austlii:cth/ARTA/2025/969
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2025-06-23
Original judgment source is linked above.
LJMH and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 969 (23 June 2025)
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Decision: Applying s 105 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), the Tribunal affirms the decision of the Respondent's delegate dated 31 March 2025 to cancel LJMH's Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa.
......................[SGD].....................................
MIGRATION - Class XE Subclass 790 Safe Haven Enterprise visa cancellation - failure to pass good character test - non-revocation decision - whether there is another reason to set aside the visa cancellation - convicted of Choking suffocation strangulation Domestic Relationship - Domestic Violence Offence and Choking suffocation strangulation Domestic Relationship - stateless Rohingya - Myanmar - Ministerial Direction No. 110
Bale v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 646
Bartlett and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1561
Bettencourt v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 172
BOE21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 99
Demir V Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 870
Dzik v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 78
EPL20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 173
Fehoko v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1471
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16; (2019) 266 CLR 250
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs and Anor [2020] HCA Trans 56
Garland v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 144
Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 153 ALD 338
Holloway v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1126
Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89; (2019) 270 FCR 12
Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 48; (2016) 241 FCR 461
Kayo Rerekura and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 153
Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326
Matthews v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 146
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker [1997] FCA 105; (1997) 73 FCR 187
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Murphy v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1924
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582
Sabharwal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 10
Sillars v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 174
Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594; (2018) 74 AAR 545
Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424
Tohi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125
Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116; (2018) 263 FCR 531
Direction No. 110 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (21 June 2024)
decision-maker must consider the Primary and Other Considerations described in Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Direction where relevant to their decision‑making. Primary Consideration 1 is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. 8. Paragraph 8 identifies the Primary Considerations and Paragraph 9(1) sets out a non-exhaustive list of Other Considerations. 9. The Tribunal may find that a consideration specified under Paragraph 9 of the Direction has equivalent or greater weight than a consideration specified under Paragraph 8 of the Direction. Each matter's circumstances affect this weighting.[24] The individual and cumulative weighing process is a matter for individual decision‑maker exercising the relevant power under the Act.[25]
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 1: PROTECTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL OR OTHER SERIOUS CONDUCT
(a) the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date; and > > (b) the risk to the Australian community if the non-citizen commits further offences or engages in other serious conduct in the future.
Paragraph 8.1.1: The Nature and Seriousness of LJMH's Conduct to Date
(a) Paragraph 8.1(2) requires decision-makers to consider both the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date, and the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct. The Respondent contends that this factor weighs determinatively against revocation.
(b) When assessing the nature and seriousness of conduct, Paragraph 8.1.1 establishes specific factors that decision-makers must consider regarding the applicant's criminal offending or other conduct. The Respondent submits that LJMH's overall offending should be viewed as very serious based on several key considerations.
(c) LJMH has demonstrated a pattern of multiple acts of family violence, primarily directed against his former wife. These incidents involved serious physical violence, including whipping his former wife and throwing a box of mangoes at his son, with these acts being perpetrated in the presence of his children. Such conduct falls within the serious considerations outlined in Paragraphs 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii) and (iii).
(d) The judicial assessment of LJMH's conduct emphasises its severity. Regarding the 2023 convictions, Judge Horneman-Wren characterised LJMH's behaviour as "protracted violent offending." The judge additionally noted that the effects of the assault continued to affect the victim, who remained fearful for her safety upon LJMH's potential release[30], as referenced in Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(d).
(e) LJMH's 2024 convictions, while not involving physical violence, were nonetheless treated with utmost seriousness by the judiciary. Magistrate Schubert described the offending as "perhaps the most serious of threats that this court sees" and expressed concern that "it is a great risk for [LJMH] to return to that community."
(f) The imposition of custodial sentences serves as an objective indicator of the seriousness of the offences involved, as established in Pavey and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 4198 at [44]. While Direction 110 does not require this matter to be taken into account under Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c), the sentences of imprisonment imposed provide additional evidence of the gravity of LJMH's conduct. Consequently, the Respondent maintains that the Tribunal must treat LJMH's criminal offending as very serious.
(a) LJMH's criminal history encompasses four domestic violence-related offences spanning a ten-year period, commencing in 2015. Of these offences, two involved physical contact, while the most recent incident constituted verbal threats made in breach of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO). It is significant to note that LJMH has no history of criminal offending beyond these four matters. > > (b) The latest offence, while acknowledged as serious, was subject to mitigating circumstances as recognised by the sentencing Magistrate. These mitigating factors included LJMH's early plea and demonstrated remorse, which led the Magistrate to grant immediate parole eligibility. The sentence imposed was proportionate, considering that the offence carried a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. > > (c) LJMH's offending occurred within a defined temporal period and specific contextual circumstances, rather than reflecting a sustained pattern of criminal behaviour as contemplated by Paragraph 8.1.1.(1)(e). This temporal limitation supports an assessment that LJMH possesses the capacity to renounce unlawful conduct and live in accordance with Australian law. Notably, LJMH has maintained a clean record for nearly two years since his last offence. > > (d) Evidence of LJMH's genuine rehabilitation efforts is demonstrated through his conduct while in custody, as documented in records provided by Queensland Corrective Services. Throughout his incarceration at Brisbane Correctional Centre, LJMH has engaged constructively, reflecting both a commitment to personal improvement and a positive contribution to the custodial environment. > > (e) LJMH's current personal circumstances constitute a mitigating factor when assessing the risk he may pose to the Australian community. The sentencing Magistrate's decision to grant parole eligibility on the same day as sentencing provides further support for this assessment. The Magistrate specifically acknowledged the timeliness of the plea, stating: "It is a timely plea in the circumstances. I reduce the penalty because of that." This judicial recognition of LJMH's early plea and the grant of immediate parole eligibility indicates the court's acknowledgment of his remorse and acceptance of responsibility. > > (f) These factors collectively support a finding that LJMH does not present an unacceptable risk to the Australian community and has demonstrated a genuine intention not to re-offend. This assessment is not intended to excuse or diminish the seriousness of LJMH's conduct in any way. LJMH fully recognises the gravity of his actions and expresses sincere remorse for the harm caused. > > (g) As established in relevant case law, these considerations are particularly important when assessing the nature and seriousness of offending. In Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 61, North J emphasised at [91] that it is not possible to reach a legally reasonable conclusion about the seriousness of an offence without informative details of the actual circumstances involved. Similarly, in NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38, Buchanan J stressed at [202] and [207] that a visa applicant or former visa holder is entitled to have their application assessed with proper regard to the merits of their particular circumstances. The most reliable guide to the objective seriousness of a particular person's offences derives from a comprehensive understanding of the actual circumstances involved in the various offences and their sentences.
The Tribunal's consideration: The nature and seriousness of LJMH's conduct
The Tribunal's findings: The nature and seriousness of LJMH's conduct.
Paragraph 8.1.2: The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
(a) In considering the need to protect the Australian community, the Tribunal should consider that the Australian community is less willing to accept any risk of harm if the potential harm is serious. If certain actions are very harmful, even the possibility of them happening again may be too much of a risk to accept.
(b) When deciding whether a non-citizen poses a risk to the community, decision‑makers should cumulatively consider:
- How serious the resulting harm would be if the non-citizen committed another serious crime or engaged in serious conduct.
- How likely it is that the non-citizen will commit another crime, looking at:
- Evidence of how likely they are to re-offend.
- Any rehabilitation they have undergone by the time of the decision, and how long they have been out of trouble.
(c) The objective is to carefully weigh the seriousness of the possible harm if the non-citizen re-offends, the likelihood of their re-offending, and any evidence of change when making decisions about a non‑citizen's risk to the community.
(a) LJMH's refugee background and gambling addiction constitute relevant and mitigating factors when assessing the nature and seriousness of his offending. The Australian Institute of Family Studies has recognised that traumatic pre-arrival experiences can impair an individual's capacity to cope in a new environment and may exacerbate challenges in family functioning during and after settlement. This contextual understanding was acknowledged by the court during sentencing, which recognised LJMH's refugee background as a relevant consideration. It is appropriate to conclude that an individual's moral culpability may be diminished where their offending is shaped by significant trauma and displacement. > > (b) In assessing whether LJMH poses an unacceptable risk to the Australian community, reliance is placed on the reasoning of Deputy President Tamberlin QC in WKCG[42]. Although that matter concerned s 36(1C) of the Act, the risk assessment undertaken by the Tribunal is equally instructive in the context of s 501. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending in WKCG, the Tribunal concluded that, having regard to WKCG's overall circumstances, he did not pose an unacceptable risk to the community. > > (c) Deputy President Tamberlin emphasised that the decision-maker's role is not to determine whether LJMH poses any risk, but whether the level of risk is unacceptable in the particular circumstances of the case. Importantly, the Tribunal noted that the nature of past offending does not necessarily have to be causally linked to the type of risk currently posed. > > (d) Two major underlying factors have contributed to LJMH's offending conduct over the years: his deteriorating physical health and his longstanding gambling addiction. LJMH's gambling addiction has been a significant contributor to his past instability and impulsive behaviour. He acknowledges that gambling fuelled his aggression and impaired his self-control. Notably, since entering custody, LJMH has experienced his first extended period of abstinence from gambling in over 25 years. He has demonstrated that he can earn an income and use it responsibly, demonstrating a growing sense of financial literacy and self-discipline. > > (e) Furthermore, LJMH suffered a heart attack upon release from custody, an event that left him physically debilitated and emotionally overwhelmed. He recounts feeling powerless and filled with anger, particularly towards himself, which he regrettably directed at those closest to him. He acknowledges that while these circumstances do not excuse his behaviour, they help contextualise his actions during that period. > > (f) LJMH acknowledges that unresolved trauma from a violent and unstable upbringing, witnessing the death of his brother, and fleeing his home has significantly impacted his mental health. He now recognises the role this trauma has played in his past behaviour and intends to continue seeking professional counselling to address it. > > (g) When properly contextualised, the evidence does not support a finding that LJMH poses an unacceptable risk to the Australian community, either through further offending or other serious misconduct. LJMH acknowledges that, due to his criminal history, this primary consideration weighs against him. However, given the nature of LJMH's offending, being confined to domestic incidents involving his former wife and his children, with no history of violence or offending against the wider community, the Tribunal should have no difficulty assigning this primary consideration lesser weight. > > (h) Furthermore, LJMH poses no discernible risk to the broader Australian community. Accordingly, the weight of this consideration, whether viewed individually or collectively, should not outweigh the compelling considerations that favour the revocation of the visa cancellation.
(a) Paragraph 8.1.2(2) requires the Tribunal to have cumulative regard to both the nature of harm to individuals, or the Australian community, should LJMH engage in further criminal or other serious conduct, and the likelihood of LJMH engaging in such conduct. This assessment must consider information and evidence on the risk of re-offending, as well as evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, while giving weight to time spent in the community since the most recent offence. > > (b) Regarding the nature of harm, should LJMH re-offend by committing domestic violence offences, the potential consequences include physical harm up to and including the possibility of death. Such offending may also result in ongoing psychological consequences for victims and others, as well as broader financial and other consequences to the justice and health systems. The National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-2023 reports that, on average, one woman is killed by an intimate partner every ten days, and violence against women and their children results in an overall economic cost of $26 billion annually, with victims bearing approximately 50 percent of that cost. > > (c) The Respondent contends that domestic violence offending is so serious that any risk of repetition is unacceptable, as outlined in Paragraph 8.1.2(1). The nature of harm resulting from domestic violence offending was comprehensively explained by Deputy President Kendall in XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection_[44]_ at [45], who noted that in a society adhering to fundamental sex equality principles, gendered violence directed at women is both individually and systemically intolerable. The harm is threefold: it results in direct physical and psychological harm to the women targeted; it psychologically harms children who witness their mothers being abused and sends a message that such behaviour should be tolerated; and it normalizes socially enforced gender imbalances that perpetuate sex-based inequalities and violence. > > (d) LJMH submits that two major circumstances surrounding his offending conduct were his health issues and gambling addiction, contending that these circumstances no longer exist and therefore he does not pose an unacceptable level of risk to the community. > > (e) The NSW Police Facts Sheets acknowledged that many domestic violence incidents arose due to the accused's severe gambling addiction, which placed great financial strain on the marriage. > > (f) LJMH indicates that his intention is to continue seeking professional counselling and states he would have the support of friends to reintegrate into society. He has expressed regret for his actions, acknowledging that he wrongly took his anger out on others, with his problems arising from gambling and traumatic experiences. > > (g) The Respondent acknowledges that LJMH made admissions and entered early guilty pleas to the 2023 and 2024 convictions. However, the Respondent contends that the Tribunal cannot safely conclude that LJMH is genuinely remorseful and has developed insight into his offending. In his personal circumstances form, LJMH stated that he "pleaded guilty to lesser charges to get my court case over + done with," suggested that his former wife and her friends "accused me of the D/V related offences," and claimed his former wife "weaponised" his children against him. Furthermore, LJMH attributed the relationship breakdown to lending money to his former wife's family that was not repaid. Queensland Corrective Services records from September 2019 noted that LJMH stated "he believes that he has done nothing wrong." The Respondent submits that these statements contradict LJMH's stated remorse and insight into his offending. > > (h) The Respondent further contends that there is no evidence demonstrating that LJMH has engaged in meaningful rehabilitation. While LJMH acknowledges this lack of engagement and attributes it to his struggles with English, the only evidence of course completion relates to a six-hour Explore Program concerning drugs, which does not appear relevant to the behaviours underlying his offending. Although LJMH has stated plans to undertake courses with Relationships Australia Queensland and the Gambling Help Program and to see a counsellor, the prospects of successful engagement and completion remain speculative and untested. Notably, LJMH previously had opportunities to engage in rehabilitation but failed to do so, and previous periods of incarceration have not produced any salutary effect. > > (i) The Respondent contends that the Tribunal should afford this primary consideration significant weight against revocation, noting that this consideration should generally be given greater weight than other primary considerations as specified in Paragraph 7(2). Applying the principles outlined in Paragraphs 5.2(3) and (5), the Respondent contends that the harm that could result from future similar offending is so serious that any countervailing considerations are insufficient to justify revoking the mandatory visa cancellation.
The Tribunal's finding: The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community were LJMH to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct
The Tribunal's consideration: The likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct
(a) facilitate the risk; or, > > (b) conversely, hinder or retard the risk.
The factors that facilitate the risk of re-offending.
The factors that hinder or reduce the risk of re-offending - Rehabilitation, remorse and other factors
The Tribunal's Risk Analysis and Consideration
(a) how likely those events happened, > > (b) how often they occurred, > > (c) the conditions surrounding them, and > > (d) the chance that new events could change the usual pattern.
The Tribunal's finding: Risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
Conclusion: Primary consideration 1: Protection of the Australian community
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 2: FAMILY VIOLENCE COMMITTED BY THE NON-CITIZEN**
The Tribunal's consideration: Family violence committed by the non-citizen
(a) When assessing the seriousness of family violence, Paragraph 8.2(3) specifies several mandatory factors for consideration where relevant. These include the frequency of LJMH's conduct and whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness, the cumulative effect of repeated acts of family violence, and rehabilitation achieved at the time of decision since LJMH's last known act of family violence. > > (b) The rehabilitation assessment encompasses the extent to which LJMH accepts responsibility for their family violence-related conduct, the extent to which LJMH understands the impact of their behaviour on the abused and witnesses of that abuse (particularly children), and efforts to address factors that contributed to their conduct. > > (c) LJMH was convicted of multiple domestic violence offences, most of which were perpetrated against his former wife in the presence of their children, with one occasion of family violence perpetrated against his son. The Respondent contends and LJMH accepts that he has been convicted of offences involving family violence, which LJMH accepts. > > (d) While there is no evident trend of increasing seriousness, the Respondent submits that LJMH's acts of family violence have been frequent. Furthermore, in relation to LJMH's 2019 conviction and 2023 convictions, he was issued an apprehended domestic violence order and a protection order respectively, protecting his former wife and children. Despite these formal warnings, LJMH continued to commit further acts of family violence. > > (e) The Respondent contends that there is limited evidence demonstrating that LJMH has addressed his offending behaviour. LJMH appears to blame his former wife for his offending behaviour. Furthermore, he has demonstrated no insight into the impact of his offending on his former wife or on his children who were witnesses to the offending, failing to meet the criteria outlined in Paragraphs 8.2(3)(c)(i) and (ii). > > (f) The Respondent contends that offending involving actual, threatened, or implied family violence is of special concern to the Australian community because of the particular vulnerability of victims who are dependent on the perpetrator and the very harmful impact of such conduct on family life. Therefore, the Respondent contends that this primary consideration weighs significantly in favour of non-revocation of the visa cancellation.
(a) LJMH acknowledges that the relevant offences constitute family violence, which is recognised as an aggravating factor when assessing the seriousness of the conduct and the risk he poses to the Australian community. > > (b) However, it is submitted that LJMH's history of family violence is not characterised by high frequency or escalating severity as contemplated by Paragraph 8.2(3). Notably, the most recent incident in 2023 does not indicate a trend of increasing seriousness. > > (c) LJMH fully accepts responsibility for his actions and does not seek to minimise or excuse his behaviour. He demonstrates insight into the impact of his behaviour, particularly on his former wife and children, and expresses unconditional remorse. Furthermore, he has taken meaningful steps to address the underlying causes of his offending, including a commitment to seek counselling, participate in anger management and gambling addiction programs, and adhere to treatment for his physical health conditions. > > (d) While in custody, LJMH has already commenced the rehabilitation process by completing available programs and has expressed a strong desire to continue his education post-release. His efforts to overcome language barriers to engage with support services further demonstrate his commitment to rehabilitation and a law-abiding future. LJMH is also eligible for community-based rehabilitation programs and has indicated his intention to enrol in Relationships Australia Queensland's Men's Behaviour Change Program. His willingness to participate in such programs reflects his acceptance of personal responsibility and significantly mitigates the risk of reoffending, as contemplated by Paragraph 8.2(3)(c)(i)(ii)(iii). > > (e) LJMH acknowledges that this primary consideration is the strongest against him. However, similar to the first primary consideration, it is submitted that the weight of this factor, whether considered individually or collectively, should not outweigh the other compelling considerations in his favour.
Conclusion: Primary consideration 2: Family Violence Committed by the Non-Citizen.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 3: THE STRENGTH, NATURE AND DURATION OF TIES TO AUSTRALIA**
(f) how long the Applicant has resided in Australia, including whether he arrived as a young child, noting that: > > > (i) less weight should be given where the Applicant began offending soon after arriving in Australia; and > > > > (ii) more weight should be given to time the Applicant has spent contributing positively to the Australian community > > (g) the strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia.
(a) LJMH is the father of four children, all of whom are Australian permanent residents. While he is not currently in contact with his children due to existing protection orders, LJMH is committed to demonstrating that he is a changed man. He intends to pursue all appropriate legal avenues in the future to re-establish a meaningful and positive relationship with his children. > > (b) LJMH has been living in Australia for over twelve years. During this time, he has made meaningful contributions to the Australian community through employment, including work on farms and within his local community. The extent of support LJMH is expected to receive from his local and broader Australian community upon release further demonstrates the strength of his community ties. > > (c) This level of community support serves as compelling evidence that the risk posed by LJMH is mitigated by strong protective factors, supporting a finding that any residual risk to the Australian community is acceptable in the circumstances. This primary consideration weighs strongly in LJMH's favour.
(a) Paragraph 8.3(1) requires the Tribunal to consider any impact of the decision on LJMH's immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely. LJMH's immediate family members in Australia are limited to his children, and the impact of the decision on them is addressed separately. > > (b) Paragraph 8.3(2) establishes factors for determining the strength, nature, and duration of ties that LJMH has to the Australian community. These factors include the length of time LJMH has resided in Australia, including whether LJMH arrived as a young child, with the direction noting that less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia, while more weight should be given to time LJMH has spent contributing positively to the Australian community. Additionally, consideration must be given to the strength, duration, and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, and people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia. > > (c) LJMH submits that during his twelve years in Australia, he has contributed positively to the Australian community. In particular, he spent significant time contributing to the local community of Gatton, where he worked on farms and contributed to the Australian agricultural industry. Furthermore, LJMH states that he was instrumental in establishing the first permanent mosque in Gatton in 2020. > > (d) LJMH has provided statements of support prepared by several individuals, including Amridpal Walila, a friend whom LJMH met while incarcerated, Anthony Gray, another friend met during incarceration, and Rashida Begum, a family friend who resides in Gatton. Each statement attests to LJMH being a good friend and a good person. > > (e) While LJMH did not commence offending soon after arriving in Australia, the evidence relating to his contribution to the community is limited. It also appears that although LJMH may have engaged in some employment, he relied on welfare benefits during his time in Australia. > > (f) Overall, the Respondent accepts that this consideration weighs slightly in favour of revocation. However, the Respondent contends that this consideration should not attract significant weight and does not outweigh the heavy weight that should be given to the primary considerations of the protection of the Australian community, family violence committed, and expectations of the Australian community.
(a) He has a 'toxic' relationship with his former wife and that there are orders against him having any contact with her.[86] He believes that if he contacted his former wife, she would complain to authorities to ensure that he is sent back to prison which gives him an additional incentive not to contact her.[87]
(b) He acknowledged that the DVO runs to 4 April 2028 and applies to both his former wife and his children (who he has not seen in four years).[88]
(c) He has worked at the jobs listed in his Personal Circumstances Form.[89]
(a) LJMH's former wife is, on balance, not part of his immediate family. Apart from the reasons noted above, the Tribunal notes that in his Personal Circumstances Form LJMH leaves the section concerned with his spouse's details blank.[95] > > (b) His immediate family consists of his four children who he has not seen for four years and cannot see, because of the DVO, until April 2028, approximately three years from the date of the hearing of this matter. > > (c) LJMH did not begin offending soon after arriving and has contributed positively to the Australian community. > > (d) Based on the documentary evidence[96], he has only been employed for approximately three years of the twelve years he has been in Australia, which qualifies the level of his positive contributions to the Australian community. > > (e) He has a small but loyal group of friends in Australia.
Conclusion: Primary consideration 3: The Strength, Nature and Duration of Ties to Australia.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 4: BEST INTERESTS OF MINOR CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIA AFFECTED BY THE DECISION.**
(a) the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen (with reduced weight accorded to non-parental relationships, absence of existing relationships, or limited meaningful contact including court-restricted access); > > (b) the extent to which the non-citizen is likely to fulfill a positive parental role in future, considering the time remaining until the child reaches eighteen years and any existing court orders regarding parental access and care arrangements; > > (c) the impact of the non-citizen's prior and likely future conduct on the child, particularly where such conduct may have negative consequences; > > (d) the probable effects of separation from the non-citizen, taking into account alternative means of maintaining contact; > > (e) the presence of other persons already fulfilling parental roles; any known views expressed by the child, weighted according to their age and maturity; > > (f) evidence of family violence perpetration, abuse, or neglect by the non-citizen toward the child; and > > (g) evidence of physical or emotional trauma suffered by the child as a result of the non-citizen's conduct. [100]
(a) He acknowledged that the DVO runs to 4 April 2028 and applies to both his former wife and his children (who he has not seen in four years and cannot contact until after April 2028). > > (b) He denied that his children may have directly seen the 2023 incident of family violence committed by LJMH against his former wife. > > (c) He heavily qualified his version of the conviction where he assaulted one of his sons by throwing a mango box at him and injuring him. > > (d) In his written evidence, LJMH indicates that the children live with their mother, their addresses are unknown, and he will not live with them upon his return to the community.[101]
(a) LJMH has four minor children in Australia. The best interests of each child are to be assessed individually, as their circumstances and needs may differ. LJMH submits that he holds a sincere hope to re-enter his children's lives and to establish meaningful and enduring relationships with each of them. > > (b) LJMH describes the current period of separation from his children as the most difficult and painful chapter of his life. Importantly, the existence of current separation, due to legal restrictions, should not be construed as an absence of a parental relationship, but rather as a temporary barrier he is committed to overcoming through lawful means and sustained personal change. In particular, LJMH is determined to resume his role as a responsible parent, including providing financial support for his children's wellbeing and future. > > (c) This primary consideration weighs significantly in LJMH's favour, with the ultimate weight to be determined by the Tribunal.
(a) LJMH has identified four minor children who would be affected by the decision: Child A, born April 2012; Child B, possibly born in December 2014; Child C, born January 2015, with similar uncertainty regarding their actual age; and Child D, born January 2017.[104] > > (b) LJMH submits that he had a close relationship with his children, particularly his youngest daughter, prior to his divorce and separation, and contends that his children would be devastated if he were forced to leave the country. In his personal circumstances form, LJMH indicates that the children live with their mother, their addresses are unknown, and they will not live with him upon his return to the community. He submits that his former wife restricted access to his children and that they were used against him. > > (c) LJMH's children are the subject of a DVO that restricts his interactions with them. The protection order applies for a period of five years from 5 April 2023, expiring on 5 April 2028. The terms of the protection order require that LJMH must be of good behaviour towards the children and not commit domestic violence against them. He is prohibited from locating and contacting them or attempting to locate or contact them or asking someone else to do so on his behalf. Additionally, he is prohibited from following or approaching within 100 metres of them or their place of residence. > > (d) The Respondent submits that LJMH does not have a relationship with his children, noting that his former wife currently fulfills the parental role and it does not appear that he provides them with any financial, practical, or emotional support in their lives, as contemplated by Paragraph 8.4(4)(c). > > (e) Furthermore, given that LJMH's offending exposed his children to family violence and involved the direct perpetration of family violence against his son, the Respondent contends that LJMH's offending would likely have an enduring negative impact on his children, as outlined in Paragraph 8.4(4)(g). > > (f) The Respondent contends that this primary consideration weighs slightly in favour of revocation, but only to a very limited extent.
(a) LJMH acknowledged that the DVO runs till 4 April 2028 and applies to both his former wife and his four children.[105] > > (b) LJMH's evidence is that he had a warm and loving relationship with his children. There is no corroborating evidence for this. > > (c) As and when the current DVO extinguishes in April 2028, LJMH has a possible range of between five and seven years with the children before they reach adulthood. > > (d) By April 2028 he will have been absent and out of communication with them for a significant portion of their lives. > > (e) The extent to which he is likely to play a positive parental role in the future is qualified and constrained by the DVO, his self-described toxic relationship with his former wife and the significant period of their lives that he will have missed. LJMH appeared to acknowledge these issues in his foreshadowing that he may need to take legal action to simply attain access to his children.[106] > > (f) The children likely observed part of LJMH's 2023 offending conduct which in turn is likely to have had at the least an adverse psychological impact on them, even if the Tribunal accepts LJMH's version of the physical injury to his son. > > (g) LJMH's former wife apparently fulfils the parental role but there is a gap in the evidence on this aspect. > > (h) None of the children have provided evidence that sets out their views. > > (i) LJMH's 2023 offending evidences that there is a risk that the children are at risk or being exposed to or subject to family violence committed by LJMH. The October 2024 sentencing decision evidences that one child suffered physical trauma caused by LJMH.[107]
Conclusion: Primary consideration 4: Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 5: EXPECTATIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY**
(a) While this primary consideration is often referred to as a "deeming provision", the Direction does not ascribe to the Australian community a relevant expectation with regard to the outcome of this case. The determination of the appropriate weight to be given remains a matter for this Tribunal. > > (b) Given that the Tribunal retains discretion in determining the appropriate weight to be attributed to this primary consideration, Deputy President Block's views in Waits v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[112] are particularly helpful. Deputy President Block emphasised that "the expectation of the Australian community should be taken to be the expectation of the informed, reasonable member of the Australian community, rather than a member of the Australian community who is only prepared to consider the punitive aspects of the power under s501. In Leha v Minister for Immigration[113], Deputy President McMahon further emphasised that "there would be a general expectation in the community that the Act would be administered fairly and humanely" at [34]" > > (c) Senior Member Cameron's observations of in Dang[114] are relevant: "The Australian nation has always been prepared to extend the hand of compassion, assistance and humanity. The Australian community has always recognised the concept of rehabilitation and of second go. It has an exception that when a person is dealt with by the criminal justice system that they will reform and not reoffend." > > (d) This is by no means intended to diminish the seriousness of the offences LJMH committed, which led to significant charges and convictions he received. LJMH expresses deep remorse and offers a sincere apology for his actions. He respectfully submits that the commission of these offences should not define his overall character, nor should he be regarded as a person with a criminal disposition. Rather, his offending should be viewed through the lens of his lived experience as a traumatised individual with no chance of survival in his country of origin. His actions occurred during a period of extreme vulnerability and distress, not from an ingrained tendency toward criminal behaviour. > > (e) All of these factors, compounded by LJMH's gambling addiction and his loss of self-respect, severely impaired his decision-making ability. This deterioration manifested as anger directed both inward and toward those around him and was further exacerbated by a need to support his gambling addiction. The sense of worthlessness and hopelessness that once consumed him has now dissipated, replaced by a growing sense of responsibility and hope for the future. > > (f) That being said, LJMH acknowledges that this primary consideration weighs against him. However, he respectfully submits that it should not be afforded such weight, either individually or collectively, as to outweigh the other considerations that support the revocation of his visa cancellation.
(a) Paragraphs 8.5(1) and (2) outline the Australian community's expectations, stipulating that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. > > (b) It is not for the Tribunal to determine for itself the expectations of the Australian community by reference to LJMH's circumstances or evidence about those expectations. Rather, the Tribunal must give effect to the 'norm' stipulated above, as established in FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185 at [68] per Charlesworth J and at [92]-[93], [100]-[104] per Stewart J, and also Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2004) ALJR 196; [2024] HCA 2 at [51]-[52] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ. > > (c) The Respondent contends that LJMH's offending is very serious as it involved acts of family violence and serious crimes against a woman, as outlined in Paragraphs 8(2)(a) and (c). The Australian community's expectations apply regardless of whether LJMH poses a measurable risk of causing psychological harm to the Australian community, as specified in Paragraph 8.5(3). > > (d) Accordingly, the Respondent contends that the Tribunal should give this consideration significant weight against revocation.
Conclusion: Primary consideration 5: Expectations of the Australian community
OTHER CONSIDERATION (A): LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION
(a) Their status in Australia is unlawful.
(b) They are subject to being detained or removed.
(c) Any other visas they hold or any visa applications they have made are cancelled or refused.
(d) They are prohibited from applying for other visas while in the migration zone other than a Protection visa or a Bridging R visa.[117]
(e) Periods of exclusion from Australia and special return criteria may apply.
(a) Paragraph 9.1 requires the Tribunal to consider the legal consequences of its decision, taking into account any non-refoulement obligations and whether LJMH is covered by a protection finding. > > (b) LJMH submits that he is at risk of indefinite detention as a stateless Rohingyan man, engaging Australia's non-refoulement obligations. Furthermore, LJMH submits that removal to Nauru is an unsuitable, unreasonable, and potentially unlawful option due to the impact it would have on his ability to have a meaningful relationship with his children, his complex health needs, and lack of opportunities in Nauru. > > (c) The Respondent accepts that a protection finding within the meaning of section 197C has been made with respect to LJMH in relation to Myanmar, such that he cannot be removed to Myanmar under s 198 of the Act by operation of section 197C(3). > > (d) The Respondent understands that LJMH is currently being held on remand. Irrespective of the Tribunal's decision, LJMH will remain in custody for the purpose of serving his sentence. As a result of the High Court's decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37, where the statutory duty to remove a non-citizen has arisen pursuant to s 198 of the Act, detention of a non-citizen is not supported by ss 189 and 196 of the Act where there is no real prospect that it will be practicable to remove the non-citizen in the reasonably foreseeable future. Since the protection finding for LJMH means that his removal to Myanmar is not required or authorised, he could only be removed to a third country. > > (e) If the Tribunal were to affirm the delegate's decision, LJMH would not be able to apply for another visa, other than a Bridging (Removal Pending) (Class WR) (subclass 070) visa due to the operation of s 501E of the Act and regulation 2.12AA of the Migration Regulations 1994. Additionally, he would be barred from making a further application for a protection visa under s 48A of the Act, unless Ministerial discretion is exercised to lift the bar under s 48B of the Act. > > (f) The direct legal consequence of the Tribunal deciding to affirm the reviewable decision is that LJMH would not be subject to immigration detention and he cannot be removed to Myanmar. LJMH would remain an unlawful non-citizen until he is either granted a Bridging (Removal Pending) visa or removed to a third country, which is a decision that the Respondent will make after his criminal detention is over. LJMH would not be subject to indefinite detention. The Respondent contends that the decision the Respondent will make with respect to a grant of a Bridging (Removal Pending) visa or removal to a third country is too far removed from what can be speculated by the Tribunal. > > (g) The Respondent contends that the potential prospect of LJMH's removal from Australia to a third country is not a legal consequence that the Tribunal should entertain. The Tribunal should confine its consideration to the direct legal consequences of a decision to affirm and not speculate about what decisions the Respondent or anyone else may make in the future, however real the prospects of those decisions are, as established in Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650 at [31]-[33] per Flick J. Removal to a third country would require, inter alia, a decision of the Respondent and the consent of that third country, which are speculative contingencies. The Tribunal should not speculate about the suitability of Nauru as a viable and safe option for LJMH. > > (h) In these circumstances, the Respondent contends that this consideration weighs neither in favour nor against revocation, as LJMH is at no risk of indefinite detention.
(a) All "legal and practical" consequences of the Tribunal decision are mandatory considerations for the Tribunal's determination. > > (b) It is noted, as agreed, that LJMH has been recognised as a refugee to whom Australia owes non-refoulement obligations. Accordingly, Australia cannot lawfully return him to his country of origin. However, in the absence of a visa, and instead of remaining in indefinite immigration detention, LJMH may be subject to removal to Nauru, a country with which the Australian Government has recently entered into an agreement to accept a cohort of individuals in similar circumstances. > > (c) LJMH acknowledges that, following the High Court's decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37, he is not subject to ongoing immigration detention upon release from custody. This decision established that indefinite detention is unlawful where there is no real prospect of removal to the country of origin in the foreseeable future. > > (d) However, it is important to emphasise that LJMH does not hold any expectation that the Respondent will grant him another visa in the future. The Tribunal should not entertain any suggestion to the contrary, as LJMH's position is that the legal consequence of an adverse decision in this matter would be his removal to a third country, rather than the grant of any bridging or substantive visa. > > (e) He contends that the legal and practical consequences of the Tribunal's decision would be his removal to a third country, currently Nauru, in accordance with recent arrangements between the Australian Government and Nauru to resettle certain individuals from the NZYQ cohort. > > (f) LJMH argues that it is inconsistent for the Respondent to simultaneously propose the possibility of the prospect of removal to a third country, while also asserting that the Tribunal should not speculate on the potential for such removal as a legal consequence of its decision. > > (g) In any event, LJMH submits that while his removal to a third country, such as Nauru or any other designated nation, may not breach Australia's non-refoulement obligations, the legal and practical consequences of such removal are nonetheless mandatory considerations for the Tribunal in determining the appropriate outcome of this review. > > (h) For completeness, LJMH is also barred from applying for another protection visa (RSFIC, 56, clause 9.1.1(3). It is respectfully submitted that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that there is any possibility of LJMH being granted any kind of visa, including protection visa, in a "foreseeable" future.
(a) LJMH is owed non-refoulement obligations.[120] > > (b) The combination of his protection status and the High Court's NZYQ decision means that he cannot be returned to Myanmar or indefinitely detained. > > (c) If the Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision, LJMH will be an unlawful non-citizen once released from jail and would be liable to be removed from Australia. Section 198AD of the Act applies so he would be removed to a regional processing country. > > (d) At the time of this decision, Nauru is the only such country. > > (e) LJMH has diabetes, has a heart condition and fears for his health if removed to Nauru. > > (f) While the Respondent contends that there was no corroborative evidence as to LJMH's medical condition, the Tribunal notes the factual history of his heart problems is documented in the documentary evidence.[121]
OTHER CONSIDERATION (B): EXTENT OF IMPEDIMENTS IF REMOVED
Decision-makers must consider the extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account:
(a) The non-citizen's age and health;
(b) Whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and
(c) Any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country.
(a) Paragraph 9.2 provides that decision-makers must consider the extent of any impediments that LJMH may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country. > > (b) This assessment must have regard to LJMH's age and health, whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers, and any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country. > > (c) As noted above, LJMH is the subject of a protection finding and there is nothing to suggest that the circumstances in s 197C(3)(c) of the Act apply to LJMH. > > (d) Consequently, the impediments that LJMH may face if he were returned to Myanmar will not eventuate as a result of the Tribunal's decision. > > (e) Accordingly, the Respondent contends that this consideration should be given neutral weight.
(a) The Tribunal must assess the practical consequences of LJMH's removal from Australia. > > (b) Accordingly, and irrespective of which third country may be designated, the Tribunal must assess the extent of impediments LJMH would face upon removal. This includes, but is not limited to, whether the receiving country is a signatory to and has ratified relevant international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture. The potential inadequacies in protections or support in such countries are directly relevant to this consideration. > > (c) Therefore, LJMH submits that the Tribunal should consider the real and tangible consequences of its decision, including the likelihood of removal to a third country and the associated impediments, when assessing LJMH's case. > > (d) It is respectfully submitted that the following potential impediments are direct and relevant considerations for the purpose of this assessment: LJMH's age and health; whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country. > > (e) LJMH has a history of serious health issues, including surviving a heart attack and managing diabetes. Access to comprehensive medical care is crucial for his well-being. Reports indicate that Nauru's healthcare infrastructure is limited, with challenges in providing adequate treatment for complex medical conditions. Relocating LJMH to such an environment could jeopardise his health and impede his rehabilitation progress. > > (f) Nauru's healthcare infrastructure is primarily designed to address basic medical needs. The Republic of Nauru Hospital, the island's main medical facility, often struggles with limited resources. Reports indicate that even essential medications can be scarce, and patients frequently endure long waits in challenging conditions to receive care. > > (g) For individuals with chronic health issues, such as heart disease or diabetes, Nauru's healthcare system may not provide the necessary level of care. The island lacks specialised medical professionals and equipment required for comprehensive management of such conditions. > > (h) Mental health services in Nauru are notably insufficient. Médecins Sans Frontières has reported significant mental health needs among both the Nauruan population and asylum seekers, with available services failing to meet these demands. The lack of adequate mental health support can exacerbate existing conditions and hinder rehabilitation efforts. > > (i) The healthcare challenges in Nauru have been particularly detrimental to refugees and asylum seekers. Advocacy groups have documented instances where individuals with serious health conditions did not receive timely or adequate medical attention, leading to deteriorating health outcomes. The repeal of the Medevac legislation, which previously facilitated urgent medical transfers to Australia, has further limited access to necessary healthcare for this vulnerable population. > > (j) The above considerations are assessed within the statutory framework of sections 189, 197C(3), 197(3)(c), and 198 of the Act as they currently stand, as outlined in Paragraphs 9.1.1(2) and (3). Collectively, this results in LJMH being removed to a third country. > > (k) For that reason alone, it is respectfully submitted that this has the potential to alter the character and meaning of the word "may" in s 501CA(4), as stated by the His Honour Justice Colvin in Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection_[124]_:
"Finally, if the Minister is satisfied that there is a reason why the cancellation decision should be revoked then, given the way in which s 501CA(4)(b) is expressed, the Minister must revoke. As the failure to meet the character test will be the only reason why a person's visa will be revoked under s 501(3A), it would be strange if the Minister was satisfied for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(i) that the person passed the character test, yet there remained a discretion whether to revoke."
(l) Therefore, the opening words to s 501CA(4) are in all likelihood an example of those cases where 'may' means 'must'. If there remains a discretion once the Respondent is satisfied as to one of the matters in s 501CA(4)(b), it would be a very narrow one that, in most circumstances, could not be reasonably exercised by refusing to revoke the original decision to cancel the visa.
Subparagraph 9.2(1)(a) - the non-citizen's age and health
Subparagraph 9.2(1)(b) - any substantial language or cultural barriers
Subparagraph 9.2(1)(c) - any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country
OTHER CONSIDERATION (C): IMPACT ON AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS INTERESTS
(a) character test: whether there is a reasonable suspicion that LJMH does not pass the character test in terms of s 501(6)(b), and whether LJMH satisfies the Tribunal that he passes the character test,[128] and, if not,
(b) exercise of discretion: whether there is another reason whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion conferred by s 501(2) to set the reviewable decision aside.
Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC)
Applicant Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions
Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Article - 'Offshore health crisis deepens: Advocates call on Labor to reinstate Medevac legislation'
The Melbourne Anglican Article - 'Calls for Royal Commission amid Nauru health failures'
ABC News Article - UNHCR calls for immediate transfer of refugees out of Manus Island, Nauru to 'humane conditions'
Parties' agreed schedule of the applicant's immediate and extended family, social and work relationships and minor children in Australia
[2] Unless the context indicates otherwise, the Tribunal has used bold font to emphasise selected passages.
[3] One example is at Exhibit R1: 75. LJMH's written statement uses the word 'weaponised' with which he was not familiar in his oral evidence.
[4] Pursuant to s 500(6L) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
[5] Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326 [41]-[48].
[7] Exhibit R1: G22, 156; G10, 59; G13, 72; G14, 85.
[11] Pursuant to s 501CA(4)(a) of the Act.
[12] Pursuant to s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act.
[13] Pursuant to s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act.
[15] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(6).
[17] As defined in s 501 of the Act and as required under s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act.
[19] See Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Makasa [2021] HCA 1.
[20] See Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166 at para [38].
[22] The Direction's paragraphs will be capitalised as 'Paragraphs' in these reasons.
[24] Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594; (2018) 74 AAR 545, at [23] and [28] (Colvin J); FHHM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 19.
[25] Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 48; (2016) 241 FCR 461, at [57]; Nguyen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 160, [23] (Perram, Colvin and Abraham JJ); Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 46; (2023) 296 FCR 582, 587 [23] (Mortimer J, as her Honour then was).
[26] A SFIC functions similarly to a pleadings document in court proceedings. It helps identify and narrow down the disputed issues, ensuring both parties understand and have the opportunity to respond to each other's arguments.
[32] Direction; [8.1.1(1)(a) and (b)].
[42] WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512; (2009) 110 ALD 434 particularly at [27]- [29].
[44] XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 2385
[53] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160 (Sabharwal), at [2]; GJJF and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 930 (17 May 2019) at [48] - [52] and Roberts and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3970 at [27].
[54] See, for example, Rahman and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2020] AATA 888 (20 April 2020); QKVH and Minister for Home Affairs [2020] AATA 4431 (QKVH 2020); Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424; GJJF and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 930 (17 May 2019); Kayo Rerekura and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 153.
[55] CTK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1211, [90] (Kerr J); see also Murphy v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1924, [37] (Mortimer J).
[56] (1997) 191 CLR 559, 574 ('Guo').
[60] Murphy v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1924 (Mortimer J) ('Murphy') [37].
[62] GJJF and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 930 ('GJJF'); Roberts and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3970 ('Roberts'); GJJF and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 930 ('GJJF') (n 52) [48]- [52]; Roberts, (n 53) [27].
[63] Dharma and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 2757, at [26].
[70] Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2 [37], [39] ('Ismail').
[82] See above under Primary Consideration 1.
[98] Tohi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125; (2021) 285 FCR 187, 240 [180], citing Spruill v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1401; 2012) 135 ALD 45, [18]-[19]; RGCZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 201; (2022) 295 FCR 365, 376 [44].
[108] Ibid at 473 [75]- [76] (Charlesworth J).
[109] Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2; (2024) 417 ALR 36, [51]-[52].
[110] Clause 790.511, Migration Regulations 1994.
[112] Waits v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] AATA 1336
[113] Leha v Minister for Immigration [2000] AATA 1054
[114] Dang and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 2095 (4 July 2018) at [90]-[91]
[117] Section 501E of the Act. Further, Criterion 5001 of Schedule 5 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prohibits the grant of a visa to person outside Australia whose visa has been cancelled under s 501.
[124] Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116
[129] Demir v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 870.
[130] Blake and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] AATA 492 (2 February 2024).
[131] Aksu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 514 (4 May 2001).
[132] Lu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 340.
Bale
Minister for
(2019) 272 FCR 454
(2024) 417 ALR 36
(2023) 296 FCR 582
(2021) 285 FCR 187
(2019) 266 CLR 250
(2019) 270 FCR 12
(1997) 73 FCR 187
(1997) 191 CLR 559
(2022) 275 CLR 582
(2014) 225 FCR 424
(2018) 263 FCR 531
(2016) 241 FCR 461
(2019) 271 FCR 326
(2022) 295 FCR 365