OPPRESSION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
29 It was common ground that the very real difficulty in the present proceeding was the resolution of the many competing factual claims. There was limited diversion between the competing camps thereafter as to the application to those facts of the relevant statutory provisions and the range of available relief. The opposing camps were even in agreement in advancing a joint submission that an order for the winding up of Fine Food Solutionz should not be made.
30 Notwithstanding the absence of disagreement as to the general principles to be applied, the statutory provisions of central relevance and the applicable principles should be briefly set forth.
31 Section 232 of the Corporations Act provides as follows:
Grounds for Court order
The Court may make an order under section 233 if:
(a) the conduct of a company's affairs; or
(b) an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or
(c) a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;
is either:
(d) contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or
(e) oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
For the purposes of this Part, a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law is taken to be a member of the company.
Section 233(1) provides as follows:
The Court can make any order under this section that it considers appropriate in relation to the company, including an order:
(a) that the company be wound up;
(b) that the company's existing constitution be modified or repealed;
(c) regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the future;
(d) for the purchase of any shares by any member or person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law;
(e) for the purchase of shares with an appropriate reduction of the company's share capital;
(f) for the company to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings;
(g) authorising a member, or a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law, to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company;
(h) appointing a receiver or a receiver and manager of any or all of the company's property;
(i) restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or from doing a specified act;
(j) requiring a person to do a specified act.
Section 234 outlines who can make an application under section 233 as follows:
(a) a member of the company, even if the application relates to an act or omission that is against:
(i) the member in a capacity other than as a member; or
(ii) another member in their capacity as a member; or
(b) a person who has been removed from the register of members because of a selective reduction; or
(c) a person who has ceased to be a member of the company if the application relates to the circumstances in which they ceased to be a member; or
(d) a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law; or
(e) a person whom ASIC thinks appropriate having regard to investigations it is conducting or has conducted into:
(i) the company's affairs; or
(ii) matters connected with the company's affairs.
32 "The statutory jurisdiction created by ss 232 and 233 … provides a means by which the court can look beyond legal rights and do what is just and equitable in the particular circumstances": Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 at [85], 71 ACSR 343 at 357 per Barrett J. Once the discretion conferred by s 233 "has been enlivened by a finding of oppression under s 232, the court has a wide discretion as to both the appropriate remedy and, if it orders compulsory purchase of shares, as to the mode of valuation of the shares": Smith Martis Cork v Benjamin Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 153 at [70], 207 ALR 136 at 145-146 per Wilcox, Marshall and Jacobson JJ.
33 The expression "company's affairs" in both s 232 and s 233 includes - by reason of s 53(a) and (c) - "the promotion, formation, membership, control, business, trading, transactions and dealings" of the company and also its "internal management and proceedings…".
34 Although there has been some academic and judicial discussion as to the manner in which s 232(d) and (e) are to be construed, it seems to be now recognised that:
section 232(d) provides a ground of relief separate from s 232(e); and
the expression "oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against" in s 232(e) is a "compound expression."
See: Ford's Principles of Corporations Law at para [11.450] (14th ed., 2010). In Szencorp Pty Ltd v Clean Energy Council Ltd [2009] FCA 40, 69 ACSR 365, Goldberg J summarised the present position as follows:
[59] The "contrary to the interests" provision now contained in subpara (d) of s 232 has a separate and distinct area of operation from the "oppression" provisions in subpara (e) of s 232. The manner in which a company is being administered and in which its affairs are conducted may fall within the category of conduct contrary to the interests of the company's members as a whole although it may not be described as oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against members of the company … An example of such conduct may be found where a company is formed for the purpose of undertaking particular activities but the directors and management disregard those activities and direct the company into different commercial areas.
[60] An essential feature of the "oppression" provisions in subpara (e) of s 232 is whether or not there has been commercial unfairness. …
35 The term "oppression" embraces a width of conduct and it is neither desirable nor possible to give an exhaustive account of that conduct which will or will not amount to oppression: Shelton v National Roads and Motorists' Association Ltd [2004] FCA 1393, 51 ACSR 278. Tamberlin J there observed:
[23] It is not practicable to delineate the numerous ways in which oppressive conduct may be established. The Court will generally look at the overall course of conduct and consider whether it is so unfair that reasonable directors would not consider it fair. If directors exercise a power so as to impose a disability or burden on a member that is unfair according to ordinary standards of reasonableness and fair dealing, then such conduct may be described as oppressive. The question is one of fact and degree for the Court to determine, having regard to the view the directors have formed themselves, and allowing for any special skill or knowledge possessed by the directors. The test of unfairness is objective …
Conduct, for example, which is "inconsistent with arrangements and understandings between shareholders may be so unfair that it amounts to oppression": Weatherall v Satellite Receiving Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 218 at [13], 30 ACSR 698 at 701 at per Whitlam J.
36 One of the many ways in which oppression may emerge is where salaries and emoluments are paid to those who run a business at the expense or to the detriment of the members as a whole. Thus, by way of example, in Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 549 at 560 Waddell CJ in Eq concluded:
In a general sense the evidence, in my opinion, justifies the conclusion that the second defendants are providing themselves with a salary and emoluments which are above the level which can be justified having regard to the plaintiff's position as a one-third shareholder. The 1984 year is, I think, significant in this respect. The adjusted profit after income tax was $9,714, out of which a dividend of $3,000 was paid, thus providing the plaintiff with $1,000 as his share of the profits. The total of the second defendants' salary and emoluments was $169,000 approximately. There would not appear to be very much room for providing the plaintiff with similar salary and emoluments had he remained as a director and done the work which Mr Moynihan was engaged to do.
This consideration indicates that the dividend which was declared was not fair to him in that year. In the 1985 year the remuneration provided for the second defendants seems to me to be plainly more than could be justified having regard to the interests of the plaintiff.
In these circumstances it should, I think, be concluded in a general sense that the defendants have conducted the affairs of the company in respect of their own salaries and emoluments in their own interests and not in the interests of the members as a whole and that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner which is oppressive to the plaintiff. The extent of the unfairness to the plaintiff remains to be determined and is bound up with the question of what is an appropriate valuation to place on his shares, which is considered below.
37 Whatever the conduct relied upon to make out a claim of "oppression", that conduct is looked at - as repeatedly acknowledged - objectively and through the eyes of a commercial bystander: Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692 at 704. Young J there summarised the position as follows:
… it has been accepted that one no longer looks at the word "oppressive" in isolation but rather asks whether objectively in the eyes of a commercial bystander, there has been unfairness, namely conduct that is so unfair that reasonable directors who consider the matter would not have thought the decision fair…
See also: Zomojo Pty Ltd v Hurd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1458 at [509] per Gordon J. See also: Dynasty Pty Ltd v Coombs (1995) 138 ALR 64 at 72, 13 ACLC 1290 at 1296 per Spender, O'Loughlin and Branson JJ; Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd [2004] FCA 1393 at [23], 51 ACSR 278 at 284-285 per Tamberlin J. Whether conduct is oppressive "is based on the objective facts": cf. Fitzpatrick v Cheal [2012] NSWSC 261 at [180], 264 FLR 313 at 366 per Ward J.
38 Section 232 and its predecessors are thus concerned with "commercial unfairness": Harding Investments Pty Ltd v PMP Shareholdings Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 567 at [9], 282 ALR 229 at 232 per Gordon J; Ample Source International Ltd v Bonython Metals Group Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1484 at [41], 285 ALR 488 at 494 per Robertson J. And, when considering "unfairness", a Court should not take "a narrow view": Edwards v Idaville Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 1 at 3 per Burchett and Ryan JJ. But a mere allegation of discrimination against a member is insufficient to attract the Court's jurisdiction: Valda Pty Ltd v Macarthur Coal Limited [2012] FCA 1264 at [16] per Kenny J.
39 An incident of "fairness" is the honesty with which an act has been performed: Chase Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd v North Sydney Brick and Tile Co Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 1 at 26. Cohen J there said of the predecessor provision to s 232:
It is a requirement of s 260(2)(b) that acts must be not only prejudicial to or discriminatory against a member but must also be unfairly so. Fairness must be related to what is known at the time. In my opinion, to take a step in the honest belief of it being a correct one would not amount to acting unfairly. To be fair is to act free from bias, dishonesty or injustice (Macquarie Dictionary)…
But "want of probity is only one of the ways in which oppression can manifest itself": Re M Dalley & Co Pty Ltd (1968) 1 ACLR 489 at 492 per Lush J. See also: Re Quest Exploration Pty Ltd (1992) 6 ACSR 659 at 669 per Mackenzie J. "Fairness" is not to be assessed in a vacuum: Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at 694, 2 ACLC 610 at 618 per Richardson J. Although subjective intention or purpose may not be a necessary ingredient in determining improper use of a position, the presence of such an intention may nevertheless be relevant in assessing impropriety: cf. Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2005] HCA 78 at [41], 227 CLR 18 at 29 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ; Vadori v AAV Plumbing [2010] NSWSC 274 at [164], 77 ACSR 616 at 646 per Ward J.
40 Even a decision taken by a director in good faith and a decision which is genuinely believed to be in the best interests of the company may nevertheless fall within the concept of oppression: Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 180 CLR 459. When addressing the terms of s 320 of the Companies (New South Wales) Code, Brennan J there observed:
It is not necessarily unfair for directors in good faith to advance one of the objects of the company to the prejudice of a member where the advancement of the object necessarily entails prejudice to that member or discrimination against him. Prima facie, it is for the directors and not for the Court to decide whether the furthering of a corporate object which is inimical to a member's interests should prevail over those interests or whether some balance should be struck between them. The directors' view is not conclusive, but an element in assessing unfairness to a member is the agreement of all members to repose the power to affect their interests in the directors [see s 78 of the Code]. Nevertheless, if the directors exercise a power - albeit in good faith and for a purpose within the power - so as to impose a disadvantage, disability or burden on a member that, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness and fair dealing is unfair, the court may intervene under s 320. The question of unfairness is one of fact and degree which s 320 requires the court to determine, but not without regard to the view which the directors themselves have formed and not without allowing for any special skill, knowledge and acumen possessed by the directors. The operation of s 320 may be attracted to a decision made by directors which is made in good faith for a purpose within the directors' power but which reasonable directors would think to be unfair. The test of unfairness is objective and it is necessary, though difficult, to postulate a standard of reasonable directors possessed of any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors. The test assumes (whether it be the fact or not) that reasonable directors weigh the furthering of the corporate object against the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose, and address their minds to the question whether a proposed decision is unfair. The court must determine whether reasonable directors, possessing any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors and having in mind the importance of furthering the corporate object on the one hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose on a member on the other, would have decided that it was unfair to make that decision: (1985) 180 CLR at 472-473.
Oppression may thus occur "despite the absence of any transgression of the fiduciary requirements of good faith, proper purpose and subordination of personal interest": Gerrard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2011] NSWSC 1156 at [49]. Barrett J there went on to observe that a "director may act oppressively in the sense relevant to the operation of s 232 of the Corporations Act and its statutory predecessors yet not breach any fiduciary or other duty owed as a director".
41 Commercial decisions, however, are - again as repeatedly acknowledged - best left to those managing the affairs of a company. A court should be hesitant in attempting to evaluate the competing merits of divergent commercial judgments. That process of decision-making is best left to the company to resolve: Zephyr Holdings Pty Ltd v Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 30 at 37. Brooking J there observed:
… Where, as in the present case, bad faith is not established and where, as in the present case, the allegation is that the proposed course of action is detrimental to the members as a whole, the court must take care that it does not too readily intervene in the affairs of a company under s 320. Compare Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at 697; Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd, 61 ALR 225 at 231. It is only stating the obvious to say that, under s 320, the court does not sit as an appellate tribunal to review the decisions of the organs of a company or of a class of its members on the footing that the court will, as it were, automatically reverse the decision if it disagrees with it.
See also: Wilson v Meudon Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1183 at [119] per Gzell J; HNA Irish Nominee Ltd v Kinghorn [2012] FCA 228, 290 ALR 372 at 489 per Emmett J.
42 "The mere fact that a member of a company has lost confidence in the manner in which a company's affairs are conducted does not lead to the conclusion that he is oppressed; nor can resentment at being outvoted…": John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (A'Asia) Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ACSR 63 at 66 per Young J. See also: Re G Jeffery (Mens Store) Pty Ltd; Re G Jeffery Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 193 at 198 per Crockett J.