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[2010] VCAT 104
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2010-02-04
Original judgment source is linked above.
Where a planning scheme is amended, the amendment shall not, unless the contrary intention expressly appears, affect any right accrued under that planning scheme.
[29] ... Permits create substantive rights. Changes to the substantive law are presumed not to operate retrospectively. See Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96, CLR 261, 267 per Dixon CJ. Where a subordinate instrument such as a planning scheme expires, lapses or ceases to have effect, the expiry, lapsing or ceasing to have effect does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that subordinate instrument or provision (Section 28(2)(e) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984). In my view these principles preserve the operation of [the permit under consideration in that case] and it is not dependant at all for its preservation on Clause [63][22] of the current Scheme or on Section 6(3) of the Planning and Environment Act.
An existing use right is established in relation to use of land under this scheme if any of the following apply:
Can conditions in a permit that establish an existing use right be amended?
[35] In my view, the Tribunal was in error in interpreting s.87(1) of the Act and in particular, the extent of the discretionary power vested in the Tribunal by that section to "amend any permit" by having reference to the provisions of the Melbourne Planning Scheme and in particular, [to the equivalent of what is now clause 63.05] of it. By interpreting the provisions of the statute by reference to the Planning Scheme, the Tribunal interpreted the meaning of the words by which it was vested with the discretionary power to amend any permit, "by reference to the terms in which a delegated power to legislate had been exercised." By adopting this process the Tribunal was in error. Parliament enacted by that section that the Tribunal should have the discretionary power to "amend any permit". By its clear terms there is to be found in that section no apparent intention of Parliament to exclude from that power, the power to amend a permit by which an owner or occupier of land enjoys non-conforming use rights in circumstances where the use is a prohibited use being a section 3 use under the Planning Scheme. In my opinion, there is not to be found in s.6(3) or any other provision of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 any basis to conclude that it was the intention of Parliament that the discretionary power vested in the Tribunal by s.87(1) of the Act, to amend a permit, should be limited in the manner as contended for by the respondent on this appeal.
Can a permit which establishes an existing use right be amended to introduce a new use in addition to the existing use right?
[29] It is essential that this amendment process extends to what the permit allows and that additional primary permissions required under the planning scheme can be added. However, there are limits to this. The process of amending a permit would stop short of allowing a transformation. In this respect, the principle of Addicoat v Fox (No 2) remains relevant - "changes made may be considerable without necessarily bringing it about that the permit granted is a different as opposed to a modified permit." [[1979] VR 347 at 363] Thus for a completely new or unrelated use or development, I consider that the proper procedure is to apply for a new permit rather than applying to amend an existing permit in such a way that would result in a different permit as distinct from modified permit.
[23] If a proposed use or development is totally unrelated to the permit as it exists and would entail completely new conditions, I consider that the amendment process would be inappropriate. There would be no point in attempting to amend a permit in such circumstances where nothing would be left of the original permit. An application for a new permit should be made. However, where the permit is not transformed but retains significant elements of its previous content, and simply adds to, expands or alters what has been previously allowed, I consider that amending a permit, rather than always having to apply for a new permit, is now clearly contemplated by the provisions in the Act.
[14] ... There is no suggestion in the words of any of these provisions of the Act that changes could not be made to any of these elements subject to proper notice being given to potentially affected persons. ...
[43] For the reasons expressed I have concluded that there was error of law in the Tribunal in determining that it did not have power under s.87(1) of the Act to amend the permit, the subject of these proceedings, by deleting condition 4 of the same. Section 87(1) of the Act properly interpreted does vest in the Tribunal a discretionary power to amend the subject permit by which the appellant enjoys the right to use the land as a brothel notwithstanding that that use is a prohibited use under section 3 of the relevant zone in the Planning Scheme. That power includes the power to amend the permit by directing that condition 4 be deleted.
Moreover, the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses "context" in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means such as those just mentioned, one may discern the statute was intended to remedy. Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous...[I]f the apparently plain words of a provision are read in light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance. Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which, by the steps identified above, is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent.
(2) The objectives of the planning framework established by this Act are -
(b) to establish a system of planning schemes based on municipal districts to be the principal way of setting out objectives, policies and controls for the use, development and protection of land;
[45] In Seventh Columbo Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council the Supreme Court of Victoria held there was power under s.87 to delete a condition restricting the hours of operation of a brothel expressed in its permit, even though the brothel had become a use prohibited in its zone. That was because the exercise of the s.87 power did not alter or expand the primary use permission, which was for a brothel. It only amended the regulatory conditions. In Beaufonte v City of Yarra & Ors the Court held that there was power under s.87 to amend the permit to extend the hours of operation expressed in a condition, notwithstanding that such a brothel had become a prohibited use as a result of being within 100 metres of a dwelling. Again, the exercise of the s.87 power did not alter or expand the primary use permission, which was for a brothel. It only amended the regulatory conditions.
[46] What the applicant wishes me to do here, however, is use the s.87A amendment power to add another primary permission for a separate and distinct land use that is now prohibited.
[47] Section 87A does not allow me to do more thereunder than I could do in the first place under the planning scheme. Permit amendments operate under the primary permit or permission; they may expand the operation of the primary permission, as in Seventh Columbo and Beaufonte but they cannot alter the permission to include a separate and distinct permission.
IS THE SCALE AND INTENSITY OF THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT AND USE ACCEPTABLE?
• Permit P1376/95 was issued on 21 August 1995 and authorised a Winery and Cellar Door Sales. There are no restrictions on the number of patrons/customers. A document endorsed as part of the permit specifies that the 'envisaged hours of operation for the cellar door sales are Noon to 5pm 7 days a week'.
• Permit TP97/1029 was issued on 7 October 1997 and authorised the use of an existing building as a restaurant in association with wine tasting and cellar door sales. Condition No. 2 of the permit states that, except with the further written consent of the Responsible Authority, the use may only operate between the hours of 12.00pm (noon) - 5.00pm seven days a week. Condition No. 6 restricts the number of seats to not more than 16, unless with the prior written consent of the Responsible Authority. Additional conditions also include restrictions on the preparation and serving of food.
• Permit No. P981005 was issued on 1 October 1998 and authorised alterations and change of use to an existing building for wine tasting and restaurant. Conditions restrict the number of seats to 60, and the hours of operation to 9.00am - 5.00pm seven days a week, without the written consent of the Responsible Authority.
• Permit No. P00/2232 was issued on 21 May 2002 (amended on 30 August 2002 and 14 November 2003). This permit was the subject of an application to the Tribunal for a review of conditions. The permit authorises an extension of hours for the existing restaurant and cellar door sales. Condition No. 8 of this permit states:
The restaurant and cellar door sales must not be open to the public (including private functions) outside the hours of:
except during the period 1 November - 1 April and the Queens Birthday weekend Wednesday, Thursday and Sunday to be 9 am - 11pm.
The restaurant and cellar door sales must be closed on Good Friday and Christmas Day.
These times may be varied by the Responsible Authority at its discretion for a maximum of four times during any twelve month period.
Unless with the permission of the Responsible Authority, not more than 60 seats must be provided for patrons of the approved restaurant use. This includes any seating provided outdoors. After 5pm no more than 60 seats must be provided to patrons of the restaurant.
[1] Seventh Columbo Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [1998] VSC 7; 22 AATR 325
[2] We have considered all submissions, evidence and accompanying material. We do not recite all of the material presented as all documentation is retained on the Tribunal's file. All questions of law have been determined by Deputy President Gibson notwithstanding any language to the contrary used in these reasons.
[3] Permit No TP97/1029 for restaurant in association with wine tasting and cellar door sales.
[4] Seventh Columbo Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council (1998) VSC 7; 22 AATR 325
[5] The applicant did not specifically concede that it was in breach of its permits. The permit amendment application is an attempt to avoid enforcement action. As these are not enforcement proceedings, we therefore make no specific findings on whether the current operations actually breach the permits.
[7] Popular Pastimes Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC [2008] VCAT 1184 at [62]
[8] Vomanda Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC [1999] VCAT 554; (1999) 2 VPR 91
[9] Malo Pty Ltd v Mornington Peninsula SC [2008] VCAT 510
[10] Popular Pastimes Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC (red dot) [2008] VCAT 1184 at [51]- [58]. See also Peacock Amber Pty Ltd v Frankston CC [2000] VCAT 1663 and Lakkis v Wyndham CC [2001] VCAT 1046
[11] In certain respects we do not consider that this aspect of the application is particularly well considered. For example, permit P1376/95 authorises a winery and cellar door sales. The land is no longer used for a winery as this use is presently defined in the planning scheme because the land is no longer used for the manufacture of vineyard products (wine). Cellar door sales may have been a separate land use in the planning scheme when this permit was first granted, but such a use is no longer separately defined. Rather, it would be covered now by clause 52.27, which requires a permit to use land to sell or consume liquor. The application proposes to amend the use to include the sale of liquor from the premises, but it purports to limit the use to the use of an existing building as a restaurant and function centre in association with wine tasting and cellar door sales. Conditions in the permit continue to refer to cellar door sales. We are not certain what purpose is served by this limitation to an existing building (as the restaurant proposes to operate in both the existing and new buildings) and why there is a continued reference to the redundant use of cellar door sales.
[12] This permission presumably replaces the use allowed by permit P1376/95, which authorised cellar door sales. Cellar door sales may have been a separate use in the planning scheme when this permit was first granted, but there is no longer any such separate use defined. Rather, clause 52.27 now requires a permit to use land to sell or consume liquor.
[13] We refer to these sections by way of shorthand. In fact, section 72 is part of Division 1A of Part 4 of the Act and sections 87 and 87A are part of Division 3 of Part 4. The whole of each Division deals with the relevant process and the way the power to amend permits must be exercised.
[14] Division 1A - Amendment of permits by responsible authority (sections 72-76D) were included in 2004 and section 87A in 2007.
[15] See Jolin Nominees Pty Ltd v Moreland CC (Red Dot) [2006] VCAT 467; Zuzek v Boroondara CC (Red Dot) [2007] VCAT 2174; Bestway Group Pty Ltd v Monash CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT at 60
[16] Zuzek v Boroondara CC (red dot) [2007] VCAT 2174; Bestway Group Pty Ltd v Monash CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT 860
[17] See Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd v Moreland CC (Red Dot) [2005] VCAT 1049
[19] See Beaufonte v Yarra City Council (1995) 17 AATR 233 where the Supreme Court held that the prohibition in section 74(1)(b) of the Prostitution Control Act 1994 only applied to the grant of a new permit and did not (at least as the law then existed) affect an application to modify an existing permit under section 87 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987. See also Popular Pastimes Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT 1184.
[20] Section 4(2)(b) Planning and Environment Act 1987. There are some exceptions to this, such as section 61 subsections (2), (3) and (4), but they do not detract from this general principle.
[22] Deputy President Macnamara refers to clause 62 in this passage but this appears to be a typographical error and should refer to clause 63.
[23] For a further discussion of accrued rights and the limitations associated with them, see Glenelg CC v Printz Pty Ltd (Red Dot) [2009] VCAT 2477
[24] See Kraan v Cardinia CC [2006] VCAT 1629 at [28]- [29]
[25] Seventh Columbo Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [1998] VSC 7; 22 AATR 325
[26] For the purpose of this analysis, we have ignored other uses for which permits have been granted, such as cellar door sales.
[27] Whether it should be amended on the planning merits is a separate issue.
[28] Accident Towing and Advisory Committee v Combined Motor Industries Pty Ltd [1987] VicRp 48; [1987] VR 529
[30] [1998] VSC 7 at [41]
[31] Bestway Group Pty Ltd v Monash CC (red dot) [2008] VCAT 860 at [20]- [23]
[32] Australian Slate-Crete Supplies v Casey CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT 6 at [25]- [29]
[33] Bestway Group Pty Ltd v Monash CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT 860 at [16]
[35] [2007] VSCA 188 at [52] - [55]
[36] [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummo W J J, quoted with approval by Osborn AJA in Popular Pastimes.
[37] Wooling Hill Garden Estate Pty Ltd v Macedon Ranges SC [2007] VCAT 2226
[39] Clause 52.06-1 Mornington Peninsula Planning Scheme.
[40] Seventh Columbo Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC [1998] VSE 7; [1998] VSC 7; 22 AATR 325; Bestway Group Pty Ltd v Monash CC (red dot) [2008] VCAT 860; Australian Slate-Crete Supplies v Casey CC (red dot) 2008 VCAT 6.
[41] State Environment Protection Policy (Control of Noise from Commerce, Industry and Trade) No. N-1.
[42] State Environment Protection Policy (Control of Music Noise from Public Premises) No. N-2.
Fosters Group Ltd
Mornington Peninsula SC
(1997) 187 CLR 384