Chang, in the matter of Chang v Chang

1. The power of the Court to grant a stay of a judgment pending determination of an appeal is made express by r 36.08(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The principles applicable to the grant of a stay are well-settled: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 649 to 695 (Kirby P, Hope and McHugh JJA), as endorsed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation [1996] FCA 460; (1996) 67 FCR 65 at 66 (Burchett, Heerey and Whitlam JJ). In Scott v NIMLAW Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 1472, O'Bryan J summarised those principles as follows (at [11]):

(a) it is unnecessary to show "special" circumstances for the grant of a stay and it is "sufficient that the applicant for the stay demonstrates a reason or an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favour";

(b) a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained and is entitled to commence with the presumption that the judgment is correct;

(c) it follows that the onus is upon the applicant for the stay to demonstrate a proper basis for a stay that will be fair to all parties;

(d) the Court will weigh considerations such as the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties before it;

(e) if an appeal will be rendered nugatory unless a stay is granted, that will be a substantial factor in favour of the grant of a stay; and

(f) while the Court will not generally speculate about the appellant's prospects of success (given that argument concerning the substance of the appeal is typically and necessarily attenuated on a stay application), the Court may make some preliminary assessment about whether the appellant has an arguable appeal in order to assess the competing interests of the parties.

1. Before the primary judge, Ms Chang raised nine grounds upon which she sought review of the decision of the Judicial Registrar. Those grounds are summarised in Chang v Chang (No 2) as follows:
   1. Holly's application raises nine grounds of review, which can be summarised as follows:

• Holly contends that the Judicial Registrar dismissed the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice on the mistaken premise that the application had already been determined on 22 August 2025 (the date of the decision which was the subject of the first review proceedings leading to Chang v Chang (No 1)) (see grounds 1-4).
• Holly contends that the Judicial Registrar denied Holly procedural fairness by (a) failing to confirm whether any refusal actually occurred; and (b) dismissing the application without hearing from the Applicant on the issue (ground 5). It is said further that the Judicial Registrar wrongly considered that she was functus officio (ground 6).
• •Holly contends that the underlying debt is disputed on substantial grounds because the costs orders are the subject of an appeal in the Supreme Court (ground 8).
• Holly contends that the Bankruptcy Notice is being used as an abuse of process, including to exert pressure during ongoing Supreme Court proceedings concerning disputed trust and beneficial ownership interests (ground 9).
  1. The application states (in ground 10) that further grounds are set out in Holly's affidavit. She filed an affidavit dated 5 November 2025. That affidavit includes paragraphs in the nature of submissions about "procedural unfairness" (section E), and "disputes as to debt and abuse of process" (section F).

1. Ms Chang also contended that an undertaking given by Mr Chang in the Supreme Court of Victoria prevented him from filing a creditor's petition and taking any other "bankruptcy steps", and that the undertaking operated until the next directions hearing in the Supreme Court. The terms of the undertaking were as follows:
   1. On 11 November 2025, the plaintiff [Victor] gave a written undertaking to the Court by email:

I provide a formal undertaking to the Court that I will not file any creditor's petition against Ms Holly Chang before the next business day after the delivery of Her Honour Justice Hannon's reserved judgments in proceedings S ECI 2021 01122 and S ECI 2022 04357. (Emphasis added)

1. The judgment of Hannon J referred to in the undertaking is that referred to at [1] above, which was delivered on 19 November 2025: Holly Chang v Victor Chang (Appeals and applications) [2025] VSC 715.
2. The primary judge considered the evidence and submissions advanced by Ms Chang in relation to those grounds and found that the review application should be dismissed because there was no proper basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [2]. In broad terms, this was because:

(a) Grounds 1 to 6: The primary judge found that the function of the Court on a review application was to consider afresh the order that should be made, unfettered by the decision of the Judicial Registrar, such that these grounds were not relevant in the proceeding that was before His Honour: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [11] to [12].

(b) Ground 8: The primary judge observed that the appeal against the costs order which founded the bankruptcy notice had been dismissed on the ground that there was no reasonable prospect of establishing that it was affected by error. As such, his Honour found that even if Ms Chang were to appeal the decision in Holly Chang v Victor Chang, the prospects of success on any further appeal was "extremely low" and did not provide a basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [14] to [15].

(c) Ground 9: The primary judge found that there was no evidence beyond Ms Chang's assertion to support the allegation that the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process. The primary judge observed, in this regard, that Ms Chang did not seek to appeal the costs order until after the bankruptcy notice was issued: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [18].

(d) Undertaking: The primary judge found that the terms of the undertaking contradicted the submissions advanced by Ms Chang because they only related to the filing of a creditor's petition and, in any event, the undertaking had expired. His Honour further observed that the undertaking did not provide a reason to set aside the bankruptcy notice: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [16] to [17].

(e) Additional arguments: The primary judge made reference to additional arguments raised by Ms Chang at the hearing as to: (1) the finality, certainty and enforceability of the costs order on which the bankruptcy notice was based; (2) the inclusion in the bankruptcy notice of post-judgment interest; and (3) its service by post. His Honour rejected those arguments because: (1) the costs order stated that the amount was payable "forthwith" and the mere fact that it could be appealed did not render the costs order unenforceable in any relevant sense; and (2) and (3) there was no substance to the remaining arguments which had been dealt with at an earlier hearing: Chang v Chang (No 2) at [19] to [20]; citing the decision in Chang, in the matter of Chang v Chang [2025] FCA 1259 at [37].

1. The grounds of appeal are lengthy. A number appear, in effect, to seek to relitigate the arguments raised before the primary judge: cf, Sorbey v Nicol [2007] FCAFC 136 at [72] (Branson, Lindgren and Besanko JJ). My preliminary assessment for the purposes of this stay application (which has been brought on urgently) is that the grounds of appeal do not identify an error in the judgment and have no prospect of success. In stating that conclusion, I emphasise that it is one reached for the purpose of the stay application and is not one for the purpose of the appeal. It is possible that, at the hearing of the appeal, Ms Chang will advance different arguments regarding those grounds.
2. Ms Chang has not satisfied me that the appeal will be rendered nugatory unless a stay is granted or that she will suffer material prejudice if the stay is refused and the appeal succeeds. Ms Chang asserted during the hearing that if the stay is refused, she will lose the house in which she resides with her elderly father. Ms Chang also asserted that Mr Chang has filed a creditor's petition in reliance on the bankruptcy notice. There is no evidence before me in support of those contentions.
3. If (as Ms Chang asserts) Mr Chang has filed a creditor's petition under s 43 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), Ms Chang is entitled to oppose that petition on numerous grounds, including the conditions specified in s 44 and s 52 of the Act. Any such opposition will require a hearing in the court in which the creditor's petition is filed. It is only at the conclusion of that hearing that a sequestration order could be made against Ms Chang, Ms Chang would become bankrupt and her property would vest in the trustee: Act, s 58.
4. If (contrary to the views that I have expressed earlier) Ms Chang were to succeed on the appeal and the bankruptcy notice was set aside, any creditor's petition founded upon the bankruptcy notice would become invalid. Mr Chang would bear the risk of that outcome and any cost consequences.
5. In my view, Mr Chang is entitled to the benefit of the judgment in Chang v Chang (No 2) and there is no reason for the grant of the stay sought by Ms Chang.

1. For all the reasons given above, I refuse the application for a stay of the judgment in Chang v Chang (No 2). The remaining relief sought by Ms Chang as outlined at [3] above is premised on the grant of a stay. Ms Chang identified no other basis upon which that relief could or should be granted. As such and given the view that I have reached with respect to a stay, I refuse that relief.
2. Mr Chang seeks an order for the costs of obtaining a transcript of the hearing before me on 28 November 2025. As a self-represented litigant, Mr Chang is entitled to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in responding to the stay application: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43 and Cachia v Hanes [1994] HCA 14; (1993) 179 CLR 403 at 410 to 411 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ). But the transcript is not an expense that Mr Chang has incurred with respect to the hearing of the stay application. Rather, Mr Chang indicated that he wanted the transcript for an unidentified future hearing. I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to make the costs order sought by Mr Chang given that the compensation he seeks is not in respect of an expense incurred in connection with the stay application decided by this judgment

I certify that the preceding sixteen (16) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Longbottom.