Boyd v Thorn - [2017] NSWCA 210 - NSWCA 2017 case summary — Zoe

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Boyd v Thorn

[2017] NSWCA 210

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2017-05-11|Before: Macfarlan JA, Leeming JA

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2017-05-11

Before

Macfarlan JA, Leeming JA

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (32 paragraphs)

[1]

Filo (1990) 19 NSWLR 490 Chaudhary v Chaudhary [2016] NSWSC 1423 Corin v Patton (1988) 13 NSWLR 15 Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd (2016) 91 NSWLR 732; [2016] NSWCA 81 Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 87 NSWLR 284; [2013] NSWCA 453 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; [1999] HCA 10 Hall v Richards (1961) 108 CLR 84; [1961] HCA 34 Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 609; [2014] NSWCA 266 In Re Hallett's Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1879) 13 Ch D 696 James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd [No 2] [2005] NSWCA 296 John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19 Lu v Heinrich [2014] NSWCA 349; 68 MVR 277 Lyons v Lyons [1967] VR 160 Malamit Pty Ltd v WFI Insurance Ltd [2017] NSWCA 162 Mastronardi v New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 54 Merit Protection Commissioner v Nonnenmacher (1999) 86 FCR 112 Mitrovic v Koren [1971] VR 479 Osborne v Smith (1960) 105 CLR 153; [1960] HCA 89 Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 Pralle v Scharka [1978] 2 NSWLR 450 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; [1968] HCA 34 Re Fettel (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 221 Ross v Lane Cove Council (2014) 86 NSWLR 34; [2014] NSWCA 50 Ross v Ross [2010] NSWCA 301; 15 BPR 28,945 Secretary, Department of Social Services & Commonwealth of Australia v Cassaniti [2015] NSWSC 1586 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317; [2014] NSWCA 462 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28 Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones and Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492; [1910] HCA 44 Werderman v Société Générale D'Électricité (1881) 19 Ch D 246 Wright v Gibbons (1949) 78 CLR 313; [1949] HCA 3 Texts Cited: C Johnston Edwards, The Law of Execution upon Judgments and Orders (London, Stevens and Sons, 1888) E Sykes "The Effect of Judgments on Land in Australia" (1953) 27 Australian Law Journal 306 E Sykes, "The Effect of Judgments on Land in Australia" (1953) 27 Australian Law Journal 226 R Walker, The Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at Common Law (Law Book Co of Australasia, 4th ed 1958) W Cornish et al, Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford University Press, 2010), Vol XI W Parker, The Practice in Equity (Law Book Company of Australia, 1930) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Ian Geoffrey Boyd (First Appellant) Dawn Kathleen Boyd (Second Appellant) Catherine Margaret Thorn as executor of the Estate of the late Betty McAuley (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: T A Alexis SC / S A C Patterson (Appellants) A J McInerney SC / V R Brigden (Respondent)

[4]

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] The appellants, Mr Ian and Mrs Dawn Boyd, are the registered proprietors of a property which is their family home. The respondent is Catherine Margaret Thorn as executrix of the Estate of the late Betty McAuley ("the Estate"). In a judgment of 25 August 2014, Robb J found that Mr Boyd had procured $260,000 from Mrs McAuley by undue influence and unconscionable conduct. On 6 November 2014, his Honour made declarations to that effect and that the Estate was entitled to trace the sum of $260,000 into any property in relation to which it had been applied. On 13 March 2015, Robb J declared that Mr Boyd held his interest in the family property "upon a constructive trust for the [Estate] to the value of $200,000", and that the Estate's judgment debt constituted an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's interest in that property. His Honour granted liberty to the Estate to apply for an order under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) for the appointment of trustees for the sale of the subject property. Mrs Boyd was not a party to the proceedings at that stage. Subsequently, Mrs Boyd applied to White J for orders setting aside the declarations and orders made on 13 March 2015. White J set these aside, finding that Mrs Boyd had been a necessary party to the proceedings, at least from the time that the Estate pursued its claim for the declarations and orders involving the subject property. His Honour also ordered that Mrs Boyd be joined as a party to the proceedings. After a further hearing in 2016, at which Mrs Boyd appeared without legal representation, Sackar J re-made the March 2015 declarations and orders that White J had set aside and ordered pursuant to s 66G that the property be vested in trustees for sale. Mrs Boyd appealed against these orders (Ground 1). Mr Boyd appealed against Sackar J's order that litigation costs, for which Mr Boyd was liable to the Estate, be paid out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds of sale (Ground 2). Both Mr and Mrs Boyd appealed against Sackar J's order that the real estate agent's commission and charges and the trustee's expenses of sale be paid from the proceeds of sale before dividing the net proceeds between Mr and Mrs Boyd (Ground 3). The Court of Appeal held that Ground 2 of the appeal should be upheld. The majority of the Court (per Leeming JA and Emmett AJA) held that the appeal should otherwise be dismissed. Ground 1: Per Macfarlan JA, Emmett AJA agreeing: The s 66G orders affected Mrs Boyd's interest in the subject property and prejudicially affected her legal rights as they required the sale of a property in respect of which she was a part owner: [17], [202]. Per Leeming JA, Emmett AJA agreeing: Once the Estate had determined to seek proprietary relief against land of which Mrs Boyd was a joint owner, it was open to her to seek to challenge the findings of breach of duty and unconscionability made by Robb J in 2014: [152], [207]. Mrs Boyd however only challenged some of the orders made in the proceedings before she became a party. She did not challenge the declaratory and substantive orders made by Robb J on 6 November 2014 which were based on findings that Mr Boyd had obtained the $260,000 from Mrs McAuley by unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty. The scope of the rehearing before Sackar J was therefore confined to the challenged orders only. Mrs Boyd was not at liberty to seek to raise issues that were inconsistent with orders made earlier in the proceedings that she did not challenge: [79], [149], [203]. Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630; Malamit Pty Ltd v WFI Insurance Ltd [2017] NSWCA 162 applied. John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19 considered. Consideration (by Leeming JA) of (a) the relationship between seeking and obtaining proprietary relief and the execution of judgments on property, (b) the effect of taking such steps on jointly owned property and (c) the procedural consequences of those steps including where necessary parties have not been joined: [76]-[104]. Per Macfarlan JA dissenting: As the Estate was seeking s 66G orders in relation to land of which Mrs Boyd was a joint owner, she had a right to object to the orders. In doing so, she could challenge the Estate's claim that it was entitled to seek the orders because it was the holder of a proprietary interest in the property (by way of tracing). As part of this opposition, Mrs Boyd was entitled to contend that Mr Boyd's wrongful conduct needed to be proved by evidence in the proceedings at a time when she was a party to the proceedings: [17]-[18], [21]-[22]. Mrs Boyd was not a necessary party to the proceedings at the time of Robb J's findings and orders in 2014. Therefore Mrs Boyd did not have a right to set aside those findings and orders: [23], [35], [37]. John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19 distinguished. This analysis does not create the prospect of there being subsisting inconsistent court findings. If when Mrs Boyd was a party, the Estate failed to re-prove that Mr Boyd had acted unconscionably, that finding would supersede the 2014 finding. This is because the 2014 parties remained parties to the proceedings (with Mrs Boyd having been added as a party): [39]. Mrs Boyd was not bound by Robb J's findings and orders made earlier in the proceedings, when she was not a party, on the basis of the principles relating to privity of interest. Mrs Boyd did not have any legal interest in the outcome of the earlier proceedings, nor did she later acquire a legal interest affected by an estoppel connected to the earlier proceedings: [28]-[30]. Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28; Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; [1968] HCA 34 and Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2014) 254 CLR 425; [2015] HCA 2 applied. Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 87 NSWLR 284; [2013] NSWCA 453 considered. Sackar J's orders and declarations should be set aside for want of proof against Mrs Boyd of Mr Boyd's unconscionable conduct and therefore of the Estate's standing to seek s 66G orders. It is open to the Estate to make a further application for such an order: [40], [54], [59]. Ground 2 The Court upheld this ground. Ground 3 The Court rejected this ground.

[6]

The proceedings in the Equity Division

By her amended statement of claim in the proceedings, Mrs Betty McAuley (now deceased) alleged that Mr Boyd had obtained money from her by means of undue influence and unconscionable conduct, and had applied that money in payment of a mortgage over the subject property. She sought a declaration that the property was charged in her favour to secure the moneys obtained from her and sought an order for the appointment of trustees for the sale of the property. Mrs McAuley died on 26 December 2012 and the respondent executrix was joined as a party to represent her estate. Although then a joint tenant of the subject property, Mrs Boyd was not a party to the proceedings when they were heard in stages by Robb J in 2014 and 2015.
In a judgment of 25 August 2014, Robb J found that Mr Boyd had procured $260,000 from the late Mrs McAuley by undue influence and unconscionable conduct ([2014] NSWSC 1159).
On 6 November 2014, his Honour made declarations that Mr Boyd had acted unconscionably and in breach of fiduciary duty, and that the Estate was entitled to trace the sum of $260,000 into any property in relation to which it had been applied. The subject property was not identified in the declarations as the destination of the funds.
After a further hearing, in a judgment of 13 March 2015 ([2015] NSWSC 199), Robb J declared that Mr Boyd held his interest in the subject property "upon a constructive trust for the [Estate] to the value of $200,000" and that the Estate's judgment debt constituted an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's interest in the property. His Honour granted liberty to the Estate to apply for an order for the appointment of trustees for the sale of the property under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act.
On 24 March 2016 Mrs Boyd filed a summons in fresh proceedings, seeking orders setting aside the declarations and orders made by Robb J on 13 March 2015 in the proceedings to which she was not a party. In her supporting affidavit Mrs Boyd contended: "As a registered owner and occupant of the property affected by the claim, I was a necessary (indispensable) party to proceedings and a party who ought to have been joined."
On 11 May 2016 White J set aside the relevant declarations and orders ([2016] NSWSC 588), finding that Mrs Boyd had been a necessary party to the proceedings before Robb J, at least from the time that the Estate pursued its claim for the declarations and orders made on 13 March 2015. His Honour also made an order joining Mrs Boyd as a party to the proceedings. His Honour considered that the declarations and orders "directly affected Mrs Boyd as they expose[d] her to the prospect of the property of which she is a co-owner being sold upon the appointment of trustees for sale" (at [20]) and that "Mrs Boyd as well as Mr Boyd, had an interest in denying that the breaches of duty that Mr Boyd was found to have committed should result in the grant of a proprietary remedy" (at [22]).
His Honour held that Mrs Boyd's rights were also affected because the declarations and orders effected a severance in equity of the joint tenancy upon which Mr and Mrs Boyd held the property, and that this had a direct effect on Mrs Boyd's interest in the property (at [23]).
Whether or not the declarations and orders had this effect, severance of the joint tenancy was put beyond doubt by the registration under s 97 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) of an instrument that Mrs Boyd lodged with the Registrar General on 8 May 2015 recording the severance of the joint tenancy. On severance, the joint owners (Mr and Mrs Boyd) became tenants in common of the property.
Following a hearing on 19 and 20 September 2016 at which Mr and Mrs Boyd appeared as unrepresented parties, Sackar J delivered a judgment of 22 September 2016 making orders granting the Estate the final relief that it had previously obtained by the declarations and orders that White J set aside. These orders included a declaration that Mr Boyd held his interest in the property "upon a constructive trust for [the Estate] to the value of $200,000" and an order that, pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act, the property be vested in trustees for sale.
His Honour also made the following orders which are relevant to Grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal: "5. That the Trustees pay out of the proceeds of sale: a. Council rates, water rates, strata levies and any other statutory duties or charges if any; b. The real estate agent's commission and charges; and c. The amounts owing to any person having a secured interest. 6. That the Trustee pay out of the first defendant's share of the proceeds of sale: a. so much of the judgment debt as represents a principal sum of $200,000 plus pre-judgment interest under the Civil Procedure Act, in the amount of $82,829.46 and interest accruing after judgment under s 101 of that Act on that principal sum the subject of declaration 2 above; b. the costs of the plaintiff referred to in order 4 of the orders made by Robb J on 13 March 2015. 7. That the trustee Timothy William Daly is authorised to charge at a rate not exceeding $400.00 per hour including GST and in the total sum not exceeding $10,000.00 including GST plus disbursements and is authorised to deduct all such expenses from the proceeds of sale. 8. That the trustee Liam Bailey is authorised to charge at a rate per hour not exceeding $638.00 including GST and in the total sum not exceeding $15,000.00 including GST plus disbursements and is authorised to deduct all such expenses from the proceeds of sale."
His Honour's judgment included the following observations: "66 As I have earlier indicated the Defendants filed no evidence. Instead, they both took it in turns to make submissions and assertions from the bar table. 67 The recurring theme of these submissions, which involved frequent reference to the decision in Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571, was that they were entitled to a rehearing of all matters which had been before Robb J and that White J's judgment of 11 May 2016 was or should be construed as having that effect. As I understood it, they believed they were entitled to a rehearing, or as the Second Defendant submitted, a hearing de novo, according to general notions of procedural fairness. This submission has no basis in law and I reject it. 68 The Defendants pointed me to the comments of Rich J in Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 at 589 and submitted that that compelled me to set aside the remaining orders of Robb J as there had been "no valid trial at all". However, the Defendants failed to appreciate the context in which these comments were made, as they simply quoted the last line of the relevant passage at 589. In full, Rich J said: "It is a fundamental principle of natural justice, applicable to all Courts whether superior or inferior, that a person against whom a claim or charge is made must be given a reasonable opportunity of appearing and presenting his case. If this principle be not observed, the person who is affected is entitled, ex debito justitiae, to have any determination which affects him set aside; and a court which finds that it has been led to purport to determine a matter in which there has been a failure to observe the principle has inherent jurisdiction to set its determination aside … in such a case there has been no valid trial at all." 69 In the full context of 589, Rich J clearly stated that only the orders binding on the person affected, in the present case, the Second Defendant, could be set aside on the basis that she had not been afforded a 'valid trial'. It is for these reasons that this central and repeated submission of both Defendants has no merit. 70 I was at pains on numerous occasions to emphasise it was only the items set out in [11] of White J's judgment of 11 May 2016 [being Robb J's declarations and orders of 13 March 2015] which were the subject of the rehearing before me. However, both Defendants were simply unable or unwilling to accept that situation."
His Honour indicated that the foundation for his conclusion that Mr Boyd's interest in the property should be charged in favour of the Estate was that "the traceable $200,000 was unconscionably procured and … it would be contrary to the principles of equity for [Mr Boyd] to retain any benefit from this $200,000" (at [83]). It is apparent from his Honour's judgment that this conclusion was founded on the findings of Robb J in his judgment of 6 November 2014, delivered at a time when Mrs Boyd was not a party to the proceedings.
Mrs Boyd submitted to this Court, I consider correctly, that there was no evidence before Sackar J which could have constituted a re-proving before Sackar J of Mr Boyd's undue influence or unconscionable conduct. This is to be contrasted with the position in Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 87 NSWLR 284; [2013] NSWCA 453 at [113]-[117] and [153].
The Estate accepted that the evidence before Robb J that formed the basis for his 25 August 2014 findings and 6 November 2014 declarations was not before Sackar J, at least in full. The Estate submitted nonetheless that there was some evidence before Sackar J upon which a finding of wrongful conduct by Mr Boyd could have been based. This evidence was however of a tenuous kind and included Mr Boyd's unrebutted statements to the effect that his dealings with his late aunt were the subject of informed consent evidenced by a letter "witnessed and certified by a Solicitor". This evidence, when taken as a whole, was insufficient to justify Sackar J's assumptions as to Mr Boyd's wrongful conduct and I do not in any event read his Honour's judgment as relying upon it for that purpose. Instead, his Honour relied upon Robb J's earlier findings.

[7]

Ground 1: whether Mr Boyd's wrongful conduct had to be and was proved against Mrs Boyd

Although Sackar J's declaration of a charge in favour of the Estate related only to Mr Boyd's interest in the property, and the trustees for sale were directed to pay the judgment debt in favour of the Estate out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds, the orders under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act for the appointment of trustees for sale related to the property as a whole. They therefore affected Mrs Boyd's interest in the property (formerly as joint tenant but by this time as tenant in common). Her legal rights were prejudicially affected by the orders as they required the sale of a property of which she was a part owner.
Accordingly, Mrs Boyd had a right to object to the making of the orders. She was present (although without legal representation) at the hearing before Sackar J and, to an extent, was permitted to do so. She was not permitted however to challenge the Estate's standing to seek the order for the appointment of trustees for sale. She did not focus her opposition to the orders on the Estate's standing to seek the orders, but that is not surprising as she was unrepresented. She sufficiently raised the point by her assertions that she was not bound by the findings and orders of Robb J and that she was entitled to have the issues that Robb J addressed re-litigated. Sackar J rejected these assertions.
The Estate's assumed standing to seek the orders derived from its apparent status as a chargee of Mr Boyd's interest in the property. On this basis it was an "incumbrancee" of the interest of a co-owner and therefore, by reason of the definition of "co-owner" in s 66F(1) of the Conveyancing Act, was itself a "co-owner" and thereby entitled to apply as a co-owner for orders under s 66G for the appointment of trustees for sale.
I note in passing that the definition of "co-owner" in s 66F(1) is stated to include "an incumbrancer of the interest of a joint tenant or tenant in common". To give this aspect of the definition a sensible meaning, this must be read as a reference to an "incumbrancee", a word which is not otherwise mentioned in that definition. "Incumbrancee" is defined in s 7 of the Act to include "every person entitled to the benefit of an incumbrance, or to require payment or satisfaction thereof". It is plainly to such a person that the definition of "co-ownership" in s 66F(1) is intended to refer (see Campbell J in Chaudhary v Chaudhary [2016] NSWSC 1423 at [114]). An intended reference to "incumbrancer" would be redundant as a person giving a mortgage, charge or other incumbrance over the property must, of necessity, be the owner of an interest in it and therefore already within the concept of a co-owner. If I am wrong in this approach, the Estate would not have had standing to seek s 66G orders and the orders would plainly be defeasible. I therefore proceed on the assumption (favourable to the Estate) that my view on this question is correct.
As part of her opposition to the s 66G orders, Mrs Boyd was entitled to contend that the Estate did not have any standing to seek the orders. In support of that contention she was entitled to submit that there was no evidence before Sackar J that Mr Boyd had procured money from his late aunt by undue influence or unconscionable conduct. If that submission was accepted, the result is that no charge arose in favour of the Estate and the Estate therefore had no standing, as an incumbrancee or otherwise, to seek s 66G orders.
Even without making allowances for the fact that Mrs Boyd did not have legal representation, it is clear from the passages in Sackar J's judgment quoted in [13] above that, at the hearing before Sackar J, Mrs Boyd contended that she was not bound by Robb J's findings and orders made on 25 August 2014 and 6 November 2014 because she was not a party to those proceedings. Those findings and orders were to the effect that Mr Boyd procured money from his late aunt by exercising undue influence and by unconscionable conduct.
Unless Mrs Boyd was effectively represented by Mr Boyd as her privy at the hearing leading to Robb J's judgment of 25 August 2014, the findings contained in that judgment, and reflected in his Honour's orders of 6 November 2014, were not binding upon her. By reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Robb J's judgment did not constitute evidence before Sackar J of the facts that Robb J found. It is therefore necessary to consider the principles relating to privity of interest. Unless the Estate can establish that those principles bind Mrs Boyd to Robb J's findings and orders, the declarations and orders of Sackar J must be set aside as they were founded upon conclusions as to Mr Boyd's conduct that were not supported by evidence in the proceedings before him.

[8]

Privity of interest

The Estate alleges that Mrs Boyd is bound by Robb J's determinations of issues of fact and law in his judgment of 25 August 2014 (as reflected in his orders of 6 November 2014) notwithstanding that she was not at that stage a party to the proceedings. The Estate makes this argument on the basis that there was privity of interest between Mr Boyd, who was a party and appeared before Robb J, and Mrs Boyd.
The relevant principles have recently been stated authoritatively by the High Court in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28. In that case, the plurality said: "33 … a party to a later proceeding ('A') can be privy in interest with a party to an earlier proceeding ('B') on either of two bases. One basis is that A might have had some legal interest in the outcome of the earlier proceeding which was represented by B, or that B has some legal interest in the outcome of the later proceeding which is represented by A. The extent to which the representation by A or B will be sufficient to bind the other is the critical issue which will be explored later in these reasons. The other basis is that, after that earlier proceeding was concluded by judgment, A might have acquired from B some legal interest in respect of which B would be affected by an estoppel which A then relies on in the later proceeding."
Their Honours emphasised that, in relation to the first category, the interest of the privy must be a legal interest. They stated that "an economic or other interest on the part of A in the outcome of the earlier proceeding is insufficient" and that "absent a legal interest, such influence as A might have had over the conduct of the earlier proceeding is irrelevant even if that influence amounted to control" (at [35]).
In relation to the second category, their Honours stated: "40 Traditional forms of representation which bind those represented to estoppels include representation by an agent, representation by a trustee, representation by a tutor or a guardian, and representation by another person under rules of court which permit representation of numerous persons who have the same interest in a proceeding. To those traditional forms of representation can be added representation by a representative party in a modern class action. Each of those forms of representation is typically the subject of fiduciary duties imposed on the representing party or of procedures overseen by the court (of which opt-in or opt-out procedures and approval of settlements in representative or class actions are examples), or of both, which guard against collateral risks of representation, including the risk to a represented person of the detriment of an estoppel operating in a subsequent proceeding outweighing the benefit to that person of participating in the current proceeding." (footnotes omitted)
In the present case there was not, on either basis, any privity of interest between Mr and Mrs Boyd in respect of Mr Boyd's unsuccessful defence of the proceedings brought against him before Robb J in 2014.
Mrs Boyd did not have any legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings, they being concerned at that stage solely with Mr Boyd's personal liability and the Estate's entitlement, in a general sense, to trace the money Mr Boyd was found to have wrongfully procured from Mrs McAuley. Robb J did not, until 13 March 2015, make orders concerning the property in which Mrs Boyd had an interest, nor, apparently, was he asked to do so before that stage. There is no basis therefore upon which it could be concluded that Mr Boyd represented Mrs Boyd before Robb J in 2014. Mr Boyd's interest in the proceedings in 2014 was "personal" to him (see Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271 at 279; [1968] HCA 34).
Nor did Mrs Boyd acquire any legal interest from Mr Boyd in respect of which Mr Boyd might have been affected by an estoppel connected with the proceedings before Robb J. Mrs Boyd's interest in the subject property was acquired independently of and prior to any of the proceedings before Robb J.
The Estate relied in this context upon a finding of Beazley P in Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain (2013) 87 NSWLR 284; [2013] NSWCA 453 at [107]-[112] that there was privity of interest between the joint property owners in that case because joint tenancies give rise to a "mutual … relationship to the same right of property". However, the point in question was not addressed by the other members of the court and her Honour's observations have, with respect, been overtaken by the High Court's subsequent detailed exposition of the principles relating to privity of interest in Tomlinson, as well as by the High Court's observations on appeal in Cassegrain (Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2015) 254 CLR 425; [2015] HCA 2) as to the limited operation that can be given to the proposition that joint tenants are "considered by the law as one person for most purposes" (at [49]). It is, with respect, clear from these authorities that the fact that a joint tenancy may give rise to a "mutual … relationship to the same right of property" is insufficient to make joint tenants privies for each other in circumstances such as the present.

[9]

Leeming JA's judgment

Since preparing these reasons I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Leeming JA.
His Honour's view differs from my view on the principal question arising on this appeal, namely whether Sackar J erred in precluding Mrs Boyd from contending that she was not bound by Robb J's findings made in his judgment of 25 August 2014, and reflected in his Honour's orders of 6 November 2014, that Mr Boyd had acted unconscionably and in breach of fiduciary duty.
Leeming JA refers inter alia to the following facts: 1. Mrs Boyd did not ask White J to set aside Robb J's orders of 6 November 2014 (or judgment of 25 August 2014), nor did White J do so. Rather, White J set aside Robb J's orders of 13 March 2015 which declared that Mr Boyd's interest in the subject property was held upon a constructive trust for the Estate "to the value of $200,000" and that the Estate's judgment debt constituted an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's interest in the property. 2. Mrs Boyd did not appeal against White J's orders. 3. During the hearing before him, White J drew Mrs Boyd's attention to the fact that his Honour's (White J's) orders did not involve the setting aside of Robb J's orders of 6 November 2014 (in response Mrs Boyd reiterated her assertion that she was entitled to have the "full original proceedings" re-heard). 4. By notice of motion of 22 July 2016, Mrs Boyd applied to set aside Robb J's orders of 6 November 2014. Rein J dismissed the notice of motion following Mrs Boyd's failure to appear after an adjournment application was rejected. Mrs Boyd did not appeal against that dismissal. 5. Mrs Boyd applied by notice of motion filed on 13 September 2016 to set aside "the judgment and all other determinations made by Justice Robb on 25 August 2014". She also applied to set aside the orders of White J. Sackar J dismissed the notice of motion on the basis that Mr Boyd had not sought to appeal from the 2014 determinations and that there was no other ground to set the judgment aside. 6. In his judgment of 22 September 2016, Sackar J noted that White J had ordered a further hearing limited to certain matters (which included the Estate's claim for a s 66G order).
Notwithstanding these matters, I remain of the view that at the hearing before Sackar J Mrs Boyd was entitled to assert that the 2014 findings and orders of Robb J were not binding on her. As she was not a party to the proceedings in 2014 (and Mr Boyd, who was a party, was not her privy), the findings and orders were not binding on her, at least at the time they were made. White J's subsequent joinder of her as a party did not have the effect of retrospectively rendering her a party to the proceedings at the time they were heard by Robb J in 2014. Her status as a party dated from the date of her joinder, not the date of commencement of proceedings or some other earlier date (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW) 2005 ("UCPR") r 6.28).
In 2014 the Estate did not need to join Mrs Boyd as a party. This obligation only arose in 2015 when the Estate commenced to pursue claims for relief in relation to the property of which Mrs Boyd was a co-owner. At that stage her interests became directly affected and she was entitled, and required, to be joined as a party.
That Mrs Boyd became a proper and necessary party to the proceedings in 2015 did not mean that what had occurred in the proceedings in 2014 became in some way defective. It was perfectly effective against the then sole defendant, Mr Boyd, and that remains the case. Because she was not a necessary party in 2014, Mrs Boyd does not, and never has had, a right to set aside Robb J's 2014 findings and orders. For this Court to have set them aside at Mrs Boyd's instance would have been to allow a non-party, whose interests were not directly affected by proceedings, to interfere unjustifiably in perfectly proper proceedings against another person. In this respect, the present case differs from John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19 where the appellant should have been joined at the outset of the proceedings and was therefore found entitled to have orders made while it was not a party set aside.
In these circumstances, neither any failure of Mrs Boyd to apply to set aside Robb J's 2014 findings and orders, nor any lack of success on her part in making any such application, adversely affects her position. Those findings and orders were never liable to be set aside at her instance. The Estate did not suggest that there were any other means by which Mrs Boyd might have become bound by Robb J's 2014 findings and orders. Certainly, no generalised assertion of acquiescence by Mrs Boyd would have been well-founded, as she persistently contended that she was entitled to re-visit the 2014 findings and orders (see for example [34(3)]).
The effect of Leeming JA and Emmett AJA's judgments in the present appeal is that Mrs Boyd bore an onus to take affirmative action to have Robb J's 2014 findings and orders set aside. I do not agree that she did, as they never became binding on her. Not having joined Mrs Boyd as a party to the proceedings before it obtained those 2014 findings and orders, it was for the Estate to take steps to re-prove the relevant matters at a time when Mrs Boyd was a party. No difficulty of conflicting findings or orders would have arisen if the Estate had been unsuccessful in doing this because the parties at the time of Robb J's 2014 findings and orders (that is the Estate and Mr Boyd) remained parties and later different findings and orders in the proceedings would have superseded those made in 2014. I do not consider that the dismissal by Rein J and Sackar J of motions filed by Mrs Boyd, when unrepresented, seeking to set aside the 2014 findings and orders estops her from contending for the correct position as I have described it. These dismissals embodied findings that Mrs Boyd was not entitled to have the 2014 findings and orders set aside, not that they were binding upon her.
That brings me to the issues before Sackar J. Of prime importance before his Honour was the Estate's claim for a s 66G order. For the reasons I have given, his Honour's s 66G order directly affected Mrs Boyd's interests. An essential element in the Estate's claim for that order was proof that Mr Boyd had acted unconscionably. The Estate sought to prove that by relying on Robb J's 2014 findings and orders. However, as I have indicated, Mrs Boyd was not bound by those findings. There was nothing to preclude her making submissions to that effect and she attempted to do so. In my view, Sackar J erred in holding that she was not entitled to put that contention. She should have been allowed to put the contention, it should have been accepted and the s 66G application should have failed for want of proof that the Estate had standing to seek such an order.

[10]

Ground 2: order 6(b) of the s 66G orders

In light of my conclusions on Ground 1, Grounds 2 and 3 do not strictly arise. It is appropriate however to make the following observations in relation to them.
By order 6(b) (see [12] above), Sackar J ordered that the costs which the Estate was entitled to be paid by Mr Boyd (by reason of a costs order made by Robb J on 13 March 2015) be paid out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds of sale of the subject property. That order did not affect Mrs Boyd's interests as the relevant payment was not ordered to be made out of her share. She therefore does not appeal against it.
Further, the order would not appear to affect Mr Boyd personally as he does not dispute his liability to pay the costs in question. The significance of the order seems to be that it effectively gives the Estate a secured interest in respect of the costs liability and thus may give it an advantage over other unsecured creditors of Mr Boyd in the event that Mr Boyd is unable to pay all of his creditors.
In my view, order 6(b) would need to be set aside even if, contrary to my view as to what should occur, the s 66G orders were otherwise to stand.
Section 66F(2)(a) of the Conveyancing Act states: "(2) (a) Property held upon the "statutory trust for sale" shall be held upon trust to sell the same and to stand possessed of the net proceeds of sale, after payment of costs and expenses, and of the net income until sale after payment of costs, expenses, and outgoings, and in the case of land of rates, taxes, costs of insurance, repairs properly payable out of income, and other outgoings upon such trusts, and subject to such powers and provisions as may be requisite for giving effect to the rights of the co-owners," (emphasis added)
In Re Fettel (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 221 at 228 McLelland J said that the phrase in s 66F(2)(a) "for giving effect to the rights of the co-owners" means "for giving effect to the rights of the co-owners as co-owners". His Honour then said in relation to s 66G(6): "I do not think that this provision gives any authority for importing terms into the order of the court which have no relation to the situation of the parties as co-owners. When the respective definitions of 'statutory trust for sale' and 'statutory trust for partition' are read, it is clear that in their general terms they are not appropriate to meet every set of facts which would arise. In order to deal with the facts of particular cases, it will at times be necessary to make special provisions, to work out the respective rights of the parties as co-owners, or to give the trustees particular powers or duties not covered by the general words of the definition, or to deal with other like circumstances. It is such matters with which s 66G(6) is concerned, and the court cannot, in my opinion, import into the statutory trusts conditions to give effect to rights arising quite outside the position of the parties as co-owners" (at 228).
Bryson AJ made observations to similar effect in Arrow Custodians Pty Ltd v Pine Forests of Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 839; 14 BPR 98,326 at [34]-[35]. I referred with approval to both statements in Ross v Ross [2010] NSWCA 301; 15 BPR 28,945 at [32]-[33].
The effect of these statements is that, when making an order under s 66G to give effect to the statutory trust for sale identified in s 66F(2)(a), the Court's authority is limited to making adjustments to reflect the rights of the co-owners in their capacity as such. Thus, as I pointed out in Ross v Ross at [34], the court could, for example, provide for the payment of an occupation fee by one co-owner to another or make an allowance for the value of improvements made by one co-owner. In the present case, assuming that the Estate is a co-owner because it is an incumbrancee (or, to use the more common spelling, an encumbrancee) the court was entitled to require the amount secured by the incumbrance (that is, the judgment debt secured by the charge) to be paid to the Estate out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds of sale. That gives effect to a right that the Estate has as a co-owner (because it arises from the incumbrance) against Mr Boyd.
The position is otherwise in respect of Mr Boyd's liability to the Estate to pay costs. That is not a liability secured by the charge as it arose independently of the charge (and therefore independently of the parties' position as co-owners) by reason of a court order.
For these reasons, Ground 2 would have been upheld if Ground 1 had not succeeded.

[12]

Orders

Whilst the orders of Sackar J should be set aside, it is still open to the Estate to make a further application for s 66G orders for sale and to seek to prove its standing to do so. The decision by the present judgment provides that the Estate did not, on the evidence adduced before Sackar J, have that standing. This decision does not constitute a determination, binding on the Estate and Mr and Mrs Boyd, that the Estate has no standing to seek s 66G orders irrespective of any evidence that may be adduced on a further application.
The Estate should pay Mrs Boyd's costs of the proceedings to date and also Mr Boyd's costs of the proceedings from the date of Mrs Boyd's joinder, although, as litigants in person, there may be little, if anything, they can recover under these orders. Earlier costs orders should remain unaffected.
Mrs Boyd should have her costs of the appeal as she has been successful. As she and Mr Boyd had joint representation and were clearly acting in the same interest, an order should be made that the Estate pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, without distinction between Mr and Mrs Boyd.
In their notice of appeal, Mr and Mrs Boyd sought an order for interest on costs pursuant to s 101(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). As the Court was not directed to any evidence relevant to that application, and as it was not adverted to in argument, I do not propose that such an order be made.
In his judgment in the present case, Leeming JA expresses the view that if (contrary to his conclusion) procedural unfairness occurred, an issue would arise as to whether this Court should order a new trial. I respectfully disagree. If, as I have concluded is the case, Mrs Boyd was not bound by Robb J's 2014 findings and orders that Mr Boyd acted unconscionably, there was no evidence before Sackar J sufficient to prove that the estate had a proprietary interest in the subject property and that the Estate therefore had standing to seek a s 66G order. For that reason, Sackar J's orders should be set aside and the Estate's claim to a s 66G order fails.
As I have said above, if the Estate wishes to make a further application for a s 66G order that is a matter for it. The Estate's application for a s 66G order before Sackar J should have failed and this must be reflected in this Court's orders. There is no question of ordering a re-hearing of what occurred before Sackar J because the Estate's evidence was deficient and it is not entitled to a further opportunity, at least on the application it has thus far made, to remedy that deficiency.
I add that if any question of a new trial had arisen, the starting point for consideration of the issue would have been my conclusion that Mrs Boyd was denied procedural fairness in a significant respect, in that she was prevented from contending that an essential element of the Estate's claim before Sackar J for a s 66G order had not been satisfied. In such a case it is sufficient for an appellant who seeks a new trial to show that the denial of procedural fairness deprived him or her of the possibility of a successful outcome. In order to negate that possibility it is necessary for the Court "to find that a properly conducted trial could not possibly have produced a different result" (Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 at 147; [1986] HCA 54; Mastronardi v New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 54 at [83]-[86]; Lu v Heinrich [2014] NSWCA 349; 68 MVR 277 at [148]). As the High Court said in Stead at 145-6, "[i]t is no easy task for a court of appeal to satisfy itself that what appears on its face to have been a denial of natural justice could have had no bearing on the outcome of the trial of an issue of fact".
I would not have been so satisfied in the present case. That Mrs Boyd has not revealed how she would have opposed the making of a finding that Mr Boyd acted unconscionably is not to the point. It was for the Estate to adduce evidence to prove that allegation before Sackar J and it did not do so. At least where the evidence of unconscionability that was before Robb J in 2014 is not before this Court, this Court cannot conclude that there is no possibility that the Estate would fail to prove at a retrial that Mr Boyd acted unconscionably.
For these reasons, I propose the following orders: 1. Appeal allowed. 2. Declarations and orders made by Sackar J on 22 September 2016 be set aside. 3. Dismiss the respondent's application for an order under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 4. Order the respondent to the appeal to pay the second appellant's costs of the proceedings at first instance, and to pay the first appellant's costs of the proceedings at first instance from the date of the second appellant's joinder as a party to the proceedings. 5. Order the respondent to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. 6. The respondent is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW), if qualified.
LEEMING JA: The principal issue in this appeal is as to the consequences of a plaintiff's failing to join a necessary defendant when seeking proprietary relief, and in particular the application of what was said by a unanimous High Court in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19 at [134]: "Walker Corporation [the third party, which had an interest in the land] was entitled to claim, if it wished, that the [plaintiff's] substantive case was insufficiently strong to succeed at all, whatever the remedy available if it did succeed to any extent. Walker Corporation was entitled to call evidence against that substantive case. Even if it did not wish to do that, it was entitled to be heard on the weaknesses in the substantive case."
The third party in the present litigation, Mrs Boyd, was belatedly joined, the orders made which were found to have directly affected her interest in jointly owned land were set aside, and she was given an opportunity to be heard when the plaintiff's application (for proprietary relief in respect of Mr Boyd's interest in the land and for the appointment of trustees for sale) was reheard. There are some nice questions about when Mrs Boyd became a necessary party, but these questions do not arise in this appeal. There are also some minor matters as to the form of the orders made following the rehearing (grounds 2 and 3). But the principal issue is as to the scope of that rehearing. Mrs Boyd maintains that what occurred was insufficient, that she should not have been confined to challenging the orders which had been set aside but rather should have been permitted to challenge all aspects of the plaintiff's claim.
In order to put in context the main issue on this appeal, and how I would resolve it, the following very simplified summary will suffice. When this litigation commenced, more than six years ago, Mrs Betty McAuley was alive. No later than the amended statement of claim filed 11 October 2012, a tutor, NSW Trustee and Guardian, had been appointed. She died later that year, and the litigation has since then been conducted by Mrs Catherine Thorn as the executrix of her estate. It will be convenient to refer to the moving party, who is the respondent to this appeal, as Mrs Thorn.
The appellants, Mr Ian Boyd and Mrs Dawn Boyd, have at all material times been co-owners of land in Miranda in southern Sydney. Mrs McAuley had granted Mr Boyd a power of attorney, which did not extend to authorising him to confer a gift upon himself.
The amended statement of claim included allegations that Mr Boyd owed fiduciary obligations to Mrs McAuley not to act to his own benefit and not to put himself in a position of conflict. It was alleged that Mr Boyd had had and received Mrs McAuley's funds and failed to account for or repay them in breach of his fiduciary obligation to her, and that his retaining those funds was unconscionable. It was alleged that Mr Boyd had used those funds, inter alia, to reduce indebtedness of a loan made by the National Australia Bank secured by a mortgage over the Miranda property.
Mr Boyd was originally the sole defendant. The procedural history of the litigation is complicated, but the critical fact is that there were two contested hearings before Robb J sitting in the Equity Division in 2014 and 2015, prior to Mrs Boyd being joined. 1. Following the first hearing, orders were made on 6 November 2014 declaring that Mr Boyd had received $260,000 in circumstances involving unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty and that he held the amount on trust for Mrs McAuley, and entitling Mrs Thorn to trace that amount into property in respect of which he had repaid a mortgage secured over that property. 2. Following the second hearing, Robb J found that $200,000 of the $260,000 had been used to repay the indebtedness of Mr and Mrs Boyd which was secured by mortgage over the Miranda property. Robb J ordered, on 13 March 2015, that Mr Boyd's interest in the Miranda property was subject to a constructive trust and a charge, and leave was granted to Mrs Thorn to apply for an order that the property be sold.
In 2016, Mrs Boyd applied to set aside the orders made on 13 March 2015, on the basis that she was a necessary party. At the time orders were made on 13 March 2015, Mr and Mrs Boyd were joint owners of the Miranda property. At some time thereafter the joint tenancy was severed by instrument registered pursuant to s 97 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
Mrs Boyd's application was acceded to by White J on 11 May 2016, who ordered the rehearing before the primary judge (Sackar J) later that year from which this appeal has been brought. However, Mrs Boyd did not at that time apply to set aside the orders made on 6 November 2014.
For the reasons which follow, I would reject the principal ground of appeal, which is that the rehearing before the primary judge was unduly confined. I would do so on two bases. The first is that Mrs Boyd only challenged some of the orders made in the litigation when she was not joined. Mrs Boyd did not challenge the declaratory and substantive orders made on 6 November 2014 which were expressly based on findings that her husband had obtained $260,000 of the plaintiff's money in circumstances involving unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty. The scope of the rehearing was confined by reference to the remaining unchallenged orders. Mrs Boyd's entitlement to adduce evidence, and to be heard on weaknesses in the plaintiff's substantive case, in accordance with what was said in John Alexander's Clubs was not unqualified. Instead her entitlement to do so was circumscribed by her choice not to challenge some of the orders already made, and she was not at liberty to seek to establish issues in the rehearing which are inconsistent with the unchallenged orders in the litigation. That is the approach adopted by the primary judge, Sackar J, and in my view, his Honour was correct to do so.
That is sufficient to resolve the main ground of this appeal. However, if that be wrong, I would still dismiss this ground on the basis that I am not satisfied that a further hearing is necessary to avoid a substantial wrong or miscarriage. Mrs Boyd to this day is in default of the rules. She has filed no defence. Nor has she has proffered any draft defence. She served no evidence before Sackar J. There is no indication as to the evidence she wishes to adduce, and this Court is left to guess what submissions she wishes to make, at any further rehearing. The potential merits of the case which Mrs Boyd wishes to advance at a rehearing also fall to be assessed against the facts that Mrs Boyd has made a series of further challenges to set aside various orders, all of which have failed, from none of which has any appeal been brought, and the underlying claim is based upon Mr Boyd's use of $200,000 plus interest, which in the scheme of Supreme Court litigation is not a large amount, especially when there have been at least 11 days of hearings before 7 judges to date.
Assuming that the hearing before the primary judge was unduly narrow, I do not consider that that entitles Mrs Boyd to judgment in her favour; the best she can seek is a rehearing. The combined effect of the matters mentioned in the previous paragraph causes me not to be persuaded that "a substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned", which is necessary before there be yet another hearing: UCPR r 51.53.
The dispositive issues, on the view I take, are not free from difficulty. The analysis is assisted by bearing in mind the distinction between obtaining judgment and execution of judgment, and in particular between obtaining a proprietary remedy against land which is jointly owned, and execution against land which is jointly owned.
These reasons take the following form. First, I address a simpler example, analogous to the facts of this appeal, in order to expose the issue and the applicable principles. Secondly, I summarise the procedural history of this litigation. Thirdly, I explain why in my view Sackar J was correct to conduct and determine the rehearing in the way in which he did. Fourthly, I explain why I have concluded that even if Mrs Boyd was entitled to be heard more fully than she was before Sackar J, there has nevertheless been no substantial wrong or miscarriage. Finally, I deal with grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal.

[14]

The company's various rights

The company has two claims against the employee which may give rise to an interest in land. Both are based upon tracing in equity, in application of the principles whereby equity will recognise that a defendant's assets are subject to a trust or charge in favour of the plaintiff. The company can contend that the employee holds her aliquot interest in the holiday house on trust for the company. Alternatively, it can assert an equitable charge over the employee's interest in the holiday house to secure the repayment of the funds used to purchase it. (In Australia, as the primary judge with respect correctly observed, the position is different at law and in equity: Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322; [1952] HCA 62 at 337-8, and see Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (in liq) (2000) 202 CLR 588; [2000] HCA 25 at [25], in both of which appeals the joint judgment referred with approval to what was said by Sir George Jessel MR in In Re Hallett's Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696 as to the wider operation of tracing in equity than at law.)
The company also has ordinary rights of execution, based on its existing judgment debt, against the employee's assets. Those assets include the employee's aliquot interests in the holiday house and the family home. For the purpose of alienation, each joint tenant is conceived as entitled to dispose of an aliquot share: Wright v Gibbons (1949) 78 CLR 313; [1949] HCA 3 at 330; Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (2015) 254 CLR 425; [2015] HCA 2 at [48] and [112], and this extends to the compulsive alienation effected by execution of a judgment on land (effected by a sale by the Sheriff pursuant to s 113 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)): see for example Gowans J's analysis in Mitrovic v Koren [1971] VR 479 at 481. The "ordinary rights of execution" referred to above do not give an unfettered choice to the judgment creditor or the Sheriff. In particular, UCPR r 39.6 imposes an obligation on the Sheriff not to sell land before any other property of the judgment debtor. In cases where the judgment debt is large, and the only substantial asset of the judgment debtor is an interest in land, little may turn on this. (It may be noted that the requirement to favour execution upon chattels is as ancient as any of the 21st century rules of civil procedure. Chapter 9 of Magna Carta is to similar effect: "Nec nos nec ballivi nostri seisiemus terram aliquam nec redditum pro debito aliquo, quamdiu catalla debitoris sufficiunt ad debitum reddendum", (Neither we nor our bailiffs shall seize any land or rent for any debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient to repay the debt). For the history of execution against a debtor's land, which seems not to have been possible at common law, but was authorised by statute no later than 1285, see C Johnston Edwards, The Law of Execution upon Judgments and Orders (London, Stevens and Sons, 1888) pp 163-166.)
To summarise: equitable tracing yields a proprietary judgment which of itself creates an interest in property. Execution of a money judgment permits the judgment debtor's assets (which may include an interest in land) to be sold. The two processes are quite distinct.
The distinction between a judgment which itself creates a proprietary interest, and a money judgment capable of being executed against the judgment debtor's land, is a crisp one in New South Wales. It was analysed by Dr Sykes in "The Effect of Judgments on Land in Australia" (1953) 27 Australian Law Journal 226 and 306 and by Kitto J (with whom Dixon CJ and Windeyer J agreed) in Hall v Richards (1961) 108 CLR 84; [1961] HCA 34 at 93-94. Both Dr Sykes and Kitto J referred to the fact that Tasmania and Western Australia had enacted local equivalents to s 13 of the Judgments Act 1838 (1 & 2 Vic c 110) which provided that a judgment, once registered, operated as an equitable charge on land, but no such law was ever enacted in New South Wales. Dr Sykes noted at 229 that: "It is a matter of cardinal import here to remember that the English Act of 1838 by which the Legislature made the entry of judgment confer a specific security interest was not copied in New South Wales."
To the contrary, the New South Wales position was reflected in s 13(1) of the Judgment Creditors' Remedies Act 1901 (NSW), and is now reflected in s 112(3) of the Civil Procedure Act: "A judgment in any action at law does not of itself bind or affect any land." The position is all the stronger in the case of Torrens land: see Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; [2007] HCA 31 at [18]-[23]. It has an important consequence when a defendant in civil proceedings is a joint owner of property (including, by way of very common example, the case where a spouse who is a joint owner of a family home borrows funds without security). The plaintiff who sues the spouse can obtain judgment and may be able to levy execution upon the spouse's aliquot share of the family home without having joined the borrower's spouse to the litigation, although the spouse will necessarily be involved when the judgment is executed.
The company has other avenues open to it as well, following from the fact that prima facie the money in the employee's hands is held on trust for the company. The company can sue the daughter directly, as a volunteer who received the traceable proceeds of property which in equity remained that of the company. It can also sue the husband, for he too has obtained for no consideration an aliquot interest in the holiday house which represents the traceable proceeds of property which in equity was the company's. The company's claims against daughter and husband may be both proprietary (for example, a constructive trust may be imposed on the car or the holiday house when the daughter or husband learned that the funds had been misappropriated) and personal (requiring them to account for the misappropriated funds retained by each of them): see Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317; [2014] NSWCA 462 at [143]-[145] and Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd (2016) 91 NSWLR 732; [2016] NSWCA 81 at [45]-[47]. For the purposes of this simplified example, which is directed to a plaintiff's choices, I am not seeking to be exhaustive, and I am putting entirely to one side such defences as the daughter or husband may have.
If the employee has ample assets, and if the car and the holiday house have not appreciated in value, then nothing will turn on the proprietary remedies the company may be able to obtain, and the company may choose simply to execute the judgment debt against the employee's assets. However, if the employee has other creditors and has insufficient assets to discharge all of the employee's debts, then the company's proprietary claims against both the employee and her husband and daughter may assume considerable importance. So too if the car or the holiday house has appreciated in value since they were acquired.
Some of the documents in this appeal suggest that Mr Boyd has few assets and large creditors other than Mrs Thorn. That may explain the focus in this litigation upon tracing into Mr Boyd's interest in the Boyd family home. Mrs Thorn has a money judgment against Mr Boyd, but has not sought to enforce it by way of execution against Mr Boyd's assets. Nor has she sought to sue Mrs Boyd as a volunteer who obtained a benefit from the use of Mrs McAuley's money to reduce Mr and Mrs Boyd's joint indebtedness to the bank. Instead, Mrs Thorn has sought to obtain a proprietary remedy against a particular asset to which Mrs McAuley's money contributed, namely, Mr Boyd's interest in the Boyd family home.
To return to the example, the issue which underlies this appeal is analogous to the company's right to assert a proprietary claim against the employee's aliquot interest in the beach house. Mrs Thorn is not seeking a proprietary interest in Mrs Boyd's aliquot interest in the family home, nor is she seeking to execute the money judgment against Mr Boyd's interest in the family home.

[15]

The different procedural consequences flowing from the company's various rights

This appeal illustrates some important procedural aspects of the company's choices, concerning the joinder of the husband and daughter to the litigation.
First, the company does not need to join the daughter or husband to the litigation until and unless it seeks a proprietary remedy in the holiday house, the car or the family home. That is so irrespective of whether the company believes that funds have been used to acquire assets now owned or co-owned by the daughter or husband, or is entirely ignorant of how its funds have been disbursed. The question of parties turns, at least primarily, on whether the orders sought directly affect the rights and liabilities of the daughter and husband: Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 at 56; John Alexander's Clubs at [131]; Ross v Lane Cove Council (2014) 86 NSWLR 34; [2014] NSWCA 50 at [51]. A plaintiff is free to advance a case which is narrower than the broadest case which the available facts entitle him or her to bring. Like much in litigation, which focusses on the adjudication of parties' claims, it is the making of a claim which is decisive on the question of parties.
Secondly, from the moment the company seeks a proprietary remedy in respect of the car, the daughter is a necessary party. That is because an order in favour of the company is detrimental to all others who have or claim an interest in that property: John Alexander's Clubs at [131]-[132].
Thirdly, from the moment the company seeks a proprietary remedy in respect of the holiday house considered as a whole, or more narrowly in respect of the husband's interest in the holiday house, the husband is a necessary party, for the same reason.
Fourthly, if and when the company seeks a proprietary remedy in respect of the employee's interest in the holiday house, then the position as to joinder of the husband is more complex. Certainly, if granting the remedy would amount to a severance of the joint tenancy of the employee and her husband, then the husband's joinder is necessary. By way of analogy, in Pralle v Scharka [1978] 2 NSWLR 450, a decision in a specific performance suit for the sale of a joint tenant's interest in land, Needham J held that the other joint tenant was a necessary party, because the consequence for the other joint tenant was that he would cease to be a joint tenant with the defendant vendor and would become a tenant in common with the plaintiff purchaser. His Honour rejected the submission that the fact that a joint tenancy was inherently susceptible of being severed in this way meant that the other joint tenant was not a necessary party. I respectfully share the view expressed by White J in this litigation (see [2016] NSWSC 588 at [25]) that where the effect of an order sought by a plaintiff is to sever a joint tenancy, then there is a sufficient direct affectation of the other joint tenants' rights to render them necessary parties. Apart from anything else, severance of the joint tenancy deprives the co-owner of any hope that he or she might succeed to ownership of the entire property. That must amount to the requisite direct affectation of the co-owner's interest.
When is a joint tenancy of land severed? An effective conveyance or transfer to a third party is sufficient. In contrast, "the grant of a mere incumbrance or burden on the estate" is insufficient to do so. In Lyons v Lyons [1967] VR 169, McInerney AJ held that a registered mortgage of Torrens title land given by one joint tenant did not sever the joint tenancy (although his Honour noted that it was clear that a mortgage of old system title land did so). In Corin v Patton (1988) 13 NSWLR 15 at 25, Hope JA (with the agreement of Priestley and Clarke JJA) endorsed those two classes of case, and added a third: "if a joint tenant enters into a transaction which gives the other party to the transaction a right to acquire a legal estate in the land, specifically enforceable in equity, the joint tenancy, although not severed at law until the legal title passes is nonetheless severed in equity."
When a constructive trust is imposed on property held by a defendant, the plaintiff will become entitled to require the property to be transferred to him or her (or, if it is a part interest in property which is not specifically severable, judicial sale). It is important to recognise that "some constructive trusts create or recognise no proprietary interest", but instead impose "a personal liability to account in the same manner as that of an express trustee": Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; [1999] HCA 10 at [4], and see Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 609; [2014] NSWCA 266 at [74]-[81]. Such an order does not affect any interest in property, and does not sever a joint tenancy. But that is not the sort of constructive trust that would be sought by the company in the example, nor is it what was sought by Mrs Thorn.
It follows that at least if the company seeks to have the employee's interest in the holiday house held on constructive trust for it, then (a) no later than when such an order is made, the joint tenancy would be severed in equity and (b) accordingly, the other joint tenant, the employee's husband, is a necessary party from such time as a constructive trust is claimed. (Because what presently matters is the seeking of an order which carries with it an obligation to transfer the property to the plaintiff, it is unnecessary for present purposes to distinguish between "institutional" and "remedial" constructive trusts: see Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317; [2014] NSWCA 462 at [141]-[157]. This is as well, because the constructive trust ordered in this case, based on findings of breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionability, has aspects of both.) On the other hand, merely seeking a charge over the employee's interest in the holiday house will not sever the joint tenancy, and it may be that in that circumstance the employee's husband would not be a necessary party, although I do not express a view on that point.
Fifthly, it is for the plaintiff to join all necessary parties: Merit Protection Commissioner v Nonnenmacher (1999) 86 FCR 112 at 117; Ross v Lane Cove Council (2014) 86 NSWLR 34; [2014] NSWCA 50 at [51]. If the plaintiff obtains orders from a superior court directly affecting non-parties, those orders are not nullities but are, as a general proposition, apt to be set aside, as a matter of right: BP Australia Ltd v Brown (2003) 58 NSWLR 322; [2003] NSWCA 216 at [133]. That reflected the relatively strict position in equity as to parties, of which Griffith CJ once said that Chancery had pressed this rule to its "extremest limits": Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones and Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492; [1910] HCA 44 at 504. This was the source of John Jardyce's remark in Chapter 8 of Bleak House: "we are made parties to [the suit], and must be parties to it, whether we like it or not" (original emphasis). Dickens was there referring to the position under Lord Eldon's chancellorship prior to the reforms effected by the Chancery Amendment Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vic c 86), of which the Commissioners had said "There is probably nothing in Chancery procedure which has tended so much to augment expense and delay as the rules of the Court as to parties": see W Cornish et al, Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford University Press, 2010), Vol XI, p 666.
The position is different in probate proceedings, in which principles derived from ecclesiastical law mean that a non-party who chooses not to intervene will be bound: Osborne v Smith (1960) 105 CLR 153; [1960] HCA 89 at 158-159. In John Alexander's Clubs at [137]-[138], the High Court endorsed the general proposition from BP Australia Ltd v Brown as to orders being apt to be set aside, but left open the possibility that it might be subject to an exception if the plaintiff were unaware of the rights of the non-party. It will not be necessary to consider this possible exception in this appeal; Mrs Thorn's pleading alleged that the money was used to reduce the mortgage on the Miranda property, and she had filed caveats on the property and must be taken to have been aware that Mrs Boyd was a co-owner.
Sixthly, the consequences of a plaintiff failing to join all parties differed at common law and in equity prior to the Judicature legislation. It is not necessary to summarise here the series of mid-nineteenth century piecemeal reforms in England dealing with misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties at law and in equity. It will be sufficient to note that that was the background to the important new rule which came into effect in 1875, was applicable both at common law and in equity and was expressed in general terms: "No action shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every action deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just, order that the name or names of any party or parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, improperly joined be struck out, and that the name or names of any party or parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the action, be added": r 9 of the Rules of Procedure contained in the Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873.
In Werderman v Société Générale D'Électricité (1881) 19 Ch D 246, each of Sir George Jessel MR, Lush LJ and Lindley LJ held that a demurrer was no longer available where there had been a failure to join a necessary party: at 250-1, 254 and 255. Lindley LJ said: "[A] demurrer on the ground that the Messrs Brogden are not parties would have been sustainable before the Judicature Act, but when we look at the Order which is in force relating to demurrers, and look also to the Order which is in force relating to misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, it appears to me perfectly plain that the old practice of demurring for want of parties is at an end, and that the demurrer on that ground cannot be allowed."
Much the same point was made in the High Court, hearing an appeal from Queensland, in Barnes & Co Ltd v Sharpe (1910) 11 CLR 462; [1910] HCA 26, dealing with a complaint that not all of the plaintiffs had been joined. Higgins J said at 482 that: "In Queensland, as well as in England, and in other States which have adopted the Judicature system, the Court is no longer driven, in the case of misjoinder or non-joinder, to dismiss the action, or to grant a nonsuit or allow a plea in abatement. The Court has full power to rectify mistakes as to parties before or at the trial; and judgment may be given for such one or more of the defendants as are found to be liable, without any amendment." (citations omitted.)
As is implicit in Higgins J's observations (made at a time when all mainland States save for New South Wales had enacted Judicature legislation), those changes were delayed in New South Wales. Under the unfused procedure, pleas in abatement continued under the Common Law Procedure Act 1899 (NSW): see Pt IV, ss 41-45 and R Walker, The Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at Common Law (Law Book Co of Australasia, 4th ed 1958), pp 39-41. Likewise, demurrers continued to be available in equity under the Consolidated Equity Rules 1902 (NSW): see Pt VIII, rr 101-112. W Parker, The Practice in Equity (Law Book Company of Australia, 1930), p 190 noted by reference to Werderman the abrogation of demurrers for want of parties in England, and said that "this decision ... would appear to regulate the practice here". It is not necessary to determine whether or not that suggestion was the fact.
On any view of the matter, after 1972 when the Judicature legislation came into force in New South Wales a plaintiff would not fail merely because of misjoinder or nonjoinder. Rule 7(1) in Part 8 of the Supreme Court Rules in Schedule 4 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) provided: "Proceedings shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder of a party or the non-joinder of any person as a party."
The modern counterpart is found in UCPR r 6.23: "Proceedings are not defeated merely because of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any person as a party to the proceedings."
Thus, no later than 45 years ago, the old procedure of demurrers and pleas in abatement ceased to be available, and the modern rules reproduced above prevailed.
This appeal has been conducted on the basis that Mrs Boyd was a necessary party at least from the time Mrs Thorn sought to trace into Mr Boyd's interest in the Miranda property. What were Mrs Boyd's entitlements following White J's decision in her favour? First, it will be seen that some of the submissions advanced by Mrs Boyd, when she was unrepresented, were to the effect that the whole proceedings should be dismissed by reason of the failure to join her at the outset. What has been said above shows that her submission is not lacking in historical antecedents. However, it has not been the law for many decades. Proceedings are no longer dismissed for want of parties.
But even so, was Mrs Boyd entitled to adduce evidence and to be heard on the substantive matters giving rise to Mrs Thorn's judgment against Mr Boyd that he held $260,000 as a trustee for Mrs Thorn following his breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionable conduct? This is the ultimate question on the main ground of the appeal, and it is necessary now to refer in detail to the procedural history of the litigation, in order to explain (a) why I have concluded that she was not entitled to be heard further than she was and (b) in any event, there is no substantial wrong or miscarriage in denying Mrs Boyd a further hearing.

[17]

Hearings before Robb J

There were two hearings and two sets of orders made by Robb J in 2014 and early 2015, before Mrs Boyd was joined to the proceedings.
Robb J's judgment delivered on 25 August 2014, following a five day hearing, found that Mr Boyd had acted unconscionably and in breach of fiduciary duty to his aunt: [2014] NSWSC 1159. On 6 November 2014, orders were made in favour of Mrs Thorn. Orders 1 and 5 are highly material to the resolution of this ground of the appeal. Order 1 was a declaration: "That upon receipt of the sum of $260,000 on 6 August 2009 from Mrs Betty McAuley, in circumstances involving unconscionable conduct and breach of the defendant's fiduciary duty, the defendant held such monies on trust for Betty McAuley."
Order 5 reflected the proprietary relief obtained in order 1, and entitled the plaintiff: "to trace the sum of $260,000, obtained from Mrs Betty McAuley in circumstances involving unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty, into any property that the defendant acquired with that money, or in respect of which the defendant repaid a mortgage secured on the property with that money or any part thereof".
It is not clear from the appeal books whether a formal order was made separating the issues for determination in the way envisaged by order 5. It is clear that that was the practical effect of the order. An order was also made requiring Mr Boyd to "file and serve a full detailed account, verified by affidavit to the best of his knowledge and belief, of his dealing with the sum of $260,000 received by him on 6 August 2009 from Mrs Betty McAuley".
The appeal books contain an unexecuted affidavit by Mr Boyd asserting that the funds were misappropriated by NAB and "[t]he funds from the gift were not applied to my property or to any banking product associated with my property, my former business, or me personally." It is clear that this affidavit was not read before Sackar J, but was read before Robb J.
Following a further hearing in February 2015, on 13 March 2015 Robb J gave a further judgment: [2015] NSWSC 199. His Honour rejected the denials in Mr Boyd's affidavit, relying in part upon bank statements obtained by Mrs Thorn on subpoena which disclosed $200,000 being deposited to Mr and Mrs Boyd's home loan account in August 2009. His Honour recorded that when faced with the bank statements, Mr Boyd appeared to contend that they were fraudulently prepared. His Honour rejected that explanation, recording at [25] that: "Given the seriousness of Mr Boyd's allegation of fraudulent conduct on the part of the NAB, and the total absence of evidence to support that claim, it is important I record that I find it is completely baseless."
Robb J declared that Mr Boyd's interest in the property was held "upon a constructive trust for the plaintiff to the value of $200,000" and also declared that there was an equitable charge in respect of a principal sum of $200,000 together with pre-judgment interest over the same property. His Honour also granted liberty to apply for an order for sale to realise the charge, and an order in respect of the sale of the property pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
(As presently advised, there may be a difficulty in reconciling both the charge and the declaration of a constructive trust. First, a charge and a constructive trust are prima facie inconsistent remedies, which is what underlies the election faced by a beneficiary whose property has been misappropriated by a trustee and used to acquire another asset explained by Jessel MR in In Re Hallett's Estate. This may be seen from asking if the debt secured by the equitable charge is repaid, then does the constructive trust nonetheless remain in place? Secondly, the conventional approach when fashioning proprietary relief in equity is to ask whether some lesser remedy, such as an equitable charge, is warranted rather than a constructive trust: Giumelli v Giumelli at [10]. Thirdly, there are other difficulties in construing the order imposing a constructive trust. It seems that what may have been intended was for a proportion of Mr Boyd's interest in the land, referable to the $200,000 deposited by him, to be held on trust for Mrs Thorn, analogously to what occurred in Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59. Against this, however, there appears to be no finding as to the value in August 2009 of Mr Boyd's interest in the land. When these difficulties were raised during the appeal, senior counsel for Mrs Thorn accepted that the orders were problematic but submitted that it was not necessary for the Court to express a view on their proper construction. I agree, and do not express a concluded view on their construction.)
Thereafter, Mrs Thorn filed an amended notice of motion seeking leave to join Mrs Boyd to the proceedings, to appoint trustees for sale of the property, and for the $200,000 plus interest plus costs to be paid from Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds of sale.
Relevantly for present purposes is the following suite of applications made by Mr or Mrs Boyd, or both of them, summarised below in chronological order.

[18]

Applications by Mr and Mrs Boyd determined by White J

First, by summons dated 24 March 2016 Mrs Boyd applied to set aside the orders made on 13 March 2015. In her supporting affidavit, she said she was "the primary registered owner and permanent occupant of the property." She said, "I am not and never have been a party to the abovementioned proceedings nor any other legal proceedings". She said, "As a registered owner and occupant of the property affected by the claim, I was a necessary (indispensable) party to the proceedings and a party who ought to have been joined."
Mrs Boyd added (paragraph 14) that "I hold evidence, some recently acquired, which, had I been given the opportunity to present to the court, would have indisputably altered the outcome of the proceedings". Mrs Boyd's affidavit did not elaborate on that evidence, recently acquired or otherwise. However, it made the following allegations against Mrs Thorn: "The Defendant failed to join me to proceedings as she knew the judgment and orders would not be made if I had been present. The Defendant's proceedings relate to her objection to a personal gift made to a third party in 2009. Her claim of equitable interest in my property is based on her belief that the disputed [gift] funds somehow exist in my property. The disputed funds are entirely unrelated to me and do not exist in my property or in my possession."
Mrs Boyd's summons did not in terms seek her joinder to the proceedings. However, it is not possible to read her affidavit and the gravamen of her complaint in any other way. The basis of her claim was that she was directly affected by the orders sought, and therefore a necessary party, and was entitled, in accordance with what was said in John Alexander's Clubs at [137], to have the orders set aside.
It seems that Mrs Thorn's motion and Mrs Boyd's summons were listed for hearing before White J on 7 April 2016. Mrs Boyd's application was acceded to, in part, by his Honour on 11 May 2016: [2016] NSWSC 588; 18 BPR 35,941. His Honour set aside the substantive orders made by Robb J on 13 March 2015, ordered that she be joined as a second defendant to the 2011 proceeding and ordered a rehearing. His Honour stood over Mrs Thorn's motion to the extent that it sought orders appointing trustees for sale to that rehearing: see at [42].
White J held that Mrs Boyd was a necessary party from the time Mrs Thorn sought proprietary relief against Mr Boyd's interest in the land owned by her and her husband: at [19]-[27]. His Honour did so on two bases. The first was that the orders made in 2015 contemplated orders for sale under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act, and although the application was only made in respect of Mr Boyd's interest in the land, the highly likely outcome would be that the land would be sold: at [19]-[22]. The second was that the declaration and orders made by Robb J in 2015 themselves effected a severance of the joint tenancy: at [23]-[27]. His Honour noted that the grant of a charge did not of itself sever the joint tenancy, and so, consistently with what has been said above, this aspect of his Honour's judgment is to be read as turning upon the relief by way of constructive trust.
Mrs Boyd had also sought to strike out Mrs Thorn's motion as an abuse of process, and an order withdrawing two caveats on the property. All these prayers were dismissed. However, Mrs Boyd did not seek to set aside the orders made on 6 November 2014.
Mrs Boyd has repeatedly stated that she was entitled to have all the orders set aside and the litigation terminated for want of parties. That may have been the case prior to the enactment of the Judicature legislation. But it was not reflected in the relief sought in her summons which was heard and determined by White J, and in any event, it is a view which is no longer good law.
In the course of making directions for the further hearing immediately following delivery of judgment, there was a series of exchanges between White J and Mr and Mrs Boyd, including the following when a question arose of serving medical evidence as to the mental health of Mrs McAuley in 2009 for the purposes of the rehearing: "[Junior counsel for Mrs Thorn]: Could I just clarify one matter, it appears that Mr and Mrs Boyd are under the apprehension that the judgment delivered in 2014 in this matter has been set aside. HIS HONOUR: That is wrong. I BOYD: We are not under that misapprehension. HIS HONOUR: You are not under that misapprehension? I BOYD: No. HIS HONOUR: You understand that what has been set aside is the orders made - the declarations and orders made on 13 March 2015 and not the orders made on 6 November 2014. I BOYD: Yes. [There followed an exchange about the relevance of the medical records.] D BOYD: My concern is that my summons, the entitlement to fresh proceedings, was my absence from the full original proceedings and my clarification just a while ago that that is going to be reheard would then surely include all of the documents and evidence that were relating to the original proceedings, otherwise - HIS HONOUR: I don't see why that necessarily follows but that can be argued on the tender of those documents. D BOYD: Otherwise I still do not understand that the judgment has not been set aside if the judgment was a consequence of proceedings that I should have been present and need to be fully reheard in full for the judgment to be valid. HIS HONOUR: Mrs Boyd, you sought to set aside only the order of the 13th - the declarations and orders of 13 March 2015. You have succeeded on that. You did not seek to set aside the orders of 16 November 2015. ... D BOYD: Mr Patterson filed the original statement of claim in the Supreme Court under a non-closed case number and - HIS HONOUR: You have a duty as well as the plaintiffs to confine your attentions to the resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. Questions of file numbers do not go to the real issue in the proceedings. D BOYD: Sorry, you[r] Honour. HIS HONOUR [White J then explained how the two proceeding numbers arose following the transfer of proceedings from the District Court to the Supreme Court.] D BOYD: ... [T]he only originating process from Catherine Thorn to start these proceedings in her own right was again filed under the wrong case number of 2012 which caused me also not to be in the court file. HIS HONOUR: Mrs Boyd, I suggest you concentrate on the merits of the case. What you are saying at the moment does not go to the merits of the case at all. D BOYD: But it has disadvantaged me. HIS HONOUR: I am not going to hear you further on that. You have a duty to ensure that, as does the plaintiff, you have a duty to ensure that the proceedings are conducted with a view to a quick, cheap and just resolution of the real issues. The real issues are whether the executrix of Mrs McAuley's estate is entitled to a proprietary interest in Mr Boyd's interest in the land by way of trust or charge. D BOYD: I understand. My concern is to make sure that I do not become a victim of any alleged deception of the Court and myself."
In those exchanges, it was made quite clear that the 2014 orders remained in place, and were outside the scope of the rehearing which was ordered. White J also directed Mrs Boyd's attention to the obligations upon her by s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act. Even a party who is unrepresented is under a duty to assist the court to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: s 56(1) and (3).
Secondly, on 6 April 2016, Mr Boyd had filed a lengthy statement of claim seeking to set aside the orders made by Robb J on 6 November 2014 on the ground that they had been procured by fraud. He also challenged the grant of probate. White J dismissed Mr Boyd's statement of claim summarily on 14 June 2016: [2016] NSWSC 837, saying at [56]: "The amended statement of claim extends to some 272 paragraphs. Barely a paragraph is free of hyperbole. It does not plead material facts. The nature of the pleading can be judged from the first three paragraphs: "1. Catherine Margaret Thorn in collusion with other parties conspired to obtain judgment and orders by fraud with the intention of acquiring property by deception for her own financial benefit. Crimes Act 1900 - Section 192E(1)(a)(b) 2. Catherine Thorn instigated an extensive campaign of elder abuse, deception, coercion, breach of fiduciary duty, false statements, unconscionable conduct, undue influence, breach of confidentiality and privacy, abuse of government authorities and abuse of the District and Supreme Courts of NSW (assisted by her husband and solicitors). 3. The scope of the allegations being directly proportionate to the extensive 7 year campaign of pre-meditated fraud for the purpose of obtaining property, a campaign which continues to this day despite the Defendant having already lost more on legal costs than the amount fraudulently sought through my property indicative of a malicious motive."

[20]

Applications by Mr and Mrs Boyd determined by Sackar J

Fourthly, Mr and Mrs Boyd together applied by notices of motion filed on 13 September 2016 in the 2011 proceedings to set aside "ex debito justitiae, the judgment and all other determinations made by Robb J on 25 August 2014". Mrs Boyd's notice of motion also sought the following orders: "2. An Order to summarily set aside, ex debito justitiae, the orders made by White J on 11 May 2015 joining me as second defendant and convening a partial retrial. 3. An Order to summarily dismiss and void the proceedings as an abuse of process. 4. An Order for the immediate withdrawal of the caveats from my property."
Those notices of motion came before Sackar J on 19 September 2016, concurrently with the rehearing ordered by White J. Sackar J reproduced both notices of motion at [27]-[28] and dismissed them for reasons given in two ex tempore judgments: see [2016] NSWSC 1344 at [29] (the judgments are not on CaseLaw). His Honour dealt with each paragraph in turn, dismissing the motions. Relevantly for present purposes: 1. In relation to the application to set aside "the judgment and all determinations made by Robb J on 25 August 2014", Sackar J treated that as a reference to the judgment delivered on that date and the orders made subsequently, noted that Mr Boyd had not sought to appeal from it, and considered that there was no basis to set the judgment or orders aside. 2. In relation to the challenge to the order joining Mrs Boyd, his Honour said: "That is a little hard to follow simply because Mrs Boyd's complaint before White J, which he accepted, was that certain orders affecting the property she jointly owns with her husband should not have been made because she was not a party to the proceedings before Robb J. Having been successful before White J it seems to me that it is quite inconsistent and, indeed, contradictory that she would then seek to set aside the balance of what his Honour had to say."
The appeal in this Court is confined to Sackar J's substantive judgment on the rehearing, delivered later that week, and does not extend to the dismissal of Mr and Mrs Boyd's motions. (To be clear, I should not be taken to be suggesting that an appeal from the dismissal of those motions would have had reasonable prospects of success.)
Sackar J also refused an adjournment application made by Mr and Mrs Boyd on the afternoon of the first day of the hearing. His Honour noted that Mr and Mrs Boyd had been given ample time to put on material and that "White J was at pains to tell Mrs Boyd, in particular, by reason of the exchanges which took place on 11 May, that they would have that opportunity and that that opportunity had to be taken up promptly within the various periods that White J then set out". Some of those exchanges have been reproduced above. Sackar J stated that the defendants had never sought to file any material before this Court in relation to the proposed relief sought by the executor. His Honour rejected the submission that Mr and Mrs Boyd did not understand the issues for determination.
Sackar J's reasons record at [31] that his Honour also refused an application for an adjournment made by Mr Boyd on the second day of the hearing, in order that an application for special leave to the High Court of Australia might be made.

[21]

The judgment of Sackar J on the rehearing ordered by White J

Sackar J reserved on the substantive rehearing and delivered judgment two days later: [2016] NSWSC 1344. Understandably, he commenced with the procedural background, stating at [22] that: "White J further ordered that the Second Defendant be joined as a second defendant to these proceedings, for the purposes of a rehearing on those limited items described at [9], [11], [41] and [42] in Boyd v Catherine Margaret Thorn as executrix of the estate of the late Betty McAuley [2016] NSWSC 588."
He noted at [26] that neither Mr nor Mrs Boyd had served any affidavits or documents upon which they wished to rely, contrary to White J's directions.
His Honour reproduced principles relating to tracing in equity, imposing a constructive trust and an equitable charge, sales of land pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act and judicial sale before turning to apply those principles at [66]-[88].
His Honour said that Mr and Mrs Boyd's submission, based on Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571; [1944] HCA 5, was that they were entitled to a rehearing on all issues. His Honour said this had no basis in law, and stated that what was said in Cameron v Cole was that the person who had not been joined was entitled to have any determination which affected him or her set aside. His Honour said at [69]-[71]: "In the full context of 589, Rich J clearly stated that only the orders binding on the person affected, in the present case, the Second Defendant, could be set aside on the basis that she had not been afforded a 'valid trial'. It is for these reasons that this central and repeated submission of both Defendants has no merit. I was at pains on numerous occasions to emphasise it was only the items set out in [11] of White J's judgment of 11 May 2016 which were the subject of the rehearing before me. However, both Defendants were simply unable or unwilling to accept that situation. Other matters were raised by the Defendants from the bar table, for example, the alleged fraud on the part of NAB in the preparation of bank statements, which was previously raised before Robb J on 12 February 2015. There were also assertions made as to who may, or may not have, what the Second Defendant described as 'equitable interests' in the relevant property. None of these allegations, or others of the kind, were the subject of evidence or currently have any foundation in fact."
On appeal, it was not suggested that Sackar J's summary of the nature and subject matter of Mr and Mrs Boyd's submissions was inaccurate.
Sackar J then found that $200,000 was transferred from Mrs McAuley's account and used to reduce the debts which were mortgaged against the Miranda property. In making that finding, Sackar J commenced with reproducing Robb J's findings to the same effect at [2015] NSWSC 199 at [29]-[30], but then referred to matters including (a) Mr Boyd's admissions in his letters dated 8 and 15 March 2010 to the NSW Trustee and Guardian, (b) the NAB bank statement and (c) Mr Boyd's cross-examination before Robb J. His Honour concluded at [78]: "On the basis of this evidence, which was only contested by way of oral submissions, I am satisfied that the $200,000 was transferred from Mrs McAuley's account and applied to pay down or reduce the debts which were mortgaged against the property. The admissions made by [Mr Boyd] referred to at [73] and [75]-[76], and the bank statements referred at [74], more than corroborate that conclusion."
His Honour addressed the issue of the imposition of a constructive trust at [79]-[83]. His Honour approached this issue quite differently from how he had dealt with the provenance of the $200,000. Paragraph 79 was expressed to be premised on the fact that Mr Boyd had unconscionably procured $200,000. Paragraph 83 once again referred to the fact that "the traceable $200,000 was unconscionably procured". The intervening paragraphs did not attempt to analyse whether the money was unconscionably procured. Instead they focussed on whether a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy, or whether some lesser remedy might be imposed. Indeed, the contrast between the meticulous analysis of the evidence as to tracing with the unsubstantiated assertion that Mr Boyd had behaved unconscionably is striking.
Having made those findings, it was straightforward for his Honour to reach the view that a s 66G sale was appropriate. His Honour made orders in the terms proposed by Mrs Thorn, including both a constructive trust "to the value of $200,000" and a charge. (Once again, no submissions appear to have been made against making both of those orders. The matters noted at [114] above as to those orders are equally applicable here, but they were not the subject of argument on the appeal and I do not express a concluded view on the point.)

[22]

The approach taken by Sackar J was correct

In this appeal, Mrs Boyd submitted that there was no attempt to re-prove that Mr Boyd had unconscionably procured and retained the $200,000, or that he had done so in breach of fiduciary duty, that much of the evidence on that issue was not before Sackar J, and that Sackar J had "relied upon these findings and orders as the foundation for the granting of proprietary relief against the property". I accept the submission. Sackar J's judgment proceeded on the basis that it was necessary to prove that the $200,000 was used to reduce debts secured by the mortgage (being a matter determined by Robb J in his 2015 judgment which was set aside), but accepted as a premise that Mr Boyd's conduct was unconscionable and in breach of fiduciary duty.
Mrs Boyd noted that "It remains open to [Mrs Thorn] to enforce the judgment for $260,000 with interest against [Mr Boyd] in the usual way", but said that the declarations and orders made by Sackar J should be set aside and "Absent a retrial of the primary case against [Mr Boyd] to which [Mrs Boyd] was a necessary party, his Honour should not have granted the relief sought."
In my view, the approach taken by Sackar J was correct. This was not a case where a non-party had objected to all that had occurred in the litigation in her absence, as was the case with Walker Corporation in John Alexander's Clubs. The critical step was and remained Mrs Boyd's limited challenge to the orders made by Robb J in 2015 to which White J had acceded. The rehearing ordered by White J did not extend to seeking to set aside the orders made by Robb J in 2014.
It may be accepted that Mrs Boyd was unrepresented at the time and may not have appreciated the full consequences of her selective challenge to the orders. However, White J made it very clear, immediately upon handing down judgment, of the limitations upon the rehearing he had ordered. His Honour also made it clear that Mrs Boyd's notion that the late joinder somehow brought the proceedings to an end, or of itself entitled her to a de novo hearing on all issues, was incorrect.
It seems likely that this consequence came to be appreciated by Mrs Boyd. After all, she has applied to have the 2014 orders made by Robb J set aside twice. But the dismissal of those applications, by Rein J and Sackar J, is outside the scope of this appeal.
On any view Mr Boyd is bound by the declaration made by Robb J in 2014 that he acted in breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionably and held the $260,000 on trust. His position was the same as if there had been a separate determination of questions of liability and personal relief. Of this, Diplock LJ said in Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630 at 642, in a passage recently applied in this Court in Malamit Pty Ltd v WFI Insurance Ltd [2017] NSWCA 162 at [43], that: "the parties to the suit are bound by the determination of the issue. They cannot subsequently in the same suit advance argument or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is by way of appeal from the interlocutory judgment and, where appropriate, an application to the appellate court to adduce further evidence."
So far as the materials in the appeal books disclose, Mr Boyd has never sought to appeal from the declaration. Further, his application to set it aside as having been procured by fraud was dismissed by White J, and from that dismissal no appeal has been brought. And his belated application to set it aside two years later was dismissed by Sackar J at the commencement of the rehearing, and this appeal does not extend to that order.
There may be a nice question whether the effect of Mrs Boyd's joinder in 2016 meant that she became bound by the orders made in 2014. Regularly, this will turn on the terms on which a joinder is made (for example, the order joining the third party may make express that party's right to challenge a particular issue). I shall follow the same course as was taken in Secretary, Department of Social Services & Commonwealth of Australia v Cassaniti [2015] NSWSC 1586 at [38] in relation to the same issue, and avoid deciding it because it is not necessary to do so. In any event, being "bound" by an order carries a number of consequences (including rights of appeal, liability to prosecution for contempt in the event of breach, and precluding collateral challenge) and it may perhaps be that the answer depends on the purpose (for example, a stricter approach may be taken in a case of contempt). It is sufficient to state that in circumstances where Mrs Boyd did not seek to set the 2014 orders aside, and obtained a rehearing by reason of the setting aside of the 2015 orders, I consider that she is unable to contend in that rehearing for findings which would give rise to inconsistent orders in the same proceedings.
It may be accepted that a necessary party who is only belatedly joined has an entitlement to adduce evidence, and to be heard, against all aspects of the plaintiff's cause of action which lead to the claim for orders directly affecting that party. In John Alexander's Clubs at [134], the non-party (Walker Corporation) was held to be "entitled to claim, if it wished, that the [plaintiff's] substantive case was insufficiently strong to succeed at all, whatever the remedy available if it did succeed to any extent. Walker Corporation was entitled to call evidence against that substantive case. Even if it did not wish to do that, it was entitled to be heard on the weaknesses in the substantive case" (emphasis added).
But Mrs Boyd was in a different position from Walker Corporation. The elements of Mrs Thorn's case leading to a proprietary claim over Mr Boyd's interest in the Miranda property were (a) Mr Boyd had taken Mrs McAuley's money in breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionably as a result of which the money was held in trust for her, and (b) Mr Boyd had used some of that money to reduce his indebtedness to the NAB which was secured over the Miranda property. The first element was established by orders 1 and 5 made on 6 November 2014. The second was established by the 2015 orders.
Accepting that in accordance with John Alexander's Clubs reproduced above it was open to Mrs Boyd to challenge the findings of breach of duty and unconscionability once Mrs Thorn had determined to seek proprietary relief against land of which Mrs Boyd was a joint owner, that was not what Mrs Boyd did. Her limited application did not challenge the 2014 orders.
The proposition in John Alexander's Clubs is not a universal proposition. There are few propositions universally true in law. Like all judicial statements of principle, what was said in John Alexander's Clubs must be read bearing in mind the context in which they were uttered: Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 at 506; Arinson Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council [2015] NSWCA 199 at [65]: "... every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found."
Further, the entitlement of Walker Corporation to adduce evidence and to be heard depended on the extent to which it wished to challenge aspects of what had occurred. That is the force of the references to the steps which Walker Corporation "wished" to take twice appearing in the passage at [134] reproduced above. Walker Corporation made it plain that it wished to challenge all aspects of the plaintiff's claim to a proprietary interest in the land.
The position of Mrs Boyd was different. The rehearing to which Mrs Boyd was entitled was a hearing whose scope reflected the limited challenge made in her summons. Sackar J proceeded on that basis. I consider that his Honour was correct to do so.
I have reconsidered my reasoning and conclusions in light of Macfarlan JA's judgment, but I respectfully adhere to the views I have expressed above. It may be that the essential difference in our reasoning may be exposed by the proposition that Macfarlan JA considers that Mrs Boyd was not bound by the findings or orders which were made in the litigation before she was joined, and that now that she has been joined, she is entitled to put in issue all elements which contribute to the orders sought by Mrs Thorn. With this latter proposition I respectfully differ, although the difference is a narrow one. I do not think that Mrs Boyd can ask the court to make inconsistent orders in the same proceeding, in circumstances where Mr Boyd remains bound, and where the rehearing was obtained by Mrs Boyd on the basis of her limited application to set aside only some of the existing orders. Test the matter this way. Suppose Mrs Boyd were permitted to contend that, contrary to orders 1 and 5 made by Robb J on 6 November 2014, Mr Boyd did not breach any duty he owed to Mrs McAuley, and it was not unconscionable for him to retain the $260,000 received by him. How are her contentions to be resolved? Is Mrs Boyd permitted to adduce evidence from Mr Boyd contrary to the findings and orders which bind him? Indeed, may Mrs Boyd apply to cross-examine him as a hostile witness if his evidence is consistent with the findings and orders binding him? Further, suppose Mrs Boyd succeeds. Then there will be inconsistent findings as between Mrs Thorn and Mr Boyd on the one hand, and Mrs Thorn and Mrs Boyd on the other, which are apt to give rise to novel difficulties in the course of executing the judgment against Mr Boyd.
These difficulties arise because of the inconsistency in orders involving the same conduct in the same litigation between different parties. A principal reason for the joinder of all necessary parties was to prevent inconsistent findings such as this. Had Mrs Boyd sought to set aside the 6 November 2014 orders, or indeed had Mr Boyd sought to appeal from them, those difficulties would go away. But those things have not occurred. The result in my respectful opinion is that Mrs Boyd was not entitled to ask the Court on the rehearing obtained by her to make orders which are inconsistent with those made on 6 November 2014.

[23]

No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice

Suppose the foregoing conclusion be wrong. The difficulty Mrs Boyd faces in this appeal is that there is, even today in 2017, no real indication of what it is that she wishes to put in issue and the way in which she wishes to do so.
It appears that no further amended pleading was filed or served by Mrs Thorn. I do not regard that as an answer to the failure on the part of Mrs Boyd to file a defence, or even an appearance. Mrs Boyd had herself invoked the court's jurisdiction by her summons, and she was present when the orders joining her were pronounced. I mean no disrespect to her, but to the extent that Mrs Boyd is under the impression that personal service of an amended statement of claim upon her is necessary before she is subject to the Court's jurisdiction (something reiterated before Sackar J repeatedly - see for example 19 September 2016 transcript pp 10-11, 63-64, 97), she is wrong.
When the matter was reheard by Sackar J, Mrs Boyd had not supplied any evidence. Instead, she sought to have further orders set aside (an application substantially identical to one dismissed by Rein J), and when that failed, she sought an adjournment. No appeal has been brought from the orders dismissing the various applications by her.
The obligation upon this Court, as well as on Mrs Boyd and her legal advisors under s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. The passages referred to above in the interchange immediately upon delivery of White J's first judgment demonstrate that White J told her this in terms. The absence of any indication of what those real issues are is a consequence of Mrs Boyd's failure to comply with the ordinary rules of courts requiring the filing of defences and the directions as to her serving evidence. Even then, it would, perhaps, have been open to her to have supplied, in connection with her application to set aside the orders against her on appeal, the proposed draft defence and an indication of the matters which she wished to agitate. After all, if there were to be a further hearing, it is necessary for this Court to be satisfied that "a substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned": UCPR r 51.53.
In part, inferences may be drawn by the nature of the submissions which she did in fact make before White J and Sackar J. One of her complaints was that she had not been personally served with an amended statement of claim and for that reason was unable to file a defence. She maintained that she had been denied natural justice by White J by his ordering a partial retrial, a complaint that the proceedings should have been dismissed as an abuse of process. She concluded that: "These proceedings are an abuse of process, based on conflict of interest by the executor and conflict of interest by solicitors, an intent to pervert the course of justice for the purpose of obtaining property by fraud."
That assertion is said to have been substantiated by the absence of an originating process, what is said to be the fabrication of an originating process, in the concluding paragraphs of a "position statement" which was said by Mrs Boyd in an affidavit to provide "reasons and justification" for the orders sought in her notice of motion before White J. There were statements about alleged coercion and an attempt to extort a financial offer of settlement. The concluding paragraph of the position paper was as follows: ""the cruelty of the 5½ year delay, the plaintiff's avoidance of any hearing of the substantive issues, the harassment and persecution of me as a non-party and wilful disregard of my legal rights, the denial of natural justice, exploitation of unrepresented parties in addition to the proceedings being an abuse of process, based on conflict of interest and an intent to pervert the course of justice for the purpose of obtaining property by fraud being more than sufficient justification for the proceedings to be dismissed and voided with full costs awarded to both defendants, if not, the proceedings are worthy of the granting of leave to be heard by the High Court."
Due allowance must be made to the fact that Mrs Boyd did not have the benefit of legal advice, although the document refers to her conversations with barristers and contains numerous extracts from Court decisions and legal texts (mostly on the topic of judgments obtained by fraud). Although it is plain that Mrs Boyd was willing to make extravagant allegations, there is nothing in the documents invoked in support of those submissions so far as I can see to suggest any material injustice in the absence of a rehearing of Mrs Thorn's limited claim to trace the $200,000 which in equity was hers into Mr Boyd's interest in the Miranda property. Ordinary principles suggest the availability of a claim against Mrs Boyd, a volunteer, subject to the possibility of defences, but Mrs Thorn's claim is narrower than that.
Separately from the above, Mrs Boyd has contended that the primary judge erred in failing to "insist on nothing short of indisputable evidence" that proceeds obtained by her husband from Mrs McAuley were used to reduce her and her husband's indebtedness to the bank. In oral submissions to Sackar J she denied receiving any benefit of the $200,000. She repeatedly referred to a "misappropriation" by the Bank. She said "The situation as stands today is the National [Australia] Bank still has appropriated the 200,000 gift funds". Although these submissions were not advanced by counsel appearing for her in this Court, it is desirable to explain why, in my opinion, Sackar J was correct to dismiss this aspect of the rehearing.
Mr and Mrs Boyd were indebted to the National Australia Bank in 2009, which had granted a "NAB Base Variable Rate Home Loan". The bank issued a statement to them, which was tendered before Sackar J, showing a credit of $200,000 on 12 August 2009, to that extent reducing the joint indebtedness.
Mr Boyd swore an affidavit stating among other things under the heading "2009 Misappropriation and Fraud" that "NAB misappropriated the gift funds to fully pay out and eliminate a business loan" and "on 16 September 2009 the NAB fraudulently combined my personal home loan with the remaining split 'business loan' (processed in 2006 as a home loan) to create one large 'home loan' ...". The affidavit went so far as to say that "Further evidence of fraud exists in the home loan and business cheque account statements the NAB falsified to appear to comply with my instructions". Page 21 of the annexures to Mr Boyd's affidavit is a copy of the bank statement (described as "Figure 4") showing the $200,000 deposit to Mr and Mrs Boyd's home loan as to which it is said: "This statement falsely states $200,000 deposited into my personal home loan on 12 August 2009 when Figure 5 below proves this to be false."
Figure 5 appears to be an internal NAB document. Mr Boyd calls it a "File Summary Report" but it is also described as a "Lending Submission". It appears to have been annotated in order to explain Mr Boyd's argument (for example, it contains two rows each of which is described as "Wrongfully Combined"). The point which Mr Boyd seeks to derive from it appears to be that the submission was dated 4 September 2009 and approved on 16 September 2009, yet the document shows an indebtedness on the home loan of $309,547 - which is to say, an indebtedness that does not include the $200,000 credited on 12 August 2009. Thus he says: "The date of the document being 16 September 2009 proves the funds used to eliminate the unsecured genuine business loan in the trading name of the business were the funds from the gift ... the statement subpoenaed from the NAB which the plaintiff relied on to escalate the former claim to the Supreme Court to include a charge of my property was intentionally false and misleading being a consequence of relying on information that is the subject of another legal matter".
It is plain that the internal NAB document may have reflected information supplied by Mr Boyd, or obtained by a bank officer, prior to the unexpected deposit of $200,000. It is not unknown for a bank to take three or four weeks, or longer, to process an application for a variation to its lending to a borrower. It is also plain that there is no sufficient basis to conclude that the error, if there was one, was intentional. But in light of the concessions made subsequently, these allegations may be rejected concisely.
First, in evidence before Sackar J was a portion of Mr Boyd's cross-examination before Robb J in which he conceded that "the money from Betty's account was transferred into your account with Sutherland Credit Union" and, in answer to the question as to the following transfers made by him, Mr Boyd said: "There was a $200,000 transfer to what we believe at that time, ok this is where we can't go much further because I can't substantiate it, it shows up on the statement you've got, transferred into the National Australia Bank account, and that was to be applied to our mortgage, our loan account."
Mr Boyd confirmed that transfer by reference to the bank statement immediately thereafter. He then went on to say that the remaining $109,000 paying off his home loan had been drawn down from superannuation funds.
It is true that what was said by Mr Boyd, and found by Robb J, might not bind Mrs Boyd, who was not at that time a party. But no evidence was sought to be tendered by Mrs Boyd to the contrary of any of this.
In my view, Sackar J was entirely justified in concluding that the $200,000 was received by Mrs and Mrs Boyd to reduce their indebtedness to the bank. Senior counsel appearing for both Mr and Mrs Boyd in this Court confirmed that: "ALEXIS: The second appellant derived a benefit in the sense that the mortgage was down and her equity was correspondingly increased, we accept that." Counsel thereafter confirmed that "the concession was a considered concession". There is no reason to doubt that it was properly made. The evidence is overpowering.
Finally, it is true that if I am wrong about the narrowness of the rehearing before Sackar J, and Mrs Boyd was entitled to put in issue matters contrary to the findings and orders that Mr Boyd had breach his fiduciary duty and acted unconscionably, then she has been denied the opportunity to do so. As noted at the outset, there is nothing to suggest that she would have been able to adduce any different evidence, or make any submissions which had not been made by Mr Boyd.
Further, Mrs Boyd candidly acknowledges (in written and oral submissions) that Mrs Thorn is entitled to execute her existing judgment against Mr Boyd. All that is sought is to trace into Mr Boyd's interest in the Miranda property. There is a real practical distinction between the two, especially if Mr Boyd's solvency is doubtful. But it seems to me to be no small thing for there to be a rehearing before a tracing remedy is available against Mr Boyd's interest in the property when it is accepted that Mrs Thorn is presently entitled to execute her unchallenged judgment against that interest in the property.
In addition to the above, I bear in mind the time and cost that this litigation has taken to date. There have been six days of hearings before Robb J, two days before White J, two days before Rein J, and two days before Sackar J, in addition to the appeal in this Court. Mr and Mrs Boyd have been unrepresented in each of those hearings, save in this Court, but that has not of course prevented the executrix, Mrs Thorn, from incurring legal costs. It seems likely that the costs incurred by Mrs Thorn would be of the same order of magnitude, and may even have exceeded, the $200,000 which is the amount of principal presently in issue. Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Act obliges this Court to implement its practice and procedure with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute. That is a further consideration which tells against a further hearing.
I have concluded that there is no basis for entering judgment in favour of Mrs Boyd. So to do would give rise to an inconsistency of final judgments in relation to the same subject matter, and would do so in circumstances where there has not been a full hearing on all of the merits, the absence of which is what gives rise to Mrs Boyd's entitlement to set aside the orders.
Nor would I order a retrial. I am not satisfied that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice given the limited relief sought by Mrs Thorn. Ultimately, the onus lies on an appellant who seeks a new trial to satisfy the Court that the errors pointed to have occasioned some substantial wrong or miscarriage, failing which the prohibition in UCPR 51.53 prevents an order of a new trial. For the reasons summarised above, I do not consider that Mrs Boyd has discharged that onus. Although the parties' written submissions did not address the possibility of a rehearing or the matters summarised above telling against it, the difficulties faced by Mrs Boyd by reason of the failure to supply a defence or draft defence, or the evidence she would seek to adduce at any such hearing, were exposed during the argument on the appeal (see appeal transcript T10.50-11.16, 13.12-19, 18.2-23 and 40.19-43).
I would add one final matter. At all stages before the hearing in this Court, the judges in the Equity Division have not had the benefit of submissions from barristers retained by Mr and Mrs Boyd. For that matter, the lawyers retained on behalf of the plaintiff likewise have not had the benefit. Instead, they have had to deal with a series of poorly formulated applications, most of which lacked any proper foundation in the evidence. This Court has been greatly assisted by the highly competent counsel retained by all parties.

[24]

Ground 2

Mr Boyd challenges the order that from the proceeds of sale of his interest in the Miranda land, there be paid not merely amounts attributable to the judgment debt of $200,000 plus interest, but also the costs ordered against him. His point is a simple one. Mrs Thorn was, in respect of those costs, an unsecured creditor, and should not have been elevated over other unsecured creditors through the form of the order made by this Court.
The partial indemnity provided by a costs order gives rise to merely an unsecured right against the party. Something more is required (such as a covenant in a mortgage that the mortgagee's costs of enforcement are also secured by it) in order for the costs to be secured. In support of the contrary proposition, Mrs Thorn relied upon the words used by Bryson AJ in Arrow Custodians Pty Ltd v Pine Forest of Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 839; 14 BPR 26,149 at [35], describing the sensible administrative efficiencies when proceeding under s 66G, which included the processes being subject to the control of the Court, "abridging processes of accounting and execution by directing how funds under its control are to be distributed". Mrs Thorn contended that those words were broad enough to extend to the liability under a costs order. I do not agree, nor does anything in this Court's determination in Ross v Ross [2010] NSWCA 301; 15 BPR 28,945 alter the position.
Mr Boyd candidly conceded that this was not a point which had been raised before Sackar J, when orders proposed by Mrs Thorn had been supplied. It is, with respect, correct in principle. If Mr Boyd's submission were not correct, there would also be the undesirable consequence that, so long as the quantification of the entitlement of Mrs Thorn to those costs remained undetermined (and this Court was told that no steps had been taken in the last two and a half years to quantify those costs, even though no challenge has been made to the order), the statutory trust would have to continue, at least to that extent.
This ground of appeal is made out.

[26]

Orders

Accordingly, the appeal should be allowed in relation to ground 2, but otherwise dismissed.
Mrs Boyd was the only appellant who advanced the main ground of appeal, ground 1. Mr Boyd was the only appellant who advanced ground 2. Both Mr and Mrs Boyd advanced ground 3.
Because the grounds of appeal were discrete, and because different grounds were advanced by different appellants, there is potential for unfairness if a costs order were made which did not distinguish between the failure on the part of Mrs Boyd on all grounds she advanced, and the partial success of Mr Boyd. Despite the need for an apportionment of costs between grounds, this is an appropriate case for exercising the discretion as to costs by reference to issues, in accordance with what was said in James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd [No 2] [2005] NSWCA 296 at [32]-[33]. I propose that Mrs Boyd pay Mrs Thorn's costs referable to ground 1, that Mrs Thorn pay Mr Boyd's costs referable to ground 2, and that Mr and Mrs Boyd be jointly and severally liable to pay Mrs Thorn's costs referable to ground 3. To be clear, a set-off would arise as between Mr Boyd and Mrs Thorn in relation to the costs referable to grounds 2 and 3. Given that on the view I take the appeal has only been allowed in a minor respect on a point not raised before Sackar J, there is no occasion to alter the exercise of the discretion as to costs by Sackar J.
If any party wishes to be heard in support of an application for a different form of order as to costs, application may be made within the time provided by UCPR r 36.16.
I propose the following orders:
Appeal allowed in part.
Set aside order 6b made on 22 September 2016.
Otherwise dismiss the appeal.
Mrs Boyd to pay Mrs Thorn's costs of the appeal referable to ground 1. Mrs Thorn to pay Mr Boyd's costs referable to ground 2. Mr and Mrs Boyd be jointly and severally liable to pay Mrs Thorn's costs referable to ground 3.
EMMETT AJA: At all material times before 13 March 2015, the appellants, Mr Ian Boyd and Mrs Dawn Boyd, owned a property situated at Miranda, New South Wales (the Property) as joint tenants. On 8 May 2015, a notice of transfer severing the joint tenancy was registered pursuant to s 97 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and, thereafter, each of Mr Boyd and Mrs Boyd owned an interest in the Property as tenants in common in equal shares. The principal question in this appeal is whether, as between Mrs Boyd and the estate of Mrs Betty McAuley (the Estate), Mrs Boyd was bound by a determination in the Equity Division that Mr Boyd held his interest in the Property upon a constructive trust for Mrs McAuley to the value of $200,000 and that the sum of $200,000 plus interest constituted an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's interest in the Property. Mrs McAuley, who was Mr Boyd's aunt, died on 26 December 2012 and the respondent, Mrs Catherine Thorn, is the executrix of her will.
Proceedings were commenced on behalf of Mrs McAuley against Mr Boyd in the Equity Division (the Equity Proceedings). In the Equity Proceedings, declarations were sought that Mr Boyd obtained moneys from Mrs McAuley in circumstances involving undue influence or unconscionable conduct and applied the moneys in repayment of a loan made by National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) on the security of a mortgage of the Property. The moneys in question consisted of the sum of $260,000 transferred on 6 August 2009 from funds of Mrs McAuley to an account of Mr Boyd's.
The Equity Proceedings were heard by Robb J in the first instance. On 25 August 2014, for reasons published on that day, Robb J found that Mrs McAuley suffered from a cognitive impairment that prevented her from making a sound judgment in relation to any major financial transaction and that Mr Boyd accepted that Mrs McAuley suffered from such a mild cognitive impairment. Robb J found that there was clearly a question about Mrs McAuley's capacity, and that Mr Boyd ignored a warning by her solicitor that there was a question about her capacity to make a gift to him such that he should not accept any gifts. Robb J concluded that the retention by Mr Boyd of the sum of $260,000 paid to NAB would be unconscionable and set aside the transfer of funds to NAB. His Honour made an order requiring Mr Boyd to repay the money to the Estate.
On 6 November 2014, various orders were made giving effect to Robb J's conclusions of 25 August 2014 (the 2014 Orders). In particular, order 5 of the 2014 Orders stated that Mrs Thorn was entitled to trace the sum of $260,000 into any property in respect of which Mr Boyd repaid a mortgage secured on such property with that sum or any part thereof.
On 12 February 2015, there was a further hearing before Robb J in relation to the 2014 Orders. On 13 March 2015, Robb J made a declaration to the effect that Mr Boyd held his interest in the Property upon a constructive trust for Mrs Thorn to the value of $200,000 and declared that the sum of $200,000 plus interest constituted an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's interest in the Property (the 2015 Orders).
On 24 March 2016, Mrs Boyd commenced further proceedings in the Equity Division to set aside the 2015 Orders made by Robb J. Mrs Boyd did not challenge the validity of the 2014 Orders or ask that the 2014 Orders be set aside. On 11 May 2016, White J set aside the 2015 Orders, apart from a costs order against Mr Boyd. White J also ordered that Mrs Boyd be joined as a second defendant in the Equity Proceedings. There has been no appeal from the 2014 Orders or from the orders made by White J on 11 May 2016.
On 19 September 2016, Sackar J dealt with several matters, including the following: (a) whether the Court should make declarations and orders to the same effect as the 2015 Orders, which had been set aside by White J on 11 May 2016; (b) whether the Property should be sold pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) (the Conveyancing Act) or by judicial sale.
On 22 September 2016, Sackar J made declarations as follows: 1. Mr Boyd holds his unencumbered interest in the Property upon a constructive trust for the Estate to the value of $200,000; 2. So much of that judgment debt as represents a principal sum of $200,000 and interest constitutes an equitable charge on Mr Boyd's title to the Property. Sackar J also made orders as follows: 1. Messrs Timothy William Daley and Liam Bailey be appointed as trustees for sale of the Property under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act; 2. The Property be vested in such trustees upon the statutory trust for sale under the Conveyancing Act; 3. The trustees pay out of the proceeds of sale: 1. any statutory duties or charges; 2. the real estate agent's commission and charges; and 3. the amounts owing to any person having a secured interest. 1. The trustees pay out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds of sale: 1. so much of the judgment debt as represents a principal sum of $200,000 plus interest; and 2. the costs of Mrs Thorn that, on 13 March 2015, Robb J ordered Mr Boyd to pay.

[28]

Ground 1

There can be no doubt that Mr Boyd is bound by the determination made by Robb J in 2014 that he acted in breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionably and held $260,000 on trust. His position was the same as if there had been a separate determination of questions of liability and personal relief. It appears that Mr Boyd has never sought to appeal from that determination. Declaration (1) made by Sackar J on 22 September 2016 relates only to the unencumbered interest in the Property held by Mr Boyd. That declaration was made on the basis of the findings made by Robb J on 25 August 2014. Insofar as the findings made by Robb J are concerned with a claim in personam against Mr Boyd, that does not affect Mrs Boyd. Insofar as declaration (1) relates to the interest of Mr Boyd in the Property, that also does not affect Mrs Boyd. The only order that would affect Mrs Boyd is the order made under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act. That order was made after Mrs Boyd became a party to the Equity Proceedings.
I have had the great advantage of reading in draft form the proposed reasons of Macfarlan JA and the proposed reasons of Leeming JA.
I agree with Macfarlan JA that, although the declaration of a charge in favour of Mrs Thorn related only to Mr Boyd's interest in the Property, and the trustees for sale were directed to pay the judgment debt in favour of Mrs Thorn out of Mr Boyd's share of the proceeds, the orders under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act for the appointment of trustees for sale related to the Property as a whole. The orders therefore affected Mrs Boyd's interest in the Property as tenant in common. Her legal rights were prejudicially affected by the orders as they required the sale of the Property, of which she was a part owner.
However, Mrs Boyd did not challenge any of the 2014 Orders, which were expressly based on Robb J's findings that Mr Boyd had obtained $260,000 of Mrs McAuley's money in circumstances that involved unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty. The rehearing before Sackar J was confined to the remaining challenged orders. Mrs Boyd's entitlement to adduce evidence, and to be heard on weaknesses in the substantive case against Mr Boyd, was circumscribed by her choice not to challenge some of the orders already made. She was not at liberty to seek to establish issues in the rehearing that are inconsistent with the orders made in the litigation that she did not challenge.
Mrs Boyd complains that Sackar J relied upon the earlier findings and orders as the foundation for granting relief in respect of the Property and that no attempt was made to re-prove that Mr Boyd had unconscionably procured and retained the $200,000, or that he had done so in breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, Sackar J proceeded on the basis that it was necessary to prove that the $200,000 was used to reduce debts secured by the mortgage over the Property, but accepted as a premise that Mr Boyd's conduct was unconscionable and in breach of fiduciary duty.
I agree with Leeming JA that the approach adopted by Sackar J was correct. That is to say, it is critical that the rehearing ordered by White J did not extend to the 2014 Orders. Rather, Mrs Boyd's challenge was limited to the 2015 Orders. While Mrs Boyd was unrepresented at the time and it may be that she did not appreciate the full consequences of her selective challenge to the orders made by Robb J, White J made clear the limitations upon the rehearing that he ordered. I agree with Leeming JA that, in circumstances where Mrs Boyd did not seek to set the 2014 Orders aside, and obtained a rehearing by reason of the setting aside of the 2015 Orders, she is now not entitled to contend for findings the effect of which would be inconsistent with orders in the same proceedings.
As indicated above, there were two elements of the case brought on behalf of the Estate leading to a proprietary claim over Mr Boyd's interest in the Property. The first was that Mr Boyd had taken Mrs McAuley's money in breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionably, as a result of which the money was held on trust for her. The second was that Mr Boyd had used some of that money to reduce his indebtedness to NAB, which was secured over the Property. The first element was established by orders 1 and 5 of the 2014 Orders. The second was established by the 2015 Orders. Only the second was the subject of the further hearing before Sackar J.
It would have been open to Mrs Boyd to challenge the findings of breach of duty and unconscionability once proprietary relief was sought against land of which she was a joint owner. However, that was not what Mrs Boyd did. Her limited application did not challenge the 2014 Orders. The rehearing to which Mrs Boyd was entitled was a hearing the scope of which reflected the limited challenge made in her summons. Sackar J proceeded on that basis. I agree with Leeming JA that his Honour was correct to do so.

[32]

Amendments 24 August 2017 - 24 August 2017 - [71] - "John Alexander's Clubs" - case name corrected. [78] - "given" replaced with "give". [78] - "of" deleted after "favour". [83] - "debtors" replaced with "creditors". [84] - "debtors" replaced with "creditors". [87] - "the shares" replaced with "the car". [87] - "the" deleted before "whether". 11 October 2018 - [68(2)] - second sentence, "to" deleted from between "property" and "be" [77] - bracketed text, "1879" changed to "1880" [91] - third sentence, "VR 160" changed to "VR 169" [96] - quote, citation, "Court" changed to "Procedure", and "Schedule 1" changed to "the Schedule" [99] - citation of Walker text, spelling of "Australasia" corrected [106] - first sentence, "or possession" changed to "for possession" [118] - quote, second para, "give" changed to "[gift]" [124] - quote, 15th para, "you Honour" changed to "you[r] Honour" [129] - second sentence, "of" deleted from between "by" and "Robb J"; order 2, "summarily" inserted before "set aside", and spelling of "justitiae" corrected; order 3, "so" changed to "to" [130] - second sentence, "reason" changed to "reasons" [150] - second sentence, comma deleted after "succeed" [156] - second sentence, "in" added before "our reasoning"; final sentence, "are" added before "apt" [163] - "paragraphs of the position paper were" changed to singular [169] - final sentence, "subsequent" deleted before "concessions" [175] - fourth sentence, "it seems to be" changed to "it seems to me to be" [187] - second sentence, "grounds 1 and 3" changed to "ground 3" [188] - final sentence, "be" changed to "been" DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 11 October 2018

Boyd v Thorn

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (32 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (12)

Cases Cited (63)

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