CXG19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1880

1. At [1]-[4], the Tribunal set out the application for review and the background of the matter.
2. At [5], the Tribunal relevantly identified that the issue arising on the review was whether the applicant was owed Australia's protection under the refugee criterion or under the complimentary protection criteria.
3. The Tribunal had regard to the criteria for a protection visa in s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations): at [6]-[10]. The Tribunal had regard to Ministerial Direction No. 56 and took into account the Procedures Advice Manual 3 (PAM3) guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration and relevant country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes: at [11].
4. At [12], the Tribunal summarised the applicant's claims in his protection visa. The applicant's claims were that he left Saudi Arabia due to the Mullah and upon return to Pakistan, both TTP militants and the Mullah were after him. He claimed that he would be subject to imprisonment if he remained in Pakistan, so he sought protection in Australia. The Tribunal noted the country information before it and the applicant's documents and evidence, both oral and written, as put before the Department. It also noted the evidence provided to the Tribunal in a letter dated 24 January 2019 at [16]. The letter made further claims, relevantly that:
   • In August 2018, the applicant's son was arrested in Peshawar and transferred to Lahore Police Station. The applicant claimed that, when they found out who his father was, they accused him of transporting arms and drugs between Gujaranwala and Peshawar. His son was remanded to be sentenced on false blasphemy and criminal charges. His wife and son-in-law bribed the Police to release him.
   • In mid-September 2018, the TTP beat his son and told him they were aware his father was bringing money from Saudi Arabia for their organisation, and that he had stolen money and escaped overseas. They told him he would be pardoned if he returned to Karachi, transported sick Muslims, and paid the Madrassa and Mullah money from the Barkat Foundation. They warned him that his father would be killed if found in Pakistan. His son agreed to these demands.
   • When his son returned to Hafizabad, the Mullah summoned and questioned him on the whereabouts of the applicant. The Mullah informed his son that he had the Police and TTP searching for his father and warned that if his father returned to Pakistan, he would be sentenced to death for stealing his money and for transporting arms and drugs from Saudi Arabia with R.
   • In December 2018, the Mullah and TTP militants travelled with his son to Peshawar. On the drive, the Mullah told him that his father had been embezzling money from Saudi businessmen and ruined their business. He told his son that the Police were awaiting his father's arrival to take him to prison and that, before the police could get his father, the Mullah's men would kill him. His son and wife advised him not to return to Pakistan. His son is planning to leave Pakistan.
5. The Tribunal noted at [17], that the applicant, in his statement dated 22 January 2019, complained that the delegate misunderstood his evidence, and that the interpreter had also misinterpreted his evidence. The Tribunal further noted the applicant had not provided it with any evidence to support the claim that the interpreter had misinterpreted his evidence.
6. The Tribunal found that the applicant was a citizen of Pakistan and that Pakistan was the receiving country. It noted there was no evidence before it to indicate the applicant had the right to enter and reside in any safe third country for the purposes of s 36(3) of the Act: at [18]-[19].

1. The Tribunal went on to assess the applicant's claims and found that he was not a 'witness of truth' due to the inconsistencies in his evidence. The Tribunal compared the statement of claim against the oral evidence given at the hearing and found nine matters which raised concerns as to the credibility of his claims.
2. The first matter of concern related to the applicant's claim that he was working in Saudi Arabia and sending money to his family in Pakistan, through a friend named R, who transferred money internationally for a small fee. The Tribunal noted there were discrepancies between the written and oral submissions of the applicant regarding: when he was asked to take money to Pakistan, where he met the Mullah to give him the money, and what the Mullah said to him; raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims: at [22]-[24].
3. The second matter of concern related to the applicant's evidence regarding the second transfer of money in January 2015 where the applicant claimed R asked him to take 50,000 rupees to the Mullah but he only agreed to take 5,000 rupees: at [25]-[29]. The Tribunal stated that the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence as to who asked him to take the money to Pakistan on the second occasion and whether or not he took money to Pakistan on a second occasion raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.
4. The Tribunal's third concern related to inconsistencies and significant omissions in the applicant's evidence regarding what happened to R in about April 2015 at the restaurant or the incident in the middle of July 2015 when a group of men surrounded him and asked him questions: at [30]-[33].
5. The Tribunal's fourth concern was in relation to the applicant's claims that the group of men involved in the incident in mid July 2015 accompanied him to his apartment, offered him cash and questioned him about his return to Pakistan. There were inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to where he was arrested, the circumstances surrounding his arrest, why he was arrested, and which gaol he was imprisoned at which raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.
6. The Tribunal's fifth concern related to the applicant's claim that he was imprisoned for two weeks and beaten and kicked until he told the Police everything that happened, and the bribe arranged by his wife and son so he could be released. At [43], the Tribunal found the omissions in the applicant's evidence and inconsistencies in his evidence in relation to whether he was detained at the police station or gaol in Hafizabad, who negotiated the bribe with the police officer, whether he was beaten by TTP militants or the Mullah, and what the police officer who accepted the bribe told him raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.
7. The Tribunal's sixths concern related to the applicant's claim, made in his written statement, dated 22 January 2019, that in August 2018 his son was arrested at Peshawar when transporting sick Christians to Islamabad for treatment: at [44]-[50]. The Tribunal stated, among other things, that it found the applicant's claim that his son was arrested in Peshawar and taken to Lahore to be implausible, as it expected they would have arrested him there or taken him to the nearest police station. There were also several inconsistencies in the evidence regarding whether the applicant's son was questioned by the police in relation to transporting Muslims who had converted to Christianity or whether he was questioned about transporting drugs, whether he was charged with criminal offences and whether a bribe was paid to the police to secure his release.
8. The Tribunal's seventh concern related to new claims raised by the applicant in oral evidence, which were not in his written Statement dated 22 January 2019: at [51]-[60].
9. The Tribunal also put to the applicant information pursuant to s 424AA, that the departmental records indicated that he was granted a visitor visa on 18 May 2015 but did not arrive in Australia until 11 August 2015 (three months later): at [61]. The Tribunal found that his delay in arriving in Australia after he was granted the visitor visa was not consistent with his claims and raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of his claims.
10. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's explanation for the delay but did not accept it: at [62]. The Tribunal found it implausible that his brother would not have informed him of the grant of the visa as soon as he was notified. It considered his delay in arriving in Australia after the grant of the visa raised concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of his claims: at [63].
11. The Tribunal, pursuant to s 424AA, also put to the applicant a document contained in his application for the visitor visa, namely, the worker's permit held by him in Saudi Arabia which expired on 4 July 2014. The Tribunal put the applicant on notice that this may lead to an adverse conclusion that he returned to Pakistan because his work visa had expired and was living unlawfully in Saudi Arabia, not for the reasons he claimed. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's response at [65], that the company he worked for provided employees with work permits and the company would provide temporary letters to employees prior to the expiry of their work permits. The applicant also stated it was difficult to live in Saudi Arabia illegally.
12. The Tribunal noted that, while the applicant was aware the work permit was an issue in the case, he did not provide evidence that he had a valid working permit at the time he finally left in 2015, despite having the time to do so, post-hearing: at [66].
13. The Tribunal recorded its questioning of the applicant regarding whether he faced any personal issues due to his Christian faith, noting the applicant had not made any claims that he had: at [71]. The Tribunal had regard to information provided by the applicant: country information regarding Christians in Pakistan (at [72]), an Amnesty international press release dated 30 May 2014 regarding the abduction and killing of a journalist, and the 2017/2018 Amnesty International Report on Pakistan.
14. The Tribunal noted the applicant's dissent to the assessments made in the DFAT report on Christians in Pakistan dated 20 February 2019, but ultimately it accepted these assessments - that Christians faced low levels of discrimination; that they faced a moderate risk of societal and sectarian violence; and that the implementation of laws against blasphemy, and the potential for communal violence following an accusation of blasphemy, disproportionately affected religious minorities including Christians: at [74]-[75]. It also discussed DFAT's overall assessment of the security situation in Pakistan with the applicant: at [76].

1. At [80], the Tribunal had regard to the Tribunal's Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility, the DFAT Country Information Report on Pakistan dated 20 February 2019, and the Department's Policy Guidelines to the extent relevant to the decision under consideration.

1. The Tribunal found the applicant was not a credible or reliable witness and that he had fabricated his material claims for the purpose of obtaining a protection visa. The Tribunal accepted the applicant's claimed identity, that he had lived and worked in Saudi Arabia from 1982 to July 2015, and that he periodically visited his family in Pakistan during that period. The Tribunal accepted that he had a friend named R in Saudi Arabia through whom he transferred money to his family in Pakistan. However, the Tribunal did not accept that he took money from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and delivered it to a local Mullah at R's request and did not accept any of his claims flowing from this. It also did not accept the applicant left Saudi Arabia or Pakistan for the reasons claimed.
2. The Tribunal also did not accept the Mullah, TTP, or the Pakistani authorities held an adverse interest in the applicant. Further, while the Tribunal accepted the applicant's son worked as an ambulance driver, it did not accept he was arrested in Peshawar or any of the claimed events flowing from that claim.
3. The Tribunal found, on the evidence before it, that the applicant faced a remote risk of harm as a Christian in Pakistan. It also found the applicant faced a remote risk of generalised violence: at [90].
4. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was at risk of serious harm or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed, including his faith or generalised violence, if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant would prefer to live and work in Australia and bring his family to Australia and that he did not wish to return to Pakistan. However, it concluded the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, was not a refugee under s 5H, and did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
5. Furthermore, having considered all of the applicant's claims, individually and cumulatively, and all the evidence in view of its earlier findings, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal found that he did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
6. The Tribunal found the applicant was not a person with respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The originating application was filed on 26 July 2019. The applicant filed a further amended application on 29 July 2025 advancing two grounds of review, though only ground one was pressed.
2. The parties appeared at a hearing on 27 August 2025 at the Parramatta Registry of the Court.
3. At the hearing, the Court Book, filed by the Minister on 3 October 2019, was tendered into evidence and marked Exhibit CB. The affidavit of Leicia Marie Stark, affirmed on 12 December 2019, which annexed a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal (the Stark Affidavit), was read into evidence. Also read into evidence was the affidavit of Mr Djasmeini, affirmed on 13 August 2025, which annexed the 'Guidelines on Assessment of Credibility' that were applicable at the time the Tribunal made its decision.
4. The applicant was represented by Ms T Baw of Counsel. The Minister was represented by Ms K Hooper of Counsel.
5. The applicant's written submissions were filed on 29 July 2025. The Minister's written submissions were filed on 13 August 2025. The oral submissions of the parties developed their written submissions.

1. The amended application for judicial review advanced the following ground:
   1. The Second Respondent (Tribunal) made adverse credibility findings against the Applicant which were legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical.

Particulars

1. The Tribunal's finding of inconsistencies in the Applicant's evidence in relation to when he took money to Pakistan is without any probative foundation, as the Tribunal was comparing accounts of two different events, not accounts of the same event.

2. [not pressed].

3. The Tribunal's finding of an omission and inconsistency in the Applicant's evidence in respect to the amount of money and occasions he took the money to Pakistan is based on a misconstruction of the evidence and unwarranted assumptions.

4. The Tribunal's finding of omissions and an inconsistency in the Applicant's evidence in respect to what happened to his friend and the occurrences after his return from Pakistan are unfounded; the Tribunal erroneously misstated the evidence.

5. The Tribunal's finding of omissions and inconsistencies in respect to his arrest in Pakistan lack any probative foundation and/or are peripheral details.

6. The Tribunal's findings and omissions and inconsistencies in respect to his experience in jail and his release are in substance consistent and/or minor matters that are individually incapable of supporting an adverse credibility finding.

7. [not pressed].

1. By this ground, the applicant contends that the Tribunal's credibility findings were unreasonable, irrational, or illogical. The applicant advanced five particulars in support of the ground of review. Before considering each of the particulars, I will first set out the relevant principles enunciated in some of the authorities relied upon by the parties.

Relevant principles - adverse credibility findings, legal unreasonableness

1. It is well established that credibility findings are not immune from judicial review: CGQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496 at [37]-[38] per McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ. Adverse credibility findings are amenable to judicial review where the findings can be shown to be legally unreasonable, such as by being based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [50] per Yates, Wheelahan and O'Bryan JJ.
2. As stated by Stewart J in EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518 (EVI19) at [36]:

Credibility findings like all findings, must be rationally made and based upon facts having logical and probative weight, and be articulated properly; minor inconsistencies and trivial errors do not constitute a valid ground upon which an adverse credibility finding may be made: SZSHV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31] per Flick J; SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 at [25] per Gordon J. See also DAO16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; 258 FCR 175 at [30] per Kenny, Kerr and Perry JJ and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at [11] per Allsop CJ.

1. Unreasonableness is concerned with both outcome and process: Plaintiff S183/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 15; (2022) 399 ALR 644 at [31] per Gordon J.
2. Emphatic adverse findings on credibility may well, expressly or implicitly, be linked with one another so that it will not be possible, or realistic, for a reviewing Court to be confident that an error in one strand of credibility reasoning does not infect other strands: AWU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 513 at [20] per Mortimer J citing SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562 per Lee J at [44]-[45].
3. A finding that evidence is a fabrication or that a person deliberately lied requires something more than mere rejection of that person's evidence: BTF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) AAR 376 at [56].
4. The applicant relied upon BEL16 v Minister of Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1678; (2019) 167 ALD 295 (BEL16) wherein Beach J said at [16].

First, it is not in doubt that in assessing credibility, a Tribunal may rely upon inconsistencies properly so-called, but the Tribunal must reason carefully and fairly to avoid any undue propensity to scepticism. Indeed, an error may be identified in how the Tribunal went about its task if the Tribunal had approached the task in one or more of the following ways:

(a) Commencing a review of the material and evidence provided by an applicant with an unwarranted degree of scepticism.

(b) Engaging in confirmatory bias by inappropriately discounting material prima facie in support of the applicant's position before the totality of the material had been considered.

(c) Viewing inconsistencies, vagueness or omissions in the applicant's version of events without regard to imperfections in memory that naturally occur over time or due to stress or language difficulties particularly when an interpreter has been used or due to reticence to be forthcoming with people or bodies perceived to be in authority. In this respect, inconsistencies, vagueness or omissions do not necessarily indicate a deliberate lack of truthfulness, although they may affect the assessment of reliability.

1. As to the treatment of inconsistencies or differences in accounts, the applicant relied upon the principles stated in ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271 at [42]-[44] per Griffiths, Mortimer and Steward JJ:

[42] Differing accounts of the same event may not be 'inconsistent' at all. One may be more detailed than another. One may have different emphasis. One may include a particular incident that another does not.

...

[43] On the other hand, differences in accounts may be rationally and reasonably capable of giving rise to concerns about a person's credibility, or (perhaps more likely) reliability. Or they may not. Simply (and incorrectly) attaching the label 'inconsistent' to differing accounts of an event, or differing narratives, does not make them so. Where an adverse finding is made on the basis of differences in accounts, it will usually be necessary to properly discharge the fact-finding task for a decision-maker to explain why she or he has found those differences of such a nature as to justify rejection of the narrative or account given by a person.

...

[44] Some true "inconsistencies" may be objectively irrelevant to the fact-finding of a decision-maker. Some may be explicable, or excusable. Some may be critical to fact-finding. Some may reflect on the credibility or reliability of an applicant, and some may not. As the Full Court said in AVQ15 at [28], the decision-maker's task requires her or him to "assess the significance of that inconsistency and the weight to be given to it". Again, simply attaching the label "inconsistency" and moving immediately from the label to an adverse finding of credibility or reliability, may not be a rational or legally reasonable approach.

1. Decision-makers must remain conscious of the particular challenges faced by asylum seekers, such as giving multiple accounts, using interpreters, or showing reticence, when evaluating differences in evidence: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83 (AVQ15) at [28].
2. The making of unwarranted assumptions, unsupported by any probative evidence, as part of a credit finding may be impugned on the basis that the finding is illogical, irrational, or unreasonable: DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175 at [45].
3. It is an error for a decision-maker to bring forward a personal assumption (e.g., about country conditions or authority behaviour) as a critical factor in a finding of disbelief without any basis in expressed expertise, country information, or material before it: SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1001 at [46].
4. The Minister relied upon the observations of Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) at [130]-[131]:

In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, "illogicality" or "irrationality" sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is "clearly unjust" or "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "unreasonable" in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A Court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.

...

...the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.

1. A decision is only considered illogical or irrational, and therefore legally unreasonable, if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, or if there is no logical connection between the decision and the inferences or conclusions drawn: BUX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1510 per Raper J at [18] and the authorities cited therein.
2. The Minister also relied upon Minister Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516; (2016) 69 AAR 210 wherein Wigney J summarised the relevant principles at [52] and [54]-[56]:

52 As Robertson J put it in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at 137 [148], for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, "extreme" illogicality or irrationality must be shown, "measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions". And as McKerracher J (with whom Reeves J agreed) emphasised in SZOOR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1 (at 22-23 [84]), a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.

...

54 ...The judgment of Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS reveals that jurisdictional error may be able to be established on the basis of illogical reasoning or illogical or irrational findings "on the way" to the final conclusion (see 648 [132]): see also SZRKT at 137-138 [151]-[153]; SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51 at [61]-[62].

55 Nevertheless, allegations of illogical or irrational reasoning or findings of fact must be considered against the framework of the inquiry being whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal: SZRKT at 137 [148]. The overarching question is whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: SZRKT at 137-138 [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at 598-599 [83]-[84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out: SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 566; (2013) 135 ALD 276 at 291 [66]; SZWCO at [64]-[67].

56 An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal's decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal's decision-making processes from scrutiny: SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31]. Considerable caution must, however, be exercised before too readily acceding to a proposition that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error: SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 at 455-456 [14]-[15]. That is because assertions of illogicality and irrationality can all too readily be used to conceal what is in truth simply an attack on the merits of the Tribunal's findings and decision. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ (at 636 [96]) made it plain that the deployment of illogicality or irrationality to achieve merits review should not be sanctioned.

1. By particulars (a) to (e) the applicant challenges the Tribunal's reasoning in respect of the first five concerns it had with the applicant's evidence which ultimately led it conclude that the applicant was not a credible or reliable witness.

Particular (a): comparison of two different events

1. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal's finding of inconsistences between his written statement, dated 25 August 2015 (at CB 105-107), and his oral evidence at the hearing, which took place more than four years and four months later, was erroneous as the Tribunal was comparing two different events that occurred on different occasions. Thus, there was no logical basis for the Tribunal to conclude there was an inconsistency in the applicant's accounts.
2. In considering whether the Tribunal so erred, it will be necessary to set out what the applicant said in his written statement and the oral evidence given at the hearing.
3. In his written statement, the applicant said the following about his claim to have taken funds at the request of his friend R to give to a Mullah in Pakistan:

Around December 2013, [R] gave me money to be handed over to the local Mullah from the Jamia Mosque situated between our house and the Church in Pakistan. I was not happy to deal with Mullahs as many Mullahs had changed within a short period of time in that Mosque. When [R] being a close friend insisted, I couldn't refuse. When I arrived in Hafizabad and informed the Mullah as to the money that I brought for him, he immediately asked me to come to meet him in a private residence and ordered that I should not attempt to meet him at the Mosque. I gave the money at the private residence, the Mullah told me that I should not mention to anyone as to our meeting at the private home. On my return back to Riyad when I questioned [R] as to the reason why Mullah ordered me to keep quiet as to the money transaction he said that the Mullah is paid money by the rich Saudis to use at the Maddrassa schools. He said that he had been continuously sending money to different Muallahs from different parts of the Pakistan through his agents but only to our area Mullah he sent it through me during my trip to Pakistan. He said that the local Mullah reprimanded him for sending money through me and warned that he should not tell anything about them to me. As we were very close, we wanted to have our secrets within ourselves. [R] also gave Saudi Reyals to the Pakistani pilgrims arriving in Saudi Arabia who needed the Saudi money during their pilgrimage to Mecca and other holy places and also to shop.

l was not interested to know where [R] met people and collected money to be sent to Pakistan. Around January 2015, when I planned to return back to Pakistan. [R] requested me to once again take money to the Mullah. The amount was 50,000 Rupees. I was not feeling safe to meet the Mullah who was nervous in meeting me. Further I was not willing to take any amount more than 5000 Rupees to Pakistan as I could be questioned by the authorities and feared for the authorities being a minority Christian. When I met the Mullah at the same place the Mullah scolded me for not bringing the 50,000 Rupees as planned. He told me that I should bring back the whole amount [R] gives, me in the future and tried to convince me that he would receive me at the airport. The Mullah was rude and authoritative and demanded that his men in Saudi Arabia would contact me directly to hand over the money to me for me to bring to him. I told [R] about Mullah's demand and he became very angry and told me that he would never involve me in the future in sending money to the Mullah. I was not happy to hear that. ...

1. The two events were said to have occurred in December 2013 and January 2015, after which the applicant claimed to have been threatened and in fear for his life.
2. When asked at the hearing about when his problems started (at Transcript (T)15.23), the applicant gave the following evidence:

T15.26:

I was in Saudi Arabia, and the company has given accommodation which was a little bit away from the city. I used to send the money to my family in Pakistan, and it was a bit difficult, so one of my friend was helping me to send this money to Pakistan. This was his work, he was sending money for other people as well.

...

T16:03

... I was going back to Pakistan, and then I met this person who used to send the money for me. ... when I met him, he introduced me to another person who was a Saudi man, and this Saudi man used to send a lot of money back to Pakistan as well. So this gentleman who was known to me, he said like this Saudi man wants to send some money, it's no problem, you can take his money to Pakistan and he assured the other Saudi man as well, that he is one of the very nicest person I know. Your money will not be, you know, any fraud or anything like that. So he [indecipherable] about me and I was a bit afraid because I never took that much, like a bigger amount, which was equal to 50,000 Pakistani money. And they actually gave it to me to take it with me. And they told me that one of the masjid mullah will come, give this money to him. And he gave him, like to the mullah, my wife's number and he told me that he will give a call when you reach there, he will give a call to this number, my wife's number and then you can take this money and deliver it to him.

...

T16.21

I went to deliver the money, ah it was inside the masjid. When I was delivering that money he asked me ah is your name ah Michal, I said yes and he said like you are a Christian, I said yes and he said why did you come into the masjid, you are not allowed to enter the masjid. Why did you bring this money. I told him that they gave me the money from there, I help my friend only. Umm he was very upset and angry with me and he said like you are a Christian, you may create the trouble for us. Then I had a one month holiday umm and then I went back again. And then I told the friend who gave me the money that umm ah this and this actually happened back over there. Then he told me the real story that they send this money to run their madrasahs and masjids to, to run those places. And ah they use this money to support some, for some illegal activities in madrasahs as well.

1. When asked about the name of his friend, the applicant said it was R: at T16.36. When asked about the amount he took, the applicant said 50,000 rupees: at T17.20. When asked when this occurred, the applicant said around March 2014: at T19.06.
2. When asked about giving the money to the Mullah at the mosque (the masjid), the applicant said:

T17:27

Yeah. I knock at door and the mullah said come inside. And he told me you are Christian, this is your name, cause I told him, told him my name, then he just you know ah pushed me out umm said you are not allowed. I told him that I already told you and you asked me to come inside, so why you are getting angry and upset about this.

1. The Tribunal had concerns with the applicant's account of events and put those concerns to him at the hearing. At T37:07, the Tribunal said:

You've said two totally different stories. Let me give you one or two examples. So for example, in your documents you said you took, you brought money from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan twice. Once in two thousand and thirteen (2013) and once in two thousand and fifteen (2015). Today you told me you took money once in two thousand and fourteen (2014). That's just one example. There are numerous others. Do you want to say anything about that?

1. In response the applicant said 'sometimes you... miss out the things because you are tensed, over tense and your brain doesn't work properly': at T37:14. The Tribunal noted that it was normal to be nervous and anxious, but expressed its concern that the differences in the accounts were 'not small differences', but were 'significant differences'. It further noted at T37.25:

...you said the mullah told you not to bring the money to the mosque. In your documents you said the mullah told you not to don't bring the documents to the mosque and you went to a, someone's residence and you gave him the money. Today you told me you took the money to the mosque and he ordered you out because you were a Christian and you shouldn't have been in there.

1. The applicant again said he was tense and did not remember everything: at T37.31.
2. The Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's claims and evidence with respect to the money he took, at the request of R, to give to the Mullah in Pakistan is set out in its reasons at [22]-[24]:

22. First, in his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that he was working in Saudi Arabia and sending money to his family in Pakistan. He claimed that he had a friend named [R] who transferred money internationally for a minimum fee and he sent money through him to his family members in Pakistan. He claimed that, in about December 2013, [R] gave him some money to take to a Mullah at a mosque near his house in Pakistan. He claimed that he was not happy about doing it but could not refuse as [R] was a close friend and insisted. He claimed that when he informed the Mullah that he had some money for him, he asked him to attend a private residence and not meet him at the mosque. He claimed that when he gave the Mullah the money he told him not to tell anyone of their meeting in the private residence. He claimed that when he returned to Saudi Arabia [R] told him that the Mullah reprimanded him for sending money through him.

23. During the hearing, the applicant gave a different version of events that was not consistent with his written claims. He stated that in 2014 his friend [R] asked him to take 50,000 rupees to a Mullah in Pakistan. He stated that he was told that the Mullah would be given his wife's telephone number and would contact him on that number when he got to Pakistan. He stated that, after he got to Pakistan, he went to the masjid (mosque) to meet the Mullah and give him the money. He stated that after he gave the Mullah the money he asked him if he was a Christian. He stated that when he said he was, he asked him why he came inside the mosque and why he brought the money to him. He stated that the Mullah became upset and said he would create trouble for them. He stated that he told [R] about this when he returned to Saudi Arabia and [R] told him that the money was being used to fund illegal activities. He stated that he told [R] that he did not want to get involved in this.

24. These inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to when he was asked to take money to Pakistan, where he met the Mullah to give him the money and what the Mullah said to him raise concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.

1. It was contended that the applicant, in his oral evidence, was in fact narrating the events that occurred on the second occasion that R had asked him to take money to the Mullah. It was contended that, other than the difference in the date, the accounts were consistent, including, the amount of money named (50,000 rupees), the location being at the mosque, and that it was after the second occasion that the applicant started to receive threats and feared for his life.
2. The applicant's contention is not supported by the evidence before the Court, as there were also inconsistencies between his oral evidence and his written statement about the second occasion in which he claimed to have taken money to the Mullah.
3. In the written statement, the applicant said it was around January 2015 when he was asked again to take money to the Mullah, he was fearful about carrying 50,000 rupees and agreed to only take 5,000 rupees. He said he met the Mullah at the same place, which he had stated earlier in the statement as being at a private residence, and that the Mullah 'scolded' him for not bringing the 50,000 rupees. In his oral evidence, however, the applicant referred to only one occasion, which he said occurred around March 2014, when he took 50,000 rupees and delivered it to the Mullah inside the masjid (the mosque). The applicant said when the Mullah found out that he was a Christian, from his name, he got upset and angry, and told the applicant he may create trouble for them.
4. It is plainly not the case that if the Tribunal had compared the applicant's oral evidence with what was said in his written statement about the second time he claimed to have taken money to the Mullah in Pakistan, it would have found the evidence to be generally consistent.
5. While the Tribunal at [22]-[24] of its reasons did not specifically refer to the two separate occasions claimed by the applicant in his written statement, it was plainly aware of those claims as it had summarised them at [12] of its reasons. Further, the Tribunal also put to the applicant its concerns about what it considered to be 'significant differences' (at T37.05-T37.30) in his accounts, including whether he took money on two occasions or one, the year in which the claimed events (or event) occurred, whether the money was taken to the Mullah at a mosque or at someone's residence, and what the Mullah had told to him when they met.
6. In response to the Tribunal's concerns, at T37.14 and T37.31, the applicant said he was tense, under pressure, and may not have remembered everything. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant's response at [68] of its reasons and accepted that he may have been anxious, nervous and upset, but did not accept, for the reasons it gave at [69], that being tense explained the many problems with his evidence.
7. I accept the Minister's submission that the claims about whether there were two (or one) money transfers on behalf of R were not peripheral or objectively minor matters and were central to the applicant's claims for protection. It was therefore open for the Tribunal to consider the differences in the accounts to be of significance in its assessment of the applicant's claims and evidence.
8. It was also open to the Tribunal, for the reasons it gave at [69], not to accept the applicant's explanation for what it considered to be significant inconsistencies in the accounts. I accept that it was within the scope of the Tribunal's decisional freedom to form the view that the inconsistencies in the accounts were significant when assessing the applicant's credibility.
9. The Tribunal's concerns about what it considered to be 'significant differences' in the applicant's accounts were not illogical or irrational. Nor can it be said that it misconstrued the applicant's oral evidence or that it failed to properly compare his oral evidence with another account given in his written statement. It was not necessary for the Tribunal, in its reasons, to go through the applicant's written statement line by line and compare it to his oral evidence before forming the view that there were significant differences in the accounts.
10. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence at [22]-[24] in respect of the first of the nine matters it identified as raising concern about the applicant's credibility and the veracity of his claims for protection.
11. Particular (a) does not establish error on the part of the Tribunal.

Particular (c): misconstruction of the evidence and unwarranted assumptions

1. By this particular, the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's reasons at [25]-[29] and its finding of inconsistencies, which the applicant submitted misconstrued the evidence, or unjustifiably heightened an objectively peripheral fact, and relied on unwarranted assumptions.
2. At [25]-[29], the Tribunal stated the following in respect of the second matter which raised concerns about the applicant's claims:

25. Second, in his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that in about January 2015 he planned to return to Pakistan and [R] again asked him to take money to the Mullah. He claimed that he was fearful about carrying 50,000 rupees and agreed to take 5,000 rupees. He claimed that when he met the Mullah he "scolded" him for not bringing the full amount and told him that in future he should bring the full amount given to him by [R].

26. During the hearing, the applicant gave a different version of events that was not consistent with his written claims. He stated that when he took the money to the Mullah at the mosque he was not aware that the money was being used to fund illegal activities. He stated that if he had known this he would not have taken the money to the Mullah.[2] He stated that about a month after he returned to Saudi Arabia he was contacted by some men who arranged to meet him. He stated that they had obtained his address and telephone number from [R]. He stated that, when he met them, they told him he was going to help them. He stated that he told them that [R] had told him everything, he was aware of the purpose for which the money was being sent and could not help them.[3]

27. The applicant gave evidence that the men went to his house a week later. He stated that they tried to convince him to take the money and offered him money and gold.[4] He stated that when he refused to take the money they threatened him that, if he did not help them, they would inform the Saudi Arabian government that he was involved in illegal work and they would put him in gaol.[5] He stated that he told them he would not be doing that. He stated that he became scared and contacted his brother in Australia. He stated that his brother told him that he would sponsor him for a visa to come to Australia.[6]

28. During the hearing, the applicant made no mention of taking 5,000 rupees to the Mullah on the second occasion. His evidence was that he took money to the Mullah on one occasion before he became aware of what the money was being used for. He stated that once he became aware of what the money was being used for he did not take any money to the Mullah in Pakistan.[7]

29. These inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to who asked him to take the money to Pakistan on the second occasion and whether or not he took money to Pakistan on a second occasion raise concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.

1. The written submissions in respect of particular (c) appear at part II of particular (b) of the applicant's outline of submission filed on 29 July 2025.[8]
2. In relation to the Tribunal's finding that the applicant made no mention of taking 5,000 rupees to the Mullah, the applicant submitted that the transcript of the oral evidence shows that the applicant mentioned 50,000 rupees and not the 5,000 because the applicant was directly answering the Tribunal's question (at T17:19-20) 'How much money was there?', to which he responded, 'Pakistani fifty thousand (50,000) rupees'. It was submitted that the applicant's oral evidence was consistent with what he said in his statement about the amount R had requested him to take. It was further submitted that the fact there was no mention of the 5,000 rupees in the oral evidence does not amount to an inconsistency and even if it was so viewed, then it was peripheral as it involved an objectively minor matter of fact which did not change the substance of the evidence.
3. The applicant also takes issue with what the Tribunal said at [28], that '[h]is evidence was that he took money to the Mullah on one occasion before he became aware of what the money was being used for'. It was submitted that this misconstrued the applicant's evidence because in his oral evidence the applicant was describing the second time that he had taken the money, as this was in response to the question asked by the Tribunal (at 15.23-24) about 'when did your problems sort of start?' to which he responded, 'my problems started since 2014'. It was submitted that the applicant, in his oral evidence had described how he used to send money to his family in Pakistan through one of his friends and that this friend had asked him to take money on his next trip to Pakistan in the amount of 50,000 rupees. It was submitted that while the date was some months earlier (March or April 2014) than what was described in the written statement (January 2015), the facts of the events aligned with the second occasion described in the statement. It was submitted that the applicant was directly answering the question about when his problems started and that this was after the second occasion, when he was asked by R to take 50,000 rupees, whereafter R disappeared and the applicant was threatened by men to take money transfers for them which led him to flee Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
4. It was submitted that the first money transfer did not result in any threats towards the applicant and the fact that he did not refer to it in his oral evidence does not mean it did not occur, rather that it was not the event which led to his problems.
5. It was submitted that when the Tribunal discussed with the applicant its concerns regarding inconsistencies in his evidence (at T36:18 and T37:8-12) as to whether he had taken money to Pakistan twice or once, the applicant's response was that he had 'missed out the things' because he was tense. It was submitted that the applicant did not deny that the first money transfer occurred and that the Tribunal, by its dismissal (at [69] of its reasons) of the applicant's explanation, failed to appreciate that by his response, the applicant was referring to the first occasion on which he transferred money. It was submitted that the Tribunal, in this regard, erred by making an unwarranted assumption that was unsupported by evidence.
6. In oral submissions, the applicant also took issue with the Tribunal's findings at [29] that he had given inconsistent evidence about who asked him to take the money to Pakistan on the second occasion and whether or not he took the money to Pakistan. It was submitted that the applicant's evidence in the written statement and oral evidence had consistently been that it was R who had asked him to take the money. It was further contended that there was also no inconsistency in the evidence about whether he had taken money to Pakistan on the second occasion and that, although the applicant said in his statement that he had only taken 5,000 rupees (even though he had been requested to take 50,000 rupees), it was not in doubt that he took money to Pakistan on the second occasion.
7. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal identified, at [26] of its reasons, that the applicant had given different accounts, that it accurately summarised the oral evidence at [27], and it summed up the differences it perceived at [28]. It was submitted that the evidence substantiated the matters set out in these paragraphs of the Tribunal's decision.
8. As to [29] of the Tribunal's decision, the Minister submitted that the inconsistency (in relation to who asked him to take money to Pakistan on the second occasion and whether he took money to Pakistan on a second occasion) arose out of the applicant's oral evidence. The Court was taken to the exchange at T19-20, where the applicant had given evidence that after he had returned from Pakistan (on the occasion he took the money at the request of R in March 2014) unnamed men had approached him and asked him to take money, but that he had refused. The Court was also taken to T23.20 where the applicant said he told the police that he 'just brought once their money'. It was submitted that, in this context, the Tribunal was referring to the inconsistency between the oral evidence and the written statement which indicated the second transfer was on behalf of R. The Minster submitted that, on this basis, it was open for the Tribunal to make the findings it made at [29].
9. I have considered the matters raised by particular (c) as follows.
10. The task of the Court is to determine whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it engaged and to make the findings that it made on the material before it: SZMDS at [135]. The mere existence of an alternative interpretation of the applicant's evidence or the identification of a new or preferable interpretation which might explain any perceived inconsistencies is not sufficient to render the decision unlawful or unreasonable for want of logic or rationality.
11. On a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons at [25]-[29], and in context of the decision as a whole, it cannot be said that there was no room for the Tribunal to have reasoned as it did or that there was no logical connection between the evidence before it and the conclusions it made.
12. It is not in dispute that the applicant made no mention of the 5,000 rupees in his oral evidence, and that he had referred to an amount of 50,000 rupees (at T16:13-T16:21) that he went to deliver to the Mullah inside the masjid. He again refers to the 50,000 rupees (at T17.20) in response to the Tribunal's question 'how much money was there?'. In the follow up question about whether he knew what the money was going to be used for, the applicant said he was 'not aware at all' and went on to give evidence that the Mullah became 'angry and upset' and pushed him out of the masjid after coming to know, through his name, that he was a Christian. In the written statement, the applicant said he had taken only 5,000 of the 50,000 rupees he was asked to take and the Mullah had 'scolded' him for not bringing the full amount. The delivery of the 5,000 rupees was said to have occurred at the same place as the first time the applicant took money to the Mullah, which was at a private residence. The applicant had also indicated in the statement (at CB 105) that it was after the first occasion, in 2013, that R had told him that 'Mullah was paid by rich Saudis to use at the Madrassa schools'.
13. The transcript discloses that the Tribunal, before discussing its concerns with the applicant, had asked the applicant (at T28:21) 'is there anything else you would like to say to me today?' to which the applicant responded 'no', and (at T28:24) 'have you told me everything you wanted to say today?' to which the applicant responded 'yes'.
14. It cannot be said that the Tribunal did not give the applicant the opportunity to give evidence or to clarify or expand upon evidence he had given earlier. In the circumstances, where the applicant claimed that the Mullah in Pakistan had scolded him for taking only 5,000 of the 50,000 rupees, it was open for the Tribunal to consider, as part of its reasoning, that there were inconsistencies in the applicant's accounts. In the context of his claims, the amount of money taken by the applicant to the Mullah could not reasonably be said to be a peripheral or objectively minor matter such that there was no rational basis for the Tribunal to consider it of concern. It should also be noted that the applicant's failure to mention the 5,000 rupees in his oral evidence was one of several matters set out at [25]-[28] that were of concern to the Tribunal.
15. As to the applicant's complaint about the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence at [28], I am not satisfied that this establishes any error on the part of the Tribunal. It is not the case, as contended by the applicant, that if the Tribunal had compared the applicant's oral evidence with what was said in the statement about the second time he had taken money to the Mullah in Pakistan, after which his problems started, that it would have been consistent. As set out above, in the statement the applicant said that after the first occasion (in 2013), R told him what the money was being used for, after which he claimed to have taken money (5,000 of the 50,000 rupees) to the Mullah on a second occasion (in 2015). Whereas in his oral evidence, when asked about the amount of money there was, he said 'Pakistani 50,000', that he was not aware what the money would be used for, and that he had not taken any other money to the Mullah. It was open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it to consider, as part of its assessment of that evidence, that there were differences in the evidence about the number of times the applicant had taken money to the Mullah in Pakistan and when he became aware of the purpose of those funds.
16. As to its consideration at [29], while I acknowledge the applicant's submission that he had only ever claimed to have taken money to Pakistan at the request of R, I accept the Minister's submission that the matters considered by the Tribunal to be inconsistent in that paragraph concerned the comparison of the applicant's oral evidence with what was in his written statement.
17. In his oral evidence, the applicant said he had taken money to Pakistan on one occasion at the request of R, in 2014, and that after he returned from Pakistan, he was approached by unnamed men to take money for them, but he refused. Whereas in his statement, the applicant said he had taken money to Pakistan on two occasions at the request of R. The Tribunal's understanding of the oral evidence, as suggested by its reasons at [29], was that on the second occasion he was asked to take money to Pakistan on behalf of the unnamed men, whose request he had refused, therefore, no money had been taken to Pakistan on a second occasion. This, as the Tribunal assessed, was inconsistent with the statement that money was taken to Pakistan at R's request on a second occasion. While the Tribunal could have provided a more detailed explanation of its reasoning in respect of the matters at [29] about which it was concerned, it cannot be said, having regard to the evidence before it, that there was no rational or reasoned basis for its assessment of the evidence.
18. At [68]-[69], the Tribunal considered the applicant's explanation for the inconsistencies in the evidence, but rejected it. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal had failed to properly appreciate that his response to its concerns (that he had 'missed out on things') related to the first money transfer. Firstly, I note that this was not the explanation that was provided to the Tribunal i.e., that his oral evidence was only in relation to the second transaction claimed in his statement and that he had missed providing details of the first transaction. The Tribunal cannot fail to consider an explanation that was not put before it. Nor can it be said that it made an unwarranted assumption, as contended by the applicant, about what he meant by his response, or that the Tribunal should have been alerted as to what the applicant was referring to. It was for the applicant to make out his case and provide sufficient detail in his response to the Tribunal's concerns. The reasons given by the Tribunal at [69] as to why it did not accept the applicant's explanations were open to it.
19. In considering the totality of matters raised by particular (c), I am not satisfied that the applicant has established that the Tribunal's evaluation or assessment of the evidence before it was due to some misconstruction or misunderstanding of the evidence, or was due to some confusion on the part of the Tribunal about whether the applicant was referring to the first or the second occasion. Nor has the applicant established that the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence was based on an unwarranted assumption, or a peripheral, or objectively minor matter.
20. Particular (c) does not establish error on the part of the Tribunal.

Particular (d): unfounded findings of omission and inconsistency; and the misstating of evidence by the Tribunal[9]

1. By this particular, the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's findings of inconsistencies in the evidence regarding what happened to R and what it found to be significant omissions in his evidence. The Tribunal's findings at [33] were made after it had compared the evidence given in the written statement (at CB 106) with the oral evidence given by the applicant at the hearing about incidents which occurred after the applicant had returned to Pakistan and what happened to R. Relevantly, the Tribunal stated:

30. Third, in his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that in about April 2015 he was at a restaurant with [R] when a group of Pakistani men with beards spoke to [R]. He claimed that the men pointed at him and then left with [R]. He claimed that this was the last time he saw [R]. He also claimed that, on a Sunday in the middle of July 2015, he saw a group of Muslim men wearing white kaftans and long beards. He claimed that he tried to avoid them but they surrounded him and warned him that if he tried to call for help they would hand him over to Saudi Arabian Police to investigate his involvement with [R]. He claimed that they asked him to work for them and told him that the Mullah in Hafizabad (Pakistan) had ordered them to approach him. He claimed that he asked them where [R] was and was told that he had worked against the Mullah and the Mullah had ordered them to take him away.

31. During the hearing, the applicant gave a different version of events that was not consistent with his written claims. He stated when he was initially approached by men in Saudi Arabia, after he returned from Pakistan, and asked to take money to Pakistan for them, he refused to do so and told them that [R] had told him everything.[10]. He stated that they subsequently confronted [R] and accused him of causing trouble for them by telling him everything. He stated that [R] then moved away and left that place.[11]

32. During the hearing, the applicant made no mention of the incident at the restaurant in about April 2015 or the incident in the middle of July 2015 when a group of men surrounded him and spoke to him.

33. These inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to what happened to [R] and the significant omissions in his evidence raise concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.

1. The written submissions extracted parts of the applicant's oral evidence from the transcript. The extracts were from T19:11-24, T19:3-T20:13, and T20:15-20.
2. The applicant contended that the summary of the evidence at [31] was erroneous as there was 'nothing in the transcript' to support the matters set out in that paragraph.
3. The Minister's written submissions referred to a different extract in the transcript at T18:8-21, which records that the applicant said:

Then I didn't meet [R] for more than a month or so and these people got the address where I was staying, the company's villa, and they came to see me. Then they, they also got my, some ah mobile number from [R] and they call me, I went and see them and they said ah you were helping us, ah you will not say anything to your government or do anything wrong to you. But I told them that I came to know for what purpose you are sending this money, I really cannot help you out with this. Then after they came, after another week. Then they try to convince me that we are not wrong people, [indecipherable] and I told them that [R] has told me everything about this. Then they also saw [R] and told him that you have told everything to the other man, means me, and ah he might be a trouble to us and you probably also can be a trouble for us. But then [R] said well he just moved away from there and left at this.

They come a couple of time and told me like we will not say or you know do anything to you but can, ah you can carry on sending our money or doing this work for us. But I, I deny doing that, I told them like, this is, this work I don't want to do any, it trouble for me. Umm I denied didn't do work with them. Then I, then ah, then they told me like ah if you don't do this work for us then we will, we will tell the Saudi government, complain to Saudi government that he is involved in wrong doings and he will be in jail and then they try to blackmail. And the next time they came to me and said like we will give you some money and some gold, could you please hand, hand over to the mullah. And I told them like I don't want to, I will, no I will not be doing this work.

1. The applicant has not challenged the accuracy of the transcript.
2. At the hearing, the applicant sought to challenge whether T18:15-21 was accurately summarised at [31] by the Tribunal. I observed that the Tribunal's summary was not an inaccurate summary of what the applicant said (as recorded in the transcript at T18:15-21) and sought further clarification about which part of paragraph [31] was not considered accurate and why. Upon further reflection, the applicant properly conceded that what was said by the applicant at T18:15-21 could have been interpreted in the way the Tribunal summarised at [31].
3. The Tribunal did not misstate or misrepresent the applicant's oral evidence. I am satisfied that the Tribunal at [31] accurately and fairly conveyed the substance of the oral evidence given by the applicant at the hearing about events he said occurred after he returned from Pakistan and what happened to R.
4. At the hearing, the applicant also took issue with the Tribunal's consideration at [32] that the applicant made no mention of the incident at the restaurant in about April 2015 or the incident in the middle of July 2015 when a group of men surrounded him. It was contended that there were several consistencies in the applicant's account of the events in that: an incident had occurred at a restaurant, the applicant was threatened, and men came to his home to demand that he continue to take money to the Mullah in Pakistan.
5. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal was correct to identify those matters as omissions from the oral evidence as they were not minor discrepancies and were objectively important aspects of the applicant's claims. It was contended that the omissions could not be considered outside the broader context of the Tribunal's reasons.
6. I accept that there were consistencies in the accounts, however, the mere existence of some consistencies in the applicant's evidence is not of itself a basis for establishing that the Tribunal's concerns as to the applicant's credibility or the veracity of his claims were unfounded, irrational or illogical. It is not for this Court to reassess the factual consistency or consider whether a different view of the evidence could have been formed by the Tribunal; rather, the focus is on the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence and whether its conclusions about the inconsistencies (and its concerns about omissions) were reasonably open to it.
7. I accept the Minister's submission that the events claimed to have occurred in April 2015 and in July 2015 were not minor or peripheral. As summarised by the Tribunal at [30], the incident in April 2015 was at a restaurant, where a group of Pakistani men with beards had come to speak with R and had left with him, that being the last time the applicant saw R. In July 2015, the applicant said he was approached by a group of men in white kaftans who threatened him and asked him to work for them, and when he asked them as the whereabouts of R, they told him that the Mullah had ordered them to take R away.
8. In the context of the applicant's claims, the events of April 2015 and July 2015 and what happened to R were, on a fair assessment, objectively central to his claims for protection. No error is identified in the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence at [30]-[32]. Nor could it be said that its conclusion at [33] (that there were inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence about what happened to R and that there were significant omissions in the applicant's evidence) was not reasonably open to it.
9. Particular (d) does not establish error on the part of the Tribunal.

Particular (e): Findings of omissions and inconsistencies lacking probative foundation and/or relying on peripheral matters[12]

1. By particular (e), the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence at [34]-[36] of its reasons and its conclusion at [37] that there were inconsistencies in the evidence relating to where the applicant was arrested, the circumstances surrounding his arrest, why he was arrested, and where he was imprisoned.
2. The applicant contended that the Tribunal erroneously relied upon omissions, which related to peripheral or minor matters, when considering the applicant's claims of arrest in Pakistan and the surrounding circumstances. It was submitted that the applicant's oral evidence was given some four years and four months after the provision of his written statement of claims, and that in the circumstances it may be reasonable to expect an applicant may not recount minor details. It was contended that the alleged omissions should have been given little, if any, weight by the Tribunal when assessing the credibility of the applicant's evidence.
3. Before considering each of the matters identified by the applicant in their submission as being minor or peripheral, it is necessary to set out the relevant paragraphs of the Tribunal's decision:

34. Fourth, in his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that the group of men involved in the incident in the middle of July 2015 accompanied him to his apartment, offered him cash and questioned him about his return to Pakistan. He claimed that they told him that he should not leave Saudi Arabia without telling them. He claimed that he agreed to their request. He claimed that he contacted his siblings and they advised him to leave Saudi Arabia immediately. He claimed that he took a flight out of Saudi Arabia and returned to Pakistan. He claimed that he was fearful about living in Hafizabad and decided to live in a friend's house in Rawalpindi with his wife until it was safe for him to return to Hafizabad.[13]

35. In his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that, within a week, he received a telephone call from his daughter informing him that the Mullah had inquired about his arrival in Pakistan and where he was staying. He claimed that she informed him that he had not returned to Pakistan. He claimed that he told his wife to return to Hafizabad so the Mullah would not suspect that she was with him. He claimed that, within a couple of days, the Police threatened his wife and they went to Rawalpindi with her to arrest him. He claimed that the Police informed him that they had been ordered by their boss to arrest him and prosecute him for arms and drug dealing in Saudi Arabia with [R].[14]

36. During the hearing, the applicant gave a different version of events that was not consistent with his written claims. He stated that the men who went to his house in early 2015 returned two or three months later and asked him when he was going to Pakistan. He stated that he told them that he had no plans to go on holidays. He stated that they threatened him and he was scared. He stated that he contacted his brother and left for Pakistan. He stated that he had arranged for his wife and son to meet him at Lahore airport.[15] He stated that the Police and the Mullah were waiting for him at Lahore airport and he was arrested at the airport.[16] He initially stated that he was taken to Lahore gaol and subsequently stated that he was taken to a gaol in Hafizabad.[17] He stated that the Mullah had filed a false case against him.[18] He stated that the Police told him that the Mullah told them he is a Christian.[19]

37. These inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to where he was arrested, the circumstances surrounding his arrest, why he was arrested and which gaol he was imprisoned at raise concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.

1. In respect of the Tribunal's findings of inconsistences in relation to: (a) where the applicant was arrested: at CB 107 and T21:7-9; (b) the circumstances surrounding his arrest: at CB107 and T20:35-37; and (c) at which gaol he was imprisoned, the applicant contended that none of those findings were dispositive, nor did they contradict the material consistencies between what was said in the written statement of claims and the applicant's oral evidence as to why he feared returning to Pakistan. It was contended that the applicant had consistently stated he was arrested by police in Pakistan, that the Mullah ordered police to arrest him, that he did not want to return to Hafizabad and informed his wife and son that it was unsafe for him to return there as people were looking for him, that he contacted his siblings immediately after he had been threatened by the men in Saudi Arabia, and that he fled Saudi Arabia following these threats.
2. The Minister submitted that each of the inconsistences found by the Tribunal, as set out at [34]-[37], were open to it on a plain reading of the material before it.
3. In respect of this particular, I repeat what I said above, the mere existence of some consistencies in the applicant's accounts is not of itself a basis for establishing that the Tribunal's credibility concerns were unfounded, irrational or illogical.
4. Differences in accounts are not fatal to an applicant's case. It is well recognised that multiple accounts provided at different stages of the decision-making process by a person seeking protection, often through interpreters, will inevitably contain differences: see AVQ15 at [25]. In this regard, the authorities emphasise the need for 'appropriate caution' when using the term 'inconsistency': AVQ15 at [27].
5. It is nevertheless well established that a decision maker is entitled to rely upon inconsistencies in assessing an applicant's credibility (or reliability), provided a fair and reasonable process has been conducted. In circumstances where an inconsistency is reasonably found, what is required is an assessment of the significance of the inconsistency and whether the inconsistency related to a matter central to the applicant's case or is at its periphery: EVI19 at [42]-[45] and the authorities cited therein.
6. The inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal in the applicant's evidence related to: (a) the location of his arrest and whether it was at Lahore airport or at Rawalpindi where he was staying; (b) the circumstances of the arrest and whether police and the Mullah were waiting for him at Lahore airport or he was arrested by police, who were accompanied by his wife, a few days later in Rawalpindi; and (c) where he was imprisoned and whether it was in Hafizabad or Rawalpindi.
7. The location of the applicant's arrest, the circumstances surrounding his arrest and where he was taken following the arrest were, objectively, matters central to his claims for protection. They related to incidents of harm at the hands of the authorities in Pakistan which the applicant claimed to have personally experienced: cf. BEL16 at [31], [55]. The inconsistencies, on a fair view of the evidence, could not be considered trivial subjective differences in the applicant's narrative such that no weight should have been attributed to them: cf. EVI19 at [49].
8. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence as set out at [34]-[36] of its reasons. In this regard, it was open for the Tribunal to conclude at [37] that the applicant had provided inconsistent evidence in respect of the matters set out at [34]-[36] of its reasons which cast doubt over the veracity of his claims. Further, as submitted by the Minister, the matters set out in these paragraphs, which comprised the Tribunal's fourth concern, was not the only basis upon which the Tribunal made its credibility finding.
9. Particular (e) does not establish error on the part of the Tribunal.

Particular (f): findings based on minor matters incapable of supporting an adverse credibility finding[20]

1. By this particular, the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence at [38]-[43] of its reasons. The applicant contended that the Tribunal's finding that the omissions and inconsistencies in his evidence regarding where he was detained, his experiences during that time, and what the police officer had told him were incapable of supporting an adverse credibility finding as they were secondary to common factual evidence.
2. The paragraphs with which particular (f) takes issue comprise the Tribunal's fifth concern as to the credibility of the applicant's claims and evidence. The Tribunal relevantly stated:

38. Fifth, in his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that he was imprisoned for two weeks and beaten and kicked until he told the Police everything that happened. He claimed that they got him to sign a false statement that was prepared by them with false facts. He claimed that his wife and brothers organized an NGO to bribe the Police to release him. He claimed that TTP militants went to the Police Station and beat him for not obeying the Saudi Arabian men. He claimed that they ordered him to return to Saudi Arabia. He claimed that, to get away from them, he agreed to their orders. He claimed that, after they left, the Police Officers advised him to leave Pakistan immediately and not to return to Pakistan. He claimed that they told him if he returned they would have to hand him over to the TTP or sentence him to permanent imprisonment. He claimed that they advised him not to tell anyone about the bribe.[21]

39. In his Statement of Claims, the applicant claimed that, on his release, his family advised him to go and live in Germany with his daughter. He claimed that his daughter advised him not to go to Germany as he would have language problems there. He claimed that his siblings in the UK and Canada advised him to come to Australia where the majority of his siblings live. He claimed that, as he already had an Australian visa, he came to Australia.[22]

40. During the hearing, the applicant gave a different version of events that was not consistent with his written claims. He stated that, after he was taken to a gaol in Hafizabad, a Policeman beat him and asked him what he did wrong in Saudi Arabia.[23] He stated that he told him he did not do anything wrong. He stated that he said he had brought money to Pakistan on one occasion. He stated that he said he subsequently found out that they were involved in wrong doings and wanted to involve him as well. He stated that the Police supported the Mullah. He stated that on the following day the Mullah went to the gaol with the Police and "bashed' him badly.[24]

41. The applicant stated that on the following day his wife and son went to the Hafizabad Police Station and he somehow, through someone, asked to see his wife and son and discreetly told them to bribe someone and get him out of gaol. He stated that his wife and son negotiated a bribe with a Police Officer and with someone else's help they managed to get him released on the following day. He stated that the Police Officer advised him not to go to his house as his life was in danger.[25] He stated that he went straight to the airport. He stated that he was able to get a seat on a flight to Australia on the following day and stayed overnight at the airport.[26]

42. In his evidence to the Tribunal, the applicant made no mention of being required by the Police to sign a false statement. He made no mention of TTP militants beating him, ordering him to return to Saudi Arabia and him agreeing to do so. He made no mention of a Police Officer advising him not to return to Pakistan and if he did they would have to hand him over to the TTP or sentence him to permanent imprisonment. He made no mention of having discussions with family members in Germany, the UK and Canada about where he should go when he left Pakistan.

43. These omissions in the applicant's evidence and the inconsistencies in his evidence in relation to whether he was detained at the Police Station at Hafizabad or at a gaol in Hafizabad, who negotiated the bribe with the Police Officer, whether he was beaten by TTP militants or the Mullah and what the Police Officer who accepted the bribe told him raise concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of these claims.

1. The applicant contends that he had provided consistent evidence in respect of the substantial factual matters in both his written statement and his oral evidence. These matters were summarised in the applicant's written submissions as follows:
   1. In his Statement he said he was forced to sign a statement with false facts. In his Oral Evidence he said they "created some fake cases against me and they sent it to the Court": T21:24-25. There is no inconsistency in substance.
   2. In his Statement he said TTP militants arrived at the police station and beat him for not listening to the Saudi's advice to work for them. In his Oral Evidence he said that "the police man actually ah beat me, or hit me and beat me and started asking me like what wrong thing [I] was doing over there. ... And the next day the mullah came with the police and they bashed me badly": T23:18-20. Again, notwithstanding who beat and hit him, it was done while he was in the custody of the police and related to the pressure from the Saudis. Any inconsistency is minor.
   3. In his Statement he said: "the police officer wanted me to leave the country and never enter Pakistan in the future. They said that if I returned back they would have to hand me over to the TTP or sentence me to prison permanently." He was asked to keep the bribe confidential. In his Oral Evidence, he said the policeman agreed to a price for the bribe and "that once he's out of jail, out of this place, don't take him to the home because his life is under threat": T24:5-7. Then later: "But umm as he talked to the policeman that umm if ah needed you can stay at the airport but don't go to the home": T24:13-14. Again, the basic factual matter was that the police man who took the bribe gave him advice; that advice was to go straight to the airport and not return home first, and it is essentially similar to the advice to leave the country immediately, in substance the advice is materially consistent.
   4. In his Statement, he said after being released, he received advice from his family members on where to go. In his Oral Statement he said that he went straight to the airport then caught a flight to Australia. The omission about receiving advice from his family members is a peripheral matter. Consistent with going straight to the airport, he said in his Statement: "As I already had the Australian visa already, there was no need for me to spend more money on agents fee, I decided to flee from Pakistan before it was too late": CB 107[2].
   5. As to any alleged inconsistency as to whether he was imprisoned at the jail or the police station, it is secondary to the common factual evidence that he was imprisoned by the Pakistani authorities.
   6. As to any alleged inconsistency as to who negotiated a bribe with the police officer for his release, it is also secondary to the common factual evidence that a bribe was negotiated and settled which caused his release from prison.
2. While another Tribunal may have reasoned in the way suggested by the applicant, it cannot be said that it was not open to the Tribunal in the present case to reason as it did.
3. A fair reading of the matters about which the Tribunal had concerns, as set out at [38]-[43], does not disclose illogicality or irrationality in its reasoning. It was open for the Tribunal to consider of note that the applicant had made no mention of incidents he claimed to have experienced in Pakistan whilst detained, including being required to sign a false statement, being beaten by TTP militants and ordered to return to Saudi Arabia, and receiving advice from police that if he returned to Pakistan he would be handed to the TTP or sentenced to permanent imprisonment.
4. As to the matters found by the Tribunal to be inconsistent at [43], it cannot be said, having regard to the evidence before it, which it accurately summarised at [38]-[41], that the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence was illogical or irrational. The matters found by the Tribunal at [43] to be inconsistent could not objectively be considered peripheral or inconsequential to the applicant's claims for protection. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's reasoning at [38]-[43].
5. Particular (f) does not establish error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. As none of the particulars have been made out, it is not necessary to consider the issue of whether any one of the particulars, if established, would have been sufficient to undermine the Tribunal's credibility finding given the cumulative reasoning upon which it relied.
2. The applicant has not established, as advanced by ground one and its particulars, that the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical. As this was the only ground pressed, the application must be dismissed.
3. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-seven (137) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.

[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings.

[2] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1 at T17.23-24.

[5] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1at T18.25-26.

[8] See [32]-[46] of the applicant's written submissions.

[9] The written submissions in respect of particular (d) appear under the heading 'particular (c)' of the applicant's outline of submission filed on 29 July 2025: at paragraphs 47-50.

[10] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1at T18.8-17, T20.2-13.

[12] The written submissions in respect of particular (e) appear under the heading 'particular (d)' of the applicant's outline of submission filed on 29 July 2025: at paragraphs 51-54.

[15] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1, T20.15-30, T22.26-27**.**

[16] Ibid. at annexure LS-1, T20.35-T21.9, T23.5.

[17] Ibid. at annexure LS-1, T21.7-9, T23.16.

[18] Ibid. at annexure LS-1, T21.13-21.25.

[19] Ibid. at annexure LS-1, T21.26-T22.1.

[20] The written submissions in respect of particular (f) appear under the heading 'particular (e)' of the applicant's outline of submission filed on 29 July 2025: at paragraphs 55-59.

[23] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1, T23.18-19.

[25] Spark affidavit at annexure LS-1, T23.35-T24.8.