Claim for interlocutory relief - serious question to be tried
22 I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have established that there is a serious question to be tried that the third and fourth defendants have contravened, or at least threaten to contravene, s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law by either carrying on or threatening to carry on a business producing and supplying Asian food products under the name "The New Crazy Dragon" and by falsely representing that the third defendant is employed by, or that the third and fourth defendants are now associated with or act on behalf of, the company in relation to its supply of "Crazy Dragon" products. I am also satisfied that the same conduct gives rise to a serious question to be tried that the third and fourth defendants have engaged in passing off or threaten to do so.
23 In this connection, although the registered business name adopted by the third and fourth defendants is not identical to the company's business name, it is, nevertheless, arguably deceptively similar to that name when applied to the production and supply of Asian food, because of the word elements "Crazy Dragon" that are common to those respective names. Indeed "Crazy Dragon" is the brand actually used by the company in relation to its products. The likely deceptive similarity between the two business names, and between the third and fourth defendants' business name and the company's brand, could be no mistake given the third defendant's role within the company's business at the time the third and fourth defendants' business name was registered.
24 I also take into account the seemingly dishonest way in which the third defendant obtained the transfer into his own name of the telephone number associated with the company's mobile phone that was used by him during his employment with the company. The third defendant has not sought to dispute the fact that he procured the transfer of the telephone number to himself by falsely representing that he was the first plaintiff; nor has he proffered any justification for this conduct. The telephone number has been promoted by the company as one associated with its business. That promotion has included use of the telephone number on the company's website. Despite the third defendant's contact details being initially removed from the company's website following the termination of his employment on 30 April 2012, it is clear that, in circumstances which have not been explained by the defendants, the third defendant's name, in association with the mobile telephone number, were reinstated on the website. On the present evidence, it is likely this could only have been done at the behest of the second or third defendant. The company was then "locked out" of the website by the fifth defendant acting, at least, on the request of the second defendant. The result is that the third defendant is now falsely identified on the company's website as a continuing point of contact (namely, as sales manager) for the sale of "Crazy Dragon" food products using the mobile telephone number he has procured to be transferred into his name.
25 I also take into account the control that the third and fourth defendants, and it seems also the second defendant, have sought to exert over the shumai machine and associated bag sealing equipment that have been used at the Hoppers Crossing premises to manufacture the company's shumai products. The third and fourth defendants have exerted this control by the third defendant taking a lease over the Hoppers Crossing premises following the demise of the Wonsum business previously conducted there. It seems that the third defendant is prepared to permit that equipment to be used at the Hoppers Crossing premises to manufacture shumai products for the company, but only on his own terms. At the present time there is nothing to stop the third and fourth defendants from using that equipment to also manufacture shumai products to be sold in competition with, or in substitution for, the company's products. The fact that they have registered a name for the business of producing Asian food indicates their preparedness to engage in that conduct.
26 It is of significance that the third defendant has not given evidence in this application. The second defendant has given evidence by way of affidavit. He has purported to do so on behalf of all defendants, other than the fifth defendant. The affidavit is in somewhat unsatisfactory form. It appears to be an amalgam of statements sought to be made by the second defendant and the third defendant, but sworn by the second defendant. To the extent that the second defendant has sought to explain the third and fourth defendants' conduct, he has done so substantially on a hearsay basis. For example, the second defendant gave evidence that the third defendant informed him that "he" (the third defendant) was not trading as "The New Crazy Dragon". I place very little weight on this evidence, given the form in which it is expressed and given also the objective evidence before me of the third and fourth defendants' conduct that I have recorded.
27 I should add that the second defendant has given evidence that, in about April 2012, he asked the third defendant to "make the necessary arrangements to ensure manufacturing could continue from the Hoppers Crossing premises with the shumai machine". He also gave evidence that "in order to maintain the status quo, I told [the third defendant] to incorporate an entity at arms length [sic] to me, and to continue to supply from the Hoppers Crossing premises". This evidence was apparently tendered to provide justification for the third and fourth defendants' conduct. However, far from justifying that conduct, the evidence implicates the second defendant in it and, specifically, in what seems to be an attempt to isolate the shumai machine and associated bag sealing equipment from use by the company except on terms that are acceptable to the third and fourth defendants and, presumably, the second defendant.
28 In this latter regard there is other evidence before me, in the form of email correspondence in May 2012, in which, in relation to concerns expressed by the Catalano interests about the rate at which the shumai products were being supplied from the Hoppers Crossing premises under the temporary arrangements to which I have referred, the second defendant said that "[the third defendant] is the one you have to talk to it is his factory". In that correspondence he also said that the "conflict" in relation to those arrangements was one between the first plaintiff and the third defendant. At the very least this evidence suggests that, when it has suited him to do so in his commercial dealings with the Catalano interests, the second defendant has sought to downplay his own involvement in the affairs of the third and fourth defendants and to attribute control over the Hoppers Crossing premises, and the use of the equipment in those premises, principally to the third defendant.
29 My conclusion on the existence of a serious question to be tried, in this regard, is sufficient to justify the particular interlocutory relief that is sought against the third and fourth defendants, subject to consideration of the balance of convenience. It is not necessary, therefore, for me to consider the other bases on which the plaintiffs claim that relief.
30 I am also satisfied that the plaintiffs have established that there is a serious question to be tried that the second defendant has acted in breach of his duty as a director of the company. Arguably, this has been manifested in four respects: first, by his purported revocation, without apparent lawful cause, of the company's right to, or right to use, the Equipment, coupled with a threat to sell the Equipment, presumably with the objective of denying its availability for use by the company in carrying on its business; secondly, by apparently procuring the third defendant to isolate the shumai machine and associated bag sealing equipment from use by the company except on terms that are acceptable to the third and fourth defendants, and presumably himself; thirdly, by failing to sign, or in procrastinating in signing, cheques drawn on the company's bank account; and fourthly, by taking the steps that eventuated in the company being effectively "locked out" of its website.
31 On the present evidence, there is a serious question to be tried that, despite his denials, this conduct was deliberately undertaken by the second defendant to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of the company's business as a form of retaliation against the Catalano interests, substantially because of the differing personal views that have developed as to how the company's business should be conducted. Such conduct, if established at a final hearing, may well constitute, for example, a breach of the second defendant's duty to exercise his powers and discharge his duties in good faith in the best interests of the company and for a proper purpose. It may also constitute, for example, a breach of his duty not to improperly use his position to gain advantage for himself or for others (such as the third and fourth defendants) or to cause detriment to the company.
32 My conclusion on the existence of a serious question to be tried, in this regard, is sufficient to justify the particular interlocutory relief that is sought against the second defendant, subject to consideration of the balance of convenience. It is not necessary, therefore, for me to consider the other bases on which the plaintiffs claim that relief.