{"id":"BILL-WA-06279DFE4938B8FC48258D3F000DDB1D","name":"Civil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025","slug":"civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"wa","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":"2025-11-12","administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446161,"registerId":"BILL-WA-06279DFE4938B8FC48258D3F000DDB1D:current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2025-11-12","status":"in_force","reasons":null,"registeredAt":"2026-05-08T16:47:34.691Z"},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"retrieval-0001","sectionType":"document_chunk","heading":"Document excerpt 1","content":"# Civil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\n\n43—1 page i\nWestern Australia\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse\nActions) Bill 2025\nContents\n1. Short title 2\n2. Commencement 2\n3. Act amended 2\n4. Section 15EA inserted 2\n15EA. Employment relationship between\nreligious practitioners and religious\ninstitutions 2\n5. Part 5 inserted 5\nPart 5 — Transitional provisions for Civil Liability\nAmendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions)\nAct 2025\n23. Terms used 5\n24. Previously finalised causes of action 6\n\npage 1\nWestern Australia\nLEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse\nActions) Bill 2025\nA Bill for\nAn Act to amend the Civil Liability Act 2002.\nThe Parliament of Western Australia enacts as follows:\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 1\npage 2\n1. Short title1\nThis is the Civil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse2\nActions) Act 2025.3\n2. Commencement4\nThis Act comes into operation as follows —5\n(a) sections 1 and 2 — on the day on which this Act6\nreceives the Royal Assent;7\n(b) the rest of the Act — on the 28th day after that day.8\n3. Act amended9\nThis Act amends the Civil Liability Act 2002.10\n4. Section 15EA inserted11\nAfter section 15E insert:12\n13\n15EA. Employment relationship between religious14\npractitioners and religious institutions15\n(1) In this section —16\ncommencement day means the day on which the Civil17\nLiability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions)18\nAct 2025 section 4 comes into operation;19\ncommissioning means —20\n(a) ordination or a similar ceremony or ritual; or21\n(b) an equivalent form of appointment or22\nrecognition;23\nreligious practitioner —24\n(a) means a person who is recognised by a25\nreligious institution, by commissioning, as26\nplaying a role in the religious or spiritual life of27\nthe institution that is distinct from that of28\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 4\npage 3\nordinary adherents of the faith or religion of the1\ninstitution; and2\n(b) includes such a person regardless of how the3\nperson’s position or title is described, for4\nexample, a bishop, priest, deacon or other5\nmember of the clergy, a monk, nun, novice or6\nother member of a religious order, a rabbi, a7\nminister, an imam or a pastor.8\n(2) This section applies in relation to a child sexual abuse9\ncause of action if the person who is taking action on the10\ncause of action was subjected to the child sexual abuse11\nby a person who was a religious practitioner of a12\nreligious institution when the act or omission giving13\nrise to the cause of action occurred (the relevant time).14\n(3) For the purposes of the action on the child sexual abuse15\ncause of action —16\n(a) the religious practitioner is taken to have been17\nan employee of the institution at the relevant18\ntime; and19\n(b) an employment relationship is taken to have20\nexisted, at the relevant time, between —21\n(i) if the institution was incorporated at the22\nrelevant time — the religious23\npractitioner and the institution; or24\n(ii) if the institution was not incorporated at25\nthe relevant time — the religious26\npractitioner and the head of the27\ninstitution (within the meaning given in28\nsection 15H(3)).29\n(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the institution proves30\nthat it did not remunerate or provide benefits to the31\nreligious practitioner in that capacity other than (where32\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 4\npage 4\nrelevant) merely reimbursing the religious practitioner1\nfor expenses incurred.2\nExample for this subsection:3\nA monk is provided a benefit by being provided4\naccommodation as part of being a member of a monastery.5\n(5) This section does not affect the common law as it6\napplies with respect to vicarious liability, except to the7\nextent expressly provided by this section.8\nNote for this subsection:9\nThis section does not displace the requirement at common10\nlaw for a plaintiff whose cause of action is based on the11\nvicarious liability of the institution to prove that the act or12\nomission giving rise to the cause of action occurred in the13\ncourse of the employment of the religious practitioner.14\n(6) This section applies —15\n(a) regardless of when the act or omission that16\nconstitutes the child sexual abuse occurred; and17\n(b) regardless of when the cause of action accrued.18\n(7) This section applies to the following child sexual abuse19\nactions —20\n(a) actions commenced on or after commencement21\nday;22\n(b) actions commenced but not finalised before23\ncommencement day.24\n(8) For the purposes of subsection (7)(b), an action is25\nfinalised when —26\n(a) judgment is given in relation to the action; or27\n(b) the action is dismissed.28\n29\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 5\npage 5\n5. Part 5 inserted1\nAfter section 22 insert:2\n3\nPart 5 — Transitional provisions for Civil4\nLiability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse5\nActions) Act 20256\n23. Terms used7\n(1) In this Part —8\ncommencement day means the day on which the Civil9\nLiability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions)10\nAct 2025 section 5 comes into operation;11\nfinalised, in relation to a child sexual abuse cause of12\naction, means —13\n(a) judgment was given in relation to the action on14\nthe cause of action; or15\n(b) the action on the cause of action was dismissed;16\nor17\n(c) the cause of action was settled;18\npreviously finalised cause of action means a child19\nsexual abuse cause of action that was finalised after20\n13 November 2024 and before commencement day and21\nin relation to which —22\n(a) the defendant or 1 of the defendants was a23\nreligious institution; and24\n(b) the vicarious liability of the institution for a25\nreligious practitioner of the institution was an26\nissue in the action on, or the settlement of, the27\ncause of action.28\nNote for this definition:29\nOn 13 November 2024 the High Court decided the case of30\nBird v DP (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 41.31\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 5\npage 6\n(2) If a term used in this Part is given a meaning in1\nsection 15A or 15EA, it has the same meaning in this2\nPart.3\n24. Previously finalised causes of action4\n(1) This section applies in relation to a proposed action on5\na previously finalised cause of action.6\n(2) Application may be made to a court that would have7\njurisdiction to deal with the proposed action, but for the8\nfinalisation of the previously finalised cause of action,9\nfor leave to commence the proposed action.10\n(3) The court may, if satisfied that it is just and reasonable11\nto do so —12\n(a) grant leave to commence the proposed action,13\nsubject to conditions; and14\n(b) to the extent necessary for that, set aside any15\njudgment, and any settlement agreement, that16\neffected the finalisation of the previously17\nfinalised cause of action.18\n(4) The court, in determining whether it is just and19\nreasonable for the purposes of subsection (3), may limit20\nitself to considering the effect of the amendments made21\nby the Civil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse22\nActions) Act 2025 on the prospects of success of the23\nproposed action.24\n(5) If an action on the previously finalised cause of action25\nis commenced (the subsequent action), any settlement26\nagreement that is part of the finalisation of the27\npreviously finalised cause of action, other than a28\ncontract of insurance, is, despite any written or other29\nlaw, void to the extent to which it relates to the child30\nsexual abuse the subject of the previously finalised31\ncause of action.32\n\nCivil Liability Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2025\ns. 5\npage 7\n(6) A party to an agreement that is wholly or partly void1\nunder subsection (5) cannot seek to recover an amount2\npaid by or for the party under the agreement on the3\nbasis that the agreement is void to that extent.4\n(7) The court dealing with the subsequent action may, if5\nsatisfied that it is just and reasonable to do so, take into6\naccount any amount paid under an agreement that is7\nwholly or partly void under this section, to the extent to8\nwhich the amount relates to the child sexual abuse the9\nsubject of the previously finalised cause of action.10\n(8) A court, other than the Supreme Court, may not set11\naside a previous judgment of another court.12\n13","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"summary":{"status_summary":"The Bill is currently before a committee in the Legislative Council.","complexity_score":5,"likely_questions":["Who qualifies as a 'religious practitioner' under the new section 15EA?","What constitutes 'remuneration or benefits' that would prevent the institution from avoiding the deemed employment relationship?","Can a victim reopen a case that was settled before 13 November 2024?","What happens to insurance policies if a settlement is voided under the transitional provisions?"],"complexity_factors":["Creates a legal fiction of employment for specific tort claims only, with an exception for unpaid volunteers that requires interpretation of 'remuneration or benefits'.","Transitional provisions allow reopening of finalised cases with court discretion, introducing procedural complexity and potential for multiple applications.","Interacts with High Court precedent (Bird v DP) and common law vicarious liability rules, requiring legal expertise to navigate."],"plain_english_summary":"This Bill amends WA’s Civil Liability Act to treat religious practitioners as employees of their institutions for child sexual abuse claims, creating a rebuttable legal fiction that expands vicarious liability unless the institution proves the practitioner received no pay or benefits. It applies retroactively to reopen certain finalised cases and voids related settlements (except insurance), increasing exposure for religious bodies, insurers, and potentially their members or donors."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":5,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"This Bill expands the statutory reach compared with the traditional common law approach by creating a presumption that commissioned religious practitioners are employees of religious institutions for child sexual abuse causes of action (s.15EA(3)). It applies retroactively (s.15EA(6)) and allows certain cases finalised after 13 November 2024 to be reopened and earlier settlements to be voided (Part 5, ss.23–24). Those features broaden the set of potential institutional defendants and revive recently finalised matters, which moves the legislation beyond merely clarifying existing vicarious liability principles into materially changing the liability landscape for religious institutions and related parties."},"complexity_factors":["Short Bill but introduces a new substantive rule altering vicarious liability (new s.15EA) with several defined terms (commencement day, commissioning, religious practitioner).","Part 5 adds transitional machinery with its own defined terms (commencement day, finalised, previously finalised cause of action) and cross‑references to s.15A and 15EA (s.23(2)).","Retroactive application: applies regardless of when abuse occurred or when cause of action accrued (s.15EA(6)), increasing factual and temporal complexity.","Conditional exception allowing institutions to rebut presumption by proving lack of remuneration/benefits (s.15EA(4))—introduces evidentiary inquiries into historical facts.","Interaction with common law: provision expressly preserves common law except as provided (s.15EA(5)), requiring courts to reconcile statute and existing vicarious liability doctrines.","Transitional discretion: courts may set aside judgments and settlements and grant leave to recommence actions if 'just and reasonable', with an express power to limit the scope of that inquiry (s.24(3)–(4)).","Settlement consequences: voiding of prior settlements (except insurance) with prohibitions on recovery of amounts paid and a discretionary ability for courts to account for those sums (s.24(5)–(7)).","Procedural limit: courts other than the Supreme Court cannot set aside judgments of another court (s.24(8)), adding jurisdictional constraint that practitioners must navigate."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this Bill changes (mechanically)\n\n- Creates a new rule in the Civil Liability Act 2002 that, for the purposes of child sexual abuse claims, treats a \"religious practitioner\" as if they were an employee of the religious institution (or the head of the institution if it was unincorporated) at the time the abuse occurred (see new section 15EA(3)).\n\n- Defines key terms used in that rule: \"religious practitioner\" (someone commissioned/ordained or similarly recognised as playing a distinct religious/spiritual role) and \"commissioning\" (ordination or equivalent) (see new section 15EA(1)).\n\n- Allows a religious institution to avoid the statutory employment presumption only if it proves the practitioner received no remuneration or benefits in that capacity other than reimbursement of expenses (see s.15EA(4)).\n\n- Makes the statutory presumption apply regardless of when the abuse happened and regardless of when the legal cause of action accrued (s.15EA(6)). It applies to actions started on or after commencement day and to actions already started but not yet finalised when the provision begins to operate (s.15EA(7)).\n\n- Says this insertion does not displace the rest of the common law on vicarious liability except to the extent expressly stated; a plaintiff still must prove the act was carried out \"in the course of employment\" where the cause of action is based on vicarious liability (s.15EA(5) and note).\n\n- Adds transitional rules (Part 5) allowing certain previously finalised child sexual abuse causes of action (finalised after 13 November 2024 but before commencement) to be re-opened. A court may grant leave to commence a new action on such a previously finalised cause if it is \"just and reasonable\" and may set aside judgments or settlement agreements where necessary (see s.23 and s.24).\n\n- Makes such prior settlements void to the extent they relate to the abuse (except contracts of insurance), but disallows recovery of amounts already paid under a voided agreement; courts may nevertheless take payments already made into account in deciding remedies (s.24(5)–(7)). Courts other than the Supreme Court cannot set aside a judgment of another court (s.24(8)).\n\nWho this affects\n\n- Primary affected parties: claimants who allege child sexual abuse by people recognised as religious practitioners; religious institutions (churches, orders, boards, etc.) named as defendants; and insurance carriers that insure those institutions.\n\n- Secondary effects: unincorporated religious bodies (where liability is pinned to the head of the institution), charities and community organisations that operate religious ministries, and legal practitioners and courts dealing with reopened or ongoing claims.\n\nWhy it matters (stated purpose and practical consequences)\n\n- The Bill’s stated functional effect is to make it easier for claimants to hold religious institutions vicariously liable for child sexual abuse committed by religious practitioners, by treating those practitioners as employees for the relevant causes of action (new s.15EA). The transitional rules are designed to allow some matters finalised after the High Court decision in Bird v DP (13 November 2024) to be re-opened where vicarious liability was an issue (Part 5).\n\n- Practical consequences and implementation mechanics to note:\n  - Financial exposure: religious institutions that previously relied on non‑employee status to limit vicarious liability may face new liability, increased claims, and higher insurance premiums (s.15EA(3)–(4)).\n  - Evidence and rebuttal: institutions can rebut the statutory presumption by proving lack of remuneration or benefits (s.15EA(4)), which will require historical records and factual inquiries about the nature of benefits provided (example given in s.15EA(4)).\n  - Retroactivity and reopened cases: the law applies regardless of when the abuse occurred (s.15EA(6)) and gives courts power to reopen certain finalised matters decided after 13 November 2024 (s.24). That creates an immediate set of cases that may be relitigated or renegotiated, subject to judicial discretion.\n  - Settlement and insurance consequences: most settlement agreements that finalised covered matters may be declared void to the extent they relate to the abuse, but contracts of insurance are expressly unaffected (s.24(5)). Parties that paid under a now‑void settlement cannot recover those payments (s.24(6)), although courts may take such payments into account when assessing remedies (s.24(7)).\n  - Judicial discretion and limits: courts decide whether reopening is \"just and reasonable\" and may limit their assessment to the effect of the statutory amendments on the claim’s prospects (s.24(3)–(4)). Non‑Supreme Courts may not set aside judgments of other courts (s.24(8)).\n\nCosts, incentives, trade‑offs and implementation risks (mechanisms, not judgments)\n\n- Who pays: liability and costs ultimately fall on religious institutions and their insurers; if insurers decline cover disputes may move to coverage litigation. Where institutions are unincorporated, liability may attach to the named head of the institution (s.15EA(3)(b)).\n\n- Incentives and behaviour: institutions may change governance, record‑keeping, supervision, appointment practices, or insurance arrangements to manage increased exposure. Claimants have stronger incentives to sue institutions rather than only individuals, and to seek re‑opening of recently finalised matters where vicarious liability was contested (Part 5).\n\n- Compliance and evidentiary burden: institutions will need to assemble evidence about historical payments, benefits and formal commissioning; courts will resolve factual disputes about whether someone was a \"religious practitioner\" as defined (s.15EA(1)).\n\n- Legal and administrative risk: the statutory presumption interacts with existing common law (s.15EA(5)), which leaves open litigation over whether conduct occurred \"in the course of employment\" and whether particular historical facts meet the statutory definitions. The power to void settlements raises transactional uncertainty for parties who relied on earlier finalisations.\n\n- Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: the clearest beneficiaries are claimants whose cases depend on institutional vicarious liability; the costs (financial, reputational, administrative) concentrate on defendant institutions and, indirectly, on their insurers and communities they serve.\n\n- Opportunity costs: public‑facing religious institutions may divert resources to legal and insurance costs and record assembly rather than program delivery. Courts will allocate time and resources to deciding leave and re‑opening questions for previously finalised claims.\n\n- Implementation complexity and predictability: factual inquiries (who counts as a commissioned religious practitioner; what counts as \"benefit\" or \"remuneration\") and the exercise of judicial discretion under the transitional rules create room for inconsistent outcomes between cases and jurisdictions (see s.15EA(1)–(4) and s.24).\n\nRelevant sections: new s.15EA (definitions and statutory presumption) and Part 5 (ss.23–24: transitional rules and re‑opening previously finalised causes of action)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/civil-liability-amendment-child-sexual-abuse-actions-bill-2025/documents"}}