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1. The plaintiff made an application for interlocutory relief to prevent a privately appointed receiver from acting in relation to the sale of a residential property in Palmerston, Canberra (the Palmerston property). The plaintiff sought orders which would give her an opportunity to sell the property herself. Yesterday I dismissed the application. These are my reasons for doing so. They also address some ancillary orders which I will make.

2. The first defendant is a company which is the assignee of a debt owed by a Mr Li arising out of a costs order in Federal Court proceedings. The plaintiff, Ms Chan, is Mr Li’s mother. She and Mr Li entered into a Deed of Charge dated 10 December 2025 with the first defendant for the purposes of effecting a sale of the Palmerston property. There is an issue as to whether Mr Li is the beneficial owner of that property. For present purposes, it is not necessary to consider that issue because both Mr Li and Ms Chan entered into the Deed of Charge requiring that the property be sold.

3. The second defendant (the Receiver), who was joined when the proceedings were first listed before the court on 13 April 2026, was appointed by the first defendant on 11 March 2026 pursuant to the Deed of Charge.

Relief sought

4. The proceedings were commenced by originating application. That originating application seeks a variety of relief: (a) an injunction restraining the defendants from exercising any power of sale in respect of the Palmerston property; (b) an injunction restraining the defendants from entering into any contract for the sale of the Palmerston property; and (c) an injunction restraining the defendants from taking any step to market, dispose of, transfer, convey, or otherwise deal with the Palmerston property for the purposes of sale.

5. As an alternative to these three orders, the application seeks that the sale of the Palmerston property be regulated by the court and that the property be sold through an agreed licensed real estate agent, with an agreed reserve price and with the plaintiff being permitted 60 to 90 days to complete the sale.

6. Finally, the application also seeks an order that the first defendant take all reasonable steps to suspend the activities of the Receiver pending the further order of the court.

7. It is notable that all of these orders appear to be in the nature of interlocutory orders and no final relief is claimed.

8. The grounds identified in the originating application point to the steps that had been taken by the plaintiff to arrange for the Palmerston property to be sold and assert that the first defendant has refused reasonable alternatives to sale by the Receiver, including cost control measures. They assert that the appointment of the Receiver was “premature, unnecessary, oppressive, and commercially unreasonable”. The grounds state that damages would not be an adequate remedy and the balance of convenience favours the plaintiff.

Evidence

9. The plaintiff relied upon two affidavits. She identified herself as an 86-year-old resident of Hong Kong.

10. The plaintiff stated that she entered into the Deed of Charge in order to assist Mr Li to pay his debt to the first defendant. She said that it was her intention to sell the Palmerston property as soon as possible. She took steps to remove an existing tenant from that property and secured it by changing the locks. She was able to have Westpac discharge the mortgage over it. She said that her solicitor had told her that the first defendant required its nominated agent to be used, and she agreed to that arrangement. She said she agreed to carry out cleaning and minor repairs. She said that on 18 March 2026, the first defendant appointed the second defendant as receiver. She said that the sale did not progress and the Palmerston property has not been listed for sale. She expressed her concern that the real estate agent “may be retained as a paid adviser”, increasing the costs of the sale. She said that she has been informed that repairs may cost approximately $25,000 but is not aware of any quotation or supporting details for that figure. She said she has been informed that the property is worth approximately $750,000, and that the debt is of approximately $300,000. She said that she believes “the current process is unfair and unnecessary” and asked the court to restrain the sale and “allow the Property to be sold properly”.

11. A second affidavit, which is undated, provides what is described as market value evidence, being a printout from the Allhomes website of sales records for the Palmerston area. The affidavit says: “Based on this information, I believe that the true market value of my Property is significantly higher than the value adopted by the Respondents”.

12. The plaintiff’s second affidavit also states: (a) the valuation report relating to the sum of $675,000 has not been provided; (b) the plaintiff has been informed that further works, including replacement of carpet, remain outstanding and therefore believes “that the sale process under the receiver is delayed and uncertain”; and (c) the plaintiff has not agreed to the scope of works and is concerned “that these costs will be deducted from the proceeds of sale of my Property.” The plaintiff also asserted concern “that such costs are being incurred without my approval or meaningful involvement.”

13. Paragraph [27] of the plaintiff’s second affidavit provides: I am concerned that: (a) I have no meaningful control over the sale process; (b) the Property has not been listed despite the receiver’s appointment; (c) the sale is being delayed; (d) costs are increasing without my agreement; and (e) the Property may be sold at an undervalue.

14. As will be apparent from this summary, much of the plaintiff’s evidence relates to her concerns, rather than providing evidence that those concerns are well-founded. Insofar as those concerns relate to a lack of information, substantial information, including the valuation and quotations for work, was provided by the evidence adduced by the defendants.

15. The evidence adduced by the defendants comprised two affidavits, one from the Receiver, Grahame Ward, dated 15 April 2026, and the other from a solicitor acting for the defendants, Rob Webb, dated 15 April 2026. Both had substantial exhibit books associated with them.

16. The affidavit of Mr Webb provides evidence of the background to the debt which the Palmerston property is being sold to repay. There were two proceedings in the Federal Court involving Mr Li, as well as appeal proceedings. The affidavit describes the mediation at which the costs of those proceedings were agreed and the assignment of that debt by the person originally entitled, a Mr Youssef, to the first defendant. It then describes bankruptcy proceedings and a settlement of those proceedings which involved the execution by Mr Li and the plaintiff of a Deed of Charge dated 10 December 2025. The affidavit then describes the circumstances in which the obligations in the Deed of Charge were breached, and the subsequent dealings between the first defendant and the solicitor for the plaintiff in relation to the sale of the Palmerston property so as to discharge the obligations secured by the Deed of Charge. The steps that had been taken by the plaintiff included the plaintiff commencing proceedings to remove a tenant from the Palmerston property and also the plaintiff taking steps to discharge a mortgage that Westpac had over the property. The affidavit also describes the appointment of the Receiver pursuant to the Deed of Charge and the communications in relation to the bringing of the present application.

17. The affidavit of the Receiver outlines the history of his appointment, the state of the Palmerston property, the steps that he had taken to arrange for painting, replacement of carpets and repair of the roof, a pre-renovation valuation, the agency agreement that he entered into, and the likely timing of a public auction.

18. Relevant to the present application, the evidence discloses that the Receiver has taken advice from a real estate agent and taken methodical steps to have the premises promptly put into a saleable condition, marketed for sale and sold. The evidence of the Receiver indicates that the Palmerston property should be on the market for sale sometime next week, that is, the week commencing 20 April 2026. The Receiver anticipates that, after a four-week marketing period, the auction will take place in late May 2026. Having regard to the progress that has been made, there can be no issue of delay and no reasonable prospect that the plaintiff would be in a position to sell the Palmerston property at any earlier date.

Submissions

19. In oral submissions, counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he did not challenge the appointment of the Receiver pursuant to the Deed of Charge. However, he submitted that there were three issues which warranted the grant of an injunction: (a) the Receiver would incur additional fees for which the plaintiff would be liable as a result of the Receiver undertaking the steps required to sell the Palmerston property; (b) there was the potential that the Receiver would not obtain an updated valuation of the Palmerston property which takes account of the renovation works that he had organised to have carried out, and hence the property might be sold at an undervalue if the reserve was set based upon the pre-renovation valuation; and (c) there was the potential that the real estate agent engaged for the purposes of the sale may recover two commissions as a result of having entered into one sale agreement with the plaintiff and a subsequent, second sale agreement with the Receiver. Consideration and decision

20. Although the threshold for the granting of an interlocutory injunction has been articulated as involving a serious question to be tried or alternatively a prima facie case, those formulations should be understood as conveying the same idea, so long as a serious question to be tried involves more than a case which is not frivolous, and a prima facie case is understood to mean a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That is the reconciliation provided by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; 227 CLR 57 at [65]-[72], and it is the approach that I have adopted when articulating the relevant test as being that there is a serious question to be tried.

21. The submissions made by the plaintiff did not demonstrate that there was a serious question to be tried. (a) The incurring of fees is an almost inevitable consequence of the appointment of a receiver. There was no challenge to the entitlement of the first defendant to have appointed the Receiver. If the plaintiff had wished to avoid the incurring of those additional fees, then she ought to have complied with the terms of the Deed of Charge which she entered. There was no evidence before the court as to the quantum of fees and no issue about fees at this stage. (b) The potential that the Receiver would not obtain an updated valuation which took account of the renovation works does not indicate that there is a serious question to be tried. The evidence discloses consideration of the cost versus benefit of undertaking the renovation works prior to sale. Having regard to the available evidence, it cannot be said that the decision to undertake those works was not taken in good faith. How the additional value of those works is assessed by the Receiver for the purpose of assessing an appropriate reserve at the auction has not, on the evidence, been determined. The most straightforward way which, in the circumstances, would be relatively inexpensive, would be to simply have the valuer who prepared the earlier valuation update it, having regard to the carrying out of those works. There may, however, be other means by which the Receiver, acting in good faith, could proceed. There is no evidence that would indicate that the Receiver would not comply with his duty to the plaintiff in relation to the setting of the reserve price. In any event, any loss arising from a breach by the Receiver would be readily measurable in money and hence not necessitate an injunction. (c) The contention that the real estate agent engaged might recover two commissions as a result of the Receiver entering into an exclusive agency agreement has not been shown to demonstrate a serious question to be tried. The agency agreement between the plaintiff and Hilton Advisory Pty Ltd was entered into on 22 January 2026. The signature of the plaintiff was not witnessed as required by the form, and the copy of the agreement in evidence is not executed on behalf of Hilton Advisory. However, the subsequent agreement entered into by the Receiver was in evidence. It discloses that the owner is identified as the plaintiff “by her Receiver Grahame Ward”. It appears to indicate that the Receiver, consistent with the agreement appointing him (Deed of Appointment of Receiver, cl 2(e)), was acting “in the name and by or on behalf of” the plaintiff (Deed of Charge, cl 17.4(e)). That is consistent with the Receiver being the agent of the chargor, even though that may be seen as “something of a contrivance” (State Bank of NSW v Chia [2000] NSWSC 552; 50 NSWLR 587 at [869]), given the substance of the appointment is to realise an asset for the benefit of the chargee. Assuming that there was an earlier exclusive agency agreement entered into by the plaintiff, the subsequent agreement was entered in her name by her disclosed agent, the Receiver. In those circumstances, it is hard to see how the real estate agent could claim twice against the same person for a commission in relation to the sale of the same property. There is no evidence indicating that the real estate agent intends to make such a claim. There is no evidence that this issue was raised by the plaintiff prior to it being raised by her counsel in court. The prospect that the real estate agent may make such a claim, which would lack apparent merit, does not rise above speculation.

22. In addition to the lack of merit in these three matters put forward to justify the granting of interlocutory relief, there were other reasons for the refusal of relief.

23. First, the originating application does not identify any final relief. It is therefore not clear what basis there could be for the granting of the interlocutory relief sought: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199.

24. Second, if there was a serious question to be tried, the balance of convenience would not favour the granting of relief in the following circumstances: (a) It is accepted that the Palmerston property must be sold, and any breach of duty might be remedied by a financial remedy. (b) The Receiver is undertaking a prompt and methodical process to have the Palmerston property marketed and sold. (c) The evidence does not establish that the Palmerston property will be sold at an undervalue. First, no reserve has been set and hence the issue has not arisen. Second, insofar as something is to be made of the existing valuation as indicative of a possible future reserve price, it would have been open for the plaintiff to put on valuation evidence indicating that the valuation obtained represented an undervalue, but that has not been done. The only evidence put on by the plaintiff in that respect is of, at best, marginal weight.

25. It is for these reasons that I dismissed the application for interlocutory relief with costs.

Access to evidence

26. The defendants sought a limit on access to the valuation report provided to the Receiver. They sought that order in the context of the Receiver’s intention to sell the Palmerston property at auction and the potential that disclosure of the valuation report would undermine the potential of that process to maximise the return to the chargors. I considered it was appropriate to make an order limiting access to that aspect of the evidence.

Joinder of Mr Li

27. At the directions hearing on 13 April 2026, the defendants raised the possibility of having Mr Li joined as a party to the proceedings. Mr Li, through his solicitor, indicated that he did not consent to being joined as a plaintiff. Having regard to that lack of consent, I considered that it was more appropriate to defer the issue to the hearing of the application for interlocutory relief.

28. The issue of joinder of Mr Li was only revisited towards the end of the hearing of the application for interlocutory relief on 16 April 2026, and counsel appearing for the plaintiff indicated that Mr Li may wish to be heard as to whether or not he is joined as a party. His instructing solicitor, who has acted for Mr Li for a considerable period, indicated that Mr Li did not consent to being joined as a plaintiff. In those circumstances, r 222 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) precluded him from being included as a plaintiff. There remained, however, the potential for him to be joined as a defendant in order to ensure that he was bound by the outcome of the proceedings.

29. Having heard argument on the interlocutory application, I considered it most appropriate to make orders in relation to the interlocutory application at that time rather than adjourning the proceedings pending a determination as to whether or not to join Mr Li as a defendant. I therefore made orders on the interlocutory application, but gave Mr Li the opportunity to provide written submissions as to why he should not be joined as a party for the purposes of any ongoing proceedings.

30. Mr Li, not acting through his solicitor, did provide submissions in opposition to being joined as a party. In those submissions, he acknowledged that the earlier statutory declaration of his mother referred to him as the 100% beneficial owner of the Palmerston property. He said that “reflected a family arrangement and understanding that my parents intended to pass properties to their children” and identified that the Palmerston property was not registered in his name. Those statements leave the position in relation to the beneficial ownership of the Palmerston property uncertain.

31. I did not consider that it was necessary, in order to dispose of the interlocutory application, that Mr Li be joined as a party to the proceedings. He did not bring the application and there was no indication that, as feared by the defendants, he would bring separate proceedings seeking similar relief if not joined so as to be unquestionably bound by the outcome of the interlocutory application.

32. Given that no final relief was claimed in the originating application, it was not clear whether there would be any attempt to amend the originating application in order to seek final relief following the refusal of interlocutory relief. That was a possibility, and it was also a possibility that the plaintiff may simply discontinue or consent to the dismissal of the application.

33. The defendants have foreshadowed the making of a cross-application for judicial sale of the Palmerston property in relation to which it may be necessary for Mr Li to be joined. That was said to be because of the potential for there to be difficulties with the Land Titles Office in having a sale registered if entered into by the Receiver.

34. Shortly before delivery of these reasons, the defendants filed a document entitled Defence and counterclaim naming Mr Li as the second cross-defendant. In those circumstances, while I did not consider it to be necessary in order to dispose of the interlocutory application or for the purposes of giving these reasons, it will be necessary to determine whether he should be joined pursuant to r 462 of the Court Procedures Rules. I do not propose to address that issue now as Mr Raj, who appears for the plaintiff and is likely to appear for Mr Li, has only had as brief a time as I have had to review the document and consider the plaintiff’s position. I note, however, that the effect of making orders consistent with the orders sought in the Defence and counterclaim would make the Receiver an officer of the court. That would have the benefit so far as the current plaintiff is concerned of giving rise to the potential that the fees charged by the Receiver be subject to approval by the court. That is not currently sought as one of the orders, but it is something which may allow the whole proposed process to be dealt with by consent without further significant costs.

35. The manner in which I will deal with this matter is to simply adjourn it into the Registrar’s list on Monday, 20 April 2026. At that point, the Registrar will be in a position to either address any matters by consent or alternatively put the matter into the list of the duty judge at some later time in order to deal with the proceedings by consent, make directions, or address the claims on a final basis.

Orders

36. For those reasons, the orders of the Court on 16 April 2026 were: (1) The application for interlocutory injunctions or other interlocutory relief is dismissed with costs. (2) Reasons are reserved. (3) The proceedings are listed for the giving of reasons at 2pm on Friday, 17 April 2026 before Mossop J. (4) All parties have leave to appear via audiovisual link on Friday, 17 April 2026. (5) No access is to be granted to inspect pages 231-255 of the exhibit to the affidavit of Grahame Ward dated 15 April 2026, other than by a party, without an order of a judge. (6) Chi Man Li has leave to serve and provide by email to the Associate to Mossop J written submissions limited to not more than three pages in relation to any opposition to him being joined as a party to the proceedings and any evidence by 12pm on Friday, 17 April 2026.

37. In addition, and for the reasons I have indicated, I will make orders in relation to the oral application to join Mr Li as a defendant in the proceedings by listing the matter for directions before the Registrar next Monday at 2:30pm and giving leave to all parties to appear by audiovisual link. Those additional orders are: (1) The oral application to join Chi Man Li as a party to the proceedings is adjourned until Monday, 20 April 2026. (2) The proceedings are listed for directions at 2:30pm on Monday, 20 April 2026 before the Registrar. (3) All parties have leave to appear by audiovisual link on that occasion.

I certify that the preceding thirty-seven [37] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date: