The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood

COURTS AND JUDGES - CONTEMPT - PUNISHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT - PUNISHMENT - ORDER - NATURE OF PUNISHMENT - IMPRISONMENT - where civil applications involving the respondent were heard by a judge of the Supreme Court - where during the hearing the respondent made allegations against the court and the judge of incompetence, corruption, and criminal conduct, and made threats of legal action - where on a later occasion the respondent was given an opportunity by the judge to withdraw the remarks - where respondent refused to do so and made further comments towards the judge of a similar nature - where respondent found guilty of contempt in the face of the court on two occasions - where questions of penalty and costs now to be determined - where the offending was serious - where during hearings for the present application the respondent made further threats of legal action and allegations of corruption and document fabrication - whether a penalty should be imposed and, if so, what the appropriate penalty is for the contempt and the circumstances of the contemnor

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 930, r 931

Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich [1998] VSC 41, cited

Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich [1998] VSC 45, cited

Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; (1986) 161 CLR 98, cited

Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732, cited

Dow v Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 58, cited

Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215, cited

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2017) 256 FCR 90; [2017] FCAFC 111, cited

Moore-McQuillan v Registrar of the Supreme Court [2009] SASC 265, cited

R v Ogawa [2011] 2 Qd R 350, cited

R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643, cited

R v Slaveski [2012] VSC 7, cited

R v Vasiliou (No 2) [2012] VSC 242, cited

Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 309, cited

Registrar of the Supreme Court v Moore-McQuillan [2007] SASC 447, cited

Rich v Attorney-General (Vic) [1999] VSCA 14, cited

Slaveski v R [2012] VSCA 48; (2012) 40 VR 1, cited

Wood v Staunton (No 5) [1995] NSWSC 61; (1996) 86 A Crim R 183, cited

• [1] On 6 June 2024 I held that I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by making the statements identified in the Originating Application Mr Wood was guilty of contempt in the face of the court on two occasions.[1] The circumstances giving rise to the finding of contempt are set out in my reasons and I will not repeat them here.
• [2] I now have to consider whether I should impose a penalty and, if so, of what kind.

The principles concerning punishment for contempt

• [3] The underlying rationale of every exercise of the contempt power is the necessity to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice.[2] To do so, the court possesses the power to impose a wide range of orders including the power to fine, imprison, and suspend a term of imprisonment.
• [4] Rules 930 and 931 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules provide:

(1) This rule applies if the court decides that the respondent has committed a contempt.

(2) If the respondent is an individual, the court may punish the individual by making an order that may be made under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.

(3) If the respondent is a corporation, the court may punish the respondent by seizing corporation property or a fine or both.

(4) The court may make an order for punishment on conditions, including, for example, a suspension of punishment during good behaviour, with or without the respondent giving security satisfactory to the court for good behaviour.

(1) An order for imprisonment of the respondent may specify the prison in which the respondent is to be imprisoned.

(2) If a respondent is imprisoned for a term, the court may order the respondent's discharge from prison before the end of the term."

• [5] These rules operate to increase the range of penalties available. They do not work to apply the conditions which regulate the making of orders under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (PSA) in circumstances unrelated to the punishment of contempt.[3]
• [6] While r 930 does not mandate the application of the provisions in the PSA (such as, for example, s 9), those provisions can provide guidance about the matters which may be taken into account when imposing a penalty in these circumstances.[4] Factors which have been held to be relevant[5] when sentencing for contempt include:
  1. the seriousness of the contempt proved;
  2. whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself of what he did;
  3. whether there has been any apology or public expression of contrition;
  4. the character and antecedents of the contemnor;
  5. general and personal deterrence;
  6. any mitigating factors; and
  7. denunciation of the contempt.
• [7] I will consider those matters and the way contempt in the face of the court has been treated in other cases.

• [8] The allegations of incompetence, corruption (both of the court and the judge), and criminal conduct, together with threatening the judge with legal action were calculated challenges to the authority of the court. The respondent's conduct on 26 July was deliberately disruptive and disrespectful. The conduct on 2 August was purposeful. Mr Wood alleged abuse of power and criminal conduct for which he said the judge should apologise.
• [9] The objective seriousness of the contempt on 26 July can be measured by reference to the words used, the number of separate instances, the nature of the allegations and threats, and the deliberation with which they were delivered.
• [10] The objective seriousness of the contempt on 2 August can be measured by reference to the nature of the allegations and threats as well as the obvious forethought which had been given to the words used.
• [11] This offending was serious. The contempts were reprehensible and intolerable.

Whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself of what he did

• [12] The respondent continued making contemptuous remarks after being warned that he might be dealt with for contempt and after being given an opportunity to withdraw his remarks.

Whether there has been any apology or public expression of contrition

• [13] Notwithstanding being given a number of opportunities to withdraw or apologise, the respondent continued to utter contemptuous remarks. While the absence of an apology is not a matter of aggravation, its absence means that Mr Wood is not entitled to the benefits (such as a reduction in punishment) which are afforded by an apology or a remorseful attitude.

The character and antecedents of the respondent

• [14] There was no evidence about the respondent's antecedents or character. No prior convictions for contempt have been alleged. No evidence of good character was provided.

• [15] As with sentencing for criminal offences, deterrence is an important consideration. In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) Kirby P said:[6]

"A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately emphatic way." (citation omitted)

• [16] The need for deterrence was emphasised in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California)[7] in the joint judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court:

"... it is essential to the due administration of justice that contempt of court, and in particular serious contempt of court, remains relatively rare. Vigilance is required to help ensure contempt remains a rare problem. Whenever there is a real need for deterrence, be it specific or general, that will always be a vitally important consideration in determining the appropriate penalty."

• [17] As I have outlined, the contempts established in this matter are serious, reprehensible, and intolerable. There is a significant need for deterrence to feature in the penalty I impose, both for the respondent personally and for others who might be minded to behave as the respondent has.

• [18] Nothing of substance was said in respect of mitigation. Mr Wood did, though, make this submission:

"... there should be no penalty at all issued to this because I am not guilty. It is completely within my purview to correctly call the court corrupt, which it is, and your Honour has proven that. So therefore the penalty should be nothing. I should not be punished for speaking the truth in a court of law."

• [19] Mr Nicolson referred to a claim made by Mr Wood in another matter to the effect that he had been diagnosed with "bi-polar". Mr Wood did not raise that in these proceedings.

• [20] The need for denunciation of the contempt is an accepted factor to be considered. There is a need to ensure that such conduct is emphatically denounced and effectively deterred.[8]

• [21] In other decisions the reason or motive of the contemnor has been taken into account. Mr Wood has made his reasons clear.
• [22] Mr Wood gave evidence of his income, given the submissions by Mr Nicolson about a fine being an appropriate penalty. In the last financial year, Mr Wood had a taxable income of $22,585.00.

• [23] His conduct on the occasions when he appeared on this application can be taken into account.[9] It does not aggravate the contempts which I have found, but it does touch upon his refusal to apologise and highlights the need for personal deterrence. There were many instances during these hearings where further allegations of corruption or threats were made. I have not set all of them out. These are some examples:

(a) He alleged that the originating application had been fabricated by the Registrar.

(b) That because, in his view, I had not followed a ruling of the Court of Appeal the court was corrupt and that my associate should refer me to the Crime and Corruption Commission otherwise my associate would have engaged in official corruption.

(c) At the hearing on 15 February 2024 the following exchange took place:

RESPONDENT: I seek you going to prison for 14 years - 120, Criminal Code.

RESPONDENT: And I ask that your Associate there refer you to the Crime and Corruption Commission under sections 38, 39 and 40A, along with the Bailiff there. They are both employees. They are both citizens held by the Crime and Corruption Act. Failure to do so - official corruption, not judicial but relating to offences 121 of the Criminal Code. Fourteen years for you, you and you.[10] Yes. You understand that, your Honour? Do you understand that?

HIS HONOUR: Have you made your submissions on the issue of costs?

RESPONDENT: I'm not going to pay costs. From what money? I've got no money. They took it all already.

HIS HONOUR: As I said, the order is application dismissed. I order that the respondent pay the applicant's costs - - -

HIS HONOUR: - - - of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

(d) At the hearing on 19 February he said: "You seem to be making an awfully overwhelming attempt to pervert the course of justice, your Honour."

(e) At the hearing on 17 May, when he sought copies of the transcript, this exchange took place:

"RESPONDENT: Can I have all the transcripts of the hearings before your Honour provided? Because I will be adducing them as evidence as well. They will be now be part of affidavit - they were not originally, but since they have come up, and your Honour has decided to engage in criminal corruption, I will just add that.

RESPONDENT: Of all of the hearings before your Honour in which you have engaged in criminal corruption, such as the application in which you have just denied, the original hearing in which Ms Steel was present - all of those in which your Honour engaged in criminal corruption - - -

RESPONDENT: As I am now making an application of criminal corruption of your Honour's behaviour with regard to this case, I am going to have to ask you and I am making an application for you to recuse yourself from any further hearing of the matter on the grounds that you are biased or apparently biased towards the prosecution.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. All right. Well, you can make that application on the Monday week. All right. Thank you. Adjourn, please."

(f) As part of his written submissions on liability and by affidavit evidence he accused numerous members of the Supreme Court, District Court and Magistrates Court of corruption.

• [24] Mr Nicolson initially submitted that substantial fines, for the contempts on each day, be imposed. He acknowledged that imprisonment was an option.
• [25] Mr Wood said: "Should your Honour decide to impose some kind of penalty, a financial penalty would be the only penalty that your Honour could impose. A term of imprisonment, as determined by all of the case law, is not appropriate in these sort of matters."
• [26] It is instructive to consider the penalty imposed in other cases while acknowledging that the type of penalty is always to be determined in light of the particular circumstances of each case.
• [27] In Dow v Attorney General[11] the contemnor had stated that the law entitled him to be discharged and said "We are in a Court of law, I hope. I hope I have been brought before a Court of law." He was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for three months. On appeal, W B Campbell J (with whom Wanstall CJ and Matthews J agreed) said: "This was a serious case of contempt and no doubt His Honour felt the necessity to act with firmness in order to protect the authority of the Court and to show that this sort of conduct in court cannot be tolerated." But, his Honour went on to say: "I think that the sentence was so excessive as to justify interference by this Court. The applicant had been awaiting trial in the remand section of the prison until this sentence was imposed upon him. He has now served seven weeks of this sentence in the prison proper and, in the circumstances, it is unnecessary for me to say what I consider should have been the proper sentence meted out to him. I would order that the sentence be varied by ordering that the term of imprisonment imposed upon him by the learned judge cease immediately."
• [28] In Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich[12] the contemnor's conduct on the first and second instances was summarised by Byrne J in this way:

"The accused man then announced [from the dock] in intemperate and offensive language that he would not take part in the process, saying that he wanted to see a doctor. He said he refused to be arraigned and that he wanted to leave the court. ... He complained that he was not receiving a fair trial. He described the proceedings to the judge as a sham and illegal. He referred to the judge as having resolved to obtain his conviction from day one and he referred to his Honour as "a silly old dog" and a "rat". He said that he wanted to leave the court to obtain medical treatment so that his state of mind might be improved. ...

the arraignment and the empanelment were adjourned..."

"... [the contemnor] then made the following statement, apparently addressed to the prosecutor, Ms Douglas:

Accused: One chance - one fucking chance. Watch your back. Every time you turn that car on of yours where you're living at the moment, I'm telling you, okay. I don't care how long it takes, 25 years bitch, I'll have a go at you. One go, that's all I want and you think by locking me up for 25 years, I don't have legs and arms out there. I've a bank account overseas and even without the money, we'll be able to get you any time, slut, I'm telling you. All I ever wanted is a fair go. You've pulled every dirty, filthy trick under the book.

He was sentenced to a total of 18 months' imprisonment - six months for the first instance and 12 months for the second.

• [29] On appeal[13] the Victorian Court of Appeal did not disturb the sentences save to order that they be served concurrently rather than cumulatively.
• [30] In Registrar of the Supreme Court v Moore-McQuillan[14] the following exchange was considered:

"HIS HONOUR: In this matter both applications are dismissed with costs. I publish my reasons.

MR MOORE-MCQUILLAN: Thank you for being an arsehole and thank you for being prejudicial and thank you for being a cunt.

MR MOORE-MCQUILLAN: Hope you have a good fucking retirement you stupid fucking idiot. Thank Christ we are getting rid of a fucking cunt like you."

• [31] Mr Moore-McQuillan was sentenced to a three-month term of imprisonment suspended on entry into a good behaviour bond. In sentencing him, Nyland J said:

"I consider that your behaviour was too serious to be dealt with simply by the imposition of a fine or a bond. A sentence of imprisonment is, in my view, the only appropriate penalty. The issue which has exercised my mind is whether all or any part of that sentence should be suspended. I take into account that you have proffered an apology for your conduct. I have also taken into account your personal history as detailed in the various reports.

In all the circumstances I have finally decided that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the matter, there is on this occasion good reason to suspend the period of imprisonment that I am about to impose. That suspension will, however, be subject to a bond with conditions which will require you to be of good behaviour."[15]

• [32] In R v Ogawa[16] the particulars of contempt were: "That on [diverse] dates between 9 March 2009 and 18 March 2009 in the District Court at Brisbane you wilfully interrupted the proceedings of the Court in the course of your trial by physically struggling with the correctional officers and screaming constantly and continually while in Court". The contemnor was sentenced to four months imprisonment with a fixed parole release date two months after the date of sentencing. The appeal against sentence failed.
• [33] Remarks similar to those made in this case were dealt with in R v Slaveski.[17] This extract from the sentencing remarks is sufficient to understand the matter:

"... you and your wife alleged before the judge that an attempt had been made to murder you by police officers as you had travelled to court that morning. Police had attempted to apprehend your vehicle that morning, without success, after you had been detected speeding. I have found that your allegations against a particular police officer of threatening you and your wife with a gun to be baseless. In the course of the hearing at court that morning:

1. you were abusive of the presiding judge, abusive of the court, and disrupted and disturbed the proceeding;
2. you alleged impropriety, partiality and corruption against the presiding judge;
3. you alleged impropriety, partiality and corruption against the court; and
4. you threatened the presiding judge.

I have found that you acted in that way intentionally and that you intended to interfere with or obstruct the due administration of justice."

• [34] A sentence of two months' imprisonment was imposed. The contemnor's psychiatric condition and his being on a suspended sentence were taken into account. The following appears in the sentencing remarks of Whelan J:

"[22] The way in which you conducted your trial before me, after your legal advisers had withdrawn, is also a relevant factor in my view. You made entirely unfounded serious allegations of impropriety against court staff, solicitors and employees of the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office, and your own counsel after they withdrew. You also made allegations of wrongdoing against a protective services officer and a police officer, which I have rejected.

[27] ... You were, however, on a suspended sentence when this offence was committed, and, indeed, you still are. You told me that you have an appeal pending in relation to that matter. When considering the possibility of a wholly or partially suspended sentence I cannot ignore that matter.

[30] Notwithstanding the factors in mitigation, and in particular your psychiatric condition, this is a case where a term of imprisonment must be imposed. If you did not have the psychiatric condition which you do, in the absence of the mitigating effect of a guilty plea, that term of imprisonment would be substantial.

[31] Because of your psychiatric condition and your family support and situation, I am prepared to moderate the term of imprisonment. If you had not already been serving a suspended sentence, I would have considered partially suspending the term."

• [35] The sentence of two months' imprisonment was not disturbed on appeal.[18]
• [36] In this case, I have come to the conclusion that:

(a) the proven contempts are serious matters; and

(b) significant considerations include:

(i) the need to uphold the authority of the court and the dignity of the law;

(ii) the need for specific and general deterrence; and

(iii) the need to impose an appropriate punishment for each instance of contempt.

• [37] A fine would not appropriately reflect the seriousness of these contempts. The contempts on 26 July were repetitive and an abuse of the authority of the court. The contempt on 2 August 2023 was calculated and contumacious.
• [38] Rule 930(4) of the UCPR provides that the court may make an order for punishment on conditions, including, for example, a suspension of punishment during good behaviour, with or without the respondent giving security satisfactory to the court for good behaviour. While Mr Wood's behaviour on 26 July 2023 is deserving of serious punishment it is also the first finding of contempt made against him. While provisions of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 such as s 9 do not apply in these circumstances, the principles they express may be borne in mind. To that end, I have come to the conclusion that the sentences I impose should recognise that the 26 July 2023 behaviour was the first to be the subject of an application for punishment for contempt.
• [39] The conduct on 2 August 2023 was of a different character. It was separated in time and it was an opportunity for Mr Wood to apologise (or purge his contempt) but he deliberately repeated his contemptuous behaviour.
• [40] I am going to suspend the sentence for the contempts on 26 July 2023. If Mr Wood repeats the sort of behaviour the subject of these proceedings, then he can expect that that would be regarded as a breach of the suspended sentence.

(a) For the contempts on 26 July 2023 you are committed to prison for four months.

(b) For the contempt on 2 August 2023 you are committed to prison for two months.

(c) The sentences are to be served concurrently.

(d) I order that the sentence of four months be suspended today for an operational period of two years on condition that you be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period. If you fail to comply with that condition then you may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed. You would then have to serve the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court.

• [42] I order that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the application on the standard basis.

[1] The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood (No 3) [2024] QSC 116.

[2] Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107, per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ.

[3] Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215 at [76].

[4] He v Sun [2021] NSWCA 95; (2021) 104 NSWLR 518 at [66].

[5] Wood v Staunton (No 5) [1995] NSWSC 61; (1996) 86 A Crim R 183 at 185.

[6] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 at 314.

[7] [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 at 133.

[8] Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 at 741 per Kirby P.

[9] R v Slaveski [2012] VSC 7 at [22]; R v Vasiliou (No 2) [2012] VSC 242 at [6].

[10] As he said "you, you and you" he pointed to me, my associate, and the bailiff.

[11] [1980] Qd R 58.

[12] [1998] VSC 41 and [1998] VSC 45.

[13] [1999] VSCA 14.

[14] [2007] SASC 447.

[15] These sentencing remarks were recorded in an associated matter: Moore-McQuillan v Registrar of the Supreme Court [2009] SASC 265

[16] [2011] 2 Qd R 350.

[17] [2011] VSC 643 and [2012] VSC 7.

[18] [2012] VSCA 48; (2012) 40 VR 1.