AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

The Federal Circuit Court 6 Before the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant was legally represented, and raised four grounds of review, one of which was not pressed. The Federal Circuit Court rejected each of them. To the extent necessary, I deal with its reasons for doing so when I consider the grounds of appeal below.

The appeal to this Court 7 As I have noted, the appellant's notice of appeal relies on a single, generalised ground, alleging error in the Federal Circuit Court's decision and that the primary judge failed to consider all of the grounds raised. Appropriately, the Minister has approached the matter by making submissions about the way the Federal Circuit Court dealt with each of the three active grounds of review pressed before it. I consider that is how the appellant's appeal should be considered. He has, in general terms, challenged the reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court on judicial review, and that is sufficient in these circumstances for the Court to consider how the Federal Circuit Court dealt with each of the grounds of review he advanced before it, when he was represented. 8 The appellant was unrepresented on the appeal to this Court until shortly before the hearing. On 26 February 2018 Mr Hodges, as solicitor for the appellant, filed short submissions based on what was ground 2 before the Federal Circuit Court. Mr Hodges was the instructing solicitor who appeared before the Federal Circuit Court. He also appeared on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal. 9 At the hearing of the appeal, I raised some matters with the Minister's counsel about what were grounds 1 and 3 before the Federal Circuit Court, on which Mr Hodges did not address the Court. Counsel for the Minister helpfully directed the Court to appropriate material to answer those questions. I have incorporated these matters in my findings below.

Resolution 10 Although I consider the Immigration Assessment Authority's reasoning, and its consideration of some of the evidence placed before it by the appellant was scant in parts, I have concluded the Federal Circuit Court was correct to determine its decision was not affected by jurisdictional error.

Ground 1 before the Federal Circuit Court 11 The first ground was that the Immigration Assessment Authority had failed to consider an integer of the appellant's claims - namely a "separate and distinct incident in March 2009", which, it was alleged, was not the subject of any findings by the Immigration Assessment Authority. That incident was the attendance of Criminal Intelligence Division officers at the appellant's place of study - "TW" - and at his home, concerning an individual called "[redacted]". 12 The appellant gave the following evidence in his statutory declaration: 15. By late 2000, my brother fled Sri Lanka and by 2004 another sister also fled Sri Lanka to France. Since 2004, I was living with my mother and two sisters in Vavuniya. 16. I was studying at [redacted], Vavuniya until 2008 and sat for the ordinary level exams in December 2008. While studying at school I was beaten on several occasions by the Army and once I was shot at while playing at a playground but escaped injury. In January 2009, I joined a computer class in [TW] Vavuniya. 17. In early 2009, my friend A was taken to custody by the CID personals and he was killed around June 2009. 18. Around March 2009, while studying at [TW] I was approached by three CID personals and was made inquires about a person called "[redacted]". I told them there was nobody I knew of by that name. Then they went to [TW] and made the same inquiry with the receptionist there. Around the same time they went to my house and made inquires about "[redacted]" with my sister as well. 19. I was frightened to stay at my house and moved to my aunty's house in Vavuniya. My mother and two of my sisters vacated the house and moved to an uncle's house in Vavuniya. I ceased attending the computer classes and was hiding in Vavuniya moving from one location to another. 20. Around March 2010, I fled to Qatar with the intention of going to France to join with my siblings. While in Qatar, my sister who agreed to help me to enter France died and my plan was shelved. I could not remain in Qatar and returned to Sri Lanka in July 2010. 13 There were some aspects of the appellant's account about these events that concerned the Immigration Assessment Authority, in terms of their consistency. This is what it said at [16] of its reasons: 16. At the PV interview the applicant stated that in Sri Lanka, a friend of his named A had been taken away, beaten and shot by the SLA or CID and he feared something similar happening to him. When asked why authorities would have an interest in him, the applicant stated 'My friend who was shot and killed knew some LTTE people. I would always hang out with my friend so they thought he and I were LTTE.' It was put to the applicant that this information was inconsistent his entry interview in 2013, where he stated that he had a friend who was shot dead because he was an LTTE member who planted bombs. In response the applicant stated that this was a different person named [redacted]. The applicant was asked why he had not mentioned [redacted] or [redacted]'s death at the entry interview or in his statement of claims. The applicant responded 'I was friends with A but I wasn't really friends with [redacted]' and reiterated this in the statutory declaration of 13 October 2016 to the IAA. In the statutory declaration to the IAA, the applicant states: 'I have not stated at the entry interview that my friend "A" was the one who planted the bomb. I have observed [redacted] alias [redacted] carrying bombs and said that he was the one who could have planted the bomb. I believe that any inconsistency in this regard was due to an interpreting error.' 14 The Immigration Assessment Authority did not accept the explanation about interpreting error. Implicitly, it appears not to have accepted the appellant's broader explanation as recounted by the Immigration Assessment Authority itself. At [18] it made the following finding: 18. I have reviewed the audio recording of the entry interview and do not accept the applicant's statement in the statutory declaration to the IAA that the inconsistencies regarding friends with LTTE links arose from an interpreting error. I also do not accept the characterisation in the submission of 27 October 2016 to the IAA of the inconsistencies as relatively minor. When discussing at the entry interview why he departed Sri Lanka, the applicant states unambiguously: 'One of my friends was an active member of the resistance and he used to set bombs and he was killed by the Army. From then they started looking for me. His name is A.' The applicant has not provided a plausible explanation for the inconsistencies outlined above between the information provided at the entry and PV interviews and I do not accept the information to be credible. I find that the applicant did not have a friend who was taken away, beaten and shot by Sri Lankan authorities. It follows that I do not accept that Sri Lankan authorities, including the SLA and CID, searched for him at [TW] or at his home, looking for him as a result of his association with a friend he claims was shot, or for any other reason. (emphasis added) 15 It is this aspect of the Immigration Assessment Authority decision that, the appellant submitted to the Federal Circuit Court, revealed that it had not appreciated the incident at TW and what happened thereafter were separate and distinct. 16 The Federal Circuit Court rejected this, finding there was an express reference to TW and the appellant's claims about this event were "subsumed" in its findings about what happened to A, and (I infer) subsumed in the Immigration Assessment Authority's finding that it did not believe the appellant concerning his association with "A". 17 The Federal Circuit Court's conclusion that the appellant's claim about what happened when CID officers visited TW was subsumed in the Immigration Assessment Authority's findings about his friend A is not affected by any error. It is clear that the appellant had linked the incident at TW with his association with his friend A. Although that is not so apparent from his statutory declaration, it is apparent from other evidence before the Court. The clearest example is what the appellant is recorded in the delegate's decision as having told the delegate: The applicant submits that he came to the authorities' attention for the reason outlined above. He claims that they visited him at his college and asked him about a person named [redacted]. He believes they were looking for him but did not realise this because his national identity card contains his full name [redacted]. He claims that the authorities also asked staff at the college about him and visited his family looking for him. The applicant submits that as a result of his friend being killed and the authorities looking for him he went into hiding at his uncle's house. 18 It is clear that the appellant's narrative about the incident at TW was not a separate claim, but rather part of his claim to fear harm because he would be seen as associated with A, a person imputed with a LTTE supporter profile. The incident at TW was given by him as one example of how the Sri Lankan authorities saw him. When the Immigration Assessment Authority did not accept the appellant's claims about his association with A and the imputations he said arose, then this was an implicit rejection of his narrative about the incident at TW.

Second ground 19 This ground concerned the Immigration Assessment Authority's reliance on s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to exclude information it characterised as "new information". 20 Section 473DD provides: 473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstances For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless: (a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and (b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information: (i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or (ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims. 21 Section 473DC defines "new information" in the following way: (1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that: (a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and (b) the Authority considers may be relevant. 22 Relevantly to this ground, the new information was the appellant's claim that "I further believe there is a court case on foot against me and this would exacerbate my situation". The Immigration Assessment Authority described the information, and made its finding in the following way: The statutory declaration also states 'I further believe there is a court case on foot against me and this would exacerbate my situation.' This information was not before the delegate and I consider it to be new information. 23 This information appeared in the last paragraph of a statutory declaration made by the appellant to the Immigration Assessment Authority dated 13 October 2016. 24 The Immigration Assessment Authority found, referring to s 473DD(b): No explanation was provided as to why this new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate, or why it may be regarded as credible personal information that was not known, and had it been known may have affected the consideration of the applicant's claims. I am not satisfied in relation to the matters set out in s 473DD(b) of the Act and have not considered this new information. 25 Mr Hodges, for the appellant, made submissions about how the Tribunal ought to have dealt with this new information. He accepted the statement was new information for the purposes of s 473DC of the Migration Act. He submitted that the Federal Circuit Court failed to refer to the submission made by the appellant's representative that the appellant had previously provided information in support of his new claims. In writing, Mr Hodges described the submission made by the appellant's representative in the following way: In the proceedings in the court below, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant did provide information relating to his claim that there may be a case against him in the same statutory declaration and in previous statutory declarations: (a) In his statutory declaration, dated 14 March 2016, the appellant claimed the following at [26]:"the authorities continue to look for me and I am now in fear of returning to Sri Lanka". (b) In his statutory declaration, dated 13 October 2016, the appellant stated the following at [3]: "The authorities came looking for me after I fled to Australia and took my mother instead". (c) It was further claimed, at [7], of the same statutory declaration as above that: "Even if I am released and permitted to go back to my village, I am scared that the local authorities will immediately come looking for me and I will be taken away". 26 Mr Hodges submitted s 473DD requires more of the reviewer than is evident at [5] of the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision. He submitted no consideration had been given to whether there were exceptional circumstances. He submitted, correctly, that as a general proposition in many areas of the law where a decision maker is required to consider whether there are "special" or "exceptional" circumstances, a decision-maker is required to consider all the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion. He submitted there is no evidence from its reasons that the Immigration Assessment Authority took this approach, especially since the appellant's claim about a court case only arose after he had been in Australia, and after he had obtained more information about his mother's arrest. Although the appellant did not provide, in terms, any explanation to the Immigration Assessment Authority, Mr Hodges submitted that there was enough material for the Immigration Assessment Authority to infer what the explanation was. Mr Hodges accepted the Immigration Assessment Authority was not itself required to make any inquiries. 27 I accept that it may be implicit in the appellant's statutory declaration about what happened to his mother and that she was taken "instead" of him that, as a matter of chronology, he could not have provided the information about the court case any earlier because he became aware of it after the delegate's decision. He does not say so in terms, which is unfortunate, especially given he was represented and his representatives should have been aware of the strictures of s 473DD. Those strictures are clearly set out in the information, in evidence before the Federal Circuit Court and this Court, which is given to applicants after a delegate's decision. 28 Even if an inference were to be drawn in favour of the appellant, that the chronology he described provided some sort of explanation for why he was only able to inform the Immigration Assessment Authority of the "court case" at the Immigration Assessment Authority stage, I do not accept this is necessarily sufficient to meet the requirements of s 473DD(b). In particular, s 473DD(b)(ii) deals with the Immigration Assessment Authority being satisfied the new information is "credible personal information". An implication arising from the appellant's statutory declaration about the timing of him receiving this information and a further implication of its possible connection to his mother's arrest will not necessarily be sufficient to meet the threshold of credibility. Especially so where a decision-maker has other reservations about the reliability of what an applicant has said. These are matters for the Immigration Assessment Authority to consider in the exercise of its discretion. 29 I also do not accept Mr Hodge's submissions that the appellant's statement in [3] of his statutory declaration, about getting further information, could be seen as a statement that he intended to get further information about his court case (which he referred to only much later in his statutory declaration). The Immigration Assessment Authority could not be expected to make these kinds of links from the bare information in the statutory declaration. Although its reasoning is brief, I do not consider that simply because the Immigration Assessment Authority did not set out a reasoning process of the kind the appellant submitted it should have undertaken, that this involves a miscarriage or misunderstanding of its task under s 473DD to determine if the prohibition on new information is engaged or not. 30 There may be circumstances where it is so plain that there is, on the material, an explanation, that the Immigration Assessment Authority should consider it even if not expressly proffered by the applicant. That might be akin to circumstances where a tribunal is required to consider a claim plainly arising on the material before it even though an applicant does not expressly make such a claim: see the recent summary of these principles by the Full Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195 (Perram, Farrell and Perry JJ) at [27]. 31 In other words, an applicant may "satisfy" the Immigration Assessment Authority about the matters in s 473DD(b) by what she or he says, or the documents she or he produces, without clothing it in a specific submission or specific evidentiary topic directed at s 473DD(b). However, that is not this case. The explanation is not clearly raised on the appellant's evidence at all - there are aspects that may, with a generous reading of the appellant's statutory declaration, be implied if a decision-maker were inclined to do so, but the material is a long way away from the circumstances in the authorities to which the Full Court in Singh refers. 32 Before the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant relied on the decision of BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958, which the Federal Circuit Court found was distinguishable. That finding was correct. As the Minister submitted on this appeal, BVZ16 concerned the scope and operation of the concept of "exceptional circumstances" in s 473DD(a). The approach taken in BVZ16 was applied in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176 (Kenny, Tracey and Griffiths JJ), and referred to without disapproval in CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192 (Gilmour, Robertson and Kerr JJ). The requirements in s 473DD(a) and (b) are cumulative, but there is no necessary indication that the Immigration Assessment Authority must commence by considering the application of paragraph (a) to the facts before it. Much will depend on the particular factual circumstances. As the Full Court noted in CHF16 at [46], the two requirements are in a practical sense very much related. A recent re-affirmation of the cumulative (or conjunctive) nature of s 473DD(a) and (b) can be found in the decision of Gilmour J in BRA16 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 127 at [26]. 33 I accept the Minister's submissions that in the present circumstances, there was nothing erroneous about the Immigration Assessment Authority directing its attention to (b) rather than (a), since the text of (b) does suggest an applicant must "satisfy" the Immigration Assessment Authority about why the information was not provided earlier. That at least calls for some material from an applicant by way of explanation, although in a statutory setting such as this there is no burden imposed. In circumstances where the appellant had not put any express material before the Immigration Assessment Authority to explain why he was relying on these facts for the first time, the Immigration Assessment Authority was not in error to identify (b) as not satisfied. That was enough to trigger the prohibition in s 473DD. 34 However, I note that in CHF16 at [46] the Full Court said: There is one point of construction which we do not find it necessary to pursue. This point is the Minister's submission that there is no obligation cast by s 473DD to consider and make findings upon both (a) and (b) once the Authority has found that either (a) or (b) was not satisfied. It is not necessary to consider this point further because the Authority in the present case has misunderstood the scope of (a) of s 473DD when concluding that it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information. Whether it is possible, as a matter of substance in a given case, to consider all exceptional circumstances without considering whether the new information could not have been provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision or was credible personal information not previously known which may have affected the consideration of the claims, we prefer to leave to a case in which it is necessary to decide it. In a formal sense the Minister's submission is correct but, as a matter of substance, it has a tendency to sidestep the real issue. 35 As the Minister noted, the question identified by the Full Court also need not be determined here. Nevertheless, I respectfully agree with what the Full Court says in [46]. 36 The Federal Circuit Court did not err in rejecting this ground. There was some discussion at the hearing of the appeal about whether the contentions put by Mr Hodges should be reflected in an amended notice of appeal. Ultimately the Minister's counsel properly accepted that they could be comprehended within the broad ground of appeal as it was expressed, and he was able to deal with the arguments advanced. It is apparent Mr Johnston's oral submissions were of considerable assistance to the Court. 37 I note there was also a refusal by the Federal Circuit Court to allow the appellant's legal representative to rely on one aspect of this ground, which was new, and for which no amendment to the notice of appeal had been filed. This related to s 473DC(3) and the asserted failure of the Immigration Assessment Authority to exercise the discretion conferred by that provision. Section 473DC(3) provides: (3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information: (a) in writing; or (b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way. 38 The Court explained its approach thus: 35. In the course of submissions, Mr Tambimuttu identified that there was a further ground that he wished to raise in relation to the Authority's exercise of its power, which was to the effect that there was a failure to exercise the discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Act because of information given about Court proceedings involving the applicant's mother. That information was information provided to the delegate. No request was made for an exercise of discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Act to the Authority. 36. It was in those circumstances that the Court indicated that it would not permit a further ground to be raised orally in respect of which no earlier notice had been given by Mr Tambimuttu. Even if such ground had been raised, for the reasons I have given it was without merit and could not make out any jurisdictional error. 37. The Court made orders in respect of the filing of an amended application which the Court expects to be complied with. It is for the benefit of both the moving party and for the party seeking to respond to any amended application, as well as the Court, that the grounds of application upon which an applicant wishes to rely for jurisdictional error are clearly identified. 38. It is not appropriate to keep up one's sleeve a further oral ground which is not disclosed at a time when the Court is being asked to exercise a discretion to permit a second amended application which does not include any reference to the undisclosed ground. It is for these reasons that Mr Tambimuttu was not permitted by the Court to formally amend the second amended application to raise the further ground. 39 Although views might differ on the approach taken by the Federal Circuit Court it was within the Court's discretion to take this approach and no appealable error is revealed.

Ground Four 40 The appellant had challenged the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision not to give any weight to a letter the appellant claimed his sister had written to the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission in support of his claims. The argument put to the Federal Circuit Court was that it was irrational for the Immigration Assessment Authority to identify the fact the letter was written several years after the events as a reason for the letter to have no probative value. It was also contended the timing of the letter was an irrelevant consideration in terms of its weight. 41 The Federal Circuit Court rejected these contentions, on the basis the Immigration Assessment Authority's finding was logical, rational and reasonable in the context of credibility findings made by the authority and in light of its "lack of contemporaneity". The Federal Circuit Court did not elaborate on why it had reached this conclusion. 42 The Immigration Assessment Authority's reasoning about the letter (at [21]) was as follows: The applicant has also provided a copy of a letter purportedly written by his sister in April 2016 to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka which states '…unknown armed persons visit our house and make death threats to produce my brother. They openly told me that they would kill my brother at the sight of him.' The letter was not written contemporaneously with the events it describes and at the PV interview, the applicant stated: 'You need evidence here that's why I organised to get the letter.' The evidence indicates that the complaint was made several years after the claimed events and with the primary purpose of supporting a visa application. In light of this and my finding that Sri Lankan authorities were not searching for the applicant, I place no weight on this letter. 43 The appellant's sister's letter is in evidence before the Court, and was before the Federal Circuit Court. It is date stamped as received by the Vavuniya Regional Centre of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka on 4 March 2016. In the first sentence of the letter, the appellant's sister states that she "made a complaint to you under Reference No: [redacted]". 44 The letter includes, as part of the narrative of the sister's complaint that her brother (the appellant) "was searched by the unknown armed persons" and due to this he went to hide in his uncle's house for a year, then fled Sri Lanka to Qatar, retuning after three months under the impression he would not have any more problems. However, the sister continues, "some unknown armed persons with masked face visited our house in search of my brother". She also describes how her mother was "frequently taken to Police Station and they made investigation and interrogation". The letter concludes with a plea for the Human Rights Commission to protect her brother (presumably, if he returns to Sri Lanka). 45 The Immigration Assessment Authority did not make any express finding that the sister's letter was false. Rather, as [21] of the Immigration Assessment Authority's reasons makes clear, the Immigration Assessment Authority rejected the letter on three bases. First, that the letter was not "contemporaneous" with the events that the appellant's sister described within it, and that the appellant had relied on. Second, the Immigration Assessment Authority found, given the appellant's statement to the Immigration Assessment Authority, that the "primary purpose" of the complaint was to support the appellant's visa application in Australia. Third, its finding that Sri Lankan authorities were not searching for the appellant also meant it placed no weight on this letter. 46 There is some force in the appellant's criticism of the way the Immigration Assessment Authority dealt with this letter. I consider it likely the Immigration Assessment Authority misunderstood the appellant's evidence, even as the Immigration Assessment Authority recited that evidence. As the Immigration Assessment Authority recited that evidence, the appellant was saying he had arranged to "get" the letter his sister had sent. He did not say that he had organised for his sister to write the letter. He certainly did not say that he had organised for his sister to make a complaint to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka. 47 Further, the fact of the timing of the letter was not as clear cut against the appellant's claims as the Immigration Assessment Authority's reasons might suggest. The events on which the appellant relied for his protection claim occurred in 2009. It is correct that, even if (based on the text of the sister's letter) her complaint was made before March 2016, it was nevertheless made a considerable time after the events she describes. Nevertheless, the complaint and the letter appear to be a plea to the Human Rights Commission for protection should the appellant return to Sri Lanka. The timing of the letter is more commensurate with the risk the appellant might be forcibly returned from Australia to Sri Lanka after an unsuccessful protection claim, coming as it does around the time the appellant had been able to apply for a temporary protection visa, after apparently being unable to do so for some three years after his arrival in Australia. 48 However, as the Minister correctly submits, the issue was what weight the Immigration Assessment Authority should give to the sister's letter, and questions of weight are matters for the decision-maker, unless the decision-maker's reasoning can be characterised as so irrational or illogical as to be outside the bounds of a conclusion that a decision-maker could reasonably reach: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[131] (Crennan and Bell JJ). Even if the Immigration Assessment Authority misunderstood the appellant's evidence about why he obtained a copy of the letter and therefore could not rationally have concluded the primary purpose of the complaint to the Human Rights Commission was, in some impermissible way, to support the appellant's visa application, the Immigration Assessment Authority's reference to its other findings about the Sri Lankan authorities not looking for the appellant was an adequate basis for the Immigration Assessment Authority to decide not to give weight to the sister's letter. On the evidence and given the way its reasons are expressed, it is not possible to find such an approach was not open to the Immigration Assessment Authority. 49 The Federal Circuit Court was correct to reject this ground of review.

Conclusion 50 The appeal must be dismissed. However, a number of observations should be made. 51 Under Pt 7AA, there are limited circumstances in which the Immigration Assessment Authority may decide to conduct an interview with an applicant: see s 473DE. The premise of Pt 7AA appears to be that decisions will be made without an interview: see s 473DB(1)(b). Even if the Immigration Assessment Authority does conduct an interview, although s 473DE(1)(c)(ii) contemplates an interview could be in person or by telephone, the Immigration Assessment Authority's policies and procedures, which were in evidence before the Court, indicate the Immigration Assessment Authority generally conducts interviews by telephone. There is no doubt that, in any given review, the absence of an oral hearing and in particular an "in person" oral hearing, may be capable of affecting both the quality of decision-making, and the ability of an applicant to explain her or his circumstances in a way which may satisfy a decision-maker more than bare written statements are capable of doing. 52 The Immigration Assessment Authority's decision in this case suffers in its quality, it seems to me, because the appellant was not given an interview. The absence of an interview is, however, a feature of the Pt 7AA process and the Court must deal with the process as the legislature has prescribed it. Nevertheless, it may assist Immigration Assessment Authority decision-makers to consider the possible effects on the quality and reliability of their decision-making from not having the benefit of being able to engage with an applicant in a direct way, and in some cases this consideration might inform the approach of Immigration Assessment Authority decision-makers to the documentary material before them. 53 There are also lessons for those representing applicants in Immigration Assessment Authority review proceedings from what occurred in the appellant's review proceeding. The compressed processes, the prohibitions on new information except in certain circumstances, the general unavailability of interviews, all mean that representatives of applicants have an additional responsibility to ensure that their clients present fulsome accounts in accordance with the processes for which Pt 7AA provides. 54 The appellant in this proceeding made serious claims before the delegate and the Immigration Assessment Authority, which were accepted, about his father's death at the hands of the Sri Lankan military, his sister being a "martyr" to the LTTE cause and his family being publicly identified as the family of such a martyr, as well as historic claims about his own assault by the Sri Lankan military. While I have found it was open to the Immigration Assessment Authority to reach the conclusion it did, and while it should be noted that the Immigration Assessment Authority found on the basis of country information that the situation had improved for Tamils in the circumstances of the appellant, it may nevertheless be appropriate for further consideration to be given to what differential risks, if any, might be faced by the appellant if he is to be forcibly returned to Sri Lanka. Whether or not any further investigation is appropriate is not a matter for the Court, but the accepted evidence of the appellant in this case may raise factual issues about his return to Sri Lanka that the material in most other cases does not. 55 There is no basis for anything other than the usual orders as to costs. In accordance with the Court's stated practice, the Minister's counsel handed up, and was given leave to file in court, an affidavit deposing to the Minister's estimate of costs, and the amount the Minister claimed by way of a lump sum order. It is a welcome development that this practice is becoming a standard one for the Minister, as it substantially reduces the time and resources applied to the question of costs. The Minister sought an order for costs in the sum of $4,100, which I am satisfied on the affidavit material is a fair and reasonable amount. Mr Hodges indicated he had no submissions to make on costs. 56 Orders will be made accordingly. I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mortimer.