1. At the hearing on 11 July 2017, the applicant agreed that, save for one matter, the respondent had accurately summarised his claims of discrimination in its submissions. The following is the respondent's description of the conduct the applicant alleged was in breach of the EO Act. Item (k) is the additional matter raised by the applicant:
   • (a) charging or arresting, or threatening to charge or arrest, the applicant on numerous occasions (on or around 17 September 2012, 28 March 2013 and 11 June 2016);
   • (b) issuing the applicant with family violence orders (on or around 17 September 2012, 28 March 2013, 17 July 2014 and 11 November 2015);
   • (c) failing to lay charges against the mother or investigate her in relation to family violence (on or around 17 September 2012, 12 February 2012, 28 March 2013, 10 August 2015 and 11 June 2016);
   • (d) failing to issue the mother with family violence orders (on or around 12 February 2012, the period between 5 October 2012 and 23 October 2014, 17 July 2014 and 11 November 2015);
   • (e) refusing to take the applicant's statement, failing to conduct an investigation, refusing complaints and hanging up on the applicant (on or around 12 February 2012, 28 March 2013, the period between April 2013 and August 2016 and 11 June 2016);
   • (f) by advising the mother or acting as legal counsel in civil cases on behalf of the mother and failing to do the same for the applicant (in the period between 5 October 2012 and 23 October 2014, 10 November 2012 and 23 November 2012);
   • (g) consulting with the mother but failing to consult with the children or the applicant (in the period between 5 October 2012 and 23 October 2014 and on or around 23 November 2012 and 9 May 2013):
   • (h) failing to contact the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in respect of alleged child abuse by the mother on or around 23 November 2012;
   • (i) making reports to Barwon Health in an attempt to have the applicant incarcerated under the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) (MH Act) and failing to report to Barwon Health in relation to the mother's mental health on or around 9 May 2013;
   • (j) threatening and attempting to intimidate and entrap the applicant (in the period between April 2013 and August 2016); and
   • (k) failing to protect the applicant from family violence over the period.
2. In support of his application, the applicant produced a large number of documents. They included court and medical documents relating to himself and his children and many emails he had sent to various persons over time, including the respondent.
3. The applicant's own materials show that, in addition to those referred to above in (b), he was also issued with intervention orders (interim or final) on 12 April 2013, 14 May 2013, 29 April 2014, 27 May 2014, 17 July 2014, 18 September 2014, 7 October 2014, 23 October 2014, 5 November 2014 and 18 November 2014. In most cases, those orders related to the applicant's family members but sometimes to others. The order issued on 18 November 2014 does not expire until 17 November 2017.
4. It is apparent from the documents produced and the way the applicant made his claim that the events of alleged discrimination occurred in the context of an acrimonious relationship breakdown and ongoing conflict about access to and custody of the children.
5. It is also apparent that, on multiple occasions, the respondent's officers attended incidents involving the applicant and the mother, investigated them and made decisions about whether to lay charges or apply for intervention orders and against whom. As indicated above, on many occasions, decisions were made to apply for orders against the applicant and not the mother. That overall context is relevant to my assessment of the claims made.
6. I will now turn to the law about summary strike out or dismissal applications under the VCAT Act and the law applicable to the applicant's claim.

1. Section 75 of the VCAT Act says, at any time, the Tribunal may dismiss or strike out a proceeding whether or not all the evidence has been heard. It can do so if, in its opinion, all or part of the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance (section 75(1)(a)), or is otherwise an abuse of process (section 75(1)(b)).
2. There have been many cases about section 75 and the law about how to approach the section is clear.[3] The Tribunal is required to exercise caution before summarily terminating a proceeding. It should only do so if the proceeding is obviously hopeless or unsustainable in fact or in law, or on no reasonable view can justify relief, or is bound to fail. This will include, but is not limited to, a case where an application can be said to disclose no reasonable cause of action or where a respondent can show a good defence sufficient to warrant the summary termination of the proceeding.
3. An application is 'misconceived' under section 75(1)(a) if it falls outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction, it is statute barred or it concerns matters that the applicant is estopped from raising.[4] Estoppel applies to a range of circumstances including where a factual or legal issue in the application has already been heard and determined (issue estoppel).
4. Whether an application is 'lacking in substance' under section 75(1)(a) will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.[5]
5. The term 'abuse of process' contained in section 75(1)(b) is not defined in the VCAT Act. It is understood to be a flexible concept designed to ensure that processes of the Tribunal are used in good faith. It can include any process used in a way that is manifestly unjust, oppressive or unfair to a party or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.[6] The categories of abuse of process are not closed but include proceedings which are manifestly groundless, without foundation or which serve no useful purpose. An abuse of process may arise where, despite the fact that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate again a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.[7]
6. The respondent contended that the application:
   • Does not disclose a cause of action as the applicant has not identified a causal nexus between the identified conduct and the identified attributes;
   • Is vague and lacking in substance;
   • Is an abuse of process because it calls into question decisions made by courts;
   • Contains many allegations which do not fall within the EO Act as they do not relate to the provision of services or fall within an exception; and
   • Includes many historical allegations which should be dismissed for want of prosecution under section 76 of the VCAT Act.[8]

1. The EO Act is protective legislation that seeks to ensure persons with named attributes are not discriminated against because of those attributes in relation to specified activities or classes of activities. The protected attributes include sex and parental status.[9]
2. The EO Act specifies areas of life in which discrimination is prohibited. Accordingly, in order to establish a breach of the EO Act, an applicant must point to an express prohibition which applies to the circumstances giving rise to the claim. The applicant says the discrimination he complains of occurred in the context of the provision of services to him by the respondent through its officers.
3. The claim here is one of direct discrimination. So, what is claimed is that, contrary to section 44 of the EO Act, the respondent treated the applicant unfavourably because of one or more of the identified attributes.[10]

1. Section 44 of the EO Act prohibits discrimination in the context of the provision of services. It says:

(1) A person must not discriminate against another person -

(a) by refusing to provide goods or services to the other person; or

(b) in the terms on which goods or services are provided to the other person; or

(c) by subjecting the other person to any other detriment in connection with the provision of goods or services to him or her.

(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the goods or services are provided for payment.

1. The respondent contended that a large number of the allegations made do not relate to the provision of services under section 44.
2. The term 'services' is defined in section 4 of the EO Act and includes:

(f) services provided by a governmental department, public authority, State owned enterprise or municipal council

1. The respondent accepted that it is a public authority capable of providing services within paragraph (f) of the definition. The respondent also accepted that the term services should be interpreted as having its ordinary and broad meaning and that it should be construed in a way that gives effect to the objects of the EO Act.[11]
2. It is well established that a service under the EO Act (and equivalent legislation), includes a helpful or beneficial activity.[12]
3. The applicant referred me to the Supreme Court of Victoria's decision in DPP v Kaba,[13] contending that was an example where Victoria Police claimed it had not provided services but was found to have done so. That case concerned a Magistrates' decision that police had no statutory power to randomly stop individuals and ask for their name and address details. His Honour Justice Bell found that police did have the power to stop and check individuals at random. However, he also found that seeking name and address was a breach of Mr Kaba's Charter right to privacy in circumstances where that information was sought when Mr Kaba was not suspected of any wrongdoing and sought in a coercive manner. The decision was not made under the EO Act and so is of little assistance to me in deciding whether the respondent provided the applicant with services as defined.
4. It is necessary to have regard to the nature of the services in issue and properly characterise them within the context of the EO Act. That requires consideration of the Victoria Police Act 2013 (Vic) (VP Act) and its predecessor legislation.
5. The VP Act came into force on 1 July 2013 and so it did not apply at all times covered by the applicant's allegations. The earlier legislation, repealed by the Police Act, was the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic) (1958 Police Act).
6. The 1958 Police Act did not set out the role or functions of police but did include an oath which all police officers were required to take. That oath provided, amongst other things, that the officer swore to 'see and cause Her Majesty's peace to be kept and preserved', to 'prevent to the best of my power all offences against the same' and 'to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties legally imposed upon me faithfully and according to law'.[14]
7. Section 8 of the VP Act says that the role of police is to 'serve the Victorian community and uphold the law so as to promote a safe, secure and orderly society'. Section 9(1) of the VP Act says that the functions of police include:

1. I proceed on the basis that the matters set out in sections 8 and 9 are consistent with the oath contained in the 1958 Police Act and describe a police officer's role both prior to and after 1 July 2013.
2. The interrelationship between services which fall within the EO Act and police has been considered in Victoria and elsewhere. Having regard to the respondent's written submissions and the cases referred to, I am satisfied that the proper approach may be summarised as follows:
   • Conduct which is helpful or beneficial for the individual is likely to be a service where it is consistent with the interests or welfare of the individual;[15]
   • The fact that the conduct might arise in the exercise of a statutory power or in the performance of a statutory duty might assist in identifying the nature of the conduct and whether it falls within the meaning of a service but those matters are not determinative;[16]
   • Those parts of the officer's duties involving assistance to or protection of members of the public entail the provision of services to the public;[17]
   • The acts of an arresting police officer cannot be characterised as being helpful or beneficial to the individual being arrested. Similarly the pursuit and arrest of an alleged offender does not involve the provision of services;[18]
   • Police functions which are associated with the prevention and detection of crime when they intervene in situations where there is a disturbance of the peace or where an offence has been, or may be, committed are services provided to the public at large. Individuals who may suffer injury or harm are likely to be the recipients of services under the EO Act when police officers attend in such circumstances. Similarly, police provide a service when they respond to a specific request for assistance, such as when an emergency call is made. When police attend following a request for assistance, a service may be provided to a person who is being asked to leave or move on or take some other action which is intended to defuse the circumstances which led to the police attendance rather than because it is suspected that an offence has been committed;[19]
   • Services are not provided when police: investigate an alleged offence; question an alleged offender; arrest an alleged offender; decide whether or not to lay charges; decide to apply for orders such as an apprehended violence order; decide whether or not to prosecute charges; and decide how a matter will proceed in court. A failure to take a statement from a particular person will not necessarily amount to a refusal to provide services;[20] and
   • Services are not provided when police serve summonses and execute search warrants and take other steps in respect of the laying of charges and their prosecution.[21]

(1) A person may discriminate if the discrimination is necessary to comply with, or is authorised by, a provision of:

(b) an enactment, other than an enactment under this Act.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), it is not necessary that the provision refer to discrimination, as long as it authorises or necessitates the relevant conduct that would otherwise constitute discrimination.

(3) Sections 50(3) and 63(1) prevail over this section to the extent of any inconsistency between them.

1. Section 13(1) of the EO Act provides that discrimination is not prohibited if a general exception, such as section 75, applies. Section 13(2) says that such an exception is a defence to discrimination, and the person seeking to rely on the exception has the burden of proving that it applies.
2. So, if I am satisfied that section 75 of the EO Act applies to the conduct the applicant complains about, even if that conduct in issue falls within the definitions of discrimination in the EO Act, the conduct would not be unlawful.
3. Judge Ginnane (as he then was) considered the scope of section 75 of the EO Act against the backdrop of the Charter in Aitken & Ors v The State of Victoria - Department of Education & Early Childhood Development.[22]
4. His Honour said that the purpose of section 75 of the EO Act reflects the power of Parliament to legislate so as to authorise conduct that is discriminatory. The common law principles of statutory interpretation require a clear expression of intent to interfere with human rights. Section 32(1) of the Charter adds to the strength of that common law principle. His Honour said:

The word "authorise" means to give authority or legal power to; to empower (to do something); to give authority for; formally sanction an act or proceeding.

The Tribunal, and its predecessors, have consistently adopted the interpretation of the statutory authority exception described in Wojcik v Roads Corporation, i.e. that the conduct is excepted if required, or permitted expressly, or by necessary implication by a statute.

The ordinary meaning of the statutory authority exception in the Equal Opportunity Acts extends to conduct permitted by an Act. Section 32(1) of the Charter, which is applicable to conduct after 1 January 2008, does not require that that ordinary meaning be departed from. Conduct expressly permitted by a statute is within the ordinary meaning of the exception. The express permission of conduct must also include within the permission, conduct necessary to enable the permitted conduct to occur.[23]

1. I respectfully adopt this approach to the interpretation of section 75 of the EO Act.
2. Having regard to the oath under the 1958 Police Act and sections 8 and 9(1) of the VP Act, I find that, in order to preserve the peace, protect life and property, prevent the commission of offences and/or detect and apprehend offenders, the respondent's officers are, from time to time, authorised or permitted by the relevant legislation to make enquiries, undertake investigations and make decisions about what action to take (if any), be that by way of applying for orders from the court or laying charges. Steps taken as part of or related to those activities are permitted under section 75 of the EO Act.
3. As a consequence of section 75 of the EO Act, even if conduct of that kind might be discriminatory contrary to the EO Act, provided it is authorised or permitted in the sense described by Ginnane J, it could not be found to be a breach of the EO Act.
4. I will now turn to the particular allegations.

1. The respondent contended that the applicant's claims are vague and fail to properly identify the causal connection between the event complained about and the attribute relied on. For example, while the applicant complains that the respondent issued family violence orders against him and failed to do the same in respect of the mother, but he does not give any indication as to why he says the respondent's officers did so because of his sex or parental status.
2. As the applicant is self-represented and clarification of the details of the basis for his claims could be addressed by an amended claim being prepared, I have left this matter to one side.
3. I have also left to one side the applicant's claims that individual police officers have perverted the course of justice or otherwise acted illegally. Those are matters to be raised elsewhere.
4. I have dealt with the claims by reference to their type.

Allegations relating to the applicant being charged or arrested or being issued with family violence orders

1. The applicant has alleged the respondent discriminated against him in circumstances where the respondent's officers considered whether to charge or arrest him or when they decided to do so.
2. He also complained about decisions to issue intervention orders, in particular on 17 September 2012, 28 March 2013, 17 July 2014 and 11 November 2015.
3. For example, the applicant said:
   • In or around mid-September 2012, police officers became involved in a dispute between him and the mother. While the applicant alleges that the mother assaulted him and that the officers threatened him, ultimately the applicant was charged with assault and assault with a weapon. The applicant complained that the attending officers failed to charge the mother with assault on one of the children;
   • On 28 March 2013, the mother entered the applicant's property and removed jointly owned items. He removed her (and her companions) from the property and called the police. The applicant alleged that during the course of the mother's attendance at his property she gained illegal entry, illegally removed and damaged property and assaulted another person. The applicant's particulars stated that he was charged with assault and was issued with a family violence order by police. He complained that the mother was not charged with assault or given a family violence order; and
   • On 17 July 2014, the applicant was issued with a family violence order after he attended one of the children's primary school. He complained that no such order was issued to the mother.
4. As discussed above, the respondent's officers do not provide services to an offender or potential offender when assessing whether to lay charges or arrest the person or when taking those actions.
5. Interim and final intervention orders are issued by courts not by the respondent's officers. Police officers may, however, apply for such an order so as to protect another person, in the course of discharging the duties described above. It is apparent from the material before me that is what occurred on a number of occasions. The decision to apply for such an order is akin to deciding to lay a charge. Such a decision is not a service which is provided to the person who is the subject of the application which is then considered by the court.
6. The applicant's materials show many intervention orders have been made against the applicant. It is an abuse of process to seek to have another court or tribunal examine the basis for such orders being made or the circumstances leading to the order. To do so would call into question the decisions made and risk a conflicting factual determination being reached.
7. If the applicant was dissatisfied with the court orders, including because of the circumstances leading to them being made, it was open to him to appeal.
8. The applicant made a general claim that the respondent had threatened and attempted to intimidate or entrap him between April 2013 and August 2016. As indicated by these reasons, that was a period of time during which there were many interactions between the applicant and the respondent's officers, often dealing with potential criminal offences or sanctions. Even if there was some basis for the suggestion that the respondent's officers engaged in the behaviour described, that could not be regarded as a service under the EO Act.
9. It would be an abuse of process to consider incidents which led to charges being laid or court orders being made.
10. Even if some breach of the EO Act could be shown, police decision making about laying charges or applying for intervention orders, are undertaken in the context of the performance of their statutory responsibilities which include preserving the peace, protecting life and property and/or preventing the commission of offences. In those circumstances, section 75 of the EO Act would apply and, as a consequence, any such conduct engaged in would not amount to prohibited discrimination.
11. I find the claims set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) above do not fall within the EO Act as the respondent did not provide services to the applicant and further that the conduct complained of was authorised or permitted under section 75 of the EO Act.

Allegations relating to the mother not being investigated, charged or arrested or issued with family violence orders

1. The applicant has complained that, on certain occasions, the respondent's officers failed to investigate, charge or arrest the mother in circumstances where he believed they should have taken one or another action. He also complained about alleged failures to issue the mother with family violence orders in respect of her interactions with the children and the applicant or otherwise protect them from family violence.
2. As I understood it, the applicant also complained that the respondent failed to consult with him about the concerns he raised about family violence on the part of the mother and his applications for intervention orders against her.
3. For example:
   • The applicant wrote that, on 12 February 2012, the applicant notified the respondent that the mother had cut off his son's toe while moving a bath. In his particulars, the applicant stated that he contacted police who attended and informed him that the son's toes were all intact. Police were said to have refused to allow the applicant to make a statement about the matter. The applicant complained that no investigation was undertaken and no charges were laid. I note that the applicant's materials contained hospital documents dated February 2013 regarding a serious injury to the son's toe after the mother was moving an old bath and it fell on the boy's toe;
   • The applicant relied on the circumstances surrounding the mother's attendance at his property on 28 March 2013, as described above; and
   • The applicant said that, on a large number of occasions when he was issued with family violence orders, police failed to issue the mother with like orders or issue them against her instead of him.
4. I noted the applicant's materials show that he applied for intervention orders against the mother in 2013 and 2014. Given the complaints made by the applicant, it would appear those applications against the mother were not granted by the court.
5. As discussed above, when a person calls for police attendance or, by analogy, makes a report to police, police might be regarded as providing a service to that person in the sense that police are executing their duty to provide assistance to or protection of members of the public.
6. Having said that, the circumstances change if the respondent's officers are then required to determine who is in need of protection or what investigations are required in order to decide whether to arrest a person or charge them with an offence or take some other action. A person who is dissatisfied with police decision making or who finds action taken against them is not the recipient of a service from police. Such a person's interests or preferences are ancillary to the execution of the duty to administer the law and keep the peace. The respondent's officers have no duty to consult with those involved to decide what action to take or not to take.
7. Where events the applicant raised coincided with an application for an intervention order against him or such an order being made, it would be an abuse of process to revisit those circumstances. When police decided to take action against the applicant rather than the mother, no service was being provided to the applicant under the EO Act.
8. The applicant contended the respondent's officers are known to discriminate against men and/or male parents and to contrive conduct. I understood that comment to be an explanation for why he was charged or had applications made against him rather than against the mother. For the same reasons discussed above, where the respondent's officers were executing their duties as police officers and took matters to court, they were not providing the applicant with a service.
9. Even if some breach of the EO Act could be shown, as discussed earlier, police decision making about laying charges or applying for intervention orders, are undertaken in the context of the performance of their statutory responsibilities including preserving the peace, protecting life and property and/or preventing the commission of offences and so section 75 of the EO Act would apply. As a consequence, any such conduct engaged in would not amount to prohibited discrimination.
10. As a consequence, I find the claims set out in paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (g) and (k) above do not fall within the EO Act as the respondent did not provide services to the applicant and further that the conduct complained of was authorised or permitted under section 75 of the EO Act.

Allegations that police represented the mother in court and did not represent or consult with him

1. The applicant complained that the police acted as counsel for the mother in various court matters, largely involving family violence orders. Police officers do not provide legal representation to victims - they sometimes act as an informant in order to bring an alleged breach of the law to the court. While no doubt it is the case that police taking on the role of informant is of assistance to victims, they do so acting in their role of preserving the peace, protecting life and property and preventing the commission of offences. They attend hearings to assist the court not as a personal legal representative. Conduct of that kind would be covered by the exception in section 75 of the EO Act.
2. Where the court appearances related to orders sought against the applicant, police could not be said to be providing a service to him.
3. Where a court order was made, it would be an abuse of process for this Tribunal to consider the respondent's officer's role in that proceeding.
4. I find the claim set out in paragraph (f) above does not fall within the EO Act as the respondent did not provide services to the applicant and further that the conduct complained of was authorised or permitted under section 75 of the EO Act.

Interactions with hospitals, mental health services and DHHS

1. The applicant said the respondent discriminated against him on 10 November 2012 in the following circumstances:
   • The mother contacted the respondent and spoke to officer, Kelly Smith who advised the mother about how to have the applicant incarcerated in order to obtain financial control and parenting control;
   • On 23 November 2012, the applicant attended the Geelong Hospital (which is operated by Barwon Health) having been requested to do so by the mother as per the earlier advice;
   • The applicant asked to be seen by a doctor but was instead referred to an intake worker who asked a range of personal questions;
   • The applicant asked the worker to telephone the mother, apparently because the mother told him that ought to be done;
   • The mother spoke to the worker and persuaded her to involve DHHS. The mother's discussion was entered into hospital records, 'as fact';
   • The respondent did not consult with the applicant or the children about the incarceration; and
   • The respondent discriminated against the applicant by not contacting DHHS about the mother or giving him advice about how to have the mother incarcerated.
2. The Barwon Health documents produced by the applicant show that on 23 November 2012 he was recorded as presenting at the emergency department wanting assessment. That assessment was carried out by the Barwon Health Community and Mental Health Team. There is no need to refer to the content of the medical records other than to note that the applicant gave a history which raised many serious behavioural issues which were reiterated by the mother when, on the request of the applicant, the staff member called her. The outcome of the assessment was not apparent.
3. Other documents filed by the applicant show that, on 3 April 2013, 'child protection' made contact with the Barwon Health Community and Mental Health Team seeking information about any recent contact from the applicant. Apparently there had been none since November 2012.
4. On 9 May 2013, a police officer contacted Barwon Health Community and Mental Health Team to enquire about recent admissions or contacts from the applicant. The notes show that the officer had concerns about the applicant's behaviour with his children and his mental state. Having said that, the notes also said there was no current risk to the applicant, to the children or others. While reference was made to the MH Act, the notes do not reveal any action being taken.
5. Assuming for the moment that in November 2012 a police officer in fact spoke to the mother about having the applicant admitted to hospital and even assuming advice was given, any potential service was provided to the mother not the applicant. Given the content of the notes made by the Barwon Health Community and Mental Health Team showing that the applicant presented himself for assessment, I could not find that his attendance as a consequence of any encouragement or involvement of the mother related to the applicant's attributes or was unfavourable treatment.
6. It is apparent from the applicant's own documents that the respondent's officer's enquiries in May 2013 arose because of concerns about the applicant's mental state and his dealings with his children at that time. If any service was being provided by the respondent, it was to the children. No action was taken in respect of the applicant under the MH Act and so I could not find there was an attempt to incarcerate him as alleged. I note, though, that on 14 May 2013, an intervention order was issued against the applicant. That decision is not one which involved the provision of a service to the applicant or is appropriate for re-agitation before the Tribunal.
7. How a health service such as Barwon Health undertakes its work or duties is not a matter over which the respondent has any control. Accordingly, the applicant cannot make a claim against the respondent in relation to the way he was managed by Barwon Health or any decision Barwon Health made about his treatment under the MH Act.
8. The applicant complained that the respondent's officers failed to consult with him about the mother and failed to report the mother to Barwon Health. The respondent had no duty to initiate contact with the applicant (or any other person) to discuss another person's mental health. It had no duty to the applicant to give advice about the operation of the MH Act or to make a report to Barwon Health. As a consequence, these matters do not fall within the meaning of 'service' under the EO Act.
9. Decisions about whether a mandatory report should be made about a person arises in the course of the execution of statutory duties and is not concerned with providing a service in the sense dealt with in the EO Act. At best, if the respondent's officers considered whether to make a mandatory report to DHHS in respect of the applicant's children, police are better characterised as providing a service to them rather than the applicant as it would have been their welfare in issue, rather than his.
10. I find the claims set out in paragraphs (h) and (i) above do not fall within the EO Act as the respondent did not provide services to the applicant. In any event, the respondent's officers' role in the events falls within the exception contained in section 75 of the EO Act.

1. For the reasons given, I find that the applicant's claims under the EO Act are misconceived. I have found that some of those claims amount to an abuse of process. I will discuss the latter issue further shortly.
2. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to consider the application for strike out under section 76 of the VCAT Act.

1. The applicant contended that, as a consequence of the conduct complained of, the respondent breached a large number of Charter rights. There was no dispute that the respondent is bound by the Charter.
2. In particular, the applicant referred to the following:
   • The section 8(2) right to enjoy human rights free from discrimination;
   • The section 10(a) right not to be subjected to torture - in his case mental torture;
   • The section 12 right to free movement in Victoria;
   • The section 13 right not to have one's home interfered with unlawfully or arbitrarily and not to have one's reputation unlawfully attacked - in his case by making orders excluding him from his home;
   • The section 17 right to protection of families - in his case by making applications for intervention orders against him and not the mother;
   • The section 18 right to take part in the conduct of public affairs directly or through freely chosen representatives - in his case by failing to provide support or assistance and failing to make mandatory reports;
   • The section 20 right not to be deprived of property other than in accordance with law; and
   • The section 21 rights to liberty and security, not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention or to be deprived of liberty other than in accordance with law.
3. The applicant claimed that the respondent breached section 38(1) of the Charter which requires public authorities not to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or make a decision without giving proper consideration to human rights. I note that section 38(2) says that section 38(1) does not apply if, as a result of a statutory provision, the public authority could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision.
4. The applicant's Charter claims relied on the factual circumstances discussed above.
5. I invited the parties to make submissions about whether the applicant's Charter claims could be considered if I decided that the EO Act claims were to be summarily struck out or dismissed. That question arose in part because in another case I decided that Charter claims could still be considered even if EO Act claims were summarily dismissed.[24]
6. The respondent contended, by reference to authorities, that my earlier decision was incorrect and that, where a decision was made to summarily dismiss or strike out a proceeding, Charter claims could not proceed. Those submissions depended in part on distinguishing between a case such as this and a case where the primary proceeding had been heard in full and dismissed but that Charter claims had also been made.[25] The submissions also referred to comments made in 2007 by then Solicitor-General, now Court of Appeal Justice Tate, to the effect that the entitlement to bring a Charter claim would depend on the non-Charter claim being such as to survive a strike out application.
7. Alternatively, the respondent contended that the its conduct fell within section 38(2) as its officers could not have reasonably acted differently or that, in the event that any human rights were limited by its officer's actions, those limitations could be justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.
8. For the moment I will take the most favourable approach to the applicant and assume his Charter based claims could survive the application for summary dismissal of the EO Act claim.
9. Even if it could be said that the respondent's officers infringed on the applicant's Charter rights, I am satisfied that any limitation would be justified under section 7(2) of the Charter. I reach that view for the same reasons as expressed for why section 75 of the EO Act applies to the claims. In addition I have noted and adopted the respondent's submission concerning the 2006 Explanatory Memorandum for the Charter. It said relevantly that laws which are necessary to protect security, public order or public safety which limit human rights are examples of laws which may be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
10. In any event, for the reasons discussed below, I consider that the Charter claim is an abuse of process.

1. I have concluded that a number of the applicant's specific claims amount to an abuse of process as they seek to have the Tribunal reconsider events leading to court orders being made as well as the orders themselves. In my view, the whole proceeding may be characterised as an abuse of process.
2. I have reached that view taking into account the overall context in which the claims are made and their nature.
3. As is apparent from the discussion above and from the material submitted by the applicant, the claims all arise in the context of conflict with his former partner about his children and how the respondent's officers dealt with requests for assistance or the circumstances which led to their attendance. In many cases, those attendances led to applications being made to the Magistrates' Court of Victoria and intervention orders being made.
4. I have mentioned the many intervention orders made against the applicant in respect of the mother and his children. The materials also show that intervention orders were made against him in respect of people other than the mother and his children.
5. While detailed materials were not available to me, it was apparent that judicial decisions have been made about the custody and care of the children.
6. The applicant's claims must be considered against this background of conflict and decision making by courts.
7. In taking action and making decisions about what steps to take (and not take) it is apparent that the respondent's officers were at all times undertaking their duties as police officers and in particular acting to preserve the peace, protect persons and prevent the commission of offences. These were not made in isolation but as part of a continuing dispute.
8. If the applicant considered the consequential decisions courts made about those applications to be unfair or in breach of the Charter they ought to have been the subject of an appeal at the time. I find that to ask this Tribunal to now consider the minutia of steps taken in the course of investigating and acting on alleged breaches of the law is an abuse of process.
9. I say that in part because there is a level of unreality in dissecting individual steps in the dealings between the applicant and the respondent over a period of four years or more. It is apparent from the applications for intervention orders and the information provided by the applicant, that the respondent's officers have considered him to be a risk to the mother and his children. The fact that intervention orders have been in place on an ongoing basis since 2012 shows that the courts have found that view to be well founded.
10. At the heart of the applicant's claim is a belief that he has been treated unfairly in the context of his dispute with the mother - that she rather than he should have faced charges and orders. The applicant seeks to use this proceeding to re-agitate the decision making of the respondent's officers and the subsequent decision making of the courts.
11. I am satisfied that such an undertaking would bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people and further that it would serve no useful purpose. As discussed earlier, seeking to litigate again matters which have already been disposed of by earlier proceedings is unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive.
12. In his particulars of claim, the applicant stated he sought the following final orders from the Tribunal:
    1. I seek that VCAT supply protection for [the applicant and the children] when subpoenaed. Victoria Police have failed to protect [the children] from family violence. Victoria Police have discriminated in respect [of] gender and parenting].
    2. That Victoria Police remove [the children] from the Family Violence Order sighting (sic) [the applicant] and be then restrained from act as legal council (sic) in respect to [the children] in civil or children's court for indefinitely.
    3. Compensation of $2000000.00 to be paid to [the applicant] in damages from loss of earnings, medical intervention, emotional pain and suffering.
    4. A public retraction be printed in [two named newspapers]
13. These proposed orders demonstrate that this proceeding is entwined with past orders made in respect of family violence. Orders 1 and 2 are certainly beyond the powers of this Tribunal.
14. In addition to the claims being misconceived, for these reasons, I find that the continuation of this proceeding would be an abuse of process and so it should be dismissed in its entirety.

[1] The Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) and the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) prohibit the publication reports of proceedings in a manner likely to lead to the identification of a child. On 11 July 2017 I made an order under section 146 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) closing the Tribunal file to all but the parties and their legal representatives. On my own motion on 6 September 2017, in order to protect the identity of the applicant's children, I made an order under the Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic) requiring that the applicant be referred to as VPZ. The order prohibited the disclosure, by publication or otherwise of any report of the whole or any part of this proceeding, or of any information derived from this proceeding, which identifies or has the effect of identifying the applicant, the applicant's former partner or the applicant's children. Accordingly, in these reasons, I have referred to the mother and children by those terms.

[2] In his particulars of claim document, the applicant referred to the attribute 'gender'. While 'gender identity' is an attribute protected under the EO Act (defined to include the identification by a person of one sex as a member of the other sex or the identification by a person of indeterminate sex as a member of a particular sex) gender is not. Given the applicant has referred to his treatment as male, I have treated the attribute in issue as 'sex'.

[3] The cases include the following: State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel & Ors [1998] 1 VR 102; Norman v Australian Red Cross Society (1998) 14 VAR 243; Towie v State of Victoria [2002] VCAT 1395; Forrester v AIMS Corporation [2004] VSC 506; Naylor v Oakley Thompson & Co Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] VCAT 2074; Owners Corporation No. 1 PS537642N v Hickory Group Pty Ltd [2015] VCAT 1683.

[4] Ballarto Pastoral Pty Ltd v Department of Primary Industries [2006] VCAT 478.

[5] Assal v Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (1992) EOC 92-409, applied in Liu v University of Melbourne [2002] VCAT 896.

[6] Molyneux v VCAT & Anor [2007] VSC 89 at [53].

[7] Chief Justice French in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 at [333] quoting with approval Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77, per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at [23].

[8] Section 76 of the VCAT Act says that the Tribunal may make an order summarily dismissing or striking out all or any part of a proceeding for want of prosecution. Schedule 1, clause 18 of the VCAT Act says that an application made under the EO Act alleging contraventions of Part 4, 6 or 7 may be summarily dismissed if the alleged contravention occurred more than 12 months before the application was made.

[9] See section 6 which sets out the list of attributes on the basis of which discrimination is prohibited.

[10] See section 8 of the EO Act for the definition of direct discrimination.

[11] IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30.

[12] IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30.

[13] [2014] VSC 52.

[16] Rainsford v State of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 31; (2008) 167 FCR 26.

[17] Farah v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 65.

[18] See Kyriakidis v State of Victoria [2014] VCAT 1039 and Robinson v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2012] FCA 770. That decision was affirmed on appeal - [2013] FCAFC 64.

[19] See Richards v Commissioner of Police [2010] WASAT 115; Whitfield v State of NSW (NSW Police Force) [2011] NSWADT 265; Commissioner of Police v Mohammed [2009] NSWCA 432.

[20] See Robinson v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force; Mariani v NSW Police Force, State of NSW [2013] NSWADT 35; Lambe v Anti-Discrimination Commission and Commissioner of Police, Northern Territory Local Court, [2001] NTMC 54; Field Meret v State of Victoria [1999] VCAT 616.

[21] Lambe v Anti-Discrimination Commission and Commissioner of Police.

[22] [2012] VCAT 1547.

[23] At paragraphs 539 to 543 - citations omitted.

[24] Rein v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency [2017] VCAT 452.

[25] Goode v Common Equity Housing [2014] VSC 585; see also R v De Bono [2013] VSC 407.