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[2026] NSWDC 99
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2026-04-17
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: SafeWork NSW v Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd; SafeWork NSW v Ferrara [2026] NSWDC 99
Hearing dates: 10 April 2026
Date of orders: 17 April 2026
Decision date: 17 April 2026
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Scotting DCJ
Decision: Penalty – Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd
1 The appropriate fine for each offence is one of $400,000.
2 Taking into account the offender’s limited capacity to pay a fine and the principle of totality, I impose a fine of $50,000 for each offence.
Penalty – Attilio Giovanni Ferrara
3 The appropriate fine for each offence is $100,000.
4 Taking into account the principle of totality, I impose a fine of $75,000 for each offence.
5 I order pursuant to section 122(2) Fines Act 1996 that 50% of the fines is to be paid to the prosecutor.
6 The offenders are to pay 90% of the prosecutor’s costs of the proceedings, as agreed or assessed.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – prosecution – work health and safety – breach of duty by persons undertaking business and officers to worker and other person - death of skydiving instructor and student
SENTENCING - objective seriousness - deterrence - aggravating factors - mitigating factors – capacity to pay a fine - appropriate penalty
SENTENCING PRINCIPLES - no record of previous convictions - good prospects of rehabilitation - remorse
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Fines Act 1996 Work Health and Safety Act 2011
Cases Cited: Bulga Underground Operations Pty Ltd v Nash [2016] NSWCCA 37
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520
Jahandideh v R [2014] NSWCCA 178
R v Youkhana [2004] NSWCCA 412
SafeWork NSW v Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd; SafeWork NSW v Ferrara [2026] NSWDC 59
Category: Sentence
Parties: SafeWork NSW (Prosecutor)
Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd (Defendant)
Attilio Giovanni Ferrara (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
D Nagle with G Diggins (Prosecutor)
M Baroni (Defendants)
Solicitors:
Department of Customer Service (Prosecutor)
Construction Legal Pty Ltd (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2023/198127 and 2023/198131
Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd
2023/198147 and 2023/198153
Attilio Giovanni Ferrara
Publication restriction: None
Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd (the offender) appears for sentence after being found guilty at trial of two offences under s 32 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the Act).
Attilio Giovanni Ferrara (also known as John Ferrara) appears for sentence after being found guilty at trial of two offences under s 32 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the Act).
The Court’s reasons for the finding of guilt are set out in the decision: SafeWork NSW v Goulburn Flight Training Centre Pty Ltd; SafeWork NSW v Ferrara [2026] NSWDC 59 (the verdict judgment). This judgment assumes familiarity with the verdict judgment and adopts the defined terms used in the verdict judgment.
On 10 April 2026, I convicted the offender and Mr Ferrara of the four s 32 offences.
The maximum penalty for each of the 32 offences for the offender is a fine of $1,766,130.
The maximum penalty for each of the 32 offences for Mr Ferrara is a fine of $353,430.
The factual findings are set out in the verdict judgment. I have taken all of those findings into account in coming to the appropriate sentence. What follows is a summary of the relevant factual findings in the verdict judgment to permit an understanding of the sentence imposed.
The offender operated a business of a skydiving school known as Adrenalin Skydive Goulburn that operated from an airport in Brisbane Grove, in an area known as “Goulburn Drop Zone” (the Drop Zone). Mr Ferrara was a director of the offender and owner of the airport. He was present at the airport 7 days a week and took an active role in running the business. He held a commercial pilot’s licence but was not a qualified skydiving instructor or a qualified Jump Pilot.
The skydiving school was an accredited training organisation that operated on the weekends, offering training to students in the Advanced Free Fall course, instructor training and tandem skydives. A tandem skydive involves a student being harnessed to a qualified skydiving instructor known as a Tandem Master who wears and operates the parachute. A tandem student did not need to have any experience or need to obtain any qualification before undertaking a tandem skydive.
In about May 2021 a Cessna 182 aircraft registration number VH-JHL (the Cessna) was acquired by Ferrara Consulting Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Richard Ferrara (Richard), to be used by the skydiving school on the recommendation of the Chief Instructor, James Czerwinski. Richard was the son of Mr Ferrara and the Senior Pilot of the skydiving school.
Mr Czerwinski discussed with Richard the need to install a step to make the Cessna more suitable for training students undertaking stage 1 of the Advanced Freefall course, that required a three-way exit. Each of Mr Czerwinski, Mr Ferrara and Richard knew that the Cessna could not be lawfully operated after it was modified unless the work was authorised by an accredited aircraft design engineer, which was commonly referred to as obtaining an engineering order. There was no agreement between Mr Czerwinski, Mr Ferrara and Richard as to who was responsible for obtaining an engineering order for the step.
From about mid-June 2021 Mr Czerwinski designed the step, had the components fabricated by an engineering firm and fitted it to the Cessna.
The step consisted of a piece of folded sheet metal that attached at the outer point to the wheel of the aircraft. The factory-fitted step was removed from the wheel strut and replaced with a fabricated U-shaped bracket (the U-bracket) facing towards the wheel. The end of the fabricated metal step fitted inside the U-bracket but was not fixed to it, referred to by Mr Czerwinski as a “slip-joint”. This was necessary to keep the flex in the wheel strut, which was essential to the ability of the plane to land safely. The effect was that the end of the step floated inside the U-bracket.
The U-bracket was about 80 mm x 95 mm and about 10 mm deep. The top of the U-bracket and the end of the step that fitted into it were constructed with 90 degree angles that had not been rounded down. The end of the step did not reach the bottom of the U-bracket, which created an S-bend. There were gaps between the U-bracket and the floating end of the step.
The step presented an obvious and dangerous snag hazard. There was no need for expert opinion to identify the risk posed by the step. There was space for a piece of harness webbing to get under the top of the U-bracket and then travel through the S-bend and rest on the bottom of the U-bracket. If webbing did get under the end of the step, gravitational force would have made it very difficult for a trapped skydiver to dislodge the webbing from the U-bracket.
On or about 16 June 2021, I found that it was reasonably possible that Mr Ferrara directed Mr Czerwinski to get an engineering order for the step (the maintenance hangar direction).
No further action was taken by Mr Ferrara to ensure that an engineering order was obtained before the Cessna was used for skydiving sorties on 27 June 2021.
On 22 June 2021 Mr Czerwinski advised Richard that he was going to operate the Cessna on Sunday 27 June 2021 for an Accelerated Free Fall student.
On 27 June 2021 Alex Welling attended the skydiving school for the purpose of undertaking two tandem skydives. Stephen Hoare was a contract skydiving instructor and was allocated to be Mr Welling’s Tandem Master for his first jump.
Mr Hoare fitted the student harness to Mr Welling in the briefing area. The harness was not fitted correctly in that the Y-strap at the back of the harness was loose and hanging down. The harness was so loose that it would have been obvious if a buddy check had been performed by another Tandem Master before Mr Welling boarded the Cessna.
In April 2021, the Australian Parachute Federation (Federation) had amended its operational regulations (OpRegs) to make the conduct of buddy checks mandatory. There was no system in place at the skydiving school to inform the skydiving instructors of important safety related information published by the Federation such as reports on incidents or changes to the OpRegs. It was poorly understood amongst the instructors at the skydiving school at the time of the incident that buddy checks were mandatory and no buddy check was sought by Mr Hoare before emplaning.
Based on the bookings for the day, Lyn Hall, the receptionist at the skydiving school allocated Mr Hoare and Mr Welling to be flown to the jump point by Mr Czerwinski in the Cessna, together with Mr Miras who was going to film the jump.
Mr Hoare and Mr Welling boarded the Cessna at about 12.25pm.
As Mr Hoare and Mr Welling jumped out of the Cessna, the Y-strap on Mr Welling’s harness became caught on the step causing the skydivers to hang underneath the Cessna, preventing their fall, known in skydiving as a hang-up. Mr Czerwinski, who was the pilot of the Cessna, left the controls and tried to cut the skydivers free using a hook knife that was kept on the aircraft for such contingencies. During this attempt, Mr Czerwinski lost control of the Cessna, dropped the hook knife and was forced to return to the controls. Mr Czerwinski then directed instructors on the ground to drive a 4WD vehicle along the runway at speed, so that he could bring the Cessna close to the vehicle and an instructor travelling on the roof of the vehicle could pull the men free. After three unsuccessful passes of the vehicle driving along the runway, Mr Czerwinski decided to take the Cessna to higher altitude. When the plane reached about 100m off the ground the skydivers became free and fell towards the ground. Mr Hoare activated the reserve parachute, but it failed to open in time. Mr Hoare and Mr Welling suffered fatal injuries.
The risk of a skydiver’s equipment snagging on an aircraft was well known in the skydiving industry and referred to in the Civil Aviation Authority’s documents, the Federation’s documents and the offender’s safety management system (SMS).
The offender was in breach of its s 19 duty owed to Mr Hoare and Mr Welling by failing to prevent the use of the Cessna, including by securing it and removing the keys, until an engineering order had been obtained for the step and by failing to have in place a system to inform the instructors of a change to the OpRegs which would have made them aware that buddy checks were mandatory from 1 April 2021.
Mr Ferrara was in breach of his s 27 duty owed to Mr Hoare and Mr Welling by failing to direct Mr Czerwinski not to operate the Cessna until an engineering order had been obtained and by failing to prevent its use until that time. Mr Ferrara also failed to direct Mr Czerwinski to inform the instructors at pre-start meetings of any safety-related information published by the Federation, including changes to the OpRegs including that buddy checks were mandatory from 1 Aril 2021.
Shortly after the incident, following the direction issued by the Federation, the offender made a number of changes to the documents in its SMS.
The offender no longer operates the skydiving school or the flying school. It continues to operate a business providing aircraft maintenance at the airport.
The offender read and relied upon the affidavit of Mr Ferrara affirmed on 9 April 2026, that can be summarised as follows.
Mr Ferrara has been the sole director of the offender since 2022 and had the day to day supervision of the operation of the skydiving school.
Mr Ferrara deposed that he and the offender accept the convictions and submit his affidavit only to support a plea in mitigation and submissions regarding the appropriate penalties to be imposed.
Mr Ferrara deposed he and the offender are deeply remorseful and regretful for the fatal injuries sustained by Mr Hoare and Mr Welling in the incident as well as the suffering caused by the incident to their family and friends.
Mr Ferrara expressed a sincere and unqualified apology for the offenders’ failures in their health and safety duties that resulted in exposing Mr Hoare and Mr Welling being exposed to risks to their health and safety.
For about two weeks after the incident, Mr Ferrara provided free accommodation to members of Mr Hoare’s family.
On 15 May 2022 the offenders hosted a special memorial day in remembrance of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling at the skydiving school. Approximately 50 people attended the memorial comprising family and friends of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling, Tandem Masters, pilots and Richard McCooey, the CEO of the Federation. The family members of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling planted a tree at a place in the airport adjacent to the skydiving school and have been visiting the tree from time to time.
Immediately following the incident Mr Ferrara deposed that he caused the skydiving business of the offender to cease operations to the public due to the significant emotional impact and distress that he suffered as a result of the incident as well the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Between 22 January 2022 and 13 May 2023, the offender resumed skydiving operations for a period of about 22 days, only to fulfil skydiving vouchers it had previously sold to the public. Since 13 May 2023 the skydiving section of the offender has not operated.
In or around December 2021, in compliance with the Improvement Notices issued by the SafeWork NSW, Mr Ferrara deposed that he directed the offender to carry out the following:
On 18 December 2021 Mr Hawkins held a safety meeting with Mr Kaine and Mr Nicholson to address the failures in the incident. The meeting addressed snag hazards, procedures to deal with snags and hang-ups, training on harnessing and aircraft exit techniques, and buddy checks;
On or about 20 December 2021 Richard reviewed and revised the SMS. On the same day Mr Ferrara and Mr Hawkins reviewed and approved the changes to the SMS. The changes addressed potential threats and hazards in relation to the step and snag/hang-ups of Cessna aircrafts, unserviceable equipment and insufficient training. Additional measures were introduced as follows:
(a) implementation of Standard Staff Induction Form; (b) removal of all steps from Cessna 182 aircrafts; (c) documenting evidence of training on the manifest computer system; (d) provision of buddy checks including independent checks of tandem passenger harnesses; (e) isolation of expired equipment in a secured area and daily pilot inspections for emergency parachute serviceability; and (f) revisions to the “scenarios” section of the SMS to include the scenario of entanglement between the skydiver and the aircraft.
(a) insertion of a procedure for snags/hang-ups for Cessna 182 aircrafts; and (b) revisions to the pilot responsibilities to include emergency parachute inspection.
(a) tandem exit procedures and associated hazards; (b) Tandem Master actions in the event of a hang-up; (c) buddy checks; (d) Tandem Master proficiency checks; (e) tandem video procedures; and (f) familiarisation with the SMS.
(a) donated a sum of money to Goulburn Base Hospital, Crookwell District Hospital and Goulburn Community Mental Health during their Melbourn Cup Charity Race Day in or around 2002; (b) donated gift vouchers for the flying school to the Unity College Mission Trip to Northern Territory indigenous communities in or around 2012; (c) organised skydiving performance for the Goulburn Show for around three to four years starting in or around 2013; (d) donated gift vouchers for the flying school to the Cancer Support Group’s Think Pink Quiz Night’s fundraiser in or around late 2014; (e) donated gift vouchers for the flying school to Bradfordville Public School’s fundraisers in or around late 2016 and late 2017; (f) hosted the APF’s first Australian National Wingsuit Performance Flying Championship in or around 2018 or 2019; (g) organised skydiving performance and hired East Grove South Park to support the Cancer Council’s “Relay for Life” fundraiser in or around 2018 or 2019; (h) donated gift vouchers for the flying school to Lifeline Canberra’s 2019 Gala in or around 2019; (i) participated in the Women in Aviation forum in Caberra in or around 2021 or 2022; and (j) organised skydiving performance for the Australia Day celebrations at Victoria Park in Goulburn for around three to four years.
(a) a copy of the offender’s financial statements for FY 2024-2025; and; (b) a copy of the offender’s Company Tax Return for FY 2024-2025.
(a) total current assets equalling $8,199; (b) total liabilities equalling (- $585,848); (c) annual income of $165,089; (d) annual expenses of $96,646; (e) net profit in the sum of $69,442; and (f) tax losses in the sum of $841,658 accumulated from 2019 to 2023.
The offences involve some objective gravity.
The risk of a skydiver getting snagged or hung-up was well known in the industry and referred to in the Authority’s documents, the Federation’s documents and the offender’s SMS. The pleaded risk was the risk of snagging on the step. A significant aspect of this case is that the Cessna was operated after the installation of the step, without it being reviewed or authorised by a competent person. The introduction of the step represented a material change in the Cessna for the purpose of skydiving. For the reasons already given, the step was an obvious and unusual snag hazard.
The likelihood of the risk occurring was low. Snags and hang-ups were rare occurrences over the course of a very large number of skydives throughout the world. However, the design of the step massively increased the risk of a serious hang-up from which the skydivers could not free themselves.
The Tandem Endorsement Guide described a hang-up as an “extremely dangerous situation” from which there were limited chances of survival. The gravity of the harm that could eventuate was a risk of death, that included the catastrophic loss of the aircraft.
The offender knew of the need to obtain an engineering order and that the Cessna should not be operated without it. By preventing the operation of the Cessna until an engineering order was obtained, the offender could have eliminated the risk. The offender knew or ought to have known that buddy checks were mandatory and that they were an important means of preventing safety incidents. By ensuring that buddy checks were conducted through the implementation of training, the offender could have minimised the pleaded risk.
The steps that the offender could have taken to further minimise the risk were known to it, simple and inexpensive.
The deaths of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling aggravate the seriousness of the offences.
I have had regard to the maximum penalty for the offences.
Mr Ferrara’s s 27 duty was to exercise due diligence by taking reasonable steps to ensure that the offender complied with its s 19 duty. Mr Ferrara was involved in all aspects of the skydiving school, which was a relatively small business.
Mr Ferrara knew that the Cessna could not be operated without an engineering order and aware that the step was being installed. He gave the maintenance hangar direction but did not do anything else to ensure that the Cessna was not operated until an engineering order had been obtained, including by locking the Cessna, securing the yoke (the control column) and removing the keys.
Mr Ferrara had no skydiving qualifications and could not be appointed to the position of Chief Instructor and he was reliant on the expertise of Mr Czerwinski and others to operate the business. However, his s 27 duty required him to keep up-to-date with health and safety matters relating to the offender’s business and to ensure that it implemented appropriate processes. Mr Ferrara should have directed Mr Czerwinski to include in the morning pre-start meetings a discussion of changes to the OpRegs and any other safety-related information published by the Federation, which would have included that buddy checks were mandatory from 1 April 2021 onwards.
The reasonable steps that Mr Ferrara should have taken to exercise due diligence were known to him, convenient and inexpensive.
The deaths of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling aggravate the seriousness of the offences.
I have had regard to the maximum penalty for the offences.
The penalty imposed in relation to the offences must provide for general deterrence. PCBUs and officers must take the obligations imposed by the Act very seriously. The community is entitled to expect that both small and large businesses will comply with safety requirements. General deterrence is a significant factor when safety obligations are breached: Bulga Underground Operations Pty Ltd v Nash [2016] NSWCCA 37 at [180].
There is very little need for specific deterrence in this matter because the offender no longer operates the skydiving school or the flying school and the incident has had a significant emotional impact on Mr Ferrara.
The offenders do not have a record of prior convictions: s 21A(3)(e) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The offender has been operating unrelated businesses since it was incorporated in 1989. In 2012 the offender changed its name and began operating the skydiving school and the flying school.
Mr Ferrara was a person of good character: s 21A(3)(f) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Mr Ferrara contributed to his local community and charitable causes.
The offender was a good corporate citizen. I am satisfied that the offender contributed to the community through its support of local organisations and schools.
The offenders have good prospects of rehabilitation: s 21A(3)(h) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The offenders have demonstrated, by the steps they has taken after the incident, that they have good prospects for rehabilitation.
The offenders have accepted responsibility for the offence and expressed remorse: s 21A(3)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The offenders have accepted the Court’s findings in the verdict judgment. I am satisfied that the mitigating factor is established. It cannot be afforded as much weight as it would be if the offender’s had pleaded guilty.
The Court is required to have regard to s 6 Fines Act 1996 before imposing a fine. Where an offender seeks to have a fine reduced on the basis of a limited capacity to pay, it bears the evidentiary onus of convincing the Court that it should exercise its discretion to limit the amount of the fine. The offender’s capacity to pay is relevant but not decisive: Jahandideh v R [2014] NSWCCA 178 at [16]. A substantial fine may still be warranted as a result of the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence.
The offender is only continuing to operate the aircraft maintenance business and has ceased operating the skydiving school and the flying school. It makes a profit of about $70,000 per year and it has no assets. I note that the offender paid rent of $39,000, which I assume is paid to Mr Ferrara as the owner of the airport. I also note that the offender owes Mr Ferrara $550,541 that he has loaned to the offender. If the offender is placed into liquidation, this will result in Mr Ferrara losing the opportunity to have the loan repaid, bearing in mind that these types of loans are more often based in accounting fiction than reality. It is likely that Mr Ferrara will have to pay any costs order imposed.
I am satisfied that the offender has a limited capacity to pay a fine.
I have had regard to totality.
In relation to the offender the duty owed to Mr Hoare was different to the duty it owed to Mr Welling, but the reasonably practicable measures that it failed to take to comply with the different duties were the same for each offence.
In relation to Mr Ferrara, he owed the same duty to ensure that the offender complied with its duties, which were slightly different. The reasonable steps that Mr Ferrara should have taken to exercise due diligence were the same for each offence. Unlike the offender, the offences pleaded against Mr Ferrara could have probably been pleaded in the same count, but the prosecutor was not obliged to take that course.
An offender must not be punished twice for common elements between offences: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at [40] (McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
The offenders seek a reduction of the usual costs order on the basis that the prosecutor was unsuccessful in establishing a number of the particulars of breach of duty.
The primary reason why the prosecutor was unsuccessful on some of the particulars was that the reasonably practicable steps were pleaded with hindsight, rather than prospectively. This is often a common problem in this jurisdiction and prosecutors must be encouraged to avoid it and to exercise concision.
I am not satisfied that any of the evidence called or tendered was unnecessary as a consequence of my findings.
Taking into account all of the circumstances, the appropriate order is that the offenders pay 90% of the prosecutor’s costs of the proceedings.
I have taken into account the Victim Impact Statements (VIS) of Frank Hoare, Helen Hoare, Danielle Hoare, Fiona Neale and Clare Hoare, the family members of Mr Hoare. These statements were read aloud in Court by Frank Hoare, Mr Hoare’s father and his sister, Fiona, and it was impossible not to be moved by them. The Hoare family impressed me as being exceptionally close and that has made the loss of Mr Hoare all the more difficult to bear. The photo of Mr Hoare included in his parents VIS perfectly depicted a young man who loved life and brought joy to his family and friends. His two young boys have been left without a father and have been psychologically affected by his death. The family members displayed compassion for Mr Ferrara and Mr Czerwinski, which reflects a deep generosity of spirit within the family.
I have also taken into account the VIS of Anthony Welling, Mr Welling’s father. His last memory of “Alby” was a social media post of him with his mates at the Drop Zone, laughing and looking forward to the tandem skydives. Mr Welling’s father has suffered and continues to suffer the loss of his son and has required grief counselling. His VIS described the precious shared experiences that he has lost and described how difficult it has been for him to cope. Mr Welling’s father stated that he does not hold any ill will towards Mr Ferrara and that he is not interested in retribution, and this speaks of a wisdom and kindness that is rare to find.
I thank all of the family members for the time and thought that they put into portraying and honouring their loved one in the VIS.
Pursuant to s 30E Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999, I have taken into account that the harmful impacts of Mr Hoare’s death endured by his family is evidence of harm to the community.
Pursuant to s 30E Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999, I have taken into account that the harmful impacts of Mr Welling’s death endured by his family is evidence of harm to the community.
The appropriate fine for each offence is one of $400,000.
Taking into account the offender’s limited capacity to pay a fine and the principle of totality, I impose a fine of $50,000 for each offence.
The appropriate fine for each offence is $100,000.
Taking into account the principle of totality, I impose a fine of $75,000 for each offence.
I order pursuant to section 122(2) Fines Act 1996 that 50% of the fines is to be paid to the prosecutor.
The offenders are to pay 90% of the prosecutor’s costs of the proceedings, as agreed or assessed.
A recurring theme in the VIS was that the families wanted to see things change to prevent further tragedies like this in the future so that the deaths of Mr Hoare and Mr Welling were not in vain. In this regard, Frank Hoare has put considerable time and effort into formulating a very sensible list of measures he would like to see put into effect. Having a detailed knowledge of the facts, in the interests of promoting the objects of the Act and saving the time and expense of a coronial inquest, it is appropriate to publish those measures as a series of recommendations for consideration by SafeWork NSW, the Federation and persons conducting skydiving businesses. By so doing, I want to stress that I have not taken these matters into account in coming to the appropriate sentence, and that is why I have set them out at the end of this judgment.
On 1 September 2016, the Federation and the New South Wales Police entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU), that permitted an inspector from the Federation to attend incident sites to investigate parachuting accidents. At the time of this incident, the term of the MOU had expired, and not been renewed. As a result, the Federation’s inspector who travelled from Victoria to investigate the incident, was denied access to the parachuting equipment used in the incident, which included the Automatic Activation Device (AAD) that recorded data in the same way as an aircraft’s “black box”. By the time Michael Tibbits got access to the equipment the battery of the AAD had gone flat and the data was lost. In the circumstances, where the Federation has specialist expertise that the Police do not, I would recommend that the Commissioner of Police give urgent consideration to renewing the MOU to avoid the loss of crucial independent and objective evidence in future incidents. I would also recommend that SafeWork NSW intervene to assist this process, as part of its regulatory functions under the Act.
Mr Hoare’s father acknowledged the work undertaken by the Federation in the design and publication a safer step to be used on Cessna 182s in parachuting operations. It is not necessary to comment further.
A critical finding in the verdict judgment was that the change to the OpRegs that made buddy checks mandatory was not effectively communicated to the skydiving instructors working at the skydiving school. The verdict judgment now stands for the proposition that it is a reasonably practical step for persons conducting a skydiving business to train its instructors on all safety-related publications of the Federation, including changes to the OpRegs. It is within the power of the Federation to introduce measures to ensure that this occurs within a reasonable time of the relevant publications. I would strongly recommend that the Federation introduces such a requirement, procedures to be implemented by training organisations to document that it has occurred and that the requirement is added to its independent auditing process.
Finally, a number of the family members were distressed by the media reporting of the incident and would like to see a warning introduced to each and every relevant broadcast. Whilst I understand the reason for this measure, it is inappropriate for me to comment further.
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(2010) 242 CLR 520
(1998) 194 CLR 610