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[2026] NSWSC 708
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-06-18
Elkaim AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Wang v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWSC 708
Hearing dates: 18 June 2026
Date of orders: 18 June 2026
Decision date: 18 June 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Elkaim AJ
Decision: 1. In respect of the first defendant’s notice of motion filed on 2 April 2026:
(a) Pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the proceedings are dismissed.
(b) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
2. In respect of the second defendant’s notice of motion filed on 7 April 2026:
(a) Pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the proceedings are dismissed.
(b) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — applications by defendants to summarily dismiss proceedings arising from an alleged assault in 2004 — history of proceedings across assorted courts — tenth proceeding brought by the plaintiff on the same facts against first defendant — abuse of court process — no reasonable cause of action disclosed
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.4
Cases Cited: Wang v State of New South Wales [2020] HCASL 266
Wang v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 1700
Wang v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWCA 124
Wang v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1478
Wang v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2020] NSWCA 148
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Li Wang (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (First Defendant)
Commonwealth of Australia (Second Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
L Wang (self-represented)
N Bentley (First Defendant)
C Taylor (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
L Wang (Sel-Represented) (Plaintiff)
The Crown Solicitor (First Defendant)
Australian Government Solicitor (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2026/29699
Publication restriction: No
In these proceedings, a statement of claim was filed on 22 January 2026. The first defendant is the State of New South Wales as the entity liable for the actions of a police officer, Senior Constable Kennedy and for the actions of various government employees and judicial officers. The second defendant is the Commonwealth of Australia, allegedly liable for legal costs totalling $10,000.
The action against the first defendant is for damages, and also an assortment of legal costs. The history of the matter goes back to January 2004, when the plaintiff was allegedly assaulted by her landlord. An investigation of the assault by SC Kennedy is allegedly tainted with disrespect, deception, and interference in the plaintiff’s pursuit of justice against her landlord.
This is not the first time proceedings arising from the same facts have been brought. In fact, this is the tenth time and is the 14th iteration of a statement of claim against the first defendant, and the third proceeding against the second defendant. The matter has been to the Court of Appeal (more than once) and to the High Court where leave to appeal was refused.
Each of the defendants has filed a notice of motion to have the proceedings dismissed or struck out.
At the hearing today the plaintiff, as she has always been, was self-represented and as also seems to have previously occurred, had little apparent understanding of the hearing, but did not wish to have the assistance of an interpreter and made it clear that she relied entirely on her written submissions. The submissions are included in the Court Book. The plaintiff’s submissions in reply commence:
“The plaintiff is unable to make a verbal argue in the hearing of 18 Jun 2026,. All the plaintiff's views and positions are based on this written submission.”
As I read the statement of claim the allegations against the first defendant fall under two primary allegations:
SC Kennedy committed intentional torts against the plaintiff. The first defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of SC Kennedy. The plaintiff suffered personal injury and economic loss because of SC Kennedy’s intentional torts.
The Crown Solicitor, or a registrar, or a solicitor working for the Crown, or an Associate Justice, interfered in, and abused the administration of justice in respect of the plaintiff’s previous statements of claim by, inter alia, filing motions to dismiss pleadings, forging documents, applying to stay proceedings, making illegal consent orders, and taking actions to prevent the proper hearing of the plaintiff’s cases. As a result of the first defendant’s “illegal litigation” the plaintiff’s economic loss was aggravated. A number of judges are also said to have acted “illegally”.
The ninth set of proceedings against the first defendant (and the second set against the second defendant), came before Schmidt AJ on 28 November 2023. On 5 December 2023, her Honour dismissed the proceedings (Wang v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1478). Her Honour’s reasons, with appropriate changes of detail and date, could well be applied here. Her Honour described the earlier proceedings, from [14]-[22]:
“14. The proceedings Ms Wang first brought in the District Court in 2008 concerned her complaints about the alleged improper actions of Senior Constable Kennedy. They were dismissed for want of due despatch.
15. The 2009 proceedings she and her husband Mr Liu then pursued in this Court about these matters were struck out by Hulme J: Wang v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 340. Leave to appeal was granted to Ms Wang and she was given leave to pursue her claim in respect of the conduct of Senior Constable Kennedy: Wang v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 209. Her special leave application in respect of this judgment was refused in November 2010: Wang & Anor v State of New South Wales [2010] HCASL 273.
16. In December 2010 Ms Wang and Mr Liu commenced further proceedings about the 2004 events in this Court. His statement of claim was dismissed and she was referred for pro bono legal assistance, which she did not pursue: Wang v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWSC 609. Her statement of claim was eventually also dismissed: Wang v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWSC 882. Her appeal was also later dismissed: Wang v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 321. As was her further special leave application to the High Court: Wang & Anor v State of New South Wales [2012] HCASL10.
17. In July 2012 Ms Wang and Mr Liu brought yet further proceedings which concerned events which had occurred during the course of their earlier litigation. They were dismissed in April 2013: Wang v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 386.
18. In April 2013 Ms Wang’s daughter brought further proceedings about the 2004 events as her tutor. There was an unsuccessful mediation in 2014 and after other interlocutory hearings, in July 2014 her daughter was removed, Mr Liu was appointed as Ms Wang’s tutor and the proceedings were stayed until a notice of appearance was filed by a solicitor: Wang v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 909. Leave to appeal was refused: Wang v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 373. As was the further special leave application: Wang & Anor v State of New South Wales [2015] HCASL 45. An attempt to further appeal the July 2014 orders also failed.
19. In July 2019 Ms Wang commenced further proceedings about the events of 2004. Orders precluding her filing any notice of motion without leave of the Court were made in October: Wang v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWSC 1332. In November the proceedings were stayed until her tutor was represented by a lawyer: Wang v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWSC 1599. Her application for leave to appeal was refused, as were three applications to set aside previous decisions: Wang v State of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 21; Wang v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2020] 64; Wang v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2020] 148; and Wang v State of New South Wales (No 4) [2020] 171. Her further special leave application was also refused in December 2020: Wang v State of New South Wales & Anor [2020] HCASL 266.
20. In February 2022 Ms Wang filed a notice of discontinuance of the 2019 proceedings, which she did not serve on the State and to which it did not consent. The proceedings against the Commonwealth were later dismissed and the other orders earlier made, including that the proceedings were stayed until her tutor was represented by a lawyer, were reissued.
21. In June 2020 Ms Wang commenced further proceedings about the events of 2004 against the State and the ‘Australia Government’, but there were service problems and her application for summary judgment was refused. Further orders were made in May: Li Wang v State of NSW [2022] NSWSC 544. It was in December 2022 that Bellew J dismissed those proceedings, accepting that they involved an abuse and that the Rules could not be construed in the way for which she contended and in 2023 that Ms Wang’s application for leave to appeal was refused, as earlier explained.
22. Applications for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) were then foreshadowed but have not been pursued against Ms Wang. There was thus no impediment which such orders would pose for Ms Wang commencing these proceedings in June 2023. But that she again commenced proceedings in order to pursue claims which have already been dismissed in earlier proceedings, as I have explained, did present a difficulty, resulting as it did in the State again seeking orders dismissing these further proceedings.”
“23. There is no question that the Court has the power to dismiss proceedings which are frivolous or vexatious or involve an abuse of process: r 13.4(1). The stringent test which must be satisfied on such an application is long settled: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130. Namely, that there must be real certainty that the case is so untenable that it cannot succeed.
24. That can be established even where the pleaded cause of action may be good, when its pursuit otherwise involves an abuse of process: Agius v The State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 371 at [24]. Thus, statements of claim must comply with the requirements of the Rules and parties are not entitled to receive unlimited opportunities to replead when they fail to adhere to them. They also cannot proceed on pleadings which are unintelligible, vague, or so general that the other party does not know what is alleged, because material facts are not pleaded, as the Rules require: see McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [21]-[39].
25. Permitting parties to proceed again in such circumstances would not be consistent with the requirements of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which imposes obligations on the Court and the parties in relation to furthering the overriding purpose there specified, the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.”
27. The statement of claim which Ms Wang filed in these proceedings still does not adhere to the requirements of the Rules in relation to her claims about the events of 2004, because she has still not pleaded the material facts on which she advances her case. Further, her complaints about what she perceives to be the illegality both of steps taken by the State in earlier proceedings and judgments of the Court which have resulted, have already been considered and rejected, including on appeal.
28. Bringing further proceedings in order to advance such claims again is not an available basis on which earlier judgments of this Court and of the Court of Appeal can be challenged. Its orders are binding and the conclusions it has reached on which those orders rest cannot be successfully challenged in these proceedings.
29. Ms Wang undoubtedly has never waivered in her beliefs. Not only that she has a good case to advance about the events of 2004, given how she has repeatedly sought to pursue those claims, but that judges of this Court and the Court of Appeal were incorrect in their views about the operation of the Rules, including those which regulate how documents and pleadings filed in proceedings commenced in this Court must be signed.
30. The Court has referred Ms Wang more than once for pro bono legal assistance, to help her meet the requirements of the Rules. She has refused such assistance and has seemingly been unable, herself, to fund legal representation, or to take the steps which all litigants must take, to pursue their litigation in accordance with the applicable requirements of the Rules.
31. This is entirely regrettable, as is the result, that none of the proceedings Ms Wang has brought have resulted in a hearing of her claims on the merits and that costs orders have nevertheless been made against her, which she does not believe she can afford to pay. But on the evidence that is the consequence of choices Ms Wang has made, not of illegality in steps taken by the State or error in decisions which various courts have made.
32. In all of the circumstances I have explained, I am satisfied that it must now be accepted that her pursuit of the claims she again seeks to pursue in these proceedings does involve an abuse of process which the Court cannot permit her to pursue further.”
I have quoted extensively from Schmidt AJ’s decision because, as I have said above, her Honour’s reasons could be equally applied to these motions. I accept the statement of claim is different to the pleading before Schmidt AJ, but the vices are the same. In particular, the abuses of process remain constant. Both defendants handed up aide memoires showing the consistency of allegations through the proceedings. I have marked these documents for identification.
It is possible to discern from the pleading that SC Kennedy is accused of an intentional tort against the plaintiff, and that damages have been said to be suffered. However, the form of the pleading is confused and vague, and it is very difficult to identify particulars of the tortious conduct. If this was the plaintiff’s first attempt, an order that she have leave to try again would easily follow. But this is the tenth proceeding (and 14th statement of claim), so that the plaintiff has been given every chance to ‘get it right’.
Another problem in respect of the allegations about events in 2004 arises from the time that has elapsed and whether the proceedings are now time barred. This issue has already been raised, by Bellew J Wang v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 1700 at [51], and by the Court of Appeal in Wang v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWCA 124 at [12].
I also note, that from [18] of his judgment, Bellew J dealt with the procedural deficiency arguments raised by the plaintiffs and there is no reason to go beyond his Honour’s reasoning.
Like Schmidt AJ, Bellew J’s decision also went through the various allegations made by plaintiff. The consistency of allegations through to the statement of claim before me renders yet another examination of each allegation to be superfluous.
As to the allegations against the solicitors, court staff, and judicial officers, they lack even the most basic particulars to enable them to be met, nor do they disclose any viable cause of action. There is little more than a list of assertions, such as “illegally” and “unlawfully” and “abuse of court process” but no particulars to identify the precise failings of the various persons.
There is no doubt that the proceedings offend s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) which strives to achieve an efficiency of litigation and therefore prevent a repetition of failed proceedings.
More importantly, I am satisfied that the proceedings are vexatious and an abuse of process under r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
It was alleged by the plaintiff that the second defendant had not filed a notice of appearance. This is wrong. The requisite notice was filed on 11 March 2026 and is replicated in the court book.
The allegations against the second defendant seem to be encompassed within paragraphs 9 to 12 of the statement of claim:
“9 The third action, the second defendant represents the Sydney Registry of the High Court of Australian.
The registrar of the Sydney Registry of the High Court Australian abused the legal process to close the proceedings before the judges made an order.
10 The evidence X: Application for special leave to appeal from the judgements of the Court of Appeal of Supreme Court of NSW. Macfarlan JA and Payne JA given on 07 Aug 2020, 20 July 2020, 20 Apr 2020, 20 Feb 2020.
11 The evidence Y: the Order of the High Court of Australia of 10 Dec 2020, the orders that the application for special leave to appeal to this Court from the judgement and order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales given and made on 20 July 2020 be dismissed.
12 The plaintiff has reasonable reason to make the claim against the second defendant for the legal costs loss:
(1). Case No. 2019/227867 - $5,000;
(2). Case No. 2019/32882 - $5,000.”
An application for special leave to appeal was filed by the plaintiff on 29 September 2020. The application related to a decision of the Court of Appeal (constituted by Macfarlan JA and Payne JA) handed down on 20 July 2020 (Wang v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2020] NSWCA 148).
On 10 December 2020, the High Court (constituted by Bell J and Gageler J) made the following finding (Wang v State of New South Wales [2020] HCASL 266):
“1. The applicant requires an extension of time within which to file an application for special leave to appeal from decisions of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the decisions of the Court of Appeal. Hence, it would be futile to grant the extension of time that is sought. Special leave to appeal should be refused.
2. Pursuant to r 41.08.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.”
“1. The application for special leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales given and made on 20 July 2020 be dismissed.”
How the plaintiff’s loss in the special leave application gives rise to an order that the second defendant pay $10,000 in costs is beyond me and not explained by the plaintiff in the statement of claim, her affidavits or her written submissions.
My first interpretation of the pleading was that the costs somehow arose from costs incurred in the special leave application. However, [12] of the pleading provides two case numbers possibly referable to Supreme Court proceedings. One of the numbers (2019/227867) is attached to a proceeding, but the other doesn’t seem connected to any of the plaintiff’s cases. There is no reason why these costs might be claimed from the second defendant especially as they seem to arise from costs orders against the plaintiff.
Therefore, I can see no possible basis on which the pleadings against the second defendant disclose any cause of action. The proceedings against the second defendant must be dismissed.
In respect of the first defendant’s notice of motion filed on 2 April 2026:
Pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the proceedings are dismissed.
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
In respect of the second defendant’s notice of motion filed on 7 April 2026:
Pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the proceedings are dismissed.
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
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Wang
State of New South Wales
[2020] HCASL 266
[2015] HCASL 45
(1964) 112 CLR 125