(given orally at the hearing and subsequently revised)

1 The Dental Practice Board of Victoria has made application to the tribunal that Dr George Varnavides be held to be guilty of contempt of the tribunal.

2 The facts can be briefly stated as follows. On 17 November 2003 the Dental Practice Board of Victoria ordered that Dr Varnavides' registration as a dentist be suspended from 28 November 2003 until 28 November 2005. On 17 December 2003 the tribunal, constituted by Deputy President Davis, ordered that the decision of the Dental Practice Board of Victoria be varied, but only to the extent that the period of suspension commence on 16 January 2004 and conclude on 16 January 2006.

3 Section 61(1) of the Dental Practice Act 1999 provides that a person must not practise dentistry unless he or she is registered as a dental care provider under the Act. The Act provides a penalty of 100 penalty units for breach of that provision.

4 The Dental Practice Board has placed affidavits before the tribunal, particularly an affidavit of Anthony Roseman dated 7 July 2004, which supports the conclusion that Dr Varnavides has been practising dentistry in Victoria since his registration was suspended and would appear to be acting in breach of section 61(1) of the Dental Practice Act 1999. And it is said, this is contrary to and in contempt of the order made by Deputy President Davis.

5 It can be inferred from the evidence before the tribunal that there is a threat that Dr Varnavides may continue to practise dentistry in Victoria contrary to section 61(1) of the Dental Practice Act and, contrary to the decision of Deputy President Davis. In such circumstances it is in the public interest that a direct and specific order be made directed to Dr Varnavides that he not practise dentistry in Victoria. Such an order was made by oral application today, and is not opposed, but even if it was opposed, I would have been inclined to make it. The basis for the injunction exists and, as a matter of discretion, it is appropriate to make such an order to ensure that the law is obeyed and that the public of Victoria is protected.

6 I wish to stress that if the order I now make is disobeyed there is a potential for serious consequences to flow from a breach of the order. Section 137 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, which makes provision for punishment where a person is guilty of contempt of the tribunal, specifies that if the tribunal finds that a person is guilty of contempt of the tribunal it may, in the case of a natural person such as Dr Varnavides, commit the person to prison for a term of not more than five years or impose a fine of up to $100,000. Moreover if the order I make today is disobeyed it might be properly regarded as a direct and wilful disobedience of a direct and transparent order by the tribunal constituted by the President of the tribunal.

7 As for the application for contempt in relation to Deputy President Davis' order, it does involve more complex issues because the order made in that case, on one view, was not directly concerned with whether Dr Varnavides could or could not practise dentistry, although it could no doubt be said that it had that effect. But it is unnecessary to pursue that at this stage. Rather the appropriate course is to adjourn that proceeding for about a month to see what action the Dental Board proposes to take. Matters that might be subject to consideration would be the possibility of action under section 61 of the Dental Practice Act, or action under section 133 of the VCAT Act, or proceeding with the application itself. Further, the attitude taken by the Dental Board may be influenced by, not only compliance with the injunction I make today, but also the co-operation shown by Dr Varnavides in demonstrating that the order made today is being complied with.

8 I propose to reserve costs because I do not believe the tribunal is in the best position today to make any decision in relation to costs. What can be said is that in cases of this sort it commonly ends up that the respondent is required to pay costs. This provides a good incentive for the respondent to conduct proceedings in a way that minimises the costs on both sides.