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[2017] VSC 701
Supreme Court of Victoria
2017-11-22
ELLIOTT J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JOINT VENTURE - Agreement between joint venturers - Nature of agreement - Duties arising from negotiations and transactions - Joint venture company incorporated after trading commenced - Further trading - Duties of directors - Fiduciary duties - Confidential information - Unauthorised use - Accessorial liability.
1 This proceeding concerns a joint venture for the export of cattle to Israel.
2 In November 2012, the parties behind the joint venture agreed to the basis upon which anticipated contracts were to be "[put] together". At this time, the parties also agreed to incorporate a joint venture vehicle, which would be named "AHRKalimpa".
3 The 3 individuals involved were Haim Bzezinski ("Bzezinski") and Danny Ruschin ("Ruschin") (who are both associated with the plaintiffs), and the first defendant, Alan Schmidt ("Schmidt").
4 In March 2013, before any formal joint venture contracts were entered into, cattle were exported to Israel pursuant to agreements for 2 shipments ("Voyage 1" and "Voyage 2" respectively). The contracting party as supplier for Voyages 1 and 2 was the second defendant, Otway Livestock Exports Pty Ltd (then known as AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd) ("Otway Livestock"). It was common ground that Voyages 1 and 2 were done on behalf of a joint venture, albeit the terms of that joint venture are in dispute.[1]
5 By mid-2013, issues had arisen with respect to finalising the terms of the joint venture. Despite this the joint venturers agreed to a third and a fourth shipment of cattle to Israel ("Voyage 3" and "Voyage 4" respectively). Although the terms of the joint venture remained in dispute, it was also common ground that Voyages 3 and 4 were conducted pursuant to the same joint venture as for Voyages 1 and 2.
6 Ultimately, the parties behind the venture were unable to agree upon the terms of the joint venture for the purposes of formal documentation or any further shipments.
7 Since the collapse of the relationship, Schmidt has continued to be involved in exporting cattle to Israel, through Otway Livestock.
(1) Whether a binding joint venture agreement was ever entered into.
(2) If no to (1), whether a fiduciary relationship, or other relationship involving equitable obligations, was created based on the transactions conducted and the related negotiations.
(3) If yes to (1) or (2) above, what were the terms of that venture or what was the nature of that relationship; and what obligations were imposed, including with respect to the future.
(4) Regardless of the answers to (1) to (3) above, whether Schmidt breached his duties as a director of AHRKalimpa by arranging for the continuation of the business of exporting cattle to Israel without the involvement of AHRKalimpa, and then resigning as a director and subsequently conducting that business through Otway Livestock.
(5) Regardless of the answers to (1) to (4), whether confidential information was provided to the defendants in circumstances imposing an obligation of confidentiality, and whether that obligation was breached by unauthorised use of the information.
9 For the reasons that follow, while the plaintiffs have failed to prove a binding joint venture agreement in the terms alleged, they have succeeded in establishing that fiduciary duties owing by the defendants were breached and that, in addition, Schmidt breached his statutory duties as a director. The plaintiffs have also established that certain confidential information provided to the defendants was the subject of unauthorised use by them.
10 Schmidt and his wife, Rachael Schmidt, have been directors of Otway Livestock since its incorporation in 1995.
11 The first plaintiff, AHRKalimpa Pty Ltd ("AHRKalimpa") was incorporated on 27 June 2013. At all material times from November 2012 up to its incorporation, it was proposed that AHRKalimpa would be the joint venture vehicle. Its founding directors were Schmidt, and his adviser, David Dunn ("Dunn"). Dunn was an experienced commercial lawyer. Dunn and Schmidt had an established close working relationship.[2] Dunn was only a director for 2 months, before he resigned and Bzezinski became a director.
12 Schmidt continued to be a director until 25 November 2013. Since then, Bzezinski has been the sole director of AHRKalimpa.
13 From the time of the incorporation of the second plaintiff, Kalimpa Pty Ltd ("Kalimpa"), on 4 August 2011, until 21 May 2015, Bzezinski was its sole director. He was replaced by Julia Ruschin ("J Ruschin"). J Ruschin resigned from that position on 3 January 2017, whereupon Bzezinski resumed the position of sole director.
14 J Ruschin's husband, Ruschin, is a business associate of Bzezinski. Having met in 2003, Ruschin spoke with Bzezinski in 2008 about the possibility of getting involved together in the export of cattle to Israel. Ruschin and Bzezinski agreed Ruschin would investigate and research the Israeli cattle market, with Bzezinski providing support, including financial assistance. Ruschin agreed to share with Bzezinski the product of his work, but otherwise the information was to be kept confidential.
15 Ruschin and Bzezinski have been involved in the business activities of Kalimpa since its incorporation. Ruschin holds his 50 percent interest "through" J Ruschin. Bzezinski owns the other 50 percent of the shares.
16 The 3 key individuals in this case are Bzezinski, Ruschin and Schmidt. On the whole, each of them gave frank and responsive evidence. Given the lapse of time, none of them had a perfect memory of all of the relevant events. Each of them readily acknowledged this. Although this affected the reliability of their evidence in some minor respects, each of them was a credible witness.
B.2 Dealings prior to the joint venture discussions
17 In 2008, Ruschin started acquiring knowledge about the Israeli cattle market. He made inquiries of people that he knew in Israel, and then approached others based on references given by those people. It was a work in progress for approximately 3 years, during which Ruschin gradually accumulated more and more information.
18 Ruschin made inquiries at various levels. He often spent extended hours on the telephone establishing relationships with various persons in Israel.[3] He spoke to importers, quarantine officials, veterinary officers, compliance auditors, feedlot owners and others. He also got to know the managing director of the Beef Association in Israel, who was a valuable source of information. All discussions, primarily over the telephone, were conducted in Hebrew.
19 From 2008 to 2011, Ruschin also investigated the Australian export market to ascertain appropriate suppliers of live cattle to Israel.
20 During the course of his investigations, and his discussions with Bzezinski, a strategy was conceived for exporting cattle to Israel. In broad terms, Ruschin was able to get the 2 largest importers to agree to have their shipments coordinated. By working together, these importers were able to use the same vessel at the same time. According to Ruschin, this had not been done before. With this possibility in place, by 2011 Ruschin and Bzezinski considered they were in a position to find an appropriate "partner" to export beef to Israel. Neither of them had any experience in exporting live cattle from Australia and needed a co-venturer with this experience and ability in order to succeed.
21 The nature of the Israeli market was the subject of expert evidence. It may be described as a feeder market, with the imported live cattle subject to extended feeding periods before processing. Further, because of the particular requirements of the market, including ensuring that the meat will be kosher, more sophisticated infrastructure and management is required to successfully export livestock to Israel.
22 Further, like many other international markets, the Israeli market relies heavily on relationships between buyer and seller. With only a small number of importers in Israel, who have specific commercial requirements, these relationships may take on considerable significance. Furthermore, any exporter would need to understand the applicable animal health protocols, which are complex.
23 Perhaps these circumstances explain, at least in part, why the volume of cattle exported to Israel from Australia is relatively small. For example, in the 2009 to 2010 financial year, of a total of $698.2 million of cattle exported from Australia, only $21.2 million represented exports to Israel.[4] For the 2008 to 2009 financial year only $9.8 million of cattle was exported to Israel out of a total of $646 million worldwide.[5]
24 In 2011, Schmidt was employed by Elders International Australia Ltd ("Elders"), as marketing manager for international live exports. In that role, Schmidt was responsible for Elders' exporting of livestock to Turkey, Russia and China. He also oversaw the purchase of cattle from Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Paraguay and the United States of America.
25 Before his role at Elders, Schmidt had had extensive experience in the live cattle export trade. Through Otway Livestock, he had established a successful business selling Australian cattle to Japan, which business he had then sold to Elders. However, Schmidt had had no experience of the live export cattle trade to Israel. He did not know the key Israeli importers. Further, although Elders had had some involvement in the past, it was not exporting cattle to Israel in 2011.
26 2011 was a tumultuous year for the Australian live cattle export industry. There was widespread publicity about the treatment of live cattle exported to Indonesia. In response, the Australian Government, amongst other things, introduced the Exporter Supply Chain Assurance System in around mid 2011.
27 According to the evidence before the court,[6] this system required exporters to provide information of their "full supply chain" to the Department of Agriculture. The regime required exporters, on a confidential basis, to give the details of all dealings with the livestock, from the time and place it was sourced through to the delivery to the ultimate overseas end user who processed the cattle, including details of all contracts entered into. The system imposed an obligation on the exporter to ensure that livestock were treated according to prescribed standards at all stages up to and including the time when the cattle were slaughtered overseas.
28 In around mid 2011, discussions commenced between Kalimpa and Elders concerning arrangements for the export of cattle to Israel. Prior to this time, Ruschin had built up a list of contacts and other information concerning the Israeli cattle market, the details of which he had kept to himself and Bzezinski.
29 As a result of these discussions, on 5 October 2011, Schmidt sent an email to Bzezinski raising a number of issues with respect to the possible shipping by Elders of cattle to Israel. That email referred to a need to commit to between 18,000 and 36,000 head of cattle being shipped to Israel. The email continued:
For us to do this we would have to have complete comfort around the following.
We are prepared to sign an agreement with you. ...
Before we start we will need to visit your customers and meet with them. We will have to negotiate contracts that will have some longevity, for example up to two years. Should we not be able to successfully complete these we will need to have provisions in our contract that allow us to mutually unwind if appropriate.
I emphasise however that we are certainly interested in doing business with you as our partner, and we are certainly willing to keep negotiations going. However the reality is there is considerable risk and complication shipping to Israel and we need to address this.
(Emphasis added.)
30 Negotiations continued. They culminated in a written agreement, executed as a deed on 17 October 2011 by Bzezinski on behalf of Kalimpa and by Schmidt on behalf of Elders ("the Elders Agreement"). The Elders Agreement included the following:
...
Operative provisions
...
2.1 Livestock sales to Israel
As from the date of this deed:
2.1.1 Kalimpa will market and manage orders for the sale of Australian livestock to Israel and will exclusively use the services of Elders.
...
2.3 Orders
2.3.1 Kalimpa will provide orders directly or will provide initial contact details between Elders and Israeli customers.
3.2 Non circumvention and non-disclosure
...
3.2.2 In case of termination under Clause 4.1 (Non-performance) of this agreement, then Elders may, with the exception of those customers introduced by Kalimpa to whom the provisions of clause 4.3.2 shall apply, pursue other opportunities with other parties in Israel.
3.2.3 Each of Elders and Kalimpa will maintain complete confidentiality regarding each other's business, customers (sic) business and sources and will not disclose any such details to any other parties without the explicit written authorisation of the other.
...
3.2.5 Elders agrees that in the event of circumvention of this directly or indirectly, Kalimpa shall be entitled to compensation and damages including punitive damages, including and not limited to all legal costs and expenses to recover lost revenue.
...
4.2 Survival of clause
Clause 3.2 survives the expiration or termination of this Agreement.
4.3 Term of Agreement
4.3.1 The term of this agreement is [5 years] ...
4.3.2 Upon termination of this agreement whether at the end of the term or otherwise Elders cannot use or benefit in any way from the customers contacts and sources introduced by Kalimpa for a period of two years from the date of termination.
4.3.3 Upon termination of this agreement Elders will be free to pursue other customers or relationships in Israel. However Elders are expressly precluded from entering contracts with customers contacts or sources introduced by Kalimpa as per clause 4.3.2, above.
...
4.20 Relationship of parties
Unless this Deed expressly provides otherwise, nothing in this Deed may be construed as creating a relationship of partnership, of principal and agent or of trustee and beneficiary.
(Emphasis added.)
31 It is evident from the negotiations in 2011 and the terms of the Elders Agreement that Schmidt, acting for Elders, acknowledged that Kalimpa had its own customers and contacts in Israel, that Elders (including Schmidt) did not know the details of the contacts, and that the parties treated such details as confidential. Further, not only was this confidentiality to be maintained during the life of the Elders Agreement, but Elders (including Schmidt) could not take the benefit of this information for 2 years after its termination. At no time did Schmidt indicate, either during his time as an employee of Elders or in his subsequent negotiations in his own right,[7] that he was not bound by the confidentiality obligations contained in the Elders Agreement, or that he did not intend to honour these obligations.
32 Before the Elders Agreement was executed, Bzezinski and Ruschin did not disclose Kalimpa's customer details to Schmidt. It was not until 26 October 2011 that they emailed a list of 5 "Kalimpa ... clients" to Schmidt, with the direct personal telephone numbers of senior officers of each of those customers. The customers included Israel's 2 largest cattle importers, Bakar Tnuva Limited Partnership ("Tnuva") and Dabach Slaughterhouse Ltd ("Dabach"). Further, information was provided to Elders about the Israeli Market. It was this very type of information that Elders did not have and required. To use Schmidt's own words, "That is what they [ie Bzezinski and Ruschin] were paid to do".
33 In late 2011, and again in early 2012, Bzezinski and Schmidt travelled to Israel to meet with the potential customers with whom Ruschin had established a rapport, including Tnuva and Dabach. The first of these trips lasted about 7 to 10 days. Only some of the people with whom they met spoke English. Bzezinski and Ruschin (by telephone) usually conducted these conversations in Hebrew, and translated for Schmidt as necessary. Before the Elders Agreement was entered into, all of Ruschin's discussions with the Israeli customers had been conducted in Hebrew. Before the trip in early 2012, Ruschin sent an email to Schmidt identifying the "time and date for the meeting[s] with Kalimpa clients in Israel". The email contained the names of the persons in question, together with their employers.
34 Two voyages were arranged and completed pursuant to the Elders Agreement. However, in late 2012, Elders decided not to continue with the relationship.[8] This position was accepted by Kalimpa. These events roughly coincided with Schmidt contemplating going into business with Kalimpa for the export of live cattle to Israel. In or about September 2012, negotiations concerning that possibility commenced.
35 Various discussions and written communications occurred. Bzezinski and Ruschin met with Schmidt alone, and also with solicitors from Harwood Andrews in Geelong. Ruschin and Bzezinski understood Harwood Andrews were acting for all parties in seeking to set up an appropriate structure. They were not told otherwise at this time.
36 It is unnecessary to catalogue all the communications. For present purposes, it suffices to record that Schmidt, on numerous occasions, referred to both Bzezinski and Ruschin as his partners. This occurred in correspondence from Schmidt not only to Bzezinski and Ruschin, but also to third parties. In 1 such communication, sent on 17 October 2012 by Schmidt to Altus Lawyers, copied to Bzezinski and Ruschin, the following was stated:
We, [Ruschin], [Bzezinski] and [Schmidt] (the partners) wish to enter into an agreement as owners of a new company (new co). We will require a shareholders deed between us in relation to the company. This company will be the beneficiary of the new export business that we propose to undertake to Israel and other parts of the world.
...
The overall aim of the agreements will be to:
Ensure that the IP [intellectual property] developed in relation to the new business is protected for the [benefit] of the partners.
Document the process to be undertaken in the event of the exit of one or more partners, or the death of one or more partners.
There will be other considerations in relation to the new business that we can discuss in due course.
We will also have to draft a document between Elders/Kalimpa and Elders/[Otway Livestock] that releases the constraints [that] are currently in place.
There will also be additional documentation to review in term so (sic) contracts between Israeli customers and the proposed new co.
(Emphasis added.)
37 On 24 October 2012, Schmidt sent an email to Harwood Andrews, again copied to Bzezinski and Ruschin, containing similar information to that set out in the previous paragraph. The email stated that the new company would be owned by 3 "equal shareholder partners", with an expected "annual turnover in the [vicinity] of US$40-60M" with respect to exporting cattle to Israel. Schmidt then stated:
All livestock and meat business carried out by this entity in the future and that is introduced by any of the partners will be traded through this entity.
(Emphasis added.)
Schmidt also stated that the "partners (besides myself) are Israelis", that they would be "providing the market" and that he would be "providing the Cattle and Australian logistic knowledge and also funding". Schmidt also gave the following instruction:
Initially it may be appropriate for my existing trading company ... to do the exporting under contract to Newco. The reason being that my company has trading history and also an export licence. The issue here will be to ensure that the value that is created via the establishment of Newco is protected.
Other issues that need to be considered and drafted into the shareholders articles include:-
The definition and roles of shareholders.
Accumulation of capital and distribution of dividends.
Issue of new capital as appropriate.
Sale of share requirements and the associated process to be followed by any shareholder that wishes to depart.
Death of a shareholder.
Dispute resolution process.
Non-compete.
(Emphasis added.)
This letter also discussed issues concerning a restraint deed Schmidt had entered into with Elders. In that regard, Schmidt stated:
Put simply, I am of the view that if Elders do not renew their contract with Kalimpa and are therefore unable to trade to Israel, then: I am free to persue (sic) business interests in Israel as I would not be competing with Elders.
(Emphasis added.)
Negotiations ensued with a common desire to put a joint venture arrangement in place so trading to Israel could commence.
B.4 An agreement to proceed with a joint venture
38 On 13 November 2012, Schmidt sent an email to Bzezinski and Ruschin, attaching a 9 page organisational chart ("the Chart"), with a covering note explaining that the Chart would be used "as the basis for putting together our various contracts". The Chart proposed trading in Israel, China and Pakistan. It referred to the parties as "joint venture partners", with Kalimpa having a 66.6 percent interest in the joint venture, and Schmidt having 33.3 percent (to be held by a company referred to as "Ozfresh").[9] It was acknowledged that Kalimpa would provide market access to Israel, and would manage market relationships in Israel.
39 Schmidt was to take care of the general management of exports. It was contemplated that a 5 year management agreement (with an option to extend for a further 5 years) would be entered into between Otway Livestock and the proposed joint venture vehicle.[10]
40 It was expressly stated that the management agreement would provide that the parties, and related entities of the then proposed joint venture vehicle, would "not sell trade or facilitate delivery of any livestock via any other third party for a period of two years should the management contract cancel, expire or not renew".
41 On a page entitled "Management oversight and communications", it was stated that there would be "a clearly defined contract" between the "joint venture partners and AHRKalimpa" and "AHRKalimpa and [Otway Livestock]". With respect to decisions of the board, they were to be decided by a simple majority, with the chairperson to have the casting vote. The chair was to be appointed on a rotational basis from either Ozfresh or Kalimpa. The page concluded with the following:
Where Contributed capital, loan notes or debt are to be drawn or repaid
Where voyage costs and disbursements are to be transferred from AHRKalimpa to [Otway Livestock]
Where Voyage profits are to be disbursed from AHRKalimpa back to the joint venture partners, then:
The Chart also made provision for pre-emptive rights as between shareholders.
42 Each of Ruschin, Bzezinski and Schmidt gave evidence, in substance, that in November 2012 the contents of the Chart reflected what they had discussed, and that they had agreed to the contents. However, the parties had different views as to what it was that they had agreed, and its legal effect.
43 On 5 December 2012, Schmidt sent an email to Bzezinski and Ruschin inquiring about "your volume customer in Israel". Various pieces of information were sought about the customer's requirements which, apparently, were not known to Schmidt.
44 As not infrequently occurs in business, Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin did not wait for the formal documentation to be prepared before beginning to trade. In around January 2013, Bzezinski and Schmidt travelled to Israel and met with various importers, including Tnuva and Dabach. The importers were told there was going to be a new company, with Schmidt as a partner, and that they would not be dealing with Elders anymore.
45 As a result, in March 2013, agreements for Voyage 1 were struck with Tnuva and Dabach, for the export of 4,800 and 2,400 head of cattle respectively, to arrive in Israel between 11 and 23 May 2013. In the same month, agreements were entered into for Voyage 2 with Tnuva and Dabach, for the same number of cattle as Voyage 1, for delivery between 1 and 5 July 2013.
46 Each of the contracts entered into in March 2013 with Tnuva and Dabach named Otway Livestock as the contractor agreeing to supply the cattle. At this point, AHRKalimpa did not exist. Further, it was Otway Livestock that held the necessary export licence.[11]
47 The contact details for each contract provided Schmidt's residential address as the address of the supplier. Further, with respect to 3 of the 4 contracts for Voyages 1 and 2, Schmidt was listed as the contact. The contract with Dabach for Voyage 1 had both Schmidt and Ruschin listed as the contacts. Why there was a difference between the contacts in this regard was not explored in evidence. In any event, little turns on this as Schmidt readily acknowledged during cross-examination that Voyage 1 and Voyage 2 were conducted by Otway Livestock for and on behalf of the proposed joint venture vehicle, AHRKalimpa.[12]
48 On 5 May 2013, Kalimpa signed a 3 year lease, commencing that day, for commercial premises on St Kilda Road, St Kilda ("the Premises"). The obligations under the lease were guaranteed by Bzezinski alone. The rent for the first year was $35,980, with a rent free period up to and including 4 October 2013. There was some general evidence about the costs of occupying the Premises. It appears that both Schmidt and Bzezinski took some of the responsibility for the rent and outgoings with respect to the Premises.
49 From this point onwards, the affairs of the joint venture arrangement (to use a neutral term) were conducted from the Premises.[13] Ruschin attended the Premises regularly, and worked on the venture on a full time basis. Bzezinski attended infrequently, as he was also attending to his other business interests on an ongoing basis.
50 Although the parties decided to engage in trade without formal documentation being in place, they continued to recognise the need for such documentation. In around mid-2013, steps were taken to progress this.
51 On 13 June 2013, a meeting was held between Bzezinski, Ruschin, Schmidt and Dunn. Dunn gave evidence that, by this time, he had a mandate from Schmidt to "sort all this out". He saw his role as putting "some rigour into the relationship".
52 On 17 June 2013, Dunn sent an email referring to the meeting on 13 June 2013. That email attached various documents for "sign off" by Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin, so that the parties could "move to documentation of the relevant structures and arrangements".
53 On the plaintiffs' case as pleaded, it was contended that an agreement was entered into "in around June to July 2013". This case relied upon various documents exchanged between the parties during those 2 months. However, that part of the case was not pursued in closing submissions. Indeed, it was plain that at no time from June 2013 were the parties able to reach any final agreement.
54 Accordingly, it is unnecessary to go through the attachments to the email sent on 17 June 2013 in any detail. Suffice to say, the documents included some matters which reflected that things had moved from the position as stated in the Chart in November 2012. In particular, reference was made to Minerva Foods SA ("Minerva"). Minerva had agreed to provide finance for Voyage 1 on the basis Minerva would participate in the profits.[14] That such an arrangement would be entered into had not been expressly contemplated in the terms of the Chart. Minerva was also the co-owner of a vessel, Pearl of Para.[15]
55 On 21 June 2013, Dunn sent an email to Harwood Andrews, copied to Schmidt, Bzezinski, Ruschin and Katrina Day ("Day"),[16] attaching a proposed corporate structure and a schedule of documentation that needed to be the subject of negotiation. The covering email stated that Dunn was working with "Schmidt and his partners". Dunn stated that there were "a number of steps required to be taken to ensure the structure is appropriately in place and documented prior to 30 June".
56 On 24 June 2013, Dunn sent an email to Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin stating that AHRKalimpa could be incorporated that week. Dunn proposed that there be 3 shares, 1 held by Otway Livestock and 2 by Kalimpa.
57 The following day, Dunn sent a further email proposing AHRKalimpa be incorporated before 30 June 2013, "to provide you with maximum flexibility in managing your emerging business opportunities". The email recorded that considerable time would need to be set aside to consider the "formation" documents and that Dunn would obtain a quote from Harwood Andrews to prepare and finalise the key documents. Dunn recommended this be done on behalf of all the parties.
59 On 2 July 2013, Dunn sent an email attaching a revised draft heads of agreement. The draft agreement had Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin as the proposed parties. Dunn proposed a "workshop" be held on 5 July 2013 at the Premises, and asked the parties to allow for a full day "to have maximum value".
60 Whilst the documentation required for the joint venture was in a state of flux, the parties actively continued to seek further business. On 3 July 2013, Ruschin sent an email to Schmidt and Bzezinski stating that, "We [have a] deal for two shipments back to back". Ruschin attached an email he had previously sent to Tnuva recording the details.
61 On 5 July 2013, the workshop was held. It was conducted as a board meeting of AHRKalimpa. Bzezinski was unable to attend, but each of Schmidt, Ruschin and Day were recorded as attending on behalf of AHRKalimpa. Dunn attended with a colleague on behalf of his firm, Otway Partners. According to draft minutes prepared by Dunn, the meeting went for 3 hours.
62 At this meeting, Ruschin took exception to the manner in which the shares in AHRKalimpa had been issued. It was agreed that Dunn would transfer his 3 shares to Ruschin's company, Kalimpac Pty Ltd, and Schmidt would transfer 3 of his shares to Bzezinski's company, Bzezinski Pty Ltd.
63 On the evening of 5 July 2013, Dunn sent an email to Harwood Andrews, which was copied to Schmidt, Bzezinski, Ruschin and Day. The email attached various documents and instructed Harwood Andrews to prepare a shareholders' agreement "and other documents referred to in the briefing note" for the purposes of a proposed directors meeting of AHRKalimpa to be held on 17 July 2013. The email concluded:
Alan, Danny and Haim - if any of the attach (sic) does not accord with your understanding please do not hesitate to let me know so that we can pass on appropriate amendments/adjustments.
64 The attached draft minutes of the AHRKalimpa board meeting recorded that the "Heads of Agreement draft was discussed and approved subject to discussion regarding the scope of non-compliance provisions". The draft minutes also recorded some outstanding issues with respect to the proposed shareholder agreement, and that Dunn was to arrange for amendments to go back to Harwood Andrews.[20] The draft minutes recorded the items to be addressed at the next board meeting, which included "Profit & Loss statement for the Israel 1 Voyage" and "Feasibility ... budget for the Israel 2 Voyage".
65 The attached briefing memorandum proposed that Dunn would be appointed the independent chairman of the board. It suggested that it was intended that AHRKalimpa would act as the employer for all staff and that its constitution would remain "a standard constitution", but the relationship between shareholders would be governed by a shareholders' agreement.
66 With respect to management and decision making, the briefing memorandum stated, amongst other things, that until AHRKalimpa's funding by Otway Livestock had been replaced, decision making by AHRKalimpa was "subject to an overriding consent of [Schmidt]". It further stated that each of the participants, namely Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin, would devote their full time and attention to working for "the [AHRKalimpa] Group". The items in this regard included the following:
67 Consistent with earlier documentation,[21] the briefing memorandum contemplated a fixed term of 5 years with an option for a further 5 years. The memorandum also proposed that pre-emptive rights be created between participants in the event that 1 or more of them decided to leave the venture. But the memorandum included the following:
The shareholder agreement should provide that none of the parties will participate in the live export business other than [AHRKalimpa] for so long as each of them holds an equity interest in [AHRKalimpa].
68 As to this proposed restraint, not only was it far narrower than what had been provided in the Chart,[22] but it gave no protection for Kalimpa or AHRKalimpa if Schmidt decided to dispose of his shareholding in AHRKalimpa. Not surprisingly, Bzezinski and Ruschin took issue with this proposed clause.
69 Further, Bzezinski and Ruschin got the distinct impression around this time that both Dunn and Harwood Andrews were acting in Schmidt's interests rather than in the joint venture's interests as a whole. Accordingly, they retained their own solicitor, Barry Moshel ("Moshel"), to review the proposed documentation. Dunn was informed of this fact by Ruschin in an email sent on 7 July 2013, which also followed up the agreed transfer of the shares in AHRKalimpa.
70 On 15 July 2013, Moshel sent an email to Dunn and Schmidt, copied to Bzezinski and Ruschin, attaching the response to the documents forwarded by Dunn on 5 July 2013.[23] In addition to making various suggestions with respect to the minutes and the Heads of Agreement, Moshel amended the briefing memorandum. In doing so, he conveyed Bzezinski and Ruschin's rejection of a number of matters. These included Dunn being appointed independent chairman.[24] Exception was also taken to the suggestion that the decision-making of AHRKalimpa would be subject to the overriding consent of Schmidt while its funding was provided by Otway Livestock.[25] Further, with respect to the restraint of trade, Moshel suggested that, if any party were to cease to be a shareholder in AHRKalimpa, a provision be included for "non-competition and non-circumvention" for 2 years after termination of the joint venture, or when a party transfers his interest.[26]
71 On 19 July 2013, Dunn "flagged" 2 key issues. In an email sent to Moshel, copied to Schmidt, Dunn noted that Schmidt would welcome funding from either Bzezinski or Ruschin, but stated that Schmidt was not prepared to entertain third party funding in respect of which the source of funds was not identified. Further, the email continued:
As has been agreed with [Ruschin] and [Bzezinski] on a number of occasions,[27] whilst [Schmidt]'s funding is in place, all Management decisions of AHRKalimpa including new funding and repayment of [Schmidt]'s funds will specifically require his consent.
(Emphasis added.)
72 On 8 August 2013, a further board meeting of AHRKalimpa was held at the Premises. Schmidt and Bzezinski attended as directors. Also in attendance were Ruschin (on behalf of Kalimpa), Dunn (on behalf of his firm) and Day (on behalf of Otway Livestock). At the meeting, the proposed Heads of Agreement was discussed. Consistent with what had been provided by Moshel, Bzezinski and Ruschin sought not to be parties to that agreement, but rather to have their nominee companies as parties. This was not agreed to by Schmidt. Further, there was disagreement with respect to funding and the ability of Schmidt to have the "last say".
73 Also with respect to funding, it was agreed that Bzezinski would seek to procure up to $4 million of new debt funding for AHRKalimpa, subject to certain conditions. Further, it was resolved that the executive salaries of Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin would be recognised at $500,000 per annum.
74 The costs of the "first voyages" were discussed. It was agreed to pay the "Israel costs", but subject to Ruschin revisiting and attempting to secure lower outcomes.
75 Towards the end of the meeting, it was agreed that a cashflow and budget forecast for AHRKalimpa for the next 12 months would be circulated. The meeting was adjourned to the following day so that the shareholders' agreement and loan agreement could be reviewed, including by Moshel.[28]
76 On 13 August 2013, Dunn circulated an email attaching a "job specification framework" he had prepared, in consultation with Schmidt and Day. Amongst other things, this document recorded Schmidt as the chief executive officer, Day as the general manager corporate, Dunn as head of corporate, and Bzezinski and Ruschin as "sales & marketing". That email also confirmed that Dunn was meeting with Moshel the following day to progress the documentation.
77 On 15 August 2013, Schmidt circulated a cashflow forecast and an anticipated profit and loss to June 2014. The forecast cashflow suggested that the business would have "[c]umulative cash" of $4,876,668 at the end of this period.[29]
B.7 A joint venture being formalised becomes less likely
78 On 15 August 2013, Dunn and Moshel met. After this meeting, Dunn circulated an email which included the following:
As canvassed with [Moshel], it is important for the Principals to agree a process for execution of existing voyages whilst any differences of opinion are resolved (or a position is reached where those differences cannot be resolved).
The email attached a proposed agenda for a board meeting to be held the following day.
79 On 16 August 2013, the foreshadowed board meeting of AHRKalimpa was held at the Premises. Again, Schmidt and Bzezinski attended as board members. Also in attendance were Ruschin, Dunn, Day (each in the same capacities as 8 August 2013)[30] and Moshel. This was a significant meeting in the context of the present dispute. The minutes prepared by Dunn, which were generally accepted as correct, recorded that:
Following extensive discussion, it was resolved that various forms of business model would be further reviewed and discussed prior to execution of the contract for Voyage 3.
It was further resolved that Voyage 2 would be completed, and if a suitable business model had not been agreed between the parties (or an alternative method of proceeding with Voyages 3 and 4) then the parties would exchange mutual non-compete undertakings in relation to their respective clients and markets, and the live export business between the parties would be wound up.
(Emphasis added.)
Under cross-examination, Schmidt properly accepted that, with respect to Kalimpa, the "respective clients and markets" was a reference to the customers and market of Israel.[33] In contrast, during his cross-examination, Dunn forcefully rejected the suggestion that Kalimpa had a market. When asked whether he had approached the matter on the basis that Kalimpa did not have a market, Dunn responded that it "had some contacts". Whilst Dunn accepted the minute referred to Israel when speaking of Kalimpa's clients and market, he stated he had recorded what is set out above only because that was what was discussed.
81 At the board meeting, Day tabled an updated cashflow and forecast. It was agreed that these would be reviewed at the next board meeting, which was to be convened on 20 August 2013. There was no evidence that such a meeting ever took place.
82 Pausing here, AHRKalimpa's board, with the benefit of advisers for the interests of each joint venturer, unanimously resolved that, if the parties could not finalise a joint venture agreement, the live export business would be wound up.[34] Further, such a winding up would be accompanied by "mutual non-compete undertakings". In short, the unequivocal position of AHRKalimpa and its stakeholders was that no one involved in the live export business then being conducted could treat the business as its own business in the event that a final agreement was not reached. This position was entirely consistent with what had been agreed in November 2012.[35]
83 On 22 August 2013, Dunn provided to Schmidt and Day a "Restructure Position Paper" with respect to AHRKalimpa, which suggested that there was "now fundamental disagreement on key issues between the parties". There is no evidence to suggest that this document was ever discussed or raised with Bzezinski or Ruschin.
84 Whilst these events were happening, attempts were still being made to secure executed contracts for Voyages 3 and 4. On 16 September 2013, Schmidt sent an email to Ruschin following up the execution of the relevant contracts by Tnuva.
85 On 17 September 2013, Moshel forwarded a draft agreement to Bzezinski and Ruschin. The proposed agreement[36] had Kalimpa, Schmidt and Otway Livestock as the only named parties. The draft recorded that 2 shipments had already been undertaken and that 2 further shipments were to occur. It also recorded that Minerva had provided 50 percent of the funding for the shipments and was entitled to 50 percent of the net profit (or loss) per shipment. The draft contained the following recital:
The Parties intend that the relationship should continue beyond the 4 shipments and this agreement sets out the basis:
i if the relationship terminates upon conclusion of the 4 shipments, and
ii where the relationship continues beyond 4 shipments.
86 Ruschin gave evidence that this draft was prepared because there was an agreement with Schmidt and Dunn that Moshel would prepare a mutual non-compete agreement for Voyages 3 and 4.
87 The draft purported to set out the relationship between the parties.[37] It recorded that they intended their future relationship to continue, that after the 4 shipments they would operate through AHRKalimpa, and that all contracts and joint venture agreements after that time would be conducted exclusively through AHRKalimpa with any existing contractual arrangements to be assigned. Further, speaking broadly, the draft provided that if the relationship between the joint venturers was terminated, then Schmidt and Otway Livestock would not be able to trade with any of the existing customers or contacts in Israel.[38]
88 The draft was forwarded by Ruschin to Schmidt late on 17 September 2013. Schmidt discussed the draft with Dunn and they agreed that what was contained in the draft was unacceptable.
89 On 21 September 2013, Schmidt sent draft sales contracts for Tnuva and Dabach to Bzezinski and Ruschin. Schmidt invited them to call if they had any issues. Both draft contracts had "AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd" as the supplier. Ruschin gave evidence he emailed Tnuva, copied to Schmidt, stating the new company existed and the contracts were required to be in the name of AHRKalimpa.[39]
B.8 Joint venture relationship seriously breaking down
90 On 23 September 2013, Dunn circulated an email, including to Moshel, identifying the issues Schmidt had with the draft forwarded on 17 September 2013. In the covering email, Dunn expressed an understanding that Otway Livestock was to execute all the contracts for Voyages 3 and 4. When giving evidence, he could not recall the basis of this understanding. The email concluded as follows:
Please note we would propose that [Schmidt] transfer his shares in AHRKalimpa to your nominee(s), and resign as a Director of AHRKalimpa as part of the present process. In this way, if an acceptable process for moving forward can be resolved, the relationship between [Kalimpa] (Group) and [Otway Livestock] is clearly defined.
Notwithstanding this proposal, Schmidt continued as a director and shareholder of AHRKalimpa.
91 The attached comments from Dunn raised 12 separate issues. These included a complaint that Bzezinski and Ruschin were not personally parties to the proposed agreement. (Ruschin gave evidence that neither he nor Bzezinski had a problem with being parties.) Further, Dunn wanted the agreement limited to the relationship between the parties up to Voyage 4, and not beyond.
92 With respect to provisions concerning restraint of trade, Dunn stated that Schmidt accepted a 2 year restraint for him and Otway Livestock with respect to "customers contacts and sources in Israel", subject to a reciprocal provision by Kalimpa, Bzezinski and Ruschin in respect of suppliers engaged by Schmidt in the delivery of cattle for Voyages 1 to 4.
93 It seems that around this time the already significant breakdown in the relationship was escalating.
94 Ruschin was clearly frustrated by the lack of progress. On 24 September 2013, he sent an email referring to a meeting held earlier that day concerning the proposed agreement between Kalimpa and Otway Livestock. Ruschin stated that the agreement needed to be signed before "the next 2 contracts with the [customers]" were signed (being a reference to contracts for Voyages 3 and 4). The email also stated that all details of the costs incurred by Kalimpa with respect to Voyage 1 and Voyage 2 would be forwarded the following day.
95 Schmidt was unhappy with Ruschin's stance. In an email sent the following morning, Schmidt suggested that, by the contents of Ruschin's email, Ruschin was threatening Schmidt with blackmail. Schmidt expressed the view that such correspondence would cause harm to the customer, himself and the vessel owner.
96 On the same day, Ruschin responded by email to Schmidt, copied to Bzezinski. Ruschin took exception to the suggestion of blackmail, stating that such a suggestion hurt him as a person and dishonoured their relationship. Ruschin reiterated that the agreement between the joint venturers needed to be finalised as soon as possible. The email continued:
[A]s soon as I saw [Dunn] comment on our agreement by way of saying that you will transfer your share and resign as director of AHRKalimpa we already know that you never [planned] to be our partner or [to do business] with us to other (sic) market than Israel.
I can't work with someone that [thinks] this thing on me.
97 Still later on 25 September 2013, Schmidt responded, rejecting the suggestions made by Ruschin. In so doing, Schmidt stated:
So what I have said is that if (as it appears) this is too hard to complete, then I am happy to operate the business to Israel until such time as you have funding in place to do so yourself. That is your call.
In terms of doing other business - you are welcome to [any part] of it, I have consistently said that. However, as I said this will require substantially more equity from someone - just how do you want to address this?
The email concluded by stating that he had not resigned or sold his shares in AHRKalimpa. Indeed, despite what Dunn had previously stated,[40] the email gave no indication as to when Schmidt might resign as a director or cease to be a shareholder.
98 It appears, from an email sent on 29 September 2013, that Ruschin and Schmidt also had a telephone conversation on 25 September 2013 concerning the subject matter of the email sent on that day. In the later email, Ruschin again refuted that he had threatened or blackmailed Schmidt. Ruschin stated that the fact that a non-compete agreement was still outstanding was detrimental "to our efficacy as partners". The email included the following:
As per our meeting [held on 24 September 2013], you said that you were going to send me the NON COMPETE agreement commentary that we agreed on, in 24 hours (now 5 days ago) and that we can then sign it and keep working on our shareholders agreement for our new company AHRKalimpa. To date I still haven't received your comment to the agreement we sent on [17 September 2013].
... [W]e need to finish this NON COMPETE agreement as soon as possible, we can't just keep wasting time as you know that we've got two more contracts coming soon.
Let's move forward with business.
(Original emphasis.)
99 In the morning of 29 September 2013, Schmidt emailed Ruschin, copied to Bzezinski, taking exception to the issue of blackmail being raised again. Schmidt stated that he accepted Ruschin's response and thought that was the end of it. Schmidt also stated the shareholders' agreement was the most important issue, not the "non compete". He promised to send something further later that day.
100 It is clear that, by this time, Schmidt was changing his views concerning what might be agreed concerning not competing in the Israeli market.[41] Later on 29 September 2013, he sent an email to Bzezinski and Ruschin with the subject "No-compete". Schmidt stated that in his life he had never negotiated how a business relationship is going to terminate before a conclusion had been reached on how it started and went forward. He continued:
We are both committed to doing business in Israel and have both now been involved in it for some time and we have all invested heavily in both time and money. What I am saying here is that we both have ownership now. I do not see it as what you have brought or what I have brought to the process. ... But we are in it together - let's be clear on that issue.
We have agreed that the business should be run through [AHRKalimpa] - no problem with that. However to go over this yet again we have to have a shareholders agreement - this has to be formally signed off. We can then fund the company.
In the process of formalising the shareholders agreement I am happy to provide you with a non-compete - provided you provide me with one as well. Quite frankly I do not know why you would want to diminish the value of your share in the company by doing this.
... What that really means is that if either of us want to do business to Israel outside of what we have now - then there is a non-compete that applies to both of us.
Alternatively - we do not have one (non-compete).
(Emphasis added.)
The email ended with the suggestion of a possible piecemeal arrangement with respect to future restraints of trade.
101 On 30 September 2013, Schmidt executed sales contracts for Voyages 3 and 4 with Dabach and Tnuva for the export of cattle to Israel. With respect to Dabach, both contracts recorded the supplier as AHRKalimpa. In contrast, the contracts with Tnuva were in the name of AH & R Schmidt (as Otway Livestock was previously known). Schmidt explained the difference in approach on the basis that Dabach was content with AHRKalimpa contracting as supplier, but that Tnuva had stated to Schmidt that, unless Tnuva did a full due diligence on AHRKalimpa, it was not willing to contract with that entity. Accordingly, Schmidt arranged for the Tnuva contracts to be in the name of AH & R Schmidt.
102 During cross-examination, it was put to Schmidt in substance that his explanation for why the Tnuva contracts were in the name of AH & R Schmidt was a recent invention. Further, it was suggested that the use of the name AH & R Schmidt was part of Schmidt's plan to take over the exporting business for himself. Schmidt rejected this suggestion.
103 I accept Schmidt's explanation for the manner in which the contracts for Voyages 3 and 4 were entered into. In addition to Schmidt being a credible witness generally, there are a number of reasons for this.
104 First, if there were such a plan, presumably it would have been adopted with respect to both Dabach and Tnuva.[42]
105 Secondly, there was nothing improper, in itself, in using the name AH & R Schmidt. This was the company which held the export licence, and had been used for the first 2 voyages. The use of that name did not mean the business was being conducted by that company in its own right to the exclusion to AHRKalimpa.
106 Thirdly, it was always the position of Schmidt that Voyages 1 to 4 were being conducted on behalf of AHRKalimpa.[43] This was recorded in contemporaneous documents. Given the state of the relationship, Schmidt may have not fully and openly discussed the change in position with respect to Tnuva in order to avoid confrontation with Ruschin and Bzezinski, but it does not follow that in September 2013 Schmidt was seeking to put steps in place to misappropriate AHRKalimpa's business with respect to Voyages 3 and 4.
107 Fourthly, it was clear that AHRKalimpa would not have satisfied any due diligence process. It did not have any substantive assets in its name, or even a bank account. Using the name AH & R Schmidt made commercial sense, rather than putting AHRKalimpa through a due diligence it was bound to fail.
108 On this topic, evidence was given about a telephone discussion held "somewhere around" late September or early October 2013, between Tnuva, Ruschin and Schmidt while Ruschin and Schmidt were at a "pub" in Broome. Schmidt had only the vaguest recollection of the discussion. In contrast, Ruschin had a specific recollection and said that, after he was informed by Tnuva that the supplier named in the contract was AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd, he confronted Schmidt with his concerns.
109 Although I accept Ruschin's evidence,[44] in my view, it does not advance the plaintiffs' case on this point. All of the contemporaneous documentation demonstrates there was never any question that, at that time, Schmidt intended to fully account with respect to Voyages 3 and 4 for both Dabach and Tnuva. Further, it is not surprising that Schmidt had little recollection of a discussion that occurred nearly 4 years ago in such a casual environment and when, as I have found, he was not doing anything beyond making sure the contracts could be executed so that AHRKalimpa could export cattle to Tnuva. Furthermore, although Ruschin could recall confronting Schmidt, he did not have a clear recollection of Schmidt's response. Certainly, there was no evidence of Schmidt admitting to any wrongdoing on his part.
110 Returning to the chronology, things went quiet between the parties in October 2013 with respect to finalising the joint venture documentation.
111 On 4 November 2013, Day sent an email to Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin providing figures with respect to Voyages 1 and 2, together with a further cashflow forecast for 2013/2014.[45] The spreadsheet referred to 8 voyages to Israel to be conducted over that period, together with a voyage to Uruguay (in January 2014) and a voyage to China (in March 2014).
B.10 Preparation for possibility of Otway Livestock alone conducting the business
112 In early November 2013, Schmidt sought finance with respect to exporting cattle to Israel. One such application was made to HSBC Bank Australia Ltd ("HSBC"). On 6 November 2013, HSBC sought information concerning "your business" from Schmidt. On 7 November 2013, Schmidt sent an email to Dunn attaching a funding proposal "as discussed". That draft funding proposal, which formed the basis of what was provided to HSBC,[46] is illuminating for what it does not say as well as for what it says.
113 On 8 November 2013, Schmidt sent an email entitled "Kalimpa invoices" to Bzezinski, Ruschin and Day. In that email, Schmidt discussed the payment of various costs that had been incurred by Kalimpa. The email dealt with the costs as follows:
Re your costs. Happy to pay as I said. We need to have your reconciled dockets. Please speak to [Day]. She should be able to explain how to present.
We did discuss capitailising (sic) Office costs. However if you want the money back we can look at doing this of course.
Although the email concluded with a reference for the need for some "cash", there was no suggestion that the costs referred to were other than costs properly incurred in the conduct of the joint venture.
114 Very soon after sending this email, Schmidt sent an email to Tnuva, copied to no one, with the subject "confidential". Schmidt attached a breakdown of the "actual purchase details for all the cattle purchased for [Voyage] 3". In the body of the email, Schmidt referred to the details as "very confidential information", stating that no one knew that Tnuva had been provided such information. The email continued:
I am sending you this just to confirm that I am deadly serious about trying to come to an arrangement with you regarding an open book arrangement.[47]
(Emphasis added.)
When it was put to him in cross-examination, Schmidt rejected the suggestion that he did not disclose the details of this email to Bzezinski or Ruschin because he was intending that Otway Livestock would deal exclusively with Tnuva. He said he decided not to tell them because he did not want to have an argument about the decision to provide this information to Tnuva. (Previously, Tnuva had expressed an interest in an "open book" contract. Ruschin had taken exception to Schmidt disclosing information to Tnuva similar to that disclosed in this email.) Accepting Schmidt's evidence at face value, it seems he was still open to the possibility of a joint venture with Kalimpa on an ongoing basis. However, the draft funding proposal Schmidt had sent to Dunn the day before[48] demonstrates that Schmidt was also preparing for the real possibility of Otway Livestock going it alone.
115 On 12 November 2013, Dunn sent an email to Helen Zhang ("Zhang"). Zhang was a Chinese cattle importer who had also entered into arrangements with Schmidt to fund shipments to Israel. At some stage during 2013, Bzezinski and Schmidt had travelled to China and met with Zhang to discuss the prospect of exporting cattle to China. On that occasion, Zhang was told that Schmidt had a "non-compete with Elders" in relation to China and that the venture would be with Kalimpa (that is, not AHRKalimpa) as Schmidt could not be involved.
116 The email noted that Dunn had resigned as a director of another company and transferred his share in that company to Otway Livestock. The email suggested that should Schmidt and Zhang wish to proceed further "with this venture", Zhang should feel free to give Dunn a call. This email was not copied to either Bzezinski or Ruschin, and there was no suggestion that its contents were ever disclosed to them at that time.
117 On the same day, Dunn sent an email to Schmidt alone, with the subject "Cattle Operations". With respect to Minerva, Dunn referred to a proposal to roll over the funding provided by Minerva for Voyage 3 for the purposes of Voyage 4. In this regard, he expressed concern about "[t]he absence of a clearly documented statement of your arrangements with Minerva".
118 The next topic dealt with in the email was AHRKalimpa. Dunn recorded that he had previously advised Schmidt to resign and to execute an open transfer of his shares to his co-owners. Dunn expressed the view that Schmidt continuing to defer this action might leave him exposed to claims on proceeds of the Israeli voyages "notwithstanding your view of how those arrangements are being undertaken". With respect to this last observation, under cross-examination Schmidt said he understood Dunn to be referring to Schmidt trying to get to a point where there was a functioning joint venture.
119 After discussing Dunn's concerns with respect to financial exposure to Zhang, Dunn turned to the issue of "Westpac and Other Funding". On that issue, Dunn recorded that Schmidt was waiting for advice from Westpac concerning its ongoing commitment to provide funding. Dunn noted that HSBC had been approached and that Dunn had also contacted another finance company for the same purpose. Dunn concluded this topic with the following:
There is no cohesive funding strategy for the debt funding of your ongoing voyages. In my view, given the risks and exposures you presently face, this needs to be established immediately.
(Emphasis added.)
It is apparent from the email that the "ongoing voyages" was a reference to up to at least 10 voyages to Israel.[49]
120 On 15 November 2013, Schmidt sent the "balance of the documentation" to HSBC. There was no reference to AHRKalimpa in the covering email or any of the other information supplied. Under cross-examination, Schmidt said that, notwithstanding this fact, he was still working towards establishing a formal joint venture through AHRKalimpa. While this may have been so, it is also apparent that Schmidt was actively preparing for the more likely outcome that no shareholders' agreement would ever be finalised.
121 The funding proposal was entitled "Funding Proposal - Israel AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd", and was on AH & R Schmidt letterhead, using the Premises as its address. Immediately under the heading, the document identified "the business" of exporting 36,000 to 48,000 live cattle per year to Israel. It continued:
We currently have Sales Contracts in place with two major customers to supply 4 shipments of cattle. The rolling contracts for voyages 5 & 6 are currently being negotiated. To date, we have completed 2 of these shipments and the 3rd is in progress.
(Emphasis added.)
After giving details of the Israeli cattle market, the document continued:
[Otway Livestock] has developed trading relationships with the two largest importers in Israel, both operating for more than 10 years, [Tnuva] and [Dabach].
...
We have completed a total of four contracts with these customers over the last 2 years. Two under Elders ownership and two under the ownership of [Otway Livestock]. A 4th contract is in progress.
...
We also have a Partnership Agreement with the Vessel owner and the Minerva SA group of Brazil. As a result of this working supply partnership, no deposit is required to secure vessel and very competitive charter rates.
122 The document then set out the financial details with respect to Voyages 1 and 2 and explained why there had been "extraordinary events" that had caused losses with respect to those voyages. Projected financial details were included for Voyage 3. All figures were presented as if the Voyages had been carried out by Otway Livestock in its own right.
123 The proposal had a section entitled "AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd - background", which included:
[Otway Livestock became] the largest exporter of live cattle to Japan prior to selling this business to Elders in 2010-11.
[Schmidt] then worked under contract for Elders International as Marketing Manager - International exports for 18 months until March 2013.
The company has now re-entered the export sector concentrating on Israel.
We found that Israeli customers had been dissatisfied with the existing supply chain from Australia and were seeking alternatives. In recognition of this, we have developing (sic) the relationships over the past 8 months resulting in 4 Sale Contracts to date.
[Otway Livestock is] currently operating in partnership with the vessel owner and Minerva SA.
(Emphasis added.)
124 Not only was there no mention of AHRKalimpa with respect to Schmidt's activities involving the Israeli export cattle market anywhere in the proposal, but, as may be seen from the matters set out above, the proposal completely misrepresented the manner in which Otway Livestock had managed to establish a connection with the Israeli market and to contract to export cattle. Moreover, the proposal unequivocally stated that Otway Livestock was already in a partnership agreement with a vessel owner and Minerva, again with no mention of AHRKalimpa.
125 Neither Schmidt nor Dunn provided a copy of the funding proposal to, or discussed the detail with, Bzezinski or Ruschin.
B.11 Joint venture relationship further deteriorates
126 On 17 November 2013, Ruschin sent an email to Schmidt, copied to Bzezinski and Day, complaining that Schmidt had stopped informing Ruschin and Bzezinski as to how the business was doing. He specifically complained about Schmidt not copying them in "on any of the emails from our customers, Minerva and Be Green"[50] for the past 2 months. Ruschin said he was not sure where that left things and that they should meet to seek to "finish" the shareholders' agreement.
127 Schmidt forwarded the email to Dunn. Dunn's initial response to Schmidt was that Ruschin's email was "setting [Schmidt] up for an injunction on the proceeds of Voyage 3". In a further email to Schmidt, Dunn provided a draft response, which was forwarded by Schmidt to Bzezinski and Ruschin on 18 November 2013.
128 In addition to refuting various matters, by Dunn's drafted email, Schmidt suggested to Ruschin that he had made it clear from the outset, that while his money was funding the operations, he would have unrestricted authority to determine how the business was executed. Schmidt stated that he had sought to resolve how business operations could be conducted through AHRKalimpa, but complained there had been no proposal from Bzezinski or Ruschin since 29 September 2013, as was the fact.
129 The email concluded by stating that Schmidt had no issue with the relationship Ruschin and Bzezinski had "developed with [their] Israeli clients, and [remained] happy to recognise this value". However, Schmidt stated that, to the extent that they wished to have entitlements beyond this, they needed to formally outline the basis for this to be considered.
B.12 Arrangements to enable Otway Livestock alone to conduct the business
130 On 19 November 2013, Dunn sent an email to Schmidt and Day, enclosing an agenda for an executive committee meeting of Otway Livestock. The agenda covered funding and joint venture arrangements with Minerva, documentation for Voyage 4, the return of shares and resignation by Schmidt as a director of AHRKalimpa, and various other items, including "overall strategic direction". There was no suggestion on the agenda of any further negotiation with Bzezinski or Ruschin.
131 The executive committee meeting was held at 1.00 pm that day.[51] It was resolved at the meeting that Schmidt "confirmed" with Minerva that Minerva required no involvement by AHRKalimpa in the joint venture. Although Schmidt gave evidence that there was no intention to cut AHRKalimpa out, it is plain that, by this time, there had been discussions between Schmidt and Minerva about the continuation of the cattle export business to Israel without any involvement of AHRKalimpa. Consistent with this, later that day an email was sent to Minerva attaching documents for Schmidt and Minerva's execution to allow business to proceed as between Minerva and Otway Livestock. Needless to say, neither Bzezinski nor Ruschin were forwarded a copy of this email.
132 At the meeting of Otway Livestock, future business opportunities were discussed. It was anticipated that the next 2 contracts for export, namely Voyages 5 and 6, would be in "February/late March or March/April" 2014.
133 It was also resolved that Schmidt would execute share transfers and a director resignation from AHRKalimpa, and forward them to Bzezinski and Ruschin, together with a request for a formal proposal for ongoing participation. It is likely that the latter part of this resolution was a matter of form rather than substance, as the decision had already been made for Otway Livestock to conduct business with Minerva without the involvement of AHRKalimpa. This is particularly so given that the minutes record that any proposal from Bzezinski and Ruschin would have to address Otway Livestock's concerns regarding "control and restraints". It would have been clear to Schmidt and Dunn that it was highly unlikely that Bzezinski and Ruschin would ever accept the position then being adopted by Schmidt on these issues. It was further resolved that, in the absence of a formal proposal, "a clear line should be drawn between past participation ... and ongoing operations" (emphasis added).
134 With respect to the Premises, it was resolved that Otway Livestock should make no commitments to lease or sublease the Premises until there was an acceptable proposal or a separation arrangement had been finalised.
135 The final substantive topic discussed was "Overall Strategic Direction". The minutes record that there was a discussion regarding operations for 2014 and beyond. Not only was trading to June 2014 "(best case)" and December 2014 "(stable case)" to restore capital lost referred to, but it was expressly agreed that in the forthcoming December and January a strategy for more efficiencies and "other scope enlargement" would be developed and pursued.
136 On 25 November 2013, Schmidt attended at the Premises and met with Bzezinski and Ruschin. Schmidt had with him a letter that he had already signed. That letter enclosed Schmidt's resignation as a director of AHRKalimpa, effective that day. Also attached was an open executed transfer of Schmidt's shares in AHRKalimpa.
137 The letter stated that it was appropriate for Schmidt to remove himself from any ownership or management of AHRKalimpa given the unsuccessful negotiations. The letter also stated that Schmidt was prepared to re-engage with AHRKalimpa if there were a proposal put to him which was acceptable. But Schmidt also stated that, in the absence of such a proposal being agreed by 21 December 2013, it should be assumed that Otway Livestock would continue to operate in the live cattle export business on an independent basis. It was suggested this did not preclude an ongoing relationship with Kalimpa or AHRKalimpa.
138 Schmidt read out the letter to Bzezinski and Ruschin. After he had done this, Ruschin walked out. According to Schmidt, as Ruschin was leaving the room he said it was going to mean "total war". Schmidt also said that, after Ruschin left, Bzezinski said Ruschin would get over it and would calm down. After this meeting, there were no further meaningful discussions between the parties.
B.14 Events after termination of the relationship
139 On 26 November 2013, an executive committee meeting of Otway Livestock was held. With respect to AHRKalimpa, it was noted that the 25 November 2013 meeting had been held, and was witnessed by Day. It was further noted that unless a proposal was received by 21 December 2013, Otway Livestock would continue to operate as an independent live cattle exporter. There were also some resolutions purporting to deal with the proceeds of Voyage 3 and the investment in Voyage 4. There was no suggestion of any involvement of AHRKalimpa in these matters.
140 With respect to funding, it was noted that proposals were presently before Westpac and HSBC. Again, these matters were being dealt with as part of the affairs of Otway Livestock.
141 On 28 November 2013, Otway Livestock and Minerva executed an agreement for the purposes of an unincorporated joint venture to export live cattle from Australia.[52] The 6 page document was prepared by Minter Ellison, on instructions previously given by Schmidt. It was unclear on the evidence when Schmidt first gave instructions to Minter Ellison for this agreement to be prepared.
142 On 14 December 2013, being a Saturday, Schmidt attended at the Premises, accompanied by a locksmith and removalists. Neither Bzezinski nor Ruschin was in attendance, nor were they aware of Schmidt's intention to enter the Premises.
143 Schmidt forced his way into the Premises, which were locked, and removed the computer and all hard-copy files located at the Premises. Since that time, Schmidt has remained in possession of all that was taken on this occasion.[53]
144 On 24 December 2013, the solicitors acting for Kalimpa, Bzezinski and Ruschin sent a letter of demand to Schmidt. After setting out the background to the dispute between the parties, and alleging various breaches, unconscionable conduct, and the like, various demands were made. These included demands for moneys with respect to Voyages 1 to 4, and for Schmidt and Otway Livestock to cease to export cattle to Israel for a period of 2 years and to provide an undertaking to that effect.
145 On 27 December 2013, Schmidt responded by email, suggesting there were inaccuracies in the letter of demand.[54] He further stated that no joint venture had ever been concluded, that a non-compete clause had never been agreed and that there had never been an agreement for payment as asserted.[55] Further, Schmidt stated that Bzezinski and Ruschin had been asked to provide "a proposal for resolution of our failed arrangements on numerous occasions", but had failed to do so. The email concluded:
If the demands outlined in your letter represent a proposal for resolution, they are rejected. I am and have been ready to determine a means of resolving our failed arrangements, but reiterate there has never been a concluded [joint venture] between us.
146 Since the end of the joint venture, Otway Livestock has continued to export livestock to Israel.
147 Before addressing the issues for determination, there are a number of additional factual issues that need to be determined.
C.1 Whether, since 27 June 2013, AHRKalimpa conducted business exporting Australian livestock to Israel
148 The defendants submitted that AHRKalimpa did not conduct any business while Schmidt was a director. Although it was acknowledged that AHRKalimpa was the intended corporate vehicle through which the parties would conduct the joint venture if agreement were reached, it was submitted that the company never engaged in any business at the relevant time.
149 The defendants relied upon the fact that AHRKalimpa did not have a livestock export licence, a bank account, its own funds, any ability to obtain funds (so it was alleged)[56] or any capacity to operate an export business. Reliance was also placed upon the fact that there were no long-term contracts in existence with any Israeli importer. Further, it was contended that the mere fact that AHRKalimpa entered into 2 sales contracts with Dabach with respect to Voyages 3 and 4 did not amount to conducting business in circumstances where AHRKalimpa had no ability to perform those contracts. Furthermore, it was contended that having "a few meetings of directors does not amount to conducting business".
150 The evidence, including the evidence of Schmidt himself, is overwhelmingly contrary to the defendants' submissions. Quite properly, Schmidt unequivocally acknowledged that each of Voyages 1 to 4 was undertaken for and on behalf of AHRKalimpa.[57] The mere fact that AHRKalimpa was not incorporated at the time of the execution of the sales contracts for Voyages 1 and 2, or at the time of any work performed up until 27 June 2013, did not mean that after 27 June 2013 those pre-incorporation contracts were not to be treated as being on behalf of AHRKalimpa,[58] or that AHRKalimpa could not take the benefit of the contracts in due course.[59]
151 Further, in addition to entering into 2 contracts in its own right and having Otway Livestock enter into contracts on its behalf, AHRKalimpa engaged in the following business activities:
(1) On behalf of the proposed joint venture vehicle, Bzezinski, Schmidt and Ruschin (by telephone) met with prospective customers and informed them of the intention to create a new company, being AHRKalimpa, to export livestock to Israel.[60] These prospective customers included Tnuva and Dabach, who became actual customers of AHRKalimpa from 27 June 2013, and the ongoing dealings with them up to that time continued.[61]
(2) Conducted its administration from the Premises, being the registered office of AHRKalimpa.[62]
(3) On 5 July 2013, resolved to address a profit and loss statement prepared for Voyage 1 and a feasibility budget for Voyage 2.[63]
(4) Maintaining accounts on a going-concern basis.[64]
(5) The updating of cashflows and forecasts for AHRKalimpa's business.[65]
(7) In addition to board members, AHRKalimpa had other representatives attend board meetings on its behalf, including Day.[68]
(8) The AHRKalimpa board recognised that executive salaries of Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin would be fixed at $500,000 per annum for the purpose of obtaining $4 million of new debt funding as approved by the board.[69]
(9) Ruschin agreed to revisit and attempt to secure lower cost outcomes for the "first voyages", as discussed by the board.[70]
152 Furthermore, it is not to the point that AHRKalimpa did not hold an export licence in 2013. Under the Chart, it was not contemplated that AHRKalimpa would obtain such a licence, but rather it was agreed it would utilise Otway Livestock's existing licence.[71] In these circumstances, the absence of a licence provides no indication that AHRKalimpa was not in business in 2013.[72]
153 For the purposes of determining this issue, it does not matter that a formal shareholders' agreement had not been agreed upon, or that the other previously intended formalities had not been put in place. From 27 June 2013, AHRKalimpa existed as a legal entity, had duly appointed directors who acted in that capacity whilst in office, and shareholders with rights as members. It also does not matter that AHRKalimpa was not named as a party in the draft agreement forwarded by Moshel on 17 September 2013.[73] Contrary to the defendants' submission, it seems highly unlikely that this non-inclusion in a draft document was a recognition that AHRKalimpa had not started its participation in the joint venture. Even if it had been intended to be such a recognition (Moshel did not give evidence), it would have been contrary to the fact.
154 In short, AHRKalimpa was engaging in business activities through its officers and agents. For the reasons stated,[74] these activities included exporting Australian livestock to Israel, including to Tnuva and Dabach.
155 Further, even though AHRKalimpa's business in the second half of 2013 was only in its early stages of development, it had real prospects of developing and expanding that business on an ongoing basis. Despite AHRKalimpa not having any executed long-term contracts with any Israeli importer, through the efforts initially of Ruschin, and then Bzezinski and Schmidt, it had established meaningful commercial relationships with key Israeli importers. The evidence disclosed that the nature and extent of these relationships meant that, if a joint venture agreement had been finalised, it was likely that AHRKalimpa would have continued to export cattle to Israel. This was especially so when the state of the market meant that it was likely AHRKalimpa would be competitive for the foreseeable future.
156 To elaborate, the 2 largest Israeli importers had both expressed their serious dissatisfaction with the then entrenched Australian exporter to Israel, which exporter had something akin to a monopoly with respect to the Israeli market.[75] Further, AHRKalimpa had demonstrated an ability to successfully export cattle to Israel on terms acceptable to these Israeli importers.
157 Furthermore, the contemporaneous evidence demonstrates the likelihood of an ongoing business becoming a reality. Whilst Schmidt was still a director of AHRKalimpa, negotiations were on foot for the completion of Voyages 5 and 6.[76] Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that it was anticipated that the business would continue for 10 voyages or more.[77] This anticipated position was soundly based. This is borne out by the fact that Otway Livestock has conducted even more than 10 voyages since 2013.
158 In summary, as at November 2013, AHRKalimpa was not only conducting an export cattle business to Israel, albeit at that time with the necessary assistance of Otway Livestock, but additionally it had already put in place a business plan, and established the necessary contacts and arrangements to implement that plan for the foreseeable future.
159 Of course, Otway Livestock choosing to enter the market in its own right took away much of the competitive edge that AHRKalimpa might otherwise have had. The unchallenged evidence of both Bzezinski and Ruschin was that subsequent attempts to re-enter the Israeli market have failed because Otway Livestock has trading relationships with the customers established by Kalimpa, and the previous window of opportunity has been closed.
160 For completeness, although AHRKalimpa did not have an export licence in 2013 and was dependent on Otway Livestock in this regard, AHRKalimpa did obtain an export licence at a later point in time. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest AHRKalimpa could not have obtained such a licence earlier if it had applied to do so.[78]
161 The plaintiffs contended that, since its incorporation, AHRKalimpa has held and maintained certain confidential information and expertise that was required to successfully export livestock from Australia to Israel, referred to as the "Israel Market Information". The plaintiffs alleged that since at least December 2013, in breach of confidence, the defendants used the Israel Market Information to export livestock, and to usurp AHRKalimpa's opportunities and business for their own benefit. This is said to have occurred without AHRKalimpa's authorisation, and to its detriment.
162 Broadly speaking, the Israel Market Information included:
(1) The names and contact details for representatives of Israeli customers and potential customers, and for various government officials.
(2) Information about the market generally, including its size, market access, costs, livestock requirements and the key competitors.
(3) Knowledge of relevant laws and guidelines in Israel, including guidelines for kosher beef.
(4) Knowledge of how to manage and maintain business relationships in Israel.
The Israel Market Information was also said to include "a plan to take business advantage" of this knowledge ("the Business Opportunity"). The plaintiffs provided details of the Israel Market Information to the court in Annexure A to their closing submissions filed 13 August 2017.[79]
163 Ruschin, with the support of Bzezinski, had been developing and maintaining the Israel Market Information between 2008 and 2011.[80] Ruschin gave a detailed account of the network of relationships he had built over this time with key representatives of potential Israeli customers, including Tnuva and Dabach, as well as the information about the market he had gathered from them, and in the Israeli livestock market more generally.[81] It was from these discussions that Ruschin, with Bzezinski, further identified and developed the Business Opportunity.
164 Ruschin stored the contact details on his mobile phone, and later, to some extent, in a notebook.[82]
C.2.2 Whether the Israel Market Information, or part of it, was confidential and not public information
165 The defendants submitted that the Israel Market Information was not confidential. This was on the basis that much of the Israel Market Information was said to be publicly available,[83] or otherwise known to Schmidt because of his experience in the cattle export industry.
166 With respect to these more broadly based contentions, the defendants' submissions must be rejected. Much of the Israel Market Information was clearly confidential (including, significantly, the names of representatives of Dabach and Tnuva with authority to negotiate and enter into agreements, together with their personal telephone numbers and email addresses), even if some of the information could have been discovered in the public domain.
167 Where a party has applied skill and ingenuity to produce a compilation, equity may treat the entire compilation of information as confidential, even where some of that information is publicly available. As Megarry J said in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd:[84]
However confidential the circumstances of communication, there can be no breach of confidence in revealing to others something which is already common knowledge. But this must not be taken too far. Something that has been constructed solely from materials in the public domain may possess the necessary quality of confidentiality: for something new and confidential may have been brought into being by the application of the skill and ingenuity of the human brain. Novelty depends on the thing itself, and not upon the quality of the constituent parts.
168 This approach acknowledges the skill, judgment and effort in acquiring and collating certain information.[85] Broadly speaking, it does not preclude a recipient from using the public information, but does not permit that public information to be used in conjunction with the confidential information to gain an advantage the recipient would not have otherwise had.[86] Further, novelty is not a necessary element of a confidentiality claim.[87]
169 It is clear that Ruschin, with the support of Bzezinski, spent a considerable amount of time acquiring and compiling the Israel Market Information, notwithstanding that some of the information was public information and may have been known to Schmidt. In certain instances, it was only through Ruschin's persistence that the desired relationships were established and important information was obtained. The evidence was that Ruschin spent between 1 and 4 hours each night speaking to the Israeli contacts. Further, Bzezinski travelled to Israel to meet the contacts face-to-face on a number of occasions between 2008 and 2011. The information collated by them was used to properly identify, and subsequently pursue, the Business Opportunity. Further, much of the information so accumulated was not known to Schmidt before he (with Elders, and later himself) dealt with Kalimpa.
170 Not only did the plaintiffs treat the Israel Market Information as confidential, but they made Schmidt aware of this.[88] Until October 2011,[89] the only person to whom Ruschin disclosed the Business Opportunity, or any of the Israel Market Information, was Bzezinski. Both Ruschin and Bzezinski considered the Israel Market Information to be "very confidential" and "valuable". Neither was willing to share it with anyone without a contract being in place. This attitude was expressly communicated to Schmidt.[90]
171 Consistent with the plaintiffs' claim of confidentiality, the defendants, themselves, treated some of the Israel Market Information as confidential. Ultimately, it seems the defendants implicitly resiled from their earlier stance, but in the lead up to trial they required business information in their possession, which formed part of the Israel Market Information, to remain confidential.[91] Moreover, when cross-examined, Schmidt readily acknowledged he would not give to his competitors details of key contacts of the major buyers of beef in Israel, or for how much cattle are sold to his customers, the quantity of cattle sold or the terms upon which his customers will deal under letters of credit or otherwise. Upon these various matters being put, Schmidt accepted he would not tell his competitors this type of information as it was "plainly confidential".
172 In a similar vein, much of the Israel Market Information was, as a compilation, confidential information.[92]
173 As to the information compiled, it broadly fell into 2 categories. Part 1 of Confidential Annexure A contains 20 contacts, including, in most cases, direct telephone numbers, for customers and other persons engaged in activities related to importing cattle into Israel. This information was properly the subject of a confidentiality claim,[93] was communicated in confidence to Schmidt[94] and was kept confidential.
174 As may be seen from part 2 of Confidential Annexure A, in addition to contact details, the plaintiffs identified 7 types of information which they claimed were confidential and formed part of the Israel Market Information. I will deal with each of these in turn.
175 First, allegations were made concerning the size of the Israeli market.[95] As set out above,[96] in global terms, the size of that market for Australian exports is publicly known. However, to the extent the detail contained in Confidential Annexure A concerns the requirements of particular customers and the desired number of shipments per year, that information was confidential. There was no evidence to suggest this information was publicly available. It was obtained during Ruschin's confidential inquiries with contacts in Israel, some of which were recorded in his notebook. I accept the plaintiffs' evidence, which was not substantively challenged, that such information was confidential to Kalimpa, and was only disclosed on a confidential basis.
176 But this information does not include the information identified with respect to demand generally.[97] The fact that demand for meat increases in conjunction with the occurrence of religious celebrations does not possess the necessary quality of confidentiality. Further, there was no direct evidence[98] as to the number of places in Israeli quarantine for cattle.[99] Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not established the existence of this particular piece of information, let alone whether any confidentiality existed in relation to it.
177 Secondly, the plaintiffs referred to information relevant to market access and associated costs.[100] It also included specific pricing details paid by an importer. There was no evidence to contradict the plaintiffs' position that this information was not generally known and was kept confidential. In particular, Graham Brown, a witness called by the defendants, who has worked in the cattle industry for over 20 years and who gave evidence about the type of information that is not confidential in the industry, did not address this issue. I accept the plaintiffs' evidence.
178 Thirdly, the plaintiffs relied upon information gathered concerning how to export Australian livestock to ensure it complied with the laws and guidelines in Israel with respect to weight and kosher requirements.[101] It is not immediately apparent how laws and guidelines that must be complied with in order to export to Israel might be thought to be confidential. It would be surprising if such information was not made known to anyone who intended to export to Israel and made the necessary enquiries.
179 Dealing with the kosher aspect of the Israeli market, the fact that the Israeli market, like other markets,[102] includes requirements for certain meat to be kosher is something generally known. Further, the specific standards and procedures which must be followed are historic and, if not known, readily ascertainable. This information does not possess the necessary qualities of confidential information.[103]
180 Further, Schmidt gave direct unchallenged evidence that he knew the sort of cattle that were required for Israel because he dealt with persons who exported to Israel who also sold cattle to him for export to Japan. Furthermore, Brown gave evidence that producers generally knew to where their cattle were being exported, especially since 2011.[104] There was no suggestion that any such information about the size and type of cattle being exported was confidential or was communicated in confidence. Accordingly, there is no basis for finding that this aspect of the claimed Israel Confidential Information was in fact confidential.
181 Fourthly, the plaintiffs suggested that the breeds and weights of livestock exported to Israel comprise confidential information.[105] For the reasons set out in the preceding paragraph, such information was not of a confidential nature and, in any event, Schmidt knew of such information before he had any dealings with Kalimpa.
182 Fifthly, the plaintiffs included the identity of the main competitor exporting cattle to Israel.[106] Again, for like reasons, such information was not confidential.
183 Sixthly, the plaintiffs refer to the price per head of cattle for export from Australian livestock stations.[107] In part, the plaintiffs sought to rely upon a document not in evidence.[108] As to the evidence before the court, there is nothing to suggest that the information referred to in emails sent on 27 January 2012 was confidential, or that it would not be readily available to anyone who inquired concerning that information.[109]
184 Lastly, the plaintiffs referred to Kalimpa's business plan, ultimately adopted by AHRKalimpa, to export livestock to Israel with an annual turnover of approximately $40 to $60 million.[110] This plan envisaged the co-operation of the 2 key Israeli importers.[111] The uncontradicted evidence was that this had not been done before and that Ruschin and Bzezinski kept this plan confidential until it was disclosed to Elders within the confidentiality regime then created. Whether or not all aspects of the plan remained confidential once it was implemented (there was no direct evidence on this point), at the time it was communicated to Schmidt the plan was a trade secret of Kalimpa that was plainly valuable, particularly in circumstances where the necessary contacts had been put in place to implement the plan. That key information relating to the plan remained confidential. Further, this plan became part of the property of the joint venture in November 2012, and, from June 2013, of AHRKalimpa.
185 As to the information in Ruschin's notebook,[112] the defendants submitted that information did not become confidential merely because it was "placed in a confidential record".
186 The notebook contained, in part, information that has otherwise been found to be confidential.[113] Those findings are not dependent upon the fact that the information (for example, certain contact details) was recorded in the notebook. That said, the fact that such details were recorded in the notebook, the contents of which were always kept confidential, supports the findings as to the confidential treatment of this information. Conversely, much of the material in the notebook concerning the Australian market is no longer the subject of any claim.
187 It suffices to address this submission by noting that the outcome of the claims for confidentiality has not depended upon whether or not particular information was recorded in the notebook.
188 Finally, the defendants contended that due to the dynamic nature of the Israeli market, to the extent that the information consisted of pricing information, that information would only be relevant for a short period of time, after which it would lose its quality of confidence.[114] Again, the defendants' submission must be rejected. It is not to the point that the Israel Market Information may have changed over time. Knowledge of point-in-time pricing information was no doubt of value to the plaintiffs and considered confidential by them, even if it was liable to change in response to the market. It could be expected that such information would still contain some ongoing value, namely knowing what a potential customer was willing to pay in the market at a particular point in time. Schmidt expressly acknowledged during cross-examination that he would not disclose such information to competitors.[115] Further, this information is quite different to the Australian market information, for which there was no cogent evidence that it was confidential.[116]
C.2.3 Whether any of the Israel Market Information was disclosed to Schmidt in confidence
189 The defendants submitted that, even if the Israel Market Information included confidential information, much of it was not conveyed to Schmidt.[117] By way of example, it was not suggested by the plaintiffs that Schmidt was ever shown Ruschin's notebook, or any form of confidential database. The defendants contended only the following information was in fact conveyed to Schmidt:
(1) The contact details of representatives of 5 potential customers in Israel, contained in the email of 26 October 2011.[118]
(2) An itinerary sent by Ruschin to Schmidt on 25 December 2011, listing the time and place of various meetings with 4 "Kalimpa clients in Israel".[119]
Further, the defendants contended that none of this information was imparted to Schmidt in circumstances imposing an obligation of confidence.
190 Turning first to the email of 26 October 2011, the defendants submitted that the details were provided pursuant to clause 2.3.1 of the Elders Agreement,[120] and that that clause "does not suggest that the contact details constitute confidential information or that the provision of the details is done in confidence".
191 Information may be imparted under an obligation of confidence by way of agreement, or where a reasonable person receiving the information would have realised that the information was being given to her or him in confidence.[121] Generally speaking, the reasonable person would be more likely to realise this obligation of confidence if the information in question were of commercial value and provided on a business-like basis with a common object in mind.[122]
192 In the present case, it was not until October 2011, after the Elders Agreement was in place, that Ruschin and Bzezinski began sharing this aspect of the Israel Market Information with Schmidt.[123] Even accepting that the information was provided pursuant to clause 2.3.1 of the Elders Agreement and not otherwise, the provision was nonetheless in the context of the confidentiality regime established under the Elders Agreement. As noted above,[124] the existence of that regime was an acknowledgement from Schmidt (on behalf of Elders) that the parties treated, amongst other things, the details of Kalimpa's customer contacts as confidential. In such circumstances, the email sent to Schmidt on 26 October 2011 was plainly sent to him in confidence and in pursuit of the common object of successfully exporting cattle to Israel.
193 As for the email sent on 25 December 2011, the defendants submitted that nothing in the terms of the email itself indicated that the information was being sent on a confidential basis. Although confidentiality was not expressly referred to, the names of the persons with whom Bzezinski and Schmidt were to meet must have been understood by Schmidt to be confidential. Not only were such names not provided to him until after the entry into the Elders Agreement and for the common object expressly contemplated, but each of Ruschin, Bzezinski and Schmidt has treated the information as confidential ever since.[125]
194 In summary, with respect to the business-related information that the defendants accepted they received from Kalimpa, much of that information was confidential and imparted in confidence. Further, upon the incorporation of AHRKalimpa on 27 June 2013, through the agency of either Kalimpa or AHRKalimpa's directors (including Schmidt) or both, that information was also held and maintained by AHRKalimpa.
196 First, the plaintiffs referred to an email sent by Ruschin on 8 January 2012 to Schmidt concerning the need to get a contract to Dabach and that Tnuva and another importer "want to work with us". However, that email did not contain any information concerning the names and contact details as contended. Further, it is difficult to understand how a communication of this very general nature in early 2012 equates with confidential information held and maintained by AHRKalimpa from June 2013. In short, this email does not advance the plaintiffs' case.
197 Secondly, the plaintiffs referred to an email sent on 27 January 2012 by Schmidt to an Elders' marketing manager for China and Russia. However, the bulk of the information in the email related to the Australian market, and contacts that Ruschin had made up to January 2012. Although the pricing detail may have been sensitive at the time,[128] it is highly likely that Schmidt (if he did not know it already), or anyone else from Elders, could have readily obtained that information by simply making the necessary inquiries. To the extent that this aspect of the case was pursued,[129] the evidence does not establish it was imparted by Ruschin (or anyone else) in confidence.
198 The email also referred to a list of contacts that Ruschin had put together. Although supplier lists or customer lists might properly be regarded as confidential even though the individual components are not,[130] the list only contained 4 names. It does not suggest any real skill, judgment or effort was involved in the list's compilation.[131] Similarly, this aspect of the email does not advance the plaintiffs' case.
199 Thirdly, the plaintiffs referred to an email sent by Schmidt to others at Elders on 6 September 2012, copied to Bzezinski and Ruschin. The email sought confirmation that an 8 vessel commitment from Elders for 2013 was not possible, and that a 3 year contract with Tnuva did not have any merit for Elders. The email effectively recorded Tnuva's requirements for the 2013 calendar year. Such information fell squarely within clause 3.2.3 of the Elders Agreement (being business information of a customer) and Elders (including Schmidt) were required to "maintain complete confidentiality".[132]
200 Upon its incorporation on 27 June 2013, AHRKalimpa also held this information through its agents, Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin. It was important information to AHRKalimpa, namely the requirements of a key customer for that calendar year. Schmidt must have obtained that information either directly from Tnuva while working for Elders, or from Bzezinski or Ruschin.[133] In either case, upon its receipt, he had an obligation to keep that information confidential and, for reasons already explained,[134] he was under a continuing obligation to Kalimpa, and then AHRKalimpa, to keep it confidential.
201 Under cross-examination, Schmidt acknowledged that, while working at Elders, what he learned about the Israeli market was either from Bzezinski or Ruschin, or from people they introduced to him after the Elders Agreement was signed.
202 Fourthly, the plaintiffs relied on an email sent by Ruschin to Day on 21 March 2013 listing the names and addresses of "all supply chain facilities",[135] as well as the names and contact numbers of representatives for those facilities and 2 names for a transport company. By this time, the parties were taking steps as part of a joint venture,[136] pursuant to the agreed arrangement recorded in the Chart.[137] This included the intention that the business would be developing intellectual property which should be "protected for the [benefit] of the partners".[138] For the same reasons as stated in paragraph 194 above, from its incorporation, AHRKalimpa held and maintained this confidential information. Further, although the email was not sent to Schmidt and there was no suggestion that he saw it at the time, this email formed part of the business records obtained by Schmidt in De[139]ber 2013.139 Those business records were taken by Otway Livestock for the purpose of it conducting the business previously run by AHRKalimpa.
203 A reasonable person in Schmidt's position in 2013, in the context of the earlier confidentiality regime that was in place with Elders and the joint venture relationship (whether on an ongoing or on a voyage-by-voyage basis)[140] would have understood that the details Ruschin sent on 21 March 2013 were being provided in confidence and solely for the purposes of the joint venture.[141] Schmidt gave no evidence contrary to this conclusion.
204 Fifthly, the plaintiffs referred to emails in April 2013 concerning Day. The first of these emails, sent by Day on 3 April 2013 to Ruschin, sought supply chain verification details for both Tnuva and Dabach. There was no evidence as to where Day had obtained the information already set out in the email.
205 In April 2013, Day was still working for Schmidt remotely.[142] There is nothing on the face of the email, nor was there any evidence led, to indicate that Day received all the information sought from Ruschin or Bzezinski. Although that general inference might have been available, given the topic was not raised with Day at all when she gave evidence, no such general inference will be drawn. However, this conclusion is subject to paragraphs 207 and 208 below.
206 The second email is from Schmidt to Ruschin and Bzezinski, by which Schmidt asked Ruschin to provide background information to Day concerning Dabach. Again, although a general inference might have been drawn that this occurred, in circumstances where this was not put to any witness, no such general inference will be drawn. However, this conclusion is subject to what follows immediately below.
207 The final email was sent by Day on 10 April 2013 to Ruschin, copied to Schmidt. By this email, Day sought specific details concerning Dabach: namely, the proper name of the company; its address; the name, email and telephone number for the main contact; and the full name of the relevant abattoir. It was stated that Day was preparing "the ESCAS deed"[143] and would insert the proper name once she had received it.
208 In circumstances where the contracts with Dabach were entered into,[144] and the provision of the details of the supply chain to the Australian Government was mandatory,[145] the only sensible inference is that this information was provided as requested. Accordingly, despite the fact the matter was not directly raised with any witness, I find that shortly after 10 April 2013, Ruschin provided the requested information to Day, which information was, at least in part, confidential to the joint venturers and, upon its incorporation, to AHRKalimpa. A similar finding is made with respect to information relating to Tnuva.
209 The individual matters raised by the defendants have been addressed above. However, in the context of the pleadings, the submissions made by the defendants with respect to the provision of information to Schmidt[146] were, to an extent, somewhat artificial. In particular, the defendants sought to rely upon the absence of specific evidence about specific names, phone numbers, positions held and email addresses being handed over to Schmidt. However, this approach ignores the substantial, and no doubt proper, concession made in the defence filed.
210 In response to the plaintiffs' allegation that the Israel Market Information, "in full or in part, was obtained, gained and/or known to Schmidt because of his position as a director of AHRKalimpa", the defendants denied that it was so obtained. But the defence went further to allege that "information and expertise of the kind said to constitute the Israel Market Information" was information and expertise disclosed to Schmidt at a time when he was engaged in the business of livestock export conducted by Elders.
211 In other words, on the pleadings, Schmidt did not dispute that the Israel Market Information had, in substance, been provided to him, but rather disputed the capacity in which it was received. Importantly, although the plaintiffs had not given full particulars of the Israel Market Information at the time the defence was filed in this form, the statement of claim specifically alleged that the names and contact details of the representatives of relevant Israeli importers[147] and Israeli government officers formed part of the Israel Market Information.
212 In short, on the pleadings and on the evidence before the court, there can be no serious contest that, to the extent the information was confidential, Schmidt obtained such information from 1 of 3 sources, all of which imposed obligations of confidentiality: namely, from Kalimpa (through its agents, Ruschin or Bzezinski or both); or while acting for Elders under the terms of the Elders Agreement; or while working pursuant to the joint venture.
213 To elaborate, the fact that Schmidt may have gathered some of the information himself during his visits to Israel does not vitiate his obligations with respect to confidentiality. Such information was gathered either under the confidentiality regime created by the Elders Agreement, or as part of the joint venture, in circumstances where it was expressly contemplated that intellectual property would be accumulated, coupled with the history of Kalimpa keeping such information confidential and protected.[148]
214 It follows that, at least, the following information was disclosed to Schmidt in confidence:
(1) The contact details for representatives of 5 potential customers in Israel, including the direct telephone numbers of 2 contacts at Tnuva and 2 contacts at Dabach.[149]
(2) The names of representatives for 2 other "Kalimpa clients in Israel".[150]
(3) The direct telephone numbers for the quarantine owner in Israel.[151]
(4) The direct telephone numbers for the transport company to be used in Israel.[152]
(5) The contacts of various feedlots in Israel.[153]
(6) The combination of the full name of Dabach, its address, and the name, email and telephone number for the main contact at Dabach, together with the full name of the relevant abattoir; and the same type of information with respect to Tnuva.[154]
(7) Certain information relevant to the size of the Israeli market.[155]
(8) Certain information relevant to market access and associated costs.[156]
(9) The business plan of Kalimpa, and, later, AHRKalimpa.[157]
215 For completeness, although the defendants made many assertions as to the lack of confidentiality in relation to much of the Israel Market Information, no positive evidence was led on their behalf to demonstrate the information was publicly available (beyond the very general information contained in the Australian Livestock Export Corporation Ltd annual reports).[158]
216 In conclusion, the evidence establishes that Ruschin and Bzezinski, on behalf of Kalimpa, provided valuable information to Schmidt (and, therefore, to Otway Livestock),[159] both before and during the conduct of the joint venture, that was both confidential and critical to Schmidt being able to participate in the joint venture, either as a director of AHRKalimpa since 27 June 2013, or in some other capacity before that time. Further, the confidential information was provided to Schmidt on either the express or implicit basis that he would keep the information confidential and not use it for purposes other than those of the joint venture.[160]
C.2.4 Whether Schmidt and Otway Livestock have used the Israel Market Information to arrange, with the Israeli Importers, to export livestock to Israel to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa, usurping to themselves the opportunity and business, without AHRKalimpa's or Kalimpa's authorisation and to their detriment
217 To establish that the defendants have used in the Israel Market Information in breach of confidence, the plaintiffs must establish the following:[161]
(1) The Israel Market Information, or a substantial part of it, was confidential.
(2) The Israel Market Information was originally imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.
(3) There has been an unauthorised use of the Israel Market Information to the plaintiffs' (or either of their) detriment.[162]
218 For the reasons already stated,[163] the first 2 elements have been established with respect to a substantial amount of the information comprising the Israel Market Information. Turning to the final element, the test is whether the defendants abused the confidence, in the sense that they have made unconscientious use of the Israel Market Information, taken unfair advantage of the provision of that information, or used it other than for the purpose for which it was conveyed.[164]
219 There is no issue that Otway Livestock has continued to export livestock to Israel after December 2013, with a total of 17 voyages now completed. This was a continuation of AHRKalimpa's business.[165] Clearly, the defendants have used the contacts provided and relationships made in continuing to conduct the business of the joint venture. In doing so, they have unfairly taken advantage of the confidential information conveyed to Schmidt, first pursuant to the Elders Agreement, and later (to Schmidt and Otway Livestock) as part of the joint venture arrangements. Further, the Israel Market Information was conveyed to Schmidt (and Otway Livestock) pursuant to those arrangements, and not for any other purpose.
220 There has been some debate as to whether it is necessary to show detriment as part of the cause of action of breach of confidence.[166] However, this issue does not presently arise for consideration. The plaintiffs have plainly suffered detriment by reason of the defendants' use of the Israel Market Information. This flows from the fact that the defendants have diverted the business of AHRKalimpa to Otway Livestock.[167] Further, given the nature of the Israeli market,[168] the entry of Otway Livestock into the market has fundamentally altered, if not substantially negated, the Business Opportunity AHRKalimpa once had to provide an attractive alternative to the incumbent supplier.
221 The defendants submitted that nothing of any significance was taken from AHRKalimpa after November 2013[169] and that this was corroborated by the fact that, between the time Schmidt resigned and October 2014 (when Voyage 6 was completed), AHRKalimpa did not itself attempt to export cattle.[170] The submission must be rejected. Leaving aside the fact that all its business records had been taken,[171] AHRKalimpa had no export licence so it was incapable of export at that time.[172] In any event, it was always the business plan of Bzezinski and Ruschin, initially of themselves and then through Kalimpa, that a joint venturer with experience in exporting cattle from Australia was a necessary part of exploiting the information and relationships that they had accumulated over a number of years. Because of the defendants' conduct that opportunity was lost to them. [173]
222 Further, not only did AHRKalimpa and Kalimpa not authorise the use of their confidential information for extraneous purposes, AHRKalimpa's directors, including Schmidt, had unanimously resolved that the business would be wound up if agreement could not be reached, with "mutual non-compete undertakings". In substance, Schmidt undertook not to do what he subsequently directly facilitated Otway Livestock to do, namely to carry on the existing business of exporting cattle to Israel; and, in particular, to AHRKalimpa's existing customers. Absent such an agreement by directors' resolution (which substantially reflected what had been previously agreed as recorded in the Chart),[174] Schmidt may well have been required to withdraw from exporting cattle to Israel for a period of time in any event.[175]
223 Based on the pleadings, the court prepared a list of issues, which was settled with the parties. Some of those issues are now not necessary for determination.
224 As noted above,[176] the plaintiffs abandoned allegations to the effect that agreement was reached in mid 2013. Further, contrary to the defence as filed at the commencement of trial, the defendants acknowledged that Voyages 1 to 4 were conducted as a joint enterprise pursuant to which "any profits would be shared between the parties equally",[177] and a full accounting with respect to Voyages 1 to 4 ought to occur. The agreed list of issues will be dealt with in light of these matters.
225 There was no issue that from 27 June 2013 until 25 November 2013, as a director of AHRKalimpa, Schmidt owed:[178]
(1) A duty to act in good faith in the best interests of AHRKalimpa and for a proper purpose.[179]
(3) A fiduciary duty not to make or pursue a gain in circumstances where there was a conflict, or a real possibility of conflict, between his interests (or those of his related parties) and those of AHRKalimpa.[182]
As to Schmidt's fiduciary duty, a director of a company is the subject of a strict ethic which is all pervasive. This disqualifies a director from usurping for herself or himself, or diverting to another, a maturing business opportunity which is being actively pursued by the company of which she or he is a director.[183] Such an obligation continues even after resignation as a director where the resignation may be fairly said to have been prompted or influenced by a wish of the director to acquire for herself or himself the opportunity, or where it was her or his position with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led to the opportunity which was later acquired.[184]
226 The plaintiffs alleged that, as a director, Schmidt breached his duties by:
(1) Appropriating the whole of the benefit received from the 2 contracts entered into with Dabach with respect to Voyages 3 and 4.[185]
(2) Entering into agreements for the export of livestock to Israel which conferred, or sought to confer, an advantage on Schmidt, Otway Livestock and/or related parties, to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa.[186]
(3) Planning and/or intending to divert from AHRKalimpa to Schmidt, or his associated entities, profits from the export of livestock to Israel which should have flowed to AHRKalimpa.[187]
(4) Improperly using the "Israel Market Information".[188]
(5) Usurping to Schmidt, Otway Livestock, or related entities of Schmidt, the opportunity and business of exporting livestock.[189]
(6) Diverting to Schmidt, Otway Livestock, or related entities of Schmidt, the business of AHRKalimpa.[190]
By reason of these matters, it is alleged that Schmidt has profited at the expense of AHRKalimpa, and further or alternatively, such conduct has caused AHRKalimpa to suffer loss or damage. It is further alleged that Otway Livestock is liable for its role in relation to the alleged breaches.[191]
E.1 Appropriation of the benefit of AHRKalimpa's 2 contracts with Dabach
227 On the pleadings, there is an issue as to whether Schmidt, or related entities, have retained consideration payable from the 2 agreements entered into with Dabach with respect to Voyages 3 and 4. Schmidt acknowledged during cross-examination that he had kept all the proceeds from these voyages.
228 The defendants' position was that this could not be looked at in isolation and that any accounting needed to take the entirety of Voyages 1 to 4 into account. The parties agreed that this issue should be deferred until the court, if necessary, considered the question of quantum.
229 In these circumstances, for the purposes of the allegation referred to in paragraph 226(1) above, it suffices to find that any benefit derived from Voyages 3 and 4 from the 2 contracts of AHRKalimpa with Dabach was a benefit to which AHRKalimpa was entitled as part of the business it was then conducting.
E.2 Whether agreements entered into were to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa
230 The only contracts entered into before Schmidt resigned as a director of AHRKalimpa were the contracts with respect to Voyages 1 to 4. In my view, the plaintiffs have not established that any of those contracts were entered into to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa. On the contrary, Schmidt entered into those contracts either for or on behalf of AHRKalimpa.[192]
231 Further, whilst he remained a director, Schmidt did not seek to, nor did he, confer an advantage on himself or Otway Livestock or any related parties other than to the extent that an advantage was derived from the fact that he was a director and shareholder (or, before 27 June 2013, a proposed director and shareholder) of AHRKalimpa.
232 Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to establish Schmidt breached his duties as a director on the basis of the allegation referred to in paragraph 226(2) above.
E.3 Planning or intending to divert profits that would have flowed to AHRKalimpa
233 For the reasons already stated,[193] with respect to Voyages 1 to 4, the plaintiffs have not made out a case against Schmidt.[194] At the time the agreements were entered into,[195] Schmidt was not planning or intending to divert any profits. However, the same cannot be said with respect to all the planning of subsequent voyages.
234 From on or about 18 November 2013, Schmidt had formed the view that he would not agree to the conditions sought to be imposed by Bzezinski and Ruschin concerning restraint of trade and that he intended to plan for the export of live cattle to Israel regardless of whether or not a joint venture agreement was concluded.[196] From that point on, whilst concluding a joint venture agreement with Bzezinski and Ruschin (involving Kalimpa or otherwise) remained a possibility, that possibility was only very remote, if not fanciful. There was no real prospect of Bzezinski or Ruschin changing their position with respect to their proposed restraint of trade as that would have meant they would have lost any ability to protect the information they had accumulated and the contacts they had established over a number of years. They had made their position in this regard very clear to Schmidt on numerous occasions.
235 It follows that, for the period of at least 1 week, Schmidt, while still a director of AHRKalimpa, was deliberately planning to divert revenue, and ultimately profits, from AHRKalimpa to himself, or to his associated entities, from the export of livestock to Israel, contrary to the interests of AHRKalimpa.
236 Further, Schmidt had been taking steps before this time which made this eventuality possible.[197] Although I have not rejected Schmidt's evidence explaining why he was acting secretly in early November 2013,[198] in my view, acting behind his fellow directors' backs in formulating the funding proposal in the terms that he did, and in disclosing the actual purchase details to Tnuva when he knew his fellow director Ruschin was very much opposed to this course, was not acting in good faith or for a proper purpose.
237 With respect to the funding proposal,[199] it not only materially misrepresented the background of the exporting business, but provided for Otway Livestock alone to engage in future trading. As to the confidential disclosure to Tnuva,[200] the explanation that Schmidt gave that he did not want to have an argument discloses that he knew he was acting contrary to the wishes of at least 1, and probably both, of Bzezinski and Ruschin. It was a critical change in approach which fundamentally altered AHRKalimpa's premise for negotiations with a major customer. Although a long-term joint venture agreement remained a remote possibility in early November 2013, it is inconceivable that Schmidt was not, when engaging in this conduct, having an eye to a future in which Otway Livestock conducted the cattle exporting business to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa, and having a consciousness that the conduct would facilitate this. Schmidt seemed to admit as much,[201] but, in any event I so find.
238 In closing submissions, the defendants suggested Schmidt's attempts to obtain funds in November 2013 did not form part of the plaintiffs' pleaded case. Relevantly, the pleaded case was as is set out in paragraph 226(3) above. The seeking of finance was a necessary part of any planning as alleged. The evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs without objection and was relevant to this issue. In my view, this evidence fell squarely within the pleaded case. In any event, there was no suggestion of any surprise as to the way this aspect of the case was put.
239 In conclusion, to the extent identified above Schmidt was not acting in good faith in the best interests of AHRKalimpa or for a proper purpose. He was also using his position as a director improperly and contrary to the fiduciary duties he owed as a director.[202]
E.4 Schmidt's use of the Israel Market Information as a director
240 For similar reasons,[203] I find that Schmidt did not misuse any Israel Market Information on or before the time he resigned as a director on 25 November 2013. At all times as a director, Schmidt was using the Israel Market Information in the business and for the benefit of AHRKalimpa. Although in early November 2013, Schmidt's conduct went beyond acting solely in the interests of AHRKalimpa, there was no specific allegation that from this time up to his resignation he misused the Israel Market Information.[204]
241 Accordingly, this part of the plaintiffs' claim fails.
E.5 Usurping to Schmidt or related entities the opportunity and business of exporting livestock
242 From at least 19 November 2013,[205] Schmidt put steps in place by which he, through Otway Livestock, could take the business that was then being conducted by AHRKalimpa. He could not have done so without the information provided by Bzezinski and Ruschin, through Kalimpa, including the necessary details to deal with the key contacts established through these sources. Further, as Schmidt frankly admitted, before his dealings with Kalimpa in 2011, he "didn't know anything about [the] key decision makers" of Tnuva or Dabach.
243 This conduct was not consistent with Schmidt acting in good faith in the best interests of AHRKalimpa and was for an improper purpose, namely for his own benefit and the benefit of those associated with Otway Livestock. Further, such conduct was also an improper use of his position as a director to gain advantage for himself, Otway Livestock and those associated with it, or to cause detriment to AHRKalimpa. It was also a clear breach of his fiduciary duties to AHRKalimpa.
244 In short, Schmidt, as a director, was acting secretly in planning to operate the business upon his resignation as a director and shareholder which would have the likely, if not inevitable, consequence of AHRKalimpa being unable to conduct a cattle export business in the foreseeable future. Such conduct can only be viewed as being contrary to AHRKalimpa's interests and a clear breach of Schmidt's duties as a director.[206]
E.6 Diverting to Schmidt or related entities the business of AHRKalimpa
245 The business taken by Schmidt was AHRKalimpa's business. For the reasons already stated,[207] appropriating that business to gain an advantage for himself and Otway Livestock was a clear breach of his duties.
246 For the reasons stated, the plaintiffs have established that Schmidt breached his duties as a director of AHRKalimpa by reason of some, but not all, of the allegations made. The findings of liability are not dependent upon issues concerning whether the parties entered into an ongoing joint venture agreement (that is beyond Voyages 1 to 4) or whether the Israel Market Information was confidential and whether there had been a misuse of that information. In other words, by reason of his position, Schmidt, as a director, was not permitted to use information and know-how obtained as a director, or obtained in anticipation of becoming a director, for his own benefit to the exclusion of AHRKalimpa.
E.8 Events after Schmidt's resignation as a director of AHRKalimpa
247 Although Schmidt ceased to be a director on 25 November 2013, there are a number of further matters that need to be considered with respect to his conduct after that time.
248 As already noted in the context of considering the confidentiality claim,[208] there is no dispute that Otway Livestock has continued to export livestock to Israel after December 2013, for a total of 17 voyages. The defendants contended that all voyages after Voyage 4 were conducted by Otway Livestock in its own right, without any obligation to account to AHRKalimpa. In seeking to establish the absence of any connection with AHRKalimpa, the defendants emphasised that the first voyage conducted after Schmidt resigned as a director and sold his shares was not until October 2014.
249 As for the delay between January 2014 (when Voyage 4 was completed) and October 2014 (when Voyage 6 was conducted), this does not assist the defendants' case. The delay was not as a result of Schmidt desisting with his involvement in the business.
250 According to the cashflow forecast circulated on 4 November 2013,[209] Voyage 5 was due to occur in February 2014. Later in November 2013, Schmidt anticipated Voyage 5 would be in either February or late March, and that Voyage 6 would be in March or April 2014.[210] Voyage 5 did not proceed because, at a time Schmidt could not recall, he was told by the manager of the Pearl of Para[211] that the vessel was being sold and would not be available for Voyage 5. Thus, Voyage 5 did not proceed for reasons beyond the control of Schmidt. Further, there can be little doubt that, but for this unforeseen event, Schmidt would have ensured Otway Livestock would have proceeded with Voyage 5.
251 As for Voyage 6, the livestock importing market in Israel is seasonal. It ceases in around March or April each year and does not recommence until July or August. This explains why, at least in part,[212] given that Voyage 6 had not been able to be completed by March or April, it did not occur until much later in 2014. However, despite this delay, the work which gave rise to securing the contracts for Voyage 6 was largely the work performed while Schmidt was a director of AHRKalimpa.[213]
253 Pausing here, I should observe that no part of the findings made carry with them a finding that Schmidt knew his conduct, in November 2013, or thereafter, was definitely improper. At a time Dunn could not recall, he gave advice to Schmidt that Schmidt was entitled to take the course that he did. It is likely Schmidt was relying on this advice from Dunn, a trusted advisor, in adopting the plan to take over the business for Otway Livestock.[216] That said, Schmidt, as an experienced company director privy to all the relevant circumstances, ought to have known better. For the reasons stated, even if Schmidt did not appreciate it,[217] a reasonable person acting as a director in Schmidt's position undoubtedly would have known better.
F.1 The nature and extent of the joint venture agreement and whether the relationship gave rise to fiduciary duties
254 The issues identified on the pleadings, and confirmed at the commencement of the trial, were premised on the defendants' position that no joint venture was ever entered into and the plaintiffs' competing allegation that a joint venture agreement was struck in June or July 2013. Now that the parties have resiled from these respective positions, essentially the issue between them with respect to the joint venture is the nature and terms of the agreement acted upon from November 2012[218] until 25 November 2013.[219]
255 It was clear from the terms of the Chart, and the conduct of the parties both before and after the contents of the Chart were agreed to, that it was always intended to have formal documentation in place with respect to a concluded ongoing joint venture agreement. The agreement struck required a management agreement to be entered into.[220] It required a shareholders' agreement and funding arrangements to be formulated.[221] No "clearly defined contract" was ever struck,[222] nor was there ever a meeting of the minds after November 2012 as to what exactly would be the terms of the proposed joint venture. Whilst these later negotiations were being conducted in 2013, there was never any suggestion that each party was other than free to act in its own interests and put forward whatever terms it considered appropriate.[223]
256 Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiffs' claim was based upon a binding and enforceable 5 year contract, either in November 2012 (or mid 2013), it cannot succeed. At most, the Chart recorded an agreement that the parties intended to further negotiate to finalise a binding agreement in due course. In these circumstances, it is not the role of a court to seek to impose terms, implied or otherwise, to find a binding and concluded agreement when the parties themselves had not reached such a position.[224]
257 It follows that the trading engaged in by way of Voyages 1 to 4 was on a piecemeal basis or pursuant to an interim ongoing[225] agreement (provided all the parties continued to agree), but, on either scenario, always under the umbrella of the parties having agreed to seek to finalise a proposed 5 year (or longer) joint venture agreement (or series of agreements).[226]
258 In making these findings as to the more limited nature of the joint venture relationship, the court does not accept the defendants' submission that the relationship was not fiduciary in nature because the "process of negotiation did not involve trust or confidence, simply hard bargaining". Although the creation of a joint venture relationship is not, in itself, determinative of whether a fiduciary relationship is also created,[227] in my view the circumstances upon which such a relationship ought to be found existed in this case.
259 At least from the moment Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin (both personally and through their corporate vehicles) agreed to the establishment of a joint venture business in November 2012 and acted on that agreement (including allowing information and know-how to be used in pursuit of the joint venture), a fiduciary relationship was brought into existence, involving mutual trust and confidence with respect to the affairs of the venture.[228] This characterisation of the joint venture relationship did not preclude any party from robust negotiations in seeking to finalise a long-term joint venture agreement,[229] "for it is well settled a person may be a fiduciary in some activities but not in others".[230]
260 Equally, the fact that the long-term agreement was never concluded does not undermine the premise for the finding of a fiduciary relationship. Even proposed participants in a joint venture may owe fiduciary duties in certain circumstances.[231] But the participants in this case were more than merely proposed; they were actually engaging in the joint venture, despite the fact that the terms of that venture had never been agreed in their entirety.
261 Of course, whether the consensus underlying the joint venture relationship from November 2012 is best characterised as a series of piecemeal agreements (per voyage) or an interim agreement,[232] such agreements or agreement were in place until the resignation of Schmidt. By reason of the defendants' concession,[233] it is unnecessary (at least presently) to explore the precise contractual terms of any such agreements or agreement.[234]
262 Further, whatever the position with respect to the nature and terms of the joint venture agreement, it came to an end on 25 November 2013 with the resignation of Schmidt. On the plaintiffs' case, it was accepted a party to the agreement was entitled to terminate its involvement in an orderly manner. Even without this concession, on 25 November 2013 both Bzezinski and Ruschin accepted Schmidt's position, and the agreement came to an end as a matter of contractual principle in any event.[235]
F.2 The nature and extent of the fiduciary duties
263 The plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to fiduciary duties owed by Schmidt as a director, fiduciary duties were owed by Otway Livestock to both Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa.
264 With respect to Kalimpa, the plaintiffs relied upon the terms and effect of the joint venture as alleged,[236] alternatively a proposed joint venture,[237] coupled with Kalimpa reposing trust and confidence in Otway Livestock. The manner in which trust and confidence was allegedly reposed was non-exhaustively pleaded. So far as is relevant to the proposed joint venture, the reposing was alleged to have been by Kalimpa agreeing to provide the Israel Market Information, and by the fact that Otway Livestock embarked on the conduct of the joint venture in the manner that it did.
265 With respect to AHRKalimpa, and confining the case to the proposed joint venture as found,[238] the plaintiffs relied upon essentially the same factors in seeking to establish the trust and confidence reposed in Otway Livestock by AHRKalimpa. The only material difference was the allegation that Otway Livestock embarked on the conduct of the joint venture "before the precise terms of the joint venture had been finalised".
266 The fiduciary duties of Otway Livestock alleged to be owed to both Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa included:
(1) Not to pursue its interests or the interests of a related party in conflict with the interests of the joint venture being conducted or the proposed long-term joint venture.
(2) Not to profit from its position, or to use its position to obtain a profit for a related party, without the fully informed consent of Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa respectively.
(3) To keep confidential the Israel Market Information (to the extent it was confidential), and not use the Israel Market Information contrary to the interests of the joint venture or the proposed long-term joint venture, without the fully informed consent of Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa respectively.
267 In my view, for reasons already stated,[239] Otway Livestock owed fiduciary duties to both Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa; to the latter from 27 June 2013. The facts demonstrate that Otway Livestock undertook to act on behalf of the interests of Kalimpa, and then later AHRKalimpa, in engaging jointly in the cattle export business, pursuant to which it utilised confidential information and affected the interests of Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa respectively in both a legal and practical sense.[240] Further, the duties as alleged are appropriate proscriptive duties that, in the circumstances of this case, ought to be imposed as a matter of law.[241] It was entirely inimical to the joint venture (to the extent it was agreed and, equally, to the extent it was proposed), for Otway Livestock to pursue its interests to the exclusion of either of the plaintiffs, or to seek to profit from its position, including by the use of confidential information, for its own benefit without obtaining permission from either of the plaintiffs. By acting in such a manner, Otway Livestock breached its fiduciary duties owed to both Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa.
268 Further, but for an understanding that a relationship in the nature of a fiduciary relationship would exist if a joint venture were embarked upon with entities related to Schmidt, Kalimpa would not have permitted Schmidt, or Otway Livestock, to use information that had been provided on a confidential basis to Elders within the strict confines of the Elders Agreement.
269 Furthermore, the fiduciary duties owed survived termination. It is trite that, in appropriate circumstances, "fiduciary duties may survive the termination of the relationship that first called those duties into being".[242] In this case, the obligation to act as a fiduciary would be substantially, if not entirely, hollow if the fiduciary, Otway Livestock, were permitted to unilaterally bring the relationship to an end and then take advantage of the opportunity afforded to it by Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa without recourse by them.
271 Very little needs to be said about this area of the law, as the issues concerning accessorial liability of Otway Livestock and Schmidt are straightforward.
272 As to Schmidt's wrongful conduct in breach of his director's duties,[245] Otway Livestock was "the corporate creature, vehicle, or alter ego" of Schmidt, used by him in an attempt to secure profits from the Business Opportunity.[246] Otway Livestock's accessorial liability arises in circumstances where it actually received a benefit from Schmidt's wrongful conduct, with full knowledge (ie Schmidt's knowledge),[247] and without paying any consideration. It must be held liable.[248]
273 As to Schmidt's accessorial liability, when Otway Livestock decided to, and then did, export cattle to Israel using the Business Opportunity available to it by reason of its relationship with Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa, it was acting at the direction of Schmidt,[249] armed with Schmidt's knowledge.[250]
274 In such circumstances, Schmidt, with full knowledge of the relevant circumstances, had actual knowledge of, and therefore was knowingly involved in, Otway Livestock's breaches of fiduciary duties to both Kalimpa and AHRKalimpa. He must also be held liable in this regard.
275 I have deliberately refrained from expressing any view as to the form of relief which ought to flow from the findings made above. The parties have not squarely addressed these issues to date.[251]
276 In addition, in declining to determine the estoppel issues with respect to the Israel Market Information, I acknowledge that some issues potentially remain outstanding with respect to the information that has been found not to be confidential. However, as the plaintiffs have been substantially successful with respect to the confidential information claim, my present view is that it is unnecessary to the resolution of the real issues to traverse this aspect of the case.[252]
277 For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs have been substantially successful.
278 The parties will be invited to make submissions as to what relief is appropriate in light of these reasons. This will include requiring the plaintiffs to make an election whether to seek an account of profits or compensatory relief.[253]
[1] The defendants' position is that there were no profits from Voyages 1 and 2. However, the issues relating to accounting for any profits or an assessment of the amount of any damages are not presently before the court. Because of a delay in expert evidence concerning quantum, the court ordered that issues of liability would be determined separately, if necessary, so that the trial date could be maintained.
[2] Dunn described Schmidt as his "partner and friend". They had, and continue to have, a number of business ventures together.
[4] Australian Livestock Export Corporation Ltd Annual Report 2009-2010, p 11.
[5] These figures are lower than the preceding 2 financial years, but even then the amounts involved are relatively small.
[6] This evidence was from key witnesses in the case, rather than a government official.
[7] Including on behalf of Otway Livestock.
[9] Schmidt has been a director of Oz-Fresh Group Pty Ltd since 1 October 2007. In closing submissions, the defendants suggested it was not the corporate entities who were the joint venturers, but rather the 3 individuals, Bzezinski, Ruschin and Schmidt. This issue had not been raised on the pleadings, other than by way of a bare denial of any joint venture, which was subsequently qualified: see par 224 below. In response, the plaintiffs objected to the point being raised and also indicated they would object to any application to amend the defence. No amendment application was made by the defendants and the issue was not further raised in their reply closing submissions. This matter has not been addressed on this basis, and also because it is unnecessary to decide: see fn 177 and par 256 below.
[11] A person is prohibited from exporting livestock unless the exporter holds a "live-stock licence": the relevant provision at the time was the Export Control (Animals) Order 2004 (Cth), s 2.02(a); made pursuant to the Export Control (Orders) Regulations 1982 (Cth), reg 3.
[12] For completeness, Dunn gave evidence Voyages 1 and 2 were carried out by Otway Livestock in its own right. Not only was this evidence contrary to Schmidt's acknowledgement, it was contrary to the contemporaneous documents in the case.
[15] Although the details at trial were sketchy, these arrangements also involved a company referred to as Eurofrance. Ruschin approach Eurofrance before he started his discussions with Elders.
[16] Day is a certified practising accountant and had previously been engaged by Schmidt. From 2007, she was involved in Schmidt's cattle export business. She continued to work for him after that business was sold to Elders: see par 25 above. She worked for Schmidt remotely, but "moved collectively" into the Premises in May 2013: see par 49 above.
[18] On the records before the court it appears 9 shares were issued, though there was no direct evidence on the point.
[19] Around this time, Dunn was seeking to secure an equity holding in AHRKalimpa. Dunn had emailed Schmidt on 19 June 2013, attaching a draft "Mandate Letter for the work I am trying to take on your behalf in relation to AHRKalimpa". In addition to setting out the proposed tasks, Dunn included a clause that addressed an "ongoing fee structure". As part of this, Dunn proposed "an equity share or carry [ie there would be no obligation to pay for his share] recognising the value add contribution" of Dunn.
[27] These occasions were not identified.
[28] Ruschin's evidence, which was not contested, was that this subsequent meeting took place. It appears no minutes were taken of the meeting held on 9 August 2013. No evidence was given as to what occurred at the meeting.
[29] Curiously, the cashflow forecast was headed "AH & R Schmidt Pty Ltd Cashflow forecast 2013/2014". No point was made with respect to this at trial.
[33] Schmidt agreed his markets were China and Japan, and said it was agreed he was "going to keep any market that wasn't Israel".
[36] It was drafted to be executed as a deed.
[42] See par 89 above. Schmidt had openly disclosed his initial intention to use the name AH & R Schmidt, as had been done for Voyages 1 and 2 (on behalf of the joint venture company then yet to be incorporated). After Ruschin complained about this, Schmidt clearly changed his intention as AHRKalimpa was used for the Dabach contracts: see par 101 above.
[44] The defendants submitted the evidence should be rejected on the basis of correspondence which disclosed the contracting parties. However, the email relied upon was not sent until 7 October 2013, which was likely to be after the discussion in Broome. Further, the fact that the contracts with Tnuva proceeded in the name of AH & R Schmidt is not inconsistent with the stated desire of Ruschin that AHRKalimpa be used.
[47] This was a reference to an arrangement whereby Schmidt would disclose all the costs of a shipment, and Tnuva would agree to pay a fixed margin in addition to the costs incurred.
[49] Dunn referred to the need to complete between 4 to 10 voyages profitably in order to recoup existing losses and outstanding liabilities.
[51] The meeting was attended by Schmidt (as chairman) and Day on behalf of Otway Livestock. Dunn was noted as being in attendance for Otway Partners.
[52] The agreement was signed by Dunn and Day on behalf of Otway Livestock.
[53] There was some suggestion that Schmidt may also have attended again on 20 December 2013, but nothing turns on this. It was common ground that Schmidt entered the Premises in December 2013 without the consent or knowledge of Bzezinski or Ruschin and took all the records of the business.
[54] The email was copied to various persons, including Dunn.
[55] This was a reference to par 4(b) of the letter of demand, which asserted a right to be paid up to $150,000 in respect of Voyage 1. This aspect of the demand did not form part of the plaintiffs' claim.
[56] There was no evidence of any failed attempt of AHRKalimpa to obtain funds. If, contrary to the facts, AHRKalimpa had sought to borrow funds in 2013 and a director of AHRKalimpa had been willing to give a personal guarantee, it is not apparent why a commercial loan could not have been arranged. Further, Bzezinski gave evidence that he could have obtained the funds to purchase and export cattle if required. (For completeness, Ruschin gave evidence that Kalimpa could not raise funds in 2012 to purchase cattle or fund the charter of a vessel, but he was not a director of Kalimpa and was not involved in preparing financial accounts for that company. In short, it was Bzezinski who provided the financial backing of Kalimpa.) See also fn 78 below.
[57] Initially, Schmidt acknowledged the whole of Voyages 3 and 4 were done for AHRKalimpa: T606.26. He then acknowledged that "it was the same business all the way through from Voyages 1 and following": T607.06. Later, Schmidt stated that, in November 2013, if he could not reach an agreement with respect to the proposed shareholders' agreement, it was his "intention to keep the business operating": T678.31.
[64] Day said she was maintaining accounts to keep a true and fair view of the business in May 2013, when she moved to the Premises. For completeness, the defendants tendered the financial accounts for AHRKalimpa for the period ended 30 June 2014. These accounts showed very little by way of activity in AHRKalimpa's own right and no substantive assets. It was contended these accounts demonstrated AHRKalimpa had never effectively engaged in business in that financial year. In my view, this contention is without substance for at least 3 reasons. First, the documents as tendered contained only draft "Minutes of Meeting of Directors". In contrast to the Kalimpa financial accounts for the same period, there was nothing to indicate on the face of the accounts as to whether, and if so on what basis, they were approved by the remaining director. Secondly, the accounts were not put to any witness. Given that Schmidt and Otway Livestock effectively took the entire business, including all its books and records, in December 2013, there may have been an approach to the accounts in 2014 which does not reflect the position now taken in this proceeding. Thirdly, it is far from clear how AHRKalimpa could have prepared detailed financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2014 when Schmidt had taken all its records: see pars 142-143 above.
[75] There was some evidence that other exporters have sold cattle to Israel at various times, but this evidence did not contradict the plaintiffs' evidence of the state of the market in 2013.
[78] Expert evidence was given as to what was required for a person to obtain an export licence, including the need to demonstrate financial capacity.
[79] The information found in Annexure A to the plaintiffs' closing submissions was first filed with the court on 12 April 2016, in response to the defendants' request for further particulars dated 2 March 2016. During closing submissions, the plaintiffs indicated they no longer pressed their claim for confidentiality over a number of items. A copy of Annexure A as ultimately pressed is annexed to this judgment as "Confidential Annexure A". Subject to further order, Confidential Annexure A will continue to be marked "confidential" and its publication will be restricted to the parties.
[81] These contacts included the owner of the Zofar quarantine facility, Israeli feedlot owners, the former and current chief veterinary officers of the Department of Israel Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development, the superior of the chief veterinarian officer, the managing director of the Beef Producers Association of Israel, and various butchers. Ruschin also gave evidence of the contacts he had made in the Australian cattle industry, but counsel conceded that these contact details did not satisfy the requirements for confidentiality: see fn 79 above.
[82] The evidence was unclear as to when Ruschin commenced recording details in his notebook. The earliest dated entry was 10 July 2011. Nothing turns on this. Whether the details were kept on his phone, in his notebook or in his mind, the evidence is plain that over a period of time Ruschin built up a significant amount of information referable to the Israeli cattle market, some of which was available publicly and some of which was not.
[84] [1969] RPC 41, 47.4. See also Andrew Shelton & Co Pty Ltd v Alpha Healthcare Ltd [2002] VSC 248; (2002) 5 VR 577, 598-599 [90] (Warren J); Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203, 215.3 (Greene LJ, with whom Somervell and Cohen LJJ agreed).
[85] Wright v Gasweld Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 317, 334B (Kirby P). See also DC Payments Pty Ltd v Next Payments Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 315, [60] (Vickery J); Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales [1975] 2 NSWLR 104, 117B-F (Bowen CJ in Eq); Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203, 215.4 (Greene LJ, with whom Somervell and Cohen LJJ agreed).
[86] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 49.2-49.10.
[87] Krueger Transport Equipment Pty Ltd v Glen Cameron Storage & Distribution Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 803; (2008) 78 IPR 262, 284 [92] (Gordon J); Andrew Shelton & Co Pty Ltd v Alpha Healthcare Ltd [2002] VSC 248; (2002) 5 VR 577, 598 [90] (Warren J). Cf Vasco Investment Managers Ltd v Morgan Stanley Australia Ltd [2014] VSC 455; (2014) 108 IPR 52, 87 [280] (Vickery J).
[88] Cf DC Payments Pty Ltd v Next Payments Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 315, [55] (Vickery J), quoting Wright v Gasweld Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 317, 334B.
[91] In an affidavit of documents sworn 16 March 2016, Schmidt claimed confidentiality with respect to a profit and loss statement for the 2012 to 2013 financial year and for the 2013 to 2014 financial year. These statements contained information relevant to the profitability of the trading with respect to Voyages 1 to 4. On 18 May 2016, the plaintiffs' solicitor was required to give a confidentiality undertaking before being able to inspect these statements. Further, on 24 May 2016, Schmidt swore a further affidavit of documents by which he discovered the sales contracts with respect to Voyages 1 to 3 for both Tnuva and Dabach. Again, confidentiality was insisted upon.
[93] Cf, for example, Krueger Transport Equipment Pty Ltd v Glen Cameron Storage & Distribution Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 803; (2008) 78 IPR 262, 284 [92] (Gordon J).
[95] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [1(1)-(4)].
[97] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [1(3)].
[98] There was a reference to "7,000 heads" in Ruschin's notebook, but it was not apparent what this referred to and no evidence was given to explain its meaning.
[99] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [1(4)].
[100] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [2(1)-(3)].
[101] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [3(1)-(2)].
[102] It is common knowledge that there are kosher butchers throughout Australia.
[103] There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the requirements of any customer went beyond the normal requirements for kosher meat.
[105] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [4(1)-(3)]. There was some overlap between this category and the previous category of information.
[107] Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [6(1)-(2)].
[114] For example, the defendants submitted that pricing information provided in January 2012 would no longer have the requisite quality of confidence in September 2013.
[117] Any information conveyed to Schmidt was necessarily information conveyed to Otway Livestock; Schmidt at all times being a director of Otway Livestock. Otway Livestock's other director, Rachael Schmidt, was not called to give evidence.
[121] Vasco Investment Managers Ltd v Morgan Stanley Australia Ltd [2014] VSC 455; (2014) 108 IPR 52, 88 [286] (Vickery J); Centaur Mining and Exploration Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] NSWCA 15; (2001) 19 ACLC 1,375, 1,388 [61] (Warren J); Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48.3 (Megarry J).
[122] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48.4. See also at 50.8.
[127] In closing submissions, the plaintiffs also referred to a document at court book 3/1134, but this document was not in evidence.
[128] No direct evidence to this effect was given.
[129] No substantive submissions were made in support of this aspect of the claim. Further, much of the Israel Confidential Information (as pleaded) referable to the Australian market was expressly abandoned in closing submissions.
[130] See, for example, Krueger Transport Equipment Pty Ltd v Glen Cameron Storage & Distribution Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 803; (2008) 78 IPR 262, 284 [92] (Gordon J).
[131] For completeness, the email also referred to cattle requirements of Tnuva, but this aspect of the email was not relied upon in Annexure A to the plaintiffs' closing submissions: see Confidential Annexure A, part 2 [6(1)(a)-(c)]. But also see par 197 below.
[133] The defendants submitted that there was no direct evidence that Ruschin had gathered the information in question, "save in the most general terms". For the reasons explained in par 200 above, with respect to the obligation to keep the information confidential, it does not matter whether the information came from Tnuva via Ruschin or from Tnuva directly. However, if I am wrong, and a finding in this regard were necessary, I would have found that Schmidt's source of this information was Ruschin. It was Ruschin who was the main contact with Tnuva and had the established relationship at this point in time. Schmidt had every opportunity to suggest he obtained this information directly, but gave no such evidence. Further, Ruschin was cross-examined about the contents of this email and it was not put to him that he was not the source of the information.
[135] This list included the names of quarantines, feedlots and slaughterhouses.
[141] Cf Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48.3 (Megarry J).
[142] That is, she was not working in an office provided by Schmidt.
[160] In light of this finding, it is largely unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants are estopped from contending that the Israel Market Information (to the extent it has been found to be confidential) was not communicated in confidence. As to the facts relevant to this issue, I refer to par 31 above. Further, I note I would have found that, but for Kalimpa's reasonable assumption that Schmidt would keep the relevant Israel Market Information confidential, Bzezinski and Ruschin would not have disclosed the Israel Market Information to Schmidt or permitted his use of that information after the Elders Agreement was terminated.
[161] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 222 [30] (Gleeson CJ), citing Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J). See also Centaur Mining and Exploration Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] NSWCA 15; (2001) 19 ACLC 1,375, 1,387-1,388 [55], 1,388 [61]-[62] (Warren J); The Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, 51.6 (Mason J).
[164] Vasco Investment Managers Ltd v Morgan Stanley Australia Ltd [2014] VSC 455; (2014) 108 IPR 52, 89 [290]-[291] (Vickery J), citing Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health [1991] FCA 150; (1991) 28 FCR 291, 304.5 (Sheppard, Wilcox and Pincus JJ), Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, 417F (Lord Denning MR), and Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales [1975] 2 NSWLR 104, 117F (Bowen CJ in Eq).
[166] See, for example, Krueger Transport Equipment Pty Ltd v Glen Cameron Storage & Distribution Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 803; (2008) 78 IPR 262, 287 [106] (Gordon J); Centaur Mining and Exploration Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] NSWCA 15; (2001) 19 ACLC 1,375, 1,389 [63]-[64] (Warren J); Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48.6 (Megarry J).
[173] See also Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544, 558.2 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) and the cases there cited.
[175] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 49.9 (Megarry J). For how long a period of time it is unnecessary to determine, at least presently. However, I note the Chart recorded the parties intended to provide for a non-competition period of 2 years: see par 40 above.
[177] That is between Schmidt, Bzezinski and Ruschin, alternatively a third to Otway Livestock and 2 thirds to Kalimpa.
[178] For completeness, the statement of claim also referred to Schmidt's duties as a director as including equitable duties. This allegation added nothing of substance. I do not intend to deal with this separately.
[179] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 181(1).
[181] Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178, 199.3 (Deane J).
[182] Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96.6-97.8, 103.5 (Mason J); Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198.2-199.10 (Deane J); Phipps v Boardman [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46, 123D-125D, 127A-128A (Lord Upjohn, dissenting) and the cases there cited.
[183] Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248; (2001) 4 VR 501, 523 [55] (Brooking JA, with whom Ormiston and Chernov JJA agreed), quoting Canadian Aero Services v O'Malley [1974] SCR 592, 607 (Laskin J).
[204] The allegations concerning breach of confidence were confined to contending that Schmidt and Otway Livestock, from "at least December 2013", used that information to contact, negotiate with, and enter into agreements with Israeli importers who were customers of AHRKalimpa.
[206] Cf Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds [2002] VSC 454, [138] (Warren J) (a decision varied on appeal: Edmonds v Donovan [2005] VSCA 36; (2005) 12 VR 513). See par 225 above.
[212] The formal contract was not entered into until 15 September 2014, but it was, in substance, an agreement for the same shipment that was contemplated in 2013.
[216] The extent of Dunn's instructions or knowledge at the time he gave his advice was not the subject of any evidence.
[217] Cf Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 162 [173] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
[221] See par 41 above. See also par 36 above and Schmidt's expressed requirement for a shareholders' deed. Neither Bzezinski nor Ruschin suggested otherwise. And also see par 37 above and the instructions from Schmidt as to what had to be considered with respect to the "shareholders articles". Again, neither Bzezinski nor Ruschin took issue with this.
[223] Although not determinative, it is significant that the plaintiffs' case as pleaded sought to rely on the alleged agreement in June or July 2013 to then plead terms of the joint venture agreement, rather than simply assert an agreement was reached in November 2012.
[224] See, for example, Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1, 26D-27G (Kirby P, with whom Waddell AJA agreed).
[225] Before 23 November 2013, there was never any agreement to limit the joint venture to Voyages 1 to 4.
[227] See, for example, John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 19; (2010) 241 CLR 1, 21 [44] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ).
[228] Cf Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96.10-97.2 (Mason J). As to the precise basis upon which the fiduciary obligations are said to have arisen and between whom, see pars 264-265 below.
[229] See, for example, Adventure Golf Systems Australia Pty Ltd v Belgravia Health & Leisure Group Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 326, [126] (Santamaria JA, with whom Kaye and Ashley JJA agreed).
[230] Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 98.2.
[231] See, for example, United Dominion Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49; (1985) 157 CLR 1, 13.3 (Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ).
[234] In many cases, the contractual terms may be determinative of whether fiduciary duties arise, and the nature and extent of those duties: Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 97.6 (Mason J). However, in my opinion, the issues with respect to fiduciary duties in this case can be properly determined without the need to engage in this process beyond the matters already set out in this judgment: see further pars 263-269 below.
[235] See, for example, Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385, 423.8 (Brennan J).
[240] Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96.10-97.2 (Mason J).
[241] See general observations of Mason J at 99.3, 102.5, 103.6-104.7. See also Gibson Motorsport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes [2006] FCAFC 44; (2006) 149 FCR 569, 574 [12] (Finn J) and the cases there cited.
[242] Edmonds v Donovan [2005] VSCA 36; (2005) 12 VR 513, 536 [56] (Phillips JA, with whom Winneke P and Charles JA agreed), referring to Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248; (2001) 4 VR 501, 522-523 [55] (Brooking JA, with whom Ormiston and Chernov JJA agreed).
[243] See, for example, Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 163-166 [164]-[186] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
[244] Based largely upon observations made in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251.9-252.2 (Lord Selborne, LC, with whom James and Mellish LJJ agreed).
[246] See Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296, 357 [243] (Finn, Stone and Perram JJ).
[247] For completeness, the finding in par 253 above as to Schmidt's state of mind does not affect any relevant issue with respect to Otway Livestock's knowledge: see, for example, Omnilab Media Pty Ltd v Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 166; (2011) 285 ALR 63, 94 [242] (Jacobson J, with whom Rares and Besanko JJ agreed), citing Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 162 [173]. See also Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296, 357 [243], [245].
[248] The plaintiffs' closing submissions also refer to s 79 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In light of the findings made, it is unnecessary to decide this issue. Further, as this provision was not referred to in the statement of claim, I will refrain from considering this issue.
[252] The relief sought by the plaintiffs does not include injunctive relief.
[253] See, for example, Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544, 559.2 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).
AHRKalimpa Pty Ltd
Schmidt [2017] VSC 701
(2002) 5 VR 577
(1991) 22 NSWLR 317
(2008) 78 IPR 262
(2014) 108 IPR 52
(2001) 208 CLR 199
(1980) 147 CLR 39
(1991) 28 FCR 291
(1995) 182 CLR 544
(1984) 154 CLR 178
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(2001) 4 VR 501
(2005) 12 VR 513
(2007) 230 CLR 89
(1991) 24 NSWLR 1
(2010) 241 CLR 1
(1985) 157 CLR 1
(1989) 168 CLR 385
(2006) 149 FCR 569
(2012) 200 FCR 296
(2011) 285 ALR 63