On 4 October 2023, Judge Tran made a number of orders in that respect, including orders identifying the manner in which the respondent was required to communicate by email with the Court. One of the orders made by her Honour was as follows:

Applicant v Respondent [2025] VSC 686 | Case summary | Zoe

VICVSC

Applicant v Respondent

[2025] VSC 686

Supreme Court of Victoria|2025-11-07|Before: Kaye JA

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of Victoria

Decision date

2025-11-07

Before

Kaye JA

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (166 paragraphs)

[1]

The applicant, by originating motion and summons, has brought an application seeking orders that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt. The application is concerned with 14 email communications by the respondent to the County Court and the Supreme Court, or to one of them, between 17 October 2023 and 2 October 2025, and to a comment made by the respondent to the presiding judge in the County Court in the course of a hearing of proceedings involving the respondent on 3 April 2024.

[2]

In 2023, the respondent commenced five proceedings in the County Court of Victoria against the State of Victoria and related entities alleging numerous torts and other claims. By order made by Judge Manova on 21 June 2024, the proceedings were consolidated into one proceeding.
On 17 August 2023, the respondents in the County Court proceedings filed summonses seeking orders that the proceedings be struck out in their entirety. The application was heard before her Honour Judge Tran on 3 October 2023. In the course of submissions, Judge Tran raised concerns with the respondent concerning the manner in which emails, forwarded by him to the Court, had been expressed. Her Honour observed that the emails contained statements about people that could be interpreted as gratuitous/abusive or insulting and which were not relevant to any issue in dispute in the proceedings. The judge indicated her intention to make orders relating to the manner in which the respondent could correspond with the County Court email addresses.

[14]

That communication is the third alleged contempt of court in this proceeding.
On 10 July 2025, the applicant in this proceeding filed an amended originating motion which added a claim that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt in respect of the third alleged contempt.
On 18 August 2025, Judicial Registrar Burgess held a directions hearing in the matter. The respondent failed to attend, and the judicial registrar made an order that the respondent appear in person at the next directions hearing listed on 8 September.
The directions hearing on 8 September 2025 was listed before her Honour, Tsalamandris J. The respondent failed to appear at the hearing. On the application of the applicant, Tsalamandris J issued a warrant in the proceeding , pursuant to r 75.08.1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, for the arrest of the respondent.
In the meantime, the Attorney-General issued a proceeding in this Court seeking relief against the respondent pursuant to the Vexatious Proceeding Act 2014. Judicial Registrar Lorenz has presided over preliminary hearings in relation to that proceeding.
On 16 September, the respondent was arrested by Victoria Police and presented to Court pursuant to the warrant. Following a hearing on the same date, Tsalamandris J made orders, which included that the respondent be released on his own undertaking that he appear in person in this Court on 27 October 2025, and that he not send any emails to the County Court or Supreme Court email addresses which contain 'abusive or threatening material'. Her Honour also made other orders for the interlocutory processes for the hearing of the substantive application.
Subsequently, between 28 September and 2 October 2025, the respondent forwarded the following twelve emails addressed to Supreme Court and County Court email addresses, which are the subject of further charges of contempt.
On 28 September 2025 at 11:12 am, the respondent sent an email that was addressed to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz of this Court, and which was copied to a number of email addresses that included: the chambers of Justice Beale of this Court; the chambers of the Chief Judge, Judge Manova and Judge Tran of the County Court; the executive associate to the Chief Justice of this Court; the Attorney‑General; Matthew Laxton of Victoria Police; and two email addresses of legal practitioners Russell Kennedy. The email contained the subject heading: 'IMMUABLE (sic) FACT Christopher Beale is corrupt'. The email then stated:

[53]

In the originating motion, and in the summons by the applicant seeking orders for contempt in respect of alleged contempts number 4 to 15, the applicant specified the basis upon which it contends that each of the 15 publications by the respondent constitute a contempt of court.
In the amended originating motion it is contended that the first and third alleged contempts, consisting of the email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Tran on 17 October 2023, and the email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Manova on 29 May 2025, were each intended, and/or had a tendency, to interfere with the due administration of justice, in that the emails: were abusive of the judges and offensive to them in their role as judicial officers; were abusive of the County Court and disrespectful of the authority of the County Court; and, in respect of the email to Judge Tran's chambers, were knowingly in breach of the 4 October order made by Judge Tran.
In the amended originating motion, the applicant contends that, by calling Judge Manova in Court a 'fuckin whore' in the course of the hearing before her Honour (alleged contempt number 2), the respondent's conduct was intended, and/or had a tendency, to interfere with the due administration of justice, in that the conduct: was abusive of, and offensive to, the judge in her role as a judicial officer; was disrespectful of the authority of the County Court; and was disruptive and disturbed the proceeding.
In the amended summons seeking relief in respect of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, the applicant contends that the respondent's conduct in sending each of the emails was intended to and/or had a tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice in that each email: was intended to influence, place improper pressure on and/or threaten or intimidate a judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties; and was abusive of, and disrespectful of the authority of, the County Court and/or the Supreme Court. It is contended that each email had a tendency to: interfere with, and intimidate, a judicial officer in the performance of their duties; dissuade a judicial officer from continuing to perform their duties in connection with proceedings involving the respondent; and undermine the authority of the Supreme Court and/or the County Court. It is further alleged that each of the emails were sent by the respondent in breach of the undertaking given by the respondent to the Court on 16 September 2025.
In the course of oral submissions, counsel for the applicant made it clear that the applicant did not rely on the proposition, that alleged contempts numbered 1, and 3 to 15 (inclusive) constituted a breach by the respondent of the order of the County Court of 4 October 2023, and further alternatively, the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, as the sole or determinative basis upon which it was alleged that those communications constituted contempt of court. In particular, counsel submitted that, in determining whether the communications were each a contempt of court, the order by Judge Tran, and the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J, are relevant in demonstrating an intention by the respondent to interfere with the due administration of justice.
In that respect, counsel noted that the undertaking before Tsalamandris J was recorded in the orders made by her Honour on 16 September. In the course of the hearing before her Honour on 16 September 2025, the judge informed the respondent that such an undertaking would be a condition of his release from custody, so as to protect the recipients of the emails so far forwarded by the respondent from any future conduct to that effect.

[54]

Before the commencement of oral submissions, the respondent filed written submissions setting out the basis upon which he resisted the application in the present case. After the applicant presented its case on the hearing of the application, the respondent advanced further submissions at the hearing of the application.
Subsequently, and after I had adjourned the matter in order to consider my decision, the respondent emailed to the Court, and copied to the email address of the applicant, a 'letter of apology' in which he stated that he accepted responsibility for his conduct and was prepared to face whatever consequences the Court considered appropriate. Notwithstanding that communication, in the circumstances of the case, and particularly in view of the submissions which the respondent previously relied on, both in writing and at the hearing of the application, it is appropriate that I treat the application as being defended, and that I consider, in respect of each alleged contempts of court, whether the applicant has established its case.
The central submission made by the respondent in his written submissions was that the communications, that are the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts, fall within the scope of lawful political expression and are to be assessed in light of the protections provided by the Commonwealth Constitution and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ('the Charter'). The respondent submitted that each communication engaged fundamental questions of equality, proportionality and fair process. It was further contended that the communications did not contain any threats of violence or unlawful conduct, but, rather, they reflected strong criticism and frustration by the respondent at perceived administrative misconduct.
In support of that submission, the respondent referred to and relied on a number of provisions of the Charter, and other legislation. He also referred to the implied freedom of political communication that was explained by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation[1] and Coleman v Power.[2] In addition, the respondent relied on the decision of the High Court in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)[3] in support of the proposition that state courts may not be used as instruments of executive policy, and on the decision of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)[4] in support of the principle that the rule of law requires that legal standards apply equally to all citizens and officials.
Based on those principles, the respondent submitted that the communications, relied on by the applicant in this case, concerned governmental and judicial integrity, they are political in character, and they fall within the scope of the principle of implied freedom of expression. I shall discuss the principles, so relied on by the respondent, later in these reasons, after I have first outlined the relevant principles of law concerning contempt of court.
The respondent further submitted that relevant material has not been provided to him, including CCTV recordings and related documents. I interpolate that those recordings and documents do not relate to the present application, but, rather, appear to have some connection with previous proceedings in which the respondent was involved.
The respondent further submitted that there have been examples of official or comparable conduct by public officials which have not been the subject of any appropriate sanction. I note that the examples provided by the respondent do not relate to any conduct in Court, or any conduct by persons concerning processes in Court, which could, as such, constitute a contempt of court.
The respondent next submitted that there has been 'extended delay' in the present case which has infringed 'statutory and constitutional safeguards'. He submitted that there was a period of some 12 days between his detention and being charged, and that he spent a total period of 110 days in custody. I interpolate that it is not apparent how that period is calculated.
The next submission made by the respondent was to the effect that the conduct of the applicant in this case constituted an abuse of process, and that the current proceeding should be stayed unless and until the prosecution has made 'full disclosure' to the respondent of information sought by him. In that respect, the respondent, again, relied on his contention that there had been non-disclosure of 'CCTV and related documents', and he also relied on the 'extended detention and charge delay', on the 'comparable' examples of official misconduct he had referred to, and the proposition advanced by him that the prosecution in the present case is directed to penalise expressions by him critical of government.
The documents referred to by the respondent apparently relate to previous incidents, and proceedings, involving the respondent. The respondent has failed to demonstrate how those matters have any relevance to the issues in the current proceeding.
The respondent submitted that the communications by him do not constitute contempt of court. He submitted that they were written protests and complaints by him concerning matters of public administration, they contained no threats of violence or incitement, and that the tone of the communications - though 'passionate' - mirrored accepted Australian idiom and fall within the constitutional and Charter protection. Accordingly, it was submitted that the communications could not objectively be classified as 'abusive' or 'threatening'.
In further written submissions, the respondent submitted that as the alleged conduct involved communications to the County Court judicial officers and registries, this Court lacks jurisdiction to punish for contempt of that Court.
That submission is misconceived. As the superior court in the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has power not only to punish contempt committed against itself, but in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, it also has power to deal with contempts committed against courts of inferior jurisdiction, including the County Court.[5]
The respondent further submitted that the County Court proceeding presided over by Judge Tran, in fact, concluded on 28 July 2023, so that there was no live proceeding, or judicial function, capable of being 'impeded' and thus the subject of a contempt of court.
That submission may also be readily addressed. As noted, the respondent issued a number of proceedings in the County Court. In one of those proceedings (No 22‑04616), Judge Tran granted an application by the defendant (the State of Victoria) for summary judgment.[6] However, that order did not affect the other proceedings issued by the applicant in the County Court. The proceeding, in which Judge Tran made the order dated 4 October 2023, restraining the respondent from forwarding emails to the County Court email address that contained abusive or threatening material, was made in a separate proceeding (Cl-23-02495).
That proceeding has remained on foot in the County Court. On 1 September 2025, Judge Pillay of that Court made orders that the proceeding be temporarily stayed until the final determination of the proceeding in this Court brought by the Attorney-General to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.[7] The temporary stay of the County Court proceeding does not mean that it has been brought to an end. It is extant, albeit that it is temporarily stayed.
The respondent advanced further arguments in oral submissions at the hearing of the proceeding. In that respect, it is relevant to note that after the completion of the presentation by the applicant of its submissions on the first day of the hearing, I adjourned the case for two days, to enable the respondent to prepare any submissions which he wished to advance in response.
The respondent commenced his oral submissions by contending that the transcript of the proceeding on the first day of the hearing before me was inaccurate. He submitted that, as a consequence, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the contempt proceeding against him was suspended, and that it should not proceed until the transcript had been properly corrected.
I do not accept that submission. The transcript of the hearing on the first day did not record any evidence. It provided useful assistance by recording the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant. Any error in it does not, and could not, affect the validity of this proceeding, or the right of the respondent to have a fair hearing.
The second proposition advanced by the respondent is that this proceeding should not be considered in isolation, but in the context of previous proceedings involving the respondent, which commenced with charges against him in 2013, which were dismissed by the Magistrates' Court. The respondent submitted he was arrested and detained in June 2016 without lawful warrant, and ultimately was brought before Beale J, who granted him bail. In addition, he submitted that in May 2017, he was assaulted by a police prosecutor outside the Magistrates' Court, and that subsequently that prosecutor filed a false statement depicting himself as the victim. The respondent also stated that in August 2021, he was subject of a search warrant on him that was executed at gunpoint in a public reserve.
I am not persuaded that the matters, to which the respondent referred, are relevant to the current proceeding. While those matters might have engendered in the respondent a feeling of grievance against the justice system, they are not relevant to the issues in the present case, namely, whether the respondent performed the conduct that is the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts of court, and, if so, whether that conduct itself constituted a contempt of court.
The respondent also relied on the doctrine of necessity as a defence to the communications which he made to the Court, and which are the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts of court. However, there was no basis, either in the evidence adduced on this application, or otherwise, which would support such a defence to any of the communications which are the subject of the 15 alleged contempts of court.
The respondent submitted that each of the 15 communications constituted the product of, or were expressions of, psychological harm that he had suffered as a result of the conduct by various organs of the State towards him. He submitted that if the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office and the Attorney-General had acted as model litigants in previous litigation, he would not have been involved in proceedings that were before the County Court.
That proposition does not constitute a valid defence in the present case. First, the respondent did not provide any evidence at all which would sustain the proposition that he has suffered psychiatric harm, as he contended. Secondly, he has not demonstrated how, if he has suffered psychological harm, it in some way might provide a defence in respect of the communications that he engaged in and which constitute the 15 alleged contempts of court.

[80]

One of the bases, on which the applicant relies in its summons, is that each of the emails constituting alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, were transmitted by the respondent in breach of an undertaking referred to in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025. In a preliminary mention hearing in this matter, I raised with the parties the question whether, in fact, the respondent had given to the Court, on that date, a binding undertaking which could form the basis of a finding of contempt of court.
As a consequence, on the hearing of the substantive application, counsel for the applicant did not seek to rely on a breach of the undertaking as the sole or determinative basis for a finding of contempt of court in respect of each of the alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15. Rather, counsel submitted that the undertaking, recorded in the Court order, and the circumstances in which that order was made, were relevant as they made clear to the respondent that the kind of communications with the Court, that he had engaged in, were impermissible and were in contempt of the Court.
That position, taken by counsel for the applicant, was correct. For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that in the hearing before Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, the applicant did give an undertaking to the Court, which, of itself, would be sufficient to constitute the basis of a finding of contempt of court.
As earlier mentioned, the respondent was arrested on 16 September 2025 pursuant to the warrant issued by Tsalamandris J on 8 September 2025. Following his arrest, the respondent came before Tsalamandris J on the same day. Her Honour made an order containing a number of directions concerning the future conduct of the contempt proceedings. In the formal orders, in the preamble, it was noted that the respondent had been arrested by Victoria Police and presented to Court pursuant to the warrant, and that the respondent was '... released on the undertakings contained in orders 1(a) and 1(b) below'.
Her Honour then made the following orders (inter alia):

[85]

The respondent then proceeded to allege that a particular judge of the Supreme Court was corrupt. Tsalamandris J interrupted and told the respondent that he could have 'whatever private thoughts' he wished to, but that referring to that judge as being corrupt may itself constitute a contempt of court. Following that exchange, the judge stated that she would adjourn the Court on the undertakings given by the respondent, to which the respondent answered: 'Yep'.
The question is whether, in those circumstances, the respondent gave a formal binding undertaking to the Court, which was such as might constitute the basis of a finding of contempt of court in the case of a relevant breach of it.
As I have noted, and as discussed by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in LCM[39] the principles, that apply concerning contempt of court by breach of an order of a court, are relevantly the same (with appropriate modification) to an allegation of a breach of an undertaking made by a party to a court.
As stated by Donaldson MR in Hussain v Hussain,[40] an undertaking to the Court '... is as solemn, binding and effective as an order of the Court in the like terms'. In a case such as the present, in which the respondent was not represented, a question arises whether, objectively, it might be properly concluded that the respondent did give such an undertaking to the Court. That is, the question is whether the respondent made an undertaking to the Court in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have understood to be providing a commitment that was as binding and effective as an order of the Court itself.
The importance of that question is illustrated, in a different context, by the decision of Barker J of the Federal Court in Oswal v Burrup Holdings Limited (No 2).[41] In that case, the applicant applied to the Federal Court for orders granting him access to the books and records of the respondent. The Federal Court made orders granting the applicant access to those documents. The order provided that the inspection by any person of the documents would be subject to the previous receipt by the solicitors for the respondent of a signed confidentiality undertaking by the person. The applicant provided a signed confidentiality undertaking which was expressed to be given 'to the Court'. The undertaking was never filed in the Federal Court. The respondent alleged that the applicant breached the undertaking by disclosing the content and substance of certain documents to a national newspaper.
In upholding the applicant's no case submission, Barker J noted that, in order that the conduct of the applicant constitute a contempt of court, it must be demonstrated not only that the applicant gave the undertaking, but that it was received and accepted by the Court.[42] His Honour concluded that in the circumstances, and based on a proper construction of the terms of Court order, it could not be concluded that the confidentiality undertaking signed by the applicant had been given in terms that it was an undertaking given to the Court.[43]
In the present case, in the course of the exchange between Tsalamandris J and the respondent, the judge did tell the respondent that he would be released from custody 'on the undertaking' that he provided, which included not to send any intimidating or abusive emails to people at the County Court or Supreme Court. However, there is nothing in the exchange between the judge and the respondent which would permit a conclusion that, in agreeing to such a course, it might be reasonably concluded that the respondent understood, or ought to have understood, that he was thereby making to the Court a binding promise which would have the force of an order of the Court. The noun 'undertaking' is commonly used in ordinary parlance, in a sense which is qualitatively different than that in which the term is used in a court proceeding. On balance, it could not be concluded that, in the relevant exchange with the judge, the respondent ought reasonably to have understood that he was thereby making to the Court a binding promise, breach of which might constitute a contempt of court.
On the other hand, for the reasons submitted by the applicant, the order made by Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, and the circumstances in which that order was made, are relevant, particularly to a consideration of the intention with which the respondent, following that date, made the communications that are the subject of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15.
As I have noted, before Tsalamandris J made that order, her Honour stated that she considered it appropriate to ensure that the respondent refrain from sending any abusive or intimidating emails to the County Court or to the Supreme Court, in order that the courts were protected from any future conduct that may constitute a contempt of court. Tsalamandris J explained to the respondent that the undertaking by him, not to send any abusive or intimidating emails to the County Court and Supreme Court, was a condition of his release. It is in those circumstances, and in the context of the exchange between the judge and the respondent to which I have earlier referred,[44] that the intention of the respondent, in sending the emails that were the subject of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, should be assessed.

[88]

In Coleman,[50] the Court was concerned with an appeal by a man who was convicted of an offence under s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences 1931 (Qld), which provided that any person who in a public place or near a public place used any 'threatening, abusive or insulting words' to any person would be liable to a fine or imprisonment. The High Court by a majority (Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ dissenting) held that the conviction of the appellant for using insulting words in a public place should be set aside.
In reaching that conclusion, McHugh J held that the provision in question was invalid because the word 'insulting' was so wide as to be capable of burdening communication about government or political matters and was not reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate end consistent with the system of representative government enshrined by the Commonwealth Constitution. Gummow and Hayne JJ in their joint judgment (with whom Kirby, in effect, agreed), having referred to the test expounded in Lange, construed s 7(1)(d) in a narrow manner, so as not to apply to the words published by the appellant. Based on that narrow construction of s 7(1)(d), their Honours concluded that the provision was not invalid.[51]
The present case is concerned with statements by the respondent (in emails and in Court) which are alleged to constitute a contempt of court. As I have discussed, the Courts have emphasised that the purpose of the principles of contempt law is not to protect individual judges or judicial officers personally from criticisms and imputations against them. Rather, the fundamental purpose of the principles of contempt law is to protect and uphold the integrity and independence of the Courts, and to maintain public confidence in the judicial process and the system of justice.
Applying the principles stated in Lange, it is clear that the principles of contempt law, which I have outlined, are reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end, namely, the protection of the integrity of the system of justice, the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the system of representative and responsible government prescribed by the Commonwealth Constitution.
The respondent has also relied on the decision of the High Court in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)[52] in support of the proposition that State Courts cannot be used as instruments of executive policy, so that the Court must remain independent when evaluating communications that are critical of government. The decision in Kable was concerned with the validity of a New South Wales Act of Parliament which empowered the Supreme Court of that state to make an order for the detention of a specified person in prison after the expiration of a sentence of imprisonment imposed on that person. The majority of the Court held that the legislation was invalid because it reposed in the Court a power that was, in essence, the antithesis of the judicial process and which, in effect, rendered the Court an instrument of executive government policy.[53] That principle does not have any application in a case such as the present. In exercising its jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings based on a contempt, the Court is not in any way acting or being used as an instrument of administrative or executive policy. Rather, as a matter of first principle, the Court is performing a judicial function to protect the integrity of the justice system and to vindicate public confidence in the courts.
Further, contrary to the submission by the respondent, the principles of contempt law do not involve the application of legal standards which do not apply equally to citizens and officials. The fundamental principles of contempt law apply to all persons, whatever their status. In that context, I should note that the four 'comparative instances of official conduct', referred to by the respondent in his submissions, appear to describe conduct by persons which had nothing to do with the justice system.
The respondent has also relied on a number of provisions contained in the Charter and more specifically, ss 8(3), 15, 21 and 24.
Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law. As discussed, that provision does not, relevantly, preclude or affect the current proceedings against the respondent for contempt of court.
Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference, and sub-s (2) provides that every person has a right of freedom of expression. However, s 15(3) provides that those rights may be subject to lawful restrictions that are reasonably necessary to respect the rights of others, and to protect (inter alia) public order. Plainly, s 15 does not, and may not, qualify or exclude the fundamental principles of contempt law, which, as I have discussed, serve the purpose of protecting and preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
Section 21 of the Charter provides that every person has a right to liberty and security. However, of course, that right is not unqualified or absolute. Thus, s 21(3) provides that a person must not be deprived of his or her liberty except in accordance with procedures established by law.
Section 24 of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence, or a party in a civil proceeding, has a right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. In the present case, the proceedings for contempt have been commenced by originating motion and summons. The applicant has set out, in some detail, the basis upon which the proceedings are brought. The Court is competent, independent and impartial in determining the proceeding brought by the applicant.
Finally, the respondent has submitted that in each case communications by him did not contain threats of violence or unlawful conduct, and while they used and were expressed in terms of strong criticism, the comments by the applicant were directed at 'perceived administrative misconduct'. I shall address that submission in considering whether the applicant has made out its case on each of the individual alleged contempts in this case.

[94]

Section 161 of the Evidence Act 2008 provides that if a document purports to contain a record of an electronic communication, it is presumed that that communication was sent by or on behalf of the person by or on whose behalf it appears that the document was sent or made, and that it was sent or made on the day which appears on the document.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent did transmit each of the emails that are the subject of alleged contempts numbered 1, 3, and 4 to 15 (inclusive).
It was not in issue in this application that the respondent, in the course of the hearing before Judge Manova on 3 April 2024, spoke the words that are the subject of the second alleged contempt. The recording of that proceeding was tendered in evidence in this application. Having listened to it, there is no doubt that the transcript (which was also tendered in evidence) accurately recorded the exchange that I have set out earlier,[54] and which contained the remark made by the respondent to the judge, calling her Honour 'you fuckin' whore'.
It is not suggested by the respondent that in some way the expression by him was a slip of the tongue or some unintended remark. In his email to the chambers of Judge Manova (and others) dated 29 May 2025 (alleged contempt number 3), the respondent, in three separate passages, accused her Honour of being a 'state funded whore' and in the concluding sentence of the email he called her a 'whore'. In his email to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025 (alleged contempt number 4), which was copied to others, including the chambers of Judge Manova, the respondent admitted that he had called Judge Manova a 'whore,' because she said that she did not see any assault in the video that she viewed in Court. More recently, in an email to the Attorney-General and others dated 9 October 2025, the respondent made the same accusation about Judge Manova, describing her as a 'woman without virtue who performs immoral acts for payment'.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent not only spoke the words that are the subject of alleged contempt number 2, but that he did so consciously and deliberately.

[98]

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the email dated 17 October 2023 was a knowing, deliberate and intentional breach by the respondent of the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023. Counsel submitted that the email constituted a deliberate attempt by the respondent to intimidate, defy and influence the decision‑making of the judge and was calculated to divert the course of justice. Accordingly, it was submitted that the email had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice and was intended to do so.
As I have noted, Judge Tran made the orders of 4 October 2023 following a directions hearing by her Honour on the preceding date, in which her Honour specifically raised her concern that any email sent by the respondent to the County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material. Judge Tran noted that the respondent had sent communications to the Court that could be interpreted as gratuitously abusive or insulting, and her Honour stated that she intended to specify clearly the Court's expectations concerning the use of various email addresses and the contents of the emails sent to the Court. Accordingly, her Honour made the orders dated 4 October 2023 in which she specified the precise email addresses to which correspondence should be forwarded, and her Honour (order number 10) directed that any emails sent by the respondent to any County Court email address 'must not contain abusive or threatening material'.
Relevantly, on 17 October 2023, the respondent sent to the chambers of Judge Tran, and copied to others, an email which accused the Court of being either incompetent or deliberately corrupted. The email made a number of accusations, including concealment of a fraud, concealing serious offences, and supporting and assisting terrorism. Following receipt of the email, the chambers of Judge Tran sent an email to the respondent reminding the respondent of the orders her Honour had made on 4 October 2023, and stating that emails sent by the respondent would not be placed on the Court file or replied to unless they complied with those orders.
It was in that context that the respondent then sent the email that is alleged contempt number 1, and which expressly and directly accused Judge Tran as being a 'corrupt low [life]'.
Applying the principles which I have discussed, it is clear that the email constituted a contempt of court on a number of bases. First and foremost, it was an intentional and direct contravention by the respondent of the order made by Judge Tran, just 13 days earlier, that an email sent by him to any County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material. Secondly, the email was directed to a judge who was presiding over hearings in a case in which he was a party. It constituted an extra-curial attempt by the respondent for the purpose of influencing or affecting the deliberations and considerations by the judge. Thirdly, the email was intended to, and had the tendency to, undermine and detract from the authority of the judge as a member of the Court and, as such, to compromise the system of justice.
For those reasons, it must be concluded that the email dated 17 October 2023 (the first alleged contempt) constituted a contempt of court by the respondent.

[100]

In respect of the second alleged contempt, counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondent spoke the particular words in an extremely expressive and threatening tone to the judge. He submitted that the insult by the respondent was part of a campaign by him to undermine judicial officers with whom the respondent took issue, and that objectively, it was calculated to interfere with the judge's ability to administer justice.
Having had the opportunity to listen to the relevant part of the recording of the hearing before Judge Manova, I accept that the words, which are the subject of alleged contempt number 2, were spoken by the respondent in a tone, and in a manner, which evidenced an intention by him to deliberately insult the judge. The words, so spoken by the respondent, constituted abuse by him in court of a judge who was presiding on the hearing in which he was involved. As such, they clearly constituted contempt of court. As explained by Whelan J in Slaveski,[56] that conduct was contempt because it challenged the authority of the Court, it interrupted the Court's proceedings, and it detracted from the capacity of the Court to conduct proceedings in a dispassionate, rational and objective manner.
The insult directed by the respondent to the judge was plainly entirely unjustified. The respondent spoke the words in response to a request by the judge to identify to her the part of the video footage in which he alleged that he had been assaulted by the police prosecutor. In that way, the judge was endeavouring to assist the respondent in the presentation of his case. The insult directed by the respondent to the judge was entirely gratuitous.
As I have noted, it is quite clear that the words spoken by the respondent were deliberately chosen by him, and were not a mere slip of the tongue, or the product of a momentary loss of rationality. The subsequent conduct by the respondent clearly demonstrates that he selected the insult, and intended that it offend the Court. As such, it not only undermined the authority of the Court, but it was intended and calculated to endeavour to intimidate the judge in the conduct by her of the judicial proceeding that was before her Honour.
For those reasons, I am satisfied that the words, that constitute allege contempt number 2, did, in fact, constitute a contempt of court.

[102]

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the third alleged contempt was transmitted by the respondent after the commencement of the contempt proceeding by originating motion, and in circumstances in which he was aware that he was already being prosecuted for contempt of court by calling Judge Manova a 'whore'. It was an email sent to the chambers of a judge who had supervised the proceeding, that was still on foot, in which he was a party. Counsel submitted that the email constituted a direct breach by the respondent of the order of Judge Tran made 4 October 2023. It was an insult specifically selected by the respondent, and was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, by retaliating against decisions and views made or expressed by the judge in the course of the hearing in which she presided.
The email forwarded by the respondent to Judge Manova, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 3, clearly constituted an intentional breach by him of the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023, namely, that he must not send emails to the Court which contained abusive or threatening material. The respondent was aware of the terms and content of the order. By transmitting the email, he intentionally and knowingly contravened the order which, he ought to have understood, was made for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate communications be made to the Court to enable the Court to objectively and appropriately undertake its work in the system of justice.
Further, the email constituted an extra-curial communication, by the respondent, with a judge who had managed proceedings in which he was then a party before the Court. As such, the email was calculated by the respondent to influence or affect the management by the judge, and by the Court, of the proceeding in which he was a party.
In addition, the email was forwarded, not only to Judge Manova's chambers, but to others, including the chambers of two County Court judges, the Chief Judge of the County Court, the Attorney-General, and the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office. In the circumstances, I am persuaded that the level of distribution of the email was such as to constitute it a contempt also on the basis that it was a scandalous disparagement of the judge in the Court, and, as such, it had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.
For those reasons, the third alleged contempt did constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.

[104]

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the email, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 4, is a serious contempt, constituting a direct threat to Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who was then conducting proceedings in the Supreme Court involving the respondent. Counsel also noted that the email denigrated judicial officers who had previously conducted, or were conducting, proceedings involving him, including two judges of the County Court.
Applying the principles which I have discussed, it is clear that the email, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 4, was a contempt of court. First, it was directed to a judicial officer, namely Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who was then responsible for the conduct of Supreme Court proceedings in which the respondent was a party. It was a communication quite plainly directed, and intended, to intimidate the judicial registrar and her management of the proceeding. Most seriously, it contained a direct threat to the judicial registrar concerning and in respect of the pending proceeding involving the respondent. As such, it was, as the applicant has submitted, a direct deliberate attempt by the respondent to divert the course of justice.
In addition, I note that the respondent copied the email (inter alia) to the Chief Judge of the County Court, and to the chambers of Judge Tran and Judge Manova. As such, the email was a direct contravention by the respondent of the order made by Judge Tran on 4 October 2023, in circumstances in which the respondent well knew and understood that he was prohibited from forwarding to members of the County Court abusive and threatening emails. In the email the respondent directly referred to Judge Manova and Judge Tran in grossly disparaging terms. As I have noted, the County Court proceedings involving the respondent were, at that time, still extant, although they were temporarily stayed. The email, as such, constituted a contempt of court by being intended to intimidate the judges of the County Court in their proceedings in which he was a litigant.
Further, in addition to being copied to the Chief Judge of the County Court, and to the chambers of Judges Tran and Manova, the email was also copied to the Attorney‑General, to two solicitors acting for the plaintiff in the vexatious litigant proceedings, and to one Matthew Laxton of Victoria Police. The email again referred to Judges Manova and Tran, and Beale J in terms which constituted a scandalous disparagement of each of those judges of those Courts and, as such, had a tendency to undermine the administration of justice in the State.
For those reasons, alleged contempt number 4 constituted a clear and serious contempt of court by the respondent.

[108]

Alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 comprised emails sent by the respondent to the Supreme Court General List email address on 1 October 2025 at 1:07 pm and 1:39 pm, respectively. Earlier on the same day, at 10:51 am, the Court General List had sent an email to the respondent attaching the authenticated order of Tsalamandris J dated 1 October, and advising the respondent that the matter had been listed for mention at 2:15 pm on 2 October in court number 1. The email attached the order. In 'other matters' the Court noted that on 28, 29 and 30 September, the respondent had sent email correspondence to the Court which needed to be addressed.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that, in that context, each email constituted a contempt of court, because it had the tendency to interfere with the course of justice. Counsel submitted that although alleged contempt number 6 was not sent directly to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz or Tsalamandris J, it was clearly directed to those two judicial officers. Further, counsel submitted that the email constituted a contempt of court by being sent to an employee of the Court, and was expressed in such terms as it had a tendency to discourage the recipient from undertaking their duties in relation to the proceeding that was before the Court. Counsel submitted that it should be inferred that each email was forwarded to the Court with that intention, namely, to place pressure on those connected with the respondent's cases from performing their duties in respect of them.
As in the case of alleged contempt number 5, the 'subject' of each of alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 was the present proceeding. The only reasonable inference, both from the context, and from the content, of each of the two emails, is that they were intentionally directed to Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz, and that it was the intention of the respondent that they be brought to the attention of each of those two judicial officers.
As I have noted, the two emails followed the email by the Court to the respondent notifying him of the order of Tsalamandris J that the matter was listed for mention at 2:15 pm on the following day, 2 October. The sixth alleged contempt commenced with a reference by the respondent to the 'undertaking' that he gave to the Court on 16 September. The email expressly referred to Judicial Registrar Lorenz. The email that constituted alleged contempt number 7 followed that email (alleged contempt number 6), and was, in a sense, an addendum to it. In that context, it must be concluded that it was the intention of the respondent that each of those emails be brought to the attention of the two judicial officers who were managing his cases, namely, Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz.
In the circumstances, the only reasonable inference, from the content of each of the two emails, is that they were intended by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by each of those judicial officers of their roles in the cases involving the respondent. As such, they were intended to, and had the tendency, to interfere with and undermine the proper administration of the course of justice. The alleged contempt number 6 concluded with a clear threat to the intended recipients, which reinforces the conclusion that the emails were intended to undermine the due course of justice in respect of the cases in which the respondent was involved in this Court.
For those reasons, the emails constituting alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 were each contempts of court.

[112]

In respect of the ninth alleged contempt, counsel for the applicant noted that the email was addressed and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran, and, as such, constituted a breach of her Honour's order made on 4 October 2023.
Counsel further submitted that the email contravened the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, and was part of an ongoing campaign by the respondent to attempt to put improper influence on the Court in respect of the proceedings in which he was a litigant. Accordingly, it was submitted that the email, being directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, was transmitted by the respondent with an intention to divert the course of justice, by attacking and seeking to intimidate judicial officers who were responsible for the conduct of proceedings in which he was a party.
For the reasons relied on by counsel for the applicant, I am persuaded that alleged contempt number 9 does constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.
First, the email was copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran of the County Court. The email twice referred to Judge Tran, and alleged that her Honour was part of an alleged coverup of corruption in the justice system. As such, the email contravened the order by Judge Tran of 3 October 2024, in that it contained abusive and threatening material.
Further, the email was directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, each of whom were then presiding over cases in the Supreme Court in which the respondent was a party. On its face, it was plainly an extra-curial communication to two presiding judicial officers. It followed, inter alia, alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7, which had been sent on the previous day, and which I have concluded were intended by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by those judicial officers of their roles in the cases involving the respondent. In that context, and taking into account the text of the alleged contempt number 9, the circumstance that the email was forwarded and copied to two judicial officers who were then presiding on cases in which he was a party, and that it was copied to other persons involved in the justice system, the only reasonable inference is that the respondent sent it to those judicial officers with an intention to divert the course of justice, by seeking to intimidate Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz who were responsible for the conduct of proceedings in which he was a party.
It follows, that it must be concluded that the ninth alleged contempt did constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.

[114]

Counsel for the applicant submitted that alleged contempt number 10 constituted a broadside attack by the respondent on anyone who has been involved in the respondent's court proceedings, including judicial officers to whom the email was sent and copied. Counsel noted that the email accused everyone of being 'criminal low lives and perverters of the law'. It was submitted that the email was an attack on any person who would attempt to undertake their duties in connection with the respondent's proceedings and, as such, constituted a contempt of court.
The email was directly copied to the email address of Judge Tran. It addressed each of the recipients - including Judge Tran - of being 'criminal low lives and perverters of the law'. As such, it was plainly in contravention of the order of her Honour made 4 October 2023 and, accordingly, constituted a contempt of court.
Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, as submitted by the applicant, the remarks made by the respondent in the email were directed to each of the recipients of it, including Tsalamandris J to whom the email was directed, and Judicial Registrar Lorenz, to whom it was copied. As submitted on behalf of the applicant, the email abused, in quite flagrant terms, each of the recipients, including those judicial officers who were then involved in the conduct and litigation in which the respondent was a party. It was a blatant attack on any person who had been involved in legal proceedings in connection with the respondent. The only reasonable inference is that, by sending the email, the respondent intended to intimidate each person who was involved in his proceedings, including the judicial officers responsible for the management of the two proceedings in the Supreme Court.
That conclusion is reinforced by the circumstance that the email was sent by the respondent just six minutes after he had remitted the email which constitutes alleged contempt number 9 and which, as I have concluded, was transmitted by the respondent with the same intent to the recipients, including Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz.
It follows that it must be concluded that alleged contempt number 10 constituted a contempt of court.