Particular issues
17 Counsel for Decimal properly raised three particular issues.
18 The first matter raised by Decimal's counsel was raised by way of disclosure to the Court. Between the first court hearing and the scheme meeting an entity called Collins St Asset Management as trustee for the Collins St Value Fund (Collins St) started collecting shares in the plaintiff and reached a 19.9% holding prior to the scheme meeting. Those shares were ultimately voted in favour of the scheme. However, at one point Collins St informed Decimal that it did not agree with the assessment by the Board of Decimal as to the merits of the scheme. Collins St did not put forward any other proposal. Accordingly, on 29 November 2018 Decimal made an announcement to the ASX which disclosed those matters and also attached a copy of a letter from Sargon of the same date, confirming that the scheme consideration (of 1.41 cents per share) as already disclosed to the shareholders represents its last and final offer. In the announcement, Decimal reminded shareholders of the importance of voting on the scheme.
19 The second matter raised by counsel was that of low voter turnout. It appears that the figure of 5.21% in this case is lower than any turnout for a members scheme meeting that is reported in the authorities. I note that in Re Osiris Insurance Ltd [1999] 1 BCLC 665, a case concerning a creditors scheme, a turnout of 3.6% was reported: only 35 of 971 scheme creditors with claims worth approximately 41% of the total value attended. That example superficially provides some comfort but I have approached the task of considering this issue with some caution.
20 The issue of low voter turnout was addressed by Farrell J in TriAusMin Limited, in the matter of TriAusMin Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 833, and I respectfully adopt her Honour's analysis:
[10] Although the statutory requirement under s 411(4)(a)(ii) has been satisfied, it is the usual practice of the Court at the second court hearing to consider the number of shareholders who attended the Scheme Meeting in person or by proxy. Low shareholder turnout may be an indication that some procedural irregularity occurred. It is inappropriate to assume (in the absence of complaint) that shareholders who did not vote either did not have notice of the meeting or were silent in protest of the scheme: Re Professional Investment Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1336 at [7] and Re Seven Network Limited (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 583 (Re Seven Network Ltd) at [61] per Jacobson J; apathy should not be presumed to be antagonism: Re Matine Limited (1998) 28 ACSR 268 at 295 per Santow J.
[11] Nonetheless it does call for consideration to ensure that the vote not unrepresentative, since the court retains the discretion to withhold its approval in that case: see Re Seven Network Ltd at [61] and Re BTR plc [2000] 1 BCLC 740 at 747. It is relevant to consider whether members have been deterred from attending or voting at the meeting: Re Cape plc [2006] EWHC 1446 at [20] per David Richards J.
[12] Relatively low shareholder turnout did not prevent orders being made in Re Avoca Resources Limited [2011] FCA 208 (11.49% of shareholders holding 72.38% of shares) or Re Cortona Resources Limited (No 2) [2013] FCA 302 (17.5% of shareholders holding 45.2% of shares); see also Re Redcape Property Fund Limited and The Trust Company (RE Services) Limited [2012] NSWSC 486 per Black J at [6]. In Re Auzex Resources Limited (No 2) [2012] QSC 101 at [18] Applegarth J noted that a turnout of 9.75% of shareholders representing 42.3% of votes was substantially higher than at annual general meetings of the company. In Re Osiris Insurance Ltd [1999] 1 BCLC 182 only 35 of 971, scheme creditors with claims worth approximately 41% of the total value attended the meeting and Re British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd [2006] 1 BCLC 665, creditor turnout was 15% representing approximately 50% of claims. See Damian T and Rich A, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks (3rd edition, 2013, University of Sydney) at 4.4.2 for a full discussion of this issue.
21 Conscious that the parameters to date of reported voter turnout will apparently be expanded by this case, I have considered carefully whether there may have been any issue with respect to despatch of information to shareholders or any other matter that may have deterred voters from attending or voting at the scheme meeting. There is no evidence of such matters. There is detailed evidence as to despatch of the materials. There is no evidence of irregularity in the manner of despatch, and in the case of a small number of 'bounce back' emails, Computershare took immediate steps to send hard copy scheme booklets to the relevant shareholders. I have also had regard to the following:
(a) the evidence of Mr Gardner was that the turnout of shareholder voters at the two preceding annual general meetings was 0.76% and 3.10% respectively. Against that history, there seems to have been less apathy by voters with respect to the scheme meeting than generally;
(b) there are many shareholders on the registry with small parcels of shares. According to Ms Robinson's evidence, the number of Decimal shareholders who held a parcel of Decimal shares worth $2,000 or less was 1,710 and the number of Decimal shareholders who held a parcel of Decimal shares worth $500 or less was 1,565. It is a reasonable inference that for many of those voters, the scheme was of relatively minor commercial interest;
(c) the Decimal shareholders who did vote voted overwhelmingly in favour of the scheme, and they represented 52.85% of shares on issue; and
(d) the ASX announcement of 29 November 2018 referred to above operated as a reminder to shareholders of the importance of voting.
22 Taking into account those matters, I do not consider the low voter turnout should prevent the Court from making orders under s 411(4)(b).
23 The third matter raised by counsel was by way of information. As appears from the reasons published following the first Court hearing (at [28]-[34]), the issue of performance risk was addressed. By Ms Robinson's affidavit, Decimal provided useful additional information as to the practical steps put in place by Computershare and Computershare's experience in effecting same-day payments to shareholders of their scheme consideration. That information confirmed my initial view that the scheme as proposed involved minimal performance risk to shareholders.