It is undoubted law that a court of probate has jurisdiction, in an appropriate case, to grant probate, or administration c.t.a. in respect of a portion only of a document which has been executed as a will, omitting other portions as having formed no part of that to which the execution of the document really applied, as, for example, where by fraud or mistake there has been included in the instrument words which in truth were not part of the testator's will: Rhodes v. Rhodes [6] . "In that case you may strike out the passage, because he did not know it was there or intend that it should be, and therefore it was not his will in any sense of the word": Morrell v. Morrell [1] . In Rhodes v. Rhodes [2] , however, Lord Blackburn, for the Privy Council, expressed doubt as to whether words could be rejected under this principle where the result would be to alter the sense of those which remained. "For", he said, "even though the Court is convinced that the words were improperly introduced, so that if the instrument was inter vivos they would reform the instrument and order one in different words to be executed, it cannot make the dead man execute a new instrument; and there seems much difficulty in treating the will after its sense is thus altered as valid within the 9th section of the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, the signature at the end of the will required by that enactment having been attached to what bore quite a different meaning". That the doubt thus expressed was well-founded the Court of Appeal held in a considered judgment in the case of In re Horrocks; Taylor v. Kershaw [3] . The will there under consideration contained a gift for objects described as "charitable or benevolent". Evidence was given that the word "or" was inserted by a mistake on the part of the typist to whom the solicitor dictated the will, the solicitor having used the word "and". In order to save the gift from the invalidity which would result from the use of "or", the Probate Court was asked to strike that word out. The Court of Appeal considered that the alleged mistake had not been established by the evidence, but went on to hold that even if it had been established the case would not have fallen within the jurisdiction to exclude from the probate a portion of a document which otherwise was proved as a will. The reason was that "charitable", with its full meaning, was the choice of the testatrix herself; the word "benevolent", with its full meaning, was the choice of the draftsman to whom she had committed the task of drafting the will and by whose choice of the word she was in the circumstances bound; and the word "or" could not be deleted without making the words "charitable" and "benevolent" qualify one another so that neither would then carry its full meaning. The fact that the actual intention of the testatrix would thereby be effectuated was not regarded as justifying a step which would produce this result. The principle which was applied - and whether it was applied correctly or not is not to the point - was expressed in the words: "the cases in which the Court has decreed probate with the omission of words, phrases or clauses have all been cases where the matter omitted was, so to speak, self-contained and its omission did not alter the sense of what remained": [4] .