Break fee and exclusivity provisions
19 Pursuant to cl 12.2 of the Scheme Implementation Deed, OTW must pay ABB a reimbursement fee, often referred to as a break fee, of $3,439,682 in the specific circumstances there prescribed (OTW Break Fee).
20 Broadly speaking, the OTW Break Fee is payable if:
(a) a competing transaction is announced within 6 months of the date of the Scheme Implementation Deed (Exclusivity Period) and within 12 months of such announcement that transaction is completed;
(b) during the Exclusivity Period, a director of OTW fails to recommend the Scheme or otherwise withdraws or adversely changes or qualifies his or her recommendation unless the Independent Expert for the Scheme concludes that the Scheme is not in the best interests of the shareholders of OTW (for a reasons other than the existence of a competing transaction), OTW is entitled to terminate the Scheme Implementation Deed or there is a 17.5% or greater fall in the share price of ABB;
(c) ABB validly terminates the Scheme Implementation Deed.
21 The OTW Break Fee represents 1.000006% of the equity value of OTW of $343,966,127, being $5.75 per OTW share multiplied by the fully diluted share capital of OTW (59,820,196 shares).
22 Break fees are not uncommon features in schemes of arrangement and have not been an obstacle to the making of orders under s 411(1) of the Act. They have been justified by reference to the costs incurred by the bidder, the benefit the bidder confers on scheme participants by increasing the value of the target company and the desirability, from the perspective of members, of the making of takeover offers to them: APN News & Media Limited, in the matter of APN News & Media Limited (2007) 62 ACSR 400; [2007] FCA 770 (APN News) at [43]-[44] (Lindgren J); Japara Healthcare Limited, in the matter of Japara Healthcare Limited [2021] FCA 1150 (Japara) at [44]-[50] (Moshinsky J); In the matter of iCar Asia Limited [2021] NSWSC 1713 at [28] (Black J).
23 The OTW Break Fee of 1.000006% of the equity value of OTW is consistent with the Takeovers Panel's guideline that break fees should not exceed 1% of the target's equity value: Australian Government Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note 7, Lock-up devices, Fourth Issue, 11 February 2010 (Guidance Note 7) at [9]; and APN News at [46]-[55].
24 I am satisfied that the evidence of Mr Omeros, for OTW, and Mr Maher, for ABB, establishes that the OTW Break Fee was arrived at as a result of negotiation between OTW and ABB, that the directors of OTW consider that the amount of the break fee was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances to secure the benefits to OTW and the Scheme Participants from the Scheme and that ABB would not have entered into the Scheme Implementation Deed in the absence of the OTW Break Fee.
25 Further, the triggers for the payment of the OTW Break Fee, such as a change in the directors' recommendation or the completion of a competing proposal, are consistent with the principles set forth in the Guidance Note 7 at [9].
26 No entitlement to the break fee arises if the shareholders do not approve the Scheme by the requisite majorities. I am therefore satisfied that it does not give rise to an inappropriate disincentive to Scheme Participants in their consideration of the proposed merger: Adelaide Bank Limited, in the matter of Adelaide Bank Limited [2007] FCA 1582 at [31] (Lander J); and In the matter of BINGO Industries Limited [2021] NSWSC 798 at [23].
27 I also note that both OTW and ABB are represented by firms with extensive mergers and acquisitions experience and the existence of the OTW Break Fee is prominently disclosed in section 12 of the Scheme Booklet.
28 The Scheme Implementation Deed also includes exclusivity provisions which OTW had granted in favour of ABB. These provisions include provisions that are commonly referred to as "no shop", "no talk" and "no due diligence" clauses. They also include obligations to notify ABB of any alternative offers and gives ABB a right to make a counter-proposal. These restrictions and obligations are subject to exceptions to the extent that they are inconsistent with fiduciary or statutory duties owed by the directors of OTW.
29 As I explained in DTS at [27];
Exclusivity restrictions in this form are now common in s 411 schemes and are consistent with the terms of the Takeovers Panel Guidance Note 7: Australian Government Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note 7, Lock-up devices, Fourth Issue, 11 February 2010 (Guidance Note 7). They have not been regarded as an impediment to the convening of a meeting to approve a scheme, subject to appropriate disclosure in the scheme booklet: Re Toll Holdings Limited [2015] VSC 123 at [36] (Robson J); Re Skilled Group Limited (No 1) (2015) 113 ACSR 525; [2015] VSC 789 at [50] (Robson J); Coca-Cola Amatil at [20]; and BINGO Industries at [25] (Black J).
30 I am satisfied that the exclusivity provisions in the Scheme Implementation Deed are sufficiently and appropriately disclosed in the Scheme Booklet.