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[2014] VCAT 342
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2014-04-01
Brooking J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Mr Chris Townshend SC and Mr Barnaby Chessell Barrister instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright, solicitors.
Written evidence was tabled from Ms Samantha Slicer of Flood Slicer author of the photomontages. Ms Slicer was not called to give evidence.
Ms Phillipa Martin for herself, Shane Dineen, Giulia Damante, Paul Chung and Ae Jin Park.
A permit was granted, at the direction of the Tribunal, for a four level mixed use development containing dwellings, shops, cafe and offices. The building included two levels of basement containing car parking and storage.
The current proposal is for a 1620m² supermarket, a mezzanine office area at first floor and two levels of basement containing car parking.
Application under Section 87A of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 to amend a permit.
Special Building Overlay(SBO) applies to only part of the land
Clause 34.01-4 A permit is required to construct buildings and works in a Commercial 1 Zone.
Clause 43.01-1 A permit is required to demolish a building, construct a building or construct or carry out works under HO532.
Clause 43.02-2 A permit is required to construct a building or construct or carry out works under DDO18.
Clause 44.05-1 A permit is required to construct a building or to construct or carry out works under the SBO.
Clause 52.06-3 A permit is required to reduce the number of car spaces required by clause 52.06-5.
Key Policies and Provisions of the Boroondara Planning Scheme
Clauses 10, 11, 15, 17 and18 of the State Planning Policy Framework.
Clauses 21, 22.05, 22.10 and 22.12 of the Local Planning Policy Framework.
Clauses 34.01, 43.01, 43.02, 44.05, 52.06, 52.07, 52.34 and 65.
The review site comprises 7 adjoining lots in a combined parcel of 2204m² located on the western side of Union Road and bounded by Croydon Road to the north, Sunbury Crescent to the south and a right of way to the west. The land falls to the north west corner and currently contains a mix of single and double storey buildings.
The site is within the Union Road Neighbourhood Shopping Centre which contains a mix of commercial and retail use with the Surrey Hills railway station located some 100m to the south-east of the review site.
An accompanied inspection was undertaken of the review site and surrounds on 26 February 2014. The Tribunal undertook an unaccompanied site visit to the Coles supermarket at 95-103 Johnston Street Fitzroy and viewed some examples of additions to heritage buildings referred to by Mr Raworth.[3]
Addicoat v Fox (No 2) [1979] VR 347; [1979] VicRp 37; Melbourne CC v Becton [2003] VCAT 1077; Tarwin Valley Coastal Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning and Anor [2010] VCAT 1226; City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135; Australian Slate-Crete Supplies v Casey CC [2008] VCAT 6; Bestway v Monash CC [2008] VCAT 860; Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd v Moreland CC [2005] VCAT 1049; Fosters Group Ltd v Mornington Peninsula SC [2010] VCAT 104
The requirements of this overlay do not apply to any planning permit application decided by the responsible authority before 26 July 2012 or to any development for which a planning permit had issued before this date.
87A Cancellation or amendment of permit issued at direction of Tribunal
(1) In addition to the powers conferred by section 87, the Tribunal may cancel or amend a permit that has been issued at its direction if it considers it appropriate to do so.
In my opinion, a power to grant a permit subject to conditions authorises the responsible authority to grant a permit for a use or development which differs from the use or development the subject of the application for a permit, provided that the difference is not so radical as to enable it to be said, viewing the matter broadly and fairly, that to grant a permit on the supposed conditions would not be to grant the permit applied for with modifications, but to grant a different permit. This is plainly a matter of degree, and indeed it is almost one of impression. In my view, the changes made may be considerable without necessarily bringing it about that the permit granted is a different as opposed to a modified permit. Whether more may be countenanced by way of limiting the development or use, as opposed to extending it, before the point is reached at which alteration ceases to be modification and becomes transformation, is a question which I find it unnecessary to decide. On this question fairness and convenience may point towards one conclusion and logic towards another. [Emphasis added]
[14] ... I consider that the ambit of change that may be made to a permit under any of these provisions may be quite substantial and may include changes to any of the things allowed by the permit, its conditions and the land description. Apart from plans, drawings and other documents, the component elements of a permit include the use or development or other thing allowed by the permit, the land description and the conditions. There is no suggestion in the words of any of these provisions of the Act that changes could not be made to any of these elements subject to proper notice being given to potentially affected persons. ...
[21] Clearly, conditions may be amended as a consequence of such amendments to what the permit allows. Conditions may also be amended without any change to what the permit allows. Situations could arise where the land description might change too.
[22] Of course, there are some limits to all this. As I said in Australian Slate Crete Supplies:
[29] ... The process of amending a permit would stop short of allowing a transformation. In this respect, the principle of Addicoat v Fox (No 2) remains relevant - "changes made may be considerable without necessarily bringing it about that the permit granted is a different as opposed to a modified permit."[13] Thus for a completely new or unrelated use or development, I consider that the proper procedure is to apply for a new permit rather than applying to amend an existing permit in such a way that would result in a different permit as distinct from modified permit.[14]
[23] If a proposed use or development is totally unrelated to the permit as it exists and would entail completely new conditions, I consider that the amendment process would be inappropriate. There would be no point in attempting to amend a permit in such circumstances where nothing would be left of the original permit. An application for a new permit should be made. However, where the permit is not transformed but retains significant elements of its previous content, and simply adds to, expands or alters what has been previously allowed, I consider that amending a permit, rather than always having to apply for a new permit, is now clearly contemplated by the provisions in the Act.
The term jurisdictional fact (which may be a complex of elements) is often used to identify that criterion, the satisfaction of which enlivens the power of the decision maker to exercise a discretion.
A jurisdictional fact is a fact which must 'in truth' exist before the decision maker can validly act.
[27] ... The decisions relating to 'jurisdictional fact' relate to whether a factual reference in a statutory formulation is a 'jurisdictional fact' and in such circumstances the normal rules of statutory construction apply[19]. Such a fact is objectively ascertained and essential.
A jurisdictional fact is said to be a fact which must 'in truth' exist before the decision-maker or official can validly act. That is, its existence is to be determined finally by the superior court which decides whether it thinks the fact existed at the relevant time[20].
[28] In Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission[21] the High Court held that the question whether what was proposed would fit within a statutory definition of 'special industry' was an issue of 'jurisdictional fact' and was not for the Development Assessment Commission itself to finally determine. The criterion 'special industry' was a matter of fact which did not depend upon the satisfaction or opinion of the Development Assessment Commission.
[29] In Becton[22] Morris J referred to the decisions in both Enfield and Timbarra in reaching a conclusion that the 'power given to the responsible authority to approve an amendment to any plans approved under a permit is clearly conditional on the amendment being of a certain character. The use of the word if in section 62(3) makes this plain'. Section 62(3) is no longer in the PE Act but at the time of the Becton decision it provided:
(3) The responsible authority may approve an amendment to any plans, drawings or other documents approved under a permit if -
(i) the planning scheme currently applying to the land; and
(b) the amendment will not authorise anything which would result in a breach of a registered restrictive covenant.
[30] The power given to the Responsible Authority in section 62(3) was relied upon by the Minister in Becton to amend a Concept Plan which had been approved under a permit. Morris J observed that the 'power to approve an amendment to plans is a broad power; but it is not a power which would extend to the approval of plans which transformed the development shown on the plans which had been approved under the permit'[23]. In other words the power to approve the amendment to the Concept Plan was dependent on the amendment being consistent with the permit as a matter of fact as required under section 62(3)(a)(i) and (ii).
Is there power under section 87A to transform a permit?
(f) to provide for a single authority to issue permits for land use or development and related matters, and to co-ordinate the issue of permits with related approvals;
[18] Permits are an integral aspect of Victoria's planning system. They are the means by which most use or development of land allowed under a planning scheme is authorised. They are documents of significant commercial value to their holders; they define rights and obligations; and they may be enforced by a responsible authority or any person. The resources that are invested by permit applicants, responsible authorities, referral authorities and third parties in the grant of permits are considerable in terms of time, effort and money, and the process can be most complex. I do not consider that the Tribunal should add unnecessarily to that complexity where it can be avoided. It is important to recognise that the practical administration of the planning permit process must occur within the context of the real world. As the Tribunal said in Mentone Mansions Pty Ltd v Kingston CC [32]:
[14] ... Most planning projects undergo a design and development process which takes a considerable time, and the planning approval phase is early in that process. As a consequence, after planning approval the development of a design for construction purposes, and the construction process itself, can result in a need to amend the development no matter how well resolved the development is at the planning stage. ...
[19] The planning system needs to be able to cope efficiently with such changes or other subsequent changes to the use or development of a site for whatever reason. It is important that changes are handled in a way that addresses their substantive merits; ensures that when eligible third persons may be genuinely affected, they are notified and given an opportunity to be heard; and that applications are processed and decisions are made about changes efficiently and in a timely way. The reforms to the Planning and Environment Act 1987 by the introduction of Division 1A and section 87A enables these objectives to be achieved by focussing on the proposed changes, rather than re-opening debate about the whole proposal. Importantly, what happens on a site, can be managed through a single permit document, which is a more transparent process and less likely to result in inconsistencies than having multiple permits for the same site accumulate over time.
[2] At the time of the application for permit the land was zoned Business 2. Amendment VC100 gazetted 15 July 2013 included the land within a Commercial 1 Zone.
[3] We gave leave for Mr Raworth to suggest examples of where treatment of levels above a heritage building is similar to that proposed. Information to this effect that included photographs and some addresses was served on the Tribunal and all parties after the hearing accompanied by a letter from Norton Rose Fulbright dated 28 February 2014.
[4] We have considered all submissions and evidence presented by the parties and Statements of Grounds although we do not recite all of the contents in these reasons.
[5] Union Central Pty Ltd v Boroondara CC [2012] VCAT 656
[7] Fosters Group Limited v Mornington Peninsula SC (includes Summary) (Red Dot) [2010] VCAT 104
[9] [1979] VicRp 37; [1979] VR 347 at 363
[10] [1979] VicRp 37; [1979] VR 347 at 363
[12] [2008] VCAT 860 at [17] and [20]
[13] [1979] VicRp 37; [1979] VR 347 at 363
[14] My comments about the amendment of permits under Division 1A apply equally to amendments under Division 3 applied for by the permit holder. Each process is similar in that it allows procedural fairness to be accorded to affected persons. It would be inequitable, not to say highly confusing, if a different approach was to be taken and different outcomes were to arise depending on whether a permit had been issued at the direction of the Tribunal or not.
[16] [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 148
[19] Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL and Others [1999] NSWCA 8; Cabal and Others v Attorney -General of the Commonwealth [2001] FCA 583
[20] A Aronsen & B Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed 2000)
[22] Melbourne CC & Ors v Minister for Planning and Becton Corporation Pty Ltd [2003] VCAT 1077
[25] [1979] VicRp 37; [1979] VR 347 at 365
[27] [2010] VCAT 104 [87]
[28] Permits can also approve other non use and development matters, such as the variation or removal of easements or restrictions.
[30] [2008] VCAT 6 at [28] - [29]
[31] [2008] VCAT 860 at [16] - [23]
[33] The Surrey Hills centre is identified in local policy as a Neighbourhood Activity Centre Level 3 at clause 22.10 of the Scheme.
[34] At clauses 11.01-2, 11.04-2, 17.01, 21.08, 21.12 and 22.10 of the Scheme.
[35] This amendment seeks to include built form controls for all Neighbourhood Shopping Centres. It was exhibited in May 2013 and considered by a Panel in November 2013. Subsequent to the hearing, the Panel report has been submitted to Council.
[36] Clause 15.01-2 Boroondara Planning Scheme
[37] Clause 2.0 Schedule 18 to the Design and Development Overlay
[38] Amendment C49, gazetted on 29 November 2012, applied HO532 to the review site and the wider Union Road commercial precinct.
[39] Including at Clauses 15, 21.05, 22.05, 43.01 and 65.
[40] As referred to in the Boroondara City Council Delegated Report on Request to VCAT for Section 87A Amendment dated 23 January 2014.
[42] Based on surveys and assumptions referred to in the traffic evidence of Mr Walsh.
Coles Property Group Developments Limited
Boroondara CC
(2000) 199 CLR 135