at 405 Rathdowne Street, Carlton, on six patients on twenty separate dates over the period 29 October 2004 to 30 July 2005, in wilful disobedience of the injunction granted by Justice Morris, President, on 12 August 2004[1]. The injunction prohibited Dr Varnavides from practising dentistry, as defined in the Dental Practice Act 1999, until 16 January 2006 or until further order.

2 Section 137(5)(a) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 ("the VCAT Act") provides that the Tribunal may, if it finds a person guilty of contempt of the Tribunal, commit the person to prison for a term of not more than 5 years, or impose a fine of not more than $100,000, or do both. Where such commitment has been ordered, the Tribunal may discharge the individual before the end of the term. It may also accept an apology for a contempt and may remit any punishment for it either wholly or in part.

3 In Varnavides v Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal & Anor [2005] VSCA 231, the Court of Appeal analysed the Tribunal's contempt powers and its conclusions may be briefly summarised as follows:

• Although the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply to punishment of contempt in the same way as it applies to sentencing for other criminal offences, contempt of court is a serious offence which should be approached as far as possible in the same way as criminal conduct generally[2].

• Therefore, when determining the appropriate punishment, it is appropriate to consider the need to provide specific and general deterrence[3];

• The Tribunal's powers to punish for contempt are strictly limited to those set out in section 137 of the VCAT Act;

• The provisions in sections 137 and 138 of the VCAT Act do not envisage the imposition of a suspended sentence, nor can any equivalent power (nor any power to impose a self-executing order for imprisonment) be derived from section 130 of that Act;

• The only sentence of imprisonment contemplated and available under section 137 of the VCAT Act is one involving immediate incarceration; however, the Tribunal can remit some or all of the penalty imposed where there has been purging of the contempt through apology or other conduct directed to rectifying the situation;

• The power to imprison for contempt is an extreme power which must be exercised as infrequently as possible, always with restraint and not for extraneous purposes;

• Where a person who has already been found guilty of contempt persists in conduct breaching the injunction prohibiting him from engaging in dental practice, the imposition of a period of imprisonment would be appropriate.

4 On the authorities, the considerations relevant to determination of the appropriate penalty in this proceeding include:

• the seriousness of the contempt, the culpability of the contemnor and whether he has demonstrated contrition[4];

• the absence of previous convictions[5]; but in the absence of statutory directions to the contrary[6], a prior criminal record should not operate to increase the sentence beyond limits set by an appropriate response to the current offence[7];

• mitigating factors, including a plea of guilty[8] and remorse[9], although the weight to be given to remorse (including an apology) may depend on the time at which it is manifested, as well as whether it came from direct evidence from the offender[10];

• other factors which alone cannot be relied upon to escape punishment but may attract some leniency, including the advancing age of an offender[11], a personal crisis occurring after the commission of offences[12]; and hardship occasioned by the fact that imprisonment of a parent will effectively deprive the children of parental care[13].

5 The details of the dental treatment carried out by Dr Varnavides in contempt of the injunction granted by Morris J are set out in the affidavit material of the six patients. Dr Varnavides accepted the accuracy of the contents of each of those affidavits, apart from three lines of paragraph 11 and parts of paragraph 20 of the affidavit of Paula Winter, which were not relied upon by the Board.

6 The following important points emerge from the factual evidence:

• Dr Varnavides treated six patients on twenty occasions over an extended period from October 2004 to July 2005;

• All the patients were genuine patients[14];

• The dental treatment provided was routine dental treatment and not the provision of emergency treatment or pain relief;

• The dental treatment provided was substantial, and fees totalling more than $10,000 were paid for that treatment by the patients;

• On a number of occasions the door to the surgery was locked and no dental nurse was in attendance;

• In relation to the treatment provided to four of the patients, Dr Varnavides falsely issued invoices or documentation showing that another dentist, Dr Amyra, had performed the dental work.

7 It is clear from the factual evidence that the above conduct constituted a sustained, deliberate and dishonest pattern of conduct, spanning nine months of the period during which Dr Varnavides was suspended from practice. The most striking, additional feature of the conduct, however, lies in the fact that it occurred during the period when Dr Varnavides was being dealt with by the Tribunal for other, earlier acts of contempt of the Tribunal.

8 This proceeding is the fourth contempt proceeding initiated by the Dental Practice Board ("the Board") arising from Dr Varnavides' conduct in practising dentistry in breach of an order of the Tribunal made on 16 December 2003 suspending Dr Varnavides' registration as a dentist for the period from 16 January 2004 until 16 January 2006.

9 The first contempt proceeding (V2 of 2004) was initiated by the Board on the basis that Dr Varnavides had acted in deliberate breach of the order made on 16 December 2003. In a directions hearing in that proceeding, the President, Morris J, granted an injunction prohibiting Dr Varnavides from practising dentistry, as defined in the Act, until 16 January 2006 or further order, and adjourned the proceeding sine die to enable the Board to consider the course it proposed to follow, as well as to give Dr Varnavides the opportunity to demonstrate compliance with the injunction[15].

10 The second contempt proceeding (V6 of 2004) was commenced by the Board on the basis that Dr Varnavides had, on 24 August 2004, wilfully disobeyed the injunction, by treating Ms Anne Marie, a private investigator engaged by the Board who feigned a dental condition and attended at his surgery claiming to be in pain. Dr Varnavides pleaded not guilty in that proceeding but on 22 September 2004 Morris J found the charge of contempt proved and imposed a fine of $10,000. Morris J also sentenced Dr Varnavides to imprisonment for six months, the service of the whole of which was suspended until 16 January 2006.

11 The third contempt proceeding (V10 of 2004) was initiated by the Board in respect of two further charges of contempt committed on 2 September 2004 and 4 January 2005, when Dr Varnavides treated a patient, Mr Eric Morse. On 16 March 2005, Dr Varnavides pleaded guilty to these charges[16] and on 27 April 2005, Morris J committed him for a term of imprisonment for six months. As Morris J contemplated that the suspended sentence, earlier imposed, would become operative, this order created a total sentence of imprisonment for twelve months[17].

12 Thus, during the very period when he was being dealt with by the Tribunal for earlier incidents of contempt, and within days of appearing in the Court of Appeal to appeal against the punishment imposed in respect of those earlier incidents, Dr Varnavides provided routine dental treatment on 20 occasions to six patients. For example, he treated Carmel McCormack in late October 2004, some 4 weeks after being found guilty of contempt by Morris J in the second contempt proceeding. Within weeks of being found guilty of contempt in the third contempt proceeding, he gave root canal treatment to Carmel McCormack, Penelope Gibbs and treated Paula Winter. Finally, within four days of appearing before the Court of Appeal in July 2005, where his counsel made submissions in support of a lesser punishment than the period of imprisonment imposed by Morris J, he treated Carmel McCormack again.

13 At paragraph 7 of his statutory declaration, Dr Varnavides said he had no excuse for his conduct in disobeying the injunction, but offered a number of factors by way of explanation, including:

• He believed the Board had treated him unfairly over the years, and although he knew the injunction was issued by the Tribunal, he treated it less seriously than he should have because he "felt it was really something being done by the Board"[18];

• He only realised the seriousness of his predicament, and the need to comply with the injunction, when he appeared before the Court of Appeal (in July 2005); since that time he has complied with the injunction and the undertakings given by him to the Court of Appeal[19];

• He wanted his practice to continue operating so he would have "something to return to" after the period of suspension of his registration ended, but his attempt to engage a locum failed. The number of patients attended to by him in breach of the injunction was a "far lesser number than would have been the case during normal operation of the practice[20];

• He was under financial pressure with a wife and young family to support and did not believe that, at the age of 68, there was any realistic alternative employment available[21].

14 The report of counselling psychologist, Draga Jevtic, dated 22 December 2005, relates to grief counselling provided to Dr Varnavides in November and December 2005, after the sudden death of his wife in September 2005, and does not address the conduct the subject of this proceeding. It does, however, address the issue of his personal circumstances since that time, and this aspect of the report is dealt with below.

15 Dr Richard Ball, Psychiatrist, consulted Dr Varnavides on three occasions in March and April 2005, at the request of the Board, and provided two reports to the Board dated 14 April and 21 December 2005. In the first report, Dr Ball noted that Dr Varnavides was being treated by a psychiatrist, Dr Kochar, "in relation to the current litigation", but that he had not been provided with any report from Dr Kochar. Dr Ball concluded that Dr Varnavides had suffered no major psychiatric illness which contributed to his conduct, but had suffered an "adjustment disorder secondary to the problems which occurred resulting from his alleged behaviours, both with regard to the Dental Board and to his domestic situation, etc".

16 In his second report, Dr Ball noted that at his consultation with Dr Varnavides on 8 December 2005 that Dr Varnavides had suffered "a range of other disasters" including the sudden death of his wife, leaving him to look after young children, as well as severe financial constraints. Dr Ball observed that Dr Varnavides had "lost his old arrogance and aggressive stance", was "very aware of how his own behaviour has brought about his professional problems"; and no longer held "his old conspiracy and jealousy theory". He noted that Dr Varnavides had "closed his practice and sold equipment therein", and that he planned "not to practise dentistry again, but to move to W.A. to have family support for the children and to be involved in a family business". Dr Ball concluded that Dr Varnavides may need some ongoing professional psychological or psychiatric help.

17 Mr Alger indicated that Dr Varnavides and his wife had been through periods of separation until two months before her death, and the children had lived with her while Dr Varnavides lived above his surgery. However, the undertakings he gave to the Court of Appeal meant he could no longer return to his residence above the surgery, and he therefore moved back to live under the same roof as his wife and children, without totally reconciling with his wife. According to Mr Alger, Dr Varnavides suffers from high blood pressure, for which he takes medication.

18 According to the report of his grief counsellor, Draga Jevtic, Dr Varnavides "has tried to let extended family and friends know how they can be helpful to both him and his children" in dealing with their grief. Ms Jevtic concluded that imprisonment of Dr Varnavides would significantly delay the family's healing process. According to the letter of Rev.Fr. Krikelis, who has counselled the family since the death of Mrs Varnavides, and who has been a prison chaplain for a number of years, any period of imprisonment would have "disastrous consequences" for Dr Varnavides and his three children "who are totally dependent on him".

19 According to Dr Varnavides' statutory declaration, in spite of there being difficult times between them, he and his wife were not separated, and decided to "remain together to try to avoid harming the childrens' upbringing". Since his wife's death, Dr Varnavides has remained in the home to care for his three children, aged 15, 12 and 9. His children get nervous when he leaves them at home, even for short periods. He is 70 years old, and, since his wife's death, wishes to focus on caring for his children. He has been living on social security payments since the end of July 2005, and has still found it difficult to meet his financial commitments. He does not wish to practise dentistry anymore. He has not yet sold his dental equipment because he believes he could get more for it if it was sold in conjunction with his dental practice. Accordingly, he has engaged the services of an agency, Dental Job Search, to sell the practice on his behalf. Once the practice is sold, he says he expects to pay at least some of the outstanding fines and legal costs he has incurred, as well as reimbursing patients he attended in contravention of the injunction granted by Morris J. In final submissions, Mr Alger said Dr Varnavides intended to move to Western Australia with the children once he had sold his dental practice, as he and his late wife have family there.

20 In the final paragraph of his statutory declaration, Dr Varnavides apologised in the following terms:

Finally, I unreservedly apologise for disobeying the injunction issued by Justice Morris. I realise that I have been very foolish and that there is no one else but myself to blame.

21 It was submitted on behalf of the Board that this case of contempt was as serious as one could imagine, as Dr Varnavides had:

• Practised routine dentistry, but at an appalling standard, in defiance of the Tribunal's injunction that he not practise dentistry at all until 16 January 2006, and did so, for substantial profit, repeatedly, secretly, fraudulently (rendering invoices in the name of Dr Amyra), from late October 2004 up until and including 30 July 2005, only days after appearing before the Court of Appeal and claiming through his counsel that he was no longer practising dentistry;

• For the third time in one year been found guilty of contempt;

• Given previous undertakings not to practise dentistry which had been demonstrated to be of little worth;

• Not paid any of the fines imposed by the Court of Appeal, nor the costs ordered against him by the Tribunal;

• Not sold his dental equipment in accordance with the undertakings given to the Tribunal in this proceeding in November 2005;

22 On the question of penalty, it was submitted that after two previous findings of guilt of contempt of the orders of the Tribunal within a year, the appropriate punishment is that of imprisonment for a term, as such a punishment is "necessary to ensure the status and integrity of the judicial and administrative structures upon which our society depends[22]".

23 It was submitted that none of the matters relied on by way of explanation could be of any assistance to Dr Varnavides. It was submitted that there was a complete dearth of expert evidence from his treating doctor and/or psychiatrist to explain his conduct at the time of the offences and/or his physical and psychological condition now. There was also, unusually in such cases, no character evidence in his support, and no independent evidence from family or friends about his personal circumstances, nor about arrangements which could be made for the care of his children if he went to jail. It was submitted that Dr Varnavides had provided no documentary evidence concerning his financial circumstances, but had recently advertised his practice for sale with a gross income in the 2004/2005 financial year, the entire course of which he was suspended from practice as a dentist, of $350,000, and that this advertisement was inconsistent with his claim that he is severely financially constrained.

24 It was conceded on behalf of Dr Varnavides that the material in the statutory declaration explaining his subjective belief about the way he was being treated by the Board, and detailing other "factors by way of explanation" for his conduct, was of no assistance in explaining or excusing his conduct. It was also conceded that, were it not for his changed personal circumstances, submissions on his behalf would have been confined to the term of any proposed commitment to imprisonment. However, in the light of the death of Mrs Varnavides, the evidence that Dr Varnavides had not practised dentistry since her death, and the fact that he was now the sole carer for his three children, it was submitted that the community would not expect or require Dr Varnavides to go to jail for his conduct, but rather would expect the imposition of a heavy fine. It was submitted that even if the physical needs of the children could be met in the event that Dr Varnavides went to jail, the emotional impact on them of separation from Dr Varnavides was of relevance. It was submitted that Dr Varnavides' failure to date to pay outstanding fines imposed in relation to earlier convictions for contempt, his inability to pay those fines as well as any fines imposed by the Tribunal, and his failure to sell his dental equipment were irrelevant to the determination of the appropriate penalty in this proceeding.

25 In setting aside the sentences of imprisonment imposed by Morris J in the second and third contempt proceedings, the Court of Appeal noted that, were it not for the particular circumstances of the case before it, the Court "would have regarded the imposition of a period of imprisonment as appropriate in the case of the applicant who, having already been found guilty of contempt, then persisted in conduct breaching the injunction prohibiting him from engaging in dental practice[23]".

26 The Dental Practice Act 1999 was enacted to regulate the profession, ensure appropriate standards of practice, and thereby protect the public. It is essential to the effective administration of justice to demonstrate that the orders of the Tribunal will be enforced[24]. The decision of the Board to suspend Dr Varnavides from practice for two years was affirmed by this Tribunal on review. For the protection of the public, and for the confidence of the public in the judicial and administrative framework regulating the dental profession, it was necessary that Dr Varnavides not practice during his period of suspension. He continued to do so while being prosecuted for earlier acts of contempt, and even after being convicted a second time of contempt for breaching the order of Morris J that he not practise dentistry.

27 Dr Varnavides provided routine, elective dental treatment to a number of patients for which he charged them more than $10,000. He did so repeatedly, secretly, occasionally behind closed doors, and on occasions rendered invoices suggesting the treatment had been provided by another dentist, Dr Amyra. Leaving aside the quality of the treatment provided, this conduct in contempt of the Tribunal's order is more serious not only because of his earlier conduct, but also because it commenced after a first conviction for contempt of the same kind, and continued after a second conviction for contempt of the same kind, and involved a greater number of acts, with a larger number of patients, over a substantial period of time (eight months).

28 Dr Varnavides' conduct strikes at the heart of the capacity of the legislative and administrative framework enacted by Parliament to regulate the dental profession and protect the public, and, in doing so, interferes with the orderly administration of justice. The contempt committed by him is therefore to be regarded as extremely serious. Having regard to the seriousness of Dr Varnavides' conduct, and to the fact that he has two prior convictions of the same kind, in respect of which he has already been fined, I consider it appropriate in the circumstances of this case to commit Dr Varnavides to prison.

29 In considering the term of the commitment to prison, it is necessary to give appropriate weight to any mitigating factors. In this regard, I turn first Dr Varnavides' explanation for his conduct as set out in his statutory declaration. I find that the matters raised by him therein do not assist him and in no way mitigate the seriousness of the acts of contempt to which he has pleaded guilty. I note that Dr Varnavides did not claim to suffer any physical or mental disturbance at the time the relevant conduct occurred, nor was any expert evidence produced by him in this regard from any treating doctors.

30 I have taken into account that by his plea of guilty on 18 November 2005 to all of the counts in the amended charge, Dr Varnavides has demonstrated his acknowledgement of the contempt committed by him. I have also taken into account his apology to the Tribunal in his statutory declaration made on 14 February 2006[25].

31 I have also taken into account that Dr Varnavides is 70 years old, and that as result of the sudden death of his wife in September 2005, he has suffered a dramatic change in his personal circumstances, in that he has become the sole parent of three school-aged children. He has no prior convictions other than those for contempt which have been referred to.

32 Dr Varnavides made scant reference in his statutory declaration to his current financial circumstances, and has provided no evidence to substantiate them. In these circumstances, I make no findings about these circumstances. There was no evidence before me of any change to his income, or to the income upon which his children depend, resulting from the death of his wife. I am therefore not satisfied that there has been any dramatic change to his financial circumstances since his wife's death, which is both unrelated to his cessation of conduct in breach of the injunction granted by Morris J, and warrants additional leniency.

33 Ms Jevtic's assessment that Dr Varnavides has enlisted the help of professionals, extended family and friends to assist with practical and psychological support for himself and his children, sits somewhat at odds with the picture painted by Dr Varnavides in his statutory declaration, which refers only to his own role in caring for his children, and to the existence of family in Western Australia, but makes no mention of the existence or availability of other close relatives or family friends to care for the children in the event of his imprisonment.

34 On the authorities, exceptional hardship may be demonstrated in circumstances where the imprisonment of a parent leaves children without parental care[26]. However, cogent evidence of such exceptional hardship is required. Even where cogent evidence of exceptional hardship is provided, the impact upon any term of imprisonment depends on the particular circumstances of the case. I consider that the material relied upon by Dr Varnavides falls far short of the cogency required. Having elected not to be cross-examined, he has produced no expert evidence concerning his children's psychological condition, and no cogent evidence of the family's social context including, in particular, evidence as to what arrangements could be made for the care of his children in the event that he is imprisoned. I have therefore given less weight than might otherwise have been the case to this factor in mitigation.

35 In all the circumstances, I consider it appropriate to commit Dr Varnavides to prison for a term of three months.

36 The Board seeks a costs order against Dr Varnavides in respect of this proceeding, on a solicitor/client basis. Counsel for the Board submitted that such an order is appropriate because this is the fourth contempt proceeding issued by the Board against Dr Varnavides in 18 months in an effort to protect the public, as well as the integrity and status of the Tribunal, and the contempt consists of direct disobedience of the Tribunal.

37 Dr Varnavides through his counsel opposed such a costs order on the basis that the proceeding before the Tribunal was between his client and the Tribunal and the Board was not a party in the sense of being an adversary to Dr Varnavides. It was submitted that if costs were ordered against Dr Varnavides, they should be ordered on a party/party basis.

38 Section 109(3) of the VCAT Act provides that an order for costs may be made by the Tribunal only if satisfied that it is fair to do so.

39 For the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in Rajendran v Tonkin [2004] VSCA 43, it is unusual for indemnity costs to be awarded against a respondent who resists an application for an order that ultimately is in the discretion of the court or the tribunal to which the application is made.

40 I note that in the third contempt proceeding, Morris J declined to award costs on an indemnity basis[27], but awarded costs against Dr Varnavides on a party/party basis, on the grounds that the contempt proceeding is different to the usual proceedings issued before the Tribunal.

41 By the very conduct to which he has pleaded guilty in this proceeding, Dr Varnavides made it necessary for the Board to initiate the proceeding in order to protect the public and the integrity of the orders made by the Tribunal. In these circumstances, I consider it fair to depart from the presumption in section 109(1) of the VCAT Act that each party bear its own costs, and to order Dr Varnavides to pay the Board's costs on a party/party basis, to be assessed by the principal registrar in default of agreement.

[1] In proceeding V2 of 2004.

[2] Rich v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [1999] VSCA 14; Doyle & Ors v The

Commonwealth of Australia & Anor [1985] HCA 46; (1985) 156 CLR 510.

[3] Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 at p 309 per Kirby J.

[4] Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 per Kirby J; Australian

Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1501; (2003) 204 ALR 537 at para 16 per

Spender J.

[5] A finding that a person has been guilty of contempt is itself a conviction: see Re Perkins; Mesto v

Galpin [1998] 4 VR 505 at page 9.

[6] Such as the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) part 2A, which deals with 'serious offenders'.

[7] Baumer v R (1998) 166 CLR 51 at 58.

[8] Which is a mitigating factor even where there is prior criminal history: see R v Tasker [2003] VSCA 190; (2003) 7 VR 128

at 134.

[9] Which is to be considered independently of any discount given for a plea of guilty: see R v Duncan

[1998] 3 VR 208 at 215 per Callaway JA; Neal v The Queen [1982] HCA 55; (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 315.

[10] R v Fraser [2004] VSCA 147 per Batt JA.

[11] Belbruno [2000] VSCA 201; (2000) 117 A Crim R 150 (CCA Vic); Gregory [2000] VSCA 212; Cobiac v Liddy (1969)

[1969] HCA 26; 119 CLR 257.

[12] See Smee (1985) 19 A Crim R 262 (CCA QLD) - where the offender's property was destroyed by a

hailstorm and his wife had a stroke after he had committed the offence of obtaining by false pretences, the

Qld Ct of C A considered that a reduced sentence was justified.

[13] See Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83.

[14] None was an "agent provocateur feigning distress, as in was the case in an earlier contempt proceeding

(V6 of 2004): see Varnavides v Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal & Anor [2005] VSCA 231 at

para 35.

[15] Dental Practice Board of Victoria v Varnavides [2004] VCAT 1565.

[16] He pleaded not guilty to two other charges and, after a hearing, was acquitted of them.

[17] Dr Varnavides appealed against the sentences imposed by Morris J in the second and third contempt

proceedings and the appeals were heard together by the Court of Appeal on 26 July 2005: see Varnavides

v Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal & Anor [2005] VSCA 231. In its judgment delivered on 19

September 2005, the Court of Appeal held there was no power to impose a suspended sentence of

imprisonment, and set aside the order for imprisonment as well as the fine imposed in the second

contempt proceeding, and substituted a fine of $5,000. The Court of Appeal also set aside the sentence

imposed in the third contempt proceeding on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, and substituted

a fine of $10,000 for each of the two acts of contempt.

[18] Para 9-10.

[19] Para 11-12.

[20] Para 13-15.

[21] Para 16-17.

[22] Varnavides v Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal & Anor [2005] VSCA 231 at para 42.

[23] Varnavides v Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal & Anor [2005] VSCA 231 at para 44

[24] Harris v Muirhead [1993] 2 Qd R 527.

[25] It was not submitted on his behalf that by making this apology he has purged his contempt.

[26] Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (s) 83; Mawson v Nayda (1995) 14 SASR 291 at 296.

[27] Dental Practice Board of Victoria v Varnavides [2005] VCAT 810 at page 6