The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood

COURTS AND JUDGES - CONTEMPT - PARTICULAR CONTEMPTS - CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT - OTHER MATTERS - where applications, concerning civil proceedings involving the respondent, were heard by a judge of the Supreme Court - where during the hearing the respondent said, among other things of a similar nature: "I'm just astounded that the Supreme Court is so incompetent"; "I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison"; "The court is corrupt"; that the judge had not "acted in good faith" - where the respondent was given an opportunity by the judge to withdraw the comments - where the respondent refused to do so and made further comments towards the judge - where the court directed the registrar to apply to the court for the respondent to be punished for contempt pursuant to r 928 of the UCPR - whether by making the statements the respondent was guilty of contempt in the face of the court

Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] UKPC 11; [1999] 2 AC 294, cited

Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Di Carlo [2017] QSC 171, cited

Dow v Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 58, cited

Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2; (1983) 152 CLR 238, cited

Hoser v R [2003] VSCA 194, cited

Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21; (2016) 36 NTLR 203, cited

John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae [1955] HCA 12; (1955) 93 CLR 351, cited

Lewis v Ogden [1984] HCA 26; (1984) 153 CLR 682, cited

Mahaffy v Mahaffy [2018] NSWCA 42, cited

McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1058, considered

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, cited

R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams [1935] HCA 34; (1935) 53 CLR 434, cited

R v Hoser [2001] VSC 443, applied

R v Nicholls [1911] HCA 22; (1911) 12 CLR 280, cited

Reece v McKenna; ex parte McKenna [1953] St R Qd 258, cited

Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Collins [1982] 1 NSWLR 682, cited

Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2007] SASC 447, cited

Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, cited

• [1] The applicant seeks an order that Mr Wood be punished for contempt committed in the face of the court on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023 in hearings conducted by Burns J. The applicant identifies six particulars of contempt on 26 July 2023 and one on 2 August 2023.

• [2] In June 2022, Mr Wood filed a claim in this court against Sibley Lawyers and others. On the same day he filed a claim against Quinn & Scattini Solicitors and others.
• [3] In the claim against Sibley Lawyers he sought $11,000,000 for "Pure Mental Harm" and $500,000 for "Financial Loss".
• [4] In the claim against Quinn & Scattini Solicitors he sought $16,000,000 for "Pure Mental Harm" and $500,000 for "Financial Loss".
• [5] The defendants in each proceeding applied for an order striking out the claim.
• [6] Mr Wood also applied, relevantly, in each proceeding for orders:

(a) that he "amend the claim and statement of claim to remove the claim for pure mental harm and replace it with claims for professional negligence and aggravated damages under rules 375 and 376 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules";

(b) that he "be allowed to amend the documents to claim additional damages for breach of contract, special damages, exemplary damages, and parasitic damages under rules 375 and 376 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules".

• [7] Each of the applications came on for hearing before Burns J on 26 July 2023. Each of the defendants was represented. Mr Wood appeared unrepresented.
• [8] After the hearing commenced there was an objection by Mr Wood to Burns J hearing the application to strike out before hearing his application to amend. It was the position of those seeking an order striking out the claims that the amendments sought made no difference to their application. There was then some discussion about whether documents had been filed and whether those documents were in court. During a discussion between Burns J and Ms Gamble (appearing for each of the defendants), Mr Wood interrupted and the following exchange occurred:

"MS GAMBLE: It should've been filed with his application, as far as I understand.

PLAINTIFF: They weren't filed because they haven't been approved.

PLAINTIFF: ---haven't been approved, so they're not filed.

PLAINTIFF: I'm just astounded that the Supreme Court is so incompetent."

• [9] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the first of the particulars of contempt.
• [10] His Honour then started to make directions for the further hearing of the matter in order that all documents could be before him in the following week. There was some discussion about whether there was a proposed amended statement of claim available and the following exchange took place:

"HIS HONOUR: I'll set both applications down for hearing for one hour on Friday 4 August.

PLAINTIFF: Just completely unnecessary. A complete waste of the court's time; because a High Court matter precludes their application from being heard, and it means you have to approve mine. So we could've just dealt with it, and it could be done by now.

PLAINTIFF: Because you're obviously worried about ---

MS GAMBLE: I'm so sorry, your Honour. My instructing solicitor's just informed me he's out of the country on Friday.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you'll have to get someone else to instruct you.

PLAINTIFF: I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison."

• [11] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the second of the particulars of contempt.
• [12] That was followed by this exchange:

PLAINTIFF: I said, I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison, because that's where you're going under section 120 of the Criminal Code, "judicial corruption"; the benefit being to these people and you not hearing this application today. I'm - I have no doubt there have been a big discussion behind the scenes about you doing exactly what you're doing. So you're not actually acting impartially; you're not acting fairly, and you're not acting in an unwise [sic] matter.[1] So enjoy prison."

• [13] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the third of the particulars of contempt.
• [14] His Honour then told Mr Wood that he would give him an opportunity to show cause why he shouldn't be dealt with for contempt in the face of the court.
• [15] During discussions about that matter, Mr Wood told his Honour that he would file a "two and a half thousand-page affidavit proving that the court is corrupt, and I will take it to the High Court if necessary, and you will all be disrobed."
• [16] The following exchange then took place:

"HIS HONOUR: Fair enough. I will give you until Wednesday 10 am to show cause why I shouldn't deal with you for contempt, and ---

PLAINTIFF: I file that as an affidavit, do I, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: No. Just listen to me, please. What I'm wanting to do is give you an opportunity to withdraw the remarks you've made in court today. Now ---

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt. I'm not withdrawing those statements, because they are factual and truthful.

HIS HONOUR: All right. You are to appear before me at 10 am next Wednesday.

PLAINTIFF: What was the date for the other hearing, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: The other hearing will be the following Friday. Ms Gamble, it may not be appropriate for me to hear it, but I'll see what happens on Wednesday.

PLAINTIFF: So do I file my two and a-half page affidavit before Wednesday, or do you just want it on the day?

PLAINTIFF: And I said, it's a two and a-half - it's already done up.

HIS HONOUR: I'm giving you an opportunity to withdraw your remarks, and if ---

• [17] The statements by Mr Wood in bold constitute the fourth of the particulars of contempt identified in the applicant's written submissions.
• [18] His Honour then went on to say that he would give Mr Wood an opportunity to withdraw his remarks and, if that did not occur, then it was likely that he would formulate a charge and that Mr Wood would be given time to respond to that charge.
• [19] Mr Wood replied as follows:

"You do that, and when you falsely charge me, I'll turn around and sue you because you haven't acted in good faith."

• [20] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the fifth of the particulars of contempt.
• [21] Soon after that Mr Wood said:

"I'll sue you personally. Yeah, false imprisonment; false arrest; false accusation. You'll go to prison for the rest of your life."

• [22] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the sixth of the particulars of contempt.

• [23] On 2 August 2023, the matter was called on before Burns J and the following exchange took place:

"HIS HONOUR: The purpose of the hearing today is to give you an opportunity to withdraw your comments from the 26th of July.

APPLICANT: Actually, your Honour, I'm going to give you the opportunity to apologise to me for abusing your power as a Supreme Court judge, which is a crime under sections 92 and 92A of the Criminal Code. Now, as I'm sure you're aware, the Court of Appeal handed down a decision on Friday last week which prevents you from holding me in contempt because you haven't complied with the rules. So I'm going to expect an apology ---

• [24] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the particular of contempt on 2 August 2023.

• [25] The Registrar has brought this application pursuant to a direction made by Burns J under r 928 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.
• [26] In the Originating Application filed by the Registrar the particulars of the alleged contempt (identified above) are set out and it is alleged:

(a) with respect to the statements made on 26 July 2023 that:

(i) by the very nature of the statements made, Mr Wood intended to interfere with the administration of justice, or intended to make those statements which had the objective tendency to interfere with the administration of justice; and

(ii) one, or more, of the statements made had a real tendency to interfere with the administration of justice and give rise to a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice by carrying one, or more, of the following implications:

• (A) the Court was incompetent;
• (B) the Court was corrupt;
• (C) the presiding judge was corrupt;
• (D) the presiding judge had committed a crime;
• (E) the Court, or judiciary, were involved in a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice; and
• (F) the presiding judge was not conducting proceedings in accordance with the law;

(b) with respect to the statement made on 2 August 2023 that:

(i) by the very nature of the statement made, Mr Wood intended to interfere with the administration of justice, or intended to make that statement which had the objective tendency to interfere with the administration of justice; and

(ii) the statement made had a real tendency to interfere with the administration of justice and give rise to a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice by carrying one, or more, of the following implications:

• (A) the Court was corrupt;
• (B) the presiding judge was corrupt;
• (C) the presiding judge had committed a crime;
• (D) the presiding judge was not conducting proceedings in accordance with the law.

The standard of proof which applies to an application of this kind

• [27] Contempt in the face of the court is a form of criminal contempt. Notwithstanding that this is a matter in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, the criminal standard of proof applies.[2] I must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements which constitute contempt of court.

Has the applicant proved that Mr Wood said what is alleged?

• [28] In my decision in The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood[3] I held that the evidence of Ms Steel (the Registrar) in her affidavit was admissible for the purposes of proving that Mr Wood had made the statements alleged in the Originating Application. The evidence consisted of the audio recordings of the proceedings before Burns J and the transcript of those proceedings based upon those audio recordings.
• [29] That is sufficient to prove, to the appropriate standard, that Mr Wood made the statements alleged to constitute contempt.
• [30] In his cross-examination of Ms Steel, Mr Wood asked her if she had become aware of allegations made in the proceeding on 26 July that Burns J had engaged in corrupt conduct. He did not suggest in his questions that the recording or the transcript was incorrect.
• [31] In Mr Nicolson's cross-examination of Mr Wood, Mr Wood was asked about the statements directed at Burns J and agreed that the transcripts contained those statements "as long as the transcripts were accurate." Mr Wood did not challenge the accuracy of the transcripts.

• [32] As is noted above, the Originating Application seeks an order that Mr Wood be punished for contempt committed in the face of the court.
• [33] To establish a contempt in the face of the court an applicant must show that the impugned conduct interferes with - or tends to interfere with - the administration of justice.[4]
• [34] The term "interfere with course of justice" comprehends an interference with the authority of the courts in the sense that there may be a detraction from the influence of judicial decisions and an impairment of confidence and respect in the courts and their judgments.[5]
• [35] It is the duty of the Court to protect the public against every attempt to overawe or intimidate the Court by insult or defamation, or to deter actual and prospective litigants from complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice.[6]
• [36] It is not the purpose of contempt proceedings to protect the judges of the court from fair, even trenchant, criticism. In R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams[7] Rich J (with whom Evatt and McTiernan JJ agreed) said:

"The jurisdiction is not given for the purpose of protecting the Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals. It is not given for the purpose of restricting honest criticism based on rational grounds of the manner in which the Court performs its functions. The law permits in respect of Courts, as of other institutions, the fullest discussions of their doings so long as that discussion is fairly conducted and is honestly directed to some definite public purpose. The jurisdiction exists in order that the authority of the law as administered in the Courts may be established and maintained." (emphasis added)

• [37] In Dunbabin, Dixon J agreed with Rich J and, speaking of the court's duty, added:

"The Court must, therefore, undertake the task notwithstanding the embarrassment of considering what it should do in relation to an attack upon itself. There is no practicable alternative. It can but do its best to disregard all considerations except those which strictly relate to the question whether the publication amounts in law to a contempt. That question is whether, if permitted and repeated, it will have a tendency to lower the authority of the Court and weaken the spirit of obedience to the law to which Rich J. has referred."[8] (emphasis added)

• [38] In Gallagher v Durack[9] the High Court confirmed the principles discussed in Dunbabin. In that case, Mr Gallagher (a union official) had been sentenced to two months' imprisonment by a judge of the Federal Court for contempt of the Court. His appeal against the sentence was allowed by the Full Court. When asked by the press for his reaction to the decision, he said: "I'm very happy to the rank and file of the union who has shown such fine support for the officials of the union and I believe that by their actions in demonstrating in walking off jobs ... I believe that that has been the main reason for the court changing its mind." The Federal Court held that in making that statement Mr Gallagher was guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to 3 months' imprisonment. In refusing an application for special leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ applied Dunbabin and said:

"The authority of the law rests on public confidence, and it is important to the stability of society that the confidence of the public should not be shaken by baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts or judges.[10]

... the applicant was insinuating that the Federal Court had bowed to outside pressure in reaching its decision. It is fundamental that a court must decide only in accordance with the evidence and argument properly and openly put before it, and not under any outside influence. What was imputed was a grave breach of duty by the court.

There can be no doubt that the offending statement amounted to a contempt of court, and if repeated was calculated to undermine public confidence in the Federal Court."[11] (emphasis added)

• [39] Mr Wood made many accusations. Chief among them was that the Court and Burns J were corrupt.
• [40] He accused Burns J of having engaged in the crime of "judicial corruption" contrary to s 120 of the Criminal Code. Section 120(1) relevantly provides:

(a) being a judicial officer, corruptly asks for, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of any kind for himself, herself or any other person on account of anything already done or omitted to be done, or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done, by the person in the person's judicial capacity; or

(b) corruptly gives, confers, or procures, or promises or offers to give or confer, or to procure or attempt to procure, to, upon, or for, a judicial officer, or to, upon, or for any other person, any property or benefit of any kind on account of any such act or omission on the part of the judicial officer;

is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years, and to be fined at the discretion of the court."

• [41] In the same accusation he claimed that there had been, in effect, a conspiracy by the members of the Court against him - "I have no doubt there have been a big discussion behind the scenes about you doing exactly what you're doing."
• [42] He accused Burns J of not acting in good faith and of acting in a way which gave rise to "false imprisonment, false arrest, false accusation."
• [43] On 2 August he effectively accused Burns J of committing the misdemeanours referred to in s 92 and s 92A of the Criminal Code. Those sections do not apply to judges. Nevertheless, the accusation was that Burns J had abused the authority of his office.
• [44] He alleged that the Supreme Court was incompetent as well as corrupt.
• [45] He threatened Burns J by saying that he would go to prison for the rest of his life.
• [46] His conduct was a mixture of abuse, insult, and threats. Judicial officers not infrequently have to deal with people who are highly emotional or are dissatisfied with the decision made by a court or are simply overwhelmed by the events. Sometimes this leads to a litigant saying something in the heat of the moment which, upon calm reflection, they would not have. Sometimes words are used which are insulting. But, as is noted above, proceedings for contempt are not for the protection of judges' feelings or to constrain honest criticism. It is well accepted that this jurisdiction should be exercised with caution and, in many cases, judges will overlook affronts where the litigant has said something while temporarily angry.
• [47] Insults are best treated with disdain except when, as Lord Denning said in Balogh v St Albans Crown Court,[12] "they are gross and scandalous." The nature of the words used needs to be determined objectively. It was put this way by Philp J:

"The crucial question argued was whether the words used were in fact insulting beyond reasonable doubt. This involves an enquiry as to whether a reasonable magistrate - not merely a reasonable man - but a reasonable magistrate exercising his office would be insulted by the words used and as to whether the words used are beyond reasonable doubt insulting." [13]

• [48] I am satisfied that each of Mr Wood's statements comprising the particulars of contempt in the originating application interfere with or tend to interfere with the administration of justice. The statements made by Mr Wood which are identified in the Originating Application were contemptuous. Similar statements have been found to be contemptuous in other circumstances, for example:

(a) accusing a magistrate of injustice;[14]

(b) accusing a judge of corruption - "to refer to a judge as 'corrupt' is an insult of the worst kind, designed to impair 'confidence in the courts and their judgements'";[15]

(c) asserting that a particular court or judge engaged in corruption did "not amount to legitimate criticism of court decisions but [was] 'scurrilous abuse'";[16]

(d) accusing a judge of dishonesty;[17]

(e) saying that "I hope I have been brought before a Court of law" was nothing other than a suggestion to the effect the judge was not conducting the proceedings in accordance with the law, and "that constitutes a serious contempt of court;"[18] and

(f) saying to a magistrate "And that's why you don't do things according to law" had the clear imputation that the magistrate did not apply the law and generally did not apply the law in accordance with his judicial oath.[19]

• [49] Mr Woods' behaviour was not spontaneous. On 26 July it was deliberate and repetitive, for example, the reference to sections of the Criminal Code and the statement made three times that "The court is corrupt". On 2 August, his answer had the hallmarks of a prepared statement with a further reference to the Criminal Code.
• [50] While there is no requirement for the Registrar to prove that Mr Wood intended to interfere with the due administration of justice,[20] where intent is found, contempt is more easily established.[21] From the nature of the words used, and the context in which they were used, Mr Wood's conduct and remarks were intended to interfere with the due administration of justice.
• [51] The words set out in the Originating Application constituted contempt in the face of the court.

• [52] The summary remedy of fine or imprisonment can be applied only "where the attacks are unwarrantable."[22] That is a proposition which has been accepted since, at least, the High Court's decision in R v Nicholls[23] where Griffith CJ[24] said:

"Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no court could or would treat that as contempt of Court."

• [53] The description of what will not be a contempt of court - and for these purposes there is no difference between scandalising the court and committing a contempt in the face of the court - carries with it the defence which is available.
• [54] I proceed on the basis that truth can be a defence to a charge of contempt, at least by way of scandalising in the court. As Brennan J said in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills:[25]

"It is sufficient to say that the revelation of truth - at all events when its revelation is for the public benefit - and the making of a fair criticism based on fact do not amount to a contempt of court though the truth revealed or the criticism made is such as to deprive the court or judge of public confidence."

• [55] It is important to note that Brennan J premised the defence on the revelation being for the public benefit. Criticism of courts and judges, made in good faith, will usually not carry the mark of contempt. It may be that some revelations will always be in the public interest. In McGuirk v University of New South Wales[26] James J considered the availability of truth as a defence to a charge of scandalising the court. He said:

"[262] There are obvious difficulties in permitting a defence of truth to be available. Borrie & Lowe say at 357:

"The problem, of course, is that in considering such a defence a judge would have to decide whether the courts were biased, corrupt or whatever."

[263] At para 191 of his judgment in Hoser[27] Eames J said:

"There are compelling policy reasons why courts were reluctant to allow a defence of truth. As was discussed by the Australian Law Reform Commission in a research paper in 1986, to allow such a defence risked the court becoming embroiled in an investigation of the merits of the scandalising remarks ..."

[264] If truth is a defence, then in the present case I will have to enter into a consideration of at least the question whether the allegations made by Mr McGuirk against Simpson J were true.

[265] In para 58 of his judgment in Hoser Eames J concluded:

... Although the law cannot be taken to be settled, it does now seem that both defences (that is truth and fair comment) are available in Australia ...

[266] After examining parts of the judgments of the members of the High Court in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1991-[1992] HCA 46; 1992) 177 CLR 1, Eames J said at para 82 of his judgment:

Whilst the statements in Nationwide News v Wills strongly suggest that defences of truth and fair comment now apply, the question cannot be taken to be concluded ...

[267] I have already quoted part of para 16 of the judgment of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Hoser[28], where the court said that Eames J's exposition of the law could be accepted and noted that the prosecution had accepted on the appeal that truth and fair comment were available as defences to a charge of contempt by scandalising the court.

[268] I consider that I should proceed on the basis that truth is available as a defence to a charge of contempt by scandalising the court.

[269] I further consider, as was held by Eames J at para 190 of his judgment in Hoser, that the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the allegations said to scandalise the court were not true. However, an evidentiary burden would rest on the defendant (Hoser at 194). To raise the defence it would not be sufficient for the defendant merely to allege, for example, that he had been the victim of bias and corruption. Eames J suggested that, even to raise the defence, a defendant would have to point to clear evidence of patent bias."

• [56] In the first instance decision in Hoser Eames J said:

"[190] Use of the word "defence" as a shorthand expression in discussion of a "defence" to a criminal charge does not mean that there is any onus on the accused person to prove that he or she is not guilty. It seems to me that once it is accepted that there is a "defence" of truth, then a similar position must pertain in the law of contempt by scandalising the court, as would pertain where a "defence" of provocation or self-defence is raised in a murder trial. Thus, in this contempt case, whether or not Hoser seeks to prove positively the truth of the allegation which has been made, if there is some credible evidence of the truth of the allegation, then the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the magistrate was not bribed or corrupted as alleged in the published statements.

[194] What constitutes some credible evidence to raise the "defence" may require analysis in later cases. In my view, however, it could not be sufficient for an accused person to merely allege that he or she was the victim of bias and corruption, and to point to the transcript of the trial in order to raise the "defence", especially where the trial had been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal. In my view, a presumption of regularity would have application in that situation. It may be that an accused person, to raise the defence, would have to first point to some clear evidence of the kind contemplated in Ahnee v DPP and by McHugh J in Nationwide News v Wills when considering instances of patent bias which would constitute an exception to the general rule that it would always be contempt to accuse a judge or magistrate of bias or a lack of impartiality." (emphasis added, citations omitted)

• [57] The "clear evidence" referred to in Ahnee v DPP[29] concerned a contempt which scandalised the court. In the Privy Council's judgment, Lord Steyn said:

"Their Lordships have already concluded the offence of scandalising the court exists in principle to protect the administration of justice. ... Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the offence is narrowly defined. It does not extend to comment on the conduct of a judge unrelated to his performance on the bench. It exists solely to protect the administration of justice rather than the feelings of judges. There must be a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. The field of application of the offence is also narrowed by the need in a democratic society for public scrutiny of the conduct of judges, and for the right of citizens to comment on matters of public concern. There is available to a defendant a defence based on the "right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice:" see Reg. v. Gray [1900] UKLawRpKQB 63; [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, 40; Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322, 335 and Badry v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1983] 2 A.C. 297. The classic illustration of such an offence is the imputation of improper motives to a judge. But, so far as may suggest that such conduct must invariably be an offence their Lordships consider that such an absolute statement is not nowadays acceptable. For example, if a judge descends into the arena and embarks on extensive and plainly biased questioning of a defendant in a criminal trial, a criticism of bias may not be an offence. The exposure and criticism of such judicial misconduct would be in the public interest. On this point their Lordships prefer the view of the Australian courts that such conduct is not necessarily an offence: ; Given the narrow scope of the offence of scandalising the court, their Lordships are satisfied that the constitutional criterion that it must be necessary in a democratic society is in principle made out. The contrary argument is rejected." (emphasis added)

• [58] In The Law of Contempt[30] the learned author considers the issue of defences available in a contempt application and says:

"... if the impropriety alleged against the court or judge is true, the wrong is surely committed by the court or judge, not by the person who seeks to expose it. In such circumstances, the court or judge is responsible for the diminution in public confidence and respect for the administration of justice. In this context, it is not apparent why the defence of justification should be conditioned upon proof of a distinct requirement that the publication was for the public benefit or in the public interest."

• [59] That is consistent with Rich J's remark in Dunbabin that:

"The jurisdiction [to punish for contempt] ... is not given for the purpose of restricting honest criticism based on rational grounds of the manner in which the Court performs its functions."[31]

• [60] What is obvious from all these discussions is that a statement that is fair or reasonable or honest or made in good faith will usually not be contemptuous. And it follows that, if a respondent fairly demonstrates, through some credible evidence, the truth of the statement, then that will usually require the applicant to prove beyond reasonable doubt the absence of truth and so on.
• [61] I respectfully agree with what Eames J said in Hoser namely that it will not be enough for an accused person to merely allege that he or she was the victim of bias or corruption, and to point to the transcript of the trial in order to raise the "defence", especially where the trial had been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal.[32]
• [62] How far does a respondent have to go to "raise the defence"? It is not enough to merely assert corruption, there must be some credible evidence of the factual circumstances which constitute the alleged corruption. The extent to which a defendant will need to go will depend upon the nature and extent of the statement made. The more serious an accusation is, the more a defendant will have to show in order to trigger the requirement that the applicant has to disprove the accusation.

• [63] Mr Wood gave evidence orally and by way of affidavit. His affidavit referred to 16 separate court appearances - two in the Magistrates Court, eleven in the District Court and three in the Supreme Court (including a Court of Appeal matter). With respect to each of them, he identifies the date of the hearing, the judicial officer involved and alleges that the judicial officer "engaged in judicial corruption for the benefit of" identified parties. Those parties include: the Director of Public Prosecutions, the police, the State of Queensland, particular solicitors and firms of solicitors, Crown Law, and other judicial officers. With respect to each of those allegations a transcript of either the proceeding, or the decision in the proceeding, is exhibited.
• [64] Mr Wood contended that the material in his affidavit was relevant to the statement that he had made on a number of occasions that "The court is corrupt." He did not suggest that it was relevant to any of the statements directed at Burns J personally.
• [65] He accepted that, in each of the matters identified in his affidavit, he was unsuccessful but he said (in cross-examination) that he was unsuccessful:

"Not because my arguments were invalid or not based in law or backed up by case law, I was unsuccessful because the magistrates, judges and justices hearing the matters were corrupt and made unlawful rulings in violation of section 120 of the Criminal Code, judicial corruption, to benefit the various people that I was opposing."

• [66] It may be observed that, of the incidents which he said supported his allegation that the Court was corrupt, only three of them relate to the Supreme Court. His statements to Burns J could only have been with respect to the Supreme Court but I have read each of the transcripts or decisions about which he complained save for Exhibits 15 and 16. Exhibit 15 is the transcript of a five-day trial in the District Court and Exhibit 16 is the transcript of a seven-day trial in that court. With those exhibits I have gone to those parts of the transcripts which relate to his assertion of corruption. I have considered all the exhibits in case it might be said that his assertions of corruption were directed towards the judiciary of Queensland as a whole because that appears to be the case he makes. In his oral evidence he said that "the law of contempt is to protect the court itself ... the court refers to the Supreme Court of Queensland, the District Court of Queensland, the Magistrates Court of Queensland."
• [67] I can find nothing which supports or even hints at support for his assertion of corruption. Likewise there was nothing to suggest incompetence or breach of duty. In these matters Mr Wood takes the view that if a judicial officer rejects his arguments, then that judicial officer is corrupt. The fact that the Court of Appeal upheld a decision which was against him was simply further evidence, in his eyes, of corruption.
• [68] With respect to one of the decisions by a judge of this court, he appealed and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.[33] The decision in that case is a good example of Mr Wood's misunderstanding of the law. A judge in the Trial Division dismissed the proceeding under r 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. Mr Wood had sued solicitors who had acted for him in relation to a charge of assault occasioning bodily harm. He retained those solicitors for about six weeks until they withdrew as solicitors on the record. He then retained another solicitor and then eventually represented himself. About three years later he sued the original firm claiming $3 million. The claim did not comply with the rules as it did not state the nature of the claim made or the relief sought, it simply demanded a sum of money. The statement of claim purported to be one for "loss and injury" suffered as a result of what he alleged to have been "professional misconduct".

Does the applicant have to show that the remarks made affected the judge's impartiality?

• [73] Mr Wood argued that the Registrar had to call evidence from Burns J to show that his impartiality was affected.
• [74] An applicant in the Registrar's position does not have to call evidence to show that a particular judge was affected in such a way that he or she could no longer be regarded as impartial.
• [75] An applicant will succeed where it is shown that the words used have, for example, "a tendency to lower the authority of the Court and weaken the spirit of obedience to the law"[35] or are "baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts or judges."[36]
• [76] Mr Wood concluded his submissions in this way:

" ... if any judge wants to hold someone in contempt anymore, they need to file an affidavit and they need to come in and get cross-examined, because otherwise there is no evidence that can refute the defendant's claim that the statements were reasonable and fair and made in good faith, and blah, blah, blah."

• [77] That exemplifies an underlying flaw in Mr Wood's argument. When claims of gross misbehaviour are made, it is for the person making those allegations to call evidence sufficient to establish the claims on the balance of probabilities. Mere assertion is not enough.

• [78] I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by making the statements identified in the Originating Application Mr Wood was guilty of contempt in the face of the court.
• [79] I will hear the parties further in relation to penalty and costs.

[1] In the audio recording it appears that Mr Wood said "manner" rather than "matter".

[2] Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534.

[3] [2024] QSC 21.

[4] Lewis v Ogden [1984] HCA 26; (1984) 153 CLR 682 at 688.

[5] Ex parte Tuckerman [1970] 3 NSWR 23 at 27.

[6] R v Fletcher; Ex parte Kisch [1935] HCA 1; (1935) 52 CLR 248 at 257.

[7] [1935] HCA 34; (1935) 53 CLR 434 at 442-3.

[8] [1935] HCA 34; (1935) 53 CLR 434 at 447.

[9] [1983] HCA 2; (1983) 152 CLR 238.

[12] [1975] 1 QB 73 at 86.

[13] Reece v McKenna; ex parte McKenna [1953] St R Qd 258 at 263.

[14] Reece v McKenna; ex parte McKenna [1953] St R Qd 258.

[15] Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2007] SASC 447 at [46].

[16] Mahaffy v Mahaffy [2018] NSWCA 42 at [223].

[17] Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21; (2016) 36 NTLR 203.

[18] Dow v Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 58 at 62.

[19] Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Di Carlo [2017] QSC 171 at [4].

[20] Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Collins [1982] 1 NSWLR 682 at 690-691; John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae [1955] HCA 12; (1955) 93 CLR 351 at 371.

[21] Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Collins [1982] 1 NSWLR 682.

[22] Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2; (1983) 152 CLR 238.

[23] [1911] HCA 22; (1911) 12 CLR 280.

[24] Adopting the words of Lord Russell of Killowen LC in R v Gray [1900] UKLawRpKQB 63; (1900) 2 QB 36 at 40.

[25] [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 39.

[26] [2009] NSWSC 1058.

[27] [2001] VSC 443.

[28] [2003] VSCA 194.

[29] [1999] UKPC 11; [1999] 2 AC 294.

[30] David Rolph, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2023 at 293.

[31] R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams [1935] HCA 34; (1935) 53 CLR 434 at 442.

[32] [2001] VSC 443 at [194].

[33] Wood v Robertson O'Gorman Solicitors Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 201.

[34] [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125.

[36] Per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ in Gallagher v Durack.