then, to that extent (and only to that extent) APN will not be obliged to make that payment and INMAL must refund to APN that payment if already made. To the extent reasonably possible, APN must submit in any relevant proceedings that no such determination should be made or that if any such determination is to be made, it should apply only to the extent that the Payment is made or to be made in excess of the amount of the actual costs incurred, directly or indirectly, by INMAL, the Consortium and their Related Bodies Corporate as a result of the Scheme not being implemented in accordance with this Agreement.
12.4 Acknowledgement
INMAL acknowledges and agrees on its own behalf and on behalf of the Consortium, to the extent permitted by law, its sole remedy against APN for any breach of this Agreement (including any breach of a warranty or representation), will be to terminate this Agreement under clause 14 and seek and enforce the payment of the Payment.
41 There are similarities between cl 12.3 and cl 11.6 noted at [28] ff above. For the reasons I gave at [32] in relation to cl 11.6, cl 12.3 does not assist me for present purposes. It is enlivened only if and when a court, arbitral tribunal or the Takeovers Panel makes a determination, but none of those things may ever happen.
42 Clause 12.4 may benefit APN: whether it does so depends on whether a breach of the SIA by APN would render APN liable to INMAL in an amount of damages exceeding $27.5 million. I have no means of knowing the answer to this question.
43 Provisions for the payment of break fees are not uncommon in agreements for schemes of arrangements and in merger and takeover agreements, both in Australia and overseas. Such provisions have not been an obstacle to the making of orders under s 411(1) of the Act for the convening of meetings. In Re SFE Corporation Ltd [2006] FCA 670 at [6]-[7], Gyles J said that he would be dissuaded from making an order by a break fee only if the amount was of such magnitude that it could influence voting or if there were some other unusual circumstances.
44 Break fees are justified by reference to:
· the costs incurred by the offeror company;
· the benefit that that company confers on the members of the target company by increasing its value; and
· the desirability, from the viewpoint of those members, that takeover offers be made to them.
45 Clearly, a company making an approach to the board of a target company is entitled to stipulate as a term of its offer that the target company agree to a provision for a break fee. It is entitled to inform that board that if it does not agree to the break fee, the offer will not be made to the target company's shareholders, and it is entitled not to make the offer to the target's shareholders, if its board does not agree to the break fee. The question is what is the appropriate response of the target company's directors, and later of the Court.
46 Rule 21.2 of the United Kingdom's City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (8th ed, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ("UK Takeover Panel"), 2006) and the UK Takeover Panel's Practice Statement No 4, Rule 21.2 - Inducement Fees (2004) recognise and permit break fees provided:
· the fee is de minimis (normally not more than one percent of the value of the diluted equity share capital of the offeree company);
· the board of the target company and its financial adviser, confirm certain matters to the Panel in writing, including that the fee arrangement was the result of normal commercial negotiation and that they believe the agreement to pay the fee to be in the best interests of the offeree shareholders;
· any fee arrangement is fully disclosed in the press release announcing the offer and in the offer document, the terms of the actual fee agreement being made available for public scrutiny; and
· the Panel is consulted at the earliest opportunity in all cases where an inducement fee or similar arrangement is proposed.
47 In the United States of America, it appears that break fees higher than one percent are regarded as unobjectionable by the courts, although the difference may be explained by the fact that break fees there appear to be usually expressed as a percentage of the purchase price rather than as a percentage of equity share capital: Kenyon-Slade S, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK: Law and Practice (OUP, 2003) at [5.279] ff. In the work just cited, Dr Kenyon-Slade states (at [5.279]-[5.280]):
If a competing bidder acquires the Target, the cost of the break-up fee is effectively assumed by such bidder as a liability of the Target corporation. The result is to increase the cost of the acquisition by the amount of the break-up fee. Break-up fees typically range from 1% to 4% of the purchase price specified in the Merger Agreement with the Acquiror (with 2-3% being most typical). Such amounts can, of course, be substantial.
Break-up fees are routine and will usually withstand judicial scrutiny. It is important, however, that such fees remain reasonable and not so high as to represent an unreasonable deterrent to other potential Acquirors.
48 In Australia the Takeovers Panel's Guidance Note 7: Lock-up Devices (2nd issue, 2005) ("Takeovers Panel's Guidance Note 7") states (at [7.18]):
It is good practice for anyone who agrees to pay a break fee to negotiate a fixed or capped figure, whether dollar or percentage based. In this regard, the Panel will use a guideline that a fee should not exceed 1% of the equity value of the target. For this purpose, the equity value is the aggregate of the value of all classes of equity securities issued by the target, where relevant having regard to the value of the consideration under the bid, as at the date the bid is announced.
49 The Takeovers Panel has had occasion to consider break fees in the context of takeovers under Ch 6 of the Act: see the discussion in Renard IA and Santamaria JG, Takeovers and Reconstruction in Australia (Butterworths, looseleaf service) at [1149], esp at 11,173 ff. Break fees were considered by the Panel in Re Normandy Mining Ltd (No 3) (2002) 20 ACLC 471; Re Ballarat Goldfields NL (2002) 41 ACSR 691; and Re National Can Industries Ltd (No 1) (2003) 48 ACSR 409 ("National Can"). In National Can, the review panel stated (at 434 [33]):
We consider that a 1% fee is usually not materially anti-competitive and does not place unreasonable pressure on shareholders. This is the basis for the choice of the 1% guideline in GN7. Further, we query whether a sunk cost is anti-competitive if shareholders reject the scheme and agree with the initial panel's statement [made earlier at 418 [42]]: "In these circumstances, we do not entirely reject the notion that a fee should be payable if and when a proposal the directors endorsed was rejected by shareholders. As GN7 puts it, such a fee may be an appropriate price to secure an opportunity broadly in the nature of an option [GN7 at para 7.21]".
50 In the present case, based on the Scheme Consideration of $6.20 per APN Share, the total equity value of all APN Shares, notes and options is $3,114,100,000 as set out at p 42 of the Scheme Booklet. The break fee of $27.5 million is 0.88308 percent of that amount. Based on the original offer of $6.10 announced on 12 February 2007, the total equity value would be $3,062,700,000, of which the break fee of $27.5 million is 0.89790 percent.
51 It is interesting to digress to consider the break fee as a percentage of the Scheme Consideration in conformity with the United States practice.
(a) The number of APN Shares on issue as at 31 December 2006 was 460,286,596. According to p 164 of the Scheme Booklet, if all APN Notes are converted and all Options are exercised, there would be 513,145,200 APN Shares on issue.
(b) According to p 164 and p 228 of the Scheme Booklet, the total number of Scheme Shares is 381,604,127. Section 11.8 on p 224 of the Scheme Booklet states that 764,420 notes will be redeemed rather than converted into APN Shares.
(c) Based on $6.20 per share, the total Scheme Consideration for the Scheme Shares is $2,365,945,587, of which the $27.5 million break fee is 1.16 percent (it would be 0.86 percent of the consideration that would be payable if all APN Shares were being acquired).
(d) Based on $6.10 per share, the total Scheme Consideration for the Scheme Shares would have been $2,327,785,175, of which the $27.5 million break fee would have been 1.18 percent (it would have been 0.88 percent of the consideration that would have been payable if all APN Shares were being acquired).
52 Would APN's liability to pay the break fee of $27.5 million be likely to coerce Offeree Shareholders into agreeing to the Scheme, or to deter companies from making a competing offer? The two considerations are related. A potential competing offeror must be prepared to pay $27.5 million plus something more than $6.20 per share if it is to have any chance of success. If the Offeree Shareholders think that no potential competing offeror would be prepared to go so far, they may feel that they have no alternative but to agree to the Scheme.
53 Having regard to the percentages mentioned above and to the approach taken to the present question in the takeover context by the Takeovers Panel as explained above, I answer the question posed in the last paragraph "No".
54 Clearly, the notion of a reasonable level of break fee will depend on the denominator by reference to which the percentage break fee is to be calculated. If, as here, the offer is for only part of the issued capital, the amount of the consideration offered can be expected to be lower than the equity value of the target company, and therefore the break fee expressed as a percentage can be expected to be higher, than it would be if equity value is the denominator. The one percent level identified by the UK Takeover Panel and the Australian Takeovers Panel has been fixed by reference to equity value, and the break fee of $27.5 million is less than one percent of equity value.
55 My consideration of the provisions for the no-shop and break fee provisions in this case has led me to the view that it would be desirable that applications under s 411(1) be supported by affidavit evidence directed to showing:
· that the no-shop and break fee provisions are the result of a normal commercial negotiation, and explaining, at least briefly and in general terms, the factual basis for that statement (see [46] above);
· that the directors of the target company, or at least those directors of it who are not affiliated with the offeror, believe that the provisions do not operate against the interests of offeree shareholders, and that in fact it was in the interests of such shareholders that the directors agreed to the inclusion of the provisions in the merger implementation agreement (see [46] above and In re Paramount Communications Inc Shareholders' Litigation 637 A2d 34 (Del Supr 1993) for a case in which a target company's directors' commitment to no-shop and break fee provisions was held, in all the circumstances, to constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty); and
· in the case of the break fee, explaining, by reference to calculations based on the evidence before the Court, the percentage that the break fee represents (a) of the "equity value" of the target company, calculated in accordance with para 7.18 of the Takeovers Panel's Guidance Note 7, and (b) of the scheme consideration (the explanation might, instead, be conveyed in a submission, but still by reference to the evidence before the Court).
If the independent expert is in a position to express an opinion on the matter (see s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)), the expert should state whether the no-shop and break fee provisions appear to be reasonable and not detrimental to the interests of shareholders, and if so, the basis for that opinion. Of course, the independent expert's opinions that agreement to the Scheme is in the best interests of the offeree shareholders and that no superior proposal is likely to be made, must not have been arrived at as a result of the very existence of the no-shop and break fee provisions (see [52] above).