Definitions and scope are central to the Act’s operation. The legal meaning of a Government advertising campaign is set out in s 4. The concept is conjunctive: to be a campaign a communication must (a) be dissemination to the public about government programs, policies, initiatives or other public matters, (b) be funded by or on behalf of a Government agency, and (c) be disseminated under a commercial advertising distribution agreement by means listed in s 4(1)(b). The Act excludes some categories explicitly, for example publication of a report required by law and advertising for persons or bodies not agencies where sponsored by an agency (s 4(2)(a)-(b)). The regulations may also exempt whole campaigns or classes of campaigns unconditionally or conditionally (s 4(5)).

The Act specifies the components that count towards a campaign’s cost in the definitions (s 3). Cost of a Government advertising campaign includes amounts paid for research (for the campaign), production or carrying out of the campaign, media distribution, and evaluation of likely or actual effectiveness. That broad cost definition matters because it affects whether a campaign triggers the statutory thresholds for peer review and cost benefit analysis (s 7), and whether liability in s 11 is assessed.

Two procedural control concepts are introduced. First, pre-commencement assessment and authorisation: heads of agencies must ensure peer review and cost benefit analysis at stated thresholds (s 7) and must give an advertising compliance certificate before a campaign commences (s 8). Second, post-commencement exceptions exist: both the CBA/peer review and certificate may be carried out or given after commencement if the head is satisfied that the campaign relates to urgent public health or safety matters or other urgent circumstances (s 7(4), s 8(3)). The Act leaves the content and form of CBA and peer review to the Government advertising guidelines (s 7(3)) and the Minister’s guidelines regime (s 5).

Substantive content restrictions are focused on political neutrality. Section 6(1) bars campaigns designed to influence support for a political party. Section 6(2)-(3) disallow material that contains the name or gives prominence to the voice or image of Ministers, MPs or candidates, or contains party names, logos, slogans or other references. The regulations may specify matters to be taken into account in determining compliance and may set circumstances in which campaigns are taken to comply (s 6(4)). Section 6(5) carves out service announcements containing electoral information or other required electoral publications.

Enforcement rests principally on financial consequences imposed on governing parties, not on agencies. If a campaign is found to breach s 6 or its regulations, its cost is payable by the governing party at the time the campaign commenced, recoverable as a debt to the Crown (s 11(1)). Where there are multiple governing parties, those parties are jointly and severally liable to the Crown but internally their liabilities are limited to the proportion of Legislative Assembly seats each party holds among the governing parties (s 11(2)-(3)). The regulations may permit deductions from electoral funding or other payments to satisfy liability (s 12). A governing party may seek Supreme Court review of liability within any regulatory time limits or within such further period as the Court allows (s 13).

Oversight and accountability are provided by the Auditor-General, who must conduct a performance audit of agency activities in relation to advertising campaigns each financial year and may determine breaches of s 6, and must include such determinations and costs in audit reports (s 14).

Key implementation tensions are evident in the text. The head of an agency has independence over certain operational decisions and the compliance certificate (s 9(1)), yet the Minister can set guidelines (s 5) and financial or budgetary limits are explicitly within Ministerial control (s 9(2)). Regulations can exempt campaigns (s 4(5)) and provide offsets (s 12). The definitions and discretionary exceptions create scope for both administrative compliance and legal contestation, particularly over what is “designed so as to influence” political support, what constitutes “prominence” of a Minister’s image or voice, and whether a particular dissemination method falls within “commercial advertising distribution agreement”.

Identify the payers, decision makers and the organisations whose behaviour the Act directly regulates.

Primary regulated organisations

• Government agencies, variously defined in s 3. The statutory definition of Government agency includes Public Service agencies under the Government Sector Employment Act 2013, statutory bodies representing the Crown, bodies established under statute for public purposes, the NSW Police Force, the Teaching Service, the NSW Health Service, wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Crown or of Government agencies, and any body declared by regulation to be a Government agency (s 3). These entities are responsible for complying with the Act’s procedural and content requirements when they fund advertising campaigns.

Decision makers inside agencies

• The head of a Government agency, defined as the person who is or exercises the functions of chief executive officer of the agency (s 3). That head must ensure that cost benefit analyses and peer reviews are carried out where required (s 7), and must give an advertising compliance certificate before a campaign commences (s 8). The head is allocated specific statutory independence on certain functions (s 9(1)), notably determining or approving method, medium or volume of campaigns, deciding on issuing compliance certificates, and whether to take debt recovery action against a governing party under Part 3.

Minister and executive

• The Minister is required to prepare the Government advertising guidelines, publish them in the Government Gazette and make them publicly available online (s 5(1)-(2)). The Minister determines what matters the guidelines may contain subject to the limitation that they must not be inconsistent with the Act (s 5(3)-(4)). The Minister therefore sets the non-statutory but legally consequential standards against which compliance certificates are to be judged.

Political parties and governing parties

• Governing party is defined as a political party whose parliamentary representatives are Ministers in the NSW Government (s 3). If a campaign breaches the prohibitions in s 6, the governing party at the time the campaign commenced becomes financially liable for the cost of the campaign, recoverable as a debt to the Crown (s 11(1)). If there are multiple governing parties, liability is joint and several, while internal apportionment among those parties is by seats held in the Legislative Assembly (s 11(2)). A governing party can seek recourse against other governing parties for excess payments (s 11(3)) and may apply to the Supreme Court for review of liability (s 13).

Oversight and enforcement agencies

• The Auditor-General must conduct annual performance audits of Government agency advertising activities, may determine breaches of s 6 and must include any such determinations and campaign costs in audit reports (s 14). The Governor may make regulations (s 15) to give effect to the Act, and regulations may also create exemptions, prescribe thresholds, and provide for offsets against electoral funding (s 4(5), s 7(1)-(2), s 12).

Other affected parties

• Media distribution channels used under commercial advertising distribution agreements will be the channels of dissemination identified in s 4(1)(b). Political actors, agency communications staff, campaign contractors (research, production, distribution, evaluation) will face practical operational effects including additional pre-commencement processes, documentation and potential exposure in litigation or audit. Electorate voters are an indirect audience, as the Act constrains what taxpayer-funded messages may be disseminated.

Who pays and who bears legal risk

• Financial liability for prohibited content is placed on governing parties, not on individual agencies or their heads (s 11). However agencies and their heads carry procedural duties (CBA, peer review, certificate) that, if omitted, could increase the agency’s exposure to audit criticism and create opportunities for government to be compelled to cease or repay campaign costs. The Act provides a mechanism for the Crown to recover campaign costs as a debt from governing parties (s 11(1)), subject to Supreme Court review (s 13). Regulations may enable offsetting of liabilities against electoral funding payments (s 12), which affects the real-world payer profile.

Geographic and temporal scope

• The Act applies to campaigns funded by or on behalf of Government agencies in New South Wales and to campaigns disseminated under commercial distribution agreements in the listed media (s 4). Campaigns that commenced before the Act’s commencement are excluded (Schedule 1, Part 2, cl 2).

This section sets out the statutory obligations imposed on actors and the rights the Act affords relevant parties, with precise section references and operational detail.

Duties of the Minister

• Prepare the Government advertising guidelines (s 5(1)).
• Publish the guidelines in the Government Gazette and ensure they are publicly available free of charge on a government-maintained website (s 5(2)).
• The guidelines may cover style and content requirements, dissemination, cost, and any matter the Minister thinks fit (s 5(3)). They must not be inconsistent with the Act or regulations (s 5(4)).

Duties of heads of Government agencies

• Ensure a cost benefit analysis is carried out before campaign commencement if the campaign’s cost is likely to exceed $1,000,000 or another amount prescribed by regulation (s 7(1)). The Act identifies $1,000,000 as the legislative benchmark but allows regulation to change this.
• Ensure a peer review is carried out before campaign commencement if the cost is likely to exceed $50,000 or a different prescribed amount (s 7(2)).
• Ensure that an advertising compliance certificate is given before a campaign commences (s 8(1)). The certificate must state that, in the head’s opinion, the campaign (a) complies with the Act, regulations and guidelines, (b) contains accurate information, (c) is necessary to achieve a public purpose and is supported by analysis and research, and (d) is an efficient and cost effective means to achieve that public purpose (s 8(2)).
• The head can give the CBA, peer review or compliance certificate after commencement only if satisfied that the campaign relates to an urgent public health or safety matter or other urgent circumstances (s 7(4), s 8(3)).
• Exercise certain functions independently without Ministerial direction or control, namely determining or approving the method, medium or volume of any campaign, determining whether to issue an advertising compliance certificate, and determining whether to take debt recovery action against a governing party under Part 3 (s 9(1)). This independence does not extend to budgetary or other financial limits (s 9(2)).

Duties of Government agencies more generally

• Ensure campaigns do not breach the political advertising prohibitions in s 6: not be designed to influence support for a political party, and not include prohibited names, prominence of Ministers’/MPs’ voice or image, or party identifiers (s 6(1)-(3)).
• Observe the pre-election blackout: do not carry out campaigns after 26 January of the year the Legislative Assembly is due to expire and before the election, except for limited exceptions (public health or safety, service announcements, notices required under law, job ads, tender advertising) (s 10(1)-(2)).

Rights and remedies of governing parties

• A governing party becomes liable to pay the cost of a campaign that breaches s 6, recoverable as a debt to the Crown (s 11(1)). If more than one governing party existed, parties are jointly and severally liable but are internally liable only in proportion to the number of seats each holds among governing parties (s 11(2)-(3)).
• A governing party that pays more than its proportionate part may recover the excess from another governing party (s 11(3)).
• A governing party may apply to the Supreme Court for review of liability to pay all or part of the cost of a campaign. The Court has broad powers including to determine whether the campaign breached s 6, to determine the campaign cost, and to order that a governing party is not required to pay the whole or part of the cost, or to specify payment manner and timing (s 13(1)-(3)).

Auditor-General’s duties

• Conduct a performance audit each financial year of one or more Government agencies in relation to their advertising campaigns (s 14(1)).
• Determine whether agencies’ activities in relation to campaigns are effective, economical and efficient, and in compliance with the Act, regulations, other laws and the guidelines (s 14(3)).
• May determine a campaign’s content or circumstances constitute a breach of s 6 and must include that determination and the campaign cost in the audit report (s 14(4)-(5)).
• Conduct audits under Division 2A of Part 3 of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 and may report under that Division (s 14(7)-(8)).

Regulations and Governor

• The Governor may make regulations not inconsistent with the Act for any required or convenient matters to give effect to the Act (s 15). Regulations may prescribe thresholds, exemptions, arrangements for offsets against electoral payments, and provisions of a savings or transitional nature (s 4(5), s 7(1)-(2), s 12, Schedule 1 cl 1).

Documentary and procedural obligations implicit from the Act

• The Act requires heads to reach an opinion for the compliance certificate including factual predicates such as accuracy, necessity, supporting analysis and cost-effectiveness (s 8(2)). That implies documentation of research, analysis, CBA or peer review outputs and procurement and costing records that substantiate the head’s opinion at the time the certificate is signed.
• The guidelines may specify the form and substance of CBAs and peer reviews (s 7(3)), and the Minister must publish the guidelines so they are publicly available (s 5(2)). Those materials become reference points in audit and potential court review.

Discretion and limits

• The Act allows discretion to the head to exercise certain functions free from Ministerial direction (s 9(1)) and allows the regulations to exempt campaigns or classes of campaigns (s 4(5)), or to prescribe circumstances in which campaigns are taken to comply with s 6 (s 6(4)). The Act also expressly permits post-commencement approvals where urgent public health or safety reasons exist (s 7(4), s 8(3)).

The Act’s enforcement architecture relies on financial recovery, audit determinations and judicial review, rather than civil penalties or criminal sanctions in the text provided.

Primary enforcement measure: financial liability to the Crown

• If the content or other circumstances of a Government advertising campaign constitute a breach of s 6 or regulations under that section, the cost of the campaign is payable by the governing party at the time the campaign commenced (s 11(1)). The cost is recoverable "in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to the Crown" (s 11(1)). That positions recovery as a civil debt enforcement action rather than an administrative penalty.

Joint and several liability with internal apportionment

• Where more than one governing party existed, each party is jointly and severally liable to the Crown for the cost, but between themselves each party is only liable for the part of the cost proportionate to the number of Legislative Assembly seats each party holds among governing parties (s 11(2)). The effect is that the Crown can recover the whole cost from any one governing party, and the paying party has a statutory right to recover excess from other governing parties (s 11(3)).

Regulatory offset arrangements

• The regulations may make provision for arrangements under which a governing party liable to pay the cost may offset that liability against amounts that would otherwise be paid to the party under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 or any other Act (s 12). This gives the executive power, by regulation, to convert a Crown debt into an offset against public electoral funding or other payments, which changes enforcement mechanics in practice.

Judicial review and dispute resolution

• Governing parties can apply to the Supreme Court for review of liability under s 13(1). An application must be made within any period prescribed by regulation or within any further period allowed by the Court (s 13(2)). The Supreme Court has broad remedial powers, including to determine whether the campaign did or did not breach s 6, to determine the campaign cost, to order that a governing party need not pay part or all of the cost having regard to the circumstances, and to order specified payment terms (s 13(3)). This provides a judicial remedial pathway both for factual determinations and equitable relief.

Auditor-General determinations and reporting

• The Auditor-General conducts performance audits each year and may determine that a campaign’s content or other circumstances constitute a breach of s 6 (s 14(1), (4)). Any such determination must be included in the audit report together with the campaign’s cost (s 14(5)). While the Act does not state that an Auditor-General determination automatically triggers recovery actions, it furnishes the Crown with authoritative public findings and cost figures that can assist litigation under s 11.

Absence of criminal sanctions or express administrative penalties

• The Act does not create specified criminal offences, pecuniary penalties, or administrative fines payable by agencies, agency heads or individuals for non-compliance in the text provided. Enforcement is oriented to recovery from governing parties and to audit and judicial remedies.

Temporal limits and review rights

• The regime contemplates time limits which may be prescribed by regulation for applications to the Supreme Court (s 13(2)), and the regulations may provide other procedural details for recovery. The Act also specifies that heads may give compliance certificates after commencement in urgent circumstances (s 8(3)), which limits enforcement exposure where public safety dictates immediate communication.

Practical enforcement dynamics and incentives

• Because liability is placed on governing parties rather than agencies, enforcement creates a direct financial risk to political parties in government post hoc. However, the availability of regulatory offsets (s 12) and the internal apportionment by seats (s 11(2)) alter the ultimate distribution of cost. Auditor-General reports create reputational risk and may underpin Crown recovery actions. The Supreme Court can be asked to resolve disputes and to tailor orders. For agencies and their heads, the immediate enforcement risk is reputational and administrative via audit and public reporting; for governing parties, the risk is monetary and subject to debt recovery mechanisms.

The Act expressly references several other statutes and leaves scope for interaction by regulation. The interactions in the text are both definitional and procedural.

Statutes referenced in the Act

• Government Sector Employment Act 2013: used to define "Public Service agency" as part of the Act’s definition of Government agency (s 3). That definition determines which entities fall within the Act’s remit.
• Electoral Act 2017: referenced in s 6(2) when disallowing material that gives prominence to the voice or image of a candidate nominated for election under that Act; and s 6(5) excludes service announcements containing electoral information or other information required to be published for the purposes of a State election under the Electoral Act 2017.
• Electoral Funding Act 2018: referenced in s 12, which permits regulations to provide for arrangements by which a governing party’s liability to pay the cost of a Government advertising campaign may be offset against amounts that would otherwise be paid to the party under that Act or other Acts.
• Government Sector Audit Act 1983: a performance audit under s 14 is to be carried out under Division 2A of Part 3 of that Act, and the Auditor-General may report under the same Division (s 14(7)-(8)).

Practical interactions and touchpoints

• Determination of what counts as a Government agency links to the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (s 3), so legal classification under that Act will determine whether an entity’s advertising is caught.
• The Electoral Act 2017 provides both a substantive carve-out for required election-related publications (s 6(5)) and a reference point for what constitutes a "candidate nominated for election". That creates an intersection: messages required by the Electoral Act escape the political advertising prohibitions, while other types of content do not.
• The potential for offsets under s 12 connects the recovery mechanism to the electoral funding machinery established in the Electoral Funding Act 2018. Regulations enabling offsets will change the mechanics of financial enforcement by allowing recovery via reduced future public funding rather than direct Crown debt collection.
• The Auditor-General’s audit powers are given force through the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 reference, which determines the audit process, timing and reporting format (s 14(7)-(8)).

Regulatory delegation and supplementation

• The Act gives the Governor power to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act to prescribe matters necessary or convenient to give effect to the Act (s 15). The regulations may therefore specify thresholds (s 7), exemptions (s 4(5)), matters to be taken into account in determining compliance with s 6 (s 6(4)) and presumably time limits and procedural details for recovery and Supreme Court applications (s 13(2)).
• The Minister’s Government advertising guidelines (s 5) are expressly subordinate to the Act and regulations (s 5(4)). However they can define required form and content of CBAs and peer reviews (s 7(3)), and are published so they play a role in compliance expectations and audit scrutiny.

Potential areas of interaction risk

• The Act’s definition of a campaign hinges on dissemination under a "commercial advertising distribution agreement" (s 4(1)(b)). The distinction between commercial and non-commercial dissemination, organic social media posts or direct government communications that are not placed under commercial agreements may give rise to legal debate about whether particular content is captured by the Act.
• Regulations may exempt classes of campaigns under s 4(5). If regulations exempt particular types of government communication that otherwise would be guided by the Act, those exemptions will determine the practical overlap with other laws and administrative practices.
• The Act allows agencies to give certificates and perform CBAs post-commencement in urgent public health or safety circumstances (s 7(4), s 8(3)), which interacts with any statutory obligations to publish urgent public health guidance under other Acts, such as public health laws.

No displacement of other law

• The Act does not purport to displace criminal law, defamation law, procurement law or other general legal obligations. It imposes its own procedural and content constraints but coexists with other legal regimes affecting government communications and procurement.

The legislative text itself includes a small number of amendment notations and schedules that indicate later adjustments or cross-references. The Act as provided includes notes indicating amendments and relevant schedules. The explicit amendment references in the provided text are:

• Section 3: includes an amendment note "Am 2017 No 22, Sch 4.21." That indicates s 3 was amended by the 2017 legislation numbered 22, Schedule 4.21. The text of s 3 as shown is current as amended.
• Section 6: includes an amendment note "Am 2017 No 66, Sch 8.11." That indicates s 6 was amended by Act No 66 of 2017, Schedule 8.11. The version of s 6 printed incorporates that amendment.
• Section 12: includes an amendment note "Am 2018 No 20, Sch 3.4." That signals s 12 was amended by Act No 20 of 2018, Schedule 3.4.
• Section 14: includes an amendment note "Am 2018 No 70, Sch 4.38." That records an amendment to s 14 effected by Act No 70 of 2018, Schedule 4.38.
• Schedule 2: marked "Schedule 2 (Repealed)" and the notation "sch 2: Rep 1987 No 15, sec 30C." That records that Schedule 2 has been repealed and references an earlier repeal.

Statutorily required review

• The Act requires the Minister to review the Act as soon as possible after five years from the date of assent, to determine if policy objectives remain valid and whether terms remain appropriate, and to table a report on the outcome in each House of Parliament within 12 months after the end of the five year period (s 16(1)-(3)). That provides a scheduled legislative review point; the text does not include the date of assent or subsequent review outcomes.

Regulatory blanks and delegated flexibility

• Several key parameters are left to regulation, which is a form of delegated amendment-by-regulation: the monetary thresholds for CBA and peer review (s 7(1)-(2)) may be prescribed by regulation; the regulations may exempt campaigns or classes of campaigns from the Act or particular provisions (s 4(5)); the regulations may prescribe matters taken into account in determining compliance with s 6 and scenarios where campaigns are taken to comply (s 6(4)); and the regulations may provide arrangements for offsetting liability against electoral funding or other Acts (s 12). Those delegated powers mean the practical contours of the regime can be changed administratively without further primary legislation.

Transitional saving for existing campaigns

• Schedule 1, Part 2, cl 2 states that the Act does not apply to campaigns commenced before the Act’s commencement. The commencement clause indicates the Act commences on proclamation of a day or days (s 2). That transitional saving would have excluded campaigns already underway at commencement.

No further amendment history is contained in the text provided. For a full legislative history beyond these notations a researcher must consult the NSW legislation database and Bills history to trace specific amendment instruments, dates of assent and commencement for those amendments, and any attendant explanatory materials.

The Act’s text supplied does not cite any cases, and contains no internal account of litigation that has arisen under it. The statutory scheme anticipates and provides for judicial involvement in two ways, which are the principal litigation hooks:

• Defence of liability in the Supreme Court: the Act grants governing parties a right to apply to the Supreme Court for review of liability to pay the cost of a Government advertising campaign (s 13(1)). The Court can determine whether a campaign breached s 6, determine the cost, and make orders tailoring payment obligations or relieving liability in whole or part (s 13(3)). That provision is the explicit procedural conduit for contestation of Crown recovery measures and will be the main litigation vehicle for governing parties who dispute liability.
• Auditor-General determinations used in litigation or parliamentary proceedings: the Auditor-General may determine that campaign content or other circumstances constitute a breach of s 6 and must include such determinations and campaign costs in audit reports (s 14(4)-(5)). Those audit reports can generate political and legal consequences, and may be relied upon in subsequent court proceedings as evidentiary or public interest material.

Because the statute does not create criminal offences or administrative pecuniary penalties in the text provided, most contestation is likely to focus on:

• Whether a particular communication is a "Government advertising campaign" as defined in s 4 (for example whether it was disseminated under a commercial advertising distribution agreement).
• Whether the content or circumstances are "designed so as to influence" political support (s 6(1)), or whether material "gives prominence" to Ministers, MPs or candidates (s 6(2)).
• The proper measurement of campaign cost under the s 3 definition.
• Whether post-commencement certificate or CBA/peer review exceptions apply due to urgency (s 7(4), s 8(3)).

The Act anticipates such disputes but does not itself record reported decisions. For up-to-date litigation precedents, practitioners must query NSW Supreme Court records and administrative law databases for decisions interpreting s 6, s 11 and s 13. The statute also contemplates regulatory detail which may set procedural time limits for applications under s 13(2); those time limits will be relevant to litigation strategy but are not contained in the Act text provided.

This section flags points in the Act that commonly produce friction, accidental non-compliance, or unintended outcomes. Each "gotcha" is grounded in the text and explains the concrete mechanism by which it matters.

1. Definition hinge on "commercial advertising distribution agreement"

• The statutory definition of a Government advertising campaign requires dissemination under a commercial advertising distribution agreement (s 4(1)(b)). Non-commercial channels, organic social media posts not placed under commercial agreements, direct email to stakeholders or press releases might fall outside this definition. Agencies may therefore inadvertently avoid the Act by using non-commercial distribution, or conversely may unknowingly be caught if a platform placement is procured under an advertising agreement. Agencies should verify whether a third party placement constitutes a commercial distribution agreement.

2. "Designed so as to influence" is a subjective statutory standard

• Section 6(1) prohibits campaigns designed to influence support for a political party. The Act leaves the test of design and influence undefined. The regulations may provide matters to be taken into account (s 6(4)), but absent regulatory detail, agencies, auditors and courts will need to assess intent, effect and context, which introduces legal uncertainty. Small differences in messaging, tone or targeting could be contested.

3. "Prominence" of Ministers' voice or image is unspecified

• Section 6(2) bars material that contains the name, or gives prominence to the voice or any image, of Ministers, other MPs or candidates. The Act does not define "prominence". A brief appearance, background image, or voiceover read by a Minister could be interpreted differently by auditors or courts. Agencies should avoid any Ministerial footage or imagery if practicable, or document why inclusion is incidental and not prominent.

4. Broad cost definition inflates threshold calculations

• The cost measure includes research, production, media distribution and evaluation (s 3). Including evaluation and research can push a campaign over peer review and CBA thresholds (s 7). Agencies must ensure their budget and contracts allocate costs in a manner consistent with statutory definitions, and document cost components for threshold calculations.

5. Heads' independence but ministerial budget control

• The head of agency is statutorily insulated from Ministerial direction for specific functions (s 9(1)), but the head is subject to Ministerial control on budgetary and financial limits (s 9(2)). That creates a tactical reality where Ministers can constrain campaign scope by controlling budgets, while the head retains operational choice on medium and compliance certificates. Heads should record instances where budgetary limits affect campaign choices, and Ministers should be conscious that budgetary control is the main lever available.

6. Governing party liability can be triggered by agency actions

• Financial liability for breaches falls on governing parties rather than on agencies (s 11). An agency may carry out a campaign that later is judged non-compliant, and the governing party will be financially liable even if the agency relied on its communications team or contractors. Governing parties may therefore need to monitor agencies’ communications policies closely. The internal apportionment between governing parties is by seat share (s 11(2)), which may create disputes between coalition partners.

7. Regulations can alter enforcement mechanics

• The regulations can exempt campaigns (s 4(5)) and provide for offsets against electoral funding (s 12). That means the practical risk to governing parties and agencies depends on subsequent regulatory design. Reliance on current statutory language alone is insufficient for forecasting enforcement without checking existing regulations.

8. Pre-election blackout timing is narrow but can be gamed

• The blackout begins after 26 January in the year the Legislative Assembly is due to expire until the election (s 10(1)). Agencies may time campaigns to commence before 27 January to avoid the blackout, or may rely on exceptions for public health or essential service announcements (s 10(2)). Determining when the Assembly is "due to expire" and whether a campaign "commenced" before blackout start are factual matters that can create litigation risk.

9. Urgent public health exception permits post-commencement approvals

• The head can allow a campaign to commence without pre-commencement peer review, CBA or certificate if satisfied the campaign relates to an urgent public health or safety matter (s 7(4), s 8(3)). That exception is necessary in emergencies, but will be scrutinised in audit and judicial review, so documentation of urgency and contemporaneous evidence is essential.

10. Auditor-General’s reports are public and may inform recovery

• Auditor-General determinations that a campaign breached s 6 and specification of campaign costs must be included in audit reports (s 14(4)-(5)). Those publicly available determinations can create reputational pressure and provide the factual and cost basis for Crown recovery actions under s 11.

11. Transitional saving for pre-commencement campaigns

• The Act does not apply to campaigns commenced before commencement (Schedule 1, Part 2, cl 2). That means later challenges only apply to campaigns launched after the Act’s commencement date. Practitioners must check commencement dates when assessing applicability to historical campaigns.

12. No criminal penalties, but reputational and financial risks remain

• The Act provides for civil recovery and audit findings but not explicit criminal or administrative penalty regimes in the text provided. This reduces the range of remedies but increases the importance of financial recovery and public reporting as enforcement levers.

Below is a practical, statutory-grounded compliance checklist for heads of agencies, communications leads, and governing party compliance officers. Each step cites the statutory provision that creates the obligation or risk.

1. Determine whether the communication is a Government advertising campaign (s 4)

• Confirm the communication meets the conjunctive requirements in s 4(1): it is dissemination to the public about a government program, policy or initiative or public health/safety matter; it is funded by or on behalf of the agency; and it will be disseminated under a commercial advertising distribution agreement via channels such as broadcast, print, digital paid media, billboards, cinemas or similar.
• If the communication is a required statutory publication or otherwise excluded under s 4(2) (for example, publication of a report required by law), treat it as non-campaign material.

2. Check for regulatory exemptions (s 4(5))

• Review current regulations to confirm whether the campaign or class of campaign is exempt. Regulations may also prescribe what is or is not treated as a campaign for the Act’s purposes.

3. Classify the campaign costs under the Act’s definition (s 3)

• Identify and document all cost components that fall within the statutory definition: research, production, media distribution, and evaluation. Use these to calculate whether the campaign is likely to exceed the peer review or CBA thresholds.

4. Apply monetary thresholds and organise peer review/CBA where necessary (s 7)

• If likely cost > $50,000 (or prescribed amount), ensure a peer review is completed before commencement (s 7(2)).
• If likely cost > $1,000,000 (or prescribed amount), ensure a cost benefit analysis is completed before commencement (s 7(1)).
• Consult the Minister’s Government advertising guidelines for any specified requirements for the form and content of CBAs and peer reviews (s 7(3)).
• If urgency is claimed (public health or safety or other urgent circumstances), document the factual basis for urgency and perform the peer review and/or CBA as soon as practicable after commencement (s 7(4)).

5. Ensure an advertising compliance certificate is obtained from the head (s 8)

• Before commencement, have the head of the agency give a written advertising compliance certificate asserting that, in the head’s opinion, the campaign complies with the Act, regulations and guidelines, contains accurate information, is necessary to achieve a public purpose supported by research, and is an efficient and cost-effective means of achieving that purpose (s 8(2)).
• If the campaign is urgent public health or safety, the head may give the certificate after commencement, but document the urgency and the subsequent certification process (s 8(3)).
• Retain the certificate and underlying analysis and evidence as record materials for audit and potential court review.

6. Avoid prohibited content (s 6)

• Do not design campaigns with the purpose of influencing support for a political party (s 6(1)). Where possible, draft copy to be neutral and factual.
• Do not include the name of a Minister, MP or candidate, and avoid giving prominence to their voice or image (s 6(2)). If Ministerial appearance is contemplated for a public health announcement, document necessity and ensure the material is not prominent.
• Do not include the name, logo, slogan or other references relating to a political party (s 6(3)).
• Review existing regulations under s 6(4) that may clarify compliance matters or circumstances in which a campaign is taken to comply.

7. Observe the pre-election blackout (s 10)

• Confirm the date on which the Legislative Assembly is due to expire for blackout calculation. Do not commence a campaign after 26 January in the election year until the election unless the campaign falls within the enumerated exceptions: public health or safety, service announcements (including electoral information), statutory notices, job advertisements or tender advertising (s 10(1)-(2)).

8. Maintain procurement and cost documentation

• Because the Crown’s recovery is a function of campaign cost (s 11), maintain transparent records of all contracts, invoices, and allocations of spend, including research, production, distribution and evaluation costs. Auditors will seek this material under s 14.

9. Prepare for audit and public reporting (s 14)

• Assume annual performance audit scrutiny by the Auditor-General and prepare to demonstrate that campaigns were effective, economical and efficient and compliant with the Act, regulations and guidelines (s 14(3)).
• Maintain an audit trail and be ready to respond to any Auditor-General determination that a campaign breached s 6, which will be included in the audit report with the campaign cost (s 14(4)-(5)).

10. Coordinate with Ministerial offices on budgets only (s 9)

• Remember that the head’s operational decisions on method, medium and the compliance certificate are independent of Ministerial direction (s 9(1)). However, accept that Ministers may legitimately set budgetary or financial limits which can affect campaign scope (s 9(2)). Ensure such budgetary directives are documented.

11. For governing parties: monitor agency campaigns and funding offsets (s 11-12)

• Political parties whose parliamentary representatives are Ministers should track agency campaigns and be aware of potential post hoc liability for prohibited campaigns (s 11(1)).
• Check existing regulations about offsets under s 12 that may allow liabilities to be deducted from electoral funding or other statutory payments, and coordinate with party finance teams accordingly.

12. If a dispute arises, prepare for Supreme Court review (s 13)

• If notified of an intention to recover campaign cost, a governing party should consider applying to the Supreme Court under s 13(1) in accordance with any prescribed regulatory period (s 13(2)). Be prepared to litigate the factual question whether the campaign breached s 6 and the correct cost figure, and to argue circumstances that might justify relief.

13. Keep an eye on regulations and guidelines

• Because thresholds, exemptions and procedural detail may be found in regulations and the Minister’s guidelines (s 4(5), s 5, s 7(3), s 12), compliance requires monitoring current regulations and guideline versions.

14. Document urgency cases carefully

• When relying on post-commencement CBA, peer review or certificate due to urgent public health or safety, create contemporaneous evidence of the urgency, the decisions made, and the timing and substance of subsequent reviews and certification (s 7(4), s 8(3)). Auditors and courts will scrutinise those cases.

15. Seek legal advice on marginal cases

• For communications near the policy-politics boundary, or where the inclusion of Ministerial imagery or names is contemplated for public health necessity, obtain formal legal advice and memorialise the reasons in the campaign file. Although the Act does not require legal advice, such documentation is protective in audit and litigation contexts.

This checklist is statutory in orientation: it translates the Act’s obligations into operational steps. Practitioners should combine it with the current text of the Government advertising guidelines and any applicable regulations and procurement rules to form a complete compliance program.