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Australian case law library
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NCAT Appeal Panel | 2014-04-09
Tenants were terminated for non-payment of rent following an uncontested hearing where the landlord's agent gave evidence and the Member recorded findings in hearing notes. The tenants sought leave to internally appeal under s 80(2)(b) but did not raise any question of law; therefore leave required. Clause 12 Schedule 4 requires showing the appellant 'may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice' because the decision was unfair, against the weight of evidence, or there is significant new evidence. The tenants relied on phone logs and asserted contact and willingness to pay. The Appeal Panel found the record disclosed arrears and necessary findings, the phone logs were not fresh or persuasive, and there was no denial of procedural fairness. Leave was refused, the appeal dismissed, and the stay of the original orders lifted.
1,627 case citations
Before: Mr P
Before: Mitchelmore JA at [1]; Dhanji J at [99]; Coleman J at [236]
Before: Harrison AJA at [1]; Sweeney J at [2]; Muston J at [3].
Before: Kirk JA at [1]; McNaughton J at [51]; McGuire J at [52]
Before: Mossop J
Before: Solomon J
Before: Austin J
Before: Feutrill J
Before: Payne JA
The Court of Appeal refused Mr Lau permission to challenge the refusal of an apology. It considered that the statutory power he relied on required an order capable of compensating an injured person or preventing or reducing loss, and the findings did not establish that Betty or her estate had suffered loss or damage. On costs, the Court accepted that Mr Lau’s $200 nominal damages award could count as success because the case at trial was directed to establishing a breach of contract. It did not disturb the primary judge’s assessment that Anglicare should pay 35% of Mr Lau’s costs, taking account of the many claims he abandoned or failed to prove. But it held that the primary judge had used a wrong principle when discounting the effect of Anglicare’s 25 March 2025 offer because Mr Lau was unlikely to be induced by money. Mr Lau ultimately received less money than the offer proposed, and the Court held that the offer should affect costs from its date. The Court therefore allowed Anglicare’s cross-appeal in part.
Before: Free JA, Yehia J, Hulme AJ
Before: Gleeson CJ, Callinan JJ
Before: Bond JA, Bradley JA, Cooper J
The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed the Attorney-General’s challenge to a sentence for a serious nightclub assault. The Court accepted that this kind of public violence will ordinarily call for some actual time in custody, but held that there is no inflexible rule requiring custody in every case. The sentencing judge was entitled to weigh the seriousness of the assault and the need for deterrence and denunciation against the respondent’s personal circumstances, including his youth, remorse, rehabilitation and offer to compensate the complainant. The Court also rejected the argument that the judge had improperly treated imprisonment and compensation as mutually exclusive. It added that, even if the appeal grounds had succeeded, it would not have returned the respondent to custody in the circumstances described.
Before: Bond JA, Doyle JA, Henry J
The Court of Appeal decided that the priority deed gave ProLend first-ranking treatment not only for principal and conventional mortgage costs, but also for the relevant amounts ProLend paid to finish the development and pay infrastructure charges, provided those sums were secured under the ProLend Mortgage. The mortgage and Step-In Deed were read together. The Court rejected the argument that a sum could only qualify if the mortgage itself was the original source of the payment obligation. It also explained that the scheduled principal component could not be expanded by treating extra principal as an “other” amount. The declarations below were set aside, and the Supreme Court was to settle the distribution of the controlled funds consistently with the Court of Appeal’s declaration.
Before: Bell JJ