The Bill relies on a small number of statutory concepts introduced or defined within the new provisions. Those concepts determine the scope of the deeming, the available procedural routes, and the limits on reopening concluded matters.

Key defined terms and concepts in s 15EA(1) and s 23(1) include:

• commencement day (s 15EA(1); s 23(1)): the operative day when the particular section or Part comes into operation. Section 2 sets the general commencement structure for the Act; the inserted provisions refer to their own commencement days in the definitions.

• commissioning (s 15EA(1)): defined to cover ordination or similar ritual, or an equivalent form of appointment or recognition. This ties the statutory category to the institution’s internal religious processes for conferring status.

• religious practitioner (s 15EA(1)): defined by recognition through commissioning as “playing a role in the religious or spiritual life of the institution that is distinct from that of ordinary adherents of the faith or religion of the institution.” The definition expressly includes a non‑exhaustive list of roles (bishop, priest, deacon, monk, nun, novice, rabbi, minister, imam, pastor) “regardless of how the person’s position or title is described.”

• child sexual abuse cause of action (implicit throughout): the provisions are framed for “an action on the child sexual abuse cause of action,” meaning the statutory effects attach specifically to causes of action based on child sexual abuse.

• employment relationship deemed for the purposes of the action (s 15EA(3)): the central statutory construct. For the action, the religious practitioner is “taken to have been an employee of the institution at the relevant time” and an employment relationship is taken to have existed between the practitioner and either the incorporated institution or the head of an unincorporated institution (s 15EA(3)(b)).

• rebuttal by proof of absence of remuneration or benefits (s 15EA(4)): the institution avoids the deeming if it proves it did not remunerate or provide benefits to the practitioner in that capacity other than reimbursement of expenses. The Bill provides an example (monk provided accommodation as part of monastery membership), signalling that certain non‑remunerative benefits may be treated as remuneration unless the institution proves otherwise.

• preservation of common law requirements (s 15EA(5) and Note): the Act states it does not affect the common law except as expressly provided. The accompanying note restates the common‑law requirement that a plaintiff relying on vicarious liability must prove the relevant act or omission occurred in the course of employment, indicating both that statutory deeming interacts with, but does not wholly displace, existing common law tests.

• previously finalised cause of action (s 23(1)): defined as a child sexual abuse cause of action finalised after 13 November 2024 and before the commencement day, where the defendant was a religious institution and the institution’s vicarious liability for a religious practitioner was an issue in the action or the settlement. The date 13 November 2024 is tied to the High Court decision in Bird v DP noted in the Bill.

• voiding of settlement agreements and limits on recovery (s 24(5)-(7)): settlement agreements (other than contracts of insurance) that formed part of the finalisation are void to the extent they relate to the abuse; parties cannot recover amounts paid under such agreements on the basis of the voidness (s 24(6)), although courts may take paid amounts into account in subsequent litigation (s 24(7)).

Conceptually, the Bill mixes two mechanisms: a substantive statutory deeming of employment status for particular tort claims, and transitional procedural remedies that can reopen and nullify certain recent finalisations of claims. The deeming alters the allocation of civil responsibility for particular torts; the transitional provisions alter the finality of settlements and judgments reached in a specified recent window where vicarious liability was contested or settled.

The statutory changes create identifiable categories of affected parties and allocate decision and proof roles among them.

Primary affected groups:

• Religious institutions: The statutory deeming (s 15EA(3)) targets “religious institutions,” defined indirectly by reference to institutional structures and s 15H(3) where head of institution is used for unincorporated bodies. Institutions that were defendants in child sexual abuse causes of action will face altered legal characterisations of their relationships with religious practitioners. The Bill makes institutions the apparent repository of financial exposure for abuse committed by practitioners because practitioners are “taken to have been an employee” for the purposes of the action (s 15EA(3)). Institutions also bear the evidential and practical burden of rebutting the deeming by proving lack of remuneration or benefits beyond reimbursements (s 15EA(4)).

• Religious practitioners: Individuals who were recognised by commissioning as playing a distinct religious or spiritual role are covered by the “religious practitioner” definition (s 15EA(1)). For the purposes of litigation, those practitioners will be treated as employees of the institution at the relevant time (s 15EA(3)), which will change the defendant profile in litigation against perpetrators and may affect indemnity, insurance and occupational arrangements.

• Plaintiffs who were subjected to child sexual abuse: The Bill is expressly framed to take effect in relation to child sexual abuse causes of action where the abuse was committed by a religious practitioner of a religious institution at the relevant time (s 15EA(2)). It applies irrespective of when the abuse occurred, and irrespective of when the cause of action accrued (s 15EA(6)). It applies to actions commenced on or after commencement day and to actions commenced but not finalised before commencement day (s 15EA(7)). For previously finalised causes of action finalised between 13 November 2024 and commencement (see s 23(1)), plaintiffs may apply for leave to commence a proposed action under s 24(2).

• Defendants and insurers in prior settlements: Parties to settlement agreements that finalised causes of action in the window after 13 November 2024 and before commencement may be directly affected by s 24. Settlement agreements (other than contracts of insurance) are declared void to the extent they relate to the child sexual abuse at issue (s 24(5)). Parties who paid amounts under those agreements cannot seek recovery on the basis that the agreement is void (s 24(6)), but courts may take paid amounts into account when considering awards in subsequent actions (s 24(7)). Contracts of insurance are explicitly preserved (s 24(5)).

• Courts: Courts decide leave applications for proposed actions arising out of previously finalised causes (s 24(2)-(3)), may set aside judgments and settlements to the extent necessary (s 24(3)), and may consider the impact of the amendments on prospects of success (s 24(4)). The Bill restricts the power of courts other than the Supreme Court to set aside previous judgments of another court (s 24(8)), creating a procedural limitation on the jurisdictional reach of lower courts in this transitional area.

Who decides and who bears evidential burdens:

• Institutions bear the burden of proving the exception in s 15EA(4) if they seek to avoid the deeming. The courts decide whether it is just and reasonable to grant leave under s 24(3), whether judgments or settlement agreements ought to be set aside, and how amounts previously paid under voided agreements should be treated (s 24(3), (7)). Non‑Supreme courts lack power to set aside judgments of other courts (s 24(8)), so strategic forum considerations will matter.

Timing and scope:

• The deeming applies across time: it applies “regardless of when” the abusive act occurred and regardless of cause of action accrual (s 15EA(6)). That means historical acts fall within the statutory rule.

• The transitional provisions are limited to a specific period: previously finalised causes are those finalised after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day where the institution’s vicarious liability was an issue (s 23(1)). The Bill draws a clear window for reopened matters.

The Bill does not impose traditional statutory duties such as ongoing reporting obligations or registration requirements. Instead it creates substantive and procedural effects that allocate rights and burdens in litigation. Those effects function as obligations and entitlements in the civil litigation context.

Rights created or clarified

• Right of plaintiffs to treat religious practitioners as employees for purposes of child sexual abuse actions (s 15EA(3)). For the purposes of their causes of action, plaintiffs may rely on the statutory deeming to assert an employment relationship that supports institutional liability.

• Right to apply for leave to commence a proposed action in relation to a previously finalised cause of action (s 24(2)). A prospective plaintiff can ask a competent court to open a previously closed matter where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

• Right of courts to void settlements (other than insurance) that finalised a previously finalised cause of action to the extent they relate to the child sexual abuse at issue (s 24(5)). That changes the finality rights otherwise enjoyed by parties to such settlements.

Burden and obligations placed on institutions and parties

• Burden on institutions to prove the exception in s 15EA(4): s 15EA(4) provides an escape valve but requires the institution to prove it “did not remunerate or provide benefits to the religious practitioner in that capacity other than (where relevant) merely reimbursing the religious practitioner for expenses incurred.” This allocates an evidential duty to institutions to show lack of remuneration or benefits to avoid being treated as an employer in litigation.

• Procedural duties when dealing with previously finalised matters under s 24: defendants and plaintiffs must consider applications for leave, potential setting aside of judgments or settlements, and the court’s potential to limit its consideration to the effect of the amendments on prospects of success (s 24(4)). Parties that have entered settlement agreements in the affected window must account for the risk their agreements (other than insurance contracts) may be void to the extent they relate to the abuse (s 24(5)).

Rights curtailed or limited

• Parties to otherwise binding settlements may lose their contractual finality to the extent the settlement relates to child sexual abuse covered by s 24(5); they cannot recover amounts paid under such an agreement on the basis that the agreement is void (s 24(6)), which limits restitution rights.

• Courts other than the Supreme Court are limited in their ability to set aside previous judgments of another court (s 24(8)), which constrains remedies available in lower courts.

Preservation and interaction with common law

• The Bill expressly states it “does not affect the common law as it applies with respect to vicarious liability, except to the extent expressly provided by this section” (s 15EA(5)). The accompanying note reiterates the common‑law requirement that a plaintiff alleging vicarious liability prove the act occurred in the course of employment. That preserves common law tests except where the statute creates a specific rule (the deeming) for child sexual abuse causes of action.

Practical legal effect

• Statutory deeming functions as a procedural‑substantive device: it does not create a new cause of action but changes the legal characterisation of the relationship between practitioner and institution for the purposes of existing causes of action for child sexual abuse (s 15EA(3)). Rights to damages continue to be pursued through civil courts; the Bill affects allocation of liability and the ability to reopen certain prior finalisations.

The Bill contains no criminal offences, regulatory sanctions, or administrative penalty regimes. Enforcement is purely through civil litigation mechanisms in the courts and through statutory effects on finality of prior civil processes.

Enforcement channels and remedies provided

• Civil actions and judicial remedies: the primary enforcement route is the ordinary tort litigation process. Section 15EA alters the parties and proof in civil causes of action by deeming religious practitioners to be employees of religious institutions for child sexual abuse causes of action (s 15EA(3)). That alters the defendant and potential respondent for damages claims.

• Court powers in transitional cases: Part 5 empowers courts to grant leave to commence a proposed action that would otherwise be barred by finalisation of a previously finalised cause of action (s 24(2)-(3)). The court may set aside any judgment or settlement agreement that effected finalisation “to the extent necessary” for granting leave (s 24(3)). Those are equitable and procedural remedies exercisable by courts.

• Voiding of settlement agreements: s 24(5) makes settlement agreements (other than contracts of insurance) void to the extent they relate to the child sexual abuse that was the subject of the previously finalised cause of action. This is a statutory nullification of contractual terms, enforceable by courts.

• Limits on restitution and consideration of payments: s 24(6) prevents parties to voided agreements from seeking to recover amounts paid under the agreement on the basis of the voidness, while s 24(7) permits courts to take into account any amount paid under a voided agreement to the extent it relates to the abuse. Those provisions shape remedies and equitable adjustments in subsequent litigation.

Who enforces and decides

• Courts: enforcement occurs through judicial decisions. Courts decide leave applications under s 24(2), whether it is “just and reasonable” to grant leave (s 24(3)), whether to set aside prior judgments and settlements (s 24(3)), and how to treat amounts paid under voided agreements (s 24(7)). The Bill restricts the power of courts other than the Supreme Court to set aside judgments of another court (s 24(8)), which channels certain remedial actions toward the Supreme Court.

• Parties and insurers: enforcement relies on parties initiating litigation or application for leave; insurers will be implicated because contracts of insurance are preserved from the voiding rule (s 24(5)), so insurers remain parties with financial and enforcement interests.

Absence of statutory penalties

• No fines or criminal liability are created or altered by this Bill; there are no compliance notices, administrative penalties or contraventions attracting specified monetary penalties in the text. Remedies are the traditional civil law remedies of damages, equitable adjustment, and setting aside of orders or agreements, exercised by courts under the ordinary civil procedural regime as modified by Part 5.

Evidential and discretionary elements

• The institution’s evidential burden under s 15EA(4) and the court’s discretionary judgment under s 24(3) and s 24(4) introduce enforcement uncertainty that will be resolved through litigation. Courts are given explicit discretion to impose conditions on leave and to limit consideration of whether it is just and reasonable to the effect of the amendments on prospects of success (s 24(3)-(4)).

This Bill operates as an amendment to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (s 3). Its text cross‑references and deliberately preserves elements of the common law; it also intersects with contract law, insurance law, and court procedural rules. Only provisions contained in the Bill should be used to describe the interaction.

Interaction with the common law of vicarious liability

• Preservation and partial displacement: s 15EA(5) states the section “does not affect the common law as it applies with respect to vicarious liability, except to the extent expressly provided by this section.” The Bill therefore preserves the common law tests except where the legislative deeming applies. The Bill’s note clarifies that the common law requirement that a plaintiff prove the act or omission occurred in the course of employment remains relevant. The statutory deeming in s 15EA(3) applies “for the purposes of the action,” which interacts with the common‑law inquiry into the employment relationship and whether the tort occurred in the course of employment. That creates a legal interface in which statutory characterisation and common law course‑of‑employment analysis will both be relevant.

Interaction with contract law and settlement finality

• Voiding of settlement agreements: s 24(5) creates a statutory exception to finality of settlement agreements entered into in the defined window; it declares such agreements void to the extent they relate to the child sexual abuse at issue, subject to the exception for contracts of insurance. This directly modifies contractual rights arising from settlements concluded after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day where vicarious liability was an issue.

• Limits on restitution claims: s 24(6) prevents a party from seeking to recover amounts paid under an agreement on the basis that the agreement is void to the extent mentioned. That interacts with general restitution doctrines by limiting recovery avenues after statutory voiding.

Interaction with insurance law

• Contracts of insurance: s 24(5) expressly excludes contracts of insurance from the voiding rule. That preserves insurance contracts as a source of cover and recovery for amounts paid in prior settlements. The Bill therefore interacts with any insurance coverage that applied to previously finalised matters, but leaves insurance contracts intact.

Interaction with court procedural law

• Powers to set aside judgments and forum limitations: s 24(3) empowers courts to set aside judgments and settlement agreements to the extent necessary to permit leave. Section 24(8) restricts courts other than the Supreme Court from setting aside a previous judgment of another court. That imposes a procedural constraint; parties seeking to challenge prior judgments may need to engage the Supreme Court for orders under the transitional regime.

Temporal and jurisdictional interaction

• The deeming applies regardless of when the abusive act occurred and regardless of when the cause of action accrued (s 15EA(6)), potentially bringing historical conduct within the statutory framework and interacting with limitation doctrines and accrued rights under other legislation. The Bill does not itself alter limitation statutes; it changes the legal relationship for the action. Any interaction with limitation or civil procedure statutes will thus be realised through litigation rather than by explicit amendment in the Bill.

Reference to external judicial authority

• The Bill’s Part 5 note about the High Court decision in Bird v DP [2024] HCA 41 (s 23 note) signals that the transitional window and the category of “previously finalised” causes of action are framed in direct relation to that decision. The Bill does not incorporate or restate the decision; it simply records the date of the High Court’s decision as the temporal trigger for the previously finalised window.

Unstated but implied interactions

• The Bill’s deeming and transitional rules will interact with indemnity arrangements, employment law classifications, and insurers’ subrogation rights in practice. The text preserves insurance contracts (s 24(5)) but otherwise does not amend insurance law, employment law or statute of limitations provisions. Any practical interaction will therefore arise from litigation applying the amended Civil Liability Act to causes of action governed by those other laws.

The instrument presented is the Civil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025. It appears as a single amending Bill and its operative changes are limited, so the amendment history within the text is straightforward and self‑contained.

What the Bill inserts

• Section 4 of the Bill inserts new s 15EA into the Civil Liability Act 2002. The new section is titled “Employment relationship between religious practitioners and religious institutions” and contains definitions, the statutory deeming of employment status for the purposes of child sexual abuse causes of action, an exception for institutions that can prove no remuneration or benefit other than reimbursements, a preservation clause for common law, and temporal application and coverage clauses (see s 15EA(1)-(8)).

• Section 5 inserts a new Part 5 into the Civil Liability Act 2002 consisting of ss 23 and 24. Part 5 contains transitional provisions dealing with previously finalised causes of action, including definitions (s 23) and the mechanism by which courts may grant leave to commence a propose action and set aside earlier judgments and settlement agreements as necessary (s 24).

Commencement schedule

• Section 2 sets the commencement: sections 1 and 2 commence on the day of Royal Assent; the remainder of the Act commences on the 28th day after that day. The inserted provisions refer to “commencement day” in their own definitions (s 15EA(1); s 23(1)), tying their operative timing to that staged schedule.

Temporal cut‑off for transitional provisions

• Part 5’s definition of “previously finalised cause of action” (s 23(1)) uses 13 November 2024 as the cut‑off reference date, noting the High Court decision in Bird v DP [2024] HCA 41. Causes finalised after that date and before commencement day can be the subject of applications under s 24.

No other amendments in this Bill

• The Bill’s single substantive additions are s 15EA and Part 5 (ss 23-24). It does not otherwise alter other sections of the Civil Liability Act 2002 within the text provided. Section 3 identifies the Civil Liability Act 2002 as the Act being amended.

Scope of retroactivity and reopening

• The Bill’s wording enables retroactive application in two senses: the deeming applies “regardless of when the act or omission that constitutes the child sexual abuse occurred” and “regardless of when the cause of action accrued” (s 15EA(6)). Separately, Part 5 provides a limited reopening mechanism for causes finalised in the specific window after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day (s 23(1); s 24), which can lead to setting aside of judgments or settlements and fresh proceedings.

Record in the Bill about judicial context

• The Bill’s note referencing Bird v DP situates the legislative changes in direct response to contemporary High Court jurisprudence, at least as framed by the Bill drafters. The amendment history in the Bill itself is therefore tightly focused and designed to introduce a defined statutory rule and a narrow transitional scheme rather than a broad overhaul of civil liability law.

The Bill itself contains only a single direct reference to litigation. It records, in the note attached to the definition of “previously finalised cause of action” in s 23(1), that on 13 November 2024 the High Court decided the case of Bird v DP [2024] HCA 41. The Bill uses that date as the starting point for the window of finalisations that may be reopened by Part 5.

What the Bill says about prior litigation

• The Bill’s Part 5 defines “previously finalised cause of action” as a cause of action finalised after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day in which (a) a defendant was a religious institution and (b) the vicarious liability of the institution for a religious practitioner was an issue in the action or in the settlement (s 23(1)). This links the new reopening procedure to the period immediately after the High Court decision noted in the Bill.

• Section 24 provides the litigation mechanism: a party may apply to a court that would have had jurisdiction to deal with the proposed action but for the finalisation of the previously finalised cause of action, for leave to commence the proposed action (s 24(2)). The court may grant leave if satisfied it is just and reasonable, subject to conditions, and may set aside judgments and settlement agreements to the extent necessary (s 24(3)). The court may limit its inquiry to the effect of the Bill’s amendments on prospects of success (s 24(4)).

Practical litigation consequences encoded in the Bill

• The new provisions enable a relitigation of issues that were finalised in a specified interval, subject to court discretion. That is a deliberate judicial reopening rather than an automatic revival of claims; leave must be obtained and the court has discretion and power to impose conditions (s 24(3)).

• Settlement agreements that were part of finalisation are made void to the extent they relate to the sexual abuse (s 24(5)), although contracts of insurance are excluded (s 24(5)). Parties cannot recover amounts paid under such agreements on the basis the agreement is void (s 24(6)), although courts may take paid amounts into account in subsequent proceedings (s 24(7)).

Limits on which courts can effect certain remedies

• Section 24(8) states that a court other than the Supreme Court may not set aside a previous judgment of another court. That procedural constraint assigns a particular gatekeeping role to the Supreme Court for orders that would set aside prior judgments of other courts.

No reported cases are named other than Bird v DP, and the Bill does not itself record any litigation applying the new provisions because it is prospective. The litigation history in the Bill is therefore limited to the reference to the High Court decision and the creation of new litigation pathways for particular prior finalisations.

The Bill’s limited scope belies several practical legal traps and strategic issues that parties must recognise. These derive directly from the text and from the interaction the Bill creates between statutory deeming, common law, settlement finality and court powers.

1. Statutory deeming versus common law course of employment test

• The Bill takes the step of “taking” a religious practitioner to have been an employee of the institution “for the purposes of the action” (s 15EA(3)). At the same time, s 15EA(5) preserves the common law as it applies with respect to vicarious liability “except to the extent expressly provided by this section” and the accompanying note reiterates the common‑law requirement that a plaintiff must prove the act occurred in the course of employment. The practical effect is that the statutory deeming may change the formal characterisation of the relationship, but plaintiffs will still need to address whether the conduct occurred in the course of employment under common law; parties should not assume the deeming alone guarantees institutional vicarious liability without considering course‑of‑employment causation.

2. Rebuttal standard and evidential burden on institutions

• The institution can avoid the deeming only by proving it did not remunerate or provide benefits to the practitioner “other than (where relevant) merely reimbursing the religious practitioner for expenses incurred” (s 15EA(4)). The Bill gives an example (monk provided accommodation). Institutions will have to marshal contemporaneous evidence about remuneration, benefits, accommodation, in‑kind support, and informal arrangements. The evidential standard and how courts construe “benefits” will be decisive; institutions cannot assume informal role descriptions or absence of salary will automatically defeat statutory characterisation.

3. Broad temporal reach

• The deeming applies “regardless of when the act or omission that constitutes the child sexual abuse occurred; and regardless of when the cause of action accrued” (s 15EA(6)). That brings historical allegations within the statutory regime and may interact unpredictably with limitation doctrines, though the Bill does not amend limitation statutes. Parties should not assume lapse of time removes the statutory characterisation.

4. Reopening of recently finalised matters, but only in a narrow window

• Part 5 applies only to matters finalised after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day where vicarious liability was an issue (s 23(1)). Parties who finalised settlements or received judgments outside that window are unaffected by the reopening mechanism. Parties who settled in that window must consider the risk their agreements (other than insurance) can now be voided to the extent they relate to the abuse (s 24(5)).

5. Contracts of insurance preserved, but commercial uncertainty remains

• Insurance contracts are explicitly excluded from voiding (s 24(5)). That protects insurer‑insured contractual arrangements. However, insurers’ subrogation rights, allocation of defence costs, and indemnity obligations remain matters for litigation and contract interpretation; the Bill does not expressly address those downstream commercial disputes.

6. Settlement voiding paired with no restitution for payers

• Section 24(5) voids settlement agreements (other than insurance) while s 24(6) bars a party to a voided agreement from seeking recovery of amounts paid under the agreement on the basis the agreement is void. That combination can leave a payer who made a settlement payment in the affected window unable to reclaim that payment, while the plaintiff may relitigate for damages , though courts may take prior payments into account under s 24(7). Parties who negotiated settlements in the window may find their commercial positions altered but without simple restitution remedies.

7. Forum and procedural constraint

• Section 24(8) prevents courts other than the Supreme Court from setting aside a previous judgment of another court. That creates a jurisdictional chokepoint: to have a judgment of another court set aside, parties may have to go to the Supreme Court, which could affect strategy, costs and timing. Lower courts can still grant leave and set aside settlement agreements or judgments within their own competence, but not set aside judgments of other courts.

8. Deeming tied to “commissioning” and institutional recognition

• The religious practitioner definition depends on “commissioning” and institutional recognition (s 15EA(1)). Parties will focus on the existence, nature and effect of commissioning rituals or equivalent recognitions. Institutions may try to argue lack of commissioning; plaintiffs will seek evidence of commissioning or functional equivalents. The Bill’s non‑exhaustive list of roles means courts will look beyond titles to the substance of recognition.

9. Strategic uncertainty for institutions and practitioners

• The combined effect of deeming, rebuttal burdens, reopening of recent finalisations and limits on recovery creates legal and commercial uncertainty for institutions, practitioners and insurers. Institutions may face increased litigation exposure and potential reopening of settled matters; practitioners’ indemnity positions may shift; insurers must assess coverage and subrogation risks in light of s 24. The Bill does not supply transitional funding or administrative mechanisms to manage that uncertainty.

10. Narrowness of the reopening power but wide consequences

• While Part 5 is temporally narrow, its consequences can be wide for specific matters. Parties who believed matters finalised in the immediate post‑Bird period must reassess finality. The statutory scheme centralises much of the decision‑making to courts and imposes substantive limits (e.g. s 24(6)). Parties should not assume their prior agreements remain intact if they fall within the defined window.

Compliance under this Bill is not a matter of registering with a regulator or filing forms; it is a matter of litigation readiness, evidence preservation, contract review and insurance management. Institutions, practitioners, plaintiffs and insurers should take distinct and immediate steps grounded in the statutory text.

For religious institutions

• Evidence of remuneration and benefits: assemble and preserve documentary and witness evidence about any remuneration, benefits, accommodation, in‑kind support, stipends, reimbursements or other financial arrangements with religious practitioners, including historical records. Section 15EA(4) allows avoidance of the deeming only if the institution proves it “did not remunerate or provide benefits to the religious practitioner in that capacity other than (where relevant) merely reimbursing the religious practitioner for expenses incurred.” Institutions should be able to prove the absence of remuneration or the purely reimbursive nature of financial transfers if they will rely on the exception.

• Records of commissioning and role recognition: maintain records of commissioning ceremonies, ordination documents, appointment letters, role descriptions, and any formal recognitions. The definition of “religious practitioner” hinges on commissioning and institutional recognition (s 15EA(1)). Evidence of the nature of commissioning, whether a ceremony, ritual, written appointment, or equivalent process, will bear directly on whether an individual satisfies the statutory definition.

• Insurance and indemnity review: review insurance policies and indemnity arrangements. Section 24(5) excludes contracts of insurance from the voiding rule. Institutions should validate insurers’ cover for historical and reopened claims, check policy terms, and coordinate with insurers about potential exposure arising from the deeming and reopening provisions.

• Settlement audit and risk assessment: identify all settlements and judgments finalised between 13 November 2024 and the commencement day where vicarious liability for a religious practitioner was an issue. Those settlements are potentially void to the extent they relate to the child sexual abuse at issue (s 24(5)). Institutions should assess exposure to reopening applications and plan litigation strategies accordingly.

• Litigation strategy and forum planning: given s 24(8) limits courts other than the Supreme Court from setting aside prior judgments of other courts, institutions should consider whether motions will require Supreme Court proceedings and plan budgets and tactics on that basis.

For religious practitioners

• Documentation of status and financial arrangements: practitioners who may be potential defendants or witnesses should ensure there are records clarifying whether and how they were commissioned, the nature of their role, and whether they received remuneration or benefits. Those records will be relevant to institutions’ attempts to rebut the deeming and to any common‑law course‑of‑employment analysis.

• Engage insurers and legal counsel: practitioners should confirm whether they are named insureds under institutional policies, whether they have personal liability cover, and how institutional indemnity arrangements apply in light of the deeming.

For plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs

• Identify candidates for leave under s 24: where a cause of action was finalised in the window after 13 November 2024 and before commencement day and the institution’s vicarious liability was an issue in the prior action or settlement, consider applying for leave under s 24(2). The court may limit itself to considering the amendments’ effect on prospects of success (s 24(4)). A carefully focused application that addresses that inquiry will be necessary.

• Evidence preservation: preserve evidence about the abuse, commissioning, institutional recognition, settlement documents, and any payments made under earlier agreements. Under s 24(7) a court may take paid amounts under a voided agreement into account in a subsequent action.

• Settlement review: if you previously settled in the defined window, check whether the settlement agreement related to the abuse and consider whether it may be voided under s 24(5). Be mindful that s 24(6) prevents recovery of amounts paid under such agreements on the basis they are void.

For insurers

• Policy analysis and notice: analyse whether policies cover potential reopened claims and whether notification obligations have been met. Section 24(5) preserves contracts of insurance from being voided as a class, but insurers will still need to address coverage disputes, defence obligations, and subrogation in light of reopened litigation.

• Reserve setting and litigation funding: insurers should reassess reserves for matters involving religious institutions and practitioners, especially for claims that may be reopened under Part 5.

For all parties , litigation readiness steps

• Legal review of settled matters finalised after 13 November 2024: create a register of potentially affected settlements and judgments; identify whether the vicarious liability of the institution was an issue; obtain copies of settlement agreements and judgment transcripts.

• Assess forum strategy: because s 24(8) constrains lower courts’ ability to set aside previous judgments of other courts, determine whether relief sought will require Supreme Court engagement and organise counsel accordingly.

• Time and tactical planning: note the staged commencement (s 2) and the Bill’s own defined “commencement day” references (s 15EA(1); s 23(1)). Plan for prompt action once the Act commences because litigation windows, leave applications and evidential freshening are time‑sensitive.

• Communication and internal governance: institutions should brief boards, trustees and insurers about the changed statutory landscape, anticipated litigation risk, and the need for records and coordination with legal counsel.

These steps derive directly from the legislative text: the rebuttal pathway in s 15EA(4) requires evidence about remuneration and benefits; Part 5 (ss 23-24) establishes the reopening pathway and the constraints and remedies that attach to prior settlements and judgments. Compliance therefore means preparing to litigate, to prove exceptions, to manage insurer relations, and to reassess prior dispositions, rather than completing any statutory filing or regulatory compliance form.