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[2012] VCAT 1547
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2012-10-18
Original judgment source is linked above.
B. The Legislation providing for Special Religious Instruction
Parliament has had regard to the following principles in enacting this Act-
(a) all providers of education and training, both Government and non-Government, must ensure that their programs and teaching are delivered in a manner that supports and promotes the principles and practice of Australian democracy, including a commitment to-
(i) elected Government;
(ii) the rule of law;
(iii) equal rights for all before the law;
(iv) freedom of religion;
(v) freedom of speech and association;
(vi) the values of openness and tolerance;
2.2.10 Education in Government Schools to be Secular
(1) Except as provided in s 2.2.11, education in Government schools must be secular and not promote any particular religious practice, denomination or sect.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the inclusion of general religious education in the curriculum of a Government school.
(3) A Government school teacher must not provide religious instruction other than the provision of general religious education in any Government school building.
(4) In this section general religious education means education about the major forms of religious thought and expression characteristic of Australian society and other societies in the world.
2.2.11 Special Religious Instruction
(1) Special religious instruction may be given in a Government school in accordance with this section.
(2) If special religious instruction is given in a Government school during the hours set apart for the instruction of the students -
(a) the persons providing the special religious instruction must be persons who are accredited representatives of churches or other religious groups and who are approved by the Minister for the purpose;
(b) the special religious instruction must be given on the basis of the normal class organisation of the school except in a school where the Minister authorises some other basis to be observed having regard to -
(i) the particular circumstances of a school or schools; or
(ii) the preparation or conduct of pageant, special event or celebration of a festival in a school or schools;
(c) attendance for the special religious instruction is not to be compulsory for any student whose parents desire that he or she is excused from attending.
(3) The Minister may give an authorisation under subsection (2) in respect of the preparation or conduct of a particular class or pageant, special event or celebration of a festival generally to all schools, to a class or classes of a school or to a specific school.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents any Government school building from being used for any purpose on days other than school days or at hours on school days other than the hours set apart for the instruction of students.
(5) In this section special religious instruction means instruction provided by churches and other religious groups and based on distinctive religious tenets and beliefs.
(a) principals must obtain parental advice by the prescribed GC566 form for their child to participate or not participate in SRI;
(b) principals must ensure that attendance at SRI classes is not compulsory for any students whose parents request that he/she be excused from attending;
(c) principals must ensure that students who do not attend SRI are appropriately supervised by teachers, and engaged in positive, independent learning such as self-study, revision or similar activity to improve their literacy and numeracy skills;
(d) principals must ensure new secular instruction/core curriculum is not delivered to non-attendees during the period of SRI.
To ensure schools comply with legislation and policy for providing special religious instruction.
The provision of special religious instruction in Victorian government schools is legislated in Section 2.2.11 of the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (the Act).
The Act makes the following distinctions. It defines:
Based on the provisions in the Act the following conditions apply for the provision of SRI:
Only accredited instructors, approved by the Minister for Education may deliver SRI in Victorian government schools.
Accreditation includes a Working with Children Check, registration, training, minimum suitability standards for persons who work or volunteer with children, and Ministerial approval.
The Department engages two major organisations to administer the accreditation and approval of religious instructors. They are (1) ACCESS Ministries, and (2) World Conference of Religions for Peace.
ACCESS Ministries' religious instructors deliver Religion in Life Christian Religious Education, which is an agreed syllabus representing 12 Christian denominations. Students receiving such instruction are not to be grouped for SRI according to denomination, but taught in their usual classes.
The World Conference of Religions for Peace (a non-government organisation associated with the United Nations to interface with the world's faith communities), currently administers the accreditation and approval process for religious instructors in other recognized faiths including Bahá'í, Buddhism, Sikhism, Hinduism and Orthodox Christianity.
The Catholic Education Office/Diocese and United Jewish Education Board also accredit religious instructors in their respective faiths.
Note: When parents request SRI in a faith that is not available at the school, the principal should advise them that such instruction can only be scheduled if the particular religious group provides an accredited instructor who is approved by the Minister for Education.
Parents may withdraw consent for their child's participation in SRI by notifying the principal in writing. It is not necessary to renew or withdraw consent each year.
At the start of each year ACCESS Ministries provide schools with the names of accredited instructors allocated to them. Schools are also informed of changes to instructors during the year. This information should be retained on file at the school.
The new form was sent to parents at the third school in the following terms:
The rest of this page is intentionally left blank.
Do Victorian Government primary schools have to enable SRI to be provided?
ACCESS ministries is an inter-church body which provides Christian religious education (CRE) and Chaplaincy in State schools in Victoria, under the provision of the Education Act 1958 (revised 1986 and 2006). It provides CRE and chaplaincy in partnership with twelve Christian churches: the Anglican Church, Australian Christian Churches, Baptist Union, Christian Brethren Assemblies, Christian Revival Crusade, Churches of Christ, Lutheran Church, Presbyterian Church, Reformed Churches, Salvation Army, Uniting Church and the Wesleyan Methodist Church. We represent these churches but our stance is ecumenical.
Christian religious education is a 30 minute weekly program for Prep to Year 6 taught in the classroom.
CRE teachers, representing the Christian churches are approved by the Minister for Education, have a Working with Children Check, and are trained and accredited through ACCESS ministries.
CRE complements the State school curriculum and uses an Agreed Syllabus published by ACCESS ministries. The training program for CRE teachers is regularly updated to reflect best practice in contemporary education. You have the right to withdraw your child from the program.
The Victorian Education Act and Regulations make provision for students to receive religious education as a normal part of their education.
ACCESS ministries CRE lessons are taught by 3200 volunteers each week. They are among the thousands of volunteers who contribute 713 million hours of service annually to Australian society (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Voluntary Work survey 2006). All ACCESS ministries CRE teachers must successfully complete the prescribed application and training requirements for this important role.
All ACCESS ministries CRE teachers have a valid Working with Children Check, an endorsement from their local Minister/Pastor/Priest who has known them for at least 12 months, and have successfully completed their initial training.
They have also been approved by the Minister for Education for the purposes of delivering SRI. All ACCESS ministries CRE teachers are also required to participate in ongoing training every year. Team leaders oversee the CRE work in their relevant school/s. Team Leaders in turn are overseen by a local Support Officer and Regional Support Manager.
The CRE curriculum engages kids, is easy to follow and helps students make good life choices.
It is biblically based, educationally sound, student-focussed, theologically clear and contextually appropriate. The material is constructed around a theological framework that intersects with values, students' lives and educational emphases. It is written by practising teachers, with backgrounds in theology and education.
The CRE curriculum makes connections between the student, values, the Bible and the Christian way of life. It introduces students to the key beliefs and values of the Christian faith and makes connections with their lives as individuals and as members of a community. It challenges them to apply the values they learn in the context of biblical teaching to the decisions and choices they make on a day-to-day basis. It does this by working towards the following outcomes:
The importance of values in national, community and one's personal life is being increasingly recognised. In the CRE curriculum, there are strong correlations between the content of the lessons and values. The values espoused in state and national curricula are reflected in the material. Such values as care, compassion, respect and honesty and trustworthiness are referenced in the material.
Each CRE teacher works from a Teacher Book designed for the age group they are teaching. This explains what they are to teach and ways in which it may be taught.
Each student has a copy of the Student Workbook in which is recorded some of the learning that takes place. The students complete one book each semester (half year).[16]
"The curriculum is based on the teachings of Bahá'u'lláh, the founder of the Bahá'í Faith. Bahá'u'lláh's teachings centre on unity and the building blocks for world peace. The teachers who are trained volunteers and registered with the Department of Education, use 'hands-on' activities like craft, drama and music to teach the curriculum."[18]
the teaching of virtues is like a golden thread of commonality that runs through them all.[19]
E. The history of the Education Act's provisions for Religious Education
In every State school secular instruction only should be given and no teacher shall give any other than secular instruction in any State school building and in every school used under this Act not being a training school night school rural school or other special school. Four hours at least should be set apart during each school day for secular instruction alone, and of such four hours two shall be before noon, two afternoon, which shall in each case be consecutive; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the State school buildings from being used for any purpose on days and of hours other than those used for secular instruction.
(1) In every State school not being a night school or other special school, four hours at least shall be set apart during each school day for the instruction of the pupils, and of such four hours two shall be before noon and shall be consecutive and two shall be after noon and shall be consecutive.
(2) Subject to this section religious instruction may be given in any State school but otherwise secular instruction alone shall be given in State schools.
(3) When religious instruction is given in any State school during the hours set apart for the instruction of the pupils -
(a) such religious instruction shall be given by persons who are accredited representatives of religious bodies and who are approved by the Minister for the purpose;
(b) such religious instruction shall be given on the basis of the normal class organisation of the school except in any school where the Minister, having regard to the particular circumstances of such school, authorises some other basis to be observed; and
(c) attendance at any class for such religious instruction shall not be compulsory for any pupil whose parents desire that he be excused from attending.
(4) No teacher within the meaning of this Act shall give any instruction other than secular instruction in any State school building.
(5) Nothing in this section shall prevent any State school building from being used for any purpose on days other than school days or hours on school days other than the hours set apart for the instruction of the pupils. [25]
"For the last two decades, they have been doing splendid work in our State Schools but have been severely handicapped because the teaching time has been confined to one half hour each week, out of regular school hours. That has necessitated these people giving religious instruction at either the beginning or end of the school day. To impart instruction to all State school scholars in that brief period would involve the council in obtaining the services of a number of teachers equal to the number employed by the Education Department. The Bill will assist these people considerably inasmuch as it will permit them to spread their labours over the school hours, allowing one person to teach during several periods in schools. The outcome will be that fewer volunteer teachers will be required to instruct an additional number of scholars. The council will be able to select its representatives so that the children will receive the benefit of sound teaching on religious subjects."[26]
"Regulations allowing religious instruction in government schools were first introduced in 1905. The current arrangements were introduced in 1950 and have received general community acceptance. These should continue."[29]
The introduction of the Education and Training Reform Act 2006
"One of the three 'cardinal points' of the 1872 Education Act was to ensure the secular nature of government schools. The 1872 act does not define secular, presumably on the assumption that the community had an agreed understanding of what secular meant. Today, secular has come to mean different things to different people. It is for this reason that the bill not only reaffirms the principle of secularity, but defines it in modern democratic language. In the first chapter, the bill makes clear that the government school system is secular and open to the adherents of any philosophy, religion or faith. Further to this, the curriculum and teaching in government schools is 'not to promote any particular religious practice, denomination or sect'.
In addition to this principle, the bill makes clear in the second chapter that the current provisions for voluntary religious instruction will continue in government schools. The bill also ensures that government school teachers are able to discuss and teach comparative religion within the context of secular subjects such as politics or history. In a democratic and diverse society such as Australia, there is a widely held view that schools should enable their students to understand the religious perspectives, beliefs and cultural understandings of the people who constitute the society in which they live. This will inevitably involve an exploration of various religious beliefs. This does not mean that teachers can promote a particular religious view, but that they can discuss and explore different religious perspectives as part of delivering the Victorian curriculum. For government school teachers to do their job properly and develop well-informed young people, they need to be confident that they can cover all historical and contemporary issues, including religion. The bill will clarify ambiguities that exist in the current legislation."[30]
F. The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
On behalf of the people of Victoria the Parliament enacts this Charter, recognising that all people are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
This Charter is founded on the following principles-
A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors including -
(a) the nature of the right; and
(b) the importance of the purposes of the limitation; and
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; and
(d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the
14 Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including -
(a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice; and
(b) the freedom to demonstrate his or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, either individually or as part of a community, in public or in private.
(2) A person must not be coerced or restrained in a way that limits his or her freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.
(1) Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.
(2) Every person has the right to enjoy his or her human rights without discrimination.
(3) Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.
(4) Measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination.
in relation to a person, means discrimination (within the meaning of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995) on the basis of an attribute set out in section 6 of that Act.
"Freedom of religion, the paradigm freedom of conscience, is of the essence of a free society."[32]
"Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms 'belief' and 'religion' are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religion and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community."
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
"Section 32 (1) exists in a constitutional setting which differs from the setting in which the HRA operates. It mandates an attempt to interpret statutory provisions compatibly with human rights. There is, however, nothing in its text or context to suggest that the interpretation which it requires departs from the established understandings of that process."[35]
"The operation of ss32(1) and 7(2) was recently considered by the High Court in Momcilovic v R. So far as s32(1) was concerned, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ and Gummow J, Hayne J and Bell J each held in separate judgements that s32 (1) does not require or authorise a court to depart from the ordinary meaning of a statutory provision, or the intention of Parliament in enacting the provision, but in effect requires the court to discern the purpose of the provision in question in accordance with the ordinary techniques of statutory construction essayed in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority.
Putting aside the disparity of views is to the application of s7(2), it nonetheless emerges from Momcilovic that the effect of s32(1) is limited. It requires:
'Statutes to be construed against the background of human rights and freedoms set out in the Charter in the same way as the principle of legality requires the same statutes to be construed against the background of common law rights and freedoms. The human rights and freedoms set out in the Charter in significant measure incorporate or enhance rights and freedoms at common law. Section 32(1) [thus] applies to the interpretation of statutes in the same way as the principle of legality but with a wider field of application ...'
Consequently, if the words of a statute are clear, the court must give them that meaning. If the words of a statute are capable of more than one meaning, the court should give them whichever of those meanings best accords with the human rights in question. Exceptionally, a court may depart from grammatical rules to give an unusual or strained meaning to a provision if the grammatical construction would contradict the apparent purpose of the enactment. But even if, however, it is not otherwise possible to ensure the enjoyment of the human right in question is not defeated or diminished, it is impermissible for a court to attribute a meaning to a provision which is inconsistent with both the grammatical meaning and apparent purpose of the enactment."[37]
"The interpretative exercise in s 32 (1) of the Charter merely demands that the Court select the interpretation which is compatible (or the least incompatible) with human rights. The constructions urged by the parties are compatible with the Charter right. As any construction is compatible, the Charter can provide no further guidance."[39]
"French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ concluded that s 32 (1) does not alter the duty of a court as defined in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have'. It simply expands the range of background considerations against which the effect of a provision falls to be assessed."[41]
There being no majority view as to the operation of s 7(2), one must deal with the point that one thinks to be correct. This Court held in Momcilovic that s 7(2) is to be considered only after the statutory provision in question has been interpreted in accordance with s 32 (1). In my view it is appropriate to adhere to that approach until and unless the High Court determines that it is incorrect.[43]
The Charter and the Interpretation of the Education Act
Conclusions concerning the Charter on the interpretation of the Education Act
(a) to promote recognition and acceptance of everyone's right to equality of opportunity;
(b) to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against people by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of various attributes;
(c) to eliminate, as far as possible, sexual harassment;
(d) to provide redress for people who have been discriminated against or sexually harassed.
"The injunction contained in s 18 of the Interpretation Act[48] is reinforced by the rule of construction that beneficial and remedial legislation, like the Act, is to be given a liberal construction. It is to be given 'a fair, large and liberal' interpretation rather than one which is 'literal or technical'. Nevertheless, the task remains one of statutory construction. Although a provision of the Act must be given a liberal and beneficial construction, a court or tribunal is not at liberty to give it a construction that is unreasonable or unnatural. But subject to that proviso, if the term 'service', read in the context of the Act and its object, is capable of applying to an activity, a court or tribunal, exercising jurisdiction under the Act, should hold that that activity is a 'service' for the purpose of the Act."
An educational authority must not discriminate against a student -
(a) by denying or limiting access to any benefit provided by the authority;
(b) by expelling the student;
(c) by subjecting the student to any other detriment.
(1) Direct discrimination occurs if a person treats, or proposes to treat, someone with an attribute less favourably than a person treats or would treat someone without that attribute, or with a different attribute, in the same or similar circumstances.
(2) In determining whether a person directly discriminates it is irrelevant -
(a) whether or not that person is aware of the discrimination or considers the treatment less favourable;
(b) whether or not the attribute is the only or dominate reason for the treatment, as long as it is a substantial reason.
(m) personal association (whether as a relative or otherwise) with a person who is identified by reference to any of the above attributes.
(1) Direct discrimination occurs if a person treats, or proposes to treat a person with an attribute unfavourably because of that attribute.
(2) In determining whether a person directly discriminates it is irrelevant -
(a) whether or not that person is aware of the discrimination or considers the treatment to be unfavourable;
(b) whether or not the attribute is the only or dominant reason for the treatment, provided that it is a substantial reason.
(q) personal association (whether as a relative or otherwise) with the person who is identified by reference to any of the above attributes.
The Charter and the interpretation of the Equal Opportunity Acts
Conclusion concerning the Charter and the interpretation of the Equal Opportunity Acts
H. What the complainants must prove to establish direct discrimination
"The words 'less favourably' and 'on the ground of', permit wide scope to the Tribunal in applying its judgement to the facts proved in each case. Both involve imprecise phrases which necessitate judgment and the characterisation of conduct which is impugned. The first requires a comparison of the treatment in the actual and in an hypothesised case: see Mahoney JA , Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd v Reddrop. As was pointed out in that case, a 'detriment' concept of discrimination has hitherto been adopted: cf Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah. The motive, reasons or suggested justifications of the detriment are irrelevant, if it can be shown that there is differentiation of treatment, which results in detriment to the person affected: see Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd v Fletcher. When the matter comes to this Court on a question of law, and a determination of the Tribunal is challenged, conformably with Azzopardi, the only questions which, relevantly this Court may review are whether there was evidence before the Tribunal capable of showing detriment and whether the finding displays a misdirection on the applicable statute. Within those limits, the evaluation of the suggested detriment is a matter for this Tribunal, not for this Court." (citations omitted)
"For present purposes, it is enough to say that we doubt that distinctions between motive, purpose or effect will greatly assist the resolution of any problem about whether treatment occurred or was proposed 'because of' disability. Rather, the central question will always be - why was the aggrieved person treated as he or she was? If the aggrieved person was treated less favourably was it 'because of', 'by reason of' that person's disability? Motive, purpose, effect, may all bear on that question. But it would be a mistake to treat those words as substitutes for the statutory expression 'because of'."
"I do not regard the expression 'subjecting ...to any other detriment' as used in section 6 (2)(b), as meaning anything more than 'putting under a disadvantage'. The question which arose in this case can therefore be simplified to this: did the difference in treatment ...put the men examiners under a disadvantage by comparison with the women examiners?
That was, in my opinion, a question of fact rather than law, and as such fell to be answered by the industrial tribunal on the material before it."
"The disadvantage must be a matter of substance; the legislation is not directed to trivial distinctions in the treatment afforded to men and women. Subject to that, it is difficult to define the limits of a concept which is, as Brandon LJ said, essentially a matter of fact to be determined in each individual case."[62]
J. The first school - Ivanhoe East Primary School
The Humanist Society is not registered as a religious organisation in Australia and, under current Victorian legislation, its world-view philosophy cannot be defined as a religion for the purposes of special religious instruction.
In [the]context of the above, Humanism cannot be accredited under the banner of religion to provide special religious instruction in Victorian Government schools.
The provision of special religious instruction has remained unchanged in the Education and Training Reform Act 2006, following wide consultation involving stakeholders and community interest groups. Therefore, legislative provision and the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development's policy on the provision of special religious instruction remains the same.[70]
"After discussion with [the eldest child], we (and he) have no interest in religious education classes at school and would like him to be excused effective immediately."[100]
"This is a single issue case involving Victorian Education Department religious instruction policy. I hope you can understand that I am not complaining about [the school].[The school] like other Victorian Government schools is only following Department of Education Policy. It is this policy I want changed from 'opt out' to 'opt in' for religious instruction for my children.
I feel very strongly that there is no place for RI in State schools at all but will be satisfied that with the instalment of an 'opt in' process."[109]
By requiring the Complainants to opt their children out of SRI if they do not wish them to attend, under both the previous SRI Policy and the current SRI Policy, the Respondent has subjected and continues to subject the Complainants' children to a detriment, specifically that their children are identified as different and segregated from their peers during normal school hours on the basis of their and their parents' religious belief or activity.
"Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their children if they so wish. However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in society."[134]
Further by forbidding the primary schools from offering secular instruction (under the Previous SRI Policy) or instruction in core curriculum (under the Current SRI Policy) during SRI classes to the Complainants' children when they have been opted out of SRI, the Respondent has:
(1) denied or limited their access to the benefit of instruction during normal school hours; and
(2) subjected them to the detriment of spending time at school during normal school hours during which they receive no instruction.
(1) A person may discriminate if the discrimination is necessary to comply with, or is authorised by, a provision of -
(a) an Act, other than this Act; or[138]
(b) an enactment, other than an enactment under this Act.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is not necessary that a provision refer to discrimination, as long as it authorises or necessitates the relevant conduct that would otherwise constitute discrimination.
(3) ...
(e) an act done by a person if it was necessary for the person to do it in order to comply with a provision of -
(iii) an instrument made or approved by or under any other Act.
(a) the 'opt out" requirement was authorised by s 2.2.11(2)(b) of the Education Act, which requires that attendance at SRI is not to be compulsory for any student whose parents desire that he or she be excused from attending; and
(b) the prohibition on instruction in the core curriculum to those not undertaking SRI and the timetabling of SRI during school hours are authorised by ss 2.2.10 and 2.2.11 of the Education Act.
"Section 69 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 contains an exception similar to that in s 39(e)(ii) and (iii) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984. It covers conduct necessary to comply with an Act or an enactment. However, it contains an additional provision. It also covers conduct authorised by an Act or an enactment. This is a far wider formulation. It does not cover only the case where it can be said that the relevant conduct was strictly necessary to comply with the relevant statutory provision. It covers a case where the relevant statutory provision can be said to authorise relevant conduct. A statutory provision can be said to do this if it requires the relevant conduct or, expressly or by necessary implication permits it. Section 69(2) is a provision not included in s39(e) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984. Section 69(2) makes it clear that relevant statutory provision must authorise or necessitate relevant conduct." [141]
"More importantly, the wide construction seems to us to be inconsistent with the general scheme of the Act. It is one thing to provide that an Act should give way to an express direction contained in an actual provision of another Act or in a statutory instrument. It is a quite different thing to provide, in effect, that the Act shall give way to any subordinate direction, no matter how informal, to which a provision of any other Act requires obedience. In that regard, it would seem inevitable that, if the wide construction is given to the words 'necessary ... in order to comply with a provision of ...any other Act' for the purposes of s 39 (e)(ii), a correspondingly wide construction should be given to the words 'necessary... in order to comply with a provision of ... an instrument' for the purposes of s 39(e)(iii). In a context where, prerogative aside, the Crown ordinarily acts through employees or agents exercising statutory powers, the result would be that the express provision in s 5 that the Act binds the Crown would become almost illusory and the effect of the Act would be to confer an unfair advantage upon some Crown commercial instrumentalities, such as the Corporation, vis `a vis any private competitor lacking comparable immunity."[144]
"Parliament cannot be taken to have authorized the Minister to give directions to the Corporation to perform acts which but for the directions would be a breach of the Act. The present case is altogether different from one where the Minister has a statutory duty to give the direction."[145]
"Prior to the commencement of the Charter, the exception in section 69 of the Equal Opportunity Act was very far reaching. However, since the commencement of Charter, there are a number of processes ensuring human rights are taken into consideration in the development of new policy and legislation. These processes are designed to ensure new acts or enactments are Charter-compatible, or that the decision to enact legislation that is not compatible is intended and explained."[146]
Conclusion concerning the statutory authority exception
[2] The complainants were also the applicants in the second proceeding
[10] Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 59(1)
[21] Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, (6th ed), p70
[22] The Royal Commission was chaired by George Higinbotham, see Victorian Parliamentary
Debates, Vol 234, pps 2864,2876, Legislative Assembly.
[23] Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 November 1950 Vol 234, p 2862
[24] Pannam, Travelling Section 116 with a U.S. Road Map[1963] MelbULawRw 3; , (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 41, 83
[25] By Act 6143, s 21 (2) of the Act became s 23 of the Education Act and retained that form in the 1958 Consolidation.
[26] Hansard, Legislative Council, 29 November 1950, Volume 234, pps 2696
[27] Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 November 1950, Volume 234, pps 2860-2861
[28] Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 November 19500, Volume 234, p2862 Brigadier Tovell
[30] Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 9 February 2006, pps 221-228
[32] [1983] HCA 40; (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 130
[33] [2009] VCAT 1869 [277]
[39] [2012] VSCA 159 [123]
[42] See Director of Consumer Affairs v Operation Smile (Australia) Inc [2012] VSCA 112 at [31] Warren CJ and Cavanough AJA not finding it necessary to decide the point, [142] Nettle JA considering that existing Victorian authority should be followed that s 7(2) was to be considered only after the provision has been interpreted in accordance with s 32(1).
[44] Re an Application under the Major Crimes (Investigative Powers) Act [2009] VSC 381; (2009) 24 VR 415 and Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd v Christian Youth Camp Limited [2010] VCAT 1613
[45] Communication No 1155/2003, date of adoption of views, 3 November 2004
[46] [2011] VSCA 266; contrast the powers of administrative tribunals when performing a merits review: see Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1977] AATA 12; (1977) 1 ALD 158 and Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 589 and see as to discretions_: PJB v Melbourne Health_ [2011] VSC 327
[47] [1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12
[48] The equivalent of s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)
[50] Complainants' written submissions paragraph 38 and T 586-587
[51] See the analysis by Bell J in Collier v Austin Health [2011] VSC 344 of the identification of the correct comparator
[52] [2001] VSCA 247; (2001) 4 VR 483 at 494 [36]- [37] per Chernov JA, cf Toben v Jones [2003] FCAFC 137; (2003) 129 FCR 515 and Catch The Fire Ministries Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207
[53] Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56; (1989) 168 CLR 165 at 176 per Deane and Gaudron JJ
[55] (1986) 86 FCR 324 at 333
[56] (1987) 8 NSWLR 442 at 471 and see Marsden v Human Rights & Equal Opportunities Commission [2000] FCA 1619 [36] per Branson J
[57] Edgley v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 379; (2001) 108 FCR 1 [54] Beaumont ACJ
[58] [2003] HCA 62; (2003) 217 CLR 92 at 163 [236]
[60] [1983] 3 NSWLR 89 at 105
[61] [1980] QB 87 at 99
[62] [1983] 3 NSWLR 89 at 105
[64] Section 140 of the Evidence Act 2008
[65] There was no uniformity as to whether a particular class was described as a year or a grade eg year 3 or grade 3. I have used the term Grade, which appeared to be applied more frequently.
[75] Similar photographs were attached to the statements of teachers at other schools.
[79] I have used the letter B for the second complainant and the letter C for the third complainant, because the first complainant's surname begins with the letter A. I have adopted letters associated with the letters B and C to refer to the second and third complainants' children
[104] T132, cf the complainants' submissions at T715
[134] 2012 SCC 7 at [40]
[135] The word "or" is contained in the 2010 Act, but not in the 1995 Act.
[137] Haines v Leves (1987) 8 NSWLR 442 at 457 per Street CJ
[138] The 1995 Act does not contain the word "or"
[141] (Supra) at pps 13-14 per McKenzie DP
[143] (Supra) at 368 per Mason CJ and Gaudron J
[144] [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 369
[146] Quoted in the Commission's submissions
[147] See Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th ed) p 282-283
[148] Plaintiff S157/2000 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 492 per Gleeson CJ
[150] [1997] VADT 75, see also Leighton v State of Victoria [2000] VCAT 416 (McKenzie DP) and Mottau v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 2650 (Coghlan DP)
[151] s 136 (c) of the 1995 Act and s 125 (c) of the 2010 Act
Aitken & Ors
The State of Victoria - Department of Education & Early Childhood Development
(1983) 154 CLR 120
(2011) 280 ALR 221
(2009) 24 VR 415
(1979) 24 ALR 577
(1997) 191 CLR 1
(2001) 4 VR 483
(2003) 129 FCR 515
(2006) 15 VR 207
(1989) 168 CLR 165
(1986) 86 FCR 324
(1987) 8 NSWLR 442
(2001) 108 FCR 1
(2003) 217 CLR 92
(1991) 173 CLR 349
(2003) 211 CLR 476