Appellant/Applicant v Respondent

APPLICATIONS - Application to refer respondent to the Director of Public Prosecutions for investigation for perjury pursuant to s 314 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) - Further application seeking travel restraint orders against respondent - No legitimate grounds for making referral or restraint orders sought - Applications refused.

1. This judgment concerns two appeals and two applications brought by Holly Chang, otherwise known as Hong Chang (Holly), that form part of a suite of matters commenced in this Court over nearly a decade (Chang family proceedings).[1]

1. The Chang family proceedings broadly concern ongoing disputes over significant real property holdings and other assets owned by or on behalf of members of the Chang family. The disputes are acrimonious, and include a history of family violence intervention orders between some family members.
2. The main litigants in this Court (in no specific order) are:

(a) Fuan Chang (Fuan) - the grandfather;

(b) Holly - Fuan's daughter;

(c) Jet Yu (Jet) - Holly's son; and

(d) Victor Chang (otherwise known as Shengli Chang) (Victor) - Fuan's son and Holly's brother.

1. To assist in understanding the issues considered and determined in this judgment, it is useful to describe the relevant matters in the Chang family proceedings.

1. Victor's proceeding concerned, in general terms, the proceeds of sale of a property on Ormond Esplanade, Elwood (Elwood property). Victor sought inter alia:[2]

(a) a declaration that Holly held her 50% legal interest in the Elwood property, and the net balance of the proceeds of its sale, on trust for Victor, together with equitable compensation, and further remedies tracing the sale proceeds into another property owned by Holly in Park Orchards; and

(b) equitable compensation, together with declaratory relief, arising from an alleged misappropriation of family funds by Holly to purchase a luxury motor vehicle.

1. On 4 February 2025, an Associate Judge gave summary judgment in Victor's favour.[3] Holly did not appear at that hearing.

A.2 S ECI 2022 04357 - Holly's first proceeding

1. Holly's first proceeding concerned alleged family trust arrangements said to lie behind the purchase and sale of various properties in Melbourne and Sydney in the period between about 2009 and 2015, including the Elwood property. Holly sought inter alia:[4]

(a) a declaration that Victor holds the balance of the family trust fund, together with various properties on trust for her, Fuan and other family members; and

(b) an injunction directing the Land Titles Office to transfer title to certain properties, including a property in Howitt St, South Yarra (South Yarra property) to Holly, Fuan and Holly's sister Hanna (who is not a party).

1. Holly also sought tracing remedies in respect of other properties allegedly purchased elsewhere by or on behalf of Victor in Malvern East and Glen Waverley in this State, and Auckland in New Zealand.[5]
2. The Associate Judge summarily dismissed Holly's claim on 4 February 2025.[6] Again, Holly did not appear at that hearing.

1. Fuan's proceeding concerns the beneficial ownership of the South Yarra property. Fuan's claim is against Jet and Shengli Investments Pty Ltd (Shengli), of which Jet is the sole director and secretary.[7] The South Yarra property was initially registered in the name of Shengli, but is now registered in Jet's name. Fuan alleges that by reason of financial contributions made by him and his wife to the purchase of that property, it is held on resulting or constructive trust for him. Fuan says that when Jet caused Shengli to transfer title to the South Yarra property to himself, he was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Fuan's equitable interest. Declaratory relief to that effect is sought by Fuan.

A.4 S ECI 2025 03682 - Holly's second proceeding

1. In Holly's second proceeding, she sues Jet and Shengli. She alleges an entitlement to a 50% beneficial interest in the South Yarra property and seeks declaratory relief to that effect.[8] Holly commenced this proceeding on 21 June 2025, immediately following the delivery of the ruling by the Associate Judge on 18 June 2025 refusing Holly's applications to set aside the summary orders made on 4 February 2025. Holly and Fuan live together in the South Yarra property.
2. Neither Fuan's proceeding nor Holly's second proceeding have been tried, and orders have been made for them to be managed and heard together.[9] An application by Jet and Shengli to stay Holly's second proceeding as an abuse of process was dismissed by the Associate Judge on 21 August 2025.[10]

1. On 21 June 2025, Holly filed two separate notices of appeal concerning orders made by the Associate Judge in Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding.
2. In Victor's proceeding, Holly appeals:

(a) the order made on 12 November 2024, by which Holly was ordered to pay Victor's indemnity costs of a hearing held on 3 October 2024, fixed in the sum of $22,168.08;[11]

(b) the order made on 4 February 2025, by which judgment was entered against Holly in the sum of $993,970.86 together with an award of interest in the sum of $397,588.34, and orders that Holly pay Victor's costs of his Summons filed 9 November 2024 on an indemnity basis, and certain other costs of the proceeding on a standard basis;[12] and

(c) the order made on 18 June 2025, by which Holly's Summons of 20 May 2025 (seeking to set aside the 4 February 2025 order) was dismissed, and she was ordered to pay Victor's costs of that Summons fixed in the sum of $5,000.00.[13]

(a) the order made on 12 November 2024, by which Holly was ordered to pay Victor's indemnity costs of a hearing held on 3 October 2024, fixed in the sum of $7,429.40;[14]

(b) the order made on 4 February 2025, by which Holly's proceeding was dismissed, and further orders that Holly pay Victor's costs of his Summons filed 29 November 2024 on an indemnity basis, and certain other costs of the proceeding on a standard basis;[15] and

(c) the order made on 18 June 2025, by which Holly's Summons of 2 June 2025 (seeking to set aside the 4 February 2025 order) was dismissed.[16]

1. Holly has also filed the following two applications (together, applications) in Victor's proceeding:

(a) by Amended Summons filed 26 June 2025,[17] an application seeking the referral of two Affidavits sworn by Victor to the Director of Public Prosecutions for investigation pursuant to s 314 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (Crimes Act), or in the exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction (referral application); and

(b) by Summons filed 8 July 2025, an application seeking travel restraint orders against Victor pursuant to s 314 of the Crimes Act, or in the exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction (restraint application).

1. Holly is self-represented. Victor is represented by counsel, but does not have solicitors on the record. On 1 July 2025, orders were made seeking to manage the materials to be relied on by the parties at the hearing of the appeals and applications.[18] The documents filed in accordance with those orders did not in fact encompass all of the materials upon which the parties sought to rely; a substantial Court Book later filed by Victor endeavoured to include all potentially relevant documents. In addition, at the hearing on 21 August 2025, I granted leave to Holly to rely on further submissions filed by Holly on 11 August 2025, outside the regime under the 1 July 2025 orders.[19]
2. For the reasons which follow, Holly's appeals and applications will be dismissed.

1. I have structured my consideration of the appeals by reference to the three sets of orders that Holly impugns (the 12 November 2024 orders, the 4 February 2025 orders and the 18 June 2025 orders), rather than the two proceedings to which the orders relate (Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding). This approach is preferable, because the two proceedings have been managed together by this Court and Holly's grounds of appeal cut across both proceedings, in substance.[20]

C.1 Jurisdiction, procedure and principles on appeal

1. The appeals were brought under Division 2A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (Supreme Court Act) and r 77.06 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules) 2015 (Rules). There are four important matters to identify at the outset.
2. First, pursuant to s 17(3), unless otherwise expressly provided, an appeal to the trial division lies as of right from any determination of the trial division constituted by an Associate Judge.[21]
3. Second, s 17A imposes restrictions on this appeal right. One restriction concerns an appeal from an Associate Judge as to costs which are in the discretion of the trial division. Such an appeal may only be brought by leave (s 17A(2)).[22]
4. Third, the procedure on appeals from decisions of an Associate Judge is governed by r 77.06.[23] Relevantly:

(a) a notice of appeal shall be served within 14 days after the judgment or order of the Associate Judge was given or made (r 77.06.2(1)(a)), save in circumstances where leave to appeal is required, where such a notice shall be served within 14 days of leave being granted (r 77.06.2(1)(b)); and

(b) where leave to appeal is required, it must be sought within 14 days after the judgment or order of the Associate Judge was given or made (r 77.06.2(3)).

1. Fourth, any appeal is in the nature of a rehearing, which ordinarily requires the appellant to show error on the part of the Associate Judge before the appellate power may be exercised. Further, if the subject orders concern a matter of practice and procedure, particular caution should be exercised in reviewing the decision.[24]

1. Holly appeals the costs orders made on 12 November 2025 referred to above at [14(a)] and [15(a)].
2. It is sufficient for present purposes to note the following matters that preceded the orders:[25]

(a) at Victor's request, on 3 October 2024, a directions hearing was conducted in each proceeding to address Holly's failure to make general discovery in Holly's first proceeding,[26] and particular discovery in Victor's proceeding;[27]

(b) at that hearing, Holly appeared in person and gave an explanation as to why she had not produced the documents sought. The Associate Judge extended the time for Holly to comply with the earlier discovery orders to 1 November 2024. Victor's costs of and incidental to the 3 October 2024 directions hearing were reserved for determination on 12 November 2024; and

(c) Victor filed affidavit evidence supporting his costs of and incidental to the 3 October 2024 hearing.[28]

1. Victor was represented by counsel at the 12 November 2024 hearing. Holly did not appear. Relevantly, her Honour said:

This is an appropriate occasion for an award of costs on an indemnity basis. The plaintiff wilfully and repeatedly refused to comply with orders for discovery prior to the hearing on 3 October 2024, and this issue was the only matter dealt with at the hearing on 3 October 2024. Further, given that the proceeding is unlikely to be set down for trial in the near future, given ongoing disputes regarding discovery, it may well be some time before the proceeding is finally determined. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the costs associated with the hearing on 3 October 2024 be fixed in a gross sum and payable forthwith.[29]

1. Further, her Honour was satisfied that the costs claimed by Victor were not unreasonable having regard to the evidence. Her Honour noted that the sums claimed were less than those claimable on scale.[30]
2. On 13 November 2024, a copy of each of the 12 November 2024 orders was sent by email by the Court to each of Victor and Holly.[31]
3. Holly required the leave of the Court to appeal the 12 November 2024 costs orders. Any such application for leave to appeal was to be filed within 14 days after 12 November 2024. Holly did not make an application for leave to appeal the 12 November 2024 costs orders within the time provided for by r 77.06.2(3), or at all.
4. Holly's appeals against the 12 November 2024 orders are incompetent. However, having regard to Holly's position as a self-represented litigant, I have proceeded on the basis that the appeal materials constitute an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal (available under r 77.06.2(6)) and, if the extension be granted, an application for leave to appeal.
5. The principles governing the exercise of the discretion to extend time for an appeal are well established and involve consideration of:

(a) the length of and reasons for delay;

(b) prejudice to the respondent; and

(c) whether the proposed appeal so lacks merit as to be futile.[32]

1. Having regard to these factors, the following matters militate against the exercise of my discretion to grant Holly an extension of time.

1. Holly's failure to challenge the costs orders (whether by application to set aside or appeal) for nearly seven months is entirely unexplained. Holly contends that her various affidavits sworn 'in June 2025' provide a full and reasonable explanation for the delay.[33] Holly filed at least 13 affidavits in the two proceedings in June 2025. I have read all of them, together with her three affidavits filed in July 2025. I am unable discern from them any explanation for the delay in commencing the appeals concerning the 12 November orders.
2. Further, it is relevant that r 46.08(a) permits the Court to set aside or vary an order which affects a person where the application was made on notice, but the person did not attend the hearing of the application.[34] This procedure was available to Holly in respect of the 12 November 2024 costs orders. Indeed, two set aside applications were made by Holly in respect of the orders made on 4 February 2025.[35] Holly could have, but did not, include the 12 November 2024 costs orders as part of her applications to set aside the 4 February 2025 orders. Her appeals were commenced only after those applications were unsuccessful. Whilst I accept that a self-represented litigant is at a disadvantage in understanding the rules of practice and procedure, there must also be finality in the litigation process.

1. Next, there is the question of prejudice to Victor arising from the delay in bringing the appeal.
2. I accept that some prejudice to Victor does arise in the circumstances before me, which include the fact that in late May 2025, Victor issued and served a Bankruptcy Notice based on the 12 November 2024 costs orders,[36] which has also been the subject of separate proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. Whilst that form of prejudice, of itself, might be an insufficient reason to decline to extend the time for making application for leave to appeal, it is nevertheless a relevant consideration in the exercise of my discretion.

C.2.3 The proposed appeal so lacks merit as to be futile

1. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, none of the proposed grounds of appeal identified by Holly disclose a sound basis for the exercise of the discretion in favour of an extension of time for a leave application.
2. Having regard to the voluminous appeal materials and submissions filed by Holly, doing the best that I can, I record below what appear to be her main contentions (including any that are relevant to the question of an extension of time) and my observations on them.
3. First, Holly contends that she was self-represented, made genuine attempts to comply with her procedural obligations,[37] and the explanations she gave about her non-compliance with discovery orders were not taken into account.[38]
4. I accept that Holly is self-represented and, following the 3 October 2024 orders, made at least some attempt to comply with the discovery orders. However, her explanation of her failure to comply prior to the hearing on 3 October 2024 was considered by the Associate Judge at that hearing, and led to the time for Holly's compliance with the discovery orders being extended (rather than a vacation of the discovery orders). There was no error apparent in the Associate Judge's conclusion that the necessity for the hearing on 3 October 2024 was entirely caused by Holly's conduct.
5. Second, Holly contends that no findings of misconduct were made against her.
6. I cannot accept Holly's submission on this point having regard to the Associate Judge's description of Holly's failure to comply with the discovery orders as both a wilful and repeated refusal to comply with the Court's orders.
7. Third, Holly says that she was ordered to do something that was impossible, because she did not have access to discoverable documents, including because she was subject to orders of this Court made in 2016 and 2018 which prevented her from relying on certain documents obtained by Holly from Victor.[39]
8. I do not accept this submission. Orders were made for the discovery of documents within Holly's possession, power and control. Moreover, at the hearing on 3 October 2024, Holly raised these same concerns before the Associate Judge, who declined to set aside the discovery orders.[40] Further, the earlier discovery orders made clear that part of Holly's discovery obligation included giving an explanation on oath as to why documents falling within the parameters of the discovery orders did not exist, or were not available for discovery.[41] If Holly was unable to access or produce relevant documents, even because she was precluded by Court order from doing so, it was her obligation to fully explain those circumstances on affidavit.
9. Fourth, Holly contends that the discovery orders were unfair, because only Holly had been ordered to make discovery and Victor had not.
10. This contention is simply wrong. Victor was ordered to make discovery, and did in fact file affidavits of documents.[42]
11. Fifth, Holly says that the alleged discovery breaches were procedural and not determinative.[43]
12. I do not accept this submission. Holly was ordered to make discovery and did not comply with those orders. Her breaches of the Court's orders led directly to the hearing on 3 October 2024. That hearing caused Victor wasted costs. Holly's repeated breaches were in fact determinative of the question of costs.
13. Sixth, Holly relies on the fact that a mediation intended to resolve or narrow issues was pending at the time the 12 November 2024 costs orders were made.[44]
14. I do not accept that this is a reason that supported the exercise of the discretion on costs in Holly's favour. Similarly, it is not an argument that supports an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. The judicial mediation concluded on 6 December 2024,[45] and no steps were taken by Holly to challenge the orders for more than six months after that date. Holly stated frankly that it was the fact of Victor's enforcement of the 12 November 2024 costs orders by Bankruptcy Notice issued 29 May 2025 that 'directly triggered' her appeals.[46]
15. Seventh, Holly contends that the quantum of costs ordered was excessive and imposed without proper scrutiny and assessment.[47] Related to this is her submission that the Court erred in summarily fixing costs in Holly's absence without providing her with an opportunity to be heard, whether on quantum or at all.[48]
16. I reject these submissions. As observed by the Associate Judge and discussed above at [28], the costs awarded were supported by affidavit evidence, and fell below scale. It is apparent that the Associate Judge carefully considered the issue of quantum before making the 12 November 2024 costs orders. There is no apparent error affecting the exercise of her Honour's discretion on the question of costs.
17. Eighth, Holly submits that the costs orders were unfair because she could not access her own money.[49]
18. I accept that it is Holly's contention that Victor's conduct has caused her alleged impecuniosity. I am satisfied that the Associate Judge was aware of this factor in exercising her discretion to make those costs orders. Holly submitted, in addition, that it is unfair that she is now subject to Federal Court of Australia bankruptcy proceedings, and a summons for oral examination in this Court as a consequence of the 12 November 2024 costs orders. These circumstances do not, of themselves, point to any error in the exercise of the discretion by the Associate Judge which should support a grant of leave to appeal out of time.
19. Ninth, Holly alleged that Victor had misled the Court in the material that he filed with the Court. This allegation also forms part of the referral and restraint applications that are addressed in Section D of these reasons. Those arguments are simply irrelevant to the application for leave to appeal out of time.
20. There is no real prospect of Holly establishing that the 12 November 2024 costs orders were affected by error. Taking into account all of the matters relied on by the Associate Judge in coming to her decision, it is difficult to see how her Honour could have reached a different decision on the question of the costs of the hearing on 3 October 2024. In those circumstances, an appeal could not succeed, and granting Holly an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal is entirely futile.
21. In any event, appeals from orders as to costs are treated as exceptional and require an appeal court to exercise particular restraint; there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of an exercise of discretion on costs. The test is not whether the appeal court would have exercised the discretion in the same way as the primary judge, but whether there was a ground on which the judge could reasonably have made the order in question.[50]
22. For all of these reasons I decline to extend the time for Holly to make application for leave to appeal the 12 November 2024 costs orders.
23. It follows given my observation about their clear lack of merit that I would not have allowed Holly's appeals from the 12 November 2024 orders even if I had granted an extension of time.

1. I set out the 4 February 2025 orders above at [14(b)] and [15(b)], which enter judgment in Victor's proceeding and dismiss Holly&#[51]s first proceeding.51 Holly appeals those orders primarily. However, in her substantive grounds of appeal, Holly also appeals:

(a) the order that she pay Victor's costs for Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding (awarded on a standard basis, subject to earlier specific costs orders made by the Court); and

(b) the order that she pay the costs of his dismissal application (awarded on an indemnity basis).

1. As the effect of the 4 February 2025 orders was to bring both Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding to an end summarily, it is important to set out her Honour's reasons in full:

1. On 4 April 2023, Matthews AsJ made orders that the parties make discovery by 8 September 2023 ('original discovery order'). On 19 July 2024, following the issue of a summons issued by the plaintiff seeking particular discovery from the defendant, I made orders that the defendant make discovery of four categories of documents ('discovery order'). Three of the categories referred to in the discovery order were relevant to the plaintiff's tracing claim in this proceeding, and one category was relevant to the defendant's assertion that the purchase of various properties owned by members of the Chang family and their related entities was in part funded by the profits of the defendant's business and property trading activities between 1998 and 2009. The latter category is also relevant to the issues in dispute in proceeding no S ECI 2022 04357 ('related proceeding'), in which the defendant in this proceeding is the plaintiff. 2. The defendant failed to comply with the discovery order. At the hearing on 3 October 2024, the defendant submitted that she should not be required to comply with the discovery order because, among other things, the documents that were the subject of the discovery order were not in her possession, were not able to be obtained by her, and/or were not relevant to the issues in dispute in the proceeding and the related proceeding. I did not accept those submissions. Consequently, I made a further order providing detailed guidance as to what the defendant was required to do to comply with the discovery order and extended the time for compliance with the discovery order ('further discovery order').

1. On 28 October 2024, the defendant filed an affidavit purporting to comply with the discovery order and the further discovery order ('discovery orders'). This affidavit did not comply with the discovery orders, and on 12 November 2024, I made orders that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of obtaining the discovery orders, and fixed those costs. I also made timetabling orders for the issue and hearing of the current application ('dismissal application').

1. The defendant failed to appear at the hearing on 12 November 2024, or at the hearing of the dismissal application. Based upon the evidence of the plaintiff's solicitors, the defendant's communications with the Court on 6 December 2024, and the presence of the defendant's family members in Court at the hearing of the dismissal application, I am satisfied that the defendant was aware of the dismissal application. However, no affidavits or submissions were filed by the defendant in opposition to the dismissal application. 2. The plaintiff filed and served extensive affidavits and submissions in support of the dismissal application, which I shall not recount in these reasons. However, I accept that it is appropriate to strike out and/or dismiss the defendant's defence, and enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff (and provide equivalent relief in the related proceeding). 3. In particular, judgment should be entered in favour of the plaintiff for the following reasons:

(a) the original discovery order was made nearly two years ago;

(b) as stated in my reasons for making an order for costs in favour of the plaintiff on 12 November 2024, the defendant's failure to make proper discovery has been wilful and repeated;

(c) the discovery orders were detailed, precise, and provided a comprehensive explanation of what was required to be done to comply with the discovery orders;

(d) I agree that the defendant's failure to disclose documents relevant to the plaintiff's tracing claim has caused significant prejudice to the plaintiff. Further, the defendant's assertion that there are no documents available to support her contentions with respect to the source of the Chang family's wealth casts doubt upon the merits of the defendant's defence in this proceeding, as well as the merits of her claim in the related proceeding; and

(e) the defendant's failure to comply with the discovery orders, her attempts to relitigate the discovery orders, and her failure to engage with the dismissal application support a conclusion that the defendant does not intend to comply with the discovery orders.

1. As for the form of the judgment to be granted in favour of the plaintiff, I note that r 21.02(3)(b) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 ('Rules') provides that the rules and principles applicable to applications for judgment in default of appearance or defence apply, with appropriate modification, where a defence has been filed but has subsequently been struck out. Given that the defence has been struck out, the defendant is taken to have admitted the allegations in the statement of claim. Given the material facts pleaded in the statement of claim, and the deemed admissions, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to award the plaintiff equitable compensation of $894,933.20 and $99,037.66. (see also the reasons in 'Other Matters' in the Order made by Irving AsJ on 23 June 2022) ('Irving AsJ reasons'). I also accept that granting a charge over the defendant's property in Park Orchards and the defendant's Mercedes-Benz motor vehicle is appropriate, given the facts pleaded in the statement of claim and is consistent with the relevant authorities regarding what ancillary relief can be granted to an award for equitable compensation.
2. Turning now to the issue of interest, I accept the plaintiff's submissions that this Court has the power in its equitable jurisdiction to award interest upon equitable compensation, and that interest may also form part of the award of equitable compensation which can be the subject of a charge over property. I also accept that calculating interest on equitable compensation at the statutory penalty interest rate rather than a lower 'trustee' rate is appropriate in circumstances where the misappropriated funds could have been deployed for commercial purposes. However, I also accept that the argument that the defendant has also profited from the use of the misappropriated funds carries less weight when the asset into which the misappropriated funds can be traced is a wasting asset such as a motor vehicle.
3. Further, I do not propose to award interest for the entire period claimed by the plaintiff, that is, from 10 June 2015. In the Irving AsJ reasons, his Honour stated as follows:

The evidence before the Court indicates that the plaintiff was aware of the material facts relating to the Elwood Property sale proceeds from 5 June 2015, and in relation to the misappropriation of funds from his Australian bank accounts from about late 2018. The plaintiff has put no evidence before the Court to explain why, in these circumstances his proceeding was not commenced until 15 April 2021. It would be contrary to equitable principles to reward the plaintiff with respect to delay that is unexplained and of his own making. It is appropriate that interest be awarded from the commencement of the proceeding.

1. I consider that the equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence apply not only to the question of whether the Court should grant relief, but also to the form and quantum of that relief. The plaintiff, through his solicitor, has provided a brief explanation of the delay. However, that explanation, plausible as it may be, does not alter the fact that the plaintiff sat on his hands for a number of years before taking steps to recover substantial sums of money. I propose to award interest from 4 February 2021. This proceeding was commenced on 15 April 2021, and I accept that taking advice and preparing a statement of claim in a claim of this complexity would take some weeks or even months, and have made an allowance for that in calculating the interest payable by the defendant.

2. Finally, with respect to the question of costs, I agree that the plaintiff should be entitled to have the costs of the dismissal application on an indemnity basis. The plaintiff has established that there has been a contumelious disregard on the part of the defendant with respect to the discovery orders and her discovery obligations generally.

3. These reasons apply, with appropriate modification, to the resolution of the plaintiff's application to dismiss the related proceeding.

1. Again, these appeals are made out of time and are incompetent. However, it is also relevant to understand that more than three months after the 4 February orders were made, on 20 May 2025, Holly issued an application to set aside the orders made in Victor's proceeding and, on 2 June 2025, an application to set aside the orders made in Holly's first proceeding (set aside applications).
2. The set aside applications were heard by the Associate Judge on 11 June 2025 and ruled against on 18 June 2025. The relevant appeals were subsequently issued on 21 June 2025, well outside the 14 day period after 4 February 2025 imposed by the Rules.
3. Again as Holly self-represented, I have proceeded on the basis that the appeal materials constitute an application for an extension of time to appeal or, where necessary, seek leave to appeal (available under r 77.06.2(6)).
4. I have approached the question of whether to extend time to appeal having regard to the general principles identified above at [32].

1. Holly has given no explanation for her nearly fourth month delay in commencing the appeal process in respect of the 18 February 2025 orders.
2. I place less weight on this factor than I do in respect of the appeal from the 12 November orders. That is because, as matters transpired, Holly did at least engage with the Court system to commence the set aside applications.

1. Victor did not point to any particular prejudice associated with the commencement of the appeal out of time.

1. Having regard to the voluminous appeal materials filed by Holly, I understand her grounds for appeal (and, where evident, any grounds for seeking leave to appeal out of time) to be as follows.
2. First, her Honour made errors of law in making her 4 February 2025 orders in circumstances where:

(a) Holly had taken steps to comply with discovery and other Court directions;

(b) the orders were made in Holly's absence without affording Holly a fair opportunity to present her case, contrary to the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice;[52]

(c) although Holly did not appear on 4 February 2025, this absence was explicable and did not mean that Holly did not want to participate. Rather, Holly submitted that:

(i) she was depressed, very sick and just could not talk, although she did not have a medical certificate;

(ii) she was scared, because of the history in other proceedings involving Victor, where there had been a previous contempt application, and she was concerned about breaching an intervention order;

(iii) she had financial difficulty and could not engage lawyers, but she had nevertheless paid the trial fee, and wanted to put on an amended defence in Victor's proceeding and an amended statement of claim in Holly's first proceeding;[53] and

(iv) Victor's dismissal applications before the Associate Judge were an abuse of process, and he had also sworn a false affidavit and misled the Court.

1. Second, the award of interest in the amount of $397,588.34 was excessive, punitive and disproportionate to the conduct of the proceedings.[54] Further, Holly submitted that she had wanted to sell her Park Orchards property but Victor had put a caveat on it, and she did not have access to funds because of that.[55]
2. Third, the awards of indemnity costs were excessive, punitive and disproportionate to the conduct of the proceedings; alternatively, that it was made with no proper basis, particularly where Holly was self-represented and no finding of misconduct was made.[56]
3. I have considered whether the 4 February 2025 orders (save for the costs orders) were made as a consequence of a legal, factual or discretionary error, noting that it would not be sufficient for Holly to establish that some aspect of her Honour's path of reasoning was incorrect, unless Holly could establish that the error could have affected the outcome.[57] I am not satisfied that there is any real prospect that Holly could establish a material error of this kind.
4. First, the reasons appear to set out accurately the history of the discovery issues, Holly's repeated failure to comply with orders of the Court, the efforts made by the Court to give guidance to Holly as to what she was required to do in order to comply, and the affording of a further extension of time to facilitate compliance. To Holly's contention that the Associate Judge failed to take proper account of the steps taken by her to comply with the orders for discovery, paragraph C of 'Other Matters' expressly acknowledges Holly's purported compliance through the filing of an affidavit of 28 October 2024. However, her Honour made clear that this affidavit did not comply, and the matters identified at paragraph F of 'Other Matters' gave cogent reasons for her Honour's conclusion that Holly in fact did not intend to comply with her discovery obligations.
5. Second, the reasons appear to accurately set out the history of Holly's failures both to appear at the hearing on 4 February 2025 and to file any materials in opposition to Victor's applications. Holly was given notice of the hearing date, and served with Victor's application materials.[58] Indeed, Holly conceded before me that she was aware of the hearing. She also told me from the bar table that she had been sick, depressed and could not talk, but did not have a medical certificate. She emphasised her difficulties with the English language, her fear of potential contempt proceedings against her, and the relationship of those proceedings to an intervention order obtained by Victor against her. She said that she had only missed one Court day and that this did not mean that she did not want to defend herself. She also said that she had financial difficulties and could not engage lawyers.[59]
6. Whilst these matter might have been relevant to Holly's set aside applications before the Associate Judge in June (and, indeed, were ventilated by Holly unsuccessfully at that hearing),[60] they do not suggest of any failure of the Associate Judge to accord procedural fairness to Holly on 4 February 2025. The relevant circumstances at that hearing included Holly's then unexplained failures to file any materials in opposition to the applications and to appear on the return date for the hearing of the applications.
7. Third, the reasons given by her Honour for granting judgment in Victor's favour and dismissing Holly's proceeding do not on their face appear to disclose any error. Her Honour correctly identified the critical importance of the discovery process to Victor's tracing claim, to Holly's defence in Victor's proceeding, and to her own causes of action in Holly's first proceeding. Her Honour's conclusion that Holly had wilfully and repeatedly failed to make proper discovery and that her conduct supported the conclusion that she did not intend to comply with the discovery orders was formed on more than ample foundation, even allowing for Holly's position as a self-represented litigant. Those were conclusions that were critical to the exercise of her Honour's discretion to strike out Holly's defence and enter judgment in Victor's proceeding, and summarily dismiss Holly's proceeding.
8. I am satisfied that there was no apparent error in the exercise of that discretionary power, having regard not only to explicit terms of ss 51 and 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (Civil Procedure Act) and the Rules,[61] but also to the authorities guiding the exercise of the discretion.[62] It is without question that the sanction imposed by the Associate Judge as a consequence of Holly's defaults in compliance was a severe one. However, her Honour had managed aspects of the conduct of the interlocutory steps in both proceedings for many months, and was well placed to consider and rule on the effect of non-compliance with discovery orders on those proceedings. Her Honour was also well placed to assess Holly's degree of culpability for the non-compliance. It was plainly open to her Honour to consider that the past conduct disqualified Holly from continuing to defend Victor's proceeding, or from prosecuting Holly's first proceeding. It also follows that there is no substance to Holly's contention that Victor's dismissal applications constituted an abuse of process.
9. Fourth, I am not satisfied that there is any real prospect that Holly could establish material error in her Honour's approach to the award of interest on equitable compensation in Victor's proceeding. Having determined that she would give summary judgment, making orders for penalty interest on the equitable compensation sums was an unremarkable course in seeking to fairly compensate Victor for his loss of use of the funds then declared by her Honour to have been held by Holly on trust for Victor ($894,933.20), or to have been misappropriated by Holly ($99,037.66). The claims for interest (which were made in respect of periods commencing some 10 to 14 years prior to the entry of judgment respectively) were also properly limited by the Associate Judge to a period commencing two months prior to the date on which Victor's proceeding was issued. Her Honour also fairly and appropriately took into account Victor's delay in commencing his proceeding, to Holly's benefit.
10. It follows that an appeal from the 4 February 2025 orders would be futile.
11. In those circumstances, I will not grant Holly an extension of time in which to bring that appeal and, even if I had, I would not have granted the appeal.
12. Finally, there is the related issue of Holly's appeal from the consequential costs orders made on 4 February 2025, which are identified as a separate ground of appeal. Having concluded that no extension of time to appeal from her Honour's substantive orders should be granted, it is strictly unnecessary to consider whether there should be an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal from the costs orders, particularly in circumstances where no such extension of time had expressly been sought and the notices of appeal were incompetent to that extent.
13. However, for completeness, I observe that in light of the findings of fact made by her Honour which led to the summary dismissal of the two proceedings, there is no apparent error in the exercise of her Honour's discretion to award Victor his costs of the dismissal applications on an indemnity basis, or his costs of Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding on a standard basis. Having regard to the strong presumption in respect of the correctness of discretionary costs orders outlined in [58], above, it follows that I would not separately grant an extension of time to Holly to seek leave to appeal from the costs orders made on 4 February 2025. There is no evident error in the exercise of her Honour's discretion on costs. Again, an appeal would be futile.

1. Unlike the appeals in respect of the 12 November 2024 and 4 February 2025 orders, Holly's appeals from the June orders were commenced within time. The question before me is whether any identifiable error arises from the Associate Judge's refusal of Holly's set aside applications on 18 June 2025 referred to above at [14(c)] and [15(c)].

1. The 18 June 2025 orders were followed by a detailed written judgment Chang v Chang (Chang).[63] From that judgment, the following matters are evident:

(a) Holly's set aside applications were made under r 24.05,[64] which confirms the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to dismiss proceedings for want of prosecution, or to otherwise finally dispose of proceedings in circumstances where a party is in default of the Rules or any Court order. Rule 24.06 provides an express power to set aside or vary any order given under Order 24, including judgment entered or given under r 24.05. Rule 24.06 is ordinarily relevant in circumstances where the defaulting party has cured that default, such that it is appropriate to set aside a judgment given in consequence of that default. Holly had not cured the default in complying with the discovery orders at the time that the application was set aside;

(b) in those circumstances, her Honour proceeded on the basis that Holly's application was made under r 46.08(a), which provides that a Court may set aside or vary an order in circumstances where the application for the order was made on notice, but the person did not appear. I add that considering Holly's application as if it had been made in reliance on that order was appropriate in the circumstances before her Honour, and fairer to Holly;[65]

(c) her Honour recorded the principles relevant to the exercise of her discretion under r 46.08, which also reflect the principles relevant to the exercise of the discretion to set aside a regularly obtained default judgment under r 21.07 (namely, whether there is a defence on the merits, the reason for the earlier default, the promptness of the application, and the extent of any prejudice to the other party). Further, in reliance on the decision of the High Court in Allesch v Maunz,[66] her Honour identified the two matters critical to Holly's set aside applications as being the existence of first, a reasonable explanation for the absence or other default and, second, a material argument that, if the matter is re-opened, might reasonably produce a materially different result more favourable to the moving party.[67] Importantly, her Honour also expressly recognised that the dismissal of a claim or defence for a failure to comply with discovery obligations is a grave matter, and a measure of last resort;[68] and

(d) in considering the application of those principles to Holly's applications before her, her Honour recorded the procedural history that had led to the 4 February 2025 orders, and also carefully identified and summarised the affidavits and submissions that had been before her on 4 February 2025, the affidavits and submissions filed by both parties in respect of Holly's set aside applications (including after the hearing the applications), and the submissions made orally by both parties.[69]

1. Her Honour's key findings in dismissing the set aside application were as follows:

(a) first, that Holly had not provided a reasonable explanation for her failure to attend the hearing on 4 February 2025.[70] The Associate Judge:

(i) did not accept that Holly had not received notice of the application, or the orders;[71]

(ii) did not accept that Holly had not understood the nature of the relief being sought;[72]

(iii) considered Holly's explanation for not attending on 4 February 2025 or otherwise engaging with the proceeding, but observed the absence of any supporting medical evidence, or any earlier explanation of the matters ultimately relied on at hearing;[73] and

(iv) rejected Holly's argument that Victor's dismissal applications were inconsistent with the mediation orders in the proceedings, noting particularly that there had been ample time for Holly to re-engage with the proceedings in the period between the conclusion of the mediation on or around 6 December 2024, and the hearing of Victor's dismissal applications on 4 February 2025;[74]

(b) second, that the absence of a reasonable explanation was sufficient to dispose of the set aside applications;[75] and

(c) third, for completeness, that even if Holly had appeared on 4 February 2025, and advanced substantially the same submissions and evidence relied on by her for her set aside applications, her Honour was not satisfied that there was a real prospect that the result may have been different.[76] In particular, there would have been no reasonable explanation for Holly's failure to comply with the underlying discovery orders, and no meaningful or reliable commitment to then comply with the further discovery orders.[77]

1. In forming these conclusions, her Honour paid particular regard to Holly's explanation as to her past non-compliance,[78] and the more recent efforts made by her to produce documents.[79] Her Honour expressly found that Holly had completely failed to engage with the order for discovery of documents relevant to Victor's tracing claim, which was directed to documents that must have been within Holly's custody or control.[80] She described Holly's explanation in respect of the failure to discover documents in some categories of documents as "disingenuous".[81] She was also greatly concerned by Holly's contention before her that Holly had now complied with the past orders for particular discovery.[82] Thus, her Honour was satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect that she would have reached a decision different to that made on 4 February 2025.[83]
2. It is also relevant to note than in materials filed and submissions made before the Associate Judge for the purposes of the set aside applications, and in a manner inconsistent with her defence filed in Victor's proceeding,[84] Holly sought to resile from her previous admission to the effect that that the sum of $894,933.20 paid to her out of the Norton Gledhill trust account on 10 June 2015 came from the proceeds of the sale of the Elwood property, and instead asserted that it was an unrelated payment from another source; perhaps a Mr Wang.[85] Her Honour expressed a concern that this apparent change in position was directed to undermining the rationale behind the particular discovery order with respect to documents relevant to Victor's tracing claim.[86]
3. Finally, in exercising her discretion to refuse the set aside applications, the Associate Judge was cognisant of the very serious nature of the adverse findings made against Holly in the absence of a contested trial, and the harshness of the outcome of her 4 February 2025 orders on Holly. However, her Honour weighed the evident prejudice to Holly against the ongoing prejudice that had been, and would continue to be, caused to Victor as a result of Holly's apparent refusal to engage meaningfully with the discovery process. Whilst her Honour accepted that the prejudice to Holly was greater, she nevertheless considered that the ongoing prejudice to Victor was a relevant matter to consider on the exercise of the discretion, even if not the determinative reason for refusing the set aside applications.[87]

C.4.2 Consideration of Holly's grounds of appeal

1. Having regard to the Notices of Appeal, the affidavits and written submissions filed by Holly and the oral submissions made by Holly at hearing, I understand that Holly contends that the Associate Judge's decision to refuse her set aside applications was attended by the following errors:

(a) first, the Associate Judge failed to give proper consideration to new evidence and material filed in support of the set aside applications;[88]

(b) second, Holly was:

(i) denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard;[89] or alternatively

(ii) unreasonably denied a hearing on her application;[90] or alternatively

(iii) the subject of orders made in a manner that was procedurally unfair and premature;[91] and

(c) third, that the cumulative effect of all of the alleged errors (that is, in respect of the 12 November 2024, 4 February 2025 and 18 June 2025 orders) had resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.[92]

1. The summary of the detailed reasons given by the Associate Judge in support of her decision to refuse the set aside applications above at [87] sufficiently demonstrates that the first and second grounds of Holly's appeal are entirely without merit.
2. First, it is evident that every opportunity was given to Holly on the hearing of her set aside applications to put relevant material before the Court. Holly availed herself of that opportunity (including the filing of material after the hearing without leave, which was considered by the Associate Judge). Second, the judgment discloses her Honour's careful consideration of each and every document filed by Holly in support of her applications, together with Holly's oral submissions. Third, the judgment records her Honour's concern that Holly's apparent change of position in respect of a key issue - her receipt of part of the proceeds of the sale of the Elwood property - was inconsistent with the available evidence and directed towards undermining the discovery orders that had been the source of Holly's non-compliance and led to the 4 February 2025 orders.
3. In those circumstances, Holly's contentions that the Associate Judge failed to give proper consideration to her materials, or otherwise failed to accord her procedural fairness, are without foundation.
4. In truth, Holly's real complaint is that her Honour did not exercise her discretion to set aside the 4 February 2025 orders, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. However, as with any appeal in respect of a decision involving discretionary judgment, there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision. Even if an appellate court might have exercised the discretion differently, it will not interfere by substituting its own decision unless satisfied there has been some legal error in the exercise of the discretion, or where the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that it can be inferred that there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion.[93]
5. Although the refusal of an application to set aside orders might in one sense be regarded as an appeal on a matter of practice and procedure (thus requiring that particular caution be exercised before appellate intervention is warranted), given the finality of the orders appealed from (which confirmed that Victor's proceeding and Holly's proceeding had come to an end), I have determined to adopt the conventional standard of review, unqualified by any such caution, in considering Holly's appeals.
6. Adopting that standard:

(a) there is no error of principle evident in the Associate Judge's approach to Holly's set aside applications. Her Honour correctly set out the relevant law guiding both the initial exercise of her discretion to dismiss both proceedings, and the subsequent exercise of her discretion on the applications to set aside her earlier orders;

(b) I am unable to discern any material error in the application of those principles to the facts before her Honour - there is, for example, no evident reliance on extraneous or irrelevant matters or mistakes as to facts, or failure to take into account some material consideration; and

(c) finally, whilst it is absolutely clear that the refusal of Holly's set aside applications leads to a very harsh outcome for Holly (in that judgment is entered against her in Victor's proceeding, and Holly's first proceeding is dismissed), having regard to all of the facts before the Associate Judge, in my view the outcome is not so unreasonable or unjust that it can be inferred that there was error in the exercise of the discretion on the set aside applications.

1. In forming my conclusions on the Associate Judge's exercise of the discretion, I have been particularly cognisant of the fact that Holly is self-represented; allowances must be made for the position of such a litigant before the Court to ensure that she is not unfairly prejudiced because of her lack of legal expertise, particularly when the consequences for Holly of the exercise of the discretion adversely to her were so evidently consequential. Nevertheless, it apparent to me that the Associate Judge was also extremely conscious of Holly's position of relative disadvantage in this regard.
2. The interlocutory history of the proceedings before the Associate Judge reveals that every effort was made to give Holly the benefit of the doubt on the issue of her discovery defaults, and to afford her the opportunity to remedy those defaults. Holly's repeated failure to engage with her discovery obligations pursuant to the Court's earlier orders left the Associate Judge in the position that the dismissal of the two proceedings was the only realistic outcome. The dismissal orders were made as a matter of last resort, in the context of the Court's power not only to supervise the management of a proceeding before it, but to prevent injustice in the management of such a proceeding, having regard to the critical object under the Civil Procedure Act that there be just resolution of the real issues in the proceeding in an efficient, timely and cost effective manner.
3. Further, on the set aside application, her Honour carefully reconsidered the outcome determined in Holly's absence, and was satisfied that it would not have been different had the materials and submissions put before her by Holly been considered at the time the dismissal orders were made. Making every necessary allowance for Holly's position as a self-represented litigant, I do not accept that the exercise of the Associate Judge's discretion on the set aside applications miscarried. There was no relevant error of law, and the outcome was not unreasonable or unjust that it can properly be said that any substantial wrong has occurred. It is significant that Holly's identified defaults in making complete discovery were not remedied at the time of the hearing before the Associate Judge. Notwithstanding the voluminous materials filed in these appeals by Holly, that position has not changed.
4. I make one further observation. Holly submitted to me orally that the Associate Judge was unable to comprehend her case because English is not Holly's first language, and that her submissions to me, with the assistance of ChatGPT, better explain the case that she wanted to make at trial with amended pleadings, and on her set aside applications.[94] I have carefully reviewed all of the written material and oral submissions raised by Holly before the Associate Judge on the set aside applications. All of the substantive matters raised by Holly before me were raised by Holly before the Associate Judge. Whilst Holly's more recent embrace of ChatGPT might have enabled her to file materials with this Court more readily, there is no evidence at all that the Associate Judge did not understand the case that Holly wished to advance at trial, the reasons for her absence on 4 February 2025, or her arguments on the set aside application. There was no denial of procedural fairness arising from Holly's English language difficulties.
5. It follows that Holly's appeal in respect of the 18 June 2025 orders fails.
6. For completeness, I note that Holly's appeal concerned all the orders made by the Associate Judge on 18 June 2025, but the grounds of appeal were directed specifically to the Associate Judge's determination that she would not set aside her earlier orders of 4 February 2025. The balance of the orders made by her Honour on 18 June 2025 flowed from that core determination, including the order made in Victor's proceeding that Holly pay Victor's costs fixed in the sum of $5,000.00. Having refused to grant the setting aside applications, there was no evident error in her Honour's approach to the ancillary orders.
7. Further, to the extent that there is any challenge to her Honour's exercise of her discretion to make a fixed costs order, adopting the principles summarised in [58] above, I would refuse leave to appeal the costs order. I cannot discern any error in the exercise of her Honour's discretion to award Victor his costs of the set aside applications. Given the volume of affidavits and submissions filed by Holly, the need to prepare answering material, and the appearance by counsel at the hearing on 18 June 2025, there was no evident error in fixing Victor's costs in the sum of $5,000.00 (for the two applications). I reject Holly's contention that the fixed costs order was excessive.

1. I now turn to Holly's referral and restraint applications in Victor's proceeding. They can be dealt with together, and in relatively short compass.
2. Holly's core complaint concerns alleged perjury by Victor, arising from affidavits filed in this Court. She contrasts statements made by him in an affidavit sworn 20 October 2016 for the purposes of an earlier proceeding in the Chang family proceedings,[95] with statements made by him in an affidavit sworn 30 May 2025 and filed in Victor's proceeding. The statements identified concern the circumstances in which Holly received the sum of (rounded) $895,000 in 2015, which later became the subject of Victor's proceeding. The 2016 affidavit generally refers to a payment made by Victor to Holly, whereas the trust accounting records exhibited to the 2025 affidavit disclose payment to Holly out of a solicitor's trust account following settlement of the sale of the Elwood property.
3. Holly asserts that the identified differences constitute the offence of perjury within the meaning of s 314(1) of the Crimes Act, which provides that a person who 'commits wilful and corrupt perjury' is liable to imprisonment. Holly contends that in those circumstances I should refer Victor to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and also make orders requiring the surrender of his passports and restraining him from leaving Australia.
4. It is certainly not the usual role of this Court to make referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions on the application of an aggrieved person, who has standing to make their own complaint to the Director. To exercise the inherent power of this Court to make a referral to the Director is a very serious matter. That power is exercised by the Court with great care, ordinarily of its own motion, in circumstances where it appears to the Court that evidence or other materials disclose breaches of the law such that those matters ought to be brought to the attention of Director for further investigation.
5. I have read the whole of the two affidavits identified by Holly in her applications.
6. I accept that the topic of the source of the payment received by Holly might have been the subject of cross-examination in any trial of Victor's proceeding and Holly's first proceeding, had it proceeded. However, I am not satisfied that there is any material inconsistency between the claims made by Victor in the 2016 proceeding and more recently in Victor's proceeding that lead to the prima facie conclusion that either Victor's 2016 affidavit or Victor's 2025 affidavit contains a false statement. Further, even if I had been satisfied of the existence of such a serious inconsistency, I could not be satisfied on the basis of the limited material before me on an interlocutory application that any such inconsistency between two affidavits sworn nine years apart arose as a consequence of Victor's wilful conduct.
7. In those circumstances, there is no legitimate basis for me to refer the affidavits identified in the Amended Summons to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation. Holly's referral application will be dismissed.
8. It also follows that there is no basis whatsoever on which I could grant Holly's restraint application, which has at its foundation the acceptance of Holly's contention that Victor has likely committed a criminal offence. In any event, for this Court to make orders of the kind sought by Holly against Victor in the context of these civil proceedings would be quite extraordinary. Holly's restraint application is entirely misconceived, and will be dismissed.
9. It is necessary to say something more about the referral and restraint applications.[96] It is a very serious matter to accuse another person of criminal conduct, or to make applications of the kind advanced by Holly before me. Whilst making every allowance for Holly's position as a self-represented litigant, it is important that it is clearly understood that such applications should be regarded as exceptional, to be pursued only in the rarest of circumstances. They should not be viewed by any litigant as a reasonable alternative, or adjunct to the ordinary course of civil litigation in this Court.

1. Holly's appeals and applications will be dismissed.
2. My preliminary view is that Holly should pay Victor's costs of the appeals and applications. However, I will hear the parties on the question of costs.

[1] The Court record discloses seven proceedings between 2016 and 2025. This judgment concerns two of the proceedings; two others are on foot and three appear to be finalised. There are also ongoing, related proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.

[2] Writ and Statement of Claim filed and dated 15 April 2025.

[3] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 4 February 2025) [3].

[4] Writ and Statement of Claim dated 21 October 2022 and filed 22 October 2022.

[6] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 4 February 2025) [1].

[7] Writ and Statement of Claim dated and filed 27 February 2023.

[8] Originating Motion dated 30 June 2025 and filed 20 June 2025.

[9] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's second proceeding, 21 August 2025) [2].

[10] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's second proceeding, 21 August 2025) Other Matters [A]-[F], [2]. In particular, her Honour found that no issue estoppel arose in respect of claims confined to the South Yarra property.

[11] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 12 November 2024) [7].

[12] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 4 February 2025) [1]-[5].

[13] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 18 June 2025) [1]-[3].

[14] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 12 November 2024) [7].

[15] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 4 February 2025) [1]-[3].

[16] Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 18 June 2025) [1]-[2].

[17] Leave to file the amended document was later granted by Burgess JR on 1 July 2025. See the order of Burgess JR (Victor's proceeding, 1 July 2025) [1].

[18] See, generally, the order of Burgess JR (Victor's proceeding, 1 July 2025). Holly's restraint and referral applications were filed subsequent to those orders.

[19] Those submissions also concern other interlocutory applications that do not fall within the scope of this judgment.

[20] The order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 19 March 2024) at [1]-[2] and the order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 19 July 2024) at [5] provide that the proceedings to be tried together. The order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 19 July 2024) at [6] provides that evidence and discovery in Victor's proceeding be evidence and discovery in Holly's first proceeding.

[21] Supreme Court Act, s 17.

[22] Ibid, s 17A.

[24] See, for example, Oswal v Carson [2013] VSC 355 [11] (Ferguson J), Schreuders v Grandiflora Nominees Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 310; (2014) 14 ASTLR 50 [4] (Garde J) and Hou v Westpac [2014] VSC 606 [37] (Warren CJ).

[25] The 'Other Matters' section of each form of order discloses the detailed history of the circumstances which led to the orders.

[26] See the order for discovery at [3] of the order of Matthews AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 4 April 2023).

[27] See the orders for discovery at [1] - [3] of the order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 19 July 2024).

[28] Eighth Affidavit of Julian Patrick Roy Gillard dated and filed 11 November 2024 at [11]-[14].

[29] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 12 November 2024) Other Matters [L]; Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 12 November 2024) Other Matters [J].

[30] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 12 November 2024) Other Matters [M]; Order of Daly AsJ (Holly's first proceeding, 12 November 2024) Other Matters [K].

[31] Tenth Affidavit of Julian Patrick Roy Gillard in Victor's proceeding dated and filed 3 February 2025 at [25] and exhibit JPRG-11 at 29.

[32] See, for example, Spanovic v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2014] VSCA 240 [4] (Ashley JA, Almond AJA agreeing), and the authorities there cited.

[33] See Holly's Reply Submissions dated 28 July 2025 and filed 26 July 2025.

[35] Her appeals from orders made dismissing those applications are addressed below in section [C.4].

[36] Victor's affidavit in Victor's proceeding dated 31 May 2025 and filed 30 May 2025 deposes to the issuing and service of the bankruptcy notice at [4]-[5].

[37] See Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal dated 21 June 2025 in Holly's first proceeding and Holly's Reply Submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 28 July 2025 and filed 26 July 2025 at [3].

[38] See, in particular, Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[39] See, in particular, the Affidavit of Holly Chang sworn 22 June 2025 in Victor's proceeding at Section 3.2(a) and Holly's Reply Submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 28 July 2025 and filed 26 July 2025 at [3].

[40] Order of Associate Justice Daly (Victor's proceeding, 3 October 2024) Other Matters [F].

[41] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 19 July 2024) [2].

[42] Victor's affidavit of documents in Victor's proceeding dated 8 October 2023 and dated 9 October 2023; Victor's affidavit of documents in Victor's proceeding dated and filed 23 January 2024.

[43] Holly's affidavit in Holly's first proceeding dated 22 June 2025 and filed 21 June 2025 at section 7 (the affidavit contains unnumbered pages and no paragraphs).

[45] Chang v Chang [2025] VSC 391 [36] (Daly AsJ).

[46] Holly's Reply Submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 28 July 2025 and filed 26 July 2025 at [3].

[47] See Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal in Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[48] See Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2022 and Holly's Reply Submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 28 July 2025 and filed 26 July 2025 at [3].

[49] Transcript of Proceedings on 21 August 2025 T86.7-10.

[50] See, for example, the recent summary of applicable principles in Anderson & Anor v City of Stonnington & Anor [2025] VSCA 68 [25] (Beach JA).

[51] Order of Daly AsJ (Victor's proceeding, 4 February 2025) Other Matters [A]-[K]; Order of Daly AsJ (Holy's first proceeding, 4 February 2025) Other Matters [A].

[52] See Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025 and Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal in Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[53] See generally Transcript of Proceedings, 21 August 2025 T15-25.

[54] See Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[55] See generally Transcript of Proceedings, 21 August 2025 T21-25.

[56] See Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 2 June 2025 and Grounds 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[57] See, for example, Nikolic v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2024] VSC 380 [77]-[78] (Gray J) and the authorities there cited.

[58] See the tenth affidavit of Julian Patrick Roy Gillard in Victor's proceeding dated and filed 3 February 2025 at [25], [28] and [29] in evidence at the hearing on 4 February 2025.

[59] See generally Transcript of Proceedings, 21 August 2025 T15-25.

[60] See generally Transcript of Proceedings, 19 June 2025 T2-4.

[61] See rr 24.02(1)(a) and (b), 29.12.1(3)(a)-(b).

[62] See, for example, Hodgson v Amcor Ltd; Amcor Ltd v Barnes (2011) 32 VR 495; [2011] VSC 63 [99]-[100] (Vickery J); Ren v Sinicorp Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 728 [100]-[104] (Matthews AsJ). Victor's written submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 20 December 2024 set out the principles extracted from these authorities in detail at [10]-[16].

[63] [2025] VSC 391 (Daly AsJ) (Chang). At [1], Her Honour makes plain that the reasons in this judgment are an 'augmented and slightly modified version' of her written ruling on the set aside applications given on 18 June 2025.

[66] Allesch v Maunz (200) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40 [48]-[50] (Kirby J).

[69] Ibid, [36]-[69]. It is noted that in respect of Holly's set aside applications, Holly relied on 12 affidavits, three of which were filed without leave following the conclusion of the 11 June hearing of her applications, and seven sets of written submissions. Victor relied on two affidavits and two sets of written submissions.

[84] In her initial defence in Victor's proceeding dated 14 February 2025 at [16], Holly admitted to receiving a sum of approximately $895,000 from the proceeds of sale of the Elwood property (being about 50% of those proceeds). See too, for reference, Victor's Writ and Statement of Claim filed on 15 April 2021 at [16].

[85] See in Victor's proceeding: Holly's reply affidavit dated and filed 2 June 2025 at [13], Holly's affidavit dated 9 June 2025 and filed 6 June 2025 at [7] and proposed Amended Defence and Counterclaim at [6] and [16] (exhibit HC-C); Transcript of hearing before Daly AsJ on 11 June 2025, T5 L19 to T6-L27.

[88] Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025; Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal in Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[89] Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[90] Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal in Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[91] Holly's Reply Submissions in Victor's proceeding dated 26 June 2025 and filed 28 June 2025 at [5].

[92] Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal in Victor's proceeding dated 21 June 2025; Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal in Holly's first proceeding dated 21 June 2025.

[93] The rule in House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) as applied in this State in cases like Northern Health v Kuipers [2015] VSCA 172 [9]-[16] (Kyrou and McLeish JJA) and Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Steuler Services GbMBH & Ors No. 2 [2015] VSCA 123 [38]-[39] (Tate, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA).

[94] Transcript of Proceedings, 21 August 2025 T19.15 - T20.12.

[95] See S CI 2016 04282: In that proceeding, Victor successfully sought orders permanently restraining Holly from publishing, using or communicating confidential information obtained by Holly from Victor's iPad, including access to his iCloud and DropBox accounts, following the publication of those materials. Judgment was given by the Honourable Justice Sloss in Victor's favour on 28 February 2017, and her Honour's orders were varied by the Honourable Justice McDonald on 23 May 2018 so as to specify a detailed list of confidential documents to which the restraint order extended.

[96] In documents filed with the Court by Holly, including Holly's document entitled 'Application Book Index' on 20 August 2025, it became apparent that Holly sought to expand the scope of her perjury allegations to other affidavits made by Victor in various proceedings. On 21 August 2025, I refused Holly leave to amend her referral application to include these additional allegations.