Applicant v Respondent

1. On the hearing of submissions concerning sentence, the applicant tendered a certified copy of the respondent's criminal record. In determining the appropriate sentence for contempt, previous convictions of the respondent ordinarily are not relevant, unless they are for what was similar to contempt offending.[2]
2. In that respect, the respondent has four relevant sets of previous convictions.
3. On 14 December 2017, the respondent was convicted and sentenced by the Melbourne Magistrates' Court on a number of charges, that included stalking another person, assault of a police officer, and threatening to inflict serious injury.
4. On 15 December 2022, he was convicted and fined by the Melbourne Magistrates' Court on one charge of contravening a conduct condition of his bail by harassing a witness.
5. On 30 November 2023, he was dealt with by the Bail and Remand Court on one charge of using a carriage service to harass, one charge of intentionally publishing a recording of a proceeding without permission, five charges of intimidating a law enforcement officer, and two charges of harassing a witness. On that occasion, he was sentenced to a total of 42 days' imprisonment.
6. Finally, on 22 December 2023, the respondent was sentenced by the Melbourne Magistrates' Court to 45 days' imprisonment on a number of charges that included two charges of harassing a witness.

1. Subsequent to the hearing of oral argument in the case, but before I delivered judgment, the respondent forwarded, by email dated 30 October 2025, a letter of apology to the Court. The letter commenced in the following terms:

To all in the State of Victoria genuinely aggrieved by my conduct,

If anyone has genuinely been harmed by my actions, I seek to provide remedy and if they feel I must go to prison, then I'm ready to do that.

Not those in public office whose statements or actions I have challenged.

No, I seek to understand if anyone has been harmed by my conduct and I would love to hear that framed in human terms, not legalese framed for outcome. If I have genuinely harmed someone, or interrupted some system of justice, a system I have personally never experienced. That, I would do everything I can to make amends for. This I mean sincerely with my whole heart. To that person, I'm genuinely sorry.

1. In the next passages of the letter, the respondent, in effect, outlined the basis on which he perceived himself to be aggrieved by the conduct of the system of justice. Having done so, he then concluded his letter in the following terms:

If injustice still reigns, it is a lesson I have now learned, not a contest I wish to continue.

I remain deeply disillusioned, but I accept that my words have caused offence to the Court and disrupted its process. That was never my purpose, and I'm sorry for that harm, even as I cannot pretend to trust the system that caused it.

This statement is made freely and sincerely. I do not intend to cause further offence or to challenge the authority of the Court. I undertake not to repeat the conduct that brought me before it.

1. Subsequently, on 5 November 2025, the respondent forwarded an email to the chambers of Judges Tran and Manova, and the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, with the subject heading 'Sorry'. The email commenced by addressing each of the judges and stating:

I would like to provide this short email to provide an apology to resorting to poor language in my dealings with you.

Unfortunately, I have a heightened sense of justice and was living under the delusion that all are equal before the law.

None the less, I have belatedly learnt that some are more equal than others and that this is just a fact of life that I must accept.

1. The respondent then proceeded to set out examples of cases that he regarded as being unjust, in which he claimed that persons in authority, such as a police officer, are granted more lenient and favourable treatment than he received notwithstanding that the former engaged in more serious conduct. Having done so, the respondent then concluded:

Judges Tran and Manova, I felt that I was not provided justice when before you, however I should have taken into account my education, and the fact that the answer to every question must always be, 'whatever the party says it is'. I am not qualified or intelligent enough to discern truth myself.

I am sorry that I did not learn that earlier and that in my ignorance, I took that out on you with rudeness, a mild abuse.

In any case, I have given up on obtaining justice, and will not be continuing with my torts. I will not repeat this conduct.

1. As I have noted, on 7 November I delivered judgment in this matter. Having done so, I encouraged the respondent to engage counsel to represent him on the question of sentence, in order to ensure that I be fully informed of any mitigating factors which I ought to take into account on his behalf.
2. On 10 November, the respondent forwarded an email to my associate, copied to Supreme Court‑General List and to the Attorney‑General. In the email, the respondent set out the basis upon which he feels that he has been the subject of injustice in the past. In doing so, he made a number of accusations, in which he contended that he is being the victim of 'systemic endemic corruption'. He maintained that the State of Victoria, the DPP, the Attorney‑General, the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office and the courts are more interested in punishing 'rude words' than they are in crimes against humanity and other serious crimes. He further explained that he would not be handing the matter over to counsel as he does not have any confidence in the legal profession. He stated:

A state that ignores crimes against humanity while incriminating a few rude words, is a state that may not pretend that it has a system of justice. This is a police state, an example of totalitarianism, the law of the jungle, the will and whim of despots, of and no amount of being polite while being immutable agents of tyranny will change what this is.

So yes, I am sorry for the way I said what I said, however that does not mean that the people have spoken of are not in any way at all virtuous, justice, honest and honourable people, despite it titles and the institutional protectionism that protects them.

1. The email concluded with the respondent contending that myself and the State, and everyone in the legal profession, would ignore 'a thousand crimes committed by his ilk while incriminating a minor technical indiscretion in response.' He concluded by stating:

... his Honour would do well not to blur the line between a technical breach of a rule, in proven facts that the system is corrupt.

1. Finally, in a further email dated 15 November 2025 addressed to 'litigation mailbox; Supreme Court‑General List' the respondent again reiterated the same propositions as those contained in his previous emails. In the third-last paragraph of the email he stated:

... I want to restate that my apology is sincere and directed squarely towards the Court themselves, and to the principles that allow them to function smoothly and with dignity. That said, there is no love lost between the Attorney‑General, the VGSO and myself, as the public record shows that aspects of their conduct and decision‑making have not consistently aligned with the five tenets that define a functional justice system: velocity, decorum, integrity of process, public confidence and accessibility.

1. On the hearing of sentencing submissions, the respondent tendered and relied on a report by Dr Leon Turnbull, an occupational and forensic psychiatrist, dated 11 December 2017. That report had been provided to an officer of Victoria Legal Aid apparently in connection with court matters then involving the respondent.
2. In the report, Dr Turnbull recorded that he had a 'relatively high threshold' for diagnosing Autism Spectrum Disorder, because he tended to see that condition over‑diagnosed in forensic settings. However, and taking into account that caveat, Dr Turnbull considered that the respondent is on the autism spectrum. Dr Turnbull stated:

His thinking is sticky and rigid, his emotional expression is constrained, and he becomes consumed by the minutiae of details to pathological proportions. He struggles to fully appreciate the effects of his actions on others.

1. Dr Turnbull considered that the respondent is not so pathologically engrossed that he cannot extract himself from police matters in which he had been involved in the last five years, but expressed the view that it would be a 'major challenge'. In that respect, Dr Turnbull stated:

His condition likely partly influences the way he has conducted himself, and he would have found it harder to shift his focus from his perceived injustices and people without autism.

...

His deficiencies in navigating the social world are likely to be chronic, but if he applies himself fully to assistance there is scope for him to at least learn more appropriate ways of dealing with situations that irk him. It is difficult to predict how successful this will be or otherwise.

1. In his report, Dr Turnbull provided a short outline of the respondent's history.
2. The respondent, who is now 55 years of age, grew up in Melbourne. His father was a teacher and his mother was a digital administrator with an accountant firm. Apparently, the respondent was academically talented. He attended Melbourne High School, but left at the end of year 11 because he had difficulty focusing in the classroom. After leaving school, he worked in the National Bank for three years, then in foreign exchange for 18 months and in financial services. He also worked in telecommunications and, from the age of 30, he worked in the sale of computer training. Apparently he was last employed in 2015.
3. The respondent was married for nine years and is divorced. He has one son who is aged 19 years and who, apparently, has been formally diagnosed with autism.

1. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the emails, that were the subject of charge 1 and charge 5, were the most direct form of defiance of the Court's authority represented by the order made by Judge Tran on 4 October 2023 and the undertaking which the respondent gave to her Honour Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025. Accordingly, it was submitted, those charges were the most serious category of contempt in the case.
2. Counsel for the applicant further submitted that each of the communications, that formed part of the 14 charges that have been upheld, constituted part of a persistent campaign by the respondent to defy, undermine, intimidate and improperly influence the workings of two Victorian courts in respect of proceedings in which the respondent was a party. Those communications occurred over a period of approximately two years and involved 14 separate incidents. It was submitted that they constituted an ongoing and deliberate campaign by the respondent, and in that way they were premeditated and calculated.
3. Counsel for the applicant further noted that the contempts of court, constituted by the third to 15th charges, were committed by the respondent after he had been charged with counts 1 and 2. Further, the contempts of court constituted by charges 4 to 15 were each committed after the respondent had also been charged with count 3, arrested and released on his own undertaking. Accordingly, it was submitted, the level of the respondent's culpability escalated, as he had had additional opportunities to desist from his campaign. Further, in the communications that were the subject of charge 4 and charge 15, the respondent expressly threatened judicial officers in plain and direct language, in order to attempt to influence the discharge by those judicial officers of their duties in relation to the cases in which he was a party.
4. Counsel submitted that, in view of the nature of the contempts of court committed by the respondent, the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation are significant in this case.
5. In respect of specific deterrence, counsel noted that sentencing purpose has been moderated to some extent by the respondent's cooperation in the latter stages of the proceeding and by his letter of apology of 30 October. Counsel also acknowledged that the respondent has not engaged in any further contemptuous email correspondence since he wrote that letter.
6. However, counsel submitted that the weight which should be accorded to those matters should be moderated for three reasons. First, the letter of apology came after the respondent had defended the hearing of the contempt charges. Secondly, the weight of the letter as evidence of remorse is reduced in circumstances in which it was written after the respondent defended the charges. Thirdly, it was submitted, the letter must be read as a whole and in the context of other correspondence which the respondent has engaged in. In particular, it was submitted, the contents of the communications, that constituted the charged contempts, evidenced that the respondent harbours animosity towards those involved in the justice system, including judicial officers, legal practitioners, police officers and others. In addition, counsel noted that the respondent has subsequently sent further correspondence, both to the Court, and also to the applicant's email addresses, which have continued to contain allegations concerning those involved in the justice system, and which have continued his campaign of abuse and threats.
7. Counsel submitted that the report of Dr Turnbull is of limited weight, as it was compiled some eight years ago. Further, Dr Turnbull's diagnosis, that the respondent suffers an Autism Spectrum Disorder, was somewhat provisional and based on limited material.
8. Counsel did accept that, based on Dr Turnbull's conclusions, the first and third principles stated by the Court of Appeal in R v Verdins[3] do have some application. In particular, as a result of the respondent's autism disorder, his subjective culpability is reduced, and general deterrence should also be modified.
9. However, counsel submitted that the degree of such mitigation should be limited. In particular, he noted that the respondent understands and understood the wrongfulness of his actions. A number of the communications made by him were not the product of any lack of impulse control, but rather, were considered and premeditated. Counsel also noted that the respondent has not sought any treatment or other assistance to address his problems, which is a consideration relevant to the fourth limb of Verdins, specific deterrence. Further, Dr Turnbull did not express the opinion that, as a result of his Autism Spectrum Disorder, the respondent would find a term of imprisonment more difficult, or that his disorder would be aggravated.
10. Counsel noted that, in his written submissions, and oral submissions, the respondent, outlined in some detail and at length, previous legal proceedings in which he perceived that he had suffered some form of injustice. Counsel for the applicant submitted that that consideration is of limited, if any, weight in determining the respondent's sentence. It is commonplace that litigation can be quite stressful, particularly when a party involved in litigation perceives that he or she has been treated unjustly. Counsel submitted that such a perception could not justify or mitigate the conduct of the respondent that constituted the contempts of court, and a reaction to the stress of litigation should not be regarded as in some way justifying or mitigating a contempt of court.
11. Counsel for the applicant also noted that although the respondent has no previous convictions for contempt of court, he does have other previous convictions which are relevant. Those convictions were for offences involving harassing witnesses, and for intentionally publishing and recording of a proceeding without permission. In addition, the respondent has previous convictions for making threats to kill and to inflict serious injury, and intimidating police and law enforcement. The respondent also has a number of previous convictions for contravening intervention orders, bail conditions and a community correction order. It was submitted that those matters are all relevant to an evaluation of the issue whether, in this case, a suspended sentence would be appropriate. Counsel submitted that, based on the respondent's previous convictions, and the fact that he has not demonstrated any insight or awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions, it should be concluded that his prospects of rehabilitation are limited, so that the sentencing purpose of specific deterrence is of some importance in this case.

1. The respondent filed an extensive document by way of submissions shortly before the hearing, and also made oral submissions.
2. In the written submissions, the respondent relied on the report of Dr Turnbull. He submitted that he has not reoffended for more than 18 months. He also noted that he had made a substantial 'civic contribution' which comprised a body of governance, public sector and justice access work. It was submitted that the conduct, that constituted the contempt of court in this case, occurred in a setting of prolonged litigation involving the respondent, 'institutional delays', and his neurocognitive vulnerabilities. It was therefore contended that the principles, summarised by this Court in Verdins and the principles stated by the High Court in Bugmy v R[4] should apply in mitigation of sentence.
3. In his written submissions, and in oral argument, the respondent focused on previous court cases in which he had been involved and in which he perceived that he had been the subject of injustice. It would seem that the respondent's grievances commenced with conduct by a police lawyer who, the respondent maintained, had assaulted him. In his submissions, the respondent emphasised a number of cases, which seemed, in one way or another, to have evolved from that circumstance, and in which, he submitted, he had not been dealt with in a just manner. He also maintained that any wrongdoing by him, and the contempts that he committed, in the present case, are inconsequential compared with a number of wrongs which, he maintained, have been committed by public figures and the like, and not dealt with by the Courts.
4. In his written submissions, the respondent set out, in some detail, elements of work he has done that he described as civic contributions by him between 2019 and 2025. It comprised the composition of papers on: governance reform framework; integrity in public sector method paper; justice access document; technical research; and national level systems design work.
5. On the question of sentence, the respondent submitted that the appropriate order should be that he be released on a 12-month adjourned undertaking to be of good behaviour without conviction. He submitted that his rehabilitation is complete and ongoing. He further submitted that his subjective culpability for the contempts of court was materially reduced by 'neurocognitive factors' as diagnosed by Dr Turnbull.
6. Based on Dr Turnbull's report, it was submitted that the sentencing purposes of general and specific deterrence should be accorded reduced weight. The respondent further submitted that a community correction order would not be appropriate because it would impose elevated stress levels on him, he would have difficulty dealing with an unfamiliar bureaucratic process, which itself might result in communication strains leading to procedural friction.

1. In considering the appropriate sentence in the present case, it is important to keep in mind the fundamental purpose of the law of contempt. It has been emphasised that the law of contempt is not designed to protect those involved in the system of justice from legitimate criticism. Rather, its function is to preserve and protect the administration of justice in the courts, which is an indispensable component of a civilised democratic state.[5]
2. In R v Bonacci (No 2),[6] that concept was expressed in the following terms:

The fundamental function of the law of contempt is to protect the administration of justice in our courts, by upholding and preserving the undisturbed and orderly processes of the courts according to law. In particular, the law of contempt protects and preserves the capacity of the courts to dispense justice in a fair, unbiased and principled manner, unaffected by, and independent of, any inappropriate external influences or interference. In that way, the law of contempt is directed to protect the rights of litigants before the courts, and to preserve public confidence in our system of justice. The principal purposes of sentences for contempt, which are designed to achieve those ends, include specific deterrence, general deterrence and denunciation.

Bearing in mind those purposes, the considerations, that are relevant to the imposition of a sentence for contempt, include the objective seriousness of the particular contempt, the circumstances in which the contempt occurred, whether any harm was occasioned by the contempt, the subjective culpability of the person convicted of the contempt, the character and antecedents of the contemnor, and whether any apology has been made by the contemnor for the contempt.

...

As I have already observed, it is of the highest importance that our courts be free to administer justice independently, objectively and impartially, and free from any improper external influences and interference. It is that principle that distinguishes, and demarcates, our courts from those in countries which do not afford to their citizens the democratic rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens of this country. Taking into account the matters that I have referred to, the conduct of the respondent was, accordingly, particularly grave. If courts were to display any tolerance towards such conduct, our system would be readily degraded, and the rights of citizens in this country would be substantially diminished.[7]

1. A conviction for contempt of court, in cases such as the present, is a conviction for an offence which is criminal in its nature. In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2),[8] Kirby P stated:

A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately emphatic way...[9]

1. The factors and considerations which need to be taken into account, in determining the sentence in a case of contempt, have been discussed and helpfully outlined in a number of decisions, including DPP v Johnson & Ors,[10] Rich v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria,[11] Matthews v Australian Securities and Investments Commission,[12] R v Vasiliou (No 2),[13] R v Witt (No 2),[14] Grocon v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union & Ors (No 2)[15] and Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California).[16]
2. For the purpose of the present case, those principles may be summarised as follows.
3. First, in determining the appropriate sentence, it is necessary to evaluate the objective seriousness of the contempt. That assessment includes a consideration of the nature and kind of the contempt. In that respect, it is important to take into account whether the contempt was intentional, or the product of some reckless or negligent conduct by the contemnor. The purpose or objective of the contemnor is relevant.
4. It is also relevant to consider the character of the contemnor, and, in particular his or her attitude to the justice system. In determining sentence, it is necessary to take into account whether the contemnor has apologised for his conduct, retracted any contemptuous statement made towards the courts, or evinced remorse.
5. Those considerations are relevant to, and inform, the fundamental purposes that are served by the law of contempt. It is necessary, taking into account those matters, and any other relevant considerations, that the sentence imposed be sufficient to denounce the conduct of the contemnor, and as such, to uphold the central importance of the justice system in our society. Further, the sentence must be sufficient, as such, to constitute an effective general deterrent, by conveying an appropriate message that any person, who is minded to seek to undermine the system of justice by acting in a manner which constitutes a contempt of court, will, on conviction, suffer condign punishment. In addition, the sentence must be of sufficient severity in order to deter the particular contemnor, in this case the respondent, from engaging in similar conduct again.
6. In some of the instances in the present case, I have concluded that the respondent's contempt consisted of his contravention of the order made by Judge Tran on 4 October 2023 that any email sent by him to the County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material.
7. In such a case, it is recognised that the purpose of punishment of the contemnor is to vindicate the authority of the Court and of the justice system.[17]
8. In Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California),[18] Besanko, Wigney and Bromwich JJ explained:

The plurality in Boral observed ... endorsing the statement of principle by Hayne J in Re Colina; Ex parte Tourney[19] ... , that the "cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt" was as an exercise of judicial power to "protect the due administration of justice". Viewed in that way, contempt proceedings are essentially protective in nature as to the judicial function and the role of the courts, even if they also serve to vindicate private interests and rights. Contempt proceedings are therefore to be viewed as essential in facilitating courts being able to function properly. That includes being, and being seen to be, effectual in adjudicating upon and resolving disputes, and in particular making orders that will ordinarily be obeyed. This means that individual contempt cases have an importance transcending the instant case by supporting and enhancing the integrity of judicial proceedings, both in respect of orders made, and more generally. That view of contempt proceedings can be seen to permeate longstanding sentencing authority in this area.[20]

1. Bearing those principles in mind, it is necessary to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed in respect of each of the 14 charges of contempt which I have upheld.

1. I commence, first, by assessing the objective and inherent gravity of each of those instances of contempt. I do so by reference to the bases upon which I concluded that each of the communications in question constituted a contempt of court.

1. In my reasons, I found that the email, sent by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Tran on 17 October 2023, constituted a contempt of court on three bases. First, it was an intentional and direct contravention by the respondent of the order by Judge Tran on 4 October 2023 just 13 days after that order was pronounced by her Honour. As such, the email was a direct and blatant defiance by the respondent of the authority of the Court. Secondly, the email constituted an extra-curial attempt by the respondent to influence or affect the deliberations or considerations by Judge Tran. Thirdly, the email was intended, and had the tendency, to undermine and detract from the authority of the judge as a member of the Court and, as such, to compromise the system of justice.[21]

Charge 2 (hearing before Judge Manova - 3 April 2024)

1. In my reasons, I noted that the respondent spoke the offending words in a tone and in a manner which evidenced an intention by him to deliberately insult Judge Manova.[22] That insult was entirely gratuitous, and the words spoken by the respondent were deliberately chosen by him, and not the product of a momentary loss of reason. As such, the insult not only undermined the authority of the Court, but it was intended and calculated to endeavour to intimidate the judge in the conduct by her of the proceeding in which the respondent was a party.[23] Conduct such as that engaged in by the respondent, if tolerated, would seriously undermine the capacity of the courts to conduct their business in an orderly and reasoned manner.

Charge 3 (email to Judge Manova dated 29 May 2025)

1. The email, forwarded by the respondent to Judge Manova on 29 May 2025, constituted a contempt of court for three reasons. First, by transmitting the email, the respondent knowingly and intentionally contravened the order by Judge Tran of 4 October 2023 that he not send emails to the County Court which contained abusive or threatening material. Secondly, the email was calculated by the respondent to influence or affect the management by the judge, and by the Court, of the proceeding in which he was a party. Thirdly, in view of the level of distribution of the email, it was a scandalous disparagement of a judge of the County Court, and, as such, it had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.[24]

Charge 4 (email to Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025)

1. The email by the respondent to Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025 constituted a serious contempt of court for three reasons. First, it contained an explicit threat, and was directed and intended to intimidate the judicial registrar in her management of the proceeding. As such, it was a direct deliberate attempt by the respondent to divert the course of justice. Secondly, the respondent copied the email (inter alia) to the Chief Judge of the County Court, and to the chambers of Judge Tran and Judge Manova, and it directly referred to their Honours in grossly disparaging terms. As such, it constituted a contempt of court by being intended to intimidate the judges of the County Court in the proceedings in which the respondent was a party. Thirdly, the email, which was forwarded to a number of other persons, constituted a scandalous disparagement of Justice Beale of the Supreme Court and Judge Manova and Judge Tran, and as such, it had a tendency to undermine the administration of justice in this State.[25]

1. The email by the respondent to the 'Supreme Court - General List' dated 29 September 2025 constituted a contempt of court on the basis that it was an extra-curial communication by him to the Court for the purpose of influencing or affecting the conduct of the litigation in the Court in which he was a party.[26]

Charges 6 and 7 (emails dated 1 October 2025 at 1:07pm and 1:39pm)

1. The two emails, that were the subject of charges 6 and 7, were each intended by the respondent to be brought to the attention of the two judicial officers who were managing his cases in the Supreme Court, namely, Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz. I further concluded that they were intended by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by each of those judicial officers of their roles in the cases involving the respondent, and as such, they were intended to, and had the tendency, to interfere with, and undermine, the proper administration of the course of justice.[27]

Charge number 9 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:12am)

1. The email, that was the subject of charge number 9, constituted a contempt of court for two reasons. First, the email was copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran of the County Court, and it twice referred to her Honour in terms which were abusive. As such, the email contravened the order by her Honour dated 3 October 2024. Secondly, the email, being directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J and being copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, constituted an intentional attempt by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by those judicial officers of their roles in the cases in which he was a party, in particular by seeking to intimidate their Honours in their conduct of those proceedings.[28]

Charge number 10 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:18am)

1. The email, that was the subject of charge 10, was a contempt of court for two reasons. First, it was directly copied to the email address of Judge Tran, and as such, it contravened the order by her Honour made 4 October 2023.[29] Secondly, the email was directed to the email address of the chambers of Tsalamandris J and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz. It abused in quite flagrant terms each of the recipients, including those two judicial officers, and it was a blatant attack on any person who had been involved in legal proceedings in connection with the respondent. As such, it was an intentional attempt by the respondent to intimidate judicial officers who were responsible for the management of the proceedings in which the respondent was a party.[30]

Charge number 11 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:43am)

1. The email, that was the subject of charge 11, was a contempt of court for two reasons. First, by being copied to Judge Tran's chambers, it was a breach of her Honour's order of 4 October 2023 by constituting an email that contained abusive and threatening material. Secondly, by suggesting that the recipients should each be 'euthanised', it constituted a blatant threat to those recipients, including two judicial officers (Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz) who were then involved in the management of cases in which he was a party. The abuse and the threat contained in the email were expressed by the respondent with the intention of intimidating those judicial officers in connection with those cases. As such, I concluded that the email was a 'clear and blatant contempt of court'.[31] It was a particularly serious instance of a contempt of court.

Charge number 12 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:45am)

1. I concluded that, the email, that was the subject of charge 12, to the chambers of Tsalamandris J and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, was transmitted by the respondent with the intention to attack and intimidate those judicial officers in the performance of their duties in connection with the proceedings involving the respondent. Further, by being copied to the chambers of Judge Tran, it breached the order made by her Honour on 4 October 2023. For those two reasons, the email constituted a contempt of court.[32]

Charge 13 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:56am)

1. I concluded that the email, that was the subject of charge 13, when taken in context, constituted part of an overall campaign by the respondent to place pressure on, and intimidate, those who were undertaking their duties in cases in which he was a party, including Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz. As such, it constituted a contempt of court.[33]

Charge number 14 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 12:06pm)

1. I concluded that the email, that was the subject of charge 14, being directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, was transmitted by the respondent with the intention of defying and intimidating the Court and thus undermining the authority of the Court. As such, it constituted a contempt of court.[34] In addition, the email was copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran and contained explicit abuse directed to her Honour and other members of the County Court. As such, it was a contravention by the respondent of the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023.[35]

Charge number 15 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 2:03pm)

1. The email, that was the subject of charge 15, contained a clear threat to Tsalamandris J that if her Honour did not adopt the course favourable to the respondent, he would not change his 'trajectory' which plainly would be unfavourable to the judge. The respondent transmitted that email twelve minutes before her Honour was due to preside over a hearing in the present case in which the respondent is a party. As such, it was clearly a direct threat to the judge and intended to intimidate her. It was a serious contempt of court by the respondent.[36]

1. It is next necessary to form an assessment of the subjective culpability of the respondent for the commission by him of each of the contempts.
2. It is clear that in the case of each contempt, the conduct of the respondent was intentional and premeditated. The report of Dr Turnbull does not suggest that he has any intellectual disability or limitation. Further, Dr Turnbull, on examination of the respondent's mental state, noted that the respondent was able to reflect on himself, and that he was not so pathologically engrossed that he could not extract himself from the prolonged conflict that he then appeared to have been involved in with police.
3. I accept that the respondent's conduct, and in particular his attitude to the justice system and the courts, are connected with his underlying autism disorder. In oral submissions on the issue of liability and on the issue of sentence, the respondent was fixated on what he perceived to be wrongful and unfair treatment that he had been subjected to in the past by the justice system. It is evident that his autism has played a material role in his underlying grievances against the justice system, his perception of that system, and thus in the conduct that constituted the contempts.
4. On the other hand, it is clear that the respondent is an intelligent person. As Dr Turnbull concluded, he has the capacity to reflect on himself and on his conduct. In the present case, the respondent was, in effect, warned on four separate occasions by the Court that his conduct involved a contempt of court.
5. First, on 4 October 2023, Judge Tran made a specific order that the respondent not include any abusive or threatening material in emails sent by him to the County Court.
6. Secondly, following the first two contempts, the applicant commenced the present proceeding by way of originating motion seeking orders that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt for those two incidents.
7. Thirdly, following the email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Manova on 29 May 2025, the applicant amended the originating motion to include that communication as a third instance of contempt.
8. Fourthly, and significantly, when the matter came before this Court, on 16 September 2025, the respondent had been apprehended and brought to Court pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Tsalamandris J on that date ordered that the respondent be released, but on his specific undertaking that he not send emails to the County Court or Supreme Court which contained abusive or threatening material. Before pronouncing that order, the judge made it clear to the respondent that the undertaking was a condition of his release from custody. It is significant that contempts numbered 4 to 15 were each committed by the respondent within a period of 16 days after his appearance before Tsalamandris J.
9. In assessing the respondent's subjective culpability, it is also relevant to take into account the four sets of previous convictions to which I have already referred. While those convictions were not in respect of charges of contempt, the offences on which he had been charged did have a relevant similarity to the offence of contempt of court. His convictions on those charges, and the sentences imposed on him, should, at the least, have communicated to the respondent the wrongfulness of the kind of conduct in which he was then engaging, and which bore some similarity to the conduct that was the subject of the contempt charges in the present case.
10. Taking those matters into account, while I do accept that the respondent's autism disorder, and the role it played in the commission by him of the contempts of court, reduces his subjective culpability for the contempts, that reduction must be qualified. In the circumstances, I also accept that, by reason of the respondent's autism, and the role that it did play in the contempts, the sentencing purpose of general deterrence should be modified, as I do not consider the respondent to be an appropriate medium for the full force of that sentencing purpose.
11. For the same reasons, I accept that the sentencing purpose of specific deterrence should be modified. In addition, the respondent has, albeit with considerable qualification, expressed an apology and some remorse for his conduct. In that respect, he has emphasised that his apology and remorse is not directed to the judicial officers who were the objects of his contemptuous emails and statements.
12. In the present case, the purpose of specific deterrence is, nevertheless, of some importance. In view of the respondent's past conduct, and the fact that during the period of the contempts in this case he was on four occasions put on notice concerning his conduct, it is necessary that the sentence imposed on the respondent be sufficient to impart to him that, if he were to continue to or to repeat the kind of conduct in which he engaged in this case, he will be deprived of his liberty within society for a significant period of time. It is only in that way that the respondent may be effectively deterred from a repetition of the conduct in which he engaged in the present case.
13. In its written submissions on sentence, the applicant helpfully provided a table of previous sentencing decisions in order to assist to identify current sentencing practices.[37]
14. Current sentencing practices are a relevant consideration in the determination of a sentence. Nevertheless, as the High Court emphasised in Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh,[38] that factor is only one of a number of considerations which must be taken into account in the determination of a sentence in any particular case. Further, as the Court of Appeal has noted on a number of occasions, some caution must be exercised in identifying the appropriate sentencing range by reference to previous decisions. No two cases are alike. The exercise of the sentencing discretion in each case is necessarily the product of a balancing of a number of different, and in some instances conflicting, factors which can vary considerably between individual cases.[39] Nevertheless, the comparable sentences referred to by the applicant are of some assistance in the determination of the appropriate sentence to be imposed in the present case.

1. Taking into account the matters that I have discussed, I have reached the conclusion that the only appropriate sentencing disposition in the present case is a sentence of imprisonment. That sentence is necessary in order to reflect the objective gravity of the contempts, and the respondent's subjective responsibility for committing them. I do not consider that the matters relied on by the respondent, and in particular his autistic disorder, are sufficient to preclude that conclusion.
2. In determining each sentence, and the orders for concurrency, I have taken into account the respondent's autistic disorder, and the apologies that he has proffered for the contempts that he has committed. In the absence of those mitigating circumstances, the sentences would otherwise have been substantially longer. The orders for concurrency and cumulation are directed to ensuring that the total effective sentence does not exceed the totality of the respondent's offending, taking those and all other mitigating circumstances into account.
3. Based on those considerations, I therefore order that the respondent be committed to prison for the following terms:

(1) Charge 1 (email dated 17 October 2023) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(2) Charge 2 (contemptuous insult directed to Judge Manova - 3 April 2024) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(3) Charge 3 (email to Judge Manova dated 29 May 2025) - 6 weeks' imprisonment.

(4) Charge 4 (email to Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025) - 8 weeks' imprisonment.

(5) Charge 5 (email dated 29 September 2025) - 2 weeks' imprisonment.

(6) Charge 6 (email dated 1 October 2025 at 1:07 pm) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(7) Charge 7 (email dated 1 October 2025 at 1:39 pm) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(8) Charge 9 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:12 am) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(9) Charge 10 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:18 am) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(10) Charge 11 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:43 am) - 6 weeks' imprisonment.

(11) Charge 12 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:45 am) - 2 weeks' imprisonment.

(12) Charge 13 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:56 am) - 2 weeks' imprisonment.

(13) Charge 14 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 12:06 pm) - 4 weeks' imprisonment.

(14) Charge 15 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 2:03 pm) - 8 weeks' imprisonment.

(a) 4 weeks of the sentence on charge 15; 2 weeks of the sentences on each of charges 3 and 11; and one week of the sentences on each of charges 1, 2, 6, 9, 10 and 14;

be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed on charge 4 and on the sentences imposed on each other.

(b) The sentences imposed on each of charges 5, 7, 12 and 13 be served concurrently with each other and with the sentences on each of the charges.

1. Accordingly, the total effective sentence is 22 weeks' imprisonment.

[1] R v Brown [2025] VSC 686 ('Reasons').

[2] R v Giscombe (1983) 79 Cr App R 79, 84; Scott v Evia Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 15, [179] (Dodds-Streeton J).

[3] [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269 ('Verdins').

[5]. Varnavides v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2002) 12 VR 1,12 [42] (Vincent and Nettle JJ, Harper AJA).

[6] [2015] VSC 134 ('Bonacci (No 2)').

[8] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309.

[9] Ibid 314; see also Registrar of the Supreme Court v Nationwide News Ltd [2004] SASC 223; (2004) 89 SASR 113, 123 [45] (Gray J).

[10] [2002] VSC 583, [59] (Osborn J).

[11] [1999] VSCA 14; (1999) 103 A Crim R 261, 281-2 [45]-[47] (Winneke P) ('Rich').

[12] [2009] NSWCA 155 [129] (Tobias JA).

[13] [2012] VSC 242 [9]-[10] (Beach J).

[14] [2016] VSC 142 [93] (J Forrest J).

[15] [2014] VSC 134 [77] (Cavanough J).

[16] [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90, 133 (Besanko, Wigney and Bromwich JJ) ('Kazal').

[17] Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; (1986) 161 CLR 98, 113 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ).

[18] [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90.

[19] (1999) 200 CLR 386, 429; [1999] HCA 57.

[20] Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90, 132 [97].

[37] Rich [1998] VSC 45; Principal Registrar, Supreme Court of New South Wales v Katelaris [2001] NSWSC 724; Prothonotary of Supreme Court of NSW v Katelaris (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 702; Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2011] SASC 447; Moore-McQuillan v Registrar of the Supreme Court (South Australia) [2009] SASC 265; R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307; R v Slaveski [2012] VSC 7; R v Vasiliou (No 2) [2012] VSC 242; Bonacci (No 2) [2015] VSC 134; Slaveski v The Queen [2015] VSCA 416; Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood (No 4) [2024] QSC 135.

[38] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 434 [5]-[9] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 453-4 [82] (Gageler and Gaudron JJ).

[39] Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520, 535-7 [48]-[54] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Hudson v The Queen [2010] VSCA 332; (2010) 30 VR 610, 617-18 [28]-[33] (Ashley, Redlich and Harper JJA); Hasan v The Queen [2010] VSCA 352; (2010) 31 VR 28, 38 [44] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Harper JJA).