This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
72 of 1988
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
7/10 complexity
What this law does, mechanically
Establishes the Anti‑Dumping Authority (the Authority) as a decision‑making and reporting body (s 4). The Authority is a single member body (s 13) that may appoint associate members to conduct particular inquiries (s 15).
Gives the Authority a set of core functions: to investigate and report to the Minister whether dumping or countervailable subsidisation justifies publication of dumping or countervailing duty notices, to review certain decisions made by the Customs CEO (Comptroller), to consider whether existing anti‑dumping measures should continue, and to prepare other reports on anti‑dumping matters (s 5, ss 7, 7A, 8, 8A, 9).
Requires the Authority to hold inquiries and produce reports within specified timeframes (for example, reports after inquiries within 120 days unless regulations provide another period) and to place reasons on the public record (ss 7(1), 7(6)–(7), 23A(8)).
Sets out procedural rules for inquiries: public notice of inquiries, invitation periods for submissions, maintenance of a public record, handling of confidential information (ss 22, 23, 23A). The Authority is not bound by formal rules of evidence and may inform itself in whatever manner it thinks fit (s 22(1)(b)–(c)).
Provides for statutory review rights: applicants can refer negative prima facie decisions and negative preliminary findings of the CEO to the Authority for review; the Authority must review and, within statutory time limits, confirm or revoke and substitute a decision (s 8). There are also reviews of termination of investigations (s 7A) and of certain negative preliminary decisions under other Customs provisions (s 8B).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Establishes how anti‑dumping measures can be continued, revoked, or substituted for undertakings, including notice and public invitation procedures, and sets a 5‑year continuation period if the Minister secures continuation (s 8A).
Requires the Authority to keep and make public reports and to remove material that would, in the Authority’s opinion, adversely affect business or commercial interests before public release (s 28). It also authorises the Authority to supply information subject to confidentiality limits (ss 32–33).
Creates offences and penalties for providing false or misleading information to the Authority (s 24) and prohibits employers from prejudicing employees for assisting the Authority (s 27).
Confers broad powers and discretion on the Authority to do anything necessary to perform its functions (s 6) and allows the Minister to give written general directions about carrying out those powers (s 12). Directions must be published and are disallowable instruments (s 12(3)–(4)).
Contains administrative provisions covering appointment, suspension, removal, remuneration and leave for the member, and arrangements for resourcing the Authority (ss 13–21, 30–31).
Limits the Act in two material ways in the text provided: it exempts goods of New Zealand origin from anti‑dumping duties under the Dumping Duty Act as applied by this Act (s 3A), and it contains a cessation clause stating the Act ceases to be in force on 31 August 2001 (s 35).
Who this affects and who decides
Importers of goods, exporters and governments of exporting countries are affected because the Authority’s reports lead to Ministerial decisions about publishing dumping duty notices or countervailing duty notices (s 7) that can make duties payable under the Dumping Duty Act (defined in s 3).
Interested parties (as defined for Part XVB of the Customs Act 1901) can make submissions in inquiries and may seek reviews of negative CEO decisions by the Authority (ss 3(1), 7, 8).
The Authority determines recommendations and, in specified review roles, substitutes decisions for the CEO within statutory timeframes (ss 7, 8). The Minister has the final administrative power to publish notices, accept undertakings, or secure continuation of measures (ss 7, 8A, 12). The Minister may give written general directions to the Authority (s 12).
The Minister and the Governor‑General exercise appointment, suspension and removal powers for the member (ss 13, 14, 20).
Why it matters (stated purpose and practical implications)
The Act’s stated function is to provide a specialist body to examine alleged dumping and subsidisation and to advise the Minister whether imposition of anti‑dumping or countervailing duties is justified (s 5, s 7). That creates a structured, administrated procedure for handling anti‑dumping matters.
Mechanically, that procedure produces binding administrative outputs (reports, recommendations, and notices to the CEO) that trigger or prevent duties under the Dumping Duty Act (s 7(1)(c); defined in s 3). The Authority’s reports include reasons and recommendations and therefore form the evidentiary and administrative basis for any Ministerial action (s 7(1)(f)).
Costs, incentives, trade‑offs, implementation risk and compliance burden (source‑grounded)
Who pays: duties that may result from a notice are payable under the Dumping Duty Act (s 3 definition of anti‑dumping matters and Dumping Duty Act). The Act does not itself set duty rates; it sets the advisory and procedural machinery that produces Ministerial decisions about duties (s 7(1)(c)).
Administrative cost and resourcing: the member must arrange with the Minister for sufficient resources, including personnel, for the Authority to perform its functions (s 30). The Authority may engage consultants (s 31). These provisions allocate operational costs and create managerial discretion for resource arrangements.
Compliance burden for private parties: interested parties must prepare submissions within specified public notice periods (s 23(g)), provide summaries of confidential commercial information suitable for public record or risk the Authority disregarding unpublished confidential material (s 23A(3)–(7)). Applications for continuation of measures must be in approved forms with specified content and signatures (s 8A(3)). Time limits apply to review applications and Authority decision windows (e.g. s 8(1) 60 days; s 7(1) 120 days).
Incentives created by the process: exporters and exporting governments can offer undertakings during an inquiry; the Authority may recommend whether the Minister should accept such undertakings (s 7C). Applicants have a statutory path to request review of negative CEO decisions (s 8), which provides an incentive to pursue administrative review rather than immediate litigation.
Bureaucratic discretion and legal standard: the Authority is given broad discretion on procedure and evidence (s 22). The Minister may give binding written directions on general principles (s 12(1)–(2)), and directions are subject to parliamentary oversight as disallowable instruments (s 12(3)–(4)). These provisions concentrate practical decision authority in administrative actors and create points where policy direction can shape inquiry practice.
Confidentiality vs. transparency trade‑off: the Authority must maintain a public record but requires confidential submitters to provide non‑confidential summaries suitable for the public record; the Authority may disregard confidential material that is not summarized or that it considers incorrectly claimed (s 23A(1), (3)–(7)). That mechanism balances availability of evidence for public review against protection of commercial information, but it also creates a compliance task for businesses and a discretionary gatekeeping role for the Authority.
Penalties and protections: supplying false or misleading information carries monetary penalties (s 24). Employers are prohibited from victimising employees who assist inquiries and face penalties (s 27). Those provisions create legal risks for false statements and legal protections for witnesses.
Implementation risk: statutory timeframes (for inquiries, reviews and continuation procedures) and dependence on availability of resources (s 30) create operational deadlines. The Authority may also choose not to consider proposed undertakings if doing so would prevent timely reporting (s 7C(3)).
Concrete concentration of benefits and costs (mechanism‑based)
Benefits accrue to parties who successfully obtain dumping or countervailing duty notices (private exporters that compete domestically may face duties; domestic industries that complain may benefit from duties). These outcomes occur through Ministerial action informed by Authority reports (s 7(1)).
Costs fall on importers and exporters subject to duties (duties under the Dumping Duty Act are the economic mechanism; see s 3 definitions and s 7(1)(c)). Parties also bear compliance costs — preparing submissions, summarising confidential information for the public record, and meeting forms/time limits (s 8A(3), s 23A(3)).
Key procedural safeguards and limits in the text
The Authority must put essential facts on the public record before reporting to the Minister (s 23A(8)).
The Authority cannot take into account information that was unavailable to the CEO when the CEO made a negative prima facie decision or terminated an investigation and referred it (ss 7A(3), 8(3)).
The Authority must terminate parts of inquiries where dumping margins, volumes, subsidies or injury are negligible as defined or applied from the Customs Act (s 7B(1)–(6), (7)).
Sections cited frequently: s 3 (definitions), s 4 (establishment), s 5 (functions), s 6 (powers), s 7 (recommendations), s 7A (reviews), s 7B (termination rules), s 7C (undertakings), s 8 (reviews), s 8A (continuation), s 22 (inquiry conduct), s 23 and s 23A (public notice and public record), s 24 (false information), s 27 (employment protection), s 28 (public availability of reports), s 30 (resourcing), s 12 (Ministerial directions), s 13–21 (constitution, appointment, removal and conditions of member).
Section 3A
Anti‑dumping measures not to apply to goods of New Zealand origin