Should the Additional Evidence be Received?
68 Section 27 of the Federal Court Act authorises the Court in an appeal to receive further evidence by affidavit. The circumstances in which the Court should exercise its discretion under s 27 to receive further evidence have been considered by the High Court in CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 (in the context of the similarly worded s 93A(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)) and by the Full Court of this Court in Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCAFC 53 at [20]-[24]; Gao v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2003] FCAFC 84 at [23]; Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited (2003) 2 ABC (NS) 32 at 48-50; [2003] FCAFC 200 at [68]-[74] and Li Pei Ye v Crown Limited [2004] FCAFC 8 at [157]-[161] as well as in Williams v Grant (see [50] above).
69 The above authorities reveal that the circumstances in which further evidence may be received in this Court on appeal are not limited by the principles laid down in authorities such as Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 which concern common law procedures. The proper limits of the discretion vested in the Court by s 27 are to be determined as a matter of statutory construction. As the Federal Court Act is silent as to the factors which govern its exercise, the discretion is confined only by the subject matter with which the Act is concerned. It should not be understood to be subject to implications or limitations not found in the words used by the legislature. It is a discretion to be exercised in the context of an appeal by way of rehearing. On appeal this Court is required to determine the rights of the parties upon the facts and in accordance with the law as it exists at the time of hearing the appeal.
70 A critical factor will be the subject matter of the proceeding with which the appeal is concerned. As the High Court observed in CDJ v VAJ the Court will more readily admit further evidence where the rights of third parties, such as children are at stake.
71 The discretion to receive further evidence must be exercised judicially, consistently with proper judicial process and in the interests of justice. It is highly unlikely that the legislature intended that s 27 should be construed in such a way as to obliterate the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction.
72 The proper role of an appellate court under s 25 of the Federal Court Act has been considered on a number of occasions in recent years including in Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd & Anor (2001) 117 FCR 424 and Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211 at [45]; it is ordinarily to correct error. Nothing in CDJ v VAJ was, in our view, intended to minimise the force of the observation of Gibbs CJ and Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ in Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7 that:
It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.
73 It is necessary to consider the additional evidence sought to be adduced by Mr Sobey having regard to the above principles. It may be noticed at once that there is no suggestion that the admission of the additional evidence is necessary to protect the rights of third parties. Indeed, the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be adduced is to show that Mr Sobey, rather than the unsecured creditors of Mr Mercorella and the Scheme, is entitled to the surplus funds from the sale of the Jerningham Street property. That is, far from protecting the rights of third parties the admission of the additional evidence might adversely affect the rights of third parties as determined by the primary judge.
74 None of the additional evidence that Mr Sobey seeks to adduce is fresh evidence in the sense that it concerns events which happened, or documents brought into existence, since the date of the hearing before the primary judge. The explanation for the evidence not being adduced at first instance is, at best, unsatisfactory and it is disputed.
75 Moreover, certain of the evidence, including the evidence concerning the execution of critical documents and the conduct of various firms of solicitors who have acted for Mr Sobey, is highly contentious. In some regards it is incomplete. For example, neither Mr nor Mrs Sobey has sworn an affidavit explaining the date on which, and the circumstances in which, Mrs Sobey witnessed Mr Sobey's signature on the memorandum of mortgage (see [54] above).
76 The additional evidence identified by Mr Hoffmann makes plain that, if the additional evidence that Mr Sobey seeks to adduce were received, fairness would demand that Messrs Nicol and Davies be allowed to adduce answering evidence. A number of the deponents to the affidavits containing the additional evidence could be expected to be required for cross-examination. That is, the only practical outcome would be for the matter to be remitted to a judge - effectively for re-hearing. As Lander J observed in Williams v Grant at [47], this would in reality give Mr Sobey that which he seeks on appeal without the merits of his appeal being considered. While in some cases the proper operation of s 27 may render this outcome unavoidable, having regard to the other considerations identified in [73]-[75], [77] and [79], we do not consider this to be a case of that character.
77 Perhaps most critically, even if the additional evidence which Mr Sobey seeks to adduce were received and accepted at face value, it is far from clear that Mr Sobey would show an entitlement to the surplus funds from the sale of the Jerningham Street property. The more significant of the difficulties that stand in the way of Mr Sobey showing that the judgment under appeal is erroneous include that:
(a) the consideration expressed in the memorandum of mortgage, which does not operate as a deed, is past consideration (see [16] above);
(b) the evidence does not support a suggestion that the consideration for the mortgage was in truth forbearance to sue or that the parties reached an agreement to discharge a previous agreement or agreements in consideration of each of them entering into a fresh agreement; and
(c) the reconciliation of Mr Mercorella's accounts and those of his related entities (see [65] above) show that since 20 April 2004 Mr Sobey and his related entities have received nearly eight million dollars from Mr Mercorella but no explanation of the relevance, if any, of those payments to Mr Sobey's asserted entitlement has been proffered by Mr Sobey.
78 This final matter assumes particular significance because of Mr Sobey's failure to provide to Messrs Nicol and Davies, or to the Court, a reconciliation of the amounts allegedly due pursuant to the loan agreement.
79 A further relevant factor is that, Lander J having refused to stay the order of the primary judge, the surplus funds available from the sale of the Jerningham Street property have now been paid to Messrs Nicol and Davies. For this reason there is a question as to the utility of the appeal from his Honour's judgment. Counsel for Mr Sobey indicated that were the matter remitted for re-hearing, Mr Sobey would seek a declaration as to his entitlement to the surplus funds. It seems that it is envisaged that Mr Sobey would thereafter be able to rely on the declaration in a proceeding to be brought against Messrs Nicol and Davies. We express no view on whether such a proceeding could successfully be brought against Messrs Nicol and Davies in the circumstances outlined above. However, there is a public interest in the finality of litigation. Mr Sobey's acceptance that the right which he seeks to establish cannot now be vindicated without the institution of yet another proceeding, or perhaps the making of a fresh application in the proceeding at first instance, is a factor which weighs against the exercise of the Court's discretion to receive additional evidence. We are not required to express a view on whether the position might be different had Mr Sobey offered to pay the costs of Messrs Nicol and Davies of the hearing before the primary judge and on appeal.
80 For the above reasons the application by Mr Sobey for this Court to receive evidence additional to the evidence before the primary judge is refused.